Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 4/28/03

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

CRAIG TETER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S106553
v.
) Ct.App.
4/3
G025239
CITY OF NEWPORT BEACH,
Orange
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. 786037

Plaintiff was arrested and jailed for public intoxication (Pen. Code,1 § 647,
subd. (f); hereafter section 647(f)),2 but was later released without charges (§ 849,
subd. (b)(2); hereafter section 849(b)(2)).3 While he was in jail, defendant was
badly beaten by another prisoner and he sued the City of Newport Beach (the City)
for negligence. The City claims immunity under Government Code section 844.6,
subdivision (a)(2) (hereafter Government Code section 844.6(a)(2)). Government
Code section 844.6(a)(2), subject to stated exceptions, provides that a public entity
1
Hereafter all statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2
Section 647(f) provides for the misdemeanor arrest of a person who is
found in a public place under the influence of an intoxicating liquor and who is by
reason of such intoxication “unable to exercise care for his or her own safety or
the safety of others . . . .”
3
Section 849(b)(2) provides that a peace officer may release a person
arrested solely for intoxication, if “no further proceedings are desirable.”

1

---

is not liable for “[a]n injury to any prisoner.” Therefore, the question presented by
this case is whether, given the fact that he was ultimately discharged pursuant to
Penal Code section 849(b)(2), plaintiff was a prisoner while he was in jail. We
conclude that plaintiff was a prisoner, and, accordingly, that the City can claim
Government Code section 844.6(a)(2) immunity.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
One evening plaintiff was arrested and booked into the City jail for
violation of section 647(f). There was no civil detoxification facility to which
plaintiff could reasonably have been taken. (See § 647, subd. (g); hereafter
section 647(g).) However, the City did have a policy, pursuant to section
849(b)(2), of releasing a person arrested for public intoxication, provided the
individual: (1) had not been arrested for public intoxication three times in the
prior year, (2) was not combative during the incident or the arrest, and (3) was not
on probation for alcohol or drug offenses.4 Prior to 6:30 the next morning, the
City determined that plaintiff was presumptively eligible for such a release.
Pending a final check of plaintiff’s condition at 8:00 a.m., and the absence of
detrimental new information bearing on one of the three eligibility factors, the
City planned to release him without filing charges.
At approximately 7:00 a.m., another prisoner, Waldron, was placed in the
cell where plaintiff was sleeping. Waldron had been arrested for falsely
identifying himself to the arresting officer after he was found sleeping on the
beach in violation of a curfew. The false identification Waldron gave the arresting
officer led the officer to believe, apparently mistakenly, that Waldron might be a

4
Under section 849(b)(2), a person arrested only for intoxication may be
released from custody without appearing before a magistrate if “no further
proceedings are desirable.” Section 851.6, subdivision (b) states that anyone
released without having charges filed “shall be issued a certificate by the law
enforcement agency which arrested him describing the action as a detention.”
2

---

registered sex offender. Apart from falsely identifying himself, Waldron was
cooperative with the arresting officer. That is, Waldron was “quite docile.” He
was not “combative, argumentative, or resistant.” Nor did Waldron exhibit any
violent behavior during the two to two and a half hours he spent in the presence of
one of the jailers. Because Waldron “was cooperative with us, he was showing no
tendencies towards violence of any kind,” the jailer “decided to get him out of the
[holding] tank and place him in the general population.” Unfortunately, before
plaintiff’s projected release at 8:00 a.m., Waldron severely beat him, resulting in a
concussion and a broken eye socket. Plaintiff spent approximately 12 days in the
hospital and suffered permanent scarring and continued vision problems.
Plaintiff sued the City for damages, alleging, inter alia, negligence. The
City contended that two provisions of the Government Code immunized it from
liability for plaintiff’s injuries: Government Code sections 844.6(a)(2) (injuries to
a prisoner) and 820.2 (discretionary act immunity). The trial court concluded that
neither statute conferred immunity, and the matter proceeded to trial. The jury
returned a verdict in plaintiff’s favor, and the trial court entered judgment against
the City for $175,006.89.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, concluding that plaintiff was a
detainee in civil protective custody, and not a prisoner within the meaning of
Government Code section 844.6(a)(2), and that the jail officer’s decision to place
Waldron in plaintiff’s cell was a ministerial act not entitled to immunity under
Government Code section 820.2.
The City petitioned for review, renewing its claim that it is immune under
Government Code section 844.6(a)(2) for any injury to a prisoner. (The petition
did not challenge the Court of Appeal’s disposition of the claim of discretionary
act immunity.) Alternatively, the City argues that it is immune under Government
Code section 844.6, subdivision (a)(1) for any injury proximately caused by a
3

