Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 8/4/03

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

In re ZETH S., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES )
S099557
AGENCY,
) Ct.App.
4/3
G027568
Plaintiff and Respondent,
) Orange
County
v.
Super. Ct. No. J437873
STACY S.,
)

Defendant and Appellant.

In a juvenile dependency appeal from an order terminating parental rights,
may the Court of Appeal receive and consider postjudgment evidence that was
never before the juvenile court, and rely on such evidence outside the record on
appeal to reverse the judgment? The general answer is no, although in the rare and
compelling case an exception may be warranted. In this case the Court of Appeal
erred in receiving and considering such postjudgment evidence, presented for the
first time through the unsworn statements of the minor’s appointed appellate
counsel in a letter brief, and in further relying on that evidence to reverse the
juvenile court’s order and judgment terminating parental rights. Accordingly, the
judgment of the Court of Appeal must be reversed.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Stacy A. (mother) appealed from an order and judgment of the Orange
County Juvenile Court terminating her parental rights pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26.1 The minor, Zeth S., was born in February 1997,
and was first taken into protective custody by the Orange County Social Services
Agency (agency) on July 2, 1998, at age 17 months. A juvenile dependency
petition was thereafter filed by the agency alleging that the minor’s parents had
failed to protect and provide support for the minor. (§ 300, subds. (b) and (g).)
The grounds alleged in support of the petition included mother’s and father’s
history of alcohol and drug abuse and related incarcerations, the unsanitary
conditions of the paternal grandparents’ home in which the minor had been left,
and the likelihood that father was in violation of his parole. During the incident
that culminated in the taking of the child into protective custody, both mother and
father were arrested for delaying/obstructing a peace officer in the performance of
his duty, with mother additionally charged with assault and battery on a peace
officer. After a detention hearing the minor was released to the home and care of
his maternal grandfather, Gregory S., pending adjudication and dispositional
hearings. Maternal grandfather confirmed that minor’s parents were using drugs
and would not be permitted to reside in his home.
At the jurisdictional hearing held August 4, 1998, the allegations of the
petition were found true and the minor was declared a dependent child of the
Orange County Juvenile Court. The minor was ordered to remain in the custody
of the maternal grandfather pending a six-month review hearing. (§ 366.21,
subd. (e).) At that hearing it was ordered that the minor be continued as a
dependent child of the court, that custody of the minor remain with the maternal

1
All further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated.
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grandfather, and that previously ordered reunification services continue to be
offered to mother and father pending a 12-month review hearing. (§ 366.21,
subd. (f).)
In March 1999, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, the minor was
released to mother’s custody for a 60-day trial visit. The results were favorable,
mother having obtained temporary employment and a subsidized apartment with
the agency’s assistance. In May 1999, the minor was returned to mother under a
court-ordered plan of family maintenance.
In October 1999, however, the agency filed a section 387 supplemental
petition for more restrictive placement, alleging that mother had left the minor in
the paternal grandparents’ unsanitary home for unmonitored visits, without mother
present, and on at least one occasion without adequate provisions for the child’s
care, all in violation of the agency’s directives. Supporting statements reflected
that mother had entrusted the minor’s care to other unauthorized persons at various
times, and was hosting drunken parties at her apartment. During one such party a
guest had passed out, leading to police intervention and mother’s ultimate eviction
from the apartment.
In a first amended supplemental petition it was further alleged that father,
who had been released from prison, was living in the paternal grandparents’
residence, had not completed his court-ordered case plan, and was being permitted
unauthorized contacts with the minor by mother. Statements by the maternal
grandfather in support of the supplemental petition reflected his belief that at times
the minor was “terrified” to be with his mother, that the minor was experiencing a
lot of stress, and that his mother was neglecting him.
At the conclusion of the detention hearing on the amended supplemental
petition, the minor’s out-of-home placement with maternal grandfather was
continued, and he again confirmed that mother would not be living in his home
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while he cared for the minor. In early December 1999, mother moved into a sober
living home; within one week she was discharged for infractions of the rules. On
December 13, 1999, the allegations of the supplemental petition were found true
and the minor continued as a dependent child of the court.
A dispositional hearing was held January 13, 2000. The trial court denied
further reunification services, found by clear and convincing evidence that return
of custody of the minor to mother or father would be detrimental to the minor, and
set the matter for a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing, also
sometimes referred to as a termination or permanency hearing (366.26 hearing).
The agency report prepared for the 366.26 hearing reflects that from October 25,
1999 until February 28, 2000, mother visited the minor (in maternal grandfather’s
home) no more than once per week. During the period from February 28 through
April 19, 2000, mother did not visit the minor at all. During those periods, mother
also refused agency-provided counseling and refused to comply with biweekly
drug testing per the court’s order. Father remained incarcerated from August 1999
through February 13, 2000. On March 18, 2000, mother and father were arrested
for possession of stolen property and illegal drugs. Father’s parole agent observed
“track marks” on both mother’s and father’s arms at the time of their arrest, and
each admitted to recent heroin use. During those same periods, maternal
grandfather reported that the minor was “flourishing” in his care; minor was
receiving regular medical attention and had been successfully enrolled in
preschool.
The agency’s report recommended termination of parental rights and
adoption as the permanency plan, indicating it was “very likely that the child will
be adopted by his current caretaker Greg [S.].” Mr. S. was divorced from maternal
grandmother, Janet F., herself a recovering alcoholic. He was in good health, had
no criminal record, was stably employed, and resided with the minor in his two-
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bedroom apartment. He stated he loved his grandson very much, believed it
important for him to adopt the child in order to ensure the child’s safety and well-
being, and did not believe this could be achieved with either parent as there was no
prospect that either mother or father would be able to care for the minor in the near
future. The report further indicated “[Gregory S.] has stated that he understands
that by adopting the child he will be responsible for the child just as if the child
was his biological child. The Homestudy worker on this case reports that the
caretaker presents [himself] as a mature and responsible individual who clearly
understands the responsibilities of adoption.”
The agency’s report was admitted into evidence without objection at the
selection and implementation hearing held May 9, 2000. Father waived his right
to be present at the hearing. Mother contested the agency’s recommendation that
her parental rights be terminated. She admitted her recent heroin use but testified
she had a close bond with the minor and claimed she was his primary caretaker
during weekend visits at the maternal grandfather’s home. Mother testified that
during those weekend visits she made lunches for the minor, bathed him, and
played with him. Mother acknowledged that she had not visited the minor for
significant portions of the preceding months. She further acknowledged that her
father never refused to let her see the minor as long as she was sober, but did not
permit her to be with the minor when she was under the influence. Mother herself
agreed that she did not want to be in the minor’s presence when she was under the
influence. She testified, “I love my son very much. I feel that I do have personal
issues and problems that can be corrected, perhaps, by counseling or therapy.
However, I don’t think that interferes with the way that I can parent my child.
And I believe that it’s more important for my son and I to be together than
anything else at this point.” Maternal grandmother, who confirmed she was
divorced from maternal grandfather and was herself a recovering alcoholic,
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testified she had observed a positive bond between mother and the minor. She
conceded, however, that at the time of the hearing mother was not in a position to
take responsibility for care of the minor.
Minor’s appointed trial counsel joined with the agency in arguing for
termination of mother’s parental rights and adoption as the permanent plan for the
minor. She urged that consistent visitation by mother had not been shown, and
that mother and maternal grandmother were minimizing the extent of mother’s
personal problems while exaggerating the positive nature of the relationship
between mother and the minor. Arguing that the minor “has been on a
rollercoaster long enough” and deserves permanency, counsel for the minor stated:
“His [maternal] grandfather is ready, willing and able to adopt. He [the minor] is
adoptable, even if the grandfather didn’t. It’s time for [the minor] to get that
permanency that he deserves.”
At the conclusion of the 366.26 hearing, the trial court indicated it was
discounting much of mother’s testimony, noting she had for the most part merely
responded to leading questions posed by her counsel. The court also found
maternal grandmother’s testimony in favor of mother biased and unconvincing.
The court found the minor adoptable, and further concluded mother failed to meet
her burden of establishing the sole possibly applicable statutory exception to
termination of her parental rights under the circumstances—the so-called benefit
exception—because she had failed to establish the threshold requirement of
“regular visitation and contact with the child,” and even had she done so, she
could not have further established that “the child would benefit from continuing
the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) The court found that termination of
parental rights would not be detrimental to the minor and would in fact be in the
minor’s best interests, and entered an order terminating mother’s and father’s
parental rights and freeing the child for adoption.
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Mother alone appealed from the judgment, on the sole ground that the trial
court erred in refusing to apply the benefit exception to this case. The Court of
Appeal appointed counsel for the minor in mother’s appeal. Minor’s appellate
counsel filed a two-page letter brief in which she indicated she had investigated
the minor’s current circumstances and learned that the minor was doing well in the
home of the maternal grandfather, that mother visited regularly and often spent the
night, that during her visits mother assumed primary parental responsibility for the
minor, and that “[a]ccording to the grandfather, he felt pressure to adopt [the
minor] and preferred to become [the minor’s] legal guardian.” Minor’s appellate
counsel concurred with mother that parental rights should not have been
terminated because the order terminating parental rights was not in the minor’s
best interests.2
Noting that minor’s appellate counsel was taking a different position than
minor’s trial counsel, the Court of Appeal invited supplemental briefing from the
parties on the following question: “In a case where a minor’s trial counsel
unequivocally assured the trial judge at the [366].26 hearing that the minor’s
current caretaker is ‘ready, willing and able to adopt,’ yet the minor’s appellate
counsel tells the appellate court in her brief on appeal that the minor’s current
caretaker was pressured into saying he wanted to adopt the child, and would prefer
to be the child’s legal guardian, and further assuming, for the sake of argument,
that the trial court did not err in not applying the [section 366.26, subdivision]

