Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S109597
Travis v. Santa Cruz Co.

Filed 7/29/04

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN TRAVIS et al.,
Plaintiffs
and
Appellants,
S109597
v.
) Ct.App.
6
H021541
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ,
Santa Cruz County
Defendant and Respondent.
Super. Ct. No. CV136570

A Santa Cruz County ordinance imposes certain restrictions on second
dwelling units on residential property. Plaintiffs Steven Travis and Stanley and
Sonya Sokolow sought a writ of mandate to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance
and remove permit conditions imposed pursuant thereto. Plaintiffs claim the
ordinance conflicts with and is preempted by state statutes and that its enforcement
unconstitutionally took their property without compensation. The question before
us goes not to the merits of plaintiffs’ challenge, but to whether it was timely
brought.
We conclude that insofar as the action seeks removal of conditions imposed
on Travis’s development permit, it was timely brought within 90 days of the final
decision imposing the conditions. (Gov. Code, § 65009, subd. (c)(1)(E).) That
Travis challenges his permit conditions as invalid because they are based on a
facially unconstitutional or preempted ordinance, rather than arguing the
conditions or ordinance have an especially adverse effect on his property, does not


affect the timeliness of his action. But because the Sokolows did not bring an
action within 90 days of their permit’s issuance, they may not now challenge, on
any grounds, the conditions imposed on their permit. Finally, insofar as plaintiffs
contend the ordinance is preempted by later-enacted state statutes, and on this
basis seek relief beyond removal of their permit conditions, such as an order
requiring Santa Cruz County (the County) to amend or cease enforcing the
ordinance, we conclude their action is untimely under the applicable statute of
limitations (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (a)).
We will thus affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of
Appeal, which affirmed the superior court’s denial of plaintiffs’ writ petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 1981, the Board of Supervisors of the County (the Board)
adopted an ordinance, effective January 15, 1982, allowing residential property
owners to construct “affordable second dwelling units” on their property. The
ordinance requires a development permit, limits second units to parcels of a
certain minimum size, sets a maximum unit size, and restricts both the income of
second unit tenants and the rent that can be charged for such units.
The ordinance is codified at section 13.10.681 of the Santa Cruz County
Code (the Ordinance). Its restrictions on occupancy and rent, of particular
importance in this litigation, are set forth as follows in subdivision (e): “The
following occupancy standards shall be applied to every second unit and shall be
conditions for any approval under this section:
“(1) Occupancy Restrictions: . . . Rental or permanent occupancy of the
second unit shall be restricted for the life of the unit to either: [¶] (i) Households
that meet the Income and Asset Guidelines established by the Board of
Supervisors resolution for lower income households; or [¶] (ii) Senior households,
where one household member is sixty-two years of age or older, that meet the
2
Income and Asset Guidelines requirements established by Board resolution for
moderate or lower income households; or [¶] (iii) Persons sharing residency with
the property owner and who are related by blood, marriage, or operation of law, or
have evidence of a stable family relationship with the property owner. [¶] . . . [¶]
“(4) Rent Levels: If rent is charged, the rent level for the second unit, or for
the main unit, if the property owner resides in the second unit, shall not exceed
that established by the Section 8 Program of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) or its successor, or the rent level allowed for
affordable rental units pursuant to Chapter 17.10 of the County Code, whichever is
higher.”
Subdivision (e)(7) of the Ordinance requires property owners, before
receiving a building permit, to record a declaration, binding on successors in
interest, to the effect that the rent and occupancy standards of the Ordinance will
be observed.
Plaintiffs own residential properties in unincorporated Santa Cruz County.
In 1999, Travis applied for and was granted a permit to construct a second
dwelling unit on his property, subject to conditions imposed under the Ordinance.
Travis filed an administrative appeal against the occupancy and rent conditions,
which the planning director denied on June 21, 1999. The Sokolows similarly
applied for and were granted a second unit permit containing occupancy and rent
restrictions. Their permit was issued October 12, 1998; they did not pursue an
administrative appeal.
Plaintiffs filed their petition for writ of mandate on September 7, 1999.
They alleged the County had a duty to “keep its Second Unit Dwelling ordinance
. . . in compliance with State and Federal laws and constitutions,” a duty the
County violated by placing Ordinance-dictated occupancy and rent conditions on
second unit permits and by failing to amend the Ordinance so as to remove the
3
restrictions. They prayed for a writ requiring the County to stop conditioning
second unit permits on the Ordinance’s occupancy and rent restrictions, to amend
the Ordinance so as to remove those restrictions, to compensate second unit
owners for lost rents and to refund any fines assessed, and to record with the
County Recorder a document expunging all unlawful deed restrictions on second
unit properties recorded pursuant to the Ordinance.
In a memorandum of points and authorities supporting their petition,
plaintiffs explained their claims that the Ordinance violates state law and is
unconstitutional. Plaintiffs contend the Ordinance’s rent restriction conflicts with,
and is preempted by, the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (Civ. Code,
§§ 1954.50-1954.535; hereafter the Costa-Hawkins Act), in that the Costa-
Hawkins Act generally exempts from local rent control laws dwelling units
constructed after February 1, 1995 (Civ. Code, § 1954.52, subd. (a)(1)) and
institutes vacancy decontrol for other units covered by local rent control laws (id.,
subd. (a)(3)(C)). They further contend the Ordinance’s occupancy restrictions
violate, or command the property owner to violate, statutory guarantees of
nondiscrimination in housing found in the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code,
§ 51.2), Government Code section 65008, and the Fair Employment and Housing
Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) insofar as the Ordinance regulates second unit
occupancy according to age or income. Finally, plaintiffs claim the deed
restrictions the Ordinance requires on rents and occupancy are exactions bearing
no reasonable relationship to the legitimate government reasons for prohibiting
second units and, therefore, work a taking of property without compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The trial court denied the writ petition. The court concluded all plaintiffs’
“facial” claims, including their claims of preemption, were untimely under
Government Code section 65009 because they were not brought within 90 days of
4
either the Ordinance’s enactment or the effective dates of the assertedly
preemptive state statutes. The Sokolows’ “as applied” challenge was untimely,
under Government Code section 65009, because they did not bring the action
within 90 days of the final decision on their permit application. Travis’s “ ‘as
applied’ regulatory taking claim” was timely but nonmeritorious.
The Court of Appeal affirmed solely on statute of limitations grounds. In
the appellate court’s view, all plaintiffs’ claims were facial, rather than as applied,
because plaintiffs did not allege the Ordinance was applied differently to their
properties than to others or that the Ordinance had a “disparate fiscal effect” on
them compared to other property owners. All claims were therefore subject to the
limitation of Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B) and were
untimely because not brought within 90 days of the Ordinance’s last substantive
amendment, which occurred in November 1997.
We granted plaintiffs’ petition for review.
DISCUSSION
As this case principally concerns the applicability and effect of two
subdivisions of Government Code section 65009 (hereafter section 65009), we
begin by reviewing that statute. Located in division 1 (Planning and Zoning) of
title 7 (Planning and Land Use) of the Government Code, section 65009 is
intended “to provide certainty for property owners and local governments
regarding decisions made pursuant to this division” (§ 65009, subd. (a)(3)) and
thus to alleviate the “chilling effect on the confidence with which property owners
and local governments can proceed with projects” (id., subd. (a)(2)) created by
potential legal challenges to local planning and zoning decisions.
To this end, section 65009 establishes a short statute of limitations, 90 days,
applicable to actions challenging several types of local planning and zoning
decisions: the adoption of a general or specific plan (id., subd. (c)(1)(A)); the
5
adoption of a zoning ordinance (id., subd. (c)(1)(B)); the adoption of a regulation
attached to a specific plan (id., subd. (c)(1)(C)); the adoption of a development
agreement (id., subd. (c)(1)(D)); and the grant, denial, or imposition of conditions
on a variance or permit (id., subd. (c)(1)(E)). Subdivision (e) of the statute
provides that after expiration of the limitations period, “all persons are barred from
any further action or proceeding.”
Of particular interest in this case are paragraphs (B) and (E) of section
65009, subdivision (c)(1). Including the introductory text of subdivision (c)(1),
they read as follows: “Except as provided in subdivision (d),[1] no action or
proceeding shall be maintained in any of the following cases by any person unless
the action or proceeding is commenced and service is made on the legislative body
within 90 days after the legislative body’s decision: [¶] . . . [¶]
“(B) To attack, review, set aside, void, or annul the decision of a legislative
body to adopt or amend a zoning ordinance. [¶] . . . [¶]
“(E) To attack, review, set aside, void, or annul any decision on the matters
listed in Sections 65901 and 65903,[2] or to determine the reasonableness, legality,
or validity of any condition attached to a variance, conditional use permit, or any
other permit.”
We proceed to consider whether and how each of these provisions, as well
as other statutes of limitations raised by plaintiffs, apply to the present action.

