IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THOMAS LEE GOLDSTEIN,
Petitioner,
S155944
v.
Ct.App. 2/3 B199147
THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
)
Los Angeles County
Respondent;
Super. Ct. No. BH004311
GRAND JURY OF LOS ANGELES
COUNTY, et al., Real Parties
in Interest.
Here we hold that California courts do not have a broad inherent power to
order disclosure of grand jury materials to private litigants. In Daily Journal
Corp. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1117 (Daily Journal), this court ruled
that “the superior court’s powers to disclose grand jury testimony are only those
which the Legislature has deemed appropriate.” (Id. at p. 1128.) “[I]f superior
courts could disclose materials based only on their inherent powers, the statutory
rules governing disclosure of grand jury testimony would be swallowed up in that
large exception.” (Ibid.)
In this case, the Court of Appeal decided that courts have inherent power to
order disclosure of grand jury materials to a private litigant, in the interests of
justice. The court distinguished Daily Journal on the basis that it involved
disclosure to the public. We reverse. The Legislature has authorized limited
1
disclosure of grand jury materials to private parties, and the Court of Appeal’s
holding creates a broad exception that would swallow the statutory rules, just as in
Daily Journal.
The Court of Appeal also held that no statute authorized the disclosure of
grand jury materials to petitioner Thomas Lee Goldstein. However, Penal Code
section 924.2 does permit the disclosure of grand jury testimony to determine
whether it is consistent with a witness’s subsequent testimony.1 Goldstein may be
able to obtain limited releases of grand jury transcripts under this provision.
BACKGROUND
In 1979 Goldstein was an engineering student and Marine Corps veteran
with no criminal history. He became a murder suspect after an eyewitness to an
unrelated shooting saw the gunman enter Goldstein’s apartment building. No
witness or forensic evidence connected Goldstein with the murder victim, but
Long Beach police detectives showed Goldstein’s photograph, among others, to
Loran Campbell, an eyewitness to the homicide. Campbell did not recognize
anyone in the photo lineup, and Goldstein did not match Campbell’s description of
the suspect. However, a detective asked if Goldstein could have been the person
Campbell saw running from the scene. Campbell said it was possible, though he
was not certain.
Goldstein was arrested and placed in a jail cell with Edward Floyd Fink, a
heroin addict and convicted felon. At Goldstein’s trial, Fink testified that
Goldstein said he was in jail because he shot a man in a dispute over money. Fink
claimed he received no benefit as a result of his testimony. Goldstein was
convicted of murder in 1980. In 1988, the Los Angeles County Grand Jury began
an investigation into the use of jailhouse informants. In 1990, it issued a public
report concluding that misuse of jailhouse informants had been pervasive over the
preceding 10 years. The grand jury found that the Los Angeles County District
1
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Attorney’s office had demonstrated a “deliberate and informed declination to take
the action necessary to curtail the misuse of jailhouse informant testimony.”
Among other deficiencies, it had failed to create a centralized index of potential
impeachment information about informants, including any benefit they received
for their testimony and their history of cooperation with law enforcement.
The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ordered that “material
accumulated and used by the 1988-89 Grand Jury and the 1989-90 Grand Jury in
their investigations of the jailhouse informants is to be kept secure by the court.
[¶] The material is not to be viewed, inspected or copied except by order of the
Presiding Judge, Assistant Presiding Judge, or the Supervising Judge of the
Criminal Division.”
After the grand jury released its report, Goldstein sought a writ of habeas
corpus in federal court. At an evidentiary hearing in August 2002, Loran
Campbell recanted his identification of Goldstein. Campbell admitted he had been
overanxious to help the police. He had identified Goldstein based on what the
police told him and his desire to be a good citizen, not on his observations on the
night of the murder. Goldstein also presented evidence that Fink had received
benefits for cooperating with law enforcement. The magistrate found Campbell
credible, and stated: “It is readily apparent to this Court that Fink fits the profile
of the dishonest jailhouse informant that the Grand Jury Report found to be highly
active in Los Angeles County at the time of [Goldstein’s] conviction.”
Goldstein’s petition was granted. He was released from custody in April of 2003,
after serving 24 years in prison.
In November 2004, Goldstein filed suit in federal court against the City of
Long Beach, four Long Beach police detectives, the County of Los Angeles, and
two members of the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office. He stated
causes of action under the federal civil rights statute, 42 United States Code
section 1983, including claims that the defendants wrongfully obtained his
3
conviction based on their pattern and practice of misusing the testimony of
jailhouse informants.
Goldstein first sought access to the grand jury material held by the court in
a February 2006 letter to the Presiding Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior
Court and the supervising judge of the court’s criminal division. Counsel for the
superior court replied that the material would not be disclosed because no statutory
exception to the rule of grand jury confidentiality appeared to apply. When
Goldstein’s counsel said he was willing to abide by a protective order limiting use
of the material to the civil rights case, court counsel evidently indicated that a
subpoena would be needed to release the grand jury material.
In July 2006, Goldstein served a federal court subpoena on the superior
court requesting production of the grand jury materials. Court counsel objected,
asking Goldstein to withdraw the subpoena and seek access under the 1990 order
of the superior court by “appropriate motion before the Presiding Judge, the
Assisting Presiding Judge, or the Supervising Judge of the Criminal Division of
the Superior Court.” Goldstein complied with this request. In September 2006 he
filed a motion seeking access to the grand jury materials under sections 924.2,
929, and 939.1.
Counsel for the County of Los Angeles responded to the motion on behalf
of the grand jury in January 2007. County counsel contended the controlling
authority was Socialist Workers Party v. Grubisic (7th Cir. 1980) 619 F.2d 641.
Grubisic requires a party seeking disclosure in a federal action to first submit a
request to the state court that supervised the grand jury, to determine if there is a
continuing need for secrecy. If not, the grand jury materials may be disclosed. If
the state court decides the materials should remain secret, the federal court then
determines whether the need for disclosure outweighs the need for secrecy, under
the test provided in Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest (1979) 441 U.S.
211, 222 (Douglas Oil). (Grubisic, supra, at p. 644.) County counsel suggested
that the court appoint a special master to review the grand jury materials and
4
recommend which records might be disclosed. Goldstein disputed the need for
secrecy and opposed the appointment of a special master, contending it would
only cause unnecessary delay.
In March 2007, the court heard argument on the motion and denied
Goldstein’s request, concluding that the statutes on which he relied did not
authorize disclosure of the grand jury materials.2 Goldstein challenged this ruling
by seeking a writ of mandate. He contended disclosure was permitted under
sections 924.2 and 929.3 The grand jury and the County responded that the
statutes did not authorize disclosure to Goldstein. The grand jury, however,
conceded that the federal court would be able to compel disclosure if the
2
County counsel appeared on behalf of the grand jury. The County and
the individual county defendants were represented by counsel that were privately
retained in Goldstein’s pending federal court civil rights action. This arrangement
of legal representation for real parties in interest continued in the Court of Appeal
and in this court. Henceforth, we refer to the county and the individual county
defendants collectively as “the County.”
3
Section 924.2 provides: “Each grand juror shall keep secret whatever he
himself or any other grand juror has said, or in what manner he or any other grand
juror has voted on a matter before them. Any court may require a grand juror to
disclose the testimony of a witness examined before the a grand jury, for the
purpose of ascertaining whether it is consistent with that given by the witness
before the court, or to disclose the testimony given before the grand jury by any
person, upon a charge against such person for perjury in giving his testimony or
upon trial therefor.”
Section 929 provides: “As to any matter not subject to privilege, with the
approval of the presiding judge of the superior court or the judge appointed by the
presiding judge to supervise the grand jury, a grand jury may make available to the
public part or all of the evidentiary material, findings, and other information relied
upon by, or presented to, a grand jury for its final report in any civil grand jury
investigation provided that the name of any person, or facts that lead to the
identity of any person who provided information to the grand jury, shall not be
released. Prior to granting approval pursuant to this section, a judge may require
the redaction or masking of any part of the evidentiary material, findings, or other
information to be released to the public including, but not limited to, the identity
of witnesses and any testimony or materials of a defamatory or libelous nature.”