2
At oral argument before this court, minor’s appellate counsel confirmed
that in the course of this appeal she neither contested nor intended to contest the
juvenile court’s finding that the minor was adoptable, and never raised nor
intended to raise a claim on habeas corpus that minor’s appointed trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel to the minor in the juvenile court
proceedings below. Minor’s appellate counsel further agreed that it appears the
Court of Appeal utilized the postjudgment evidence issue as a means of re-
examining the mother-child relationship in this case.
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(c)(1)(A) ‘benefit exception’ at the [366].26 hearing, what is the proper disposition
of the case on appeal?” Following supplemental briefing, the Court of Appeal in a
published opinion reversed the order terminating parental rights and remanded the
matter to the trial court for an “updated review hearing in the form of a retrial of
the [366].26 hearing.”
Agency petitioned for rehearing. Appended to the petition was a supporting
sworn declaration by minor’s maternal grandfather. With regard to minor’s
appellate counsel’s representation to the court that he preferred guardianship over
adoption, Mr. S. explained that he had learned from the social services agency, as
well as from a class which he attended, that under the juvenile dependency law,
adoption is the preferred permanent plan over legal guardianship, and that if he
sought legal guardianship rather than adoption of his grandson, the court could
place his grandson for adoption with an “outside family” in furtherance of the
law’s preference for adoption. With regard to counsel’s further suggestion to the
court that mother was now caring for the minor at maternal grandfather’s home,
Mr. S. responded in the declaration, “I understand that it has been reported that
Zeth’s mother is regularly his primary caretaker. That of course is not so. She is
caretaker when she visits, under my supervision. Her visits are not regular, and
usually on the weekends only.” Rehearing was denied.
We granted the agency’s petition for review.3