---

prisoner. Plaintiff argues that the City failed to raise this argument in the Court of
Appeal. The City disputes this. However, a fair reading of its briefs in the Court
of Appeal is that the City, for whatever reason, relied solely on the immunity
provided by Government Code section 844.6(a)(2) (injury to a prisoner).
Therefore, as a matter of policy, we decline to consider the City’s argument based
on Government Code section 844.6, subdivision (a)(1) (injury proximately caused
by a prisoner). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(b)(1).)
II. DISCUSSION
To reiterate: Government Code section 844.6(a)(2), subject to stated
exceptions, provides that a public entity is not liable for “[a]n injury to any
prisoner.”5

5
Government Code section 844.6 states: “(a) Notwithstanding any other
provision of this part, except as provided in this section and in Sections 814,
814.2, 845.4, and 845.6, or in Title 2.1 (commencing with Section 3500) of Part 3
of the Penal Code, a public entity is not liable for:

“(1) An injury proximately caused by any prisoner.
“(2) An injury to any prisoner.
“(b) Nothing in this section affects the liability of a public entity under
Article 1 (commencing with Section 17000) of Chapter 1 of Division 9 of the
Vehicle Code.

“(c) Except for an injury to a prisoner, nothing in this section prevents
recovery from the public entity for an injury resulting from the dangerous
condition of public property under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 830) of
this part.

“(d) Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for
injury proximately caused by his negligent or wrongful act or omission. The
public entity may but is not required to pay any judgment, compromise or
settlement, or may but is not required to indemnify any public employee, in any
case where the public entity is immune from liability under this section; except
that the public entity shall pay, as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section
825) of Chapter 1 of this part, any judgment based on a claim against a public
employee who is lawfully engaged in the practice of one of the healing arts under
any law of this state for malpractice arising from an act or omission in the scope of
his employment, and shall pay any compromise or settlement of a claim or action,
based on such malpractice, to which the public entity has agreed.”
4

---

Section 844.6(a)(2) appears in chapter 3 of title 1, division 3.6, part 2 of
the Government Code. Government Code section 844 also appears in chapter 3.
Section 844 provides that “[a]s used in this chapter, ‘prisoner’ includes an inmate
of a prison, jail, or penal or correctional facility. For the purposes of this chapter,
a lawfully arrested person who is brought into a law enforcement facility for the
purpose of being booked . . . becomes a prisoner, as a matter of law, upon his or
her initial entry into a prison, jail, or penal or correctional facility, pursuant to
penal processes.” (Italics added.)
Plaintiff was arrested and booked for violation of Penal Code section
647(f). Therefore, the City contends, he was a prisoner under the plain terms of
Government Code section 844. Plaintiff disagrees. The term prisoner as used in
Government Code section 844.6(a)(2), he contends, should be narrowly construed.
Government Code section 844.6(a)(2) is part of the California Tort Claims
Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.). Under the Tort Claims Act, plaintiff contends,
liability is the rule and immunity the exception. Plaintiff is quite wrong about that.
The Tort Claims Act provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute,”
“[a] public entity is not liable for an injury.” (Gov. Code, § 815.) Recently, in
Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127-1128, we reiterated
that “ ‘ “[T]he intent of the [Tort Claims Act] is not to expand the rights of
plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential
governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances . . . .” ’ (Brown v.
Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829.)”
The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff that he was not a prisoner, but
rather in civil protective custody, at the time of his injury. The considerations that
led the Court of Appeal to this conclusion are simply not apposite.
First, the Court of Appeal raised Penal Code section 647(g). Section 647(g)
provides in pertinent part: “When a person has violated subdivision (f) of this
5

