Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 8/31/06 (this opinion should follow companion case, S123951, also filed 8/31/06)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

STATE OF CALIFORNIA ex rel.
KAMALA HARRIS, as District
Attorney, etc., et al.,
Plaintiffs
and
Appellants,
S131807
v.
Ct.App.
1/4
A095918
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLP,
et al.,
San
Francisco
County
Defendants and Appellants.
Super. Ct. No. 993507

The California False Claims Act (CFCA; Gov. Code, § 12650 et seq.)
provides that any “person” who knowingly submits a false claim to the State of
California, or to a “political subdivision,” may be liable in a court action for treble
damages and civil penalties. (Id., §§ 12651, 12652.) The suit may be brought by
the Attorney General where state funds are involved, or by the “prosecuting
authority” of a political subdivision where the political subdivision’s funds are
involved, subject to intervention and participation by the other official where both
state and political subdivision funds are involved. (Id., § 12652, subds. (a), (b).)
The statute also includes a “qui tam” feature, under which suit may be
brought in the name of a defrauded government entity, whether state or local, by a
“person” with independent knowledge of the facts who files an action before
anyone else eligible to sue has done so. (Gov. Code, § 12652, subds. (c)(1), (10),
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(d)(2), (3).) The qui tam plaintiff may conduct the action in the name of the
defrauded entity or entities if the latter decline to intervene; even if such
intervention occurs, the qui tam plaintiff may remain a party, eligible to receive a
portion of the proceeds recovered. (Id., subds. (c)(4), (7)(B), (e)(1), (f)(1), (g)(2)-
(6).)
In Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation, (Aug. 31, 2006, S123951)
__ Cal.4th ___ (Wells), we hold, among other things, that public school districts
are not “persons,” as defined in the CFCA, who may be sued under the terms of
that statute. Here we consider whether the City and County of San Francisco
(City), represented by its district attorney and city attorney, is a “person” who may
sue, as a qui tam relator, upon a false claim involving, not its own funds, but
exclusively funds of the State of California. We conclude that the answer is “no.”
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The history of this lawsuit is complex but, for purposes of this opinion, it
can be condensed somewhat. City sued Old Republic Title Company (Old
Republic) under the CFCA, the unfair competition law (UCL; Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 17200 et seq.), and the false advertising law (id., § 17500 et seq.). The CFCA
count alleged that Old Republic had falsified “holder reports” submitted to the
State Controller pursuant to the Unclaimed Property Law (UPL; Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1500 et seq.; see id., § 1530) in order to conceal its failure to escheat dormant
funds to the state as required by the UPL. The remaining causes of action, not
germane to the issue here presented on review, asserted that Old Republic had
used escrow accounts to generate hidden income properly payable as interest to
escrow customers, and had charged customers fees for services not rendered.1 For

1
The wrongful financial practices alleged in the non-CFCA counts were
entirely unrelated to the “escheat” claims raised by City under the CFCA. City
obtained at least some of its information about Old Republic’s various alleged
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purposes of the CFCA count, City claimed that, although it was asserting no false
claim against its own funds, it was a “person” with standing to sue on the state’s
behalf as a qui tam plaintiff.
When City’s complaint was unsealed2 and served on Old Republic, the
company remitted to the state some $9.5 million in funds subject to escheat, plus
some $7.7 million in statutory interest on those funds. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1577.)
City nonetheless maintained its CFCA cause of action for treble damages
recoverable under the false claims statute. (Gov. Code, § 12651, subd. (a).)
In the trial court, City’s action was consolidated for all purposes with
several class actions against Old Republic alleging wrongful customer practices
similar to those set forth in City’s complaint. Old Republic demurred to City’s
CFCA cause of action on grounds that City is not a “person” who may sue as a qui
tam relator under that statute. The demurrer was overruled. Old Republic’s
motion for summary adjudication of the CFCA count, premised on similar
grounds, was denied.
Upon City’s motion for summary adjudication of the CFCA claim, Old
Republic conceded liability on that count. The court granted City’s motion,

illegal practices from Old Republic’s former chief financial officer, Donald Barr.
After firing Barr for embezzlement in connection with certain of these practices,
Old Republic referred the matter to City’s district attorney. The district attorney
opened an investigation leading to criminal charges against Barr. Barr later
negotiated a disposition of the charges in return for providing information against
Old Republic.
2
As noted in Wells, supra, __ Cal.4th ___, ___ [at p. 15], a qui tam
complaint under the CFCA must be filed under seal, and may remain sealed for up
to 60 days, with extensions of time available upon timely application, while the
Attorney General (in cases involving state funds) or the local “prosecuting
authority” (in cases involving political subdivision funds) decides whether to
intervene and assume control of the action. (Gov. Code, § 12652, subd. (c)(2),
(4)-(8).) During this time, the complaint may not be served on the defendant. (Id.,
subd. (c)(2).)
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determined that the damages for Old Republic’s delayed remission of funds
subject to escheat were the stipulated UPL interest of $7.568 million, trebled to
$22.704 million, and offset by interest already paid, for a net recovery of $15.136
million. The court awarded City, as the qui tam relator, one-third of the trebled
damages, or $7.568 million.
The consolidated action proceeded to trial, under the UCL, on the hidden-
interest and unearned-fee claims raised by both City and the class plaintiffs.
Finding liability on these counts, the court awarded restitution to the class totaling
$11.554 million, plus stipulated prejudgment interest of $2.211 million.
Additionally, on City’s complaint, the court assessed UCL civil penalties totaling
$2.181 million and awarded injunctive relief.
Meanwhile, City filed an amended complaint naming
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (PwC) as an additional defendant under the CFCA
and UCL causes of action. The amended complaint alleged that PwC was Old
Republic’s independent public accountant during relevant periods, and was
charged, among other things, with preparing Old Republic’s annual audit report to
the Insurance Commissioner, as required by the Insurance Code.3 PwC was liable,
the amended complaint claimed, for failing in these reports to disclose Old
Republic’s escheat violations.4