1
Subdivision (d) of section 65009 extends the limitations period to one year
for certain actions brought in support of affordable housing developments. In this
court, plaintiffs do not contend their petition for writ of mandate comes within
subdivision (d).
2
Government Code sections 65901 and 65903 provide for hearing and
decision on, and administrative appeals concerning, applications for variances,
conditional use permits, and other permits.
6


I. Plaintiffs’ Attack on Permit Conditions Imposed on Their
Properties Under the Ordinance
Plaintiffs’ action, in our view, is in part one to “determine the . . . validity”
of conditions imposed on their permits and to “void, or annul” the decisions
imposing those conditions. (§ 65009, subd. (c)(1)(E).) Plaintiffs allege that the
County has violated its legal duties by imposing rent and occupancy conditions on
second unit permits; that Travis unsuccessfully sought removal of the conditions
to his permit at the administrative level and now seeks the same through judicial
relief; and that the Sokolows, having unsuccessfully sought to have the Ordinance
amended, seek judicial relief against the County’s “exceeding its lawful authority
by imposing” the permit conditions. They pray, inter alia, for orders requiring the
County to cease imposing such conditions and to record an expungement of the
rent and occupancy restrictions the Ordinance required them and other second unit
owners to record against their deeds. To the extent it rests on such allegations and
requests such relief, the action comes within section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E).
The action was brought within 90 days of final administrative action on
Travis’s permit; it thus is timely as to Travis’s claim the conditions imposed on his
permit are invalid. (See Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 22
(Hensler) [limitations period for challenge to application of land use regulation to
specific property runs from “the final adjudicatory administrative decision”].) But
the action was brought almost 11 months after the Sokolows’ permit application
was approved; it is thus untimely as to their claim of invalid permit conditions.
Despite the plain language of section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E), the
County insists the subdivision is inapplicable to Travis’s claims because Travis
has challenged the permit conditions generally, as imposed pursuant to a
preempted or unconstitutional ordinance, “rather than challenging the application
of the ordinance to a particular permit.” The County urges us to hold that
7
paragraph (B) of section 65009, subdivision (c)(1), rather than paragraph (E),
applies to all Travis’s claims because the petition presents only facial claims of
invalidity, without alleging any disparate application or effect on his property
compared to other second units subject to the Ordinance.
We find the County’s reasoning unpersuasive. True, plaintiffs’ legal
challenge to the Ordinance is properly characterized as facial in that it “considers
only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular
circumstances of an individual.” (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th
1069, 1084.) Yet plaintiffs object not only to the Ordinance’s enactment and
continued existence, but also to its application to their second dwelling unit
permits. Plaintiffs’ claim of unconstitutionality, for example, is not “a facial
challenge to the . . . ordinance predicated on a theory that the mere enactment of
the . . . ordinance worked a taking” (Hensler, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 24), but, rather,
a claim that the County effected a taking by demanding invalid exactions as a
condition of issuing them second unit permits. Plaintiffs’ preemption arguments,
to be sure, go solely to the Ordinance’s facial validity, but their complaint, as we
have seen, is aimed not only at the Ordinance’s enactment or existence but also at
the County’s enforcement of the Ordinance against plaintiffs’ own property.
Section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E), in setting a time limit for actions
challenging permit conditions, does not purport to restrict the legal theories or
claims that may be made in such an action, and we see no justification for reading
such a substantive limitation into the clear procedural language of the statute.
Subdivision (e) of section 65009 provides that after expiration of the limitations
period, “all persons are barred from any further action or proceeding.” (Italics
added.) A plaintiff, therefore, may not avoid the short 90-day limit of section
65009 by claiming that the permit or condition is “void” and thus subject to
challenge at any time. (Ching v. San Francisco Board of Permit Appeals (1998)
8
60 Cal.App.4th 888, 891-894 [challenge to conditional use permit as “null and
void” fell within Gov. Code, former § 65907, the predecessor to § 65009, subd.
(c)(1)(E)]; Hawkins v. County of Marin (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 586, 592-593
[same].) By the same token, an action is not removed from the purview of section
65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E) merely because the plaintiff claims the permit or
condition was imposed under a facially unconstitutional or preempted law.
The County relies on Hensler, supra, 8 Cal.4th at page 22, in which this
court stated: “If the challenge is to the facial validity of a land-use regulation, the
statute of limitations runs from the date the statute becomes effective.
Government Code section 65009 establishes a 120-day period of limitation for
such actions.”3 But in Hensler we were not concerned with delineating the issues
that could be raised in a timely challenge to permit conditions. The point of the
cited passage was, rather, that an action in inverse condemnation based on an
allegedly invalid subdivision ordinance, brought several years after the city had
applied the ordinance to the plaintiff’s property, was untimely, whether considered
as an attack on the ordinance itself or on the city’s application of the ordinance.
(Hensler, supra, at pp. 7-8, 21-22.) Indeed, elsewhere in the decision we
explained that a claim of regulatory taking, arising from imposition of a
“development restriction,” requires a showing that “the ordinance, regulation, or
administrative action is not lawful or constitutionally valid if no compensation is
paid.” (Id. at p. 25, italics added.) Hensler thus does not stand for the proposition

