Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S094467A
Shively v. Bozanich


Filed 12/22/03 (reposted same date for minor counsel listing correction)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

JILL SHIVELY,
S094467
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Ct.App. 2/3 B130905
PETER BOZANICH, as Deputy District
Attorney, etc., et al.,
Los Angeles County
Defendants and Respondents. )
Super. Ct. No. BC 179915

JILL SHIVELY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Ct.App. 2/3 B133983
v.
BRIAN PATRICK CLARKE,
Defendant and Respondent.

In this case we consider the application of the statute of limitations to a
defamation case in which plaintiff first learned that she had been defamed after
purchasing and reading a book that contained defamatory remarks about her,
remarks that were attributed to persons other than the author of the book.
Ordinarily, a tort cause of action accrues and the limitations period
commences when the injury occurs; for defamation this occurs, generally
speaking, when the defendant communicates the defamatory statement to others.
1



In some tort actions, the accrual of the cause of action is delayed until the plaintiff
knew (or with reasonable diligence should have known) of the factual basis for the
claim. This so-called discovery rule has been applied to defamation actions in
limited circumstances when the defamatory statement is made in secret or is
inherently undiscoverable. The question before us is whether the discovery rule
may be employed to delay the accrual of a cause of action for defamation beyond
the point at which the defamation no longer is secret but was made public in a
book.
In the present case, plaintiff alleged that the same defamatory statement
was communicated on three separate occasions. The first two occasions involved
relatively private communications with only one or two listeners. On the third
occasion, the statement was recounted in the book, together with a description of
the circumstances under which the statement originally was made and
subsequently was repeated.
With respect to the third occasion, there can be no question that the cause of
action for defamation accrued and the statute of limitations ran from the date the
book was first generally distributed to the public, regardless of the date on which
plaintiff actually learned of the existence of the book and read its contents.
Uniform authority establishes that the discovery rule does not apply to delay the
accrual of a cause of action for a defamation contained in such a publication.
Plaintiff’s causes of action based upon the defamatory statements contained in the
book are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
With respect to the first two occasions on which these statements were
communicated, even if the defamatory statements originally were made in
confidence, any basis upon which to apply the discovery rule was dispelled by the
publication of the book recounting these first two communications. Accordingly,
we decline to sanction the application of the discovery rule in the circumstances
2

presented by this case. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal that in
turn reversed the trial court’s entry of judgment in favor of defendants.
I
Plaintiff was a witness for the prosecution in a grand jury proceeding in
which the prosecution sought the indictment of Orenthal James (O.J.) Simpson for
the murder of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Lyle Goldman. Ultimately, the
grand jury proceeding was dismissed and the prosecution proceeded by way of
information. Evidently, plaintiff did not testify at the ensuing trial.
Plaintiff alleged in a complaint filed on October 22, 1997, that she was
defamed on three occasions. The first was in June 1994 when, her complaint
alleged, defendant Brian Patrick Clarke (with whom plaintiff at one time had been
romantically involved) described plaintiff to Peter Bozanich, a deputy district
attorney employed by Los Angeles County (County) and to Bozanich’s wife,
fellow prosecutor Pam Ferrero, as “a felony probationer.” The complaint alleged
that plaintiff again was defamed when, in 1996, defendant Bozanich told
defendant Joseph Bosco, an author, that plaintiff was on felony probation, adding
that the district attorney’s office had “checked it out.” The complaint alleged that
plaintiff was defamed for a third time when, in December 1996, defendant Bosco
and defendant William Morrow and Company (William Morrow) published
Bosco’s book, entitled A Problem of Evidence, which recounted Clarke’s and
Bozanich’s defamatory statements regarding plaintiff. The book, a page of which
is attached to the complaint, also stated that Bozanich had recounted to Bosco the
circumstances under which he had heard Clarke’s statement. The book further
explained that it was plaintiff’s status as a felony probationer that accounted for
the prosecution’s failure to call her as a witness at trial, not (as previously had
been announced) the circumstance that she had sold her story to Hard Copy. The
3

specific defamatory words alleged in each of the causes of action in the complaint,
however, were “[s]he’s a felony probationer.”
Plaintiff’s complaint contained eight causes of action. It named as
defendants Clarke, Bozanich, the County (as the employer of Bozanich), Bosco,
and William Morrow. Three causes of action were alleged against Clarke, one for
each of the three alleged defamations. (Counts one, four, and six.) Two causes of
action were alleged against Bozanich, one for his statement to Bosco and one for
the statement contained in the book. (Counts two and seven.) Two corresponding
causes of action were alleged against the County as Bozanich’s employer, based
upon Bozanich’s having uttered the defamatory remark in the course of his
employment with the County. (Counts three and eight.)1 Finally, one cause of
action was alleged against Bosco and William Morrow for the statement contained
in Bosco’s book. (Count five.) Each of the causes of action included allegations
with respect to the asserted falsity of the alleged defamatory statement and
defendants’ malice. The specific allegation that is of importance to the issue in the
present case is that plaintiff did not become aware that the defamatory statements
had been made, and could not have become aware that they had been made, until
the publication of the book A Problem of Evidence. Plaintiff’s additional
pleadings, as noted below, added the claim that she did not become aware of the
defamatory statements until she bought and read the book in December 1996.
Clarke demurred to the first cause of action on the ground that it was barred
by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to defamation claims. (See Code

1
The causes of action against the County included the allegation that on
May 3, 1997, plaintiff had presented to the County a claim for the damages she
sought in the complaint, as required by Government Code section 910.
4



Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (c).)2 The trial court sustained Clarke’s demurrer to the
first cause of action without leave to amend, on the basis that the defamatory
statement had been made more than one year prior to the filing of the complaint.
The court subsequently clarified its order to reflect that, on the same basis, it had
sustained the demurrer as to each of the three causes of action that had been
alleged against Clarke. A judgment was entered in favor of defendant Clarke on
May 24, 1999. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, case No. B133983.
For their part, defendants Bozanich and the County answered the complaint
and raised various affirmative defenses, including that the causes of action alleged
against them were barred by plaintiff’s failure to file her claims against them
within six months of the time her causes of action accrued, as required by the
California Tort Claims Act. (Gov. Code, § 911.2.) Subsequently, these
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on that ground as to plaintiff’s
four causes of action against them. In their motion, they asserted that the causes
of action accrued on September 18, 1996, the date by which they alleged the book,
A Problem of Evidence, had been distributed in California. They asserted that
plaintiff filed her claim with the County on May 12, 1997, more than six months
later, as demonstrated by County records. In support of the motion, defendants
submitted a declaration by William Murphy, vice-president of William Morrow,
who declared that the book received general distribution in California in
September 1996. Attached to that declaration were detailed shipping records
establishing the number of copies that were shipped to California bookstores
between September 5 and October 21, 1996.