5
circumstances justified it, and faulted Goldstein for failing to pursue his remedy
by way of federal subpoena.
The Court of Appeal granted Goldstein’s petition and directed the superior
court to reconsider his motion to determine whether disclosure was required in the
interests of justice, under the Douglas Oil test. The court rejected Goldstein’s
statutory claims. However, though no party had briefed the issue, it decided that
California law permitted the superior court to exercise its inherent authority to
prevent injustice in a particular case. The court relied on a quotation from a
treatise in Ex Parte Sontag (1884) 64 Cal. 526, 526 (Sontag), and decided that
Daily Journal did not apply because it concerned only public disclosure of grand
jury proceedings. We granted review.
DISCUSSION
We briefly outline the positions taken by the parties. The grand jury and
the County dispute the notion that California courts have inherent authority to
order disclosure of grand jury materials, and maintain that no statute supports
Goldstein’s request for disclosure.4 The grand jury continues to contend that
Goldstein might have obtained disclosure by pursuing a federal court subpoena.5
In its reply brief, however, the grand jury concedes it is unclear whether the
4
The County also argues that Goldstein’s statutory claims are beyond the
scope of our grant of review. However, we “may decide any issues that are raised
or fairly included in the petition or answer.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.516(b)(1).) Goldstein did include his statutory arguments in his answer to the
petition for review, and they are properly before us.
5
The grand jury claims there is no apparent reason for Goldstein’s failure
to present the superior court with a federal subpoena in connection with his motion
for disclosure. It asserts that this failure deprived the trial court of the opportunity
to address “the potentially dispositive effect of U.S. District Court process.”
However, the record clearly establishes that Goldstein did present the court with a
federal subpoena. Then, at the court’s specific request, he withdrew his subpoena
and followed the court’s direction to proceed by motion instead.
6
federal court could compel disclosure if the state court were to rule that the grand
jury materials should remain confidential. 6
Goldstein claims the Court of Appeal’s decision does not conflict with
Daily Journal, and is consistent with the statutory scheme governing the release of
grand jury materials. Alternatively, he argues that even if courts lack inherent
power to order disclosure to private litigants, statutory authority for the discovery
he seeks is found in sections 924.2 and 929.
The law regarding disclosure of evidentiary materials gathered by a grand
jury was comprehensively analyzed in two decisions by this court, Daily Journal,
supra, 20 Cal.4th 1117, and McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court (1988) 44
Cal.3d 1162 (McClatchy). In McClatchy, we noted: “The California grand jury
has three basic functions: to weigh criminal charges and determine whether
indictments should be returned (§ 917); to weigh allegations of misconduct against
public officials and determine whether to present formal accusations requesting
their removal from office (§ 922; see Gov. Code, § 3060 et seq.); and to act as the
public’s ‘watchdog’ by investigating and reporting upon the affairs of local
government (e.g., §§ 919, 925 et seq.). Of these functions, the watchdog role is by
far the one most often played by the modern grand jury in California. [Citations.]”
(McClatchy, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1170.)
6 The County vigorously contends that federal law affords no basis for
compelling disclosure in contravention of state law. Goldstein argues that the
federal court may compel disclosure by the superior court, and urges us not to
grant state court litigants a lesser right of access to grand jury materials than is
available in federal court.
Goldstein is, of course, free to renew his attempt to obtain discovery by
federal subpoena. Because he withdrew his subpoena below, we have no occasion
to consider the extent of federal court authority to compel disclosure over the
objection of a state court. We note, however, that there is a conflict in the federal
cases on this point. (Compare Socialist Workers Party v. Grubisic, supra, 619
F.2d at pp. 644-645, with Camiolo v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. (3d Cir. 2003)
334 F.3d 345, 359, fn. 10.)
7
McClatchy arose from a decision by a civil grand jury to make public the
evidentiary materials it gathered during an investigation into Fresno County’s
award of a computer service contract. The superior court struck the portion of the
grand jury report announcing the intended disclosure, and sealed the evidentiary
materials. (McClatchy, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1167-1168.) The Court of Appeal
ordered release of the materials, reasoning that a court may refuse to file a grand
jury report only when the grand jury has violated an explicit statutory limitation.
(Id. at p. 1169.) This court disagreed, holding that the superior court acted
properly to ensure the grand jury did not exceed its statutory authority. (Id. at p.
1184.)
Reviewing the statutes governing the functions of the grand jury, we
concluded that the Legislature intended to incorporate the common law tradition
of preserving the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. (McClatchy, supra, 44 Cal.3d
at pp. 1172-1174.) The interests underlying that tradition were identified in
Douglas Oil: “First, if preindictment proceedings were made public, many
prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing
that those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony. Moreover,
witnesses who appeared before the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully
and frankly, as they would be open to retribution as well as to inducements. There
would also be the risk that those about to be indicted would flee, or would try to
influence individual grand jurors to vote against indictment. Finally, by
preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that persons who are accused
but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule.” (Douglas
Oil, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 219, fn. omitted; see McClatchy, at pp. 1174-1175.)
The
McClatchy court observed that “the encouragement of candid
testimony and the protection of witnesses and their reputations are best achieved
when secrecy is maintained even after the conclusion of a grand jury
investigation.” (McClatchy, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1175.) It also emphasized that
secrecy is essential for both the indictment and “watchdog” functions of the grand
8
jury. “The importance of secrecy is well established in the context of the grand
jury’s criminal indictment function. By the same token, when the grand jury
conducts a watchdog investigation of local government operations as in the instant
case, secrecy appears equally vital. Compared with indictment proceedings, the
efficacy and credibility of watchdog investigations no less require that witnesses
testify without fear of reproach by their peers or their superiors. Though the
watchdog investigation and report serve a different social purpose than the
criminal indictment, eliciting candid testimony is obviously critical to both
functions of the grand jury.” (Ibid.) “Secrecy also serves to protect the
reputations of those who may be unjustly accused during the course of a watchdog
investigation.” (Id. at p. 1176.)
“Recognizing the important purposes served by grand jury secrecy, the
Legislature has enumerated only three situations in which disclosure of raw
evidentiary materials is permitted. First, by court order the testimony of a witness
may be disclosed to determine whether it is consistent with testimony given before
the court or when relevant to a charge of perjury. (§ 924.2; [citation].) Secondly,
section 938.1, subdivision (b), provides that when an indictment is returned,
transcripts of testimony taken before the grand jury are to be delivered to the
defendant and thereafter filed for public access. [Citation]. [¶] And finally,
evidentiary materials gathered by one grand jury may be disclosed to a succeeding
grand jury. (§ 924.4. . . .) Section 924.4 represents the grand jury’s only statutory
authority to undertake disclosure of its evidentiary materials on its own
initiative.”7 (McClatchy, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1178, fns. omitted.)
In
McClatchy, we rejected the idea that the grand jury has intrinsic power to
disclose evidentiary material to the public. “Broad though they are, the grand
jury’s powers are only those which the Legislature has deemed appropriate.”
7
Ten years after the McClatchy decision, the Legislature passed section
929, which provides civil grand juries with an avenue for releasing evidentiary
materials, though the scope of disclosure is strictly limited.
9
(McClatchy, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1179.) We noted several statutes indicating
that the Legislature intentionally withheld from grand juries the statutory authority
to disclose raw evidentiary materials. Section 939.1, for instance, provides for a
grand jury to hold public proceedings only upon a joint request by the foreman and
the district attorney or Attorney General, and with the superior court’s approval.
