Supreme Court of California Justia
Citation 45 Cal. 4th 303, 196 P.3d 810, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 110
In re Raymond C.

Filed 12/11/08 (this opn. should follow companion case, S150038, also filed 12/11/08)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

In re RAYMOND C., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S149728
v.
Ct.App.
4/3
G035822
RAYMOND C.,
Orange
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. DL020274

In this companion case to People v. Hernandez (Dec. 11, 2008, S150038)
__ Cal.4th __ (Hernandez), we conclude that the officer acted with sufficient
particularized suspicion to justify the traffic stop at issue here.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At 1:00 a.m. on October 24, 2004, Officer Timothy Kandler saw Raymond
C. driving an Acura without license plates or a temporary operating permit in the
rear window. The car was otherwise being driven lawfully. Kandler could not see
whether there was a temporary permit in the front window. He stopped the Acura
for the apparent license plate violation.
1


Kandler asked Raymond for his driver’s license, registration,1 and proof of
insurance. Raymond provided his driver’s license and proof of insurance and said
the temporary permit was displayed in the front window.2 In the course of the
conversation Kandler noticed the odor of alcohol emanating from Raymond’s
breath and person. Kandler then administered a field sobriety test, which
Raymond failed.
At a motion to suppress evidence3 Raymond’s father testified that he
purchased the 2005 Acura on October 2, 2004, and did not receive license plates
until early December. The two-week-old car was “shiny and new” when his son
was arrested. There was a temporary permit in the front window.
Raymond’s motion to suppress was denied. The court found that he had
driven a vehicle under the influence of alcohol and with a blood-alcohol level of
0.08 percent or more.4 Raymond was declared a ward of the court and placed on
probation with conditions including a 10-day work program.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the officer had reasonable
grounds for the stop. He saw that Raymond’s car did not have license plates or a
temporary permit in the rear window; he could not see whether there was a
temporary permit in the front window. “[T]he absence of a rear plate or, from the
officer’s vantage point, a temporary tag substituting for the plate, justified the
stop.”

1
A driver is required to show an officer a license and proof of registration.
(People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1137 (Saunders); Veh. Code, § 4462,
subd. (a).)
2
A temporary permit is to be placed in the lower rear window. However, if
it would be obscured there, it may be placed in the lower right corner of either the
windshield or a side window. (Dept. Motor Veh. Handbook of Registration
Procedures (Oct. 2007) ch. 2, § 2.020 p. 7 available online at
http://dmv.ca.gov/pubs/reg_hdbk_pdf/ch02.pdf [as of Dec. 11, 2008].)
3
Penal Code section 1538.5.
4
Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivisions (a) and (b).
2


We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
We reviewed the fundamental principles of applicable law in the
companion case, Hernandez, supra, __ Cal.4th __, __.
In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court finds the historical facts,
then determines whether the applicable rule of law has been violated. (Saunders,
supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 1133-1134.) “We review the court’s resolution of the
factual inquiry under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. The ruling on
whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact
that is subject to independent review. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1134.) This case, like
Hernandez, supra, __ Cal.4th __, turns on a question of law.
“[E]xcept in those situations in which there is at least articulable and
reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not
registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure
for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to
check his driver’s license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. . . . [P]ersons in automobiles on public roadways
may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the
unbridled discretion of police officers.” (Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S.
648, 663.)
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1.) “A
detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer
can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may
be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231
(Souza).) Ordinary traffic stops are treated as investigatory detentions for which
the officer must be able to articulate specific facts justifying the suspicion that a
3
crime is being committed. (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1082-1083;
People v. Superior Court (Simon) (1972) 7 Cal.3d 186, 200.)
We agree with the Court of Appeal that the facts here supported the
officer’s reasonable suspicion that the car was being driven in violation of
vehicular license requirements. (Veh. Code, §§ 5200, 5201.)
The cases that Raymond relies upon are inapposite. In most of them the
officers saw temporary permits, but disregarded them, as in the companion case,
People v. Hernandez, supra, __ Cal.4th __.5 Here, Officer Kandler saw neither
license plates nor a temporary permit before he made the stop.6
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. (United States
v. Knights (2001) 534 U.S. 112, 118.) Whether an officer’s conduct was
reasonable is evaluated on a case-by-case basis in light of the totality of the
circumstances. (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 231.)
Officer Kandler was driving behind Raymond’s car. Certainly further
observation was permitted. The question is whether Officer Kandler was allowed
to stop the car in order to continue his investigation. Raymond argues that the
officer should have driven around the vehicle to see all the windows. Such
maneuvering would require driving alongside the Acura on both sides and driving