2
Prior to 2002, the relevant language was designated as subdivision (3) of
Code of Civil Procedure section 340, but for convenience, the current designation
(Code Civ. Proc. § 340, subd (c)), is used throughout this opinion.
5



Plaintiff opposed the motion for summary judgment upon the ground,
among others, that her causes of action against these defendants did not accrue
until December 1996, when she bought and read the book and learned of the
defamatory statements. She also asserted that triable issues of fact remained
concerning the date of the book’s publication and distribution, while maintaining
that she had not had adequate time to engage in discovery. In her mandatory
statement of material facts in dispute (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)),
however, plaintiff conceded it was undisputed that the book was shipped to
California beginning on September 5, 1996; that almost 7,000 copies were shipped
to California between that date and October 21, 1996; that the book was on sale in
California no later than September 18, 1996; that thousands of copies were on sale
in California no later than October 21, 1996; and that the official publication date
for the book was October 3, 1996. (The record also reflects that almost 33,000
copies of the book had been shipped for distribution throughout the nation by
October 21, 1996.) Plaintiff also conceded as undisputed that she filed her tort
claim on May 12, 1997, and that on May 21, 1998, the County provided notice of
both her failure to comply with the requirement of the California Tort Claims Act
that the claim be filed within six months (Gov. Code, § 911.2) and the
requirements for a late-claim petition.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Bozanich and the
County on the grounds that (1) plaintiff failed to file her statement of material
facts in dispute in a timely manner (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)), and (2)
plaintiff failed to file a timely claim with the County pursuant to the Tort Claims
Act (Gov. Code, § 911.2) or to seek relief when the County denied her claim as
6

untimely. The trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants Bozanich and
the County. Plaintiff filed a second notice of appeal, case No. B130905.3
The Court of Appeal consolidated the two appeals. It reversed the two
judgments, holding (both with respect to defendant Clarke and defendants
Bozanich and the County) that the trial court erred in failing to consider the
accrual date of plaintiff’s causes of action and the commencement of the period of
limitations under the discovery rule. Under that rule, according to the Court of
Appeal, all of plaintiff’s causes of action accrued when plaintiff knew (or with
reasonable diligence should have known) of the defamatory statements — a
question for the jury to determine in this case.
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that Code of Civil Procedure section
340, subdivision (c) establishes a one-year statute of limitations for defamation
actions, among others, but the court observed that most of the tort claims
enumerated in that statute have been considered to be subject to tolling until the
plaintiff learns of (or with reasonable diligence should have discovered) his or her
injury. The appellate court explained that the discovery rule has been
characterized as applying to delay the accrual of a cause of action in cases in
which the plaintiff cannot easily discover the injury or the plaintiff and the
defendant are in a fiduciary relationship. The court also noted that a defendant
who conceals his or her identity or responsibility may be equitably estopped from
relying upon the defense that the statutory limitations period has expired.

3
Neither of these judgments encompassed plaintiff’s claims against Bosco
and William Morrow. Although plaintiff named them as respondents in the
appeals designated case Nos. B133983 and B130905, these defendants
subsequently were dismissed as parties to the appeals. Thus, the application of the
statute of limitations to the causes of action alleged against Bosco and William
Morrow is not before us in the present case.
7



The Court of Appeal pointed out that both the discovery rule and the
doctrine of equitable estoppel have been applied to defamation claims, whether
they involve libel or slander. The court commented that no California case has
held the discovery rule and the doctrine of equitable estoppel inapplicable to a
claim alleging libel or slander when the tort has been committed by a “non-mass-
media defendant.” The court determined that the result should not be different as
to a “non-mass-media” defendant merely because the defamatory statement of
such a defendant has been republished in a “mass media forum.” It expressed
concern that the term “mass media” unwisely could be deemed to include any type
of publication, no matter how obscure, and that rigid application of the one-year
statute of limitations could leave helpless those plaintiffs who have been defamed
in obscure books or other media outlets. The court held that “the discovery rule
can be applied to toll the running of the statutory period for defamation against
non-mass-media defendants, even though the fact of the initial defamation is
brought to light in a mass media publication.” The court also applied the
discovery rule to toll the period of limitations imposed by the California Tort
Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 911.2) with respect to claims against defendants
Bozanich and the County.4
Finally, the Court of Appeal concluded that a triable issue of material fact
existed with respect to the question whether “the republication of defendants’
allegedly defamatory statements in [the] author’s book was, under all of the

4
The Court of Appeal also concluded that the trial court erred in granting the
motion for summary judgment in favor of defendants Bozanich and County in part
on the basis that plaintiff had failed to file a timely separate statement of disputed
and undisputed facts. (See Code Civ. Proc.,§ 437c, subd. (b).) The Court of
Appeal noted that, in their appellate briefing, defendants had not relied upon this
basis for the judgment in their favor. This issue is not before us.
8



circumstances, sufficient to put plaintiff on reasonable notice that defendants had
defamed her. Until plaintiff had such notice, the running of the statute was
tolled.”5
Bozanich and the County petitioned for review. Clarke did not.
Nonetheless, because the two appeals were consolidated, both matters came before
us when we granted review.
II
A
Initially, we briefly describe relevant aspects of the law of defamation,
including the so-called single-publication rule, to assist in understanding the
allegations of plaintiff’s complaint and the application of the statute of limitations
to these allegations.
Defamation constitutes an injury to reputation; the injury may occur by
means of libel or slander. (Civ. Code, § 44.) In general, leaving aside certain
qualifications that are not relevant in this case, a written communication that is
false, that is not protected by any privilege, and that exposes a person to contempt
or ridicule or certain other reputational injuries, constitutes libel. (Civ. Code,
§ 45; Rest. 2d Torts, § 568, subd. (1).) A false and unprivileged oral
communication attributing to a person specific misdeeds or certain unfavorable
characteristics or qualities, or uttering certain other derogatory statements

