Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 7/31/06

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

S. B. BEACH PROPERTIES et al.,
Plaintiffs
and
Respondents,
S127513
v.
Ct.App. 2/6 B168950
RICHARD A. BERTI et al.,
Santa
Barbara
County
Defendants and Appellants. )
Super.
Ct.
No.
01110911

A strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) is subject to a
special motion to strike (anti-SLAPP motion), under Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP statute).1 A defendant who is the “prevailing [party]
on” such a motion is “entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (c).) Here, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their entire action
without prejudice before defendants attempted to file an anti-SLAPP motion. As a
result, we conclude that defendants may not recover their attorney fees and costs
pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c).

1
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
1

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, S. B. Beach Properties is a limited partnership, with plaintiffs
William J. Levy and Roy J. Millender, Jr. serving as general partners. Defendants
Richard A. Berti, Marguerite A. Berti, and Ilene Bruckner are limited partners.
On January 2, 2003, plaintiffs sued defendants, alleging breach of fiduciary
duty, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Plaintiffs alleged that the partnership was seeking approval to develop
partnership property in Santa Barbara, that defendants opposed these plans and
unreasonably demanded audits of the partnership records.
On January 21, defendants answered, asserting as an affirmative defense,
that the complaint was “a strategic lawsuit against public participation” and
subject to section 425.16.
On February 11, defendants filed an ex parte motion to increase the page
limitation on the anti-SLAPP motion they planned to file. On February 20,
plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their entire complaint without prejudice.
The next day, defendants sought to file an anti-SLAPP motion, including a
notice of a request for attorney fees and costs. The clerk initially accepted the
motion but refused to calendar a hearing because plaintiffs had already dismissed
the action. Later that afternoon, defendants tried to file additional supporting
documents, but the clerk refused to accept them for the same reason.
On March 11, defendants filed a motion to recover attorney fees and costs
under sections 425.16, subdivision (c) and 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10). The
motion was denied. The trial court ruled, “[o]nce the case was dismissed the [anti-
SLAPP] statute does not give the Court the right to make the decisions necessary
to award fees. If the Legislature wanted fees to be awarded, post dismissal, it
would be a simple matter to give appropriate directions to trial courts as to the
guidelines we should follow. Absent such directions we have neither the authority
2

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nor any wish to invent them.” The court also analogized the fee request to a
motion for sanctions under section 128.7. Citing Eichenbaum v. Alon (2003) 106
Cal.App.4th 967, the court concluded that the availability of a fee award under the
anti-SLAPP statute, like the availability of sanctions under section 128.7,
“depends upon whether the . . . motion was filed before or after dismissal.” The
court concluded that awarding fees in this case “would inevitably open the door to
judicial intervention, after dismissal, in virtually any case that might possibly be
related to the interests sought to be protected.”
The Court of Appeal reversed, relying on cases holding that “a dismissal of
the complaint after the anti-SLAPP motion is filed, but prior to a hearing on the
motion, does not deprive the court of jurisdiction” to award attorney fees and costs
under section 425.16, subdivision (c). According to the appellate court, “[i]f a
dismissal prior to the hearing on the motion does not deprive the court of
jurisdiction, there is no reason why a dismissal prior to filing the motion should.”
It further observed that “[t]he filing and service of a complaint demanding
substantial damages can inhibit participation in matters of public significance.”
Thus “[t]he purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute will not be achieved if an offending
plaintiff can avoid sanctions simply by dismissing his complaint before the
defendant files his motion.”
II. DISCUSSION OF SECTION 425.16, SUBDIVISION (C)
Under section 425.16, subdivision (c), “any SLAPP defendant who brings a
successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees.” (Ketchum v.
Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.) Here, however, plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed their action pursuant to section 581 before defendants filed an anti-
SLAPP motion. Defendants maintain they may still recover their attorney fees
and costs. We conclude to the contrary. Defendants who fail to file an anti-
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SLAPP motion before the voluntary dismissal of all causes of actions against them
cannot recover fees or costs under section 425.16, subdivision (c).
Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) provides: “[a] cause of action against a
person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of
petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless
the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that
the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” Section 425.16, subdivision (c) then states
that “[i]n any action subject to subdivision (b), a prevailing defendant on a special
motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.”
In construing any statute, we first look to its language. (Wilcox v.
Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 977.) “Words used in a statute . . . should be
given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the language is clear
and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to
indicia of the intent of the Legislature . . . .” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45
Cal.3d 727, 735.) “If the language permits more than one reasonable
interpretation, however, the court looks ‘to a variety of extrinsic aids, including
the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative
history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the
statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.’ [Citation.]” (Wilcox v.
Birtwhistle, at p. 977.)
Under section 425.16, subdivision (c), only a “prevailing defendant on a
special motion to strike” may recover attorney fees and costs. (Italics added.)
This statutory language is unambiguous, and makes the filing of a viable anti-
SLAPP motion a prerequisite to recovering any fees and costs. As a matter of
logic, a defendant must file a special motion to strike in order to prevail on one.
4