3
We have received amicus curiae briefs from the County of San Diego,
joined in by the California State Association of Counties, and the Law Office of
Harold LaFlamme, both in support of petitioner agency. We have also received
amicus curiae briefs from the Northern California Association of Counsel for
Children, joined in by the Children’s Advocacy Institute of the University of San
Diego School of Law and Legal Services for Children, and Dependency Court
Legal Services, Inc. Both of these briefs indicate they are not intended to be in
sole support of any one party in this case.
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DISCUSSION
It has long been the general rule and understanding that “an appeal reviews
the correctness of a judgment as of the time of its rendition, upon a record of
matters which were before the trial court for its consideration.” (In re James V.
(1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 300, 304.) This rule reflects an “essential distinction
between the trial and the appellate court . . . that it is the province of the trial court
to decide questions of fact and of the appellate court to decide questions of law
. . . .” (Tupman v. Haberkern (1929) 208 Cal. 256, 262-263.) The rule promotes
the orderly settling of factual questions and disputes in the trial court, provides a
meaningful record for review, and serves to avoid prolonged delays on appeal.
“Although appellate courts are authorized to make findings of fact on appeal by
Code of Civil Procedure section 909 and rule 23 of the California Rules of Court,
the authority should be exercised sparingly. (De Angeles v. Roos Bros., Inc.
[(1966)] 244 Cal.App.2d 434, 443.) Absent exceptional circumstances, no such
findings should be made. (Green v. American Cas. Co. (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 270,
273.)” (Tyrone v. Kelley (1973) 9 Cal.3d 1, 13; see also In re Brittany H. (1988)
198 Cal.App.3d 533, 554.)
There is no blanket exception to the general rule for juvenile dependency
appeals. Review of such appeals is governed by generally applicable rules of
appellate procedure, with proper deference to be paid to the factual findings and
uncontested rulings of the juvenile court, and all appropriate inferences to be
drawn in favor of the judgment below. In furtherance of the state’s strong interest
in preserving and promoting the welfare of dependent children of the court, and
the fundamental right of such children to a stable parent-child relationship and a
permanent home, the Legislature has enacted a comprehensive juvenile
dependency scheme that can lead to orders removing a child from the parents’
home, declaring the child a dependent child of the court, and ultimately
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terminating parental rights and freeing the child for adoption, as occurred in this
case. Various provisions of the statutory scheme strictly control the timing and
manner of appeal or writ review of the critical findings and orders that can
culminate in an order terminating parental rights, their primary goal being to
expedite finality and thereby achieve permanency for the child.
The facts of this case are tragic but unexceptional; they afforded no basis
for the Court of Appeal to deviate from the settled rules on appeal in the manner in
which it did when entertaining mother’s appeal from the order terminating her
parental rights. At the time the minor Zeth was taken into protective custody, he
was a healthy 17-month-old baby boy. As far as the record reflects, he thrived in
the out-of-home care and custody of his maternal grandfather, and was
successfully admitted into preschool while under his grandfather’s care. While in
the former care and custody of his mother, however, the picture was not as bright.
Mother’s alcohol and drug abuse, and her related arrest and incarceration,
prevented her from fulfilling her parental obligations to protect and provide
support for her minor child. (§ 300, subds. (b) and (g).) She repeatedly left the
child in the care of his paternal grandparents, in an unsanitary home, and on at
least one occasion without basic provisions for his care. Father, who, like mother,
suffered from a history of alcohol and substance abuse, was a parolee who was
permitted unsupervised and unauthorized contacts with the minor by mother, even
after the child was taken into protective custody and then released back to mother
for a trial visit. Maternal grandfather furnished sworn statements relating his
belief that at times the minor was “terrified” to be with his mother, that he was
experiencing a lot of stress, and that his mother was neglecting him. His sworn
statements further reflect that it was clear to him, from the time his grandson was
taken into protective custody through the pendency of mother’s appeal, that his
daughter was incapable of providing a permanent home or consistent care and
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support for her minor son. The record is replete with evidence of mother’s alcohol
and drug (heroin) abuse, including drunken parties leading to her eviction from her
subsidized apartment, and the incident that led to her arrest for assault and battery
on a peace officer and the necessity of taking the child into protective custody.
It is particularly noteworthy that no party to this appeal has ever questioned
or challenged the trial court’s critical finding, made at the termination hearing
below, that the minor Zeth was adoptable within the meaning of section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1). “The issue of adoptability . . . focuses on the minor, e.g.,
whether the minor’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult
to find a person willing to adopt the minor. [Citations.]” (In re Sarah M. (1994)
22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) All that is required is clear and convincing evidence
of the likelihood that adoption will be realized within a reasonable time. (In re
Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 223.) As noted, minor’s appointed
appellate counsel confirmed at oral argument before this court that in the course of
this appeal she never contested the finding of the juvenile court that the minor was
indeed adoptable within the meaning of the statute.
In light of the factual record before us, and the rationale invoked by the
Court of Appeal to reverse the juvenile court’s judgment, the central issue on
review is this: May a reviewing court look to postjudgment evidence that is
outside the record on appeal and was never considered by the trial court—here, an
unsworn statement by minor’s appellate counsel that maternal grandfather may
have felt pressured into choosing adoption of his grandson over legal
guardianship—to reverse the trial court’s judgment terminating parental rights?4

4
A separate issue raised in the agency’s petition also falls within our grant of
review: May a section 388 petition for modification be brought in the trial court
while an appeal from an order terminating parental rights is pending? The issue
arose when the Court of Appeal, in hypothetically describing the procedure
whereby an appellate court would reverse a judgment terminating parental rights
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This is not the first time Division Three of the Fourth District Court of
Appeal has confronted the matter of the relevance and admissibility of
postjudgment evidence in a juvenile dependency appeal. The agency and its amici
curiae have pointed to four other published decisions authored by the court, each
seemingly intended to further advance the court’s belief that postjudgment
evidence will often be relevant in an appeal of an order terminating parental rights
and freeing a dependent child for adoption, that counsel appointed for the minor
on appeal is obligated by statute to independently investigate the child’s current
out-of-home placement and bring any evidence of changed circumstances to the
attention of the reviewing court, and that such evidence should be liberally
received and considered by the reviewing court for its potential impact on the
appeal from the juvenile court’s termination order entered at the 366.26 hearing.
Although we have no doubt the Court of Appeal had the best interests of the

based on postjudgment evidence of changed circumstances and remand the matter
for a new 366.26 hearing, at one point suggested that “Additionally, the pendency
of the appeal would allow the parent to bring a section 388 motion [for
modification] if appropriate.”