---

section, a peace officer, if he or she is reasonably able to do so, shall place the
person . . . in civil protective custody. The person shall be taken to a facility,
designated pursuant to Section 5170 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, for the
72-hour treatment and evaluation of inebriates [(civil detoxification facility)]. . . .
No person who has been placed in civil protective custody shall thereafter be
subject to any criminal prosecution . . . based on the facts giving rise to this
placement.” (Italics added.)
Section 647(g) is inapposite because plaintiff was not placed in civil
protective custody pursuant to it. The predicate for the application of section
647(g) is that the arresting officer be “reasonably able” to place the arrestee in a
civil detoxification facility. However, as the Court of Appeal acknowledged,
“[a]ccording to the record on appeal, no such facility is available in or near
Newport Beach.”
The fact that no civil detoxification facility was available to the arresting
officer here, and that plaintiff was accordingly not placed in civil protective
custody pursuant to section 647(g), distinguishes this case from the case upon
which the Court of Appeal principally reliedMeyer v. City of Oakland (1980)
107 Cal.App.3d 770 (Meyer).
Like plaintiff here, the plaintiff in Meyer, supra, 107 Cal.App.3d 770, was
arrested for public intoxication and was injured by other inmates while confined in
jail. However, unlike the City of Newport Beach, the City of Oakland had a civil
detoxification facility. The supervising officer of the Oakland City jail knew that
Mr. Meyer was being held in civil protective custody pursuant to section 647,
former subdivision (ff) (now § 647(g)). Under the practice of the Oakland City
jail, a person brought in under that statute was to be sent to the civil detoxification
facility at Highland Hospital when room there was available. The hospital should
have been called in Mr. Meyer’s case, but apparently was not. Therefore, it was
6

---

“undisputed that . . . he was held at the jail in ‘civil protective custody’ pursuant to
Penal Code section 647, [former] subdivision (ff).” (Meyer, at p. 773, fn.
omitted.) “Because plaintiff was not a ‘prisoner’ when he was injured,” the Court
of Appeal concluded in Meyer, “the City is not immune from liability pursuant to
section 844.6, subdivision (a)(2).” (Meyer, at p. 778.)
Again, as the Court of Appeal here recognized, this case is distinguishable
from Meyer. The plaintiff here was not being held in civil protective custody
pursuant to section 647(g). He had been arrested and booked for violation of
section 647(f), and we have emphasized that such a person is being held pursuant
to a penological objective. (Sundance v. Municipal Court (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1101,
1127 (Sundance).)
Moreover, we reject the underlying premise of the Meyer opinion—that a
section 647(f) arrestee being held in jail pending transfer to a civil detoxification
facility is not a prisoner for the purposes of Government Code section 844.6(a)(2).
The California Law Revision Commission, in the report that resulted in the
California Tort Claims Act, observed that “no tort liability should be admitted for
damages sustained as the consequence of conditions which are common to all
inmates and which simply represent a reasonable application of general policy
determinations by responsible prison or jail authorities with respect to the
administration of such institutions.” (Recommendation: Sovereign Immunity
Study (Jan. 1963) 5 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1963) p. 425, italics added.)
Suppose that in two cities, A and B, the jails are identical in all respects, including
the factors that bear on the likelihood of prisoner/prisoner assaults, like the
number of single cells and the staff/prisoner ratios. However, in City A, unlike
City B, a civil detoxification facility is available. In City A’s jail, a section 647(f)
arrestee is injured by another prisoner while awaiting transfer to the civil
detoxification facility. In City B’s jail, a section 647(f) arrestee is also injured by
7

---

another prisoner. Why should City A be liable under Government Code section
844.6(a)(2) when City B is not? Why should the question of the city’s liability
turn on the availability within that city of a civil detoxification facility? We can
think of no good reason. Accordingly, we disapprove of, and not merely
distinguish, Meyer v. City of Oakland, supra, 107 Cal.App.3d 770.
In concluding that those arrested for violation for section 647(f) but
ultimately released without charges pursuant to section 849(b)(2), should be
considered to have been held in civil protective custody, the Court of Appeal
reasoned that the contrary conclusion “could discourage cities from providing
detoxification facilities, clearly contradicting the Legislature’s intent in enacting
section 647, subdivision (g).” Indeed, one of the virtues of the Court of Appeal’s
opinion, in plaintiff’s view, that it would have “encourage[d] local authorities to
designate civil detoxification facilities . . . .” Providing civil detoxification
facilities may well be sound public policy for a number of reasons, not the least of
which is that public inebriates, by definition, are unable to exercise care for their
own safety, and are therefore especially vulnerable to predatory fellow inmates.
However, it is not for the courts, but rather for those exercising legislative
authority at the state or county level, to make that policy judgment. As we said in
Sundance, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1101, 1139: “This court should not interfere with the
County’s legislative judgment on the ground that the County’s funds could be
spent more efficiently [on civil detoxification facilities than on criminal
enforcement of section 647(f)]. [¶] The Legislature determined that public
intoxication is a crime and it offered counties the option of diverting section 647(f)
arrestees to civil detoxification facilities in lieu of prosecution. (§ 647[, former
subd.] (ff)[; now § 647(g)].) Although section 647(f) is a valid penal statute,
plaintiffs urge this court to override the legislative judgment and effectively
decriminalize public intoxication on the ground that civil detoxification is cheaper
8

