Filed 11/4/10
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
S175307
v.
Ct.App. 4/1 D054754
FIRME HASSAN HAJJAJ,
Riverside County
Defendant and Respondent.
Super. Ct. No. SWF024102
In this case, as in People v. Engram (Oct. 25, 2010, S176983) ___ Cal.4th ___
(Engram), the trial court concluded that on the last day established by Penal Code section
1382 for bringing this Riverside County criminal proceeding to trial, there were no
courtrooms or judges available to try the case. Defendant objected to any further
continuance and, at his request, the court scheduled a hearing for the following day on his
motion to dismiss the action. At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court granted
defendant‟s motion, pursuant to section 1382.1
On appeal, the People, represented by the district attorney, initially challenged the
dismissal solely on the ground that the trial court should have transferred the case for trial
to any judge assigned to a civil courtroom — the principal contention advanced in
Engram by the district attorney and analyzed in our decision in that case.
1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
1
In response to a request by the Court of Appeal for supplemental briefing, the
district attorney additionally argued that the trial court‟s dismissal of the action was
improper in light of the circumstance that at 4:15 p.m. on the last permissible day for
bringing the case to trial, a courtroom and judge had become available at a branch of the
Superior Court for Riverside County (hereafter Riverside Superior Court or Riverside
court) located in the City of Indio, 76 miles from the main criminal courthouse in the City
of Riverside, where defendant and all counsel were present awaiting assignment of the
case for trial. After learning that a courtroom in Indio had become available because a
trial being conducted there had just concluded, the trial court informed the parties that
this development had no bearing on the merits of defendant‟s motion to dismiss, because
it was too late in the day for defendant and his counsel to reach that distant courtroom
and for the case to be brought to trial before the close of court that day.
The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed with the conclusion reached by the trial
court, holding instead that under the circumstances presented by this case “the physical
remoteness [of the open courtroom] constitutes good cause within the meaning of
[section 1382] to commence the trial the next day at the branch court.”2 We granted
review to consider the validity of this determination by the Court of Appeal.
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude the Court of Appeal‟s decision
should be reversed. The reviewing court suggested that the trial court, in granting
defendant‟s motion to dismiss, had “overlooked the fact that in a large and populous
county like the County of Riverside, which is served by one superior court consisting of a
central courthouse for criminal matters (the Riverside Hall of Justice) and various
outlying branch facilities (such as the Indio court), the administration of justice and the
2
Because it resolved the case in the People‟s favor on this ground, the Court of
Appeal did not reach the question whether the case should have been assigned to a civil
courtroom for trial.
2
efficient utilization of limited judicial resources may require the parties to a criminal
proceeding to travel to a distant court facility.” The record demonstrates, however, that
the trial court did not overlook the possibility and propriety of requiring the parties to
travel to a distant court facility; on the contrary, the trial court specifically stated that if
the Indio courtroom “had been available an hour and a half prior, then . . . I would have
had people on the road.” The trial court‟s action was not based upon a reluctance to
require defendant and counsel to travel to a distant courthouse, but rather upon a
recognition that, because of the combination of the lateness of the hour and the time it
would take for defendant and counsel to reach that courtroom, the Indio courtroom was
not an “available courtroom” in which defendant could be brought to trial within the
statutorily prescribed period. Moreover, contrary to the conclusion reached by the Court
of Appeal, the “physical remoteness” of the Indio courtroom did not constitute “good
cause” under section 1382 to delay defendant‟s trial. This geographical circumstance
simply precluded the occurrence of one of the elements essential to the commencement
of trial — namely, the physical presence of defendant and his counsel in a courtroom that
is available for trial — within the period established by that statute, a situation rendering
the particular courtroom, in fact, unavailable. Because, as in Engram, the lack of any
judge or courtroom available to bring this case to trial within the statutory period resulted
from chronic court congestion attributable to the state, the trial court properly concluded
that good cause did not exist under section 1382 to delay defendant‟s trial. Accordingly,
we conclude that the trial court, pursuant to section 1382, properly dismissed the
proceeding.
I
By information filed in the Riverside Superior Court on May 2, 2008, defendant
Firme Hassan Hajjaj was charged with selling or transporting a controlled substance, a
felony. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a).) It was alleged as an enhancement that
he had suffered a prior felony conviction for the same offense. (Health & Saf. Code,
3
§ 11370.2, subd. (a).) Additionally, it was alleged that the same prior conviction had
resulted in a separate prison term and that defendant had reoffended within five years of
the conclusion of that prior term. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) Defendant posted bail and
remained free from custody from the time he was arraigned on the complaint through the
conclusion of the proceedings.
Defendant was arraigned on the information on May 6, 2008, and a trial-readiness
conference was set for May 28, 2008. The clerk noted that the last permissible day for
trial to commence would be July 7, 2008. At the readiness conference conducted on
May 28, 2008, trial was set for June 30, 2008, and the clerk again noted that the last
permissible day for trial to commence would be July 7, 2008.
On June 30, 2008, trial was trailed to July 1, 2008, and the clerk again noted that
the last permissible day for trial to commence would be July 7, 2008. On the latter date,
the parties announced their readiness for trial, and the matter was assigned for trial to the
master calendar department, with trial set for July 10, 2008. The clerk‟s entry for that
date indicates that counsel stipulated that the last permissible day for trial would be
July 14, 2008.
On July 10, 2008, the defense moved for continuance pursuant to section 1050,
because the deputy public defender representing defendant was in trial on another case.
The People did not object and the court found good cause for continuance, setting a new
trial date of July 16, 2008. The clerk noted the last permissible day for trial would be
July 28, 2008.
On July 16, 2008, the People announced they were not ready for trial, because the
deputy district attorney assigned to the case was in trial on another case. Defense counsel
objected to any further delay. The court determined good cause had been demonstrated
for continuance and trailed the matter to July 23, 2008, “due to courtroom unavailability.”
The clerk noted that the “[d]ates set are within [the] previous time waiver.”
4
On July 23, 2008, both parties announced ready for trial but agreed to trail the
matter until July 25. July 28 remained the last day for trial.
On Friday, July 25, 2008, both parties again stated their readiness for trial and
announced an anticipated trial duration of three days. On its own motion, however, the
trial court trailed the matter to July 28, 2008, again “due to courtroom unavailability.”
On Monday, July 28, 2008, at 4:04 p.m., both sides indicated they were ready for
trial, but the court announced: “The Court finds there are no available courtrooms a[t]
this time.” The court acknowledged that it was the last day for commencement of trial,
but informed the parties3 that “we are out of courtrooms.” Defendant objected to any
further delay and moved for dismissal.
During the hearing, at 4:15 p.m., the court received information that a criminal
trial had just been completed in Indio at a different branch of the Riverside Superior
Court (Judge Hawkins, presiding). The court previously had considered sending a case to
the Indio facility, noting that it had been checking all day with court personnel at that
facility, that the Indio trial judge in question had been involved in closing arguments in a
murder case, and that “it didn‟t look like he would open before the end of the day. Now
it‟s 4:15 in the afternoon and he just now opened.” The court added that “it takes an hour
and 20 minutes [to drive there] if you were already in the car.” The court stated: “I just
don‟t think that solves anything.”