The Court of Appeal’s dicta notwithstanding, it is settled that
subdivision (i) of section 366.26 unequivocally precludes the juvenile court from
modifying an order terminating parental rights entered pursuant to section 366.26:
“Any order of the court permanently terminating parental rights under this section
shall be conclusive and binding upon the child, upon the parent or parents and
upon all other persons who have been served with citation by publication or
otherwise as provided in this chapter. After making the order, the court shall have
no power to set aside, change, or modify it, but nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit the right to appeal the order.” (§ 366.26, subd. (i), italics
added.) Past decisions have recognized that “[t]his statute forbids alteration or
revocation of an order terminating parental rights except by means of a direct
appeal from the order.” (In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1161
(Meranda P.); see In re Ronald V. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1803, 1806 [section
366.26, subdivision (i) precludes section 388 petition to modify order terminating
parental rights on grounds of changed circumstances].) Accordingly, no further
discussion of the point is required here.
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minors in mind when it decided this and the related cases, the court’s rationale and
holdings are nonetheless well outside the legal mainstream, and cannot be squared
with the general rules on appeal and specific statutory provisions that govern
juvenile dependency appeals.
The Court of Appeal’s four related decisions can briefly be summarized as
follows. In In re Jonathan M. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1234, the court stated, “This
court routinely accepts evidence per Code of Civil Procedure section 909 in
juvenile dependency cases to expedite just and final resolution for the benefit of
the children involved. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1236, fn. 2, italics added.)5
The court next decided In re Eileen A. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1248
(Eileen A.), which held that a dependent child’s appointed appellate counsel, like
the child’s trial counsel in the juvenile court, has a “duty to make an independent
evaluation based on the circumstances in each case,” that “evidence as to how well
the child is doing in a placement during the pendency of the appeal may be taken
into account by the appellate court,” and that “it is especially important that
independent minor’s appellate counsel evaluate what is in the best interests of their
clients without any presumptions.” (Id. at p. 1262, fn. 13.)
In re Jeremy S. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 514 was decided next. That decision
also stands for the proposition that in a parent’s appeal from an order terminating
parental rights, appointed appellate counsel for the minor can side with the parent
and challenge the trial court’s order by raising new matters arising from a change
in the status or current circumstances of the child’s preadoptive out-of-home

5
As we have noted, long-standing case law construing Code of Civil
Procedure section 909 reaches just the opposite conclusion. “ ‘Absent exceptional
circumstances, no such findings [based on the receipt of evidence outside the
record on appeal pursuant to section 909] should be made. [Citation.]” (Tyrone v.
Kelley, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 13; see also In re Brittany H., supra, 198 Cal.App.3d
at p. 554.)
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placement, and that the normal requirements on appeal—that issues on appeal
must first be raised in the trial court, and must be preserved through a timely
notice of appeal—should routinely be dispensed with “[b]ecause the paramount
concern of the appellate court in all dependency proceedings is for the protection
and welfare of the child, [and] it would be inappropriate to simply ignore the issue
raised by [the minor] as waived based on procedural technicalities.” (Id. at
p. 527.)
Finally, the Court of Appeal’s decision in In re Jayson T. (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 75 (Jayson T.), decided after its decision in the instant case, echoed
its holding in Eileen A.—that orders terminating parental rights under section
366.26 must be reviewed under a standard that “look[s] for the child’s best
interests,” rather than the traditionally applied deferential standard of review.
(Jayson T., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 84, capitalization and italics omitted.)
Jayson T. further holds that postjudgment evidence uncovered during the
pendency of an appeal should routinely be received and considered, and can lead
to reversal and the need for an “updated review hearing,” even where the juvenile
court itself has committed no legal error in terminating parental rights or selecting
adoption as the permanent plan on the evidence before it at the termination
hearing. (Id. at pp. 86, 91.)
The Court of Appeal in this case further expanded upon its view of the role
of counsel appointed to represent minors on appeal first espoused in Eileen A.
Here the court held that section 317, a provision which, by its express terms, is
addressed to the duties and obligations of minors’ trial counsel in dependency
proceedings before the trial court, also applies by implication to minors’
appointed appellate counsel, obligating counsel to serve the reviewing court as a
“ ‘neutral’ litigant” in a “quasi-judicial capacity” by independently investigating
the current circumstances of the child’s preadoptive placement, and by reporting
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any changes to the reviewing court so that the court can determine anew whether
the lower court’s judgment should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new
366.26 hearing.6
The chief problem with the Court of Appeal’s approach, however well
intentioned it was, is that it effectively substitutes the reviewing court’s own post
hoc determination of whether termination of parental rights remains in the minor’s
best interests7 for the legislatively mandated determination that follows when the
comprehensive juvenile dependency statutory scheme is dutifully adhered to in the
trial court. The Legislature, however, has determined that what is in the child’s
best interests is best realized through implementation of the procedures,
presumptions, and timelines written into the dependency statutes. The statutory
scheme does not authorize a reviewing court to substitute its own judgment as to
what is in the child’s best interests for the trial court’s determination in that regard,