3
Insurance Code section 12389, subdivision (a)(4) requires an underwritten
title company such as Old Republic annually to submit to the Insurance
Commissioner an audit report certified by independent auditors. The statutory
purpose is to “maintain the solvency of the companies subject to this section and
to protect the public by preventing fraud and requiring fair dealing.” (Ins. Code,
§ 12389, subd. (d).)
4
The new allegations against PwC were apparently based on testimony given
by PwC managers and auditors at the trial against Old Republic.
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PwC demurred to both counts, and also moved for judgment on the
pleadings on the CFCA count. The trial court sustained the demurrer without
leave to amend on the UCL count. The court ruled that any omissions or
misrepresentations by PwC in Old Republic’s audit reports under the Insurance
Code were immaterial, because the Department of Insurance (DOI) does not police
escheat violations. Moreover, the court reasoned, the funds had now been
escheated and could be claimed by their owners, so there was no additional
remedy to impose.
The court denied PwC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling, as
before, that City was a “person” eligible to sue, on the state’s behalf, as a qui tam
plaintiff under the CFCA. Subsequently, however, the court granted PwC’s
motion for summary judgment on the CFCA count. Again, the court reasoned that
any lapses by PwC in the Insurance Code audit reports were immaterial, because
even if these reports had disclosed Old Republic’s escheat irregularities, the DOI,
in the ordinary course of business, would not have forwarded the information to
the State Controller, the officer charged with enforcement of the UPL.
Multiple appeals followed. In a proceeding numbered A097793, Old
Republic appealed from the judgment against it in favor of City and the class
plaintiffs. In a separate proceeding numbered A095918, City appealed from the
dismissal of its action against PwC. PwC cross-appealed in No. A095918, urging,
among other things, that City is not a “person” who may sue as a qui tam relator
under the CFCA. The appeals were consolidated.
The Court of Appeal, in No. A097793, affirmed the judgment against Old
Republic in its entirety. In No. A095918, the Court of Appeal reversed both
(1) the summary judgment for PwC on City’s CFCA cause of action and (2) the
dismissal of City’s UCL cause of action against PwC after PwC’s demurrer was
sustained without leave to amend. With respect to the CFCA cause of action, the
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Court of Appeal rejected PwC’s argument that City is not a “person” eligible for
qui tam status under that statute.
City and PwC both petitioned for review; Old Republic did not. City urged
that in its CFCA action against Old Republic, the trial court and the Court of
Appeal should not have limited damages (subject to the treble multiplier) to
interest on the funds whose escheat to the state was delayed, and should have
included the principal amount of the unescheated funds as well.5 PwC argued that
(1) City is not a “person” who can assert qui tam status under the CFCA, (2) the
Court of Appeal erred in finding that any misstatements or omissions by PwC
from Old Republic’s Insurance Code audit reports were “material” for purposes of
the CFCA and the UCL, and (3) a UCL claim against PwC could not be premised
on an alleged failure to comply with professional accountancy standards.
We denied City’s petition and granted PwC’s. Our order limited the issue
to be briefed and argued to the following: “May a political subdivision bring an
action under Government Code section 12652, subdivision (c) [i.e., the CFCA], to
recover funds on behalf of the state or another political subdivision?”
Subsequently, counsel for City, Old Republic, and the class plaintiffs
stipulated in this court that (1) the issue on which we granted review was
presented solely by No. A095918, and had no bearing on No. A097793, and
(2) Old Republic had not sought review in either appeal, had paid the judgment in
No. A097793, and was entitled to exoneration of its appeal bonds. These parties

5
In its petition, City advised that, following the Court of Appeal’s judgment,
City had settled with Old Republic on terms that precluded any additional
recovery by City against Old Republic regardless of the outcome of future
proceedings. City nonetheless claimed the issue was not moot because, if its
CFCA action against PwC was reinstated, our ruling on the damage issue would
be relevant to City’s potential recovery against PwC.
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therefore requested we sever the two appeals and retransfer No. A097793 to the
Court of Appeal with directions to issue its remittitur therein forthwith.
PwC’s counsel professed PwC’s neutrality on the request, and counsel for
the class plaintiffs advised that issuance of the remittitur in No. A097793 would
allow some $12.5 million paid by Old Republic into a court-ordered fund to be
distributed to class members. Accordingly, we severed the two appeals and
retransferred No. A097793 to the Court of Appeal with instructions to issue its
remittitur.6
We turn to the issue on which we granted review. We conclude the Court
of Appeal erred in holding that City is a “person” who may sue under the CFCA,
on behalf of another public entity, as a qui tam plaintiff.7
DISCUSSION
Under the CFCA, any “person” who submits a false claims to the “state,” or
to a “political subdivision,” may be sued for treble damages and civil penalties.
(Gov. Code, § 12651, subd. (a).) For this purpose, a “political subdivision”
includes “any city, city and county, county, tax or assessment district, or other
legally authorized local government entity with jurisdictional boundaries.” (Id.,
§ 12650, subd. (b)(3).)
The CFCA specifies in detail who may bring and prosecute actions under
that statute, depending on whether state or political subdivision funds are
involved. If state funds are involved, the Attorney General may bring the action.