Upon learning that the trial in Judge Hawkins‟s courtroom in Indio had concluded,
the prosecutor suggested “that the court could send the case out at this point in time.
There could be a DA [deputy district attorney] in the courtroom within the next five
minutes in Judge Hawkins‟ court. And, so from our position, the court could send one of
3
In addition to defendant‟s case, there were four other last-day cases on the court‟s
calendar that were in need of an open courtroom.
5
these cases out. We would be ready. There would be a courtroom available, provided
there is a jury available.”
The court disagreed with the prosecutor‟s position: “I don‟t see how it starts a
trial to have a DA not prepared on it show up and say, „I‟m a DA and I‟m in a
courtroom,‟ when to start the trial, as I understand it, a jury needs to be impaneled, and at
least a few questions of court voir dire have to be commenced. [¶] With the defendant
not there, the defense lawyer not there, and the DA there who is not prepared, I don‟t see
that that‟s the start of the trial under the law.” The court concluded: “And as to whether
all of this then ties up to . . . good cause for continuance . . . to go beyond the statutory
periods, my understanding is that it does not.”
In his motion to dismiss, defendant alleged (1) that he was not brought to trial
within 10 days of the date set for trial, in violation of section 1382, subdivision
(a) (section 1382(a)), and (2) that the delay constituted a violation of his state and federal
constitutional rights to speedy trial. In support of the motion, his counsel submitted a
declaration asserting that defendant and counsel appeared in department 63, the master
calendar department, at 8:30 a.m. on July 28, 2008, and that “[t]hroughout the day both
defense counsel and the prosecutor announced ready for trial.”
On Tuesday, July 29, 2008, the court conducted a hearing on the motion to
dismiss. The prosecutor maintained that the five pending last-day cases (including
defendant‟s) should have been transferred to the judges assigned by the Chief Justice of
California to try civil cases in Riverside County, and, with respect to the Indio court,
argued that a courtroom at that facility had become “available” on July 28. The
prosecutor added that, “at the very least,” good cause should have been found for
continuance to the following day.
In addressing the prosecutor‟s claim regarding the Indio courtroom, the court
explained: “With respect to the courtroom that became available at 4:30 [the court
subsequently acknowledged that the time had been 4:15] in Indio, as I understand the
6
law, we don‟t start a trial by having a prosecutor appear in Indio when the defense lawyer
can‟t be there and the defendant can‟t be there, when we hear at 4:30 that a courtroom is
available in Indio. It would have been highly artificial to say that the trial started just
because the prosecutor assigned to the Indio office, knowing nothing about the particular
trial, showed up in court and said, „I‟m a prosecutor,‟ and it doesn‟t — it‟s not the same
as starting a trial. [¶] So if that courtroom had been available an hour and a half prior,
then, you know I would have had people on the road.” (Italics added.)
Immediately after defendant‟s case was dismissed, the People refiled the felony
complaint against him under a different case number (People v. Hajjaj (Super. Ct.
Riverside County, 2008, No. SWF026125)). Defendant was arraigned on the refiled
charges, and the trial court set the case for felony settlement conference as well as for
preliminary hearing.
On December 8, 2008, a preliminary hearing was held on the refiled charges and
defendant Hajjaj was held to answer. On February 23, 2009, however, the People elected
to pursue an appeal from the dismissal of the charges involved in the proceedings now
before us, in case No. SWF024102. On the People‟s motion, the trial court dismissed the
refiled charges. The Court of Appeal subsequently reversed the judgment rendered by
the trial court dismissing the original action on speedy trial grounds (No. SWF024102).
We granted defendant‟s petition for review.
II
The basic principles governing this case are not in dispute. The state and federal
Constitutions guarantee a defendant facing criminal charges the right to a speedy trial.
(U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) This right protects an accused from
facing an unduly lengthy period in which criminal charges are pending. (People v. Lewis
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 628-629 (Lewis).) In California, one of the principal statutes
implementing the constitutional right to a speedy trial is section 1382.
7
Section 1382(a) provides in relevant part: “The court, unless good cause to the
contrary is shown, shall order the action to be dismissed in the following cases: [¶] . . .
[¶] (2) In a felony case, when a defendant is not brought to trial within 60 days of the
defendant‟s arraignment on an indictment or information . . . . However, an action shall
not be dismissed under this paragraph if either of the following circumstances exists: [¶]
(A) The defendant enters a general waiver of the 60-day trial requirement. . . . [¶]
(B) The defendant requests or consents to the setting of a trial date beyond the 60-day
period. . . . Whenever a case is set for trial beyond the 60-day period by request or
consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant
shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.” (Italics
added.)
In other words, in the absence of waiver or consent on the part of the defendant,
section 1382 “requires dismissal when a defendant is not „brought to trial‟ within the
statutorily prescribed period after the filing of the information,” unless good cause is
shown. (Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 629; see People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557,
561 (Johnson); see also People v. Sutton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 533, 545 (Sutton).)
We first consider whether defendant could have been “brought to trial” on July 28,
2008, in the Indio courtroom under the circumstances reflected in the record. The
principal case governing the question of when a case is considered to have been “brought
to trial” for the purpose of section 1382 is Rhinehart v. Municipal Court (1984) 35 Cal.3d
772 (Rhinehart). In Rhinehart, the trial court calendar coordinator informed the
defendant‟s counsel that a jury would be called and selected on November 27, but that the
trial would be delayed until December 3 because of the trial court‟s obligations in another
trial. (Rhinehart, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 775.) On Friday, November 27 — the last day of
the statutory 10-day grace period — the trial court confirmed its plan, that is, that the jury
would be impaneled on November 27, but that trial would be delayed until December 3.
The court explained that the reason this procedure would be followed was to avoid
8
dismissal under section 1382. Over defense objection, the court proceeded with jury
selection, subsequently directing the jurors to return on December 3.
In deciding whether the case had been “brought to trial” within the meaning of
section 1382 by virtue of the impanelment of the jury, we acknowledged in Rhinehart
that the phrase “brought to trial” lacked a “talismanic” meaning, but that “ „a defendant
has certainly not been brought to trial prior to the day when the trial is scheduled and
both parties appear and announce that they are ready to proceed.‟ ” (Rhinehart, supra, 35
Cal.3d at p. 777.) In an effort to give meaning to the statutory phrase, our analysis turned
to two appellate decisions, People v. Amati (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d Supp. 10 (Amati), and
Sanchez v. Municipal Court (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 806 (Sanchez).
