Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 7/16/07

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

)
THOMAS M. SIEBEL,
)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
S125590
v.
) Ct.App.
6
H025069
CAROL L. MITTLESTEADT et. al.,
Santa Clara County
Defendants and Respondents. )
Super. Ct. No. CV790935

Here we consider what constitutes a favorable termination of a lawsuit as a
predicate for a subsequent malicious prosecution action. We hold that, in this
context, a postjudgment settlement constitutes a favorable termination when the
malicious prosecution plaintiff received a favorable judgment in the underlying
action, and settled without giving up any portion of the judgment in his favor.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Initially, Debra Christoffers sued her employer, Siebel Systems, Inc. (SSI)
and the company’s chief executive officer, Thomas M. Siebel. Christoffers had
been hired by SSI as a sales director. She asserted that Siebel had induced her to
leave her previous employer by falsely promising to compensate her with large
commissions and lucrative stock options. Once she joined SSI, Christoffers
alleged Siebel and the company discriminated against her because of her gender,
refused to pay commissions, and fired her to avoid paying both commissions and
vested stock options.
1

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Christoffers alleged eight causes of action against Siebel individually. The
first six were based on various assertions of gender discrimination and wrongful
termination, and were disposed of by demurrer, summary adjudication, or
voluntary dismissal before trial.1 It is these six causes of action that Siebel later
relied upon to bring his malicious prosecution suit. Christoffers went to trial on
the two remaining fraud allegations against Siebel individually, and on her
allegations against SSI for fraud, failure to pay compensation and wrongful
termination to avoid those payments.
Christoffers failed to prove fraud or wrongful termination. The jury
specifically found that SSI had fired Christoffers because it honestly believed that
her job performance was deficient, that neither Siebel nor SSI had made a promise
it had not intended to keep, and that neither defendant had concealed a material
fact. The jury did find that SSI had failed to pay Christoffers substantial
commissions. Accordingly, it awarded her $233,662.25 in damages and
prejudgment interest. On SSI’s cross-complaint, the jury found that Christoffers

1
The first six counts of Christoffers’ complaint were disposed of in the
following manner in favor of Siebel:

Count I: Wrongful termination to avoid paying compensation. Summary
adjudication granted.

Count II: Sexual discrimination in violation of Fair Employment and
Housing Act (Gov. Code, §§ 12940, et seq.). Demurrer granted.

Count III: Sexual discrimination in violation of the California Constitution.
Voluntarily dismissed by Christoffers.

Count IV: Wrongful termination in violation of the public policy against
sexual discrimination. Summary adjudication granted.

Count V: Violation of Labor Code section 970 (inducing Christoffers to
move for purposes of employment and wrongful termination of this statute.)
Summary adjudication granted.

Count VI: Wrongful termination in violation of Labor Code section 970.
Summary adjudication granted.
2

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had not appropriated any trade secrets, but that she was liable for breach of
contract, breach of duty of loyalty, and conversion. It went on to find, however,
that SSI had failed to prove that it had suffered any damages.
SSI and Siebel moved for attorney fees under Government Code section
12965 arguing that Christoffers' sex discrimination claims had no foundation in
law or fact and were brought in bad faith. The company’s motion was denied. As
the prevailing party on her unpaid-compensation claim against SSI, Christoffers
was awarded costs and attorney fees attributable to that portion of the action.
(Lab. Code, § 218.5.) Because Christoffers had failed to recover from Siebel
personally, he was granted his litigation costs.
All parties appealed, but later agreed to settle the case. Under the
settlement terms, SSI agreed to pay Christoffers approximately 86 percent of the
damages and costs she had been awarded. Christoffers agreed to pay Siebel’s
court-awarded litigation costs. The parties also agreed that Christoffers, and her
attorneys, E. Rick Buell II and Carol L. Mittlesteadt, would release Siebel, SSI,
and their attorneys from any liability or obligations arising from the case. Siebel,
SSI, and their attorneys released Christoffers, but not her attorneys, Buell and
Mittlesteadt (collectively, defendants.) The agreement specifically provided that it
did not modify “the final termination of the Action entered in favor of Siebel for
purposes of pursuing claims against Buell or Mittlesteadt, or otherwise prevent
Siebel from pursuing any claims against Buell or Mittlesteadt” based on the
underlying judgment.
On October 5, 1999, pursuant to the settlement agreement, the parties
voluntarily dismissed their appeals. In July 2000, Siebel, acting as an individual,
filed this lawsuit against Buell and Mittlesteadt for malicious prosecution.
According to the complaint, upon associating in the case as counsel, Buell had
advised Mittlesteadt and Christoffers that the sex discrimination claims were
3