6
As a result of this final disposition of the claims involved in No. A097793,
both City and the State of California will retain all sums recovered against Old
Republic under the CFCA for violation of the escheat laws. No conclusions
reached in this court’s opinion will have any operative effect on those recoveries.
7
An amicus curiae brief, professing to support neither party but essentially
supporting PwC on the particular facts of this case, has been filed by Eugene
Dong.
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(Gov. Code, § 12652, subd. (a)(1).) If political subdivision funds are involved, the
action may be brought by the political subdivision’s “prosecuting authority” (id.,
§ 12652, subd. (b)(1)), i.e., “the county counsel, city attorney, or other local
government official charged with investigating, filing, and conducting civil legal
proceedings on behalf of, or in the name of, [the] particular political subdivision”
(id., § 12650, subd. (b)(4), italics added). Where both state and political
subdivision funds are involved, each of these officials may intervene, on behalf of
the public entity he or she represents, in an action initiated by the other. (Id.,
§ 12652, subds. (a), (b).)
Under this scheme, the Attorney General, acting in his official capacity, is
not authorized to sue to recover exclusively political subdivision funds. The only
official who may do so in such capacity is the “prosecuting authority” representing
the “particular political subdivision” (Gov. Code, § 12650, subd. (b)(4), italics
added) whose funds are involved (id., § 12652, subd. (b)(1)). Conversely, the
“prosecuting authority” of a political subdivision, acting in that capacity, is not
authorized to sue to recover exclusively state funds—the only category of funds at
issue in this case. The sole official who may do so is the Attorney General. (Id.,
§ 12652, subd. (a)(1).) Nor may the prosecuting authority of one political
subdivision sue as such where only the funds of another political subdivision are
involved. The only official who may do so is the prosecuting authority of the
“particular” political subdivision that was actually defrauded. (Id., §§ 12650,
subd. (b)(4), 12652, subd. (b)(1).)
There is, however, a third category of eligible plaintiffs under the CFCA.
A “person” with independent knowledge of the facts, who gets to the courthouse
first, may bring a qui tam action for and in the name of the state (if state funds are
involved), or a political subdivision (where the political subdivision’s funds are
involved), or both. (Gov. Code, § 12652, subds. (c)(1), (10), (d)(2), (3).)
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Such a suit is filed under temporary seal (Gov. Code, § 12652,
subd. (c)(2)), whereupon the qui tam plaintiff must immediately notify the
Attorney General and disclose all pertinent information in the plaintiff’s
possession (id., subd. (c)(3)). If political subdivision funds are involved, the
Attorney General must, in turn, provide similar notice and disclosure to the
prosecuting authority of the affected political subdivision. (Id., subd. (c)(7)(A),
(8)(A).) After investigation, the pertinent official or officials may intervene in the
qui tam suit and assume control of the action. (Id., subd. (c)(4)-(8).) If
intervention occurs, the qui tam plaintiff may remain a party. (Id., subd. (e)(1).)
If no official intervenes, the qui tam plaintiff may conduct the action. (Id.,
subd. (c)(6)(B), (7)(D)(ii), (8)(D)(iii).)
When a false claims suit is brought, in the first instance, by the Attorney
General, or by the prosecuting authority of a political subdivision, the defrauded
entity or entities themselves receive 67 percent of the proceeds. The remaining 33
percent goes to the officials who litigated the case, for use in investigating and
prosecuting other false claims against the entities they represent. (Gov. Code,
§ 12652, subd. (g)(1)(A)-(C).)
When a prosecuting official or officials intervene in an action initiated by a
qui tam plaintiff, the plaintiff remains entitled to receive between 15 and 33
percent of the proceeds in addition to the 33 percent official share, leaving as little
as 34 percent for the defrauded entity or entities. (Gov. Code, § 12652,
subd. (g)(2).) If no prosecuting official intervenes in the action, the qui tam
plaintiff may receive up to 50 percent of the proceeds, with the remainder going
directly to the defrauded entity or entities. (Id., subd. (g)(3).)
City’s district attorney and city attorney, who represent City in this action,
closely fit the description of officials who, as prosecuting authorities, may sue
upon false claims involving City’s funds, but have no official prosecutorial
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jurisdiction over false claims that involve only state funds. Indeed, City concedes
that neither it nor its legal representatives were authorized to sue as prosecuting
authorities in this case, because only state funds, and no funds of City itself, are at
issue. Nonetheless, City urges, it may proceed through these same officers on the
state’s behalf simply as a “person” eligible to sue under the statute’s “qui tam”
provision. We disagree.
The CFCA contains a single definition of “person” as including “any
natural person, corporation, firm, association, organization, partnership, limited
liability company, business, or trust.” (Gov. Code, § 12650, subd. (b)(5).) Absent
contrary indications, we assume the Legislature intended the same meaning of
“person” to delineate both who may be sued under the statute, and who may sue
under its qui tam provision. (But see text discussion, post.)
In Wells, supra, __ Cal.4th ___, we consider whether public school districts
are “persons” who may be sued under the CFCA. Answering that question “no,”
we conclude, among other things, that the language of this particular statute
weighs heavily against a determination that public or governmental entities are
covered “persons.”
As we explain in Wells, the CFCA’s enumeration of included “persons”
“contains no words or phrases most commonly used to signify . . . public entities
or governmental agencies.” (Wells, supra, __ Cal.4th ___, ___-___ [at pp. 18-
19].) Yet, in other contexts the CFCA “makes very specific reference to
governmental entities,” including both the state and “political subdivisions,”
which are defined to include every kind and form of local government with
jurisdictional boundaries, including cities, counties, and cities and counties. (Id. at
p. ___ [at p. 19]; see Gov. Code, § 12650, subd. (b)(3).) Moreover, Wells notes, in
other statutes, “the Legislature has demonstrated that . . . definitions of ‘persons’
[similar to that set forth in the CFCA] do not include public entities, and that
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legislators know how to include such entities directly when they intend to do so.”
(Wells, supra, at p. ___ [at p. 19]; see also id. at pp. ___-___, & fn. 12 [at pp. 19-
20], and examples therein described.)
These points are particularly telling in the determination whether public
entities, such as City, are “persons” who may sue, as qui tam relators, under the
CFCA. As noted above, the statute has carefully separated the officials who may
bring false claims actions, on behalf of the public entities they represent, when
those particular entities’ funds are involved in the alleged false claims, from the
“persons” who, partly in hopes of self-enrichment, may bring such actions
regardless of the particular public entity whose funds are involved.
The obvious purpose of these provisions is to delineate the boundaries of
official jurisdiction, to make each public entity’s prosecuting officer or officers
responsible only for funds falsely claimed from that entity, and to preclude one
government agency’s false claims jurisdiction from intruding on another’s. In
logical fashion, each designated prosecuting officer is made responsible for
“diligently” investigating and pursuing false claims on behalf of his or her own
entity (Gov. Code, § 12652, subds. (a)(1), (b)(1)), but not on behalf of others.
Nothing in the CFCA implies that such cross-agency investigation and intrusion
may nonetheless occur through the indirect device of qui tam actions by one
public entity on behalf of another.
Indeed, the language of the CFCA contains one explicit indication that
governmental entities, state or local, are not among the intended class of “persons”
who may sue as qui tam relators. In providing that a qui tam complaint shall be
filed under seal (a requirement not applicable to actions initiated by the Attorney
General for the state, or by prosecuting authorities for their own political
subdivisions), the statute describes such a complaint as one “filed by a private
person.” (Gov. Code, § 12652, subd. (c)(2), italics added.)
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In Wells, we also note that the limited evidence available from the CFCA’s
legislative history suggests public entities were not intended as “persons” covered
by the statute. “As originally introduced on March 4, 1987, Assembly Bill No.
1441 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) . . . , which in final form became the CFCA,
explicitly included, as covered ‘persons,’ ‘any person, firm, association,
organization, partnership, business trust, corporation, company, district, county,
city and county, city, the state, and any of the agencies and subdivisions of these
entities. [Citation.] A substantial subsequent amendment to the bill excised the
references to government entities, and the definition of ‘person’ was changed to
the form finally adopted. [Citation.]” (Wells, supra, __ Cal.4th ___, ___-___ [at
pp. 20-21].)
With respect to the specific issue before us in this case—whether the CFCA
contemplates public entities as qui tam plaintiffs—the history of Assembly Bill
No. 1441 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 1441) provides additional
insights. On May 6, 1987, after the bill was amended in the Assembly on April
29, 1987, to delete the specific references to public entities as “persons,” the
Assembly Judiciary Committee heard testimony from David Huebner,
representing the Center for Law in the Public Interest, which participated in
drafting both the current federal and California false claims statutes. Huebner
described the proposed California law as “deputizing citizens to join the fight to
protect the public treasury.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Hearing on Assem. Bill
No. 1441 (CFCA) (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) (May 6, 1987), testimony of David
Huebner, p. 3, italics added.)
Huebner explained that “the Justice Department and local prosecuting
authorities do not have unlimited resources and should be able to benefit from
additional non-governmental resources brought to bear on their behalf. The
driving force behind the false claims concept is the providing of incentives for
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individual citizens to come forward with information uniquely in their possession
and to thus aid the Government in [ferreting] out fraud. This false claims
legislation provides a mechanism for harnessing such non-governmental
resources, at no additional cost to the government.” (Huebner Testimony, supra,
p. 3, italics added.) Huebner noted, as one of the bill’s principal benefits, that
“taxpayers see their elected representatives acting decisively and calling upon the
source of the funds, the taxpayers themselves, for assistance.” (Id., at p. 4, italics
added.)
Moreover, Huebner testified, “the False Claims bill before you encourages
cooperation between state and local authorities by setting out a framework for
deciding whether the state or local authorities have jurisdiction over particular
cases involving mixed funds. Providing such a framework is essential to effective,
efficient investigation and enforcement.” (Huebner Testimony, supra, pp. 3-4.)
The Legislature could reasonably conclude that these purposes are
undermined by allowing a local government entity to step outside the specified
jurisdictional boundaries, and to bring qui tam actions exclusively on behalf of
other units of government. Such a system raises concerns that scarce government
resources might be wasted on duplicative, overlapping, and competitive
investigations of possible false claims. Though a qui tam action brought by one
government entity exclusively on behalf of another might succeed, thus enriching
the coffers of both, it might also fail, resulting in the irretrievable loss of taxpayer
dollars and public resources expended by the “qui tam” agency in its effort to
recover funds owed exclusively to a different agency.
The CFCA certainly seeks to induce private “whistleblowers,” uniquely
armed with information about false claims, to risk the failure of their qui tam suits
in hopes of sharing in a handsome recovery if they succeed. Indeed, this prospect
of reward may be the only means of inducing such private parties to come forward
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with their information. The statute further sweetens the deal by sanctioning qui
tam actions that “jump the gun” on the defrauded public agencies. Thus, a qui tam
suit is barred if the defrauded entity gets to the courthouse first (Gov. Code,
§ 12652, subd. (d)(2)), but if the qui tam plaintiff wins that race, he or she may file
suit, and thus secure the right to share in any recovery, before he or she shares
with the defrauded entity any information bearing on the claim (see id.,
subd. (c)(3)).
This carefully balanced scheme enlists “nongovernmental” resources—
informants acting partly in their own self-interest—in the battle to ferret out and
prosecute public fraud. On the other hand, it costs the government nothing in
time, resources, or money beyond what a defrauded entity might spend to
investigate and prosecute on its own behalf.
Allowing public agencies to act as qui tam plaintiffs, however, may
encourage some agencies, seeking risky paydays, to employ taxpayer funds, and to
divert time and resources from their usual public duties, in order to speculate in
qui tam litigation on the sole behalf of other agencies. It may also encourage some
public entities, acting for their own enrichment, to compete with each other in
races to the courthouse, or to withhold relevant information from their defrauded
colleagues, so they can file “surprise” qui tam suits and share in the defrauded
entities’ recoveries. These significant policy concerns counsel against a
conclusion, absent a clearer expression of purpose, that the Legislature meant to
authorize qui tam suits by public entities. The issue is best left to the Legislature’s
specific attention, at its discretion.8