3
In a footnote, we cited section 65009, former subdivision (c)(2) as
establishing this 120-day period. (Hensler, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 22, fn. 10.)
Section 65009’s limitations period was later shortened to 90 days, and subdivision
(c)(2) was renumbered as subdivision (c)(1)(B). (Stats. 1995, ch. 253, § 1, p. 874;
Stats. 1999, ch. 968, § 5.)
9


that a challenge to a permit or permit condition, timely under section 65009,
subdivision (c)(1)(E), is rendered untimely merely because the theory of challenge
is the facial invalidity of the ordinance upon which the permit or condition is
based.
That the Ordinance could have been facially attacked in an appropriate
action at an earlier time, before it was applied to Travis’s property, does not make
section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E) inapplicable to Travis’s claim for removal of
invalid conditions. This is not a case in which the plaintiff complains of injury
solely from a law’s enactment. (See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La
Habra (2001) 25 Cal.4th 809, 824 [“Here, in contrast, the City’s allegedly illegal
actions include not only the Ordinance’s initial enactment, but also the City’s
continued collection . . . of an unapproved tax”].) Travis complains of injury
arising from, and seeks relief from, not simply the Ordinance’s enactment or
continued presence in the County Code, but the County’s imposition on his second
unit permit of conditions required by the Ordinance. Having brought his action in
a timely way after application of the Ordinance to him, Travis may raise in that
action a facial attack on the Ordinance’s validity. (Id. at p. 822 [plaintiffs’ attacks
on the validity of the tax ordinance itself “are not barred merely because similar
claims could have been made at earlier times as to earlier violations”].)
In the related context of local government development fees, the Court of
Appeal has distinguished between a “legislative decision” adopting a generally
applicable fee and an “adjudicatory decision” imposing the fee on a particular
development. (N.T. Hill Inc. v. City of Fresno (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 977, 986.)
Adjudicatory fee decisions, the court held, are subject to the protest procedures
and limitations period set forth in Government Code section 66020; legislative fee
decisions are subject only to the limitations period in Government Code section
66022. “Put slightly differently, section 66022 applies when the plaintiff’s goal is
10
a judicial finding that the legislative decision adopting the charge cannot be
enforced in any circumstance against any existing or future development because
of some procedural or substantive illegality in the decision and section 66020
applies when the plaintiff’s goal is a judicial finding that the charge set by the
legislative decision cannot be demanded or collected in whole or part with respect
to the specific development.” (N.T. Hill Inc. v. City of Fresno, supra, at pp. 986-
987.)4 Analogously, to the extent Travis seeks a finding that the Ordinance cannot
be applied against him and relief in the form of removal of the conditions on his
permit, his challenge is to the County’s adjudicatory decision imposing the
conditions and comes within section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E).5

4
The court added, “In the latter [adjudicatory] situation, the fundamental
validity of the legislative decision enacting or modifying the fee is not in issue.”
(N.T. Hill Inc. v. City of Fresno, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 987.) As our
discussion above indicates, we do not agree with any suggestion that a property
owner’s challenge to an adjudicatory decision on a development fee (or zoning)
matter may not include an attack on the validity of the fee or zoning ordinance
itself. More correct is that in the adjudicatory situation, the validity of the
legislation cannot be the only issue at stake—there must be a challenged
enforcement or application of the legislation against the plaintiff’s property.
5
The Attorney General, in an amicus curiae brief, points out that Travis’s
challenge to the adjudicatory permit decision should have been brought by petition
for administrative mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) rather than ordinary
mandate (id., § 1085). But where the entitlement to mandate relief has been
adequately pled, “a trial court may treat a proceeding brought under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1085 as one brought under Code of Civil Procedure section
1094.5.” (County of San Diego v. State of California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, 109.)
As the only question before us is timeliness, and as a writ of administrative
mandate, like a challenge under section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E), must be
brought within 90 days of the final administrative decision (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1094.6, subd. (b)), we need not address the effect, if any, of plaintiffs having
failed to label their petition as one for administrative as well as ordinary mandate.
11