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Here, defendants failed to do so before plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal. A
section 581 dismissal “is available to [a] plaintiff as a matter of right and is
accomplished by filing with the clerk a written request therefor. If in proper form,
the dismissal is effective immediately.” (Associated Convalescent Enterprises v.
Carl Marks & Co., Inc. (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 116, 120.) “The entry is a
ministerial, not a judicial, act, and no appeal lies therefrom.” (Ibid.) Once
plaintiffs dismissed their action no lawsuit existed for defendants to move against
pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c).
Defendants nonetheless maintain that the trial court retained authority to
resolve their fees and costs motion. They correctly note that a voluntary dismissal
under section 581 does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over “collateral
statutory rights,” including “the right to statutory costs and attorneys fees . . . .”
(Frank Annino & Sons Construction, Inc. v. McArthur Restaurants, Inc. (1989)
215 Cal.App.3d 353, 357.) This general rule does not assist defendants here. The
general rule does not apply because defendants’ particular request is based on a
claimed entitlement arising from their success on a motion they did not file.
Legislative history buttresses this conclusion. In enacting the anti-SLAPP
statute, the Legislature adopted a balanced approach to end SLAPP suits at an
early stage while not jeopardizing meritorious actions. (Gallagher v. Connell
(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1269.) The Legislature originally passed an anti-
SLAPP bill that “contained a ‘pleading hurdle’ which prohibited a person from
pleading a SLAPP suit cause of action until a court granted leave to do so after
demonstration of a ‘substantial probability’ of success on the merits.” (Assem.
Subcom. on Admin. of Justice, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1264 (1991-1992 Reg.
Sess.) as amended Mar. 26, 1992, p. 4.) The Governor vetoed this bill. The
Legislature then passed Senate Bill No. 1264, which became section 425.16.
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Unlike the previous enactment, Senate Bill No. 1264 gave plaintiffs an
“unencumbered opportunity to make SLAPP suit allegations, prior to the motion
to strike hearing.” (Assem. Subcom. on the Administration of Justice, Analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 1264, supra, as amended Mar. 26, 1992, p. 4.) In passing the new
bill, the Legislature acknowledged that “defendants will be forced to incur defense
costs, and related expenses and difficulties, prior to invoking the relief afforded.”
(Ibid.) “This movement—from a ‘pleading hurdle’ to a mandatory special motion
to strike—was made at the request of the State Bar’s Committee on the
Administration of Justice (Committee), which is concerned that a ‘pleading
hurdle’ may violate a plaintiff’s constitutional right to a jury trial. The Committee
is more comfortable with the ‘motion to strike’ approach, which permits the
plaintiff some opportunity to conduct discovery while preserving the ability of the
defendant to dismiss the lawsuit at an early, and, perhaps, inexpensive stage.”
(Ibid., italics added.)
Thus, the Legislature “establish[ed] a special procedure. It [gave] the
defendant the right to file a ‘special motion to strike’ the claim.” (Cal. Dept. of
Consumer Affairs, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1264 (1991-1992 Reg.
Sess.) prepared for Governor Pete Wilson (Aug. 25, 1992) p. 3.) And only
“[d]efendants who prevail on the motion to strike are entitled to attorney’s fees
and costs.” (Ibid., italics added.) Consistent with this understanding, the fee
“provision applies only to the motion to strike, and not to the entire action.” (Sen.
Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1264 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) as
introduced Jan. 6, 1992, p. 5; see also Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle
Publishing Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1384.
Using a “motion to strike” approach, rather than a “pleading hurdle,” the
Legislature made the filing of a viable anti-SLAPP motion a necessary trigger for
both an imposed judgment of dismissal and an award of fees and costs. Where, as
6