8
Our discussion of these issues in the abstract is not meant to impugn City’s
motives or actions in this lawsuit.
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Nonetheless, City asserts multiple grounds for concluding that it is a
“person” who can sue under the CFCA, as a qui tam plaintiff, on behalf of the
state. None of these arguments is persuasive.
First, City argues that the plain language of the CFCA supports its
interpretation. City urges that the statutory definition of “person” is expansive and
inclusive, and particularly enumerates “corporations,” which encompass municipal
corporations. (See City of Pasadena v. Stimson (1891) 91 Cal. 238, 248, 252
[persons natural or artificial, and thus corporations public or private, and thus
municipal corporations, are “persons” for purposes of statute allowing any
“person” to acquire property by condemnation for sewerage purposes]; Blum v.
City and County of San Francisco (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 639, 644 [City and
County of San Francisco is a municipal corporation].) City also asserts that it is an
“organization,” and the CFCA does not expressly limit its coverage to “private”
organizations.
However, as we explain in Wells, and discuss further above, there are
numerous indications in the language, structure, and history of the CFCA that the
Legislature did not intend this particular statute to include public entities as
“persons.” Moreover, though City insists otherwise, the specific statutory
reference to qui tam suits by “private person[s]” (Gov. Code, § 12652,
subd. (c)(2)) provides additional support for the view that public entities are not
“persons” who may bring actions of that kind.9