(McClatchy, at p. 1179.) Most significantly, section 924.4 permits evidence to be
passed on to a succeeding grand jury, indicating that statutory authority is required
even for this limited form of disclosure. The legislative history of section 924.4
showed that its enactment was a response to the preexisting prohibition on the
disclosure of evidence by a grand jury. That prohibition would apply with even
more force to public disclosure. “[F]urther, if before section 924.4 was enacted in
1975 the grand jury was actually empowered to disclose evidence and other
materials as it pleased, the Legislature’s grant of specific authority to release such
materials to succeeding grand juries would have been unnecessary and the
enactment of section 924.4 meaningless.” (McClatchy, at p. 1181.)
In
Daily Journal, we concluded that the superior court as well as the grand
jury itself has no general inherent power to disclose evidentiary materials, for the
same reasons discussed in McClatchy. “To paraphrase McClatchy: Broad though
they are, the superior court’s powers to disclose grand jury testimony are only
those which the Legislature has deemed appropriate.” (Daily Journal, supra, 20
Cal.4th at p. 1128.) The Daily Journal case began when the superior court
responded to media requests by ordering the disclosure of all transcripts and
documents from a criminal grand jury investigation into an investment banking
firm’s underwriting of Orange County debt offerings. (Id. at pp. 1120-1121.) The
Court of Appeal held that the superior court had acted within its “inherent power
to order the release of otherwise secret grand jury materials whenever the
advantages gained by secrecy are outweighed by a public interest in disclosure.”
(Id. at p. 1121.)
10
We reversed, following the contours of the McClatchy analysis. We noted
two other statutes authorizing disclosure, in addition to those mentioned in
McClatchy. If a grand jury returns no indictment, section 924.6 permits the court
that impaneled the grand jury to disclose relevant and admissible evidence to the
parties in a pending or subsequent criminal proceeding. (Daily Journal, supra, 20
Cal.4th at pp. 1127-1128, fn. 6.) And section 929, enacted in 1998, authorizes a
civil grand jury, with the court’s approval, to release unprivileged evidentiary
materials to the public, so long as the names of witnesses and any facts identifying
the witnesses are withheld. (Daily Journal, at p. 1124; for the text of § 929, see
fn. 3, ante.) We also reviewed earlier cases adhering to the limits set by the
Legislature on the disclosure of grand jury proceedings (People v. Tinder (1862)
19 Cal. 539, 545; Sontag, supra, 64 Cal. at pp. 527-528), and on the powers of the
grand jury in general (Allen v. Payne (1934) 1 Cal.2d 607, 608-609). (Daily
Journal, at pp. 1124-1125; see also McClatchy, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1179.)
In
Daily Journal, as in McClatchy, we rested our holding on the need to
maintain the integrity of the statutory provisions governing disclosure of grand
jury materials. “[I]f superior courts could disclose materials based only on their
inherent powers, the statutory rules governing disclosure of grand jury testimony
would be swallowed up in that large exception.” (Daily Journal, supra, 20 Cal.4th
at p. 1128; see McClatchy, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1181.) “Under the legislative
scheme, once it has impaneled and charged the grand jury, the superior court’s
powers are narrowly circumscribed; it has very limited authority to review the
grand jury’s work and none to dictate its functions. (See Pen. Code, §§ 915-944.)
Thus, . . . we conclude that whatever exercise of authority to disclose grand jury
materials has not been expressly permitted by the Legislature is prohibited.”
(Daily Journal, at pp. 1128-1129.)
Goldstein argues that the Court of Appeal properly distinguished
McClatchy and Daily Journal on the basis that they involved disclosures to the
public, rather than to a private litigant. We disagree. The statutory scheme
11
governs disclosure to litigants (§§ 924.2, 924.6, 938.1) as well as to the public
(§§ 929, 938.1, 939.1). If the courts had broad inherent authority to release grand
jury materials to litigants in the interests of justice, there would be no need for the
statutes permitting disclosure in limited circumstances. We have not distinguished
between public and private disclosure. Indeed, we relied on the statutes governing
disclosure to litigants to support our holdings restricting public disclosure in both
McClatchy and Daily Journal.
Preserving the secrecy of watchdog grand jury proceedings furthers
important public interests: witnesses are encouraged to provide candid testimony
free from outside influence, and the reputations of those who may be unjustly
accused are protected. (McClatchy, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1176.) These
considerations are fully applicable when disclosure is sought by a private litigant.
Witnesses may very well fear the effects of disclosure to parties interested in the
subject of a grand jury investigation, and the reputations of those under
investigation may be damaged by revelations made in the course of litigation.
Vesting the courts with wide discretion to overlook statutory restrictions on
disclosure and provide private parties with access to grand jury evidentiary
materials “in the interests of justice” would not only place those secrecy interests
at risk; it would also pull the teeth from the statutory limitations.
The Court of Appeal relied on Douglas Oil, supra, 441 U.S. 211, and
Sontag, supra, 64 Cal. 525, in ruling that state courts have inherent authority to
order the disclosure of grand jury materials in the interests of justice. Neither of
these cases, however, supports that conclusion. In Douglas Oil, civil litigants in
an antitrust case sought transcripts from a criminal grand jury investigation.
(Douglas Oil, at p. 213.) The Douglas Oil court, after noting the interests served
by grand jury secrecy (see p. 8, ante), observed: “At the same time, it has been
recognized that in some situations justice may demand that discrete portions of
transcripts be made available for use in subsequent proceedings. [Citation.]
Indeed, recognition of the occasional need for litigants to have access to grand jury
12
transcripts led to the provision in Fed. Rule Crim.Proc. 6(e)(2)(C)(i) that
disclosure of grand jury transcripts may be made ‘when so directed by a court
preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.’ ” (Douglas Oil, at
pp. 219-220.)
The
Douglas Oil test for determining when the traditional secrecy of the
grand jury may be broken, 8 and the cases on which the court relied in formulating
that test, depend on the authority of the federal rule governing disclosure. (Fed.
Rules Crim.Proc., rule 6(e), 18 U.S.C.; Douglas Oil, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 222;
United States v. Procter & Gamble (1958) 356 U.S. 677, 679, fn. 1, 682, fn. 5;
Dennis v. United States (1966) 384 U.S. 855, 869-870.) There is no similar
California provision for disclosure “ ‘when so directed by a court.’ ”9 (Douglas
Oil, at p. 220; see current Fed. Rules Crim.Proc., rule 6(e)(3)(E), 18 U.S.C.;
People v. Superior Court (Mouchaourab) (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 403, 427.) The
Court of Appeal believed the broad terms of the federal rule merely reflect the
judiciary’s “inherent responsibility to prevent injustice.” California, however, has
taken a different approach. Our statutes give the courts discretion to order
disclosure only in limited circumstances. As McClatchy and Daily Journal make
clear, when the Legislature has placed specific restrictions on the release of grand
jury materials, and refrained from providing the courts with general authority to go
8
“Parties seeking grand jury transcripts under Rule 6(e) must show that the
material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial
proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued
secrecy, and that their request is structured to cover only material so needed.”
(Douglas Oil, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 222.)
9
The only arguably analogous provision in the California statutes was
deleted by the Legislature in 1983. Earlier, the grand juror’s oath included a
promise not to disclose things said before the grand jury “except when required in
the due course of judicial proceedings.” (Former § 911, as amended by Stats.
1975, ch. 289, § 1, p. 743; see Sontag, supra, 64 Cal. at pp. 527-528.) The 1983
amendments to section 911 omitted this exception. (Stats. 1983, ch. 111, § 4, p.
280.)
13
further, there is no room for the courts to fashion broadly applicable standards like
those articulated in Douglas Oil.
