Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S063274
In re Thomas



Filed 3/6/06



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA



In re RALPH INTERNATIONAL

THOMAS, )


S063274

on

Habeas

Corpus.



Mary Gioia and Greg Kniffin were “Deadheads,” followers of the band the

Grateful Dead, who in 1985 traveled with other Deadheads to Berkeley,

California, to see one of the band’s shows. When they arrived, they stayed in

Rainbow Village, a permanent encampment of homeless people on the shores of

San Francisco Bay. Sometime during the night of August 15-16, 1985, they were

both shot and killed.

Petitioner Ralph International Thomas, a resident of Rainbow Village, was

convicted of second degree murder and first degree murder with special

circumstances and sentenced to death for the killings of Gioia and Kniffin. We

affirmed the convictions and sentence on automatic appeal. (People v. Thomas

(1992) 2 Cal.4th 489 (Thomas).) However, in response to Thomas’s petition for a

writ of habeas corpus claiming that defense counsel had failed to adequately

investigate evidence that someone other than Thomas had committed both

murders, we issued an order to show cause and subsequently appointed a referee to

hear evidence and make factual findings. The referee has now issued his report,

and the parties have filed briefs on the merits.

1




The key issue in this case was identity: Was Thomas in fact the person

who shot Gioia and Kniffin? At trial, the defense presented its theory that

someone other than Thomas had committed the murders through the reread

preliminary hearing testimony of a lone witness, Vivian Cercy, who testified to

seeing Gioia arguing late on the fatal night with a blond man named “Bo.”

Thomas argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because,

although numerous additional witnesses were available to offer evidence

supporting the theory that “Bo” was the real killer, defense counsel neither sought

nor located any of them. In a case hinging on circumstantial evidence, Thomas

argues this shortcoming was prejudicial.

We conclude (1) because counsel failed to investigate the available avenues

most likely to yield corroboration of Cercy and failed to provide any viable

tactical justification for that omission, his performance was deficient, but

(2) Thomas has not shown prejudice because, as best as can be determined 20

years after the fact, the fruits of a constitutionally adequate investigation would

not have been sufficient to raise a reasonable probability of a more favorable

outcome. The order to show cause is discharged.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Crimes and Trial

The following description of the crimes and trial is taken in large part from

our decision in Thomas’s automatic appeal. (Thomas, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 504-

514.)

On August 15 and 16, 1985, a number of followers of the Grateful Dead

rock band were staying at Rainbow Village because the band was scheduled to

play locally during the coming weekend. Among them were Mary Gioia and Greg

Kniffin. During the early morning hours of August 16, 1985, Gioia and Kniffin

2



were beaten and shot at point-blank range near Rainbow Village.1 Gioia’s body

was seen floating in the San Francisco Bay on the morning of August 16; Kniffin’s

body was recovered by an underwater dive team the next day.

Thomas was arrested shortly after the murders. The prosecution’s case

consisted entirely of circumstantial evidence falling generally into four categories:

Thomas’s ownership of a high-powered rifle that could have inflicted the fatal

wounds, which he was seen using the night of August 15 but claimed was stolen

immediately thereafter; sightings of Thomas alone with the victims shortly before

the killings; Thomas’s conduct and statements after the killings, collectively

suggesting consciousness of guilt; and certain additional physical evidence,

including recovery of a corncob pipe at the murder scene that was argued to have

been Thomas’s.

The defense centered on the testimony of Vivian Cercy. Cercy testified at

the preliminary hearing but was unavailable at trial, so her prior testimony was

read to the jury. Her testimony pointed to a third party, a blond man, as

potentially responsible for the murders. Cercy testified that on the night of

August 15-16, she was parked in her car outside Rainbow Village when she

witnessed a discussion/argument between three people. Two of the people

resembled Gioia and Kniffin; the third, a tall blond man she did not know, she

referred to as “Bo.” After the discussion/argument, the woman walked off; the

blond man followed. Minutes later, Cercy heard sounds that could have been

firecrackers or gunshots. Later that night, she saw the blond man washing his


1

In early 1985, the City of Berkeley set aside a landfill area near the

Berkeley Marina to provide living space for people who had previously been
living in their vehicles on the public streets. The area became known as Rainbow
Village. Thomas lived there.

3



hands in a sink and throwing something over a fence. Still later, a man she could

not describe knocked on her car door, asked her a few questions, and threatened to

kill her.

The jury convicted Thomas of first degree murder for killing Kniffin and

second degree murder for killing Gioia. (Pen. Code, § 187.)2 It found true a

multiple-murder special circumstance. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) It also found true

allegations that Thomas used a firearm in the commission of each murder.

(§ 12022.5.) The jury returned a verdict of death, and we affirmed. (Thomas,

supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 504.)

The Habeas Corpus Proceedings

During the pendency of Thomas’s automatic appeal, appellate counsel filed

a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and Thomas filed, in propria persona, a habeas

corpus petition raising an issue not presented in counsel’s petition; we denied

both.