In Amati, a panel of prospective jurors was sworn at 4:30 p.m. on the last
permissible day for trial under section 1382, but the proceedings then were recessed until
the following morning. The trial court dismissed the case because of an apparent
violation of section 1382, but the superior court‟s appellate department reversed. It
explained that “the swearing of a panel of prospective jurors constitutes bringing a case to
trial within the [then applicable] 45-day provisions of Penal Code section 1382, so long
as the panel is sworn in as a good faith start to the jury selection process and not as a
mere device to avoid the impact of the statute.” (Amati, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d Supp. 10,
12, italics added, quoted with approval in Rhinehart, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 777-778.)
In Sanchez, at 2:20 p.m. on the last day for trial pursuant to section 1382, the
defendant‟s case was called for trial in a regular misdemeanor trial court, and the court
presided as a jury panel was sworn and 12 prospective jurors were seated. The court then
recessed the matter until the following court day because of the lateness of the hour and
because the court had some “ „matters to take care of‟ ” in other cases — including
trailing another case because the attorney for the defendant in that case had been sent to
trial in the Sanchez matter. On the following court day, a new prospective juror replaced
one who needed to be excused. The court then learned that a judge assigned to hear
9
traffic matters4 had become available, so the case, which involved alleged Vehicle Code
violations, was transferred to that judge‟s court for trial. In concluding that the case had
been brought to trial before the first judge in a timely manner within the meaning of
section 1382, the appellate court in Sanchez expanded upon the reference made in Amati
to the necessity for “good faith” on the part of the trial court, stating that whether the
court acted in good faith must be objectively determined. (Sanchez, supra, 97
Cal.App.3d at pp. 811-812.) The court held that where “the record objectively shows that
a case is assigned for trial to a judge who is available to try the case and the court has
committed its resources to the trial, the parties answer ready and a panel of prospective
jurors is summoned and sworn, the trial process has commenced and defendant has been
„brought to trial‟ as that term is used in Penal Code section 1382.” (Sanchez, supra, 97
Cal.App.3d at p. 813.) The court in Sanchez went on to caution, however, that it was
“not rul[ing] out the possibility that in any given case subsequent events may disclose
that the court was not in fact available or ready to process the case to conclusion without
unnecessary delay. In such cases it could then appear that the trial had not in fact
commenced.” (Ibid.)
In concluding that the circumstances of the case rendered dismissal appropriate,
our decision in Rhinehart adopted the Sanchez test relating to what constitutes being
“brought to trial,” commenting that it “gives substance to the rights embodied in section
1382,” thereby “ensur[ing] compliance with both the letter and the spirit of the statute.”
(Rhinehart, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 779.) In this way, we discouraged trial courts from
“merely paying lip service to the legislative mandate embodied in section 1382.”
(Rhinehart, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 779.) This court noted the “circumvention of section
1382” that would be invited by an alternative conclusion: “If a trial court could impanel
4
The original judge‟s court had been designated “nontraffic” and the case going to
trial was a traffic matter. (Sanchez, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d at p. 809.)
10
a jury and delay a trial days or even weeks, then the statutory guarantee of a speedy trial
would be rendered a nullity, and an accused‟s rights under section 1382 would be
eviscerated.” (Rhinehart, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 779.)
The Rhinehart decision concluded that past cases “compel the holding that an
accused is „brought to trial‟ within the meaning of section 1382 when a case has been
called for trial by a judge who is normally available and ready to try the case to
conclusion. The court must have committed its resources to the trial, and the parties must
be ready to proceed and a panel of prospective jurors must be summoned and sworn.”
(Rhinehart, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 780, fns. omitted.) Applying this standard, we held
that the criminal case under review had not been “brought to trial” on the last permissible
day, because the jury was impaneled in order to avoid dismissal and the court was not
“available or ready to try the case to conclusion.” (Ibid.) Instead, the trial court intended
to recess for several days so it could complete another trial.
Applying the decision in Rhinehart to the present case, we disagree with any
argument that defendant would have been “brought to trial” on the last day of the
statutory period if, at 4:15 p.m. on July 28, 2008, the trial court had assigned the case to
the Indio court for trial. Although as of 4:15 p.m. a Riverside Superior Court courtroom
and a judge in Indio no longer were occupied with other court proceedings, they were not
available to commence defendant‟s trial in any meaningful sense, because defendant and
his attorney (along with the assigned prosecutor) could not, before the close of business
on the last day of the statutory period, travel to the distant Indio courthouse from the
calendar court — where they had been required to appear and remain throughout the day
on July 28 awaiting an open courtroom.
The Rhinehart decision teaches that section 1382 requires more than mere lip
service to the fundamental right to a speedy trial; it requires that the elements vital to
undertaking a trial be present. One of these vital elements is the presence of the parties
and their counsel. In order to commence trial, the parties must be “ready to proceed”
11
(Rhinehart, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 780); logically, a party is not ready to proceed if he or
she cannot be present in the courtroom, along with counsel. Indeed, there are
constitutional and related statutory provisions requiring the defendant‟s presence. (See
People v. Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 77, 81 [describing defendant‟s state and federal
constitutional rights to be present at trial in the absence of waiver or certain misconduct,
along with his or her statutory rights under §§ 977 & 1043 to be present]; see also People
v. Howze (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1394-1396 [acknowledging that a defendant has a
statutory right to be present at the commencement of trial, but finding the right may be
waived]; People v. Granderson (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 703, 707-708 [acknowledging
that defendants have a right to be present at the commencement of trial, which is defined
as occurring when the impaneling of the jury begins].)
To declare that defendant could have been “brought to trial” within the meaning of
section 1382 on the last day of the statutory period under the circumstances of the present
case would be to accord significance to a “mere device to avoid the impact of the
statute.” (Amati, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d Supp. at p. 12.) Through no fault of the defense,
defendant and defense counsel could not be “ready to proceed” in the Indio court; there
could be no “ „good faith start‟ ” (Rhinehart, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 777-778, italics
omitted) to the proceedings. A courtroom that cannot be reached by the parties prior to
the close of business is for practical and legal purposes unavailable for bringing the
accused to trial. To conclude otherwise — that defendant could have been brought to
trial on July 28 — would endorse the view that a defendant may be brought to trial,
within the meaning of the speedy-trial protections of section 1382, in an unavailable
courtroom. This result, in the understated language employed by the trial court, would be
“highly artificial.” Indeed, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court‟s conclusion in
this respect, summarily rejecting the People‟s claim to the contrary.
We next consider the question of what constitutes “good cause” within the
meaning of section 1382. If the defendant is not “brought to trial” within the statutory
12
period, dismissal is required unless the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion,
determines that good cause has been demonstrated. (§ 1382 (a); Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th
at p. 545; Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 629; Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 561, 570.)
In order to avoid dismissal, the prosecution must meet the burden of demonstrating good
cause for delay. (Rhinehart, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 781.)