The
Sontag opinion says nothing different. There, in proceedings to set
aside an indictment, a grand juror was held in contempt of court for refusing to
disclose whether he voted for the indictment. This court observed: “The form of
the oath, in general use for centuries, binds the grand juror to preserve inviolate
the secrets of the grand jury room. Public policy would seem to forbid vain
disclosures made to gratify idle curiosity. ‘But,’ says Thompson and Merriam,
‘when, for the purposes of public justice, or for the protection of private rights, it
becomes necessary, in a court of justice, to disclose the proceedings of the grand
jury, the better authorities now hold that this may be done. . . .’ (Thom. & Mer. on
Juries, § 703.)” (Sontag, supra, 64 Cal. at p. 526.)
The Court of Appeal seized on the last sentence quoted above as authority
for its holding. However, the Sontag court dispelled any notion that California
courts have broad inherent power to order the disclosure of grand jury proceedings
in the interests of justice. It noted that some cases cited by the Thompson and
Merriam treatise permitted grand jurors to disclose whether there were 12 votes
for indictment, but others forbade such inquiry, and no case held that grand jurors
could be compelled to reveal their own votes. (Sontag, supra, 64 Cal. at pp. 526-
527.) The court did not then formulate a judicial disclosure policy. To the
contrary, it declared: “In this State the whole matter is regulated by statute.”10
(Id. at p. 527.)
10
Whether this statement in Sontag is taken as a reference to disclosure of
grand jury proceedings in general (see Daily Journal, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p.
1124), or read more narrowly as a statement about the matters an individual grand
juror may be compelled to disclose, it is inconsistent with the “interests of justice”
exception created by the Court of Appeal. The defendant in Sontag asserted that
justice required disclosure of the grand juror’s vote. As discussed above, the
Sontag court rejected that claim and adhered to the limited statutory exceptions to
the rule of grand jury secrecy.
14
The governing statute then, as now, prohibited grand jurors from disclosing
their votes. (Sontag, supra, 64 Cal. at p. 527; see § 924.2.) The Sontag court
noted that the statutes recognized exceptions only to permit testing the consistency
of witnesses’ grand jury testimony with their subsequent testimony. (Sontag, at p.
527.) The court rejected the argument that in the case before it, the grand juror’s
testimony was required for purposes of the defendant’s motion to set aside the
indictment. “The mere inconvenience or difficulty of proving the fact ought not to
overrule the many grave objections to a procedure not only not directly authorized,
but expressly forbidden by the Code, which may interfere with the complete
freedom of exposure of alleged offenses which it is the design of the institution of
grand juries to secure, and conflict with other principles of public policy which are
subserved by keeping inviolate the secrets of the grand jury room — except when
their disclosure is absolutely necessary.” (Sontag, at p. 528.)
Neither the Court of Appeal nor Goldstein, in his briefing here, relied on
the Sontag court’s mention of absolute necessity, and for obvious reasons. The
Court of Appeal did not restrict its rule permitting disclosure of grand jury
materials to instances of absolute necessity. Goldstein, as the grand jury points
out, has the grand jury report and was able to secure his release on habeas corpus
without the evidentiary materials he is seeking for use in his civil rights lawsuit.
Thus, it is apparent that his position is not one of necessity, but of “mere
inconvenience or difficulty of proving the fact[s]” needed to make his civil case in
federal court. (Sontag, supra, 64 Cal. at p. 528.)11
11
This court has on one other occasion noted, in dicta, a potential
nonstatutory avenue of disclosure. In Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976) 17
Cal.3d 107 (overruled on another point in People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th
96, 131), the court observed that “there may be cases of urgent and particularized
need in which those policies [supporting grand jury secrecy] must be made to
yield to some extent in order to accommodate the demands of truth and fairness in
civil litigation.” (Shepherd, at p. 127.) Shepherd cited federal law to support this
“ ‘compelling necessity’ ” exception. (Ibid., quoting United States v. Procter &
Footnote continued on next page
15
We turn now to Goldstein’s statutory claims, which were summarily
rejected by the Court of Appeal. Goldstein relies, as he did below, on sections
924.2 and 929. While the Court of Appeal properly found no basis for disclosure
under section 929, we conclude that section 924.2 does apply to Goldstein’s
request, though not as broadly as he asserts.
Section 929 was enacted in 1998, years after the issuance of the grand jury
report at issue here. Even if it were applicable to Goldstein’s request (see
Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 230-
231), this statute allows a grand jury, with court approval, to make evidentiary
materials “available to the public” after redacting the names of witnesses and any
information reflecting their identity. (§ 929.) Here, the 1990 grand jury
performed no such redaction, and released no information to the public. Rather, it
specified that the materials “be preserved under secure conditions.” The trial court
order implementing this directive strictly prohibited viewing, inspection, or
copying except by permission of the court. Thus, neither the grand jury nor the
Footnote continued from previous page
Gamble, supra, 356 U.S. at p. 682.) For reasons discussed above, federal
authority is not persuasive on this point. (See p. 13, ante.) However, such a
limited exception might be deemed consistent with the Sontag court’s dictum
contemplating disclosure when “absolutely necessary.” (Sontag, supra, 64 Cal. at
p. 528.)
We have no occasion in this case to consider the viability of such a narrow
exception. Nor did we in Daily Journal, where we reviewed a sweeping ruling
that courts could order disclosure whenever the benefits of releasing grand jury
materials outweigh the advantages of maintaining secrecy. (Daily Journal, supra,
20 Cal.4th at pp. 1121-1122.) We leave for another day whether a private litigant
may obtain disclosure of grand jury materials without express statutory
authorization, on a showing of absolute necessity. Arguably, there might be
circumstances in which such an exception could operate without eroding the
interests served by grand jury secrecy. (See, e.g., People v. Superior Court
(Mouchaourab), supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 427-434.) This, however, is not
such a case.
16
court made evidentiary materials “available to the public,” and section 929 would
not permit the discovery Goldstein seeks.
Goldstein has a better argument under section 924.2, which allows “[a]ny
court [to] require a grand juror to disclose the testimony of a witness examined
before the grand jury, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is consistent with
that given by the witness before the court.” Goldstein overstates the scope of this
statute, which permits disclosure only for impeachment of witnesses, not for
general discovery. However, his claim that section 924.2 applies to transcripts of
grand jury testimony has merit.
The Court of Appeal ruled that section 924.2 “has no application here,”
observing that the statute was meant to limit the circumstances in which grand
jurors could be called as witnesses. This reading of the statute is unduly
restrictive. As Goldstein notes, the relevant provisions of section 924.2 date from
a period when grand jury proceedings were not transcribed. (See Stats. 1851, ch.
29, § 218, pp. 235-236; former section 926, enacted in 1872; Sontag, supra, 64
Cal. at p. 527; People v. Superior Court (Mouchaourab), supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at
p. 416.) When the Legislature did provide for transcription, it evidently did so to
facilitate the use of grand jury testimony for impeachment purposes.12
12
“Provision for the recording of grand jury proceedings was first added to
the Penal Code in 1897. At that time, the Legislature authorized the reporting and
transcribing of testimony in criminal cases by amending former section 925 to
provide that ‘[t]he grand jury, on the demand of the District Attorney, whenever
criminal causes are being investigated before them, must appoint a competent
stenographic reporter to report the testimony that may be given in such causes in
shorthand, and reduce the same afterward, upon the request of the said District
Attorney, to longhand; a copy of the said testimony so taken must be delivered to
the defendant in any such criminal cause upon the arraignment after indictment of
the said defendant.’ (Stats. 1897, ch. 142, p. 204; In re Kennedy (1904) 144 Cal.
634, 635.) The reporting of testimony was deemed to be ‘for the benefit of the
district attorney — probably for the purpose of preventing witnesses of a certain
character from safely giving testimony before the trial jury differently from that
Footnote continued on next page
17
Given this background, section 924.2 should not be construed to bar the use
of transcripts of grand jury witness testimony. “ ‘[O]ur task is to select the
construction that comports most closely with the Legislature’s apparent intent,
with a view to promoting rather than defeating the [statute’s] general purpose, and
to avoid a construction that would lead to unreasonable, impractical, or arbitrary
results.’ ” (Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training v. Superior Court
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 278, 290; see also People v. Superior Court (Mouchaourab),
supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 428.) It would be unreasonable to require grand jurors
to appear at trial to provide their recollections of witness testimony, when
transcripts of that testimony are readily available.