---

and more effective than prosecution of public inebriates. This court declines to
intrude so far into the legislative prerogative.”
Alternatively, plaintiff contends that a person arrested for violation of Penal
Code section 647(f), but released without charges pursuant to Penal Code section
849(b)(2), should be treated as if he or she were never a prisoner within the
meaning of Government Code sections 844 and 844.6(a)(2). His argument is as
follows: Under Government Code section 844, an arrested person “brought into a
law enforcement facility for the purpose of being booked . . . becomes a prisoner
. . . .” (Italics added.) Under Penal Code section 7, subdivision (21), “[t]o ‘book’
signifies the recordation of an arrest in official police records . . . .” However,
under Penal Code section 849, subdivision (c), the arrest of a person for public
intoxication who is released pursuant to section 849(b)(2) is deemed a detention
only, not an arrest.
This is but a variation on what the Courts of Appeal have referred to as the
“ ‘disappearing lawful arrest’ ” trick. (See Armondo v. Department of Motor
Vehicles (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1178; Behan v. Alexis (1981) 116
Cal.App.3d 403, 405.) To paraphrase the Armondo court, we hold that an arrest
for Penal Code section 647(f), valid when made, remains a valid arrest for the
purposes of Government Code section 844.6(a)(2), even though the person
arrested is subsequently released pursuant to Penal Code section 849(b) and issued
a certificate pursuant to Penal Code section 851.6, describing the action as a
detention. (See Armondo, at p. 1179.)
Next, in an argument that is very difficult to follow, plaintiff claims the
1996 amendment to Government Code section 844 somehow supports his position
that he was never a prisoner within the meaning of Government Code sections 844
and 844.6(a)(2). However, the legislative history of the amendment demonstrates
that, if anything, the opposite is true.
9

---

To reiterate, Government Code section 844 provides that “[a]s used in this
chapter, ‘prisoner’ includes an inmate of a prison, jail, or penal or correctional
facility. For the purposes of this chapter, a lawfully arrested person who is
brought into a law enforcement facility for the purpose of being booked . . .
becomes a prisoner, as a matter of law, upon his or her initial entry into a prison,
jail, or penal or correctional facility, pursuant to penal processes.” (Italics
added.)
The second sentence of Government Code section 844, which we have
italicized, was added to the statute in 1996. (Stats. 1996, ch. 395, § 1.) The
legislative history of the amendment reveals that it was sponsored by the
California State Sheriffs’ Association (CSSA) because the CSSA “believe[d] that
conflicting appellate court decisions may place public entities at risk of liability
for persons injured while being taken into custody and booked.” (Sen. Com. on
Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1493 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended
April 8, 1996, p. 2 (hereafter Senate Bill Analysis).)
The Court of Appeal decision of particular concern to the CSSA was
Zeilman v. County of Kern (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1174. (Sen. Bill Analysis,
supra, at pp. 2-3.) At the time the arrestee in Zeilman fell and injured herself, the
paperwork portion of the booking procedure had been completed, but she had not
yet been fingerprinted or photographed. In her suit for personal injuries resulting
from the fall, the trial court granted the county’s motion for summary judgment
based on Government Code section 844.6(a)(2). The Court of Appeal reversed.
In the Court of Appeal’s view, “the line of demarcation between status as an
arrestee and as a confined person is the completion of the booking process”
(Zeilman, at p. 1181), and, the Court of Appeal concluded, “a triable issue of fact
exist[ed] as to whether the booking process was completed” (id. at p. 1183).
10