As we recently observed, section 1382 does not define good cause, “but numerous
California appellate decisions that have reviewed good-cause determinations under this
statute demonstrate that, in general, a number of factors are relevant to a determination of
good cause: (1) the nature and strength of the justification for the delay, (2) the duration
of the delay, and (3) the prejudice to either the defendant or the prosecution that is likely
to result from the delay. [Citations.] Past decisions further establish that in making its
good-cause determination, a trial court must consider all of the relevant circumstances of
the particular case, „applying principles of common sense to the totality of
circumstances . . . .‟ [Citations.] The cases recognize that, as a general matter, a trial
court „has broad discretion to determine whether good cause exists to grant a continuance
of the trial‟ [citation], and that, in reviewing a trial court‟s good-cause determination, an
appellate court applies an „abuse of discretion‟ standard. [Citations.]” (Sutton, supra, 48
Cal.4th at p. 546.)
Good cause within the meaning of section 1382 exists, for example, when the
delay beyond the statutory period is caused by the conduct of the defendant or occurs for
his or her benefit, or there are unforeseen circumstances such as unexpected illness,
unanticipated unavailability of counsel, or the absence of a witness despite due diligence
to secure his or her attendance. (Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 570; see Owens v.
Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 238, 251, 253; 5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law
(3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, §§ 308-312, pp. 457-463.)
It is settled that, although a broad variety of unforeseen events may establish good
cause under section 1382, the unavailability of a number of judges or courtrooms
13
sufficient to handle the court‟s caseload, due to chronic congestion of the court‟s docket,
does not establish good cause, absent exceptional circumstances. (Engram, supra, ___
Cal.4th at p. ___ [ p. 41]; see Stroud v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 952, 969.) The
view we expressed 30 years ago in Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, holds true today, as
we confirmed in Engram: “ „A defendant‟s right to a speedy trial may be denied simply
by the failure of the state to provide enough courtrooms or judges to enable defendant to
come to trial within the statutory period. . . . “[U]nreasonable delay in run-of-the mill
criminal cases cannot be justified by simply asserting that the public resources provided
by the State‟s criminal-justice system are limited and that each case must await its turn.”
[Citation.]‟ ” (Engram, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___ [p. 41], quoting Johnson, supra, 26
Cal.3d at pp. 571-572.)
It is quite evident that routine congestion was the cause of the delay in the present
case. At the hearing conducted in the late afternoon of the last permissible day to bring
the case to trial, the prosecutor challenged the court concerning the availability of any
courtrooms or judges to try the five last-day cases then on the court‟s calendar,
suggesting, among other examples, that the calendar court consider recalling any criminal
case from a trial court if that case was not subject to dismissal for delay; assigning the
last-day cases to criminal court judges handling pre-preliminary-hearing negotiated
dispositions or to judges assigned to the mental health court or the drug court; or
assigning the cases to civil court judges hearing probate or family court matters, or to
judges hearing traffic cases. The prosecutor suggested that the court‟s presiding judge
and pro tem judges could assume the function of criminal calendar judges, thereby
freeing the latter to conduct trials. The prosecutor asked whether the court “has done
everything possible and has diverted all civil resources to criminal matters,” including
interrupting civil trials, and suggested the court could order one of the judges then sitting
by assignment of the Chief Justice (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6, subd. (e)) to interrupt
ongoing civil trials to preside over the trial of one of the last-day cases.
14
The response given by the court affords striking evidence of the congestion facing
the Riverside criminal courts. It explained convincingly that there were no open criminal
courtrooms: “There are not, to the very best of my ability and the ability of my staff to
check and recheck all day long sending e-mails and making phone calls, no, there just
aren‟t.” The court stated there were no criminal trials being tried “that have remaining
time available to where they can be recalled.” The court rejected the proposal that certain
judges handling negotiated dispositions in criminal cases be reassigned, explaining that
such functions were essential to the court system if dismissal of criminal cases on
timeliness grounds was to be avoided: “[I]f a judge is settling ten cases a day or fifty a
week — that‟s fifty times as much effect in terms of avoiding the dismissal as if he‟s
trying a case a week.”
The court continued: “And the criminal calendar courts know we‟re not going to
take a criminal calendar court judge off in order to have him do a trial. For one thing,
many of those are commissioners who can‟t do trials there. For another thing, all of the
criminal calendar courts are resolving cases like crazy. Again, more cases would be
dismissed, not less, if we were to disrupt the criminal calendar courts.” The court added
that it would not recall judges from vacation and that it did not believe any judges were
absent for training.
The court went on: “Pro tems, to handle a calendar — we‟re burning out our pro
tems right and left. . . . [T]hese are good people who volunteer but . . . but they don‟t
want to volunteer all the time because their overhead is running at their office.” The
court added: “No, we are not going to call the P.J. [presiding judge] in . . . . [¶] If we
don‟t have somebody administering [the court system], then again, it will lead to
inefficiencies, which lead to more dismissals, not less.”
The court noted that the Chief Justice and the Judicial Council had been informed
of the situation facing the Riverside courts, adding that the court would not press into
service for the last-day criminal cases those judges who had been assigned by the Chief
15
Justice to relieve the pressure on civil departments caused by the overwhelming volume
of criminal trials. The court emphasized the “human issues” involved in civil cases,
including probate and family matters, as well as in traffic cases, and declined to send the
last-day cases to those courts for trial.
Moreover, we concluded in our decision in Engram — which examined the very
situation in which the Riverside Superior Court found itself during the period here in
question — that the severe court congestion then affecting the processing of criminal
cases constituted a chronic problem, attributable to the state, that did not constitute good
cause within the meaning of section 1382. (Engram, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___
[p. 44].) We stated that “when the unavailability of a judge or courtroom is fairly
attributable to the fault or neglect of the state, such unavailability does not constitute
good cause within the meaning of section 1382.” (Engram, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ____
[p. 41].)
We said of the case then before us in Engram, as well as with reference to other
cases involving the congestion in Riverside, that in each of these cases “arising out of the
same general circumstances prevailing in the Riverside Superior Court during the
relevant period, the trial court properly could find that the congested criminal caseload
represented a chronic condition rather than an exceptional circumstance, and further that
the lack of available courtrooms and judges was attributable to the Legislature‟s failure to
provide a number of judges and courtrooms sufficient to meet the rapidly growing
population in Riverside County.” (Engram, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___ [p. 42].)
We concluded by pointing out: “The calendar congestion that produced the
circumstance in which the numerous last-day criminal cases pending in the superior court
exceeded the resources available to the court unquestionably constituted a chronic
condition. It cannot properly be characterized as an „exceptional circumstance‟ as that
term was used in our decision in Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, 571-572.” (Engram,
supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___ [p. 44].)
16
The Court of Appeal in the present case acknowledged that court congestion
ordinarily does not constitute good cause for delay. In the view of the appellate court,
however, “the physical distance of the available and ready Indio branch courtroom from
the court‟s location in the City of Riverside, which made it impossible for this criminal
case to be brought to trial late in the afternoon of the last statutory day for trial,
constituted good cause for the court to order Hajjaj, his counsel, and the prosecutor to
appear in the Indio court for the commencement of trial beyond the time limit set under
section 1382(a).”