The Court of Appeal also reasoned that Goldstein made no claim that a
witness at his federal trial would give testimony inconsistent with the witness’s
grand jury testimony. However, section 924.2 does not require a party to make a
showing or claim of conflicting testimony without access to the transcripts in some
form. The statute contemplates disclosure “for the purpose of ascertaining
whether [grand jury testimony] is consistent with that given by the witness before
the court.” (§ 924.2, italics added.)
Thus, the Court of Appeal erred by holding that section 924.2 does not
apply to Goldstein’s request for disclosure. But Goldstein goes too far by arguing
that section 924.2 does not restrict the trial court’s discretion over the extent of the
grand jury material that may be disclosed. He claims that all the grand jury
transcripts and other evidentiary materials may be released to him under section
924.2. Nothing in the statutory language supports that interpretation, which would
entirely “swallow[] up” the limited provisions for disclosure prescribed by the
Legislature. (Daily Journal, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1128.) It would transform this
Footnote continued from previous page
which they have given before the grand jury.’ (144 Cal. at p. 638.)” (People v.
Superior Court (Mouchaourab), supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 416.)
18
narrow exception, expressly confined to impeachment, into a general discovery
provision.
The trial court denied Goldstein’s request under section 924.2 in part
because no witness was before it. The court correctly interpreted the statute in this
respect. Section 924.2 permits disclosure only for purposes of impeachment. It
does not authorize a litigant to obtain unlimited disclosure in advance of a
witness’s testimony. To preserve the narrow scope of the statute, the appropriate
procedure is for the witness to testify first. Counsel may then request the court to
examine the transcript of that witness’s grand jury testimony in camera, to
determine if it provides potentially relevant impeachment material. If it does, the
court may release the relevant pages to counsel, with a protective order restricting
the use of the material to impeachment.
We leave it for the superior court and the federal district court, with the
cooperation of the parties, to sort out additional appropriate procedures for
providing Goldstein with access to the testimony of grand jury witnesses under
section 924.2, should he seek that limited form of disclosure.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.
CORRIGAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
19
CONCURRING OPINION BY KENNARD, J.
I concur in the majority opinion, which I have signed. I write briefly to
express my view on a question that the majority opinion does not decide (see maj.
opn., ante, at p. 15, fn. 11) but that, in my view, merits clarification: the extent to
which a trial court retains nonstatutory power to order disclosure of grand jury
proceedings.
In Ex Parte Sontag (1884) 64 Cal. 525 (Sontag), this court stated that
“principles of public policy . . . are subserved by keeping inviolate the secrets of
the grand jury room — except when their disclosure is absolutely necessary.” (Id.
at p. 528, italics added.) Almost a century later, in Shepherd v. Superior Court
(1976) 17 Cal.3d 107, this court suggested that “there may be cases of urgent and
particularized need” in which the policies underlying grand jury secrecy “must be
made to yield to some extent in order to accommodate the demands of truth and
fairness in civil litigation.” (Id. at p. 127.) Read together, these two decisions
imply that courts may order disclosure of grand jury materials based on a showing
of absolute necessity by the party requesting disclosure.
But thereafter, in Daily Journal Corp. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th
1117 (Daily Journal), this court held that “the superior court’s powers to disclose
grand jury testimony are only those which the Legislature has deemed
appropriate.” (Id. at p. 1128.) We explained: “By enacting the statutes governing
the ‘exceptional cases’ [(Sontag, supra, 64 Cal. at p. 527)] in which a court may
1
order disclosure of grand jury materials, the Legislature has, in effect, occupied
the field; absent express legislative authorization, a court may not require
disclosure.” (Id. at pp. 1124-1125.) And today this court, echoing its holding in
Daily Journal, concludes that “the superior court as well as the grand jury itself
has no general inherent power to disclose evidentiary materials” that have been
presented before the grand jury. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.) In the wake of these
two decisions, is the “absolute necessity” exception discussed earlier still a viable
concept? I think it is.
It is true that the governing statutory scheme permits disclosure of grand
jury proceedings only in certain circumstances specified by statute. (See Daily
Journal, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 1122-1124; McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior
Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1162, 1178.) But the Legislature cannot preclude such
disclosure when preclusion would deny the requesting party the right to due
process guaranteed under the state and federal Constitutions. Only in that
circumstance does a trial court retain the power to order disclosure of grand jury
proceedings.1
1
Of note here is the Court of Appeal’s decision in People v. Superior Court
(Mouchaourab) (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 403. There, the petitioners, who had been
indicted on various charges, sought disclosure of the prosecutor’s opening
remarks, closing remarks, and argument, as well as the superior court’s answers to
questions asked by members of the grand jury. According to the petitioners, this
information was necessary to prepare their motions to dismiss the indictments.
(Pen. Code, § 995.) The majority held that the authority to order discovery of
these materials was implicit in the statutory scheme allowing a defendant to move
to set aside a grand jury indictment “on the basis that the district attorney failed to
advise of exculpatory evidence or failed to advise as to the limited admissibility of
evidence.” (Mouchaourab, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 428.) Writing separately,
Justice Mihara observed in his concurring opinion that the right to discover the
materials in question arose not from the statutory scheme but “from the California
Constitution’s guarantee of due process.” (Id. at p. 441 (conc. opn. of Mihara, J.).)
2
Here, petitioner does not rely on the absolute necessity exception, nor does
he contend that to deny him access to the grand jury materials at issue would
violate his right to due process under the state and federal Constitutions. Rather,
he asks this court to affirm the holding by the Court of Appeal in this case that the
trial court possessed, and should have exercised, the broad power to disclose such
materials in the interests of justice. But, as the majority opinion points out, “[t]he
Legislature has authorized limited disclosure of grand jury materials to private
parties, and the Court of Appeal’s holding creates a broad exception that would
swallow the statutory rules.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.)
KENNARD,
J.
3
CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J.
If his allegations are to be believed, Thomas Lee Goldstein suffered an
injustice as a result of the failure of our judicial system that is difficult to conceive
— serving 24 years in prison for a crime he did not commit — and now seeks
through a civil lawsuit to gain some small measure of the justice that has
previously eluded him. I agree with the majority that the strong policy in favor of
grand jury secrecy generally does not permit discovery of grand jury transcripts
and materials except for that which fits into the narrow categories defined by
statute. I also agree with the majority that Penal Code section 924.21 is one
avenue Goldstein may use to access grand jury materials. But as the majority also
acknowledges, its position, and that of courts of the state for over 125 years, is
consistent with a recognition of an “absolute necessity” exception to the rule
against discovery of grand jury materials. (See Ex Parte Sontag (1884) 64 Cal.
525, 526, 528-529 (Sontag).) I write separately to affirm that there is indeed such
an absolute necessity exception, and to explain in my view what showing a civil
litigant must make in order to fit within that exception.
We affirmed in Daily Journal Corp. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th
1117, 1129) that “whatever exercise of authority to disclose grand jury materials
has not been expressly permitted by the Legislature is prohibited.” (See also
1
All statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated.
1
McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1162, 1179
(McClatchy).) Yet “it is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not
considered.” (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1176.) Neither Daily
Journal nor McClatchy, both of which involved requests by the press for public
disclosure of grand jury materials, considered a case in which nondisclosure would
cause injustice to a civil or criminal litigant. As explained below, our cases
strongly suggest that disclosure would be available on the proper showing of need
and the resulting injustice if disclosure is not made, and when the disclosure would
not undermine the goals underlying grand jury secrecy.