On April 15, 1996, Thomas filed his first federal petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. The United States District Court for the Northern District of

California stayed federal proceedings, allowed Thomas to amend his federal

petition to delete all unexhausted claims, and directed him to present to this court

all claims identified by the district court as unexhausted. Thomas complied by

filing the present exhaustion petition on August 1, 1997.

We issued an order to show cause based on Thomas’s allegation that he

would have obtained a better outcome at trial had his trial counsel, Alameda

County Public Defender James Chaffee, investigated and presented witnesses who

could corroborate Vivian Cercy’s testimony and support a theory of third party


2

All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.

4



culpability. Thomas identified Megan Barry, David Kohn, Daniel Adams, and

Claus von Wendel as four witnesses defense counsel should have located and

called. In the return, the People, represented by the Attorney General, defended

the adequacy of Chaffee’s investigation. Thomas, by his traverse, placed at issue

the truth of the People’s denials. Because an evidentiary hearing was necessary to

determine whether an investigation of the kind Thomas alleged trial counsel

should have conducted would have yielded third party culpability evidence that

would have made any difference, we appointed a referee to hear evidence and

answer the following factual questions concerning Defense Counsel Chaffee’s

performance:

Counsel’s Performance

1. What information did trial counsel James Chaffee have, prior to trial,

concerning the possible identity of the blond man Vivian Cercy testified she saw

with persons who apparently were Mary Gioia and Greg Kniffin, on the night they

were killed?

2. What action, if any, did Chaffee take to investigate this information

prior to trial?

3. If Chaffee investigated incompletely or not at all, what, if any, were his

reasons?

Prejudice

4. Did Chaffee know, or could he reasonably have learned, prior to trial, of

the existence, whereabouts, and potential usefulness as witnesses of Megan Barry,

David Kohn, Daniel Adams, and Claus von Wendel?

5. If Chaffee could have contacted these potential witnesses, what

information would they have provided?

6. Would they have testified at petitioner’s trial and, if so, to what effect?

5



The referee heard testimony from nearly two dozen witnesses, including

Defense Counsel Chaffee and the four witnesses identified in the reference order.

He also considered a wealth of documentary evidence. After the close of

evidence, the referee solicited proposed findings from each side, took the matter

under submission, and issued detailed findings on each of the six referred

questions. Briefly summarized, those findings indicate that the witnesses Thomas

faults Chaffee for not locating and calling at trial either could not have been

located, were not credible, lacked firsthand knowledge relevant to the killings, or

had some combination of all three shortcomings.

The parties have filed postreference briefs on the merits, and Thomas has

filed exceptions to the referee’s report; the Attorney General does not take

exception to any of the referee’s findings. We address the referee’s individual

findings and Thomas’s specific exceptions to them only insofar as they are

relevant to the two questions before us: (1) Did Thomas receive reasonably

effective assistance from counsel; and (2) if not, was his defense prejudiced?

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Framework

The general standards applicable to Thomas’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim are well settled. “ ‘[I]n order to demonstrate ineffective assistance

of counsel, a defendant must first show counsel’s performance was “deficient”

because his “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . .

under prevailing professional norms.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.

668, 687-688 [(Strickland)]; [People v.] Ledesma [(1987)] 43 Cal.3d [171,] 215-

216.) Second, he must also show prejudice flowing from counsel’s performance

or lack thereof. [Citations.] Prejudice is shown when there is a “reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

6



proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” ’ ” (In re Avena (1996) 12

Cal.4th 694, 721; accord, People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1211.)

In evaluating Thomas’s claim, we give great weight to those of the referee’s

findings that are supported by substantial evidence. (In re Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th

974, 998; In re Johnson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 447, 461; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th

184, 201.) This is especially true for findings involving credibility determinations.

The central reason for referring a habeas corpus claim for an evidentiary hearing is

to obtain credibility determinations (In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 824);

consequently, we give special deference to the referee on factual questions

“requiring resolution of testimonial conflicts and assessment of witnesses’

credibility, because the referee has the opportunity to observe the witnesses’

demeanor and manner of testifying” (In re Malone (1996) 12 Cal.4th 935, 946).

Though we defer to the referee on factual and credibility matters, in other

areas we give no deference to the referee’s findings. We independently review

prior testimony (In re Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 998, fn. 2), as well as all mixed

questions of fact and law (In re Ross, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 201). Whether

counsel’s performance was deficient, and whether any deficiency prejudiced the

petitioner, are both mixed questions subject to independent review. (Ibid.)

Ultimately, the referee’s findings are not binding on us (In re Malone, supra, 12

Cal.4th at p. 946; In re Ross, at p. 201; In re Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 584, 603);

it is for this court to make the findings on which the resolution of Thomas’s

habeas corpus claim will turn (In re Visciotti (1996) 14 Cal.4th 325, 349; see In re

Scott, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 824).