Utility Cost Management v. Indian Wells Valley Water Dist. (2001) 26
Cal.4th 1185 does not suggest a different result. Without deciding whether the
distinction drawn in N.T. Hill Inc. v. City of Fresno is correct, we there held the
fee imposition decision at issue would in any case be deemed legislative rather
than adjudicatory because the fee ordinance was expressly applicable to the
plaintiff and “calculation of the fees was a purely ministerial act—assertedly
performed by a computer—based on the formulas set forth in the fee legislation.”
(Utility Cost Management v. Indian Wells Valley Water Dist., supra, at p. 1194.)
In the present case, the decision by the County’s zoning officials to issue Travis a
second unit permit subject to rent and occupancy conditions, while it may have
been legally compelled by the Ordinance, required more than a purely mechanical
or arithmetic process on their part.
The County’s construction of section 65009 would, in addition, tend to
produce unjust and potentially unconstitutional results, which we do not believe
the Legislature intended. If a preempted or unconstitutional zoning ordinance
could not be challenged by a property owner in an action to prevent its
enforcement within 90 days of its application (§ 65009, subd. (c)(1)(E)), but
instead could be challenged only in an action to void or annul the ordinance within
90 days of its enactment (id., subd. (c)(1)(B)), a property owner subjected to a
regulatory taking through application of the ordinance against his or her property
would be without remedy unless the owner had had the foresight to challenge the
ordinance when it was enacted, possibly years or even decades before it was used
against the property. Like the “notice” rule rejected in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island
(2001) 533 U.S. 606, 626-627 (the idea that a postenactment purchaser takes with
notice of the legislation and therefore cannot claim it effects a taking), a
construction of section 65009 barring any challenge to the validity of a zoning
ordinance once 90 days have passed from its enactment—even in the context of
12
its application to particular property—would allow the government, “in effect, to
put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule.
Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the
use and value of land.” (Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, supra, at p. 627.) The
Legislature intended section 65009 to provide certainty to local governments
(§ 65009, subd. (a)(3)), but not, we think, at the expense of a fair and reasonable
opportunity to challenge an invalid ordinance when it is enforced against one’s
property.6
We conclude, therefore, that Travis’s challenge to the imposition of
conditions on his second unit permit was timely brought, though the Sokolows’
was not. The remaining question is whether plaintiffs’ other claims for relief—
that the County has, and is violating, a duty to repeal or amend the Ordinance or to
cease enforcing it—are timely. We examine now the limitations statutes
assertedly applicable to those claims.

6
In suggesting, on the basis of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, supra, 533 U.S.
606, that permittees and their successors in interest may bring actions to invalidate
the Ordinance or the property restrictions imposed thereunder as unconstitutional
takings of property without regard to any statute of limitations, the concurring and
dissenting opinion (post, at p. 4) goes much farther than plaintiffs themselves.
Plaintiffs disavow any claim that “statutes of limitations on takings claims may be
‘set aside.’ ” Rather, plaintiffs argue, Palazzolo “affirms the federal constitutional
right to bring an as-applied challenge when a land-use ordinance is first applied to
one’s property, even if one is the successor in interest to the person who owned the
property when the ordinance was enacted.” Such a challenge, plaintiffs concede,
is subject to “the appropriate statute of limitations.” We agree and observe that
Palazzolo concerned only the effect of a postenactment change of ownership on
takings claims, not the application of any statute of limitations.
13


II. Plaintiffs’ Attack on the County’s Maintenance and Continued
Enforcement of the Allegedly Preempted Ordinance
As noted earlier, Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B)
sets a 90-day limitation period, running from the legislative body’s decision, for
bringing an action “[t]o attack, review, set aside, void, or annul the decision of a
legislative body to adopt or amend a zoning ordinance.” Code of Civil Procedure
section 338, subdivision (a) sets a three-year period for an action “upon a liability
created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture.” The three-year limitation,
running from accrual of the action, does not apply “where, in special cases, a
different limitation is prescribed by statute.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 312.)
Plaintiffs contend the 90-day limitation prescribed by section 65009,
subdivision (c)(1)(B) does not apply to their preemption claim because their
challenge is not to the Board’s decisions to “adopt or amend” the Ordinance, but
to the Board’s failure to repeal or amend the Ordinance and its continued
enforcement despite having been preempted by the Costa-Hawkins Act in 1996.
Application of section 65009 to claims of preemption by a later-enacted statute is
unworkable, they argue, because it would preclude any challenge to an ordinance
that was valid when enacted but later preempted by state law.7 Hence, plaintiffs
argue, Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a)’s more general

7
The Costa-Hawkins Act was added by a 1995 statute effective January 1,
1996. (Stats. 1995, ch. 331, § 1, p. 1820.) The antidiscrimination statutes
plaintiffs claim preempt the Ordinance’s occupancy limits were added at earlier
times. (See Stats. 1984, ch. 787, § 1, p. 2781 [adding Civ. Code, § 51.2]; Stats.
1980, ch. 992, § 4, p. 3140 [enacting Fair Employment and Housing Act]; Stats.
1971, ch. 1517, § 1, p. 2993 [adding Gov. Code, § 65008].)
14


three-year limitation period for statutory liabilities is the applicable statute of
limitations.8
The County maintains that facial attacks on such assertedly preempted laws
are subject to the 90-day limitation, but that here (as the Court of Appeal held) the
period ran from the Ordinance’s last substantive amendment in 1997, rather than
from its 1981 adoption. Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a), the
County argues, is inapplicable because a more specific limitations period, that in
Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B), applies.
We agree with plaintiffs that their challenge to the Ordinance, to the extent
it is based on preemption by later-enacted state statutes (i.e., the Costa-Hawkins
Act and Civil Code section 51.2), is subject to the three-year limit of Code of Civil
Procedure section 338 rather than the 90-day limit of Government Code section
65009. Plaintiffs, in claiming the County has breached a duty to bring its zoning
code into compliance with later-enacted state law, are not complaining of the
Ordinance’s adoption but of the Board’s failure, since the enactment of Civil Code
section 51.2 in 1984 and the Costa-Hawkins Act in 1995, to repeal the Ordinance