As an initial matter, this court has long recognized “common law principles
as supplementary to the applicable California statutes relating to grand juries.”
(People v. Superior Court (1973 Grand Jury) (1975) 13 Cal.3d 430, 440, fn. 11;
see also Fitts v. Superior Court (1936) 6 Cal.2d 230, 240-241.) In Fitts, the court
concluded that the concurrence of 12 grand jurors was necessary to return an
accusation against a public official. Although no statute spoke to the issue, the
court based its conclusion on the common law. “The grand jury system is a
product of the common law. . . . The members of the first constitutional
convention in providing for a grand jury must have had in mind the grand jury as
known to the common law. . . . The convention of 1879, like the convention of
1849, by failing to make further provisions as to the grand jury left to the
legislature all questions affecting the grand jury not expressly covered by the
Constitution. The Constitution of 1879 did not attempt to change the historic
character of the grand jury, and the system its members had in mind was evidently
the same system that had come down to them from the common law. It is in no
sense a statutory grand jury as distinguished from the common-law grand jury as
claimed by the respondents.” (Fitts, supra, 6 Cal.2d at pp. 240-241.)
2
We have also recognized that common law principles should be employed
as a means of interpreting statutes related to grand jury secrecy. (McClatchy,
supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1172-1173.) Although grand jury secrecy was the rule
under common law, an exception was recognized under certain circumstances
when a breach of secrecy is in furtherance of justice. As stated in an 1882 treatise
more or less contemporaneous with our second constitutional convention, and
quoted in Sontag: “But when, for the purposes of public justice, or for the
protection of private rights, it becomes necessary, in a court of justice, to disclose
the proceedings of the grand jury, the better authorities now hold that this may be
done,” subject to certain exceptions. (Thompson & Merriam, On the Organization
and Conduct of Juries (1882) § 703, p. 740 (Thompson & Merriam), quoted in
Sontag, supra, 64 Cal. at p. 526.) The “better authorities” to which the treatise
refers are state judicial authorities reflecting the development of the common law.
(Thompson & Merriam, supra, at p. 740, fn. 4, and cases cited therein.) In Sontag,
the question was whether a defendant attempting to have his indictment set aside
could require a grand juror to declare whether he voted for the indictment.
(Sontag, supra, 64 Cal. at p. 526.) After quoting the treatise above, the court
discussed various cases and treatises that addressed that particular question and
then declared that “[i]n this State the whole matter is regulated by statute.” (Id. at
p. 527.) It proceeded to expound on former section 903, which, inter alia,
expressly prohibited grand jurors from disclosing how they or other grand jurors
voted.
The Sontag court then concluded: “It is contended that the right to move on
the ground that the indictment was not properly found necessarily includes the
right to prove the fact by the testimony of those only who can know the fact. But
there are many legal rights which cannot be established by certain witnesses. . . .
The mere inconvenience or difficulty of proving the fact ought not to overrule the
3
many grave objections to a procedure not only not directly authorized, but
expressly forbidden by the Code, which may interfere with the complete freedom
of exposure of alleged offenses which it is the design of the institution of grand
juries to secure, and conflict with other principles of public policy which are
subserved by keeping inviolate the secrets of the grand jury room — except when
their disclosure is absolutely necessary.” (Sontag, supra, 64 Cal. at p. 528, italics
added.)
In Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 107, plaintiffs sued the
City of Emeryville and various city officials in connection with the alleged
wrongful death of their son at the hands of several Emeryville police officers.
They sought to discover materials in the possession of the Alameda County
District Attorney that had been presented to the Alameda County Grand Jury,
which had refused to return an indictment against the police officers. (Id. at
pp. 113-114.) The court rejected the Alameda County District Attorney’s
argument that denial of the grand jury material was supported by United States v.
Procter & Gamble (1958) 356 U.S. 677, 683 (Procter & Gamble), in which the
court held that wholesale discovery of grand jury transcripts were not available
absent a “compelling necessity.” First, the Shepherd court pointed out that the
plaintiff did not “seek to learn what evidence was or was not presented to the
grand jury, or the content of that body’s deliberations upon it. What she seeks are
materials which may or may not have been so presented. We do not perceive that
any significant derogation of the policies underlying grand jury secrecy is here at
stake.” (Shepherd, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 127.) Second, “as the high court was
careful to point out, there may be cases of urgent and particularized need in which
those policies [of secrecy] must be made to yield to some extent in order to
accommodate the demands of truth and fairness in civil litigation. Although the
‘ “indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings” [citation] must not be broken
4
except where there is a compelling necessity[,] [t]here are instances when that
need will outweigh the countervailing policy.’ (Proctor & Gamble, supra, 356
U.S. 677, 682.)” (Shepherd, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 127.)
In People v. Superior Court (Mouchaourab) (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 403,
the court held that, despite the lack of an express statutory provision, the capacity
of defendants to reasonably set aside their indictments pursuant to section 995
would be undermined if such defendants were forbidden to discover
nontestimonial grand jury materials, including oral and written advisements given
the grand jury by the district attorney. (Id. at pp. 435-436.) The court recognized
a rule permitting defendants to grand jury discovery material “necessary to . . .
bring a section 995 motion to set aside [their] indictment.” (Id. at p. 436.) The
majority in the present case correctly recognize that this case serves as an example
of an absolute necessity exception that “could operate without eroding the interests
served by grand jury secrecy.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 15-16, fn. 11.)
The recognition of a common law “absolute” or “compelling” necessity
exception to the grand jury secrecy rule is consistent with the development of the
law in other jurisdictions. For example, in State v. Hartfield (Or. 1981) 624 P.2d
588, the Oregon Supreme Court considered whether a defendant could obtain a
tape recording of the state’s chief witness given to the grand jury that had indicted
the defendant. The trial court had refused such access, finding no statutory
authorization for such a disclosure. The Supreme Court reversed. It noted that
there were two statutory exceptions to grand jury secrecy under the relevant
statute, Oregon Revised Statutes section 132.220, which provides: “A member of
a grand jury may be required by any court to disclose: [¶] (1) The testimony of a
witness examined before the grand jury, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it
is consistent with that given by the witness before the court. [¶] (2) The
testimony given before such grand jury by any person, upon a charge against such
5
person for perjury or false swearing or upon his trial therefor.” Although neither
of these provisions were construed to assist the defendant, the court allowed
discovery of the tape recording under a nonstatutory judicial exception of
longstanding, in which such material is discoverable “ ‘when permitted by the
court in the furtherance of justice.’ ” (Hartfield, supra, 624 P.2d at p. 590.) The
court quoted from a venerable treatise, 1 Bishop On Criminal Procedure (2d ed.
1872) section 859: “ ‘[W]hen the reasons for keeping the testimony private have
passed away, the obligation of secrecy would seem to have ended also. Yet when,
in addition to this, the claims of public justice must go unsatisfied unless the
disclosure is made, the same reason which originally required secrecy requires that
the secret be no longer kept.’ ” (Hartfield, supra, 624 P.2d at p. 591.) It appears
that most jurisdictions have likewise adopted some sort of furtherance of justice
exception to the grand jury secrecy rule.2
2
In some cases, as in Hartfield, this has been done by common law,
sometimes supplementing the statutory framework for grand jury secrecy. (See,
e.g., Millican v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1982) 423 So.2d 268; 270 [adopting a
common law rule allowing grand jury discovery for impeachment purposes]; Keen
v. State (Fla. 1994) 639 So.2d 597); Euresti v. Valdez (Tex.App. 1989) 769
S.W.2d 575, 578-579 [grand jury testimony is not absolutely privileged against
discovery in a civil suit and may be obtained on a showing of particularized need];
State v. Higgins (La. 2005) 898 So.2d 1219, 1241 [common law exception to
statutory rule]); Sutton v. State (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1975) 334 A.2d 126, 129
[recognizing a common law rule similar to federal rule]; Mannon v. Frick (Mo.