---

The bill sponsored by the CSSA clarified that a lawfully arrested person
who is brought into a law enforcement facility for the purpose of being booked
becomes a prisoner, as a matter of law, upon his initial entry into the facility.
(Sen. Bill Analysis, supra, at p. 2.) Plaintiff can hardly take comfort from this
clarification.
Plaintiff’s reliance on Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d
710 is also misplaced. In Sullivan, a prisoner who had been confined in jail for
several days after his term expired brought an action for false imprisonment.
Because the plaintiff was a prisoner, the county argued, it was immune under
Government Code section 844.6. We rejected the claim of immunity. “Continued
confinement cannot legally make him a ‘prisoner’ when the jail term has expired;
in the eyes of the law plaintiff is no longer a ‘prisoner.’ In short, we conclude that
section 844.6’s reference to ‘an injury to any prisoner’ does not apply to a case of
false imprisonment; the section, accordingly, in the instant case, does not
immunize the county.” (Sullivan, at p. 717, first italics added.) Sullivan is
inapposite here because plaintiff was not falsely imprisoned. At the time of his
injury, plaintiff was still a prisoner, still being held in “pretrial detention . . .
attendant upon enforcement of a criminal statute.” (Sundance, supra, 42 Cal.3d at
p. 1127.)
Finally, plaintiff makes a number of constitutional claims. He argues that
“[s]ection 647(f) arrestees who are temporarily detained to sober up in local jails,
with no intention that they be charged or prosecuted, cannot be considered
‘prisoners’ because they are afforded none of the due process requisites of
criminal procedure.” Plaintiff’s argument is based on a false premise—that the
City had no intention of charging him when it arrested him. To the contrary, when
plaintiff was arrested, the question whether he would be charged was an open one,
and it remained open at the time of his injury. As previously stated, the question
11

---

whether charges would be filed depended upon whether plaintiff was found to
satisfy the City’s three criteria for release pursuant to section 849(b)(2)—that he
(1) had not been arrested for public intoxication three times in the prior year, (2)
was not combative during the incident or the arrest, and (3) was not on probation
for alcohol or drug offenses. The decision was still in abeyance, pending a final
determination that plaintiff met these criteria, when plaintiff was attacked by
Waldron. No further process was due plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends that section 647(g), insofar as it makes placement of a
section 647(f) arrestee in a civil detoxification facility contingent upon whether
such a facility is reasonably available in the jurisdiction in which the arrest occurs,
denies equal protection to those arrested in jurisdictions where such facilities are
not reasonably available. This argument, first raised not long after section 647,
former subdivision (ff) (now section 647(g)) was enacted, has been consistently,
and in our view correctly, rejected. (Johnson v. Municipal Court (1977) 70
Cal.App.3d 761; People v. McNaught (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 599; People v.
Superior Court (Colon) 29 Cal.App.3d 397, 400-401.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the matter remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BROWN, J.

WE CONCUR:

GEORGE,
C.J.
BAXTER,
J.
CHIN,
J.
12

---

CONCURRING OPINION BY KENNARD, J.
I concur generally in the majority opinion. There is, however, one aspect
with which I disagree: Unlike the majority, I would not reach out to disapprove
the Court of Appeal’s decision in Meyer v. City of Oakland (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d
770. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 7-8.) As the majority acknowledges, this case is
readily distinguishable from Meyer. (Id., at p. 7.) That distinction renders it
unnecessary to resolve the difficult question of whether Meyer was correctly
decided, an issue I would leave for another day when it is squarely presented.

KENNARD,
J.

WE CONCUR:

WERDEGAR, J.
MORENO, J.
1

---

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Teter v. City of Newport Beach
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

XXX NP opn. filed 3/25/02 - 4th Dist., Div. 3
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S106553
Date Filed: April 28, 2003
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Orange
Judge: John M. Watson

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Robert W. Burnham, City Attorney, Daniel K. Ohl, Deputy City Attorney; Glen E. Tucker; Beam, Brobeck,
West & Sullivan, Beam, Brobeck & West, David J. Brobeck, Jr., and Kermit D. Marsh for Defendant and
Appellant.