9
City points out that the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the original version
of Assembly Bill No. 1441 declared the bill (which, as introduced, covered only
false claims against the State of California) would authorize “the Attorney General
and any other person” to sue on the state’s behalf. (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem.
Bill No. l441 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Mar. 4, 1987, italics added.)
But that version of the bill specifically included all state and local entities as
“person[s].” (See discussion, ante.) As City observes, when the bill was amended
to include false claims against political subdivisions also, to designate local
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Moreover, we have determined in this opinion that, by carefully delineating
the jurisdictional responsibilities of designated public officials who may sue on
behalf of particular entities, state or local, the CFCA implicitly excludes such
officials as “persons” who may sue on behalf of other public entities. (See
discussion, ante.) City points out, however, that “persons” suing as qui tam
relators are not the exact equivalents of the statutorily designated officials suing on
behalf of their own agencies. As indicated above, when a qui tam suit is filed, the
relevant state or local officials must be notified, and they have the right to
intervene and assume control of the action. (Gov. Code, § 12652, subds. (c)(3)-
(8), (e)(1).) “Persons” otherwise eligible to bring qui tam actions have no similar
right to notice and intervention in actions initiated by prosecuting officials on
behalf of their own agencies, and the filing of such a suit cuts off the right to bring
a qui tam action based on the same “allegations or transactions.” (Id.,
subd. (d)(2).)
Thus, City argues, recognizing a public entity’s right to sue as a qui tam
relator solely on behalf of other agencies—subject to their right to intervene and
assume control—is not necessarily at odds with the jurisdictional limits on public

officials who could sue on behalf of such political subdivisions, and to delete the
references to public entities as “persons,” the Legislative Counsel’s Digest
continued to indicate that suits could be maintained by “the Attorney General, the
prosecuting authority of a political subdivision and any other person.” (Leg.
Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1441 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) 4 Stats. 1987,
Summary Dig., p. 523, italics added.) On this basis, City urges the Legislature
must have intended such officials to be “persons” with the authority to bring qui
tam suits. We are not persuaded. Retention by the Legislative Counsel of the
word “other” for subsequent versions of the bill may well have been an oversight,
failing to take account of the fact that public entities had been removed from the
definition of “person.” In any event, the Legislative Counsel’s declarations are not
binding or persuasive where contravened by the statutory language, and by other
indicia of a contrary legislative intent. (E.g., People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th
764, 780.)
16

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prosecutorial authority set forth in the statute. However, we adhere to our view
that the careful statutory distinction between public prosecutorial authorities, on
the one hand, and “persons” who may bring qui tam actions on the other, suggests
the Legislature did not intend to recognize public entities as qui tam relators.
City urges that “persons” who may bring qui tam actions under the federal
false claims statute (FFCA; 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq.) include the several states.
For a number of reasons, City’s analysis of federal law does not convince us that
the CFCA permits qui tam suits by public entities.
In the first place, as we explain in Wells, though the CFCA was patterned
after the FFCA as then recently amended, there are significant differences between
the two statutes. In particular, we note at the outset, the FFCA does not define the
word “person,” while its California counterpart supplies a definition that appears
to exclude public entities as “persons” for any purpose under its provisions. (See
Wells, supra, __ Cal.4th ___, ___ [at p. 28]; see also discussion, ante.)
City cites federal case law for the proposition that the states are proper qui
tam relators under the FFCA. However, no decision has directly so held. In
United States ex rel. State of Wis. v. Dean (7th Cir. 1984) 729 F.2d 1100 (Dean),
Wisconsin was the qui tam plaintiff, but no party questioned the state’s standing,
as such, to bring such an action. The issue was simply whether provisions of the
FFCA then in effect, which barred a qui tam action based on information already
known to the federal government at the time the suit was filed, were applicable if
the source of the government’s knowledge was the qui tam relator itself. Dean
held that the bar applied in such cases.
In Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina (8th Cir. 2002) 276 F.3d
1032, which involved no public entity plaintiff, an issue was whether a private
association could satisfy the FFCA’s requirement that the qui tam relator have
“direct” knowledge of the false claim, insofar as an organization must glean its
17

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information from individuals. Holding that the association could be a qui tam
plaintiff using knowledge obtained from its members, the court of appeals
commented, among other things, that “[t]here is no hint in the history of the 1986
[amendments to the FFCA] that Congress intended to disqualify organizational
relators. To the contrary, any such rule would have disqualified the State of
Wisconsin from proceeding as relator in Dean . . . .” (Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse
Anesthetists, supra, at p. 1049, italics added.) Again, however, neither of these
decisions directly presented, or decided, the issue whether public entities may sue
as qui tam plaintiffs under the FFCA.
City points to certain legislative history of the 1986 amendments to the
FFCA. These amendments, which slightly preceded enactment of the California
statute, substantially revised the federal law. Among other things, the FFCA was
altered, in response to Dean, to narrow the circumstances in which a qui tam
action based on facts or evidence already known to the federal government is
barred. (See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(2)(A), as added by Pub.L. No. 99-562 (Oct. 27,
1986) § 3, 100 Stat. 3154, 3157 [bar applies where suit is against member of
Congress, member of the judiciary, or senior executive branch official].)
As City observes, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report for the bill
incorporating the 1986 amendments (Sen. No. 1562, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)),
in discussing the Dean issue, included the following passage: “The National
Association of Attorneys General adopted a resolution in June of 1984 stating that
‘to prohibit sovereign states from becoming qui tam plaintiffs because the U.S.
Government was in possession of information provided to it by the State and
declines to intercede in the State’s lawsuit, unnecessarily inhibits the detection and
prosecution of fraud on the Government.’ The resolution goes on to strongly urge
that Congress amend the False Claims Act to rectify the unfortunate result of the
18