8
Plaintiffs also argue the Ordinance relates to rent control, not zoning. The
Ordinance, however, is a zoning ordinance within the meaning of section 65009,
subdivision (c)(1)(B). It is contained in chapter 13.10 of the Santa Cruz County
Code, entitled “Zoning Regulations.” It regulates land use by allowing a particular
use, second dwelling units, in designated zones of the County. That the
regulations imposed include a restriction on rental levels does not convert the
Ordinance from a zoning regulation to a rent control law, for the two are not
mutually exclusive. Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 19
Cal.4th 952 is not to the contrary: in remarking that a typical rent control law
could, for purposes of constitutional analysis, be seen as a type of price control
rather than a land use regulation (id. at p. 967), we had no occasion to consider
whether a law restricting rents on conditionally permitted uses in particular
geographic zones might also be considered a zoning ordinance for purposes of
section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B).
15


or amend it to conform to state law. To this extent, therefore, the action is not one
to “attack, review, set aside, void, or annul the decision of a legislative body to
adopt . . . a zoning ordinance.” (§ 65009, subd. (c)(1)(B), italics added.)9
Moreover, a challenge to the Ordinance based on its conflict with state laws
passed in 1984 and 1995 could not have been brought within 90 days of the
Ordinance’s 1982 effective date. (See Hawkins v. County of Marin, supra, 54
Cal.App.3d at pp. 593-594.) Section 65009 was intended to require prompt
challenges to zoning ordinances, but not to demand the impossible.10
Plaintiffs’ petition for declaratory and injunctive relief against the
Ordinance’s future enforcement is, nevertheless, untimely. The newest of the state
statutes upon which plaintiffs rely for their preemption claim, the Costa-Hawkins
Act, came into effect on January 1, 1996, more than three years before the petition
was filed. Assuming the Costa-Hawkins Act subjects the County to a duty to
repeal or amend the Ordinance to conform to state law, that duty first arose—and

9
Lest our holding be misunderstood (see conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 1), we
emphasize it applies only to claims of preemption by statutes enacted after the
Ordinance’s adoption
, and not to statutory or constitutional provisions already in
force at the time the Ordinance was adopted. As the constitutional protections
against taking of property without just compensation (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th
Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 19) were already in existence when the County
adopted the Ordinance, a facial attack on the Ordinance as a taking of property
would be an action to “attack, review, set aside, void, or annul the decision of a
legislative body to adopt . . . a zoning ordinance” (§ 65009, subd. (c)(1)(B)),
subject to the 90-day statute of limitations.
10
While the Ordinance was twice amended (in 1997 and 1998) after the
effective date of the Costa-Hawkins Act, neither amendment introduced any of the
conflicts between the Ordinance and state law of which plaintiffs complain.
Plaintiffs’ petition thus does not seek to “attack, review, set aside, void, or annul
the decision of a legislative body to . . . amend a zoning ordinance.” (§ 65009,
subd. (c)(1)(B), italics added.)
16


was first violated by the County’s inaction—when the Costa-Hawkins Act became
effective. As the period in Code of Civil Procedure section 338 begins running on
accrual of the cause of action (id., § 312), an action to enforce the County’s
asserted statutory duty had to be brought within three years of its initial violation,
i.e., three years from the effective date of the assertedly preemptive statute.
Plaintiffs argue their action was brought “fewer than 3 years following the
January 1, 1999, fully-effective date of Costa-Hawkins,” apparently alluding to
provisions of that law phasing in, between January 1, 1996, and January 1, 1999,
vacancy decontrol on existing units already subject to local rent control
ordinances. (See Civ. Code, § 1954.52, subd. (a)(3)(C).) But the conflict
plaintiffs perceive between the Costa-Hawkins Act, which mandated immediate
exemption of new units and eventual vacancy decontrol on all units, and the
Ordinance, which restricted indefinitely rents on newly constructed second units,
if it ever existed, existed as of the effective date of the Costa-Hawkins Act,
January 1, 1996. If, as claimed, the County has, and is violating, a duty to repeal
or amend the Ordinance to avoid a conflict with the state law, it had, and violated,
that duty as of the day the state law came into effect. Plaintiffs’ action to enforce a
statutory obligation thus accrued on January 1, 1996; under Code of Civil
Procedure section 338, they had three years from that date to bring it.
Plaintiffs also argue the action as a whole is timely under Code of Civil
Procedure section 338 because it was brought “within three years of two
applications of the Ordinance—one to the Sokolows in 1998 and one to Travis in
1999.” They rely on Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra, supra,
25 Cal.4th at pages 818-825, in which we deemed a facial attack on a local utility
tax to accrue every time the city collected the tax. As applied here, the theory
would hold a new facial invalidity claim (i.e., one seeking to overturn the
legislative body’s decision to adopt the zoning ordinance) accrues, and a new
17
three-year period begins, whenever a zoning ordinance is employed to deny or
impose conditions on a permit.
The theory of continuous accrual under Code of Civil Procedure section
338, subdivision (a) would, in this context, create an illogical contrast with the
application of Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B). In a facial
challenge to a zoning ordinance based on preexisting statutes or the Constitution,
plaintiffs are limited, under section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B), to 90 days from
the ordinance’s adoption, which is the first time such a challenge could be
brought. When the challenge is instead based on a later-enacted state statute, the
limitations period (under Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (a)) also runs, as we hold
above, from the first time the challenge could be brought, i.e., the initial accrual of
the cause of action. Plaintiffs’ continuous accrual theory would delay running of
the statute only in the latter case, thus providing an anomalous and unwarranted
benefit to those challenging a zoning ordinance on the ground of its postadoption
preemption. Promptness would be required in one case, under section 65009,
subdivision (c)(1)(B), but illogically excused in the other, under Code of Civil
Procedure section 338, subdivision (a).
To adopt plaintiffs’ theory would thus be to thwart the legislative purpose
behind section 65009 without any necessity in justice or fairness. The express and
manifest intent of section 65009 is to provide local governments with certainty,
after a short 90-day period for facial challenges, in the validity of their zoning
enactments and decisions. We hold (pt. I, ante) that the statute nonetheless
provides a property owner full opportunity to challenge the validity of a zoning
ordinance, as pertinent to the validity of permit conditions, when it is applied to
him or her—the earliest time such conditions can be challenged. The policy
requiring prompt challenges to a zoning ordinance also gives way in cases of
preemption by a later-enacted state statute. Property owners or taxpayers must be
18
permitted to challenge the ordinance on the basis of such preemption after the
preemptive state statute has taken effect—a challenge that could not have been
made when, perhaps years earlier, the ordinance was first adopted. Both property
owners and watchdog groups thus have, under our understanding of the statutes,
full opportunity to challenge preempted ordinances on their face and in their
application.
The legislative policy of requiring a prompt challenge, running from the
earliest date the action could be brought, nonetheless remains clear in section
65009. Were we to hold that a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance, based on a
later-enacted preemptive statute, need not be brought within three years of initial
accrual (the state statute’s effective date) but may instead be brought at any time
within three years of any application of the ordinance, we would directly
contravene that legislative policy. (Cf. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of
La Habra, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 825 [continuous accrual rule adopted in absence
of specific legislative guidance].)
Alternatively, plaintiffs argue their taking claim comes within the five-year
limitation period for an action “arising out of the title to real property, or to rents
or profits out of the same.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 319; see also id., § 318 [five-year
limitation for “action for the recovery of real property”].) We recently held the
five-year period, though applicable to inverse condemnation actions based on a
physical taking (see, e.g., Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 862, 867-868; Frustuck v. City of Fairfax (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d
345, 374), did not apply to a regulatory taking claim based on enactment of a
zoning ordinance, as such government action neither effected “a physical invasion
19
of the land” nor impaired “title to the land.” (Hensler, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 24.)11
In any event, plaintiffs’ taking claim rests on the County’s demand that, as
conditions of their permit approvals, they record rent and occupancy restrictions
on their deeds. The specific statute of limitations for such a challenge to permit
conditions, as discussed above, is Government Code section 65009, subdivision
(c)(1)(E). Code of Civil Procedure sections 318 and 319 are thus inapplicable.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 312; see Hensler, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 22.)
Finally, plaintiffs suggest that preemption by state law renders a local
ordinance not only unenforceable but also “null and void,” and that consequently
in this case “there is no applicable limitations period because there is essentially
no ordinance.” Plaintiffs’ claims would thus be timely whenever brought.
Plaintiffs cite no authority for this approach, and we have discovered none. Nor
does it appeal as a matter of logic. A preempted ordinance, while it may lack any
legal effect or force, does not cease to exist; if it did cease to exist, any challenge
to it would have no object. Plaintiffs here, for example, could not sensibly pray
for an order that the County amend or repeal the Ordinance or stop enforcing it, if
the Ordinance no longer existed. Just as section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E)
applies to claims that a permit or condition is void (see Ching v. San Francisco
Board of Permit Appeals, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 891-894; Hawkins v.
County of Marin, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at pp. 592-593), so the statute of