5
In a footnote stating that it was not called upon to decide whether there
“might be some public policy reason against applying the discovery rule to toll the
statute of limitations on causes of action against a mass media defendant,” the
Court of Appeal nonetheless suggested that the discovery rule should apply to
“mass media defendants.” The court claimed that the Uniform Single Publication
Act, adopted in California in Civil Code section 3425.1 et seq., applied merely to
limit a plaintiff to one cause of action for a defamation contained in a “mass media
publication,” but did not have any effect on the applicable statute of limitations.
9



regarding a person, constitutes slander. (Civ. Code, § 46; Rest. 2d Torts, § 568,
subd. (2).) The present case involves claims based upon both libel and slander.
One of the elements of the tort of defamation is “publication.” In general,
each time the defamatory statement is communicated to a third person who
understands its defamatory meaning as applied to the plaintiff, the statement is
said to have been “published,” although a written dissemination, as suggested by
the common meaning of that term, is not required. Each publication ordinarily
gives rise to a new cause of action for defamation. (See Khawar v. Globe
Internat., Inc. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 254, 268; Lundquist v. Reusser (1994) 7 Cal.4th
1193, 1203; Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645; Kanarek v.
Bugliosi (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 327, 332-333; Rest.2d Torts, § 577 &
coms. b & c, pp. 201-202; id., § 578; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed.
1988) Torts, §§ 476-478, pp. 560-562; 1 Smolla, Law of Defamation (2d ed. 1997)
§ 4:77-4:78, pp. 4-124-4-126; § 4:87, p. 4-136.3.) In the present case, three
separate “publications” are alleged — one by Clarke to Bozanich, one by
Bozanich to Bosco, and one by Bosco and William Morrow in the book, A
Problem of Evidence. It is alleged that various defendants are jointly liable for
some of the publications.
The rule that each publication of a defamatory statement gives rise to a new
cause of action for defamation applies when the original defamer repeats or
recirculates his or her original remarks to a new audience. (See Kanarek v.
Bugliosi, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 332; Rest. 2d Torts, § 577A, subd. (1),
com. a, p. 208; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, § 478, p. 562.) That
rule also applies when a person who heard, read, or saw the original defamatory
remark repeats the remark to others (subject to qualifications not relevant here).
(See Khawar v. Globe Internat., Inc., supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 268; Frommoethelydo
10

v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1986) 42 Cal.3d 208, 217; Di Giorgio Corp. v. Valley
Labor Citizen (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 268, 273.)
It is under the latter application of the rule, presumably, that plaintiff
alleged that Bozanich’s statement to Bosco, repeating Clarke’s original statement,
gave rise to a cause of action for defamation against Bozanich.
In general, the repetition by a new party of another person’s earlier
defamatory remark also gives rise to a separate cause of action for defamation
against the original defamer, when the repetition was reasonably foreseeable.
(Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 268, 281; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal.
Law, supra, Torts, § 478, p. 562; 1 Smolla, Law of Defamation, supra, § 4:91,
pp. 4-138-4-139.) It is the foreseeable subsequent repetition of the remark that
constitutes publication and an actionable wrong in this situation, even though it is
the original author of the remark who is being held accountable. (See, e.g.,
Schneider v. United Airlines, Inc. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 71, 75-76.)
It is under this rule, presumably, that plaintiff alleged causes of action
against Clarke based upon Bozanich’s oral repetition of Clarke’s original remark,
and against Clarke based upon Bosco’s and William Morrow’s repetition, in the
book, of Clarke’s original remark. Similarly, it is under this theory, presumably,
that plaintiff alleged causes of action against Bozanich and the County based upon
Bosco’s and William Morrow’s repetition, in the book, of the statement related by
Bozanich to Bosco.
Under the common law as it existed in the 19th century and early part of
the 20th century, the principle that each communication of a defamatory remark to
a new audience constitutes a separate “publication,” giving rise to a separate cause
of action, led to the conclusion that each sale or delivery of a copy of a newspaper
or book containing a defamation also constitutes a separate publication of the
defamation to a new audience, giving rise to a separate cause of action for
11

defamation. (See 2 Harper et al., Law of Torts (1986) § 5.16, p. 126; 5 Witkin,
Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, § 479, p. 563.) This conclusion had the
potential to subject the publishers of books and newspapers to lawsuits stating
hundreds, thousands, or even millions of causes of action for a single issue of a
periodical or edition of a book. This conclusion also had the potential to disturb
the repose that the statute of limitations ordinarily would afford, because a new
publication of the defamation could occur if a copy of the newspaper or book were
preserved for many years and then came into the hands of a new reader who had
not discovered it previously. The statute of limitations could be tolled indefinitely,
perhaps forever, under this approach.
The difficulties created by the early common law rule are illustrated in a
19th century English case that concluded a plaintiff could bring an action seeking
redress for libel against a publisher based upon an allegedly defamatory remark
contained in a newspaper issued 17 years prior to the plaintiff’s discovery of the
defamation, on the theory that the sale to the plaintiff of the long-forgotten copy of
the newspaper constituted a new publication, starting anew the running of the
period of limitations. (The Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer (Q.B. 1849) 117 Eng.
Rep. 75.) Despite the burdens created by the staleness and potential volume of the
claims thus permitted, many American courts, and the reporters of the first
Restatement of Torts, nonetheless adhered to the rule applied by the English court
in the Duke of Brunswick case. (Rest., Torts, § 578, com. b, p. 200; 1 Smolla, Law
of Defamation, supra, § 4:93, p. 4-140.1.)
Ultimately, many American courts began to reconsider the common law
rule exemplified in the Duke of Brunswick case. These courts recognized that the
advent of books and newspapers that were circulated among a mass readership
threatened unending and potentially ruinous liability as well as overwhelming (and
endless) litigation, as long as courts adhered to the rule that each sale of a copy of
12