The reviewing court assumed that at 4:15 p.m. on July 28, 2008, a jury panel was
available and could be sworn that same day.5 Under these assumed facts, according to
the Court of Appeal, “the circumstance that both prevented Hajjaj, his defense counsel,
and the prosecutor from appearing before Judge Hawkins for trial on July 28 in the
available criminal courtroom at the Indio court and prevented a panel of prospective
jurors from being summoned and sworn there that afternoon was the physical remoteness
of the Indio court from the Riverside Hall of Justice.” The court added: “We are
persuaded that had Judge Hawkins‟s courtroom been located at the Riverside Hall of
Justice, this case would have been brought to trial within the statutory time period
governed by section 1382(a).”
The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court, in a proper exercise of its
discretion, should have permitted a one-day delay of the commencement of trial to permit
an out-of-custody defendant, along with defense counsel and the prosecutor, to travel to
the Indio courthouse. The reviewing court, asserting that defendant would not have
suffered any prejudice thereby, asserted that the trial court “overlooked the fact that in a
5
The record does not indicate whether or not there was a jury panel available in
Indio that could be summoned and sworn for the commencement of voir dire so late in
the day.
17
large and populous county like the County of Riverside, which is served by a superior
court consisting of a central criminal courthouse (the Riverside Hall of Justice) and
various outlying branch facilities (such as the Indio court), the administration of justice
and the efficient utilization of limited judicial resources may require the parties to a
criminal proceeding to travel to a distant court facility.” (Italics added.)
The Court of Appeal announced as its holding: “[W]hen, on the last day of the
statutorily prescribed time period for commencement of trial in a criminal case, a
courtroom becomes ready and available for trial in the late afternoon at a branch court
that is physically remote from the criminal calendar court at the main courthouse and that
remoteness prevents the parties and counsel from appearing for trial that day, the physical
remoteness constitutes good cause within the meaning of section 1382(a) to commence
the trial the next day at the branch court.”
We disagree with the analysis and conclusion rendered by the Court of Appeal on
the issue of good cause. As we have seen, the state bears the duty of supplying judicial
resources sufficient to bring defendants to trial within the statutory period. Extended
distances and lengthy travel time between a court‟s calendar department and remote trial
departments are circumstances that confront court administrators attempting to fulfill this
duty. Thus geography and travel time, being constant obstacles in a large county, are
conditions for which court administrators must plan. The neglect of the state in not
providing resources adequate to enable the Riverside court to bring cases to trial in a
timely manner in the face of these routine, consistent, predictable obstacles represents a
“fault or neglect of the state.” (Engram, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___ [p. 41].) This
failure to account for routine and constant circumstances cannot be compared with the
events ordinarily underlying a finding of good cause under section 1382, such as actions
on the part of the defendant that cause delay, or unexpected or one-time occurrences such
as the sudden illness of defense counsel or failure to appear by a witness who has been
subpoenaed to testify. (See Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 570.) The logistical
18
difficulty that occurred in the present case was not brought about by any failure on the
part of defendant to allocate sufficient time in which to reach a distant assigned court.
Instead, it was physically impossible for defendant to travel from the calendar court,
where he was required to appear, to the remote courtroom and judge characterized by the
district attorney as “available,” in time to commence the trial in a timely fashion.
That it was chronic court congestion that caused the problem can be seen from the
colloquy that took place between the trial court and the prosecutor concerning the court‟s
fruitless efforts to identify a single open courtroom, and the prosecutor‟s suggestion that
civil trials should come to a halt in order to avoid dismissals of the five last-day cases.
The congestion that prevailed into the last hour of the last day for trial — a condition
without which the court would not have needed to consider the efficacy of sending
defendant‟s case to the remote courthouse location — did not constitute good cause for
exceeding the statutorily prescribed period for trial.
We are unaware of any authority supporting the proposition that the geographical
distance between court facilities and the extended travel time required to reach them
constitute good cause within the meaning of section 1382, especially when the need to
resort to a distant court is caused by chronic court congestion.
In support of our own conclusion, however, we have identified one case bearing
some resemblance to the current matter, where neglect attributable to the state‟s heavy
burdens related to the administration of justice prevented the defendant from being
present in court in a timely manner. In Jackson v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d
1391 (Jackson), the last day for trial under section 1382 was February 11. The defendant
was not present when the case was called, however, because the sheriff failed to transport
the in-custody defendant to court until after the trial court‟s 9:30 a.m. deadline, following
which the trial court continued the matter due to the defendant‟s nonappearance. The
lower court viewed the sheriff‟s failure to transport the defendant to court in time to meet
the trial court‟s deadline as good cause within the meaning of section 1382, but the Court
19
of Appeal disagreed. The court observed that the right to speedy trial “cannot be stifled
by procrastination or neglect by public officials.” (Jackson, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at
p. 1393.) Although the People pointed to the logistical difficulties faced by the Los
Angeles County Sheriff‟s Department in daily transporting approximately 2,000 inmates
to court appearances throughout a large and populous county, the Court of Appeal
responded: “The risk of delay caused by those charged with official action rests with
[the] People, not the defendant.” (Id. at p. 1394.)
As suggested by the court in Jackson, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d 1391, it is the state‟s
obligation to resolve the routine logistical difficulties it faces in bringing defendants to
trial in a timely manner. As has been stated, distance and travel time between calendar
courts and trial courts are routine matters that must be taken into account by the state in
fulfilling its duties. In the present case, had the state committed sufficient resources to
criminal trials in Riverside County, it would have provided a courtroom in which
defendant actually could be brought to trial within the statutory period; it would not have
been necessary to rely upon a proposal to transfer the present case to a distant courthouse
at 4:15 p.m. on the last permissible day for trial. The circumstance that a single
courtroom and judge became available late in the afternoon of the last day for trial
somewhere in the expansive geographical area served by the Riverside County Superior
Court does not constitute “good cause” under section 1382 to delay defendant‟s trial
beyond the presumptive statutory period.6
6
The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal does not find support in the
circumstance that “had Judge Hawkins‟s courtroom [in Indio] been located at the
Riverside Hall of Justice, this case would have been brought to trial within the statutory
time period governed by section 1382(a).” Judge Hawkins‟s court was not located in the
City of Riverside, and because of the distance between Riverside and the Indio
courtroom, his courtroom simply was not available to bring defendant to trial on July 28.
20
Nor, contrary to the suggestion of the Court of Appeal, was the trial court required
to find good cause for continuance because a courtroom would be open on the day
following the expiration of the statutory period. Such a rule would undermine the periods
prescribed by the Legislature to provide substance to the defendant‟s right to a speedy
trial — at least in geographically expansive counties.
Although the Court of Appeal essentially ignored court congestion as the cause of
the delay, the People — in a slight modification of the Court of Appeal‟s analysis —
contend that, even under circumstances of chronic court congestion, “if there is an
available courtroom on the statutory last day, then a defendant can be „brought to trial.‟
However, if the parties cannot reach the courtroom due to „physical remoteness,‟ then
that is an „exceptional circumstance‟ establishing good cause for a continuance under
section 1050.” (Italics added.)