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unfounded and should be dropped. He also allegedly told Siebel and SSI's counsel
on several occasions that he believed these allegations were “bogus.”
Nevertheless, the complaint alleged, Buell remained as counsel in the case, then
pursued the claims solely to force a settlement. Likewise, Siebel alleged
Mittlesteadt knew that the charges were fabricated to extract a settlement using
SSI’s pending initial public offering as leverage. The complaint also alleged
Mittlesteadt had sued Siebel personally to coerce him into a prompt settlement,
rather than risk creating an unfavorable reputation in the industry and impair SSI’s
ability “to recruit and employ talented female personnel.”
Siebel further noted that five of Christoffers’s first six causes of action had
been resolved by pretrial court rulings. Siebel alleged Christoffers voluntarily
dismissed the remaining third cause of action before trial, because her counsel had
“recognized that the claim was devoid of merit and that a judgment or decision in
favor of Siebel was inevitable.” Siebel sought both punitive and compensatory
damages.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, urging: (1) Siebel could not
prove malicious prosecution because there had been no favorable termination; (2)
public policy required dismissal because defendants would not be able to defend
the lawsuit without violating the attorney-client privilege; and (3) Siebel could not
demonstrate that defendants lacked probable cause for prosecuting the underlying
action.
The trial court granted defendants’ motion on the first ground, did not reach
the remaining grounds, and entered judgment for defendants.
4

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The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that Siebel had obtained a
favorable termination.2
DISCUSSION
To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the prior action (1) was initiated by or at the direction of the
defendant and legally terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, (2) was brought without
probable cause, and (3) was initiated with malice. (Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 336, 341 (Casa Herrera).)
Malicious prosecution actions have traditionally been disfavored as
potentially chilling the right to pursue legal redress and report crime. (Sheldon
Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 872. However, we have noted
that this principle “ ‘should not be employed to defeat a legitimate cause of action’
or to ‘invent[] new limitations on the substantive right, which are without support
in principle or authority.’ [Citations.]” (Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958,
966.) Thus, malicious prosecution suits are not barred simply because they are
disfavored. (Casa Herrera, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 349.) As we have also
observed, “The malicious commencement of a civil proceeding is actionable
because it harms the individual against whom the claim is made, and also because
it threatens the efficient administration of justice. . . . [¶] The judicial process is
adversely affected . . . not only by the clogging of already crowded dockets, but by
the unscrupulous use of the courts by individuals ‘. . . as instruments with which to
maliciously injure their fellow men.’ [Citation.]” (Bertero v. National General

2
The Court of Appeal also held that the wrongful termination claims
contained in the first, fourth and sixth causes of action asserted against Siebel
lacked probable cause. Our review is limited to the favorable termination element
of a malicious prosecution claim.
5

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Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 50-51, fn. omitted.) “[W]hen the litigation is
groundless and motivated by malice the balance tips in favor of the policy of
redressing the individual harm inflicted by that litigation.” (Crowley v. Katleman
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 695.)
Here, the Court of Appeal held that Siebel obtained a favorable termination
because the settling parties did not stipulate to a new judgment but agreed instead
to dismiss their appeals and allow the existing judgment to become final. “ ‘The
theory underlying the requirement of favorable termination is that it tends to
indicate the innocence of the accused, and coupled with the other elements of lack
of probable cause and malice, establishes the tort [of malicious prosecution].’
[Citation.] Thus, ‘[i]t is hornbook law that the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution
action must plead and prove that the prior judicial proceeding of which he
complains terminated in his favor.’ [Citation.]” (Casa Herrera, supra, 32 Cal.4th
at p. 341.)
To determine whether a party has received a favorable termination, we
consider “ ‘the judgment as a whole in the prior action . . . .’ [Citation.] ” (Casa
Herrera, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 341.) Victory following a trial on the merits is not
required. Rather, “ ‘the termination must reflect the merits of the action and the
plaintiff’s innocence of the misconduct alleged in the lawsuit.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at
p. 342.)
Defendants’ primary contention is that the Court of Appeal failed to apply
what they term the “settlement rule” set forth in Ferreira v. Gray, Cary, Ware &
Freidenrich (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 409 (Ferreira). Defendants’ reliance on
Ferreira is misplaced.
In Ferreira, Frank Ferreira sued Debra Rushing, Rushing’s mother, and her
sister, seeking the return of gifts he had given Rushing during their failed
romance. (Ferreira, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 411.) Defendants hired the law
6