a newspaper or a book, regardless how long after original publication, constituted
a new and separate publication. The early common law rule threatened a volume
of litigation and a potential for indefinite tolling of the period of limitations that,
these courts realized, would challenge the ability and willingness of publishers to
report freely on the news and on matters of public interest. (See Gregoire v. G.P.
Putnam’s Sons (N.Y. 1948) 81 N.E.2d 45, 46-48 [collecting cases]; see also
Hartmann v. Time, Inc. (3d. Cir. 1948) 166 F.2d 127, 134 [observing that the 19th
century rule posed a threat to freedom of the press]; Applewhite v. Memphis State
University (Tenn. 1973) 495 S.W.2d 190, 194 [noting that the rule posed threats of
harassment, multiple recovery, and injury to the administration of justice]; Winrod
v. Time, Inc. (Ill.App.Ct. 1948) 78 N.E.2d 708, 709-710.)
Seeking to avoid both the multiplicity and the staleness of claims permitted
by the rule applied in the Duke of Brunswick case, courts fashioned what became
known as the single-publication rule, holding that, for any single edition of a
newspaper or book, there was but a single potential action for a defamatory
statement contained in the newspaper or book, no matter how many copies of the
newspaper or the book were distributed. (See, e.g., Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam’s
Sons, supra, 81 N.E.2d 45, 46-48; see also Bradford v. American Media
Operations, Inc. (E.D.Pa. 1995) 882 F.Supp. 1508, 1513-1514; Rinaldi v. Viking
Penguin, Inc. (N.Y. 1981) 420 N.E.2d 377, 380-382; Winrod v. Time, Inc., supra,
78 N.E.2d at pp. 708-709; Rest.2d Torts, § 577A, subd. (3); 2 Harper et al., Law of
Torts, supra, § 5.16, pp. 126-128.)6 Of course, because each person who takes a
responsible part in a publication of defamatory matter may be held liable for the

6 The applicability of the single-publication rule to written publications that
receive an extremely limited distribution is not an issue in the present case.
13



publication (see Dunn v. Hearst (1903) 139 Cal. 239, 241; Osmond v. EWAP, Inc.
(1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 842, 852), multiple causes of action, even under the single-
publication rule, could be brought in one proceeding against several defendants
for a single defamatory statement. (Wathan v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (C.D. Ill.
1986) 636 F.Supp. 1530, 1533-1536; Dubinsky v. United Airlines Master
Executive Council (Ill.App.Ct. 1999) 708 N.E.2d 441, 454; 14 West U. Laws Ann.
(1990) U. Single Publ. Act, comrs. note, p. 375.)
Under the single-publication rule, with respect to the statute of limitations,
publication generally is said to occur on the “first general distribution of the
publication to the public.” (Belli v. Roberts Furs (1966) 2140 Cal.App.2d 284,
289; see also Bradford v. American Media Operations, supra, 882 F.Supp. at p.
1514 [collecting cases].) Accrual at that point is believed to provide adequate
protection to potential plaintiffs, especially in view of the qualification that
repetition of the defamatory statement in a new edition of a book or newspaper
constitutes a new publication of the defamation that may give rise to a new cause
of action, with a new accrual date. (See Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., supra,
420 N.E.2d at p. 433.)7 Under this rule, the cause of action accrues and the period
of limitations commences, regardless of when the plaintiff secured a copy or
became aware of the publication. (See Strick v. Superior Court (1983) 143
Cal.App.3d 916, 923; McGuiness v. Motor Trend Magazine (1982) 129

7
Notwithstanding the single-publication rule, a new edition or new issue of a
newspaper or book still constitutes a new publication, giving rise to a new and
separate cause of action and a new accrual date for the purpose of the statute of
limitations. (Schneider v. United Airlines, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 76;
Kanarek v. Bugliosi, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 332 [separate causes of action
for hardback and paperback editions of a book]; Rest.2d Torts, § 577A, subd. (3);
1 Smolla, Law of Defamation, supra, § 4:93p. 4-140.2.)
14



Cal.App.3d 59, 62-63; Belli v. Roberts Brothers Furs, supra, 240 Cal.App.2d at p.
289; see also Morgan v. Hustler Magazine (N.D. Ohio 1987) 653 F.Supp. 711,
717; Flynn v. Associated Press (Mass. 1988) 519 N.E.2d 1304, 1307-1308.)
The single-publication rule largely has been codified in the Uniform Single
Publication Act, which has been adopted in many states, including California.
(Civ. Code, § 3425.3 (added by Stats. 1955, c. 867, § 1, p. 1481);8 McGuiness v.
Motor Trend Magazine, supra, 129 Cal.App.3d at p. 61; Belli v. Roberts Brothers
Furs, supra, 240 Cal.App.2d at p. 288; see also 1 Smolla, Law of Defamation,
supra, § 4:93, p. 4-140.2; 2 Harper et al., Law of Torts, supra, § 5.16, pp. 127-128
& fn. 8.) The Uniform Single Publication Act was intended to reflect the common
law single-publication rule. (Wathan v. Equitable Life Assur. Co., supra, 636
F.Supp. at pp. 1533-1536; Dubinsky v. United Airlines Master Executive Council,
supra, 708 N.E.2d at p. 454; 14 West U. Laws Ann., supra, U. Single Publ. Act,
comrs. note, p. 375.)
B
We next consider the application of the statute of limitations for
defamation, which requires that an action be filed within one year of accrual of the
cause of action, to the present case. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (c).)9 In