We cannot agree that distance and ordinary travel time between two courts in
which a defendant is required to appear constitute “exceptional circumstances” within the
meaning of our case law, any more than they constitute good cause. Distance and
ordinary travel time are quite distinct from the kind of extraordinary, unanticipated,
nonrecurring events, discussed in Johnson, supra, 26 Cal 3d. 557, that may constitute
“exceptional circumstances” excusing delay caused by court congestion. In that decision,
we cited a discussion appearing in the American Bar Association standards for speedy
trial: “ „Although it is fair to expect the state to provide the machinery needed to dispose
of the usual business of the courts promptly, it does not appear feasible to impose the
same requirements when certain unique, nonrecurring events have produced an
inordinate number of cases for court disposition.‟ ” (Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 571,
quoting ABA Project on Standards for Crim. Justice, Stds. Relating to Speedy Trial
(Approved Draft 1968) pp. 27-28 (ABA Standards), italics added.) For example, such
“ „unique, nonrecurring events‟ ” might include “ „a large-scale riot or other mass public
disorder‟ ” resulting in “ „an inordinate number of cases‟ ” that are simultaneously
21
scheduled for trial. (Engram, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___, fn. 12 [pp. 41-42, fn. 12]
quoting ABA Standards, p. 28.) A similar understanding of the kind of exceptional
circumstances needed to justify delay under section 1382 is found in Government Code
section 68115, subdivision (h), a provision that permits extension of the time provided for
trial in Penal Code section 1382 “[w]hen war, insurrection, pestilence, or other public
calamity, or the danger thereof, or the destruction of or danger to the building appointed
for holding the court, renders it necessary, or when a large influx of criminal cases
resulting from a large number of arrests within a short period of time threatens the
orderly operation of a superior court . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 68115.) Although other
unanticipated but less calamitous circumstances may be designated as “exceptional”
under the circumstances of a particular case, a constant feature — such as the distance
and ordinary travel time between two courthouses in which the defendant is required to
appear — cannot qualify.
In addition, as the People conceded at oral argument, their rationale would permit
disparate application of section 1382 depending upon the size of the county in which the
defendant‟s trial was proceeding. In a small county, defendants would have the benefit of
the speedy trial period specified by the statute, whereas defendants in Riverside and other
large counties would be subject to having the period extended by an additional day to
accommodate travel time.
In sum, we are not persuaded by the People‟s circular argument that, because a
trial court was not actually available to bring defendant to trial until one day following
the conclusion of the statutorily prescribed period, due to routine court congestion,
exceptional circumstances existed justifying a one-day delay. To adopt the People‟s
position would permit chronic court congestion and institutional shortcomings, such as
those we refused to condone in Engram, supra, ___ Cal.4th ___, to serve — in certain
counties —to extend routinely the periods specified by the Legislature in section 1382.
22
III
For the reasons discussed above, the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal is
reversed.
GEORGE, C. J.
WE CONCUR:
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
23
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion People v. Hajjaj
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 175 Cal.App.4th 415
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No.
S175307Date Filed: November 4, 2010
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
SuperiorCounty: Riverside
Judge: Thomas H. Cahraman
__________________________________________________________________________________
Counsel:
Rod Pacheco, District Attorney, Alan D. Tate and Matt Reilly, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff andAppellant.
Douglas G. Benedon, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Respondent.
Michael P. Judge, Public Defender (Los Angeles) and John Hamilton Scott, Deputy Public Defender as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Gary Windom, Public Defender (Riverside), Joseph J. Martinez and William A. Meronek, Deputy Public Defenders,
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Matt ReillyDeputy District Attorney
3960 Orange Street
Riverside, CA 92501
(951) 955-5400
Douglas G. Benedon
Benedon & Serlin
21700 Oxnard Street, Suite 1290
Woodland Hills, CA 91367
(818) 340-1950
Joseph J. Martinez
Deputy Public Defender
4200 Orange Street
Riverside, CA 92501
(951) 955-4382
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal reversed an order of dismissal of a criminal proceeding. This case presents the following issue: Was defendant denied his statutory right to a speedy trial where the trial court found good cause for a one-day continuance when a courtroom became available on the last day for trial but it was too far away to be reached before the normal close of business on that day?
| Date: | Citation: | Docket Number: | Category: | Status: | Cross Referenced Cases: |
| Thu, 11/04/2010 | 50 Cal. 4th 1184, 241 P.3d 828, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 | S175307 | Review - Criminal Appeal | submitted/opinion due | PEOPLE v. BYE (S178333) |
| 1 | The People (Plaintiff and Appellant) Represented by Attorney General - San Diego Office P.O. Box 85266 P.O. Box 85266 110 West "A" Street, Suite 1100 San Diego, CA |
| 2 | The People (Plaintiff and Appellant) Represented by Alan Douglas Tate Office of the Riverside County District Attorney 4075 Main Street, First Floor Riverside, CA |
| 3 | The People (Plaintiff and Appellant) Represented by Matt D. Reilly Office of the Riverside County District Attorney 3960 Orange Street Riverside, CA |
| 4 | Hajjaj, Firme Hassan (Defendant and Respondent) Represented by Appellate Defenders, Inc. 555 W. Beech Street, Suite 300 555 W. Beech Street, Suite 300 San Diego, CA |
| 5 | Hajjaj, Firme Hassan (Defendant and Respondent) Represented by Douglas G. Benedon Benedon & Serlin 21700 Oxnard Street, Suite 1290 Woodland Hills, CA |
| 6 | Judge, Michael P. (Amicus curiae) Represented by John Hamilton Scott Office of the Los Angeles County Public Defender 320 W. Temple Street, Room 590 Los Angeles, CA |
| 7 | Office of the Riverside County Public Defender (Amicus curiae) Represented by William Alan Meronek Office of the Riverside County Public Defender 4200 Orange Street Riverside, CA |
| 8 | Office of the Riverside County Public Defender (Amicus curiae) Represented by Joseph James Martinez Office of the Riverside County Public Defender 4200 Orange Street Riverside, CA |
| Opinion Authors | |
| Opinion | Chief Justice Ronald M. George |
| Dockets | |
| Aug 7 2009 | Petition for review filed Defendant and Respondent: Hajjaj, Firme HassanAttorney: Douglas G. Benedon Firme H. Hajjaj, respondent by Douglas G. Benedon, counsel |
| Aug 7 2009 | Record requested |
| Aug 10 2009 | Received Court of Appeal record one doghouse |
| Sep 30 2009 | Petition for review granted Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno and Corrigan, JJ. |
| Oct 16 2009 | Counsel appointment order filed Upon request of respondent for appointment of counsel, Douglas G. Benedon is hereby appointed to represent respondent on the appeal now pending in this court. Respondent's brief on the merits must be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date of this order. |
| Nov 10 2009 | Request for extension of time filed Douglas Benedon counsel for respondent Firme Hajjaj requesting to Dec. 15, 2009 (30 days) to file the opening brief on the merits. (to court for permission) |
| Nov 16 2009 | Extension of time granted On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including December 15, 2009. |
| Dec 11 2009 | Opening brief on the merits filed Defendant and Respondent: Hajjaj, Firme HassanAttorney: Douglas G. Benedon |