5
United States v. Wilson (4th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3d 720, 721-722 [temporary
tag]; Berry v. State (Ga.Ct.App 2001) 547 S.E.2d 664, 668 [drive-out tag]; State v.
Aguilar
(N.M.Ct.App. 2007) 155 P.3d 769, 770-771 [temporary dealer tag]; State
v. Butler
(S.C.Ct.App. 2000) 539 S.E.2d 414, 415-416 [temporary tag]; State v.
Lord
(Wis. 2006) 723 N.W.2d 425, 426 [temporary plate]; see also People v.
Nabong
(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 3 [temporary registration tag].
6
United States v. Lopez-Soto (9th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3d 1101 is inapposite for
a different reason. In Lopez-Soto, the stop was predicated on the San Diego
officer’s mistaken belief that Baja California required that registration stickers be
visible from the rear of the vehicle. Here, there is no indication that Officer
Kandler believed that the rear window was the only place that a temporary permit
may lawfully be affixed. It is, however, the preferred location. (Ante, fn. 2.)

(footnote continued on next page)
4


ahead of it while scanning the windshield in the officer’s rear view mirror. Even
assuming the officer could have engaged in these potentially dangerous
maneuvers, he was not required to do so. “The reasonableness of [an] officer’s
decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive
investigatory techniques.” (United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 11.) Nor
is an officer required to eliminate all innocent explanations that might account for
the facts supporting a particularized suspicion. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11
Cal.4th 354, 373.) The course Kandler followed was reasonable as well as safer
for him, Raymond, and other motorists. Moreover, if Kandler had passed
Raymond in order to check his windshield for a temporary permit, he would have
lost control of the situation. Raymond could have turned into a side street and
driven away before the officer could turn around and follow. If the car had been
stolen, allowing the driver to fall in behind the officer would place the officer in
danger of attack by a felon seeking to avoid arrest. The course taken by Kandler
was entirely reasonable under the circumstances.

(footnote continued from previous page)

Therefore, when Kandler did not see a temporary permit in the rear window, it was
reasonable for him to stop the car to investigate further.
5


DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
CORRIGAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.

6



See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion In re Raymond C.
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion


Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 145 Cal.App.4th 1320
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S149728
Date Filed: December 11, 2008
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Orange
Judge: Caryl Lee

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Jean Ballantine, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette,
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton, Steven T.
Oetting, Jennifer A. Jadovitz and Jeffrey J. Koch, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.



Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Jean Ballantine
12228 Venice Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90066
(310) 398-5462

Jeffrey J. Koch
Deputy Attorney General
110 West A Street, Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 645-2204


Petition for review after the Court of Appeal affirmed orders in a wardship proceeding. The case presents the following issue: If a police officer sees that a motor vehicle lacks a rear or both license plates, may the officer make a traffic stop to determine if the vehicle has a temporary permit or if a displayed temporary permit is a valid one?

Opinion Information
Date:Citation:Docket Number:Category:Status:Cross Referenced Cases:
Thu, 12/11/200845 Cal. 4th 303, 196 P.3d 810, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 110S149728Review - Criminal Appealclosed; remittitur issued

PEOPLE v. DEAN (S160418)


Parties
1C., R. (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Jean Corey Ballantine
Attorney at Law
12228 Venice Boulevard, PMB 152
Los Angeles, CA

2The People (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by Jennifer Jadovitz
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 85266
San Diego, CA

3The People (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by Jeffrey John Koch
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 85266
San Diego, CA

4C., R. (Overview party)
Represented by Jean Corey Ballantine
Attorney at Law
12228 Venice Boulevard, PMB 152
Los Angeles, CA


Opinion Authors
OpinionJustice Carol A. Corrigan
ConcurChief Justice Ronald M. George, Justice Carlos R. Moreno, Justice Joyce L. Kennard, Justice Kathryn M. Werdegar, Justice Marvin R. Baxter, Justice Ming W. Chin