8
That section provides: “No person shall have more than one cause of
action for damages for libel or slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort
founded upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance, such as any one
issue of a newspaper or book or magazine or any one presentation to an audience
or any one broadcast over radio or television or any one exhibition of a motion
picture. Recovery in any action shall include all damages for any such tort
suffered by the plaintiff in all jurisdictions.” (Civ. Code, § 3425.3.)
9
In addition, with respect to the claims against Bozanich for statements
made in the course of his employment, and against the County as his employer,
plaintiff was obliged to file a claim with the County within six months of the
accrual of her cause of action. (Gov. Code, § 911.2.)
15



common with other statutory limitations of the period within which an action may
be brought, this statute serves to protect potential defendants from stale claims and
to encourage plaintiffs to be diligent. Such provisions, by creating limits on the
period during which a person’s conduct may engender litigation and liability,
promote predictability and stability. (See Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21
Cal.4th 383, 395-396.)
In a claim for defamation, as with other tort claims, the period of
limitations commences when the cause of action accrues. (Code Civ. Proc., § 312;
Norgart v. Upjohn Co., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 397.) As we have discussed, in
general a cause of action in tort accrues at the time of injury, and a cause of action
for defamation accrues at the time the defamatory statement is “published” (using
the term “published” in its technical sense). (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris
Industries, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 931; Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44
Cal.3d 1103, 1109; Schneider v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at
p. 76; Strick v. Superior Court, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at p. 922; see also Norgart
v. Upjohn Company, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 397.)
As noted, in defamation actions the general rule is that publication occurs
when the defendant communicates the defamatory statement to a person other than
the person being defamed. (Cunningham v. Simpson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 301, 307;
5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, § 476, pp. 560-561; Rest.2d Torts,
§ 577.) As also has been noted, with respect to books and newspapers, publication
occurs (and the cause of action accrues) when the book or newspaper is first
generally distributed to the public. (Strick v. Superior Court, supra, 143
Cal.App.3d at p. 922; McGuiness v. Motor Trend Magazine, supra, 129
Cal.App.3d at p. 61; Belli v. Roberts Brothers Furs, supra, 240 Cal.App.2d at p.
289.)
16

When we apply these definitions to plaintiff’s causes of action in the
present case, it is evident that each is barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff
filed her claim with the County on May 12, 1997, and her complaint on
October 22, 1997. By contrast, the first alleged defamation was published in
1994, more than one year prior to the filing of the complaint and more than six
months prior to the filing of the claim with the County. The second alleged
defamation was published in 1996 sometime prior to September. The third alleged
defamation was communicated by means of the book, thousands of copies of
which were distributed for sale in California, on a date (as plaintiff concedes) prior
to October 21, 1996. Even if we consider October 21, 1996 to be the date of
publication, the complaint was filed a year and a day after that date and the claim
with the County was filed more than six months after that date.
Plaintiff contends, however, that pursuant to the so-called discovery rule,
all of her causes of action accrued when she first learned of the defamatory
statement. She urges that, as a general rule of tort law, the accrual of a cause of
action is tolled until the time the plaintiff knows (or with reasonable diligence
should have known) that the injury occurred. In her case, she claims, accrual
occurred in December 1996, when she bought and read a copy of the book, A
Problem of Evidence. She asserts that the applicable statute of limitations should
run from that time for all of her causes of action.
We have recognized that in some instances, the accrual of a cause of action
in tort is delayed until the plaintiff discovered (or reasonably should have
discovered or suspected) the factual basis for his or her claim. (See Norgart v.
Upjohn Co., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 397.) In professional malpractice cases, for
example, delayed accrual is justified on the basis that the expertise expected of
professionals is beyond the ability of laypersons to evaluate, and on the further
basis that it may be impossible for a layperson even to observe the professional’s
17

application of this expertise. (See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart &
Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 188.) As observed by the Courts of Appeal here and
in several other decisions, the discovery rule most frequently applies when it is
particularly difficult for the plaintiff to observe or understand the breach of duty,
or when the injury itself (or its cause) is hidden or beyond what the ordinary
person could be expected to understand. (Evans v. Eckelman (1990) 216
Cal.App.3d 1609, 1614-1615; see also Mark K. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop
(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 603, 610-611; Prudential Home Mortgage Co. v. Superior
Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1246-1247.)
When the basis for a claim has been published in the public record or has
been the subject of publicity, several cases have declined to apply the discovery
rule, commenting that the plaintiff may be expected to be sufficiently diligent to
discover the basis for his or her claim within the statutory period. (See Utility
Cost Management v. Indian Wells Valley Water Dist (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1185, 1197
[rejecting application of the discovery rule to a claim for refund of an assertedly
excessive charge, when the basis for the plaintiff’s claim could have been
discovered by means of the public reporting requirements that were imposed by
statute on the defendant]; Norgart v. Upjohn Co., supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 408-409,
fn. 7 [relying upon press coverage in rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that, because
they had no actual or constructive suspicion concerning a defendant’s culpability,
they could not have amended their complaint to name the defendant within the
period of limitations]; McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc. (1999) 74
Cal.App.4th 151, 160-161 & fn. 11 [referring to publicity as a basis for rejecting
tolling under a statutory discovery rule]; 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996)
Actions, § 602, p. 773; but see Prudential Home Mortgage Co. v. Superior Court,
supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1247-1248 [observing that public records may impart
18

“presumptive notice” of the basis for a claim, but declining to hold that they
always do so as a matter of law].)
This court and other courts in California and elsewhere have recognized
that in certain circumstances it may be appropriate to apply the discovery rule to
delay the accrual of a cause of action for defamation or to impose an equitable
estoppel against defendants who assert the defense after the limitations period has
expired.
An example of equitable estoppel is presented in Bernson v. Browning-
Ferris Industries of California, Inc., supra, 7 Cal.4th 926, in which a company
allegedly circulated among various press outlets a defamatory dossier concerning
the plaintiff, a city council member. When the plaintiff learned of the dossier and
accused the defendant of being its author, the defendant denied authorship, both to
the plaintiff personally and in a letter printed in the Los Angeles Times. The
defendant also demanded that the newspaper retract its assertion that the defendant
had been the author. Although the normal rule is that ignorance of the identity of
the defendant is not a basis for tolling the statute of limitations, under the
particular circumstances this court determined that as a matter of equity, the
defendant should be estopped from profiting from its own misconduct in
precluding the plaintiff from ever ascertaining the identity of the defendant.
(7 Cal.4th at pp. 932-933, 936.) We acknowledged, in passing, that the discovery
rule has been applied to defamation cases. (7 Cal.4th at pp. 931-932.)
That rule has been applied when the defamatory statement is hidden from
view as, for example, in a personnel file that generally cannot be inspected by the
plaintiff. The rationales offered in support of the application of the discovery rule
to defamation cases are equitable in nature. The cases turn upon the circumstances
in which the defamatory statement is made and frequently involve a defamatory
writing that has been kept in a place to which the plaintiff has no access or cause
19