11
Sandpiper Mobile Village v. City of Carpinteria (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th
542, 549, upon which plaintiffs rely, applied Code of Civil Procedure section 319
to a regulatory taking claim, but did so without analysis, in reliance on Garden
Water Corp. v. Fambrough
(1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 324, a case of physical
invasion. In light of our holding in Hensler, supra, 8 Cal.4th at page 24,
Sandpiper Mobile Village v. City of Carpinteria, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th 542, is
disapproved to the extent it applied the five-year period to a regulatory taking
claim.
20


limitations governing the claim that an ordinance has been preempted by a later-
enacted state law, Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a), applies
despite the further contention that preemption rendered the ordinance void.
CONCLUSION
To the extent it challenges the validity of conditions the County imposed on
Travis’s development permit and seeks removal of those conditions, the action
was timely brought. (§ 65009, subd. (c)(1)(E).) In all other respects the action is
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (a).)
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of the writ solely on statute
of limitations grounds and did not address the trial court’s additional
determination that the taking claim, to the extent timely, was without merit.
Remand is thus appropriate.
DISPOSITION
We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeal
and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
WERDEGAR, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
21

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY BROWN, J.

I concur with the majority’s conclusion that Travis’s action challenging the
validity of the conditions imposed by the County of Santa Cruz (hereafter County)
on his development permit is timely and that Travis can raise a facial attack on the
ordinance’s validity under Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E).
However, although the majority disclaims any such intent, its treatment of the
constitutional claims effectively puts an “expiration date” on fundamental
guarantees. (See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606.) From that
portion of the analysis, I dissent.
Plaintiffs contend that the passage of the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing
Act (Civ. Code, §§ 1954.50-1954.535) has preempted the ordinance and that
enforcement of the ordinance works a taking of their property without
compensation. Admittedly, the interaction of the public interest and private
constitutional protections raise complex questions, which are not easily resolved.
But, when considering constitutional implications, it is important for courts to
think as carefully and to articulate governing principles as precisely as possible.
The majority concludes an action seeking removal of permit conditions is timely if
brought within 90 days of the final decision imposing the conditions. (Maj. opn.,
ante, at p. 1.) Challenges based on broader claims of invalidity, i.e., preemption or
unconstitutionality, are subject to the three-year statute of limitations under Code
of Civil Procedure section 338 and are thereafter permanently barred. The
majority never explains, however, what policy imperative or maxim of
constitutional interpretation compels the latter result.
1