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Wis. v. Dean decision.” (Sen. Rep. No. 99-345, 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News pp. 5266, 5279.)
However, despite an apparent assumption by the quoted organization that
states were proper qui tam plaintiffs under the FFCA, nothing in the 1986
amendments themselves speaks to this issue. While Congress amended the statute
to ameliorate the “source of information” problem—which could arise whether the
potential qui tam plaintiff is public or private—it did nothing to indicate
specifically that the states, or other public entities, are “persons” with standing to
bring qui tam actions.
Post-1986 federal decisions involving states as qui tam relators similarly do
not directly address or determine whether their status as public entities affects
their standing to bring qui tam actions. These cases simply note that, by virtue of
the 1986 amendments, the Dean holding has been superseded, and states are not
barred as qui tam plaintiffs for the reason that they provided the federal
government with the pertinent false claims information before filing suit
themselves. (U.S. ex rel. Hartigan v. Palumbo Bros., Inc. (N.D.Ill. 1992)
797 F.Supp. 624, 630-631; cf. U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club
(D.C. Cir. 1997) 105 F.3d 675, 680, & fn. 1.)10

10
As noted in Wells, the FFCA was originally adopted in 1863 to combat
massive contractor fraud during the Civil War. (Wells, supra, __ Cal.4th ___, ___
[at p. 28].) City cites a passage from the Senate floor debate on the 1863 bill in
which the bill’s sponsor, Senator Howard, indicated in passing his view that qui
tam relators would not be limited to “the informer[s] who come[ ] into court to
betray [their] coconspirator[s],” and that “[e]ven the district attorney, who is
required to be vigilant in the prosecution of such cases, may also be the informer,
and entitle himself to one half the forfeiture . . . and . . . damages . . . .” (Remarks
of Sen. Howard, Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. (1863) pp. 955-956.) But the
opinion of a single legislator about who might be “persons” entitled to bring qui
tam suits under the 1863 federal statute is of little relevance to what the California
Legislature intended when, in 1987, it adopted California’s law containing a
definition of “person[s],” not shared by the federal version, that appears to exclude
19

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Insofar as it has been assumed that the FFCA permits qui tam actions by
states, such assumptions may be based on considerations that differ significantly
between the federal and California statutes. State and local public entities often
have relationships with the federal government that make them privy to false
claims against the national treasury; by the same token, allowing such entities to
sue as qui tam relators on the federal government’s behalf does not create an
undue danger of interference with the single official—the Attorney General of the
United States—designated to represent the government directly in such suits. On
the other hand, the CFCA gives not only the California Attorney General, but
numerous local officials, direct statutory authority to prosecute false claims action
on behalf of the entities they represent. Additionally to recognize the same state
or local entities as “persons” who may bring qui tam suits, under the CFCA, on
behalf of other state and local entities risks widespread overlap and competition
among such California officials acting in dual capacities.
City notes the United States Supreme Court’s recent holding that certain
local government agencies, including counties and cities, are “persons” who may
be sued under the FFCA. (Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler (2003)
538 U.S. 119; but see Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex
rel. Stevens (2000) 529 U.S. 765 [states are not persons subject to suit under
FFCA].) However, as we have explained both in Wells, supra, __ Cal.4th ___,
___-___ [at pp. 28-30], and in this opinion, the federal and California statutes
differ significantly with respect to their treatment of “persons.” Since 1863 the

public entities. The quotation of Senator Howard’s remarks in federal case law
which does not directly address the standing of public entities as qui tam relators is
also of little help. (See U. S. ex rel. Marcus v. Hess (1943) 317 U.S. 537, 546
[private qui tam plaintiff; decision holds, under then extant version of FFCA, that
qui tam relator need not have independent knowledge of the facts, and might
obtain his information from reading criminal indictment].)
20

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FFCA has left that term entirely for interpretation under federal common law (see
Chandler, supra, at p. 125), while the CFCA’s more specific definition of the
word, viewed in context of the California statute’s structure and history, suggests
an intent to exclude public entities.
City argues that, under California principles, statutes applying to “persons”
are deemed to include public entities unless such inclusion would infringe the
entities’ sovereign powers. (E.g., City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando
(1975) 14 Cal.3d 199, 276-277; Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d
920, 933; see Wells, supra, ___ Cal.4th ___ [at p. 21].) City suggests that even if
inclusion of public entities as “persons” who may be sued under the CFCA would
infringe such powers, allowing public entities to sue as qui tam plaintiffs under the
CFCA would not have that effect. Thus, City urges, we may hold it is a “person”
for purposes of bringing qui tam actions, even if we conclude (as we do in Wells)
that public entities are not “persons” who can be defendants under the CFCA.
For example, City observes, we held in People v. Centr-O-Mart (1950)
34 Cal.2d 702 (Centr-O-Mart), that the State of California was a “person” who
could sue to enforce the Unfair Practices Act (UPA; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17000 et
seq.), even though the state was not expressly included in the statute’s definition
of “person” as “includ[ing] any person, firm, association, organization,
partnership, business trust, company, corporation or municipal or other public
corporation” (id., § 17021). In Centr-O-Mart, we applied the principle that laws
in derogation of sovereignty must be strictly construed in favor of the state, and
that statutes will not be interpreted to impair or limit the state’s sovereign power to
act in its governmental capacity. (Centr-O-Mart, supra, at pp. 703-704.) Noting
that the express purpose of the UPA was to “ ‘safeguard the public,’ ” we held
that, though not specifically mentioned in the statute, the state, through its law
21