to seek access. The plaintiff’s inability to discover the libel when it first was
“published” and placed in a confidential file would render unjust any holding that
the cause of action accrued and the period of limitations commenced when the
writing was placed in the file.
For example, in a case upon which plaintiff places great emphasis, the court
in Manguso v. Oceanside Unified School Dist. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 725
determined that a teacher’s cause of action for libel against a school principal did
not accrue until the teacher knew or had reasonable cause to learn of the libelous
material the principal had placed in her personnel file. The court explained that
statutes of limitations are intended to protect defendants from unexpected, stale
claims when the plaintiff has slept on his or her rights, but that the discovery rule
provides an exception when the plaintiff has used reasonable diligence to protect
these rights. The court asserted that the discovery rule is intended to avoid
unjustly depriving plaintiffs of their causes of action when they have been diligent,
and to relieve plaintiffs of the obligation to file a claim prior to the time they
reasonably could be expected to discover it. (Id. at pp. 730-731; see also Staheli v.
Smith (Miss. 1989) 548 So.2d 1299, 1303 [collecting cases limiting the discovery
rule to private or confidential publications and holding that an “inherently
undiscoverable” libel contained in a tenure recommendation may be subject to the
discovery rule]; Tom Olesker’s Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. (Ill. 1975) 334 N.E.2d 160, 164 [applying the discovery rule to the
transmittal of a defamatory credit report]; Flynn v. Associated Press, supra, 519
N.E.2d at p. 1307 [suggesting that in defamation actions, the discovery rule
applies only to “inherently unknowable” publications].) As for oral defamatory
remarks (that is, slander), plaintiff has cited one case in which the court assumed
the same analysis would apply. (See McNair v. Worldwide Church of God (1987)
197 Cal.App.3d 363, 379-380.)
20

The discovery rule has not, however, been applied to postpone the accrual
of a cause of action based upon the publication of a defamatory statement
contained in a book or newspaper. The rule constitutes an exception to general
rules concerning the accrual of a cause of action — an exception based upon
equity. Plaintiff does not explain satisfactorily how the equitable considerations
that may apply to a defamation that is hidden from view might apply to a
defamation that is made public in a book.
Indeed, courts uniformly have rejected the application of the discovery rule
to libels published in books, magazines, and newspapers, pointing out that
application of the discovery rule would undermine the protection provided by the
single-publication rule. (McGuiness v. Motor Trend Magazine, supra, 129
Cal.App.3d at pp. 62-63; Schweihs v. Burdick (7th Cir. 1996) 96 F.3d 917, 920-
921; Barrett v. Catacombs Press (E.D.Pa. 1999) 64 F.Supp.2d 440, 444-446;
Bradford v. American Media Operations, Inc., supra, 882 F.Supp. at pp.1514,
1518-1519; Morgan v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., supra, 653 F.Supp. at p. 717;
Rinsley v. Brandt (D.Kan. 1977) 446 F.Supp. 850, 852-853; Flynn v. Associated
Press, supra, 519 N.E.2d at pp. 1307-1308 [collecting cases]; Holloway v. Butler
(Tex. App. 1983) 662 S.W.2d 688, 693; see also Tom Olesker’s Excit. W., etc. v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., supra, 334 N.E.2d at p. 164 [distinguishing “hidden”
defamatory statements by a credit reporting agency from statements published in
books and newspapers].)
Plaintiff asks us to deviate from this authority in order to produce an
assertedly equitable result, based upon her contention that she has been a
reasonably diligent litigant — even as to the allegedly defamatory statement
published in the book, A Problem of Evidence. But, as one court explained,
although application of the discovery rule may be justified when the defamation
was communicated in confidence, that is “in an inherently secretive manner,” the
21

justification does not apply when the defamation occurred by means of a book,
magazine, or newspaper that was distributed to the public. (McGuiness v. Motor
Trend Magazine, supra, 129 Cal.App.3d at p. 63.) Even a decision that applied
the discovery rule to a defamatory statement contained in a confidential credit
report distinguished the case before it from defamations of the kind alleged in the
present case, on the ground that “the publication has been for public attention and
knowledge[,] and the person commented on, if only in his role as a member of the
public, has had access to such published information.” (Tom Olesker’s Excit. W.,
etc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., supra, 334 N.E.2d at p. 164.)
As is evident, application of the discovery rule to statements contained in
books and newspapers would undermine the single-publication rule and reinstate
the indefinite tolling of the statute of limitations intended to be cured by the
adoption of the single-publication rule. If we were to recognize delayed accrual of
a cause of action based upon the allegedly defamatory statement contained in the
book, A Problem of Evidence, on the basis that plaintiff did not happen to come
across the statement until some time after the book was first generally distributed
to the public, we would be adopting a rule subjecting publishers and authors to
potential liability during the entire period in which a single copy of the book or
newspaper might exist and fall into the hands of the subject of a defamatory
remark. Inquiry into whether delay in discovering the publication was reasonable
has not been permitted for publications governed by the single-publication rule.
Nor is adoption of the rule proposed by plaintiff appropriate simply because the
originator of a privately communicated defamatory statement may, together with
the author and the publisher of a book, be liable for the defamation contained in
the book. Under the rationale for the single-publication rule, the originator, who is
jointly responsible along with the author and the publisher, should not be liable for
millions of causes of action for a single edition of the book. Similarly, consistent
22