6
There is no uniform statewide requirement or practice that separate counsel
be appointed for the minor in an appeal by a parent from an order terminating
parental rights pursuant to section 366.26. The parties have not asked us to
address that circumstance, nor do the facts of this case present us with an occasion
to consider it. It is noteworthy that the Fourth District Court of Appeal is the only
Court of Appeal statewide to presently require appointment of counsel for the
minor in all dependency appeals coming before that court. Thus, although the
court in this case construed section 317 as obligating appointed counsel for the
minor in every such appeal to investigate the status and circumstances surrounding
the minor’s current preadoptive placement, and if necessary, to report any changed
circumstances to the reviewing court for consideration of their potential impact on
the pending appeal of the termination order, as a practical matter, the effect of that
holding would be limited to juvenile dependency appeals in which appellate
counsel is appointed for the minor, a requirement that presently is only mandated
in the Fourth Appellate District.
7
As the Court of Appeal suggested, “[T]here can be no doubt about the need
to take into account postjudgment developments in juvenile dependency cases.”
(Italics in original.) The court further opined that the postjudgment evidence in
this case “is clearly relevant to a change of circumstances warranting a change in a
prior [section 366.26] order because the best interests of the child demand it.”
(Italics added.)
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reached pursuant to the statutory scheme’s comprehensive and controlling
provisions. This is particularly true where the reviewing court reaches a contrary
determination on the basis of postjudgment evidence outside the record on appeal,
which evidence, in likelihood, would have been irrelevant and excludable had it
been known and presented to the trial court in the first instance.
The court in Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, explained the nature
of the statutory scheme from the parent’s unique perspective in this way: “The
dependency scheme is a ‘remarkable system of checks and balances’ (In re
Andrew B. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 825, 865) designed to ‘preserve the parent-child
relationship and to reduce the risk of erroneous fact-finding in . . . many different
ways . . . .’ (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 255.) Until
permanency planning, the parent’s interest in having a child returned to the parent
is the paramount concern of the law. (Id. at pp. 255-256; §§ 366.21, subds. (e) &
(f), 366.22, subd. (a).) The parent is thus entitled to 12 months, and possibly 6
more months, of reunification services aimed at assisting the parent in overcoming
the problems that led to the child’s removal. (§§ 361.5, subd. (a), 366.21, subds.
(e) & (f).) There is also in force at the dispositional hearing and at all subsequent
prepermanency planning hearings a statutory presumption that the child will be
returned to parental custody. (§§ 366.21, subds. (e) & (f), 366.22, subd. (a).) [¶]
In addition, there are ‘precise and demanding substantive and procedural
requirements’ which the petitioning agency must fulfill before it can propose
termination. At the dispositional hearing, the agency must show by the enhanced
standard of clear and convincing evidence that removal of the child is necessary.
(§ 361, subd. (b).) At the interim review hearings, the agency has the burden of
showing by a preponderance of evidence that the return of the child to the parent
would be detrimental to the child and that reasonable reunification services have
been provided. (§§ 366.21, subds. (e) & (f), 366.22, subd. (a).) Before
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reunification can be terminated, the agency must establish by a preponderance of
evidence that it would be detrimental to return the child to the parent. (§§ 366.21,
subd. (f), 366.22, subd. (a).) [¶] Also, independent judicial review of the case is
mandated at least every six months during the reunification period and a myriad of
positive findings are required with respect to every critical pre-permanency
planning decision. (§§ 366.21, 366.22.) . . . [¶] Last, the relevant statutes provide
for early and complete notification to the parent of every stage of the proceedings
during the entire course of the dependency.” (Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1154-1155.)
By the time the proceedings reach the stage of a 366.26 hearing, “[t]he
number and quality of the judicial findings that are necessary preconditions to
termination convey very powerfully to the fact finder the subjective certainty
about parental unfitness and detriment required before the court may even
consider ending the relationship between natural parent and child.” (Cynthia D. v.
Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 255-256 (Cynthia D.).) “ ‘[T]he decisions
made at the review hearing regarding reunification are not subject to relitigation at
the termination hearing. This hearing determines only the type of permanent
home.’ ” (Id. at p. 250, fns. omitted.)
Although the settled case law thus holds that the critical findings of parental
unfitness, detriment, and the failure of attempts at reunification may not be
reopened or reconsidered at the termination hearing, the Court of Appeal’s
approach in this and its related decisions, once again, is precisely to the contrary.
The Court of Appeal is of the view that to reverse and remand for an
“ ‘updated review hearing’ ” (see Jayson T., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 91; see
also Eileen A., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1259), based on the receipt of
postjudgment evidence during the pendency of a section 366.26 appeal, is
somehow of less impact than would be an outright reversal of the judgment based
17

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on the new evidence. The court in Jayson T. suggested that “[i]f postjudgment
developments cast doubt where the law requires certainty, there is no harm in
allowing the trial court to take a second look at a child’s adoptability.” (Jayson T.,
supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 78.) We fail to see any meaningful distinction
between “tak[ing] a second look” at the child’s adoptability, and outright reversal
of the judgment.8 No matter how the remedy is labeled, the result is the same; the
trial court’s judgment is reversed. In this case, the court once again reversed the
juvenile court’s judgment “even though there was, strictly speaking, no ‘error’ by
the juvenile court.” (Jayson T., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 84, italics added
[describing the nature of our grant of review in this case].) Moreover, as already
noted, in this case minor’s appointed appellate counsel has herself conceded, at
oral argument before this court, that by all appearances the Court of Appeal below
had utilized the postjudgment evidence issue as a means of re-examining the
mother-child relationship. Yet that was a settled matter which, by statutory
directive, could not be reopened for reconsideration by mother, not even at the
termination hearing itself.9

8
In its decision in Jayson T., even the Court of Appeal acknowledged that
“[o]rdinarily, this appeal would result in an affirmance because of a deferential
standard of review.” (Jayson T., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 79.) The court
further acknowledged that minor’s appointed trial counsel had filed no appeal on
behalf of the minor, and that “nothing as yet regarding actual unadoptability has
been found, as a matter of fact, by a trial court.” (Id. at p. 83.)
9
As we explained in Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th 242, “It is not the purpose
of the section 366.26 hearing to show parental inadequacy, which had to have
been previously established, and there is no burden on the petitioning agency to
show at the section 366.26 hearing that the parents are ‘at fault.’ ” (Id. at p. 254.)
“A parent whose conduct has already and on numerous occasions been found to
grievously endanger his or her child is no longer in the same position as a parent
whose neglect or abuse has not so clearly been established. At this point the
interests of the parent and child have diverged, and the child’s interest must be
given more weight. Because section 366.26 contemplates termination of parental
rights only when there is clear and convincing evidence that the child is likely to
18

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Under the Court of Appeal’s expansive view of the scope of an appeal of an
order terminating parental rights, postjudgment evidence of circumstances
involving the minor’s present out-of-home custody status during the pendency of
the appeal would be routinely and liberally considered. Appointed counsel for the
minor in the appeal would be encouraged, and indeed obligated, to independently
investigate such evidence outside the record, and bring it to the reviewing court’s
attention for consideration in the appeal. Basic formalities such as the need for a
notice of appeal, and the requirement that issues raised on appeal first be raised in
the trial court, would be dispensed with, and a best interests standard of review,
applied anew from the perspective of the reviewing court, would be utilized to
determine whether the juvenile court’s judgment should be reversed and the case
remanded for a new 366.26 hearing, even where the juvenile court itself has

be adopted, the child’s fundamental interest in the opportunity to experience a
stable parent-child relationship is very much at stake at the section 366.26
hearing.” (Ibid.) “In light of the earlier judicial determinations that reunification
cannot be effectuated, it becomes inimical to the interests of the minor to heavily
burden efforts to place the child in a permanent alternative home. By the time of
the section 366.26 hearing, no state interest requires further evidence of the
consequences to the child of parental unfitness, let alone evidence that meets an
elevated standard of proof.” (Cynthia D., 5 Cal.4th at p. 256.)
The one exception is when a colorable claim that the so-called benefit
exception should be applied is raised at the termination hearing, because under the
second prong of the benefit exception, the trial court at such hearing may inquire
into whether the minor would benefit from a continuing relationship with the
parent or parents whose parental rights stand to be terminated. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(A).) Although mother did raise that claim at the 366.26 hearing, and
although her sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to invoke
the benefit exception in her case, hers could hardly be deemed a potentially
meritorious claim, because she failed to meet the threshold prong required for the
benefit exception to apply—that she be shown to have “maintained regular
visitation and contact with the child.” (Ibid.) Mother herself testified at the
termination hearing that she had not visited her child for significant portions of the
months preceding the hearing while the child remained in her father’s custody.
Maternal grandfather’s sworn statements corroborated her concession.
19