| Jan 8 2010 | Request for extension of time filed Alan Tate, Senior Deputy District Attorney, for appellant The People is requesting to February 9, 2010, to file answer brief on the merits (to court for permission) **Granted** order w/court for signature |
| Jan 14 2010 | Extension of time granted On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including February 9, 2010. |
| Feb 9 2010 | Request for extension of time filed thirty (30) days, to and including March 11, 2010, to serve and file appellant's answer brief on the merits. The People, appellant by Matt Reilly, Deputy District Attorney |
| Mar 10 2010 | Answer brief on the merits filed Plaintiff and Appellant: The PeopleAttorney: Matt D. Reilly |
| Mar 25 2010 | Request for extension of time filed ten (10) days, to and including April 9, 2010, to serve and file defendant's reply brief on the merits Firme H. Hajjaj, defendant Douglas G. Benedon, counsel |
| Mar 29 2010 | Extension of time granted On application of defendant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including April 9, 2010. |
| Apr 1 2010 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) Defendant and Respondent: Hajjaj, Firme HassanAttorney: Douglas G. Benedon |
| Apr 2 2010 | Received: Certificate of word count (Reply Brief on the Merits) from Douglas Benedon, counsel for respondent. |
| May 3 2010 | Application to file amicus curiae brief filed in support of respondent Michael P. Judge, amicus curiae by John S. Hamilton, counsel |
| May 5 2010 | Application to file amicus curiae brief filed by the Office of the Riverside County Public Defender in support of respondent. CRC 8.25(b) |
| May 6 2010 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted The application of Michael P. Judge for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondent is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within 20 days of the filing of the brief. |
| May 6 2010 | Amicus curiae brief filed Amicus curiae: Judge, Michael P.Attorney: John Hamilton Scott |
| May 12 2010 | Compensation awarded counsel Atty Benedon |
| May 12 2010 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted The application of Office of the Riverside County Public Defender for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondent is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within 20 days of the filing of the brief. |
| May 12 2010 | Amicus curiae brief filed Amicus curiae: Office of the Riverside County Public DefenderAttorney: William Alan Meronek Answer due within 20 days. |
| May 12 2010 | Request for judicial notice filed (Grant or AA case) Amicus curiae: Office of the Riverside County Public DefenderAttorney: William Alan Meronek |
| May 27 2010 | Received: letter dated May 26, 2010, indicating that no answer to amicus curiae briefs will be forthcoming from the People Matt Reilly, Deputy District Attorney |
| Sep 7 2010 | Case ordered on calendar to be argued Wednesday, October 6, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., in Fresno (at Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, 2424 Ventura Street) |
| Sep 20 2010 | Application filed Application to divide oral argument time filed by Joseph J. Martinez, counsel for amicus curiae Office of the Riverside County Public Defender. Douglas G. Benedon, counsel for respondent, has invited amicus curiae participation at argument, and is asking to share 10 minutes of time with amicus curiae. |
| Sep 22 2010 | Filed: Letter from Douglas G. Benedon, counsel for respondent Hajjaj, requesting to divide oral argument with amicus curiae Office of the Riverside County Public Defender. |
| Sep 22 2010 | Order filed The request of respondent to allocate to amicus curiae Office of the Riverside County Public Defender 10 minutes of respondent's 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted. |
| Sep 30 2010 | Request for judicial notice denied The request for judicial notice filed on May 12, 2010 by amicus curiae, the Office of the Public Defender of Los Angeles County, is denied. |
| Oct 6 2010 | Cause argued and submitted |
| Oct 18 2010 | Received: from Los Angeles Co. Public Defender Office notice to correct Judicial Ntc. order. |
| Oct 21 2010 | Order filed The order filed on September 30, 2010 is hereby amended to read in its entirety: The request for judicial notice filed on May 12, 2010 by amicus curiae, the Office of the Public Defender of Riverside County, is denied. |
| Nov 3 2010 | Notice of forthcoming opinion posted To be filed Thursday, November 4, 2010 @ 10 a.m. |
| Briefs | |
| Dec 11 2009 | Opening brief on the merits filed Defendant and Respondent: Hajjaj, Firme HassanAttorney: Douglas G. Benedon |
| Mar 10 2010 | Answer brief on the merits filed Plaintiff and Appellant: The PeopleAttorney: Matt D. Reilly |
| Apr 1 2010 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) Defendant and Respondent: Hajjaj, Firme HassanAttorney: Douglas G. Benedon |
| May 6 2010 | Amicus curiae brief filed Amicus curiae: Judge, Michael P.Attorney: John Hamilton Scott |
| May 12 2010 | Amicus curiae brief filed Amicus curiae: Office of the Riverside County Public DefenderAttorney: William Alan Meronek |
| Brief Downloads | |
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| Dec 17, 2010 Annotated by hberezin | Facts At a readiness conference on May 28, 2008 at the Riverside Hall of Justice, trial was set for June 30, 2008 on the understanding that trial could commence no later than July 7, 2008 in order to comply with both federal and state law relating to the right to a speedy trial period. On June 30, 2008 the trial was trailed until July 10, 2008 with an understanding that the last possible date to begin trial was July 14, 2008. On July 10, 2008 defense counsel moved for a continuance on the ground that the deputy public defender assigned to the case was in trial on another case. The People raised no objection. The trial was set for July 16, 2008 and the clerk noted that the last day to commence trial was July 28, 2008. On July 16, 2008 the People announced that they were not ready for trial because the deputy district attorney was assigned to another case. Defense counsel objected to any further delay, but the court determined that there was good cause for continuance and trailed the matter until July 23, 2008. On July 23, 2008 both parties announced they were ready to begin but agreed to trail the trial until July 25, 2008. Despite both parties being ready on that date, the trial court trailed the matter until July 28, 2008, due to courtroom unavailability. Throughout this time, July 28, 2008 remained the last day to commence trial. At 4:04 PM on July 28, 2008, the trial court announced that there were no courtrooms available to hear the case on that day. Defense counsel moved for dismissal due to the court’s failure to begin trial by the statutorily prescribed date. During the hearing, at 4:15 PM, the court received word that a courtroom had become open at another branch of the Riverside County Superior Court, at Indio, California, 76 miles to the east of Riverside. Because it takes one hour and twenty minutes to drive from Riverside to Indio, the trial judge stated that: “I don’t think that solves anything.” The prosecutor in Riverside stated that a District Attorney could be ready in Indio in five minutes and that, in his view, the prosecution would be ready to begin trial on that day. But the trial court dismissed the case on the grounds that a trial could not be considered commenced despite the presence of a jury ready to be impaneled, when both defendant and defendant’s counsel were not present, the District Attorney assigned to the case had no knowledge of the case, and continuing the case would violate statutory guidelines. The trial court found that there was no “good cause” for continuance. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the trial court, finding that under the circumstances of the case, the physical remoteness of the trial court constituted good cause for continuance of the trial the next day at the branch court. Procedural History Immediately after the ruling, the People refiled the charges under a different court number, but the People subsequently elected to pursue an appeal of the dismissal. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding that physical remoteness constituted good cause under the meaning of §1382 to continue the trial to the next day. The California Supreme Court granted review. Issue Holdings 2) The physical remoteness of the courtroom did not constitute good cause (or exceptional circumstances) to bring the defendant to trial beyond the statutorily mandated speedy trial period. Analysis (George, C.J.) Section 1382 provides, in relevant part: “The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown , shall order the action to be dismissed in the following cases: [¶] ... [¶] (2)In a felony case, when a defendant is not brought to trial within 60 days of the defendant's arraignment on an indictment or information…Whenever a case is set for trial beyond the 60-day period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.” (Italics added.) This section requires, in the absence of waiver or consent on the part of the defendant, dismissal when a defendant is not “brought to trial” within the statutory period, unless good cause can be shown. In deciding whether a case had been “brought to trial” in the statutory sense of the term, the California Supreme Court stated in Rhinehart v. Municipal Court, 35 Cal. 3rd 772, 200 Cal. Rptr. 916, 677 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1984) that “the phrase ‘brought to trial’ lacked a ‘talismanic’ meaning, but that a defendant has certainly not been brought to trial prior to the day when the trial is scheduled and both parties appear and announce that they are ready to proceed.” Id. at 777. The Rhinehart court was further informed by two California Appellate Court decisions, People v. Amati, 63 Cal. App. 3d 10, 134 Cal. Rptr 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) and Sanchez v. Municipal Court, 97 Cal. App. 3d 806, 159 Cal. Rptr. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). In Amati, the court found that a defendant had been brought to trial when jurors were sworn in, “so long as the panel was sworn in as a good faith start to the jury process and not as a mere device to avoid the impact of the statute.” See Amati, 63 Cal. App. 3d. at 12. In Sanchez, the court held that where “the record objectively shows that a case is assigned for trial to a judge who is available to try the case and the court has committed its resources to the trial, the parties answer ready and a panel of prospective jurors is summoned and sworn, the trial process has commenced and defendant has been ‘brought to trial’ as that term is used in §1382.” See Sanchez, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 813. Based on this, the court in Rhinehart upheld dismissal of the case when a jury was sworn in, but thereafter the trial would be delayed for a week. See Rhinehart, 35 Cal. 3rd at 779. In this way, lower courts would be prevented from merely “paying lip service” to §1382’s legislative mandate. Id. Rhinehart holds that when a court’s resources are committed to trial, the parties are ready to proceed, and jurors have been impaneled, the defendant has been brought to trial, but not when the jurors have been impaneled in order to avoid dismissal. Id. at 780. Applying Rhinehart to this case, the Supreme Court reasoned that if the trial court had assigned the case to the Indio court at 4:15 PM on July 28, 2008, Hajjaj would not have been “brought to trial” in any meaningful sense, because Hajjaj, his attorney, and the prosecutor assigned to the case could not have arrived at the courthouse by the close of business on that day. The trial court remarked that if the Indio courtroom “had been available an hour and half prior, then I would have had people on the road.” The trial court’s decision was based, not on a reluctance to ask the defendant to travel to another courthouse, but on the practical reality that the parties could not have arrived in Indio, which is 76 miles from Riverside, until after the close of business on July 28, 2008. Rhinehart requires that the vital elements in the undertaking of a trial be present in order for a defendant to be “brought to trial” under the meaning of §1382. One of these vital elements is the presence of the parties and their counsel. Without this, parties cannot be considered “ready to proceed” as required by Rhinehart. Furthermore, there are constitutional and statutory provisions requiring the defendant’s presence. Through no fault of the defense, defense and defense counsel could not have been “ready to proceed” in the Indio courtroom on July 28, 2008. For practical and legal purposes, the courtroom was unavailable on that day. Therefore, dismissal could be avoided only if there was “good cause” for a continuance. In determining good cause, courts look at (1) the nature and the strength of the justification for delay, (2) the duration of the delay and (3) prejudice resulting from any delay. The trial court is instructed to take all relevant circumstances into consideration and, significantly, the trial court’s determination is to be given broad discretion to determine whether good cause exists. An appellate court’s review is limited to the “abuse of discretion” standard. Good cause exists when the delay is caused by or occurs for the benefit of the defendant, or when there are unforeseen circumstances such as illness, unavailability of counsel or absence of a witness despite due diligence. But past jurisprudence was clear that delays based on lack of available courtrooms or judges caused by chronic congestion of the court’s docket do not constitute good cause under the statute, absent exceptional circumstances. See People v. Engram, 50 Cal. 4th 1131, 240 P.3d 237 (Cal. 2010). Furthermore, calendar congestion producing numerous last-day trials cannot be considered an exceptional circumstance. Id. at 1165. The Supreme Court found that the delays were based on chronic congestion of the court’s docket in this case. The trial court rejected the prosecution’s suggestion that criminal court judges assigned to pre-preliminary-hearing negotiated dispositions be assigned to last-day cases. In the trial court’s view, by denying these judges the right to negotiate settlements, the court’s docket would become more crowded rather than less. The trial court also rejected the prosecution’s suggestions that pro tems, drug court, or family court judges be assigned the last day cases. The trial court also rejected the idea that judges be recalled from vacation. The Supreme Court found that this exchange between the prosecution and the trial judge on July 28, 2008 was strong evidence of the of the court’s congestion on that day. The Supreme Court disagreed with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that while chronic congestion ordinarily does not constitute good cause within the meaning of §1382, the physical distance between the Riverside and Indio courts constituted good cause within the meaning of the statute and that the trial court should have granted a one-day continuance. In the Supreme Court’s view, the physical distance between different courthouses is a condition for which court administrators must plan, for it is the state which bears the duty of supplying judicial resources sufficient to bring defendants to trial within the statutory period. See Jackson v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1391, 281 Cal. Rptr. 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). And to grant a one-day continuance in this case would undermine the speedy trial periods prescribed by the legislature. The physical distance between courthouses also cannot constitute an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of Supreme Court case law. Such exceptional circumstances must be caused by certain unique, nonrecurring events. Physical distance is not such an event. A contrary application of the rule would permit disparate treatment under §1382 for defendants in large-sized counties (like Riverside County) as opposed to defendants in smaller-sized counties. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly dismissed the case. Tags: speedy trial period, statutory speedy trial period, continuance, good cause for continuance, brought to trial, constitutional right to a speedy trial, physical remoteness, extraordinary circumstances, exceptional circumstances, risk of delay, commencement of a trial, chronic congestion of courts, impaneling of jurors, available courtroom, ready to proceed Related/Cited Cases Annotation by Harry Berezin |