with that rationale, the originator, like the author or the publisher, should not be
subject to suit many years after the edition is published.
We conclude, therefore, that the causes of action that are based upon
publication of the defamatory material in the book, A Problem of Evidence 
namely, the causes of action that would hold Clarke and Bozanich, respectively,
(and the County as Bozanich’s employer) liable for the allegedly foreseeable
repetition of their defamatory statements published in the book  must be barred.
The Court of Appeal reached a contrary conclusion, based upon the
assertedly confidential nature of the first two defamatory publications made by
Clarke and Bozanich. We believe, however, that the court failed to recognize the
presence of separate causes of action alleged against Clarke and Bozanich for the
statements contained in the book. The circumstance that plaintiff understandably
might not be aware of Clarke and Bozanich’s earlier confidential communications
would have no bearing on the application of the statute of limitations to a later,
separate defamation that was contained in the book, and for which plaintiff seeks
to hold Clarke and Bozanich responsible. Clarke’s and Bozanich’s liability in this
respect was essentially the same as the potential liability of the book’s author and
publisher, and, with regard to the latter category of defendants, the single-
publication rule applies without any possibility of doubt.
The Court of Appeal’s opinion, in a footnote, questioned the basis for and
legitimacy of the single-publication rule even as applied to defamations contained
in books and newspapers. It asserted that the rule has nothing to do with the
statute of limitations, but this assertion is untenable. The history of the rule, the
basis for its adoption, and the cases cited above demonstrate the fallacy of this
position. Without purporting to answer all potential attacks on the rule, we believe
that our discussion has established that the single-publication rule is supported by
23

settled authority and by legitimate policy concerns, and that it should apply in the
present case as we have determined.
Next, we examine whether accrual of plaintiff’s remaining causes of action
should be tolled pursuant to the discovery rule. These causes of action are alleged
against Clarke, for his original defamatory statement, and against Clarke for
Bozanich’s repetition of that defamatory statement; against Bozanich, for his
repetition, in the course of his employment with the County, of the defamatory
statement to Bosco, and against the County as Bozanich’s employer.
We acknowledge that the discovery rule has been applied to such inherently
covert defamations as entries in personnel records, and also to communications by
credit reporting agencies to their subscribers. (See, e.g., Manguso v. Oceanside
Unified School Dist., supra, 88 Cal.App.3d at pp. 730-731; Schweihs v. Burdick,
supra, 96 F.3d at p. 921 [declining to apply the discovery rule to a book, but
observing that “[t]he courts seem to apply the discovery rule in situations where
the defamatory material is published in a manner likely to be concealed from the
plaintiff, such as credit reports or confidential memoranda. In these situations, the
injustice that results from the expiration of the limitations period before discovery
of the plaintiff’s injury is more likely to occur”]; Tom Olesker’s Excit. W., etc. v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc,. supra, 334 N.E.2d at p. 164.) Applying the discovery rule
to delay accrual of a cause of action based upon an asserted defamation contained
in a faculty tenure report, one court observed: “Those states having directly
addressed the discovery rule in defamation cases have generally applied it in those
very limited situations where the allegedly libelous statement occurred in private
or confidential publications [that are] not readily available to the plaintiff or the
public.” (Staheli v. Smith, supra, 548 So.2d at p. 1303.)
These authorities might support plaintiff’s position if the original
defamatory statements made by Clarke and Bozanich had not been disseminated in
24

the book, and if plaintiff had learned of them for the first time through, for
example, an entry in a police report, an employment record, or an unexpected
disclosure by someone to whom the essentially private defamations had been
repeated. We believe, however, that the equitable basis for applying the discovery
rule — that a plaintiff should not forfeit a cause of action based on a confidential
communication that he or she had no reasonable basis for discovering — no longer
exists once the original defamatory statement is published in a book that was
distributed to the general public. In such circumstances, not only is the basis for
the claim not hidden, but it has been trumpeted.
The Court of Appeal did not appear to recognize that, even with respect to
the two presumably confidential communications, the equitable basis or rationale
for applying the discovery rule in the case of inherently secret or confidential
communications ceases once a book recounting these communications is
published and is distributed to the general public. The book in the present case
repeated the earlier defamatory statements and attributed them to Bozanich and
Clarke. We can see no justification for applying the discovery rule to delay the
accrual of plaintiff’s causes of action beyond the point at which their factual basis
became accessible to plaintiff to the same degree as it was accessible to every
other member of the public. The situation facing plaintiff was analogous to that
presented in other cases where the factual basis for the claim is a matter of public
record and thus does not invoke the rationale for applying the discovery rule. (See
Utility Cost Management v. Indian Wells Valley Water Dist., supra, 26 Cal.4th at
p. 1197; McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp.
160-161 & fn. 11.) We conclude that any equitable ground supporting the
application of the discovery rule to the earlier defamations ceased to exist once the
book was published and was distributed to the general public.
25

III
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is
reversed and the matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
GEORGE, C. J.
WE CONCUR:

KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.

26



See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Shively v. Bozanich
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted

XXX 85 Cal.App.4th 363
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S094467
Date Filed: December 22, 2003
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Reginald A. Dunn

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Hill & Hill, Monique Shana Hill and Gregory Charles Hill for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Office of Robert Cooper and Robert Cooper for Paul Ingerson as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff
and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, David D. Lawrence, Cindy S. Lee and Jin S. Choi for
Defendants and Respondents Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles.

Davis Wright Tremaine, Kelli L. Sager, Alonzo Wickers IV, Rochelle L. Wilcox and Thomas R. Burke for
California Newspapers Publishers Association, Los Angeles Times Communications, LLC, The Copley
Press, Inc., ABC, Inc., Magazine Publishers of America, Inc., News America, Inc., Cable News Network,
National Broadcasting Company, Inc., and Time Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and
Respondents Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles.

Thomas W. Newton for California Newspaper Publishers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Defendants and Respondents Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles.

Karlene W. Goller for Los Angeles Times Communications, LLC, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Defendants and Respondents Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles.

Harold L. Fuson, Jr., and Judith Fanshaw for The Copley Press, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Defendants and Respondents Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles.

27


Page 2 - counsel continued - S094467

Attorneys for Respondent:

Jean Zoeller for ABC, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents Peter Bozanich
and County of Los Angeles.

Squadron Ellenoof Plesent & Sheinfeld and Slade R. Metcalf for Magazine Publishers of America, Inc., as
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles.

Jan F. Constantine for News America, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents
Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles.

David Vigilante for Cable News Network as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents
Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles.

Andrea Hartman for National Broadcasting, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and
Respondents Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles.

Paul Gardephe for Time Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents Peter Bozanich
and County of Los Angeles.

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent Brian Patrick Clarke.