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here, defendants never filed such a motion, they cannot recover under section
425.16, subdivision (c).
Defendants cite many cases upholding an award of attorney fees and costs
pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c) notwithstanding the voluntary
dismissal of the action. None are apposite here. In each, the plaintiff voluntarily
dismissed the action after the defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion.2

2 See
Pfeiffer Venice Properties v. Bernard (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 211, 218
(“a defendant who has been sued in violation of his or her free speech rights is
entitled to an award of attorney fees . . . even if the matter has been dismissed
prior to the hearing on that motion”); Kyle v. Carmon (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th
901, 908, fn. 4 (“the parties agree that even if plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal is
valid, the trial court retained jurisdiction to award defendant attorney’s fees
pursuant to a section 425.16 motion filed before plaintiff dismissed the case”); Liu
v. Moore (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 745, 751 (“We hold that a defendant who is
voluntarily dismissed, with or without prejudice, after filing a section 425.16
motion to strike, is nevertheless entitled to have the merits of such motion heard as
a predicate to a determination of the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees and
costs under subdivision (c) of that section”); Coltrain v. Shewalter (1998) 66
Cal.App.4th 94, 107 (“where the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an alleged SLAPP
suit while a special motion to strike is pending, the trial court has discretion to
determine whether the defendant is the prevailing party for purposes of attorney’s
fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c)”); Ecash
Technologies, Inc. v. Guagliardo (C.D.Cal. 2000) 127 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1083-1084
(awarding attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16 even though the
plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action after the defendants filed an anti-SLAPP
motion); see also Moraga-Orinda Fire Protection Dist. v. Weir (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 477, 480 (“resolution of the underlying action [on the ground of lack
of standing] does not moot a fee request under the SLAPP statute”); White v.
Lieberman (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 210, 220-221 (allowing award of attorney fees
and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c) even though the trial court
sustained defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend without ruling on the
pending anti-SLAPP motion); Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443,
446 (“Where a plaintiff dismisses an action while an anti-SLAPP motion is
pending, the defendant may nonetheless be entitled to recover attorney fees”).
7

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The legislative mandate to construe the anti-SLAPP statute “broadly” does
not compel a different conclusion. (§ 425.16, subd. (a).) Even when broadly
construing a statute, we may not “ignore the plain statutory language” or reach
conclusions inconsistent with this language. (Decker v. U.D. Registry, Inc. (2003)
105 Cal.App.4th 1382, 1390.)
Our holding comports with and harmonizes the purposes behind both
sections 581 and 425.16. The purpose behind section 581 “is to allow a plaintiff a
certain amount of freedom of action within the limits prescribed by the code.”
(Cal-Vada Aircraft, Inc. v. Superior Court (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 435, 446.)
Meanwhile, section 425.16 “is designed to enable the defendant-victim of a
SLAPP suit to extract himself or herself from the lawsuit as quickly and
inexpensively as possible.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No.
9 (1992-1993 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 6, 1992, p. 2.) Allowing plaintiffs to
voluntarily dismiss an action without penalty before the filing of an anti-SLAPP
motion serves both purposes. Plaintiffs have the freedom to reconsider the
wisdom of their actions without penalty before defendants have incurred clearly
identifiable and recoverable legal fees. Defendants are expeditiously relieved of
the burden a SLAPP suit imposes, because they must generally file their anti-
SLAPP motion “within 60 days of the service of the complaint.” (§ 425.16, subd.
(f).)
A contrary holding would accomplish neither purpose. Penalizing plaintiffs
despite a voluntary dismissal would restrict their freedom of action in a manner
inconsistent with the Code of Civil Procedure. Permitting defendants to recover
attorney fees and costs without filing a viable anti-SLAPP motion would only
prolong and likely increase the overall costs of SLAPP litigation.
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that “[a]n action which is
ultimately dismissed by the plaintiff, with or without prejudice, is nevertheless a
8