Disposition
Dec 31 1969Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Dec 31 1969Petition for review filed
  Raymond C., Appellant by Jean Ballantine, counsel C/A opinion certified for publication 12/20/2006. No change in judgment.
Dec 31 1969Record requested
 
Dec 31 19692nd record request
 
Dec 31 1969Received Court of Appeal record
  file jacket/briefs/transcripts
Dec 31 1969Petition for review granted (criminal case)
  votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno & Corrigan, JJ.
Dec 31 1969Counsel appointment order filed
  upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, Jean Ballantine is hereby appointed to represent appellant on the appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits must be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date of this order.
Dec 31 1969Request for extension of time filed
  counsel Jean Ballentine requesting two weeks additional to June 22, 2007 to file appellants opening brief on the merits.
Dec 31 1969Extension of time granted
  to June 22, 2007 to file appellants opening brief on the merits.
Dec 31 1969Opening brief on the merits filed
  Appellant, Raymond C. by counsel, Jean Ballantine.
Dec 31 1969Request for extension of time filed
  Respondent ( The People ) requesting 30 day extension till August 17, 2007 to file respondent's answer brief on the merits. by Jeffrey J. Koch, counsel
Dec 31 1969Received:
  letter from Attorney General's Office.
Dec 31 1969Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Ballantine
Dec 31 1969Extension of time granted
  to August 17, 2007 to file respondent's answer brief on the merits.
Dec 31 1969Answer brief on the merits filed
  The People, respondent by Jennifer A. Jadovitz, Deputy Attorney General filed with permission due to incorrect cover.
Dec 31 1969Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  The People, respondent by Jennifer A. Jadovitz, Deputy Attorney General
Dec 31 1969Request for extension of time filed
  Appellant, Raymond C., asking to Sept. 19, 2007 to file the Reply Brief on the Merits by cousel, Jean Ballantine.
Dec 31 1969Extension of time granted
  On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the reply brief on the metis is extended to and including September 19, 2007.
Dec 31 1969Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  Raymond C., appellant by Jean Ballantine, counsel
Dec 31 1969Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  Raymond C., appellant by Jean Ballantine, counsel
Dec 31 1969Received:
  letter from respondent regarding scheduling concerns. by Jennifer A. Jadovitz, Deputy Attorney General
Dec 31 1969Case ordered on calendar
  to be argued Tuesday, October 7, 2008, at 9:00 a.m., in Riverside County
Dec 31 1969Request for Extended Media coverage Filed
  The California Channel by James Gualtieri
Dec 31 1969Request for Extended Media coverage Granted
  The request for media coverage, filed by the California Channel on September 2, 2008, is granted, subject to the conditions set forth in rule 1.150, of the California Rules of Court.
Dec 31 1969Filed:
  additional authorities by appellant Ramond C., a minor Jean Ballantine, counsel
Dec 31 1969Request for Extended Media coverage Filed
  The Desert Sun Mike Snyder, Photographer
Dec 31 1969Request for Extended Media coverage Filed
  Calif. State Univ. San Bernardino-Palm Desert Campus Mike Singer, photographer
Dec 31 1969Request for judicial notice granted
  The Attorney General's request for judicial notice filed on August 16, 2007, is hereby granted.
Dec 31 1969Request for Extended Media coverage Granted
  The request for extended media coverage of the Supreme Court's Oral Argument Special Session on October 7, and 8, 2008, filed on October 1, 2008, by The Desert Sun to serve as pool photographer is granted, subject to the conditions set forth in rule 1.150, California Rules of Court.
Dec 31 1969Request for Extended Media coverage Granted
  The request for extended media coverge of the Supreme Court's Oral Argument Special Session on October 7 and 8, 2008, filed by the California State University, San Bernardino-Palm Desert Campus photographer on September 26, 2008, is granted, subject to the conditions set forth in rule 1.150, California Rules of Court.
Dec 31 1969Cause argued and submitted
 
Dec 31 1969Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
 
Dec 31 1969Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
  Opinion by Corrigan, J. -----joined by George, C.J., Kennard, J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., Chin & Moreno, JJ.
Dec 31 1969Remittitur issued (criminal case)
 