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firm of Gray, Cary, Ware & Freidenrich (Gray Cary) and cross-complained
against Ferreira for battery, assault, intrusion into private affairs, unauthorized
wiretaps, eavesdropping, stalking, false imprisonment, intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress, conversion and trespass to chattel. (Id. at pp. 411-
412.) A jury found for Rushing on her conversion claim, but awarded no
damages. It also found in favor of Rushing’s mother on her wiretapping and
emotional distress claims, awarding $500 in damages. The jury found for Ferreira
on the remainder of the claims and cross-claims and awarded $75,982 in damages.
(Id. at p. 412.) The parties settled after entry of judgment. Terms of the
subsequent settlement provided that Ferreira prevailed on certain claims and was
awarded damages, but that he would accept $1 from each of the three opposing
parties in satisfaction of the judgment. In exchange, Rushing and her family
members agreed they would not appeal. An amended judgment reflecting the
terms of the settlement was entered. Ferreira then sued Gray Cary for malicious
prosecution. (Ibid..)
The Court of Appeal held that despite Ferreira’s trial victory, he did not
obtain a favorable termination because the matter was settled. (Ferreira, supra,
87 Cal.App.4th at p. 413.) The court reasoned that because of the potential
chilling effect of malicious prosecution actions, “its requirements must be strictly
enforced. [Citation.] The fact that a settlement occurs after trial as opposed to
earlier in the proceeding does not change the essential fact that the litigation
terminated as the result of the parties’ agreement and not based on the merits of
the action. We recognize that cases are settled for a variety of reasons; however,
where both sides give up anything of value in order to end the litigation, a party
cannot later claim he received a favorable termination. [Citations.] It is not
necessary to analyze the particular circumstances of the settlement or to examine
the motivations of the parties—a negotiated settlement not only creates an
7

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ambiguity as to the merits of the underlying action, it is entirely inconsistent with
bringing a further lawsuit for malicious prosecution. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 413-
414.)
Here, the Court of Appeal did not challenge Ferreira’s reasoning or result.
Instead it distinguished Ferreira because, procedurally, the parties in that case
agreed to a new disposition and an amended judgment. Ultimately that amended
judgment, not the jury verdict, ended the litigation. Conversely, Siebel and
Christoffers accepted different rights and obligations between themselves, but did
not stipulate to a new judgment. The agreement to abandon their appeals allowed
the existing judgment to become final. The Court of Appeal reasoned that,
although the settlement agreement compromised certain awarded amounts, the
judgment itself, favoring Siebel, remained intact. The court also declined to
extend Ferreira.
Defendants challenge the attempt to distinguish Ferreira. They rely on the
Ferreira court’s statement that “[i]t is not necessary to analyze the particular
circumstances of the settlement or to examine the motivations of the parties—a
negotiated settlement not only creates an ambiguity as to the merits of the
underlying action, it is entirely inconsistent with bringing a further lawsuit for
malicious prosecution.” (Ferreira, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 414.) They urge
Ferreira was not based on whether the original judgment was left intact, but
focused on whether “both sides [gave] up something of value to resolve the
matter.” (Id. at p. 413.) Defendants assert that both sides here relinquished
something valuable to end the litigation. They compromised certain awards to
avoid the costs and uncertainty of their appeals.
The Court of Appeal’s analysis is correct. Adopting defendants’ position
would foreclose a malicious prosecution action whenever a case is resolved by
agreement. Such a conclusion would run counter to the policy favoring negotiated
8

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dispositions. A blanket rule could also bar legitimate malicious prosecution
actions, allowing unscrupulous parties and/or their attorneys to hide behind its
shield. “The action for malicious prosecution is a recognition of the right of an
individual to be free from unjustifiable litigation. . . . [¶] The purpose of the
action is to compensate a wronged individual for damage to his reputation and to
reimburse him for the expense of defending against the unwarranted action.
[Citation.]” (Cowles v. Carter (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 350, 354.)
Here, after a jury trial, Siebel received a favorable judgment on the merits of
the claims brought against him. If the parties had not appealed, Siebel would have
secured a favorable termination because the judgment “reflect[ed] the merits of the
action and [Siebel’s] innocence of the misconduct alleged in the lawsuit.
[Citation.]” (Casa Herrera, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 342.) During the pendency of
their appeals, the parties reached a settlement that did not amend the judgment on
the merits as it related to Siebel. Siebel should not be penalized for reaching a
settlement with Christoffers in the underlying action. Although the dollar amount
Christoffers received from SSI was compromised, this amount related to the merits
of the action between Christoffers and the company. The underlying judgment for
Siebel on the merits was unaffected.3 Because Siebel received a favorable
judgment in the underlying proceeding and settled without giving up any portion
of the judgment in his favor, we hold that the parties’ settlement constitutes a
favorable termination. (See HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118