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committed no legal error in terminating parental rights on the record evidence
before it.
Given the state’s strong interest in the expeditiousness and finality of
juvenile dependency proceedings (see In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 993
[the state has a “strong” interest in the expeditiousness of dependency
proceedings, and its interest in the finality of such proceedings is “stronger still”]),
the statutory scheme generally does not permit the critical findings and orders
made prior to the final setting of the 366.26 hearing to be reopened and relitigated
in an appeal from the order terminating parental rights.10 Nor can the order setting
the hearing itself, or any findings subsumed therein, be appealed unless earlier writ
review of any substantive claim was first sought and denied. (§ 366.26, subd. (l).)
And the Legislature has further expressly provided that the final order terminating
parental rights and freeing the child for adoption itself cannot be collaterally
attacked in the trial court. (§ 366.26, subd. (i).) To the extent the Court of
Appeal’s expansive theories and holding regarding appeals of judgments entered
pursuant to section 366.26 would allow and encourage the reopening of any
foundational order or finding in support of the judgment terminating parental

10
As we recently observed, “After reunification efforts have failed, it is not
only important to seek an appropriate permanent solution—usually adoption when
possible—it is also important to implement that solution reasonably promptly to
minimize the time during which the child is in legal limbo. A child has a
compelling right to a stable, permanent placement that allows a caretaker to make
a full emotional commitment to the child. (In re Marilyn H.[(1993)] 5 Cal.4th
[295,] at p. 306.) Courts should strive to give the child this stable, permanent
placement, and this full emotional commitment, as promptly as reasonably
possible consistent with protecting the parties’ rights and making a reasoned
decision. The delay an appellate reversal causes might be contrary to, rather than
in, the child’s best interests.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 59, italics in
orig.)
20

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rights, they are at odds with each of these procedural limitations which section
366.26 imposes on review of judgments terminating parental rights.
We therefore conclude that consideration of postjudgment evidence of
changed circumstances in an appeal of an order terminating parental rights, and
the liberal use of such evidence to reverse juvenile court judgments and remand
cases for new hearings, would violate both the generally applicable rules of
appellate procedure, and the express provisions of section 366.26 which strictly
circumscribe the timing and scope of review of termination orders, for the very
purpose of expediting the proceedings and promoting the finality of the juvenile
court’s orders and judgment.11 To the extent anything said in In re Jonathan M.,

11
In light of our disposition on the facts of this case, we have no occasion to
further address the question whether any particular circumstances may give rise to
an exception to the general rule that postjudgment evidence is inadmissible in a
juvenile dependency appeal from an order terminating parental rights. On one
past occasion, however, this court did recognize one such exception. In In re
Elise K. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 138, all of the parties were in agreement, and offered to
stipulate, that due to changed circumstances and the minor’s advanced age, the
minor in that case was no longer adoptable within the meaning of former Civil
Code section 232, subdivision (a)(7), thereby undermining the foundational basis
of the trial court’s order terminating mother’s custody and control over the minor.
This court determined that it was appropriate to accept that stipulation, and on that
basis the judgment of the superior court was reversed. (33 Cal.3d at p. 139.)

Elise K. therefore serves as precedent for the proposition that where
postjudgment evidence stands to completely undermine the legal underpinnings of
the juvenile court’s judgment under review, and all parties recognize as much and
express a willingness to stipulate to reversal of the juvenile court’s judgment, an
appellate court acts within its discretion in accepting such a stipulation and
reversing the judgment. Beyond that scenario, however, the nature and scope of
any exception to the general rule of nonadmissibility of postjudgment evidence in
an appeal by a parent or parents from an order terminating parental rights must
await a case in which the facts squarely present the issue. Here, the postjudgment
evidence in question did not even directly relate to, much less undermine, the
juvenile court’s finding of the adoptability of the minor Zeth, as conceded by
minor’s appellate counsel at oral argument. Moreover, as regards the asserted new
evidence of changed circumstances in this case—that maternal grandfather felt
pressure to adopt the minor and would have preferred to become the minor’s legal
21

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supra, 53 Cal.App.4th 1234, Eileen A., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 1248, In re
Jeremy S., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th 514, or Jayson T., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th 75, is
inconsistent with the views expressed herein, those decisions are disapproved.
The parties have also briefed the issue of whether the Court of Appeal was
correct in concluding that section 317 requires counsel appointed for a minor in a
parent’s appeal of an order terminating parental rights to independently investigate
the current circumstances of the child’s preadoptive placement, and to report any
significant changes to the reviewing court so that the court can determine anew
whether the trial court’s judgment should be reversed, and the matter remanded for
a new 366.26 hearing. Because we have concluded the Court of Appeal erred in
holding that the postjudgment evidence in question in this case was cognizable and
admissible in mother’s appeal in the first instance, the judgment must be reversed,
and there is no need to further address this related issue. However, because the
Court of Appeal erred in its conclusion that section 317 “makes no differentiation
between minor’s trial counsel and minor’s appellate counsel,” and echoed that
erroneous conclusion, as well as reached seemingly conflicting conclusions, in
other reported decisions, we make the following observations.
Subdivision (d) of section 317 expressly provides, in unambiguous terms,
that, “The counsel appointed by the court shall represent the parent, guardian, or
minor at the detention hearing and at all subsequent proceedings before the

guardian—that “evidence” only came to the attention of the Court of Appeal
through an unsworn statement in a letter brief submitted by minor’s appointed
appellate counsel. It is axiomatic that the unsworn statements of counsel are not
evidence. (See, e.g., In re Heather H. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 91, 95 [“unsworn
testimony does not constitute ‘evidence’ within the meaning of the Evidence
Code”]; People v. Lee (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 830, 841 [same]; People v. Superior
Court (Crook) (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 335, 341 [statements by counsel are not
evidence]; see also Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 5-200(e) [attorneys must not “assert
personal knowledge of the facts at issue, except when testifying as a witness”].)
22