Dec 31 1969Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Ballantine
Dec 31 1969Returned record
  Court of Appeal - Fourth Appellate Division Three
Dec 31 1969Received:
  Receipt for remittitur from Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District - Division Three

Briefs
Dec 31 1969Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Dec 31 1969Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Dec 31 1969Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
Brief Downloads
application/pdf icon
raymond2.pdf (991698 bytes) - Petition for review
application/pdf icon
raymond3.pdf (1837235 bytes) - Raymond C.'s opening brief
application/pdf icon
raymond4.pdf (712615 bytes) - Attorney General's brief
application/pdf icon
raymond5.pdf (754894 bytes) - Raymond C.'s reply brief
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website
Jul 7, 2011
Annotated by Arnoldo Cantu

Facts:
On October 24, 2004, Officer Timothy Kandler saw juvenile Raymond C. driving an Acura without license plates or a temporary operating permit in the rear window, an apparent violation for which he stopped the car. Officer Kandler had no other grounds to stop the vehicle.

Raymond C. presented officer Kandler his driver’s license and proof of insurance. He informed the officer that the vehicle’s temporary permit was displayed in the front window. However, Officer Kandler detected the odor of alcohol on Raymond’s breath and administered a field sobriety test. Raymond failed.

A motion to suppress evidence was denied, and Raymond was found to have driven a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. He was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation. The Court of Appeals affirmed holding that, even though the temporary permit was lawfully affixed to the vehicle, it was outside Officer Kandler’s vantage point and so Officer Kandler had reasonable grounds for the stop.

Procedural History:
After an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence, the court determined that Raymond C. had unlawfully driven a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. The Court of Appeals affirmed, deciding that the officer had reasonable grounds for the stop. The Supreme Court of Californa affirmed.

Issue:
If a police officer sees that a motor vehicle lacks a rear or both license plates, may the officer make a traffic stop to determine if the vehicle has a temporary permit or if a displayed temporary permit is a valid one?

Holding:
Yes. under the totality of the circumstances, the police officer acted reasonably in stopping the motorist.

Analysis:
Under the Fourth Amendment, a traffic stop is treated as an investigatory detention for which the officer must be able to articulate specific facts justifying the suspicion that a crime is being committed. People v. Wells 38 Cal. 4th 1078, 1082-83 (2006). The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, United States v. Knights 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001), and the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct is evaluated on an individual basis under the totality of the circumstances. People v. Souza 9 Cal. 4th 224, 231 (1994). Evaluation of an officer’s reasonableness in stopping a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques. United States v. Sokolow 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989).

Officer Kandler approached Raymond’s vehicle from the rear, obscuring his view of the temporary permit on Raymond’s front windshield. While Officer Kandler could have maneuvered his vehicle around Raymond’s vehicle to see whether a temporary permit was affixed to the front windshield, doing so could have been dangerous to other drivers. Moreover, had Officer Kandler passed in front of Raymond’s vehicle to inspect his windshield, he would have lost control of the situation, allowing Raymond to potentially turn into a side street and evade apprehension before Officer Kandler could turn and follow. Also, had Officer Kandler driven in front of the other vehicle, he would have left himself vulnerable to a potential attack by the offending motorist. In light of these alternatives, Officer Kandler’s traffic stop was safer for him, Raymond C., and other motorists. The actions of Officer Kandler were therefore reasonable under the circumstances.

Tags:
Fourth Amendment, search and seizure, traffic stop, reasonable suspicion, reasonable articulable suspicion

Key Related Cases:

People v. Hernandez 45 Cal. 4th 295 (2008) (Companion Case)
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12988959549442163423&q=peopl...

Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17773604035873288886&q=terry...

People v. Souza 9 Cal. 4th 224 (1994)
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=117004875959605798&q=people+...

People v. Wells 38 Cal. 4th 1078 (2006)
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13407676577264111752&q=peopl...

United States v. Knights 534 U.S. 112 (2001)
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1560488013338831968&q=united...

United States v. Sokolow 490 U.S. 1 (1989)
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1799203374017461902&q=united...

People v. Glaser 11 Cal. 4th 354 (1995)
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1402868286758293069&q=people...