1956) 295 S.W.2d 158, 163-165 [recognizing an exception to grand jury secrecy
in civil law suit beyond what is explicitly provided by statute]; State v. Doliner
(N.J. 1984) 475 A.2d 552, 557-558 [common law exception recognized similar to
federal court rule notwithstanding the lack of a similar state court rule]); State v.
Carillo (R.I. 1973) 307 A.2d 773, 777 [recognizing a rule similar to the federal
rule in criminal cases based on due process].) Other jurisdictions have adopted by
court rule or statute an interest of justice exception to the secrecy rule. (See State
ex rel. Ronan v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County (Ariz. 1964) 390
P.2d 109, 119; Petition of Jessup (Del.Super.Ct. 1957) 136 A.2d 207, 219;
Diamen v. U.S. (D.C. 1999) 725 A.2d 501, 532; Hinojosa v. State (Ind. 2003) 781
Footnote continued on next page
6
Thus, the absolute or compelling necessity exception has been invoked both
in the context of criminal indictments, as in Sontag, and civil lawsuits and
discovery, as in Shepherd. Given the existence of a common law compelling
necessity exception not strictly based on statute, the question is, what must a civil
litigant show in order to qualify for that exception? What a compelling necessity
is not, and therefore impliedly what it is, was suggested by the United States
Supreme Court in Procter & Gamble. There, a grand jury had refused to return a
criminal antitrust indictment against the defendants. The government filed a civil
suit against the defendants and the defendants sought the grand jury transcripts the
government was relying on to prepare its civil case. (Procter & Gamble, supra,
356 U.S. at pp. 678-679.) The high court held the district court had abused its
discretion in granting wholesale access to grand jury transcripts. After reciting the
reasons for maintaining grand jury secrecy, the court stated: “This ‘indispensable
secrecy of grand jury proceedings,’ [citation] must not be broken except where
there is a compelling necessity. There are instances when that need will outweigh
the countervailing policy. But they must be shown with particularity. [¶] . . . [¶]
No such showing was made here. The relevancy and usefulness of the testimony
sought were, of course, sufficiently established. If the grand jury transcript were
made available, discovery through depositions, which might involve delay and
substantial costs, would be avoided. Yet these showings fall short of proof that
without the transcript a defense would be greatly prejudiced or that without
reference to it an injustice would be done.” (Procter & Gamble, supra, 356 U.S.
at p. 682, fn. omitted.)
Footnote continued from previous page
N.E.2d 677, 681; In re Grand Jury of Douglas County (Neb. 2002) 644 N.W.2d
858, 863; People v. Di Napoli (1970) 27 N.Y.2d 229, 238; State v. Greer (Ohio
1981) 420 N.E.2d 982, 989.)
7
Moreover, the notion of absolute necessity implies a necessity so
compelling that it outweighs the strong countervailing interests in grand jury
secrecy. This principle is elucidated in Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest
(1979) 441 U.S. 211, 220 (Douglas Oil), which interpreted a former version of
rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (18 U.S.C.), providing that
disclosure of grand jury transcripts may be made “ ‘when so directed by a court
preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.’ ” The court
concluded that the one seeking disclosure must show, inter alia, “that the need for
disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy, and that [the] request is
structured to cover only material so needed.” (Douglas Oil, supra, at p. 222.) The
court made clear that “[s]uch a showing must be made even when the grand jury
whose transcripts are sought has concluded its operations . . . . For in considering
the effects of disclosure on grand jury proceedings, the courts must consider not
only the immediate effects upon a particular grand jury, but also the possible effect
upon the functioning of future grand juries. Persons called upon to testify will
consider the likelihood that their testimony may one day be disclosed to outside
parties. Fear of future retribution or social stigma may act as powerful deterrents
to those who would come forward and aid the grand jury in the performance of its
duties.” (Ibid.)
Although the compelling necessity test suggested by the California case law
discussed above is more stringent than the test adopted in Douglas Oil, that case is
instructive in the present context. Even if a plaintiff in a civil case were to show a
strong need for grand jury materials, and that such materials would be in the
furtherance of justice, the plaintiff’s discovery request could not be granted if to
do so would undermine the reasons for grand jury secrecy recited in the case law
and strongly implicit in the state’s legislation regarding grand juries. Moreover,
this need for secrecy is substantial not only when the grand jury is performing its
8
criminal indictment function but also when, as in this case, it performs its
investigatory function. “Compared with indictment proceedings, the efficacy and
credibility of watchdog investigations no less require that witnesses testify without
fear of reproach by their peers or their superiors. Though the watchdog
investigation and report serve a different social purpose than the criminal
indictment, eliciting candid testimony is obviously critical to both functions of the
grand jury.” (McClatchy, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1175.)
In light of the above, in cases in which a civil plaintiff seeks transcripts of a
grand jury investigation, in my view the litigant must show: (1) that the
information sought is necessary to prosecute his or her claim; (2) that the
information cannot reasonably be obtained through the usual means of civil
discovery short of resorting to grand jury materials — “mere inconvenience or
difficulty of proving the fact” is not sufficient (Sontag, supra, 64 Cal. at p. 528);
(3) that granting the request will not undermine the essential functions of grand
jury secrecy, including that of ensuring that the disclosures will not chill the
testimony of future grand jury witnesses; (4) that the request is narrowly tailored
to accomplish these ends. Although the above is more strict than under federal
law (see Douglas Oil, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 222) and those of many state
jurisdictions, anything less would appear to be inconsistent with the strong policy
of grand jury secrecy that finds its expression in our statutes.
9
In the present case, as the majority note, Goldstein has not articulated, and
the Court of Appeal did not rely on, an absolute necessity standard. Whether he
can do so on remand remains to be seen.3
MORENO, J.
3
The majority state: “Neither the Court of Appeal nor Goldstein, in his
briefing here, relied on the Sontag court’s mention of absolute necessity, and for
obvious reasons. The Court of Appeal did not restrict its rule permitting
disclosure of grand jury materials to instances of absolute necessity. Goldstein, as
the grand jury points out, has the grand jury report and was able to secure his
release on habeas corpus without the evidentiary materials he is seeking for use in
his civil rights lawsuit. Thus, it is apparent that his position is not one of
necessity, but of ‘mere inconvenience or difficulty of proving the fact[s]’ needed
to make his civil case in federal court. (Sontag, supra, 64 Cal. at p. 528.)” (Maj.
opn., ante, at p. 15.) It is of course true that access to the grand jury materials was
not necessary to secure his release in his habeas corpus proceeding. Whether there
is an absolute or compelling necessity for access to such materials in order for
Goldstein to pursue his civil case is, of course, a different matter and, as indicated
above, one that has not been addressed by the parties. I do not understand the
majority position to be that absolute necessity can never arise in the context of a
civil case, or that it has been clearly established in the present case that there is no
such necessity.
10
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion Goldstein v. Superior Court
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 154 Cal.App.4th 482
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No.
S155944Date Filed: November 17, 2008
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
SuperiorCounty: Los Angeles
Judge: Peter P. Espinoza
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Kaye, McLane & Bednarski, Ronald O. Kaye, David S. McLane, Marilyn E. Bednarski and Matthew N.Sirolly for Petitioner.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
No appearance for Respondent.Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, and Gordon W. Trask, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for
Real Party in Interest Los Angeles County Grand Jury.