Thomas vigorously criticizes the referee for adopting verbatim large

portions of the Attorney General’s proposed findings and suggests the referee’s

findings are not entitled to deference. On this record, we disagree. As Thomas’s

7



own analysis demonstrates, the referee did revise or reject some proposed

findings, presumably where he disagreed. We decline to infer that the referee

abdicated his responsibility to issue the independent report we requested such that

we should vary the standard of review. (See Anderson v. Bessemer City (1985)
470 U.S. 564, 572-573.) Consequently, as with any other referee’s findings, these

referee’s findings are entitled to deference precisely to the extent they are

supported by substantial evidence; to the extent they are not, or to the extent they

touch on mixed questions of fact and law, we will accord them no deference.

II. Counsel’s Performance

Thomas contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and

present the testimony of other persons who could have corroborated Vivian

Cercy’s account of an unknown blond male, “Bo,” who might have committed the

murders. Thomas alleges no such investigation was conducted and that witnesses

could have been discovered who would have established Bo was a real person,

James Bowen, and would have supported the theory that Bowen was the

perpetrator.

A. Standards for Establishing Deficient Performance

The burden is on Thomas to demonstrate by a preponderance of the

evidence that counsel’s performance was inadequate and fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness (In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 790), i.e., that

Thomas was deprived of “reasonably effective assistance” (Strickland, supra, 466

U.S. at p. 687; accord, People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 989). We assess the

reasonableness of counsel’s performance deferentially. (Strickland, at p. 689;

People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 449.) We consider counsel’s performance

from his perspective, analyzing counsel’s decisions based on what he knew or

should have known at the time. (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1243-

1244; In re Andrews (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1234, 1253.)

8



The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is assessed according to the

prevailing norms at the time. The United States Supreme Court has “declined to

articulate specific guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct and instead ha[s]

emphasized that ‘the proper measure of attorney performance remains simply

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’ ” (Wiggins v. Smith (2003)
539 U.S. 510, 521; accord, Rompilla v. Beard (2005) ___ U.S. ___ [125 S.Ct.

2456, 2462].)

In evaluating counsel’s performance, we assess both the reasonableness of

counsel’s decisions and the reasonableness of the investigation that underlay each

decision. “[B]efore counsel undertakes to act, or not to act, counsel must make a

rational and informed decision on strategy and tactics founded upon adequate

investigation and preparation.” (In re Marquez, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 602; accord,

In re Avena, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 722; see also In re Jones (1996) 13 Cal.4th

552, 564-565.) “ ‘[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and

facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic

choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the

extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on

investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular

investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not

to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the

circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.’ ”

(In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 722, quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at

pp. 690-691.)

B. The Defense Investigation

The referee’s findings include the following, supported by substantial

evidence and unchallenged by either party: Defense Counsel James Chaffee had

9



copies of the police report from an August 17, 1985, interview with Vivian Cercy

and both a tape and written summary of an August 29, 1985, public defender

investigator interview with Cercy. In the police interview, one day after the

killings, Cercy “stated that sometime Thursday evening she had had an argument

with her boyfriend, Harry Shorman, and had drunk ‘quite a bit.’ She drove with

her two small children to a dumpster. While throwing away her trash, Cercy

claimed to have seen a white female and two white males possibly arguing. The

female was described as about five feet, six inches or five feet, seven inches and

stocky. One male was described as being about 23 to 25 years old, clean shaven,

with blond hair. Cercy thought the other male was in his late twenties, with dark

curly hair and possibly a beard; he might have been wearing overalls. Cercy

overheard the blond [man] say, ‘[W]e need this, this is worth money,’ and

believed he placed something in his waistband. She could not tell what it was but

thought it might be a revolver or handgun. Cercy was positive the item was not a

rifle because of its length.

“Cercy reportedly heard the woman say, ‘[P]ut it back, I don’t want to be

part of it,’ or words to that effect. She then walked away. Cercy invited the

woman to stay in her car but the woman laughed and continued walking down the

road. She then believed the blond man said something to the effect of ‘I’ll take

care of this,’ and followed the woman. Cercy drove to another location and about

15 minutes later heard what she thought were two or three firecrackers or possibly

shots. She drove to where she had seen the people walking but did not see

anybody. Cercy then returned to her original location and did not see anything

else.”

Cercy provided similar information in her August 29, 1985, interview with

an Alameda County Public Defender’s Office investigator. In that interview,

according to the investigator’s summary, Cercy said: “[A]t some point on the day

10



of the killings, at a time she could not recall, [she] drove to a dumpster outside

Rainbow Village to throw away her trash. She claimed to have seen the victims

and a man she called Bo. Cercy described Bo as about six feet tall with blond

hair. She stated that Bo was no longer in Rainbow Village and she did not know

when he left or where he went. Cercy did not know the names of the murder

victims until after the killings