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burden on the target of the litigation and the judicial system . . . .” (Tokerud v.
Capitolbank Sacramento (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 775, 779.) We further recognize
that a defendant may incur legal fees and expenses in preparing an anti-SLAPP
motion, before the voluntary dismissal of the action. But to conclude differently
would raise other vexing questions. For instance, how is a trial court to evaluate
the viability of an incomplete anti-SLAPP motion, not yet filed at the time of
dismissal? Is a defendant entitled to finish briefing the motion, or to include the
expense of completed briefing as part of a motion for fees and costs? To allow
recovery for postdismissal work runs counter to the purpose of section 425.16: to
compensate defendants for expenses incurred in extricating themselves from
SLAPP suits. Drawing a bright line is fully consistent with the terms and purposes
of sections 425.16 and 581 and has the additional benefit of discouraging
prolonged litigation solely over the matter of fees and costs.
Accordingly, we hold that defendants who do not file an anti-SLAPP
motion before plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal may not recover attorney fees and
costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c).
9

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III. DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand with
instructions that the matter be returned to the trial court for reinstatement of its
previous order denying the award of attorney fees and costs.
CORRIGAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
10

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion S. B. Beach Properties v. Berti
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 120 Cal.App.4th 1001
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S127513
Date Filed: July 31, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Santa Barbara
Judge: Thomas Pearce Anderle

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Davis Wright Tremaine, Kelli L. Sager, Sonja R. West, Gary L. Bostwick, Rochelle L. Wilcox; Foley &
Bezek, Peter J. Bezek and Robert A. Curtis for Defendants and Appellants.

Davis Wright Tremaine, Thomas R. Burke and Kavita Amar for Sierra Club as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Defendants and Appellants.

Levy, Ram & Olson, Karl Olson; Karlene W. Goller; Jonathan Donnellan; Thomas W. Newton; Harold W.
Fuson, Jr.; Stephen J. Burns; David McCraw; and David Greene for California Newspaper Publishers
Association, Los Angeles Times, Hearst Communications, Inc., The Copley Press, Inc., McClatchy
Newspapers, Inc., New York Times Company, California First Amendment Coalition and First
Amendment Project as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Cappello & Noel, A. Barry Cappello, Troy A. Thielemann, Wendy D. Welkom and Christoph T.
Nettesheim for Plaintiff and Respondent S.B. Beach Properties.

Grokenberger & Smith, David W. Grokenberger and W. Bradley Thomas for Plaintiffs and Respondents
William J. Levy and Roy J. Millender, Jr.

Thelen Reid & Priest, Daven G. Lowhurst, Patrick M. Ryan and Chad DeVeaux for Richard Lamm as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

---

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Kelli L. Sager
Davis Wright Tremaine
865 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 2400
Los Angeles, CA 90017-2566
(213) 633-6800

A. Barry Cappello
Cappello & Noel
831 State Street
Santa Barbara, CA 93101
(805) 564-2444

Patrick M. Ryan
Thelen Reid & Priest
101 Second Street, Suite 1800
San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 371-1200