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juvenile court.” (Italics added.) Furthermore, the placement of section 317 in that
portion of the Welfare and Institutions Code governing juvenile dependency
proceedings in the trial court is further evidence that its provisions were intended
to govern trial counsel’s representation of minors in juvenile court, not appellate
counsel’s representation of minors in the appellate courts. (See, e.g., People v.
Seneca Ins. Co. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 954, 959-959 [statute governing release of
convicted defendants on bail pending sentencing inapplicable to convictions by
guilty plea in light of placement in Penal Code and “context” of surrounding
provisions].) Section 317 is found in chapter 2 (Juvenile Court Law [italics
added]) of part 1 (Delinquents and Wards of the Juvenile Court [italics added]) of
division 2 (Children) of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The provisions of section 317 are addressed to the duties and obligations of
counsel appointed by the juvenile court to represent minors in the juvenile court.
Every reference to the “court” in section 317 is plainly intended as a reference to
the juvenile court. For example, the court is empowered to “fix the compensation
to be paid by the county for the services of appointed counsel” (§ 317, subd. (c),
italics added), a provision that would be inapplicable to counsel appointed in the
Court of Appeal, who are not paid from county coffers. There is simply nothing in
the language of section 317 that would affirmatively support the Court of Appeal’s
conclusion that the Legislature intended its provisions to apply to counsel
appointed for minors in dependency appeals. (Accord In re Steven H. (2001) 86
Cal.App.4th 1023, 1029-1030 [section 317, subdivision (d), requires counsel
appointed for a minor to continue representing the minor at all subsequent
proceedings before the juvenile court, but not in proceedings before the appellate
court].) The superior court, sitting as a juvenile court in the county in which a
dependency appeal arises, is neither responsible for nor obligated to appoint
counsel for a minor in the Court of Appeal of the appellate district in which the
23

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appeal will be heard. The Court of Appeal, in its administrative function, makes
the determination whether to appoint counsel for a minor on appeal, not the
juvenile court from which the appeal arises.
The Court of Appeal therefore erred in its construction of section 317.
Although a reviewing court is free to appoint separate counsel for a minor in an
appeal of an order and judgment terminating parental rights, section 317 does not
compel the appellate court to make such an appointment of counsel, nor does that
section purport to prescribe or regulate the duties and obligations of appointed
counsel in juvenile dependency appeals.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the matter remanded
to that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
BAXTER, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.

24

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion In re Zeth S.
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted

XXX 90 Cal.App.4th 107
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S099557
Date Filed: August 4, 2003
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Orange
Judge: Gary Bischoff, Temporary Judge*

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Rich Pfeiffer and Jennifer Mack, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Laurence M. Watson and Benjamin P. deMayo, County Counsel, Robert G. Overby, Julie J. Agin, Deborah
M. Gmeiner and Rachel M. Bavis, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Law Office of Harold LaFlamme, Craig E. Arthur and Karen Cianfrani for Dependency Children in the
County of Orange and Trial Attorneys for Zeth S. as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

John J. Sansone, County Counsel (San Diego), Susan Strom, Chief Deputy County Counsel, Gary C.
Seiser, Deputy County Counsel; and Ruth Sorensen for California State Association of Counties and
County of San Diego as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

Melissa A. Chaitin, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Minor.

William Wesley Patton for Whittier Law School Legal Policy Clinic as Amicus Curiae.

Robert C. Fellmeth; Shannan Wilber; Janet G. Sherwood and Donna Furth for Children’s Advocacy
Institute of the University of San Diego School of Law, Legal Services for Children and the Northern
California Association of Counsel for Children as Amici Curiae.

Kenneth P. Sherman, Lisa E. Mandel and Anne E. Fraggasso for Dependency Court Legal Services, Inc., as
Amicus Curiae.

*Pursuant to California Constitution, article Vl, section 21.
1

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Rich Pfeiffer
17621 Irvine Boulevard, Suite 214
Tustin, CA 92780
(714) 573-0198

Rachel M. Bavis
Deputy County Counsel
12447 Lewis Street, Suite 201
Garden Grove, CA 92840
(714) 935-7291

Craig E. Arthur
Law Office of Harold LaFlamme
2140 W. Chapman Avenue, Suite 109
Orange, CA 92868
(714) 935-1125

Melissa A. Chaitin
419 N. Larchmont Boulevard, PMB 290
Los Angeles, CA 90004
(323) 462-7913

William Wesley Patton
Whittier Law School Legal Policy Clinic
3333 Harbor Boulevard
Costa Mesa, CA 92323
(714) 444-4141, ext. 229