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enforcement officers, was a proper party to bring suit for that purpose. (Centr-O-
Mart, supra, at p. 704.)
On the other hand, City points out, Community Memorial Hospital v.
County of Ventura (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 199, later held that a county is not a
“person” who may be sued under the UPA. Distinguishing Centr-O-Mart, the
Community Memorial Hospital court reasoned that in the earlier case, exclusion of
the state as a “person” who could sue under the UPA would have undermined the
state’s sovereign power to act in its governmental capacity, while a determination
that a county can be sued under the statute would also have that effect. Hence, the
Court of Appeal concluded, “[t]he same rule that compelled the court in Centr-O-
Mart to conclude the state was a person for the purpose of bringing an action
compels us to conclude the County is not liable under the [UPA].” (Community
Memorial Hospital, supra, at p. 211.)
In Wells, we conclude, among other things, that recognizing CFCA suits
against public entities would undermine their sovereign powers by impeding their
fiscal ability to carry out their core missions. (Wells, supra, __ Cal.4th ___, ___-
___ [at pp. 23-26].) However, as already indicated, we have independently
determined for other reasons that the Legislature did not intend the CFCA to apply
to public entities, either as defendants or as plaintiffs. Indeed, we have discerned
particular indicia that public agencies were not intended as qui tam relators under
the statute. Accordingly, the mere fact that allowing public entities to bring qui
tam actions might not undermine their sovereign powers—an issue we do not
address—does not dissuade us from our view that they are not proper qui tam
plaintiffs under the CFCA.
Citing the CFCA’s proviso that the statute must be liberally construed to
promote the public interest (Gov. Code, § 12655, subd. (c)), City contends at
length that recognizing public entities as qui tam relators furthers the purposes of
22

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the false claims law. Such a construction, City urges, broadens the range of actors
available to ferret out and redress fraud against the government. Indeed, City
argues, political subdivisions like City are more attractive qui tam plaintiffs than
private persons and entities, because public entities’ decisionmakers “are
constrained by political accountability to utilize the [CFCA] judiciously and
wisely, avoiding reckless suits.” This accountability, City argues, belies PwC’s
contention that allowing qui tam actions by public entities would encourage them
to divert their prosecuting officials from their usual law enforcement duties within
their own jurisdictions.
Moreover, City insists, the CFCA contains safeguards against
“opportunistic” suits, and unfair windfall recoveries, by “public” qui tam plaintiffs
that sue on behalf of other public entities. In particular, City points to those
statutory provisions that allow the defrauded entity itself to intervene, assume
control, and even settle the action despite the qui tam plaintiff’s objections.
The fact remains that the construction urged by City provides an
opportunity for public entities, acting in their financial self-interest, to withhold
pertinent information that fellow agencies of government have been defrauded,
then race their colleagues to the courthouse in hopes of obtaining a “cut” of the
proceeds that would otherwise accrue to the defrauded entities and their
prosecuting authorities. For the reasons we have explained in detail, the
Legislature reasonably could decide to avoid such a scheme, and we see no
evidence that it intended to create one.
23

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We therefore conclude that public entities, such as City, are not “persons”
who may bring qui tam actions on behalf of other agencies of government under
the CFCA. Insofar as the judgment of the Court of Appeal is premised on a
contrary conclusion, it must therefore be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed insofar as it concludes City
may proceed with its false claims action, on behalf of the State of California,
against defendant PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP. The cause is remanded to the
Court of Appeal for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this
opinion.

BAXTER, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
IRION, J*

_____________________
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division
One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

24

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion State of California ex. rel. Harris v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 125 Cal.App.4th 1219
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S131807
Date Filed: August 31, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: San Francisco
Judge: Stuart R. Pollak

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Terrence Hallinan and Kamala D. Harris, District Attorneys, David A. Pfeifer, June D. Cravett and David
C. Moon, Assistant District Attorneys; Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney, Therese M. Stewart, Chief Deputy
City Attorney, Joanne Hoeper, Chief Trial Attorney, Ellen M. Forman, Donald P. Margolis and David B.
Newdorf, Deputy City Attorneys, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Daniel M.. Kolky, Joel S. Sanders, Mark A. Perry, Ethan D. Dettmer, Rebecca
Justice Lazarus and Catherine H. Ahin-Halverson for Defendant and Appellant.

Law Office of Eugene Dong and Eugene Dong as Amicus Curiae.

---

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Donald P. Margolis
Deputy City Attorney
Fox Plaza
1390 Market Street, 6th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94102-5408
(415) 554-3853

Daniel M. Kolkey
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
One Montgomery Street
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 393-8200