28



Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Gregory Charles Hill
Hill & Hill
The Center Promenade
1001 Partridge Drive, Suite 105
Ventura, CA 93003
(805) 477-0069

Cindy S. Lee
Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence
225 South Lake Avenue, Penthouse
Pasadena, CA 91101-3005
(626) 304-7830

Kelli L. Sager
Davis Wright Tremaine
865 Figueroa Street, Suite 2400
Los Angeles, CA 90017
(213) 633-6800

29


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Mon, 12/22/2003S094467A

Parties
1County Of Los Angeles (Defendant and Respondent)
2Bozanich, Peter (Defendant and Respondent)
3Shively, Jill (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Gregory Charles Hill
Hill & Hill
7007 Washington Ave., Suite 211
Whittier, CA

4Shively, Jill (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Monique Shana Hill
Hill & Hill
7007 Washington Ave., Suite 211
Whittier, CA

5Bosco, Joseph (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by Stephen G. Contopulos
6Clark, Brian Patrick (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by Bart Ivan Ring
Adler & Ring
21700 Oxnard Street
Suite 1620
Woodland Hills, CA

7Burke, Thomas R. (Pub/Depublication Requestor)
c/o Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP
One Embarcadero Center, Suite 600
San Francisco, CA 94111

8California Newspapers Publishers Association Et Al (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Thomas Rohlfs Burke
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP
One Embarcadero Center, Suite 600
San Francisco, CA

9California Newspapers Publishers Association Et Al (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Kelli L. Sager
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP
865 S. Figueroa St., Suite 2400
Los Angeles, CA

10California Newspapers Publishers Association Et Al (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Alonzo Iv Wickers
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP
865 S. Figueroa St., Suite 2400
Los Angeles, CA

11Ingerson, Paul (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Robert Cooper
Attorney at Law
269 S. Beverly Drive, Suite 726
Beverly Hills, CA


Disposition
Dec 22 2003Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Jan 17 2001Petition for review filed
  Respondents County of Los Angeles and Peter Bozanich
Jan 22 2001Received Court of Appeal record
  1 doghouse
Feb 6 2001Answer to petition for review filed
  By counsel for Resp. {Shively}
Feb 6 2001Request for Depublication (petition/rev. pending)
  by attorney Thomas R. Burke (non-party).
Feb 6 2001Request for depublication filed (another request pending)
  Respondents County of Los Angeles and Peter Bozanich
Feb 16 2001Opposition filed
  By counsel for applt. to requests for depublication
Mar 7 2001Time Extended to grant or deny Petition for Review
  to and including April 17, 2001.
Mar 28 2001Petition for Review Granted (civil case)
  Votes: George C.J., Mosk, Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin & Brown JJ.
Apr 6 2001Received Letter in Los Angeles from:
  counsel for William Morrow & Co.(Respondent) with copy of order from CA dismissing them from appeal.
Apr 13 2001Received letter from:
  counsel for appellant Shively
Apr 20 2001Application for Extension of Time filed
  by resps to file the opening brief on the merits, to 5-28-01.
Apr 24 2001Extension of Time application Granted
  to and including May 29, 2001 for respondent to file opening brief on the merits.
May 29 2001Opening brief on the merits filed
  Respondents County of Los Angeles and Peter Bozanich
Jun 27 2001Answer brief on the merits filed
  Appellant Jill Shively
Jul 17 2001Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  Respondents County of Los Angeles and Peter Bozanich
Aug 16 2001Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  of CALIFORNIA NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOC., LOS ANGELES TIMES COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, THE COPLEY PRESS, ABC, INC., MAGAZINE PUBLISHERS OF AMERICA, NEWS AMERICA, INC., CABLE NEWS NETWORK, NATIONAL BROADCASTING CO., INC. & TIME INC. ** supports resps. Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles * submitted concurrent w/ Request for Judicial Notice in support of A.C.brief.
Aug 28 2001Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  CA Newspaper Publishers Assoc., et al.
Aug 28 2001Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  CALIFORNIA NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOC., LOS ANGELES TIMES COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, THE COPLEY PRESS, INC., ABC, INC., MAGAZINE PUBLISHERS OF AMERICA, INC., NEWS AMERICA, INC., CABLE NEWS NETWORK, NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC., AND TIME INC. in support of respondents, Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles. Answer due within 20 days by any party.
Aug 28 2001Request for Judicial Notice filed
  by counsel for California Newspapers Publishers Assoc. et al. in support of AC brief.
Dec 11 2001Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  Paul Ingerson [application/reqt to file late w/i brief]
Dec 19 2001Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Paul Ingerson in support of appellant. (appli & brief under same cover)
Dec 19 2001Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  counsel for Paul Ingerson in support of appellant.
May 6 2002Change of Address filed for:
  Cindy Lee, counsel for respondents (County of LA & Peter Bozanich).
Apr 28 2003Record requested
  B133983 to ship reqular mail.
Oct 1 2003Case ordered on calendar
  Tuesday, November 4, 2003 @1PM (Sacramento)
Oct 14 2003Filed:
  request of resps City of L.A. and Bozanich to allocate oral argument time to A/C Calif. Newspapers Publishers Assn. et al.
Oct 15 2003Change of Address filed for:
  counsel for aplt Shively
Oct 15 2003Request for judicial notice denied
  The request for judicial notice filed on August 28, 2001, is denied.
Oct 17 2003Request for judicial notice granted
  The order filed on October 15, 2003, denying the request for judicial notice, is vacated. The request for judicial notice filed on August 28, 2001 is granted.
Oct 17 2003Order filed
  permission granted for two counsel to argue on behalf of resps
Oct 17 2003Order filed
  permission granted for resps to allocate 10 min oral argument time to A/C Calif. Newspapers Publishers Association
Nov 4 2003Cause argued and submitted
 
Nov 24 2003Note: Mail returned (unable to forward)
  Order dated 10/15/03 to Hon. Reginald A. Dunn returned with note on envelope "addressee retired".
Dec 22 2003Opinion filed: Judgment reversed
  and remanded to CA2/3. Majority Opinion by Geroge, C.J. joined by Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown & Moreno, JJ.
Jan 23 2004Remittitur issued (civil case)
 
Jan 30 2004Received document entitled:
  Receipt for remittitur - from CA2/3
Jan 30 2004Note:
  record to shipping department to send to CA2/3.

Briefs
May 29 2001Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Jun 27 2001Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Jul 17 2001Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
Aug 28 2001Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Dec 19 2001Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website