The fundamental purpose served by statutes of limitations—even the
stringent limitations of validation actions—is to prevent stale claims. (Wyatt v.
Union Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, 787.) They thus provide repose to
individuals subject to legal actions or criminal prosecution. Statutes of limitations
“are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” (Wood v. Elling Corp. (1977) 20
Cal.3d 353, 362.) “Just determinations of fact cannot be made when, because of
the passage of time, the memories of witnesses have faded or evidence is lost.”
(Wilson v. Garcia (1985) 471 U.S. 261, 271, italics added.) Similarly, litigants
may not “ ‘attack ancient administrative determinations on the ground they
constitute a necessary foundation for current administrative action’ ” because it
would “ ‘inject unacceptable uncertainty’ ” into administrative decisionmaking
and “ ‘emasculate the purposes of the statute of limitations.’ ” (Traverso v.
Department of Transportation (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1148, quoting Miller
v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1376-1377.)
In similar respects, statutes of limitations allow public entities to implement
new enactments without concern for contingent liabilities that may not become
manifest for many years. This latter concern justified the restrictions this court
imposed in Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1: “The purpose of
statutes and rules which require that attacks on land-use decisions be brought by
petitions for administrative mandamus, and create relatively short limitation
periods for those actions, and actions which challenge the validity of land use
statutes, regulations, and/or decisions, is to permit and promote sound fiscal
planning by state and local governmental entities.” (Id. at p. 27.)
Although the assertion of a constitutional right is subject to reasonable
statutes of limitations (Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 13; Rand
v. Bossen (1945) 27 Cal.2d 61, 65), we have declared this principle in the context
of vindication of personal claims or failure to challenge revenue measures. The
2
rationale for imposing a limitations period breaks down, however, where the
plaintiff seeks a declaration of constitutional invalidity or preemption rather than
monetary damages or similar remedies. The desire to avoid stale claims
dependent on ancient facts or to minimize potential fiscal disruption is not
implicated in an action merely to conform an enactment to controlling authority.
The
discussion
in
Palazzolo suggests a way to harmonize the countervailing
interests at issue here. In rejecting the state’s argument that a property owner who
takes title to land after enactment of a regulation cannot assert a takings claim, the
high court observed: “Just as a prospective enactment, such as a new zoning
ordinance, can limit the value of land without effecting a taking because it can be
understood as reasonable by all concerned, other enactments are unreasonable and
do not become less so through passage of time or title. Were we to accept the
State’s rule, the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of its
obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or
unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect to put an expiration date on the
Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too, have a
right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land.
(Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, supra, 533 U.S. at p. 627, italics added.)
Justice Stevens’s concurring and dissenting opinion also endorsed the
principle that future generations have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations
on the use and value of land. “If a regulating body fails to adhere to its procedural
or substantive obligations in developing landuse restrictions, anyone adversely
impacted by the restrictions may challenge their validity in an injunctive action. If
the application of such restriction to a property owner would cause her a ‘direct
and substantial injury,’ [citation], I have no doubt that she has standing to
challenge the restriction’s validity whether she acquired title to the property before
or after the regulation was adopted.” (Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, supra, 533 U.S.
606, 638 (conc. & dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) However, he stopped short of saying
3
that a succeeding owner may obtain compensation for a taking of property from
her predecessor in interest. (Ibid.)
The resolution of this case does not require us to address the merits of
either claim. We are asked simply to decide whether a public entity’s action may
be insulated from review by the running of the statute of limitations. The zoning
restriction here becomes a permanent limitation in the landowner’s deed and will
thus restrict subsequent purchasers. Considering the purpose of any limitations
period, I see no reason to bar subsequent purchasers from ever challenging this
ordinance simply because they have no need to obtain a permit. Moreover, even
current owners who did not challenge a permit condition when it was imposed,
may have standing to seek pure declaratory relief if the status quo is altered by
preemption or subsequent interpretation.
BROWN, J.
4
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Travis v. County of Santa Cruz
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion


Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 100 Cal.App.4th 609
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S109597
Date Filed: July 29, 2004
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Santa Cruz
Judge: Robert B. Yonts, Jr.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Steven Travis, Stanley M. Sokolow and Sonya Sokolow, in pro. per.; Pacific Legal Foundation, James S.
Burling and Harold E. Johnson for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Paul B. Campos for The California Building Industry Association, Home Builders Association of Northern
California and Building Industry Legal Defense Foundation as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and
Appellants.

Harold Griffith as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Law Offices of Rosario Perry and Rosario Perry as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Pahl & Gosselin, Stephen D. Pahl and Karen Kubala McCay for California Apartment Association as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Samuel Torres, Jr., and Dana McRae, County Counsel, and Dwight L. Herr, Assistant County Counsel, for
Defendant and Respondent.

Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney (San Francisco), Andrew W. Schwartz, William Chan and Ellen Forman,
Deputy City Attorneys, for City and County of San Francisco and League of California Cities as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, J. Matthew
Rodriquez, Assistant Attorney General, Joseph Barbieri, Christiana Tiedemann and Alice Busching
Reynolds as Amici Curiae.


1

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

James S. Burling
Pacific Legal Foundation
3900 Lennane Drive, Suite 200
Sacramento, CA 95834
(916) 419-7111

Dwight L. Herr
Assistant County Counsel
701 Ocean Street, Room 505
Santa Cruz, CA 95060
(831) 454-2040

Andrew W. Schwartz
Deputy City Attorney
City Hall, Room 234
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place
San Francisco, CA 94102-4603
(415) 554-4620

2


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Thu, 07/29/2004S109597

Parties
1Travis, Steven (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Harold E. Johnson
Pacific Legal Foundation
10360 Old Placerville Road, Suite 100
Sacramento, CA

2Travis, Steven (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by James S. Burling
Pacific Legal Foundation
10360 Old Placerville Road, Suite 100
Sacramento, CA

3County Of Santa Cruz (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by Dwight L. Herr
Office Of The County Counsel
701 Ocean Street, Room 505
Santa Cruz, CA

4County Of Santa Cruz (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by Dana M. Mcrae
County Counsel - Santa Cruz
701 Ocean Street, Room 505
Santa Cruz, CA

5County Of Santa Cruz (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by Samuel Torres
Assistant County Counsel = Santa Cruz
701 Ocean Street, Room 505
Santa Cruz, CA

6Sokolow, Stanley (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Harold E. Johnson
Pacific Legal Foundation
3900 Lennane Drive, Ste.200
Sacramento, CA

7Sokolow, Stanley (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by James S. Burling
Pacific Legal Foundation
3900 Lennane Drive, Ste. 200
Sacramento, CA

8Sokolow, Stanley (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Dwight L. Herr
Office Of The County Counsel
701 Ocean St #505
Santa Cruz, CA

9Sokolow, Sonya (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Harold E. Johnson
Pacific Legal Foundation
10360 Old Placerville Road, Suite 100
Sacramento, CA

10Sokolow, Sonya (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by James S. Burling
Pacific Legal Foundation
10360 Old Placerville Road, Suite 100
Sacramento, CA

11California Building Industry Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Paul B. Campos
Homebuilders Association Of Northern California
200 Porter Dr, Ste. 200
San Ramon, CA

12Home Builders Association Of Northern Calif. (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Paul B. Campos
Homebuilders Association Of Northern California
200 Porter Dr
San Ramon, CA

13Building Industry Legal Defense Foundation (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Paul B. Campos
Homebuilders Association Of Northern California
200 Porter Dr
San Ramon, CA

14Griffith, Harold (Amicus curiae)
P.O. Box 96
Freedom, CA 95019

15State Of California (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Alice Lee Busching
Deputy Attorney General
1515 Clay St 20FL
Oakland, CA