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Thu, 08/31/2006	S131807

Disposition
Aug 16 2006	Publication request denied

Dockets
Feb 28 2005	Petition for review filed   by counsel for deft-aplt PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP c/a rec req
Mar 1 2005	2nd petition for review filed   by aplts (S.F. City Atty and Dist. Atty.)
Mar 9 2005	Received Court of Appeal record   file jacket/briefs/two sealed envelopes/one box
Mar 9 2005	Received Court of Appeal record   A097793-file jacket/briefs/loose papers/two accordian files
Mar 21 2005	Answer to petition for review filed   by counsel for deft-aptl PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.
Mar 21 2005	Request for judicial notice received (pre-grant)   by counsel for deft-aptl PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.
Mar 21 2005	Answer to petition for review filed   by counsel for pltf-aplt (The State of Calif. et al.).
Mar 30 2005	Reply to answer to petition filed   by counsel for appellant
Apr 25 2005	Time extended to grant or deny review   to and including May 27, 2005, or the date upon which review is either granted or denied.
May 11 2005	Petition for review granted; issues limited (civil case)   Defendant's motion requesting judicial notice is granted. Defendant's petition for review GRANTED. The issue to be briefed and argued is limited to the following: May a political subdivision bring an action under Government Code section 12652, subdivision (c), to recover funds on behalf of the state or another political subdivision? Plaintiffs' petition for review is denied. Werdegar, J., was recused and did not participate. Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Chin, Brown, and Moreno, JJ.
May 12 2005	Note:   CIP letter & form sent to counsel.
May 23 2005	Request for extension of time filed   Joint request for a 15 day extension to file opening & answer briefs on the merits.
May 24 2005	Filed:   Request for Parcial Publication of the Court of Appeal's opinion - by (non-party) Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Sam's West Inc.
May 25 2005	Order filed   The joint request for extension of time filed on May 23, 2005 is hereby DENIED without prejudice to refiling at an appropriate time.
May 25 2005	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. 5/26/05 received amended declaration of service.
May 25 2005	Request for extension of time filed   Defendant PricewaterhouseCoopers requesting extension to June 24, 2005 to file opening brief on the merits.
May 26 2005	Received:   Amended declaration of service of Certification of interested entities - from counsel for PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.
Jun 1 2005	Extension of time granted   to and including June 24, 2005 for Defendant to file opening brief on the merits.
Jun 3 2005	Filed:   response from Plaintiffs (San Francisco District Attorney Kamala D. Harris, and San Francisco City Attorney Dennis J. Herrera). Response to Request for Parcial Publication by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Sam's West Inc. filed on 5/24/05.
Jun 10 2005	Filed:   Response to WalMart Stores et al. request for selective publication filed 6/3/05. Atty Michael Sobol @Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein (Non-party) (rcv'd permission to file)
Jun 13 2005	Filed:   Response from defendants (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP) to letter filed 6/3/05 by plaintiffs. (rcv'd permission to file)
Jun 14 2005	Filed:   from counsel for (non-parties) Bank of America, N.A; Imperial Bank; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.; and Union Bank of California, N.A. in SUPPORT OF WalMart Stores et al. request for selective publication filed 6/3/05 and RESPONSE TO the opposition to the request submitted by the law firm Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP. (rcv'd permission to file)
Jun 17 2005	Filed:   from Robert Sanford, counsel for Class Plaintiffs - joining in request of Plaintiffs (SF DA & SF City Attorney) filed 6/3/05 for the partial publication of the CA opinion. (rcv'd permission to file.)
Jun 24 2005	Opening brief on the merits filed   by counsel for Defendant & Appellant (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP).
Jun 24 2005	Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)   by counsel for Defendant & Appellant (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP).
Jun 27 2005	Request for extension of time filed   by counsel for respondent requestint to 8/8/05 to file answer brief on the merits (to court for permission)
Jun 29 2005	Extension of time granted   on application of plaintiffs and appellants and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including August 8, 2005.
Jul 22 2005	Order filed   The order filed on June 29, 2005, extending the time is hereby amended to read in its entirety: "On application of plaintiffs and appellants and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including August 8, 2005."
Aug 1 2005	Request for extension of time filed   by counsel for plaintiffs/appellants, requesting an additional two weeks (to 8/22) to file answer brief on the merits
Aug 4 2005	Extension of time granted   On application of plaintiffs and appellants and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including August 22, 2005. No further extensions of time are contemplated.
Aug 11 2005	Filed:   Stipulation to Remittitur
Aug 11 2005	Received:   document entitled: Stipulation to remittitur of case no. A097793 - from counsel for plaintiffs.
Aug 16 2005	Filed:   Letter from Atty Dettmer obo Pricewaterhouse Coopers in response to parties stipulation to issue remittitur immediately. (filed w/permission from the court)
Aug 16 2005	Received:   Letter from Atty Dettmer obo Pricewaterhouse Coopers in response to parties stipulation to issue remittitur immediately.
Aug 22 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed   By counsel for plaintiffs and appellants.
Aug 22 2005	Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)   By counsel for plaintiffs and appellants submitted w/proposed order
Aug 25 2005	Request for extension of time filed   by counsel for appellant PricewaterhouseCoopers. Requesting to 9/19/05 to file reply brief on the merits
Aug 30 2005	Extension of time granted   On application of appellant, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including September 19, 2005.
Sep 19 2005	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   By counsel for appellant, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Sep 21 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   by attorney Dong in support of neither party (application enclosed within amicus brief).
Sep 26 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   by attorney Eugene Dong. An anwser may be served and filed by any party within 20-days of the fiiling of the brief.
Sep 26 2005	Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)   By amicus, Attorney Eugene Dong
Oct 6 2005	Application filed to:   file consolidate answer briefs to any briefs filed by Amicus Curiae (stipulation) [to court for permission]
Oct 13 2005	Order filed   The parties' joint application to file consolidated answer briefs to amicus curiae briefs is granted as follows: Each party may file a consolidated answer brief to all amicus curiae briefs which have theretofore been filed pursuant to timely applications for permission to file such briefs. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.1(f)(1), (2).) Each party's consolidated answer brief shall be filed no later than 20 days after the last such amicus curiae brief is filed. (See id., rule 29.1(f)(6).)
Oct 26 2005	Filed letter from:   Counsel for appellant, Michael Wisper, requesting the Court's review of the Stipulation to Remittutur of case no. A097793 filed on August 11, 2005. As stated in the stipulation, the issue now under review pertains solely to the other case (A095918), and the California Supreme Court's review will have no effect on the Court of Appeal's disposition of case no. A097793.
Nov 8 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   By counsel for appellants, State of California
Nov 16 2005	Order filed   Good cause appearing upon stipulation of the parties, the appeals numbered A095918 and A097793 in the Court of Appeal, which were heretofore consolidated by that court, are severed. The appeal in A097793 is transferred to the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, with directions to issue its remittitur therein forthwith. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 293(d). Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Chin, and Moreno, JJ. Werdegar, J., was recused and did not participate.
May 2 2006	Case ordered on calendar   June 8, 2006, at 9:00 a.m., in Los Angeles
May 11 2006	Justice pro tempore assigned   Justice Joan Irion (4th Appellate Dist., Div. 1) (Werdegar, J., recused)
May 26 2006	Supplemental brief filed   PricewaterHouseCoopers LLP's, Defendant and Appellant. (CRC, rule 29.1(d)) Daniel M. Kolkey, counsel
Jun 8 2006	Cause argued and submitted
Aug 16 2006	Publication request denied (case closed)   The request for an order directing republication of the court of appeal opinion is denied. Weredegar, J., was recused and did not participate.
Aug 31 2006	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   and remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings. Majority Opinion By: Baxter, J. joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Chin, Moreno, Corrigan, JJ., Irion, JPT.
Nov 2 2006	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Nov 8 2006	Received:   Receipt for remittitur from First Appellate District, Division 4, signed for by I. Calanoc, Deputy Clerk.
Sep 4 2007	Returned record   To 1 DCA.

Briefs
Jun 24 2005	Opening brief on the merits filed
Aug 22 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed
Sep 19 2005	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Sep 26 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Nov 8 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

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