3
The parties’ settlement agreement provides, “Nothing in this Agreement is
intended to modify, or does modify, the final termination of the Action entered in
favor of Siebel for purposes of pursuing claims against Buell or Mittlesteadt, or
otherwise prevent Siebel from pursuing any claims against Buell or Mittlesteadt
that he may have related to the Judgment in this Action.”
9

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Cal.App.4th 204, 215-216 (HMS Capital),4 see generally Casa Herrera, supra, 32
Cal.4th at pp. 341-342; Crowley v. Katleman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 684-685.)
Cases relied upon by defendants are inapposite. For example, in Dalany v.
American Pacific Holding Corp. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 822, 827 (Dalany), a
pretrial settlement resulted in a stipulated judgment. A pretrial settlement obviates
an adjudicated judgment on the merits. Thus, generally there is no favorable
termination, because there is nothing to reflect the malicious prosecution
plaintiff’s innocence on the merits. (See Casa Herrera, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp.
341-342.) Our case is limited to a postjudgment settlement by the parties that does
not fundamentally change the parties’ relationship established by the underlying
judgment on the merits.
Defendants’ reliance on Casa Herrera, supra, 32 Cal.4th 336, is likewise
misplaced. There, we noted that a favorable termination does not occur simply
because a party has prevailed regardless of the reason for success. (Id. at p. 342.)
A termination unrelated to the merits fails to show the innocence of the defendants
in the underlying action. (Ibid.) We gave examples of such instances and cited
Dalany, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th 822, for the general proposition that dismissals

4
In HMS Capital, HMS prevailed over Lawyers Title at trial and the court
entered judgment in its favor. (HMS Capital, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 208.)
The judgment “left open a space for the amount of costs to be awarded to HMS,
which was to be determined later.” (Ibid.) The parties reached a settlement on the
costs and a stipulation was entered reflecting their agreement. The trial judge
“amended the judgment by interlineation to include a $7,906.36 costs award.” (Id.
at p. 209.) In a subsequent malicious prosecution action brought by HMS,
Lawyers Title argued that HMS did not receive a favorable termination because
the underlying judgment was entered upon stipulation. The trial court rejected this
argument and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The court held that because HMS’s
costs were ancillary to the merits of the litigation, “the settlement and the resulting
stipulation did not relate to the merits of the parties’ dispute.” (Id. at p. 215.)
10

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following settlement agreements would fall under this category. (Casa Herrera, at
p. 342.) Our reference to Dalany shows this observation was made in the context
of a pretrial settlement, which sets it apart from this case.
Further, statements made by the court in Pender v. Radin (1994) 23
Cal.App.4th 1807 fail to assist defendants. In Pender, the court spoke in broad
terms: “Generally, a dismissal resulting from a settlement does not constitute a
favorable determination . . . .” (Id. at p. 1814, italics added.) However, in Pender,
like Dalany, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th 822, the parties reached a pretrial settlement so
the “litigation was terminated by agreement without regard to its merits” and could
not be viewed as a favorable termination. (Pender, at p. 1814.)5

5
Other cases defendants generally cite in support of their position are also
not applicable. Villa v. Cole (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1332-1333 dealt with a
pretrial settlement, thus not a judgment on the merits. Sierra Club Foundation v.
Graham (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1135 also involved a situation unlike the present
case. Graham held that summary judgment in an underlying federal court action
was a favorable termination for the Sierra Club even though a settlement had been
reached in a related state action in New Mexico. The court held that the two
actions were separate and that the settlement did “not cast a shadow of ambiguity
on the federal judgment.” (Id. at p. 1152.) Pattiz v. Minye (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th
822, 824 held that dismissal of an action for failure to comply with discovery
orders was not a favorable termination because the dismissal left doubt as to the
liability or innocence of the prevailing party in the underlying action. Finally, in
Citi-Wide Preferred Couriers, Inc. v. Golden Eagle Ins. Corp. (2003) 114
Cal.App.4th 906, 914, the court held that Citi-Wide received a favorable
termination because Golden Eagle signed a stipulation in the underlying action
that the court termed a “surrender.” The resolution was not a settlement because
Golden Eagle admitted in a stipulation—signed on the eve of trial “when it learned
it was in for a contest”—that its lawsuit lacked merit. (Ibid.) None of these cases
address the facts and procedural context of this case, and our holding is consistent
with them to the extent we focus on the malicious prosecution plaintiff’s
innocence in the underlying action. (Casa Herrera, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 341-
342.)
11