Collins, Collins, Muir & Stewart, John J. Collins, Tomas A. Guterres, Douglas Fee and Eric C. Brown for
Real Parties in Interest County of Los Angeles, John Van de Kamp and Curt Livesay.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Ronald O. KayeKaye, McLane & Bednarski
128 North Fair Oaks Avenue
Pasadena, CA 91103
(626) 844-7660
Gordon W. Trask
Principal Deputy County Counsel
648 Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration
500 West Temple Street, Room 651
Los Angeles, CA 90012
(213) 974-1821
Douglas Fee
Collins, Collins, Muir & Stewart
1100 El Centro street
South Pasadena, CA 91030
(626) 243-1100
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal granted a petition for peremptory writ of mandate. This case presents the following issue: Did the Court of Appeal err in permitting disclosure of grand jury materials "to avoid a possible injustice" (Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest (1979) 441 U.S. 211, 222) although the disclosure was without "express legislative authorization" (Daily Journal Corp. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1117, 1125)?
Date: | Citation: | Docket Number: | Category: | Status: |
Mon, 11/17/2008 | 45 Cal. 4th 218, 195 P.3d 588, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 213 | S155944 | Review - Criminal Original (non-H.C.) | closed; remittitur issued |
1 | Goldstein, Thomas Lee (Petitioner) Represented by Matthew Nathaniel Sirolly Kaye, McLane & Bednarski, LLP 128 N. Fair Oaks Avenue Pasadena, CA |
2 | Goldstein, Thomas Lee (Petitioner) Represented by Ronald Owen Kaye Kaye, McLane & Bednarski, LLP 128 N. Fair Oaks Avenue Pasadena, CA |
3 | Goldstein, Thomas Lee (Petitioner) Represented by David Sean Mclane Kaye, McLane & Bednarski, LLP 128 N. Fair Oaks Avenue Pasadena, CA |
4 | Superior Court Of Los Angeles County (Respondent) Represented by Frederick R. Bennett Los Angeles Superior Court 111 N Hill St #620 Los Angeles, CA |
5 | Grand Jury Of The County Of Los Angeles (Real Party in Interest) Represented by Gordon W. Trask Office of the County Counsel 500 W. Temple Street, Room 651 Los Angeles, CA |
6 | County Of Los Angeles (Real Party in Interest) Represented by Douglas Fee Collins Collins et al,. LLP 1100 El Centro Avenue South Pasadena, CA |
7 | Van De Kamp, John K. (Real Party in Interest) Represented by Douglas Fee Collins Collins et al,. LLP 1100 El Centro Avenue South Pasadena, CA |
8 | Livesay, Curt (Real Party in Interest) Represented by Douglas Fee Collins Collins et al,. LLP 1100 El Centro Avenue South Pasadena, CA |
Disposition | |
Nov 17 2008 | Opinion: Reversed |
Dockets | |
Sep 4 2007 | Received Court of Appeal record |
Sep 4 2007 | 2nd petition for review filed Real Parties County of Los Angeles, John Van de Kamp and Curt Livesay Attorneys Douglas Fee, etal |
Sep 4 2007 | Petition for review with request for stay filed (criminal) Real Parties Grand Jury of the County of Los Angeles, et al Principal Deputy County Counsel Gordon W. Trask |
Sep 6 2007 | Received: amended proof of service Real Parties Grand Jury of County of Los Angeles, etal Principal Deputy County Counsel Gordon W. Trask |
Sep 25 2007 | Answer to petition for review filed Consolidated Answer to petition for review filed with permission. Thomas Lee Goldstein, petitioner Matthew N. Sirolly, Counsel (CRC 8.25b) |
Oct 4 2007 | Reply to answer to petition filed Real Parties in Interest Grand Jury of the County of Los Angeles Gordon W. Trask, attorney |
Oct 5 2007 | Reply to answer to petition filed Real Parties: County of Los Angeles, John Van De Kamp and Curt Livesay Attorney Douglas Fee |
Oct 10 2007 | Petition for review granted (criminal case) Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno and Corrigan, JJ. |
Nov 7 2007 | Opening brief on the merits filed Real party in interest Jury ofthe County of Los Angeles Attonrey Gordon W. Trask, Principal Deputy County Counsel |
Nov 14 2007 | Opening brief on the merits filed Real Parties in Interest County of Los Angeles, John Van De Kamp and Curt Livesay CRC 8.25 |
Dec 10 2007 | Application filed to file consolidated Answer Brief of the Merits. |
Dec 12 2007 | Answer brief on the merits filed with permission. Thomas L. Goldstein, petitioner Matthew N. Sirolly, Counsel |
Dec 13 2007 | Motion filed (non-AA) for Preferential Calendaring and Expedited Review Thomas L. Goldstein, appellant David McLane, Counsel |
Dec 28 2007 | Reply brief filed (case not yet fully briefed) Grand Jury of the Coutny of Los Angeles, Real Party in Interest by Gordon W. Trask, counsel |
Jan 3 2008 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) RPI County of Los Angeles |
Jul 22 2008 | Filed: suppplemental declaration in support of motion for preferential expedited calendar setting. petitioner Thomas Lee Goldstein |
Jul 30 2008 | Case ordered on calendar to be argued Wednesday, September 3, 2008, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco |
Aug 18 2008 | Filed: Letter from Douglas Fee, counsel real parties in interest, requesting to divide oral argument time (20 minutes for County of Los Angeles et al., and 10 minutes for the Grand Jury). |
Aug 20 2008 | Order filed The request of counsel for real parties in interest in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of real parties at oral argument is hereby granted. The request to allocate to the Grand Jury of the County of Los Angeles 10 minutes and the County of Los Angeles et al. 20 minutes of real parties' 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted. |
Sep 3 2008 | Cause argued and submitted |
Nov 14 2008 | Notice of forthcoming opinion posted |
Nov 17 2008 | Opinion filed: Judgment reversed The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. Majority opinion by Corrigan. J. -----joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar and Chin, JJ. Concurring Opinion by Kennard, J. Concurring Opinion by Moreno, J. |
Dec 18 2008 | Remittitur issued (criminal case) |
Dec 24 2008 | Received: receipt for remittitur from 2 DCA, Division Three. |
Briefs | |
Nov 7 2007 | Opening brief on the merits filed |
Nov 14 2007 | Opening brief on the merits filed |
Dec 12 2007 | Answer brief on the merits filed |
Dec 28 2007 | Reply brief filed (case not yet fully briefed) |
Jan 3 2008 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) |
Brief Downloads | |
Petition for Supreme Court Review Goldstein v Superior Court.pdf (513866 bytes) - Petition For Review | |
Consolidated Answer Brief on the Merits Goldstein v Superior Court.pdf (628216 bytes) - Consolidated Answer Brief On The Merits | |
Brief on the Merits Goldstein v Superior Court.pdf (280438 bytes) - Brief On The Merits | |
Answer to Petition to Review Goldstein v Superior Court.pdf (325703 bytes) - Consolidated Answer To Petitioners For Review |
Jan 9, 2009 Annotated by admin.ah | Written By: Foster Johnson Holdings The Supreme Court of California, Corrigan, J., held that: (1) California Courts do not have broad inherent authority to release grand jury materials to litigants; (2) respondent failed to demonstrate “absolute necessity” requiring disclosure of grand jury materials (3) state statute allowing a grand jury to make evidentiary materials available to the public did not authorize the requested disclosure to private § 1983 litigant; but (4) Section 924.2 allows disclosure of select testimony in camera for purpose of determining whether a witness’s grand jury testimony is consistent with their court testimony. Summary Goldstein v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.4th 218 (2008), is a California Supreme Court decision holding that California courts do not have broad inherent authority to release grand jury materials to litigants in the interest of justice. The Court found that the state legislature has authorized only limited disclosure of grand jury materials in order to insure the effective functioning of State grand juries and preserve the reputations of those unjustly accused. Explaining the holding, the Court emphasized that “mere inconvenience or difficulty of proving facts” in a civil case does not entitle litigants to grand jury materials. However, the Court’s decision, as well as the two concurring opinions by Kennard, J. and Moreno, J., left open the possibility that the release of certain grand jury materials might be allowed where their disclosure is “absolutely necessary” for the preservation of justice. |