Jones & Mayer, Martin J. Mayer and Michael R. Capizzi for California State Sheriffs’ Association,
California Police Chiefs Association, California Peace Officers’ Association, California State Association
of Counties and Ten California Cities as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Michael R. Cully and Associates, Michael R. Cully; and Jean Ballantine for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1

---

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Kermit D. Marsh
Beam, Brobeck & West
600 W. Santa Ana Boulevard, Suite 1000
Santa Ana, CA 92701-4586
(714) 558-3944

Jean Balantine
12228 Venice Boulevard, Suite 152
Los Angeles, CA 90066
(310) 398-5462

2

---

Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Mon, 04/28/2003	S106553

Disposition
Apr 28 2003	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
May 2 2002	Petition for review filed   appellant City of Newport Beach
May 2 2002	Application filed to:   include document w/petn
May 10 2002	Record requested
May 13 2002	Answer to petition for review filed   respondent CRAIG TETER
May 14 2002	Received Court of Appeal record   blue plastic file
May 17 2002	Reply to answer to petition filed   appellant City of Newport Beach
Jun 12 2002	Petition for Review Granted (civil case)   The application for Inclusion of Additional Document is denied. Votes: Geroge, CJ., Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown and Moreno, JJ.
Jun 19 2002	Received Court of Appeal record   1-doghouse
Jun 24 2002	Filed:   Letter from Jean Ballantine, Co-Counsel that espondent Craig Teter is not aware of any persons, associations of persons, firms, partnerships, corporations etc. -- attached CIP form left blank. [Letter stamped received on 6/24/2002 in the Los Angeles office. ]
Jun 24 2002	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   counsel for Teter
Jul 1 2002	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   counsel for appellant City of Newport Beach
Jul 12 2002	Opening brief on the merits filed   City of Newport Beach, appellant
Jul 22 2002	Request for extension of time filed   to file answer brief/merits attached to a declaration of Jean Ballantine. to> September 10, 2002
Jul 31 2002	Extension of time granted   Respondent to and including September 10, 2002, to file the Answer Brief on the Merits. No further extensions of time will be granted.
Sep 6 2002	Answer brief on the merits filed   by Respondent Craig Teter
Sep 6 2002	Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)   by Respondent Craig Teter
Sep 19 2002	Request for extension of time filed   to file Reply Brief/Merits.
Sep 25 2002	Opposition filed   (faxed) by Jean Ballantine, Co-counsel for Respondent Craig Teter (Hard copy received 9/26/2002)
Sep 27 2002	Note:
Oct 3 2002	Extension of time granted   On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the Reply Brief on the Merits is extended to and including October 9, 2002. No further extensions of time are contemplated.
Oct 9 2002	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   by appellant City of Newport Beach
Nov 8 2002	Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief   Californai State Sheriff's Asso., Calif. Police Chiefs Assoc., Calif. Peace Officers' Assoc, Calif State Assoc.of Counties and Ten Calif Cities [under same cover] supporting respondents.
Nov 14 2002	Received:   Telephone call from amicus applicant California State Sheriff's Assn. regarding error on the cover page. Party supported should be "defendant and appellant" and not plaintiff and respondent.
Nov 18 2002	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   The application of California State Sheriff's Association, California Police Chiefs Association, California Peace Officers Association, California State Association of Counties and Ten California Cities for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of defendant and appellant is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Dec 2 2002	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   by Resp. to the A/C brief of Calif. State Sheriffs' Assn, et al.
Jan 7 2003	Case ordered on calendar   2-5-03, 9am, Sacramento
Jan 16 2003	Filed:   Application of petitioner/appellant/defendant City of Newport Beach to divide oral argument time into equal parts opening and rebuttal, filed by counsel for City of Newport Beach
Jan 16 2003	Received:
Jan 28 2003	Order filed   Respondent's request for judicial notice of the publication "Treatment Works! Where to find help in California communities for alchohol and other drug problems..." is denied. Respondent's request for judicial notice of a comment made in a digest of Senate Bill No. 819 is granted.
Feb 5 2003	Cause argued and submitted
Apr 28 2003	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   and remanded Majority Opinion by Brown, J. -- joined by George, C. J., Baxter and Chin, JJ Concurring Opinion by Kennard, J. -- joined by Werdegar and Moreno, JJ.
Jun 13 2003	Remittitur issued (civil case)   Two certified copies each of the opinion and remittitur were sent to Fourth District, Division Four.
Jun 20 2003	Received:   Receipt for remittitur from Fourth District, Division Three, signed for by Orlando Duarte, Deputy.

Briefs
Jul 12 2002	Opening brief on the merits filed
Sep 6 2002	Answer brief on the merits filed
Oct 9 2002	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Dec 2 2002	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website