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Mon, 07/31/2006	S127513

Disposition
Jul 31 2006	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Sep 1 2004	Petition for review filed   respondents S.B. Beach Properties, etal [rule 40k]
Sep 3 2004	Record requested
Sep 8 2004	Received Court of Appeal record   one doghouse
Sep 21 2004	Answer to petition for review filed   appellants, Richard A. Berti, Marguerite A. Berti and Ilene Bruckner
Oct 1 2004	Reply to answer to petition filed   respondents, S.B. Beach Properties.
Oct 27 2004	Petition for review granted; issues limited (civil case)   The issue to be briefed and argued is limited to the following: Does a trial court have jurisdiction to consider a motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 if the action was voluntarily dismissed before the special motion to strike was filed? Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown, and Moreno, JJ.
Oct 27 2004	Record requested   remainder of c/a record
Nov 3 2004	Received additional record   two doghouses
Nov 12 2004	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   Foley & Bezek, LLP, counsel for appellant.
Nov 22 2004	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   A. Barry Cappello for Respondent (S.B. Properties).
Nov 23 2004	Request for extension of time filed   Respondent (S.B. Beach) to file the opening brief on the merits. Asking to Dec. 14, 2004.
Dec 2 2004	Extension of time granted   to Dec. 14, 2004 for respondents to file the opening brief on the merits.
Dec 14 2004	Opening brief on the merits filed   by resps
Dec 22 2004	Request for extension of time filed   to file answer brief on the merits. asking to February 10, 2004.
Jan 5 2005	Extension of time granted   to Feb. 10, 2005 for appellants to file the answer brief on the merits. No further extensions of time will be granted.
Feb 10 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed   appellants Richard A. Berti, Marguerite A. Berti and Ilene Bruckner
Feb 10 2005	Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)   appellants Richard A. Berti, Marguerite A. Berti and Ilene Bruckner
Mar 2 2005	Request for extension of time filed   to and including 4-7-2005 to file Respondents' Reply Brief on the Merits. Received supplemental declaration in support of application. Order prepared granting e.o.t. ONLY to 4-1-2005. No further extensions will be granted.
Mar 4 2005	Extension of time granted   On application of respondents and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and fle the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including April 1, 2005, only. No further extensions of time will be granted.
Apr 4 2005	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   Respondents ( S. B. Beach Properties, et al.)
May 2 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   and brief of California Newspaper Publishers Association, Los Angeles times, et al. in support of appellants (Berti et al.)
May 4 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   and brief of Governor Richard Lamm [Former Governor of Colorado State] in support of respondents (S.B. Beach) with Request for Judicial Notice (separate)
May 4 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   and brief (separate) of Sierra Club in support of appellants (Berti et al) with Request for Judicial Notice (separate)
May 6 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   The application of California Newspaper Publishers Association for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellants 9Berti, et al.) is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
May 6 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   California Newspaper Publishers Association in support of appellants (Berti, et al.)
May 16 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   The application of Governor richard Lamm (Former Governor of the State of Colorado) for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondents (S. B. Beach Properties, et al.) is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
May 16 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   by Governor Richard Lamm (Former Governor of the State of Colorato) in support of respondentsl.
May 16 2005	Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)   by Amicus Governor Richard Lamm (Former Governor of the State of Colorato)
May 16 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   The application of Sierra Club for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellants is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the briefs.
May 16 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   Sierra Club in support of appellants.
May 16 2005	Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)   by Amicus Sierra Club
May 27 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   by resps. to the A/C brief of Newspaper Publishers Assn. (40.1b)
Jun 6 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   counsel for appellant, Richard A. Berti to amicus brief of Former Colorado Governor Richard Lamm
Oct 11 2005	Received:   notice of firm's name change. {Foley, Besek, Behle & Curtis, LLP}
Dec 1 2005	Received:   Substitution of Attorneys for Grokenberger & Smith as counsel for Respondents William J. Levy and Roy J. Millender, Jr., in place of Cappello & Noel LLP. (Cappello & Noel LLP shall remain attorneys of record for Respondent S. B. Beach Properties)
May 2 2006	Case ordered on calendar   June 1, 2006, at 1:30 p.m., in San Francisco
May 11 2006	Received:   appearance letter from attorney Kelli L. Sager for apepllants Ricahrd Berti, Marguerite Berti and Ilene Bruckner
May 12 2006	Application filed to:   divide oral argument time. Counsel for respondents S.B. Beach Properties requesting to share 10 minutes of oral argument time with counsel for amicus curiae Richard Lamm.
May 17 2006	Order filed   The request of counsel for respondents in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of respondents at oral argument is hereby granted. The request of respondents to allocate to amicus curiae Richard Lamm 10 minutes of respondents' 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
May 22 2006	Request for judicial notice granted   The request for judicial notice filed by appellants on Febraury 10, 2005, is hereby granted. The request for judicial notice filed by amicus curiae Governor Richard Lamm on May 16, 2005 is hereby granted.
Jun 1 2006	Cause argued and submitted
Jul 5 2006	Received:   Letter from Cappello & Noel [ Respondent S.B. Beach ] dated 6-30-2006, re decision filed 6-20-2006 from the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, Case No. G035400, Chambers v. Miller, 2006 Cal.App. LEXIS 910.
Jul 11 2006	Received:   Letter from Kelly L. Sager, counsel for appellants, dated 7-10-2006, requesting the court to reject the 6-30-2006 letter submitted by respondents re new authority.
Jul 31 2006	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand with instructions that the matter be returned to the trial court for reinstatement of its previous order denying the award of attorney fees and costs. Opinion by Corrigan, J. -- joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, JJ.
Aug 31 2006	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Sep 11 2006	Received:   Receipt for remittitur from Second District, Division 6, signed for by Gay E. Bents, Deputy Clerk.
Jan 11 2007	Received Court of Appeal record   one doghouse - CA #B188216

Briefs
Dec 14 2004	Opening brief on the merits filed
Feb 10 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed
Apr 4 2005	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
May 6 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
May 16 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
May 16 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
May 27 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed
Jun 6 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

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