2

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Mon, 08/04/2003	S099557

Disposition
Aug 4 2003	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Aug 1 2001	Petition for review filed   and Request for Depublication by Resp.
Aug 9 2001	Received Court of Appeal record   orange plastic file
Aug 13 2001	Request for Depublication Filed (another req. pending)   and request to deny review pursuant to rule 14(b) by Professor William Wesley Patton from Whittier Law School (non party).
Aug 14 2001	Request for Depublication Filed (another req. pending)   and request to deny review pursuant to rule 14(b) by The Northern CA Assoc. of Counsel for Children (non party).
Aug 21 2001	Answer to petition for review filed   40N ** minor Zeth S. **
Aug 21 2001	Request for depublication filed (another request pending)   by behalf of Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services (joins with Orange County Social Services Agency)
Aug 21 2001	Answer to petition for review filed   appellant Stacy S.
Aug 21 2001	Request for Depublication Filed (another req. pending)   and support for grant of review pursuant to rule 14(b) by The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (non-party).
Aug 23 2001	Received:   Untimely request from Santa Clara County Social Services Agency, Dept. of Family and Children's Services joins Orange County Social Services Agency in there request for depub/support for review. (Depub req. due by 8/21/01 - sent via UPS 2nd day air)
Aug 23 2001	Received:   Untimely request for depublication and support for request for review by Karen S. Cianfrani, Attorney at Law, and the Law Office of Harold LaFlamme. (Depub req. due by 8/21)
Aug 28 2001	Received:   Untimely opposition from Bay Area Dependency Chapter of CA Appellate Defense Counsel (non-party) to Orange County Social Services Agency's (Respondent) request for review or depublication.
Sep 21 2001	Time extended to grant or deny review   to and including October 30, 2001.
Oct 10 2001	Petition for review granted (civil case)   Votes: George C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin & Brown JJ.
Oct 24 2001	Received:   application to file A.C. brief and brief from Whittier Law School Legal Policy Clinic. (premature)
Nov 5 2001	Application for Extension of Time filed   Respondent asking to December 7, 2001 to file opening brief on the merits. **ok to grant. Order being prepared**
Nov 9 2001	Extension of Time application Granted   To December 7, 2001 to file respondent's Opnening Brief on the Merits.
Nov 14 2001	Counsel appointment order filed   Richard Pfeiffer is hereby appointed to represent appellant Stacy S. Appellant's brief on the merits shall be served and filed on or before 30 days from the date respondent's opening brief on the merits is filed.
Nov 14 2001	Counsel appointment order filed   Melissa Chaitin is hereby appointed to reprent the minor Zeth S. Minor's brief on the merits shall be served and filed on or before 30 days from the date respondent's opening brief on the merits is filed.
Dec 10 2001	Opening brief on the merits filed   by counsel for respondent Orange County Social Services Agency. **40n**
Jan 3 2002	Request for extension of time filed   to file Minor's Answer Brief/Merits faxed SF **Granted-order being prepared. **
Jan 8 2002	Answer brief on the merits filed   appellant Stacy S.
Jan 8 2002	Extension of time granted   to and including Feb. 6, 2002 for Zeth S. to file answer brief on the merits. Respondent may file a combined reply brief within 20 days after the later of Zeth S. and Stacy S. answer briefs are filed.
Feb 6 2002	Answer brief on the merits filed   minor Zeth S.
Feb 28 2002	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   by respondent Orange County Social Services Agency. **timely pursuant to rule 40k**
Mar 4 2002	Letter sent to:   William Wesley Patton regarding amicus brief received 10/24/01. Court requests a declaration stating that all briefs in case have been read and have nothing more to supplement to the amicus brief or, submit a new request and proposed brief on or before April 2, 2002.
Mar 7 2002	Received letter from:   Professor William Patton stating he as read all briefs and doesn't have additional data to present in an updated amicus curiae brief. Requests that his ac brief dated 10/22/01be filed.
Mar 14 2002	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   by Whittier Law School Legal Policy Clinic.
Mar 14 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:   Whittier Law School Legal Policy Clinic. (not as support for any party's position) Answer due within 20 days.
Mar 28 2002	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   from The Office of Harold LaFlamme in support of respondent. (appli & brief separate)
Mar 29 2002	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   from Children's Advocacy Institute of the University of San Diego School of Law, Legal Services for Children, and the Northern California Assocation of Counsel for Children. (appli & brief separate)
Mar 29 2002	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   Dependency Court Legal Services, Inc. [applctn w/i brief]
Apr 2 2002	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   from California State Assoc. of Counties and County of San Diego in support of respondent. (received in San Diego - appli & brief separate)
Apr 4 2002	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   The Office of Harold LaFlamme in support of respondent.
Apr 4 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:   The Office of Harold LaFlamme in support of respondent. **Answer due in 20 days.**
Apr 4 2002	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   Children's Advocacy Institute of the University of San Diego School of Law, Legal Services for Children, and the Northern California Assocation of Counsel for Children.
Apr 4 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:   Children's Advocacy Institute of the University of San Diego School of Law, Legal Services for Children, and the Northern California Assocation of Counsel for Children. **Answer due within 20 days.**
Apr 4 2002	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   Dependency Court Legal Services, Inc.
Apr 4 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:   Dependency Court Legal Services, Inc. **Answer due within 20 days.**
Apr 10 2002	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Chaitin
Apr 15 2002	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   California State Assoc. of Counties and County of San Diego in support of respondent.
Apr 15 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:   California State Assoc. of Counties and County of San Diego in support of respondent.
Apr 16 2002	Received letter from:   Appellate Defenders, Inc. informing the court that they would be pleased to submit briefing if the court so wishes regarding the practices of the CA4/3, in appointing independent appellate counsel for the minor in dependency cases.
Apr 22 2002	Note: Mail returned (unable to forward)   Alan Siraco, counsel for Bay Area Dependency Chapter. Moved-left no address. Address removed from party screen.
Apr 29 2002	Received letter from:   counsel for respondent requesting that the court not calendar oral argument on June 3, 2002.
May 20 2002	Note: Mail returned (unable to forward)   Alan Siraco, counsel for Bay Area Dependency Chapter. Moved-left no address. Orders dated 9/21/01, 10/10/01, 11/9/01 & 03/14/02.
Mar 4 2003	Received letter from:   counsel for minor (Zeth S.) requesting that the court not calendar oral argument between 4/1/ 03 to 4/18/03 and 6/4/03 to 6/16/03.
Apr 9 2003	Case ordered on calendar   5-7-03, 9am, S.F.
Apr 15 2003	Note: Mail returned and re-sent   to Ann M. Ravel w/May calendar enclosed. (Envelope notes: "Forwarding order expired". Correct address obtained from State Bar website. Old address: One Almaden Blvd., 10th Floor, San Jose 95113-2211)
Apr 18 2003	Filed:   Request of resp to allocate oral argument time to A/C.
Apr 21 2003	Filed:   Request of Minor's counsel to divide oral argument time.
Apr 28 2003	Filed letter from:   counsel for appellant (Stacey S.) dated 1/9/03 regarding additional authority.
May 5 2003	Order filed   The request of counsel for respondent to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of respondent is granted.
May 5 2003	Order filed   The request of resp. to allocate 10 minutes of oral argument time to A/C Law Office of Harold LaFlamme is granted.
May 5 2003	Order filed   The request of counsel for applt. and the minor to allow three counsel to argue on behalf of aplt. and the minor is hereby granted.
May 5 2003	Order filed   The request of aplt. to allocate 10 minutes of oral argument time to Melissa Chaitin, counsel for the minor. is granted.
May 5 2003	Order filed   The request of counsel for aplt. and the minor to allocate 10 min. oral argument time to A/C Whittier Law School is granted.
May 7 2003	Cause argued and submitted
Aug 4 2003	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   and remanded to CA. Majority Opinion by Baxter, J. joined by George C.J., Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, Brown & Moreno JJ.
Sep 4 2003	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Sep 11 2003	Received document entitled:   Receipt for remittitur - from CA4/3.
Sep 29 2003	Note:   record sent to CA4/3 ( 2 doghouses).
Oct 2 2003	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Pfeiffer
Oct 29 2003	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Chaitin $2,789.09

Briefs
Dec 10 2001	Opening brief on the merits filed
Jan 8 2002	Answer brief on the merits filed
Feb 6 2002	Answer brief on the merits filed
Feb 28 2002	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Mar 14 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Apr 4 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Apr 4 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Apr 4 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Apr 15 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website