16City And County Of San Francisco (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Andrew W. Schwartz
Office of the City Attorney
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Pl., room 234
San Francisco, CA

17League Of California Cities (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Andrew W. Schwartz
Office of the City Attorney
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Pl., room 234
San Francisco, CA

18Action Apartment Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Rosario Perry
Law Offices Of Rosario Perry
312 Pico Blvd
Santa Monica, CA

19California Apartment Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Karen Kubala Mccay
Pahl & Gosselin
160 W Santa Clara St 14FL
San Jose, CA

20California Apartment Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Stephen D. Pahl
Pahl And Gosselin
160 W Santa Clara 14th Fl
San Jose, CA


Disposition
Jul 29 2004Opinion: Affirmed in part/reversed in part

Dockets
Sep 3 2002Petition for review filed
  by counsel for appellants (Steven Travis, et al.)
Sep 5 2002Record requested
 
Sep 6 2002Received Court of Appeal record
  One file folder and One accordian folder.
Sep 23 2002Answer to petition for review filed
  By counsel for Respondent {County of Santa Cruz}.
Sep 30 2002Reply to answer to petition filed
  by counsel for appellants Steven Travis, et al.. (filed in Sacto)
Oct 25 2002Time extended to grant or deny review
  The time for granting or denying review in the above-entitled matter is hereby extended to and including Dec. 2, 2002, or the date upon which review is either granted or denied.
Nov 26 2002Petition for Review Granted (civil case)
  In addition to issues specified in the petition for review, the parties are asked to brief the following questions: Was the petition for writ of mandate, or any claim for relief therein, subject to the limitation periods in Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6 and/or Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E)? If so, was the petition or claim timely under those statutes? Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown and Moreno, JJ.
Nov 26 2002Letter sent to counsel re:
  conflict & form
Dec 5 2002Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  By Respondent {County of Santa Cruz}.
Dec 10 2002Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  in Sacramento by appellants {Steven Travis et al.).
Dec 26 2002Opening brief on the merits filed
  in Sacramento by appellants (Steven Travis et al.).
Jan 24 2003Answer brief on the merits filed
  by respondent (County of Santa Cruz).
Feb 13 2003Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  in Sacramento by counsel for appellants Steven Travis et al.
Feb 27 2003Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  by Calif. Building Industry Assoc. et al., in support of appellants.
Mar 6 2003Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Calif. Building Industry Assoc.
Mar 6 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  Calif. Building Industry Assoc. et al. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Mar 10 2003Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  by Harold Griffith in support of appellants (Steven Travis et al.).
Mar 12 2003Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Harold Griffith
Mar 12 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  On application of Harold Griffith for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellants is hereby granted. Answer due by any party within 20 days.
Mar 14 2003Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief
  by City and County of San Francisco and League of California Cities in support of respondent.
Mar 17 2003Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  by California Apartment Association in support of appellants.
Mar 17 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  the Attorney General on behalf of the People for the State of California. (Filed per rule 29.1(f)(7))
Mar 18 2003Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  City and County of San Francisco and League of California Cities
Mar 18 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  The application of City and County of San Francisco and League of California Cities for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondent is hereby granted. Answer due by any party within 20 days.
Mar 18 2003Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief
  Action Apartment Assoc. in support of appellants. (timely per rule 40k)
Mar 19 2003Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  California Apartment Association
Mar 19 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  The application of California Apartment Association for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellants is hereby granted. Answer due by any party within 20 days.
Mar 19 2003Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Action Apartment Association
Mar 19 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  The application of Action Apartment Association for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellants is hereby granted. Answer due by any party within 20 days.
Mar 25 2003Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  by respondent (County of Santa Cruz). Answer to amicus brief by the California Building Industry Association et al.
Apr 1 2003Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  by counsel for respondent (County of Santa Cruz). Answer to amicus brief filed by Harold Griffith.
Apr 7 2003Received document entitled:
  Request of appellants to file a single consolidated reply to various amicus briefs.
Apr 7 2003Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  by counsel for appellants (Steven Travis et al.). Consolidated reply to amicus briefs from City & County of San Francisco, League of California Cities and The People of the State of CA.
Apr 8 2003Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  by counsel for respondent. Answer to amici briefs by Action Apartment Assoc. and of the California Apartment Assoc.
Apr 15 2003Filed:
  Amended Declaration of Service from counsel for appellants (Steven Travis et al.) re consolidated reply to amicus briefs from City & County of San Francisco etc.
May 15 2003Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)
  by counsel for respondent (County of Santa Cruz).
Apr 6 2004Case ordered on calendar
  5-6-04, 1:30pm, S.F.
Apr 16 2004Filed:
  Request of resp County of Santa Cruz to allocate oral argument time to a/c City & County of S.F. and League of Calif. Cities. (faxed)
Apr 19 2004Request for judicial notice denied
  (Respondent's) as calling for notice of irrelevant material. ( See Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1141, fn.6; Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. ( 1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1064.)
Apr 21 2004Order filed
  Permission granted for two counsel to present oral argument on behalf of resp.
Apr 21 2004Order filed
  Permission granted for resp to allocate 15 min oral argument time to amicus curiae City & County of S.F. and League of Calif. Cities.
Apr 27 2004Received:
  Submission of New Authority from counsel for petnrs.
May 4 2004Change of contact information filed for:
  counsel for petnrs.
May 6 2004Cause argued and submitted
 
Jul 29 2004Opinion filed: Affirmed in part, reversed in part
  and remanded to CA. Majority Opinion by Werdegar, J. joined by George C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Chin & Moreno, JJ. C&D Opinion by Brown, J.
Aug 31 2004Remittitur issued (civil case)
 
Sep 1 2004Note:
  Record sent to CA6. (3 doghouses)
Sep 3 2004Received:
  receipt for remittitur - from CA6.
Feb 9 2005Received:
  Our record returned from CA6 (3 doghouses and 3 volume of clerk transcripts).

Briefs
Dec 26 2002Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Jan 24 2003Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Feb 13 2003Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
Mar 6 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Mar 12 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Mar 17 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Mar 18 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Mar 19 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Mar 19 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Mar 25 2003Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
Apr 1 2003Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
Apr 7 2003Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
Apr 8 2003Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website