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Defendants’ remaining arguments are unpersuasive. They urge that the
Court of Appeal’s decision allows the defendant in an underlying action to
implement a strategy to divide plaintiffs from their attorney. In addition to its
chilling effect, defendants claim that such a situation would discourage
settlements, increase malicious prosecution actions, and disrupt the attorney-client
relationship.
To the contrary, our refusal to extend Ferreira, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 409, to
create a blanket rule will facilitate positive outcomes. It will allow for resolution
of disputes among litigants on mutually satisfactory terms.6 It will also
discourage litigation by reaffirming the policy in favor of nonfrivolous actions.
The attorney-client relationship and effective advocacy will not be impeded as
long as an attorney provides sound counsel and does not encourage allegedly
baseless lawsuits that subject either the attorney or client to a malicious
prosecution action.7

6
We recognize that, in a postjudgment context, trial counsel and the client
may find their interests in conflict. However, clients have no duty to refuse an
otherwise legitimate settlement in order to protect their lawyer’s divergent interest.
Our decision encourages settlements in the postjudgment context. The fact that an
attorney may not want to settle a case that is on appeal because the settlement may
be against the attorney’s interests should not outweigh the interests of the client.
7
Defendants may be understood to argue that a postjudgment settlement that
releases the client (Christoffers), but not the client’s former attorneys (defendants),
from malicious prosecution exposure should not, for public policy reasons, be
deemed a favorable termination that would support a subsequent malicious
prosecution action against the attorneys. These public policy considerations
involve the basic fairness of such a one-sided settlement agreement, its effect on
the attorney-client relationship, and the attorney’s difficulty in defending against a
malicious prosecution suit, particularly where, as here, the client agrees not to
cooperate in the suit or, presumably, to waive the attorney-client privilege. These
concerns may be serious. However, we conclude that questions concerning the
enforceability of client-only releases, and any public policy defenses available to

(footnote continued on next page)
12

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A party filing a malicious prosecution action still faces strict requirements
that should militate against an opening of the floodgates for this type of litigation.
(See ante, p. 5.) “Concerns over the potential chilling effect . . . are readily
assuaged by stringent enforcement of the probable cause element of the malicious
prosecution tort.” (Casa Herrera, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 348.)8 It is up to
malicious prosecution plaintiffs to ensure that their lawsuits can survive the
rigorous judicial scrutiny given to such actions.9

(footnote continued from previous page)

the attorneys in malicious prosecution actions under such circumstances, are not
directly relevant to the narrow issue of favorable termination, and are thus beyond
the scope of the holding in this case. They are more properly raised in
proceedings below.
8
We also described as “difficult” the burden of proof that a malicious
prosecution plaintiff faces in actions emanating from criminal proceedings. (Jaffe
v. Stone (1941) 18 Cal.2d 146, 159.)
9
Defendants also contend that they are not bound by the terms of an
agreement to which they were not parties. Defendants claim that they only
consented to a release of any obligation that Siebel or SSI may have to pay their
attorney fees. This argument is irrelevant to our discussion of whether Siebel
received a favorable termination. Siebel does not argue, nor do we conclude, that
the agreement itself imposed any obligations on defendants.
13

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DISPOSITION
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is affirmed.
CORRIGAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.

14

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Siebel v. Mittlesteadt
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 118 Cal.App.4th 406
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S125590
Date Filed: July 16, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Santa Clara
Judge: Gregory H. Ward

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Blecher & Collins, Maxwell M. Blecher, Ralph C. Hofer; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Robin
Meadow and Laura Boudreau for Plaintiff and Appellant.

DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US, Mark H. Hamer and Jarod M. Bona for National Federation of
Independent Business Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Law Offices of Tony J. Tanke, Tony J. Tanke; Law Offices of Gary L. Sims, Gary L. Simms;
Roeca, Haas, Hager, Russell S. Roeca, Daniel W. Hager; Murphy, Pearson, Bradley, Feeney, Timothy J.
Halloran and Christine A. Huntoon for Defendants and Respondents.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Robin Meadow
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland
5700 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 375
Los Angeles, CA 90036-3697
(310) 859-7811

Tony J. Tanke
Law Offices of Tony J. Tanke
2050 Lyndell Terrace, Suite 240
Davis, CA 95616
(530) 758-4530

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Mon, 07/16/2007	S125590

Disposition
Jul 16 2007	Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Jun 14 2004	Received oversized petition for review   from counsel for resps (rec'd in Sac.)
Jun 22 2004	Petition for review filed with permission   by counsel for resps. (new petition in conformance with word count limit)
Jun 24 2004	Received Court of Appeal record   file jacket/briefs/appendices/transcripts
Jun 30 2004	Filed:   by counsel for resps. Notice of Unavailability of Counsel, Notice of Change of Address, Notice of Association of Counsel.
Jul 12 2004	Answer to petition for review filed   appellant Thomas M. Siebel
Jul 16 2004	Reply to answer to petition filed   by counsel for resps. (Mittlesteadt and Buell)
Aug 11 2004	Time extended to grant or deny review   to andi ncluding Septemebr 20, 2004, or the date upon which review is either granted or denied.
Sep 1 2004	Petition for review granted (civil case)   Voters: George, C.J., Werdegar, Chin, Brown, and Moreno, JJ.
Sep 1 2004	Order filed   The above entitled matter is retitled as follows: THOMAS SIEBEL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CAROL L. MITTLESTEADT et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Sep 8 2004	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   by counsel for respondent
Sep 15 2004	Issues ordered limited   The issue to be briefed and argued is limited to the following: Whether a post-judgment settlement agreement revising a damages award and providing for the parties to withdraw their appeals but not providing for an amended judgment and expressly preserving the defendant's right to bring a malicious prosecution action precludes a finding of favorable termination in that defendant's subsequent malicious prosecution action? (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(a)(1).)
Sep 16 2004	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for respondent requests a 45-day extension of time (November 15, 2004) to file the opening brief on the merits.
Sep 21 2004	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including November 1, 2004.
Oct 27 2004	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for respondent requests extension of time to November 21, 2004, to file the opening brief on the merits.
Nov 3 2004	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including November 21, 2004. No further extension will be granted.
Nov 23 2004	Opening brief on the merits filed   by counsel for resps. (Mittlesteadt and Buell) (40k)
Dec 8 2004	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for appellant requests extension of time to January 24, 2005, to file the answer brief on the merits.
Dec 10 2004	Extension of time granted   Appellant's time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and and including January 24, 2005.
Jan 13 2005	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for aplt. requests extension of time to February 14, 2005, to file the answer brief on the merits.
Jan 18 2005	Extension of time granted   Appellant's time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including February 14, 2005.
Feb 15 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed   by counsel for aplt. (Thomas Seibel) (40.1 (b))
Feb 18 2005	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for resp. (Mittlesteadt) requests extension of time to April 6, 2005, to file the reply brief on the mertis.
Feb 24 2005	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including April 6, 2005.
Apr 5 2005	Request for extension of time filed   Counsel for respondent requests extension of time to April 20, 2005 to file the reply brief on the merits.
Apr 6 2005	Filed:   by counsel for resp. (Buell, et al.) supplement to appl. for ext. of time.
Apr 7 2005	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including April 20, 2005.
Apr 22 2005	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   by counsel for resps. (C. Mittlesteadt, et al.) (40.1(b))
May 23 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   The National Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation requests permission to file amicus curiae brief in support of appellant.
May 25 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   National Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation
May 25 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   National Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation in support of appellant. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Jun 13 2005	Request for extension of time filed   Respondent (Mittlesteadt) to answer the AC brief of National Federation of Independent Business.
Jun 14 2005	Extension of time granted   to serve and file the Response to the amicus brief is extended to and including June 27, 2005.
Jun 28 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   by counsel for (C. Mittlesteadt and R. Buell, II) (40.1(b))
Apr 3 2007	Case ordered on calendar   to be argued Wednesday, May 2, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
Apr 24 2007	Supplemental brief filed   counsel for respondents *** new authorities ***
May 2 2007	Cause argued and submitted
Jul 13 2007	Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
Jul 16 2007	Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full   OPINION BY: Corrigan, J. --- joined by: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, JJ.
Aug 16 2007	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Aug 20 2007	Received:   receipt for remittitur from CA/6

Briefs
Nov 23 2004	Opening brief on the merits filed
Feb 15 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed
Apr 22 2005	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
May 25 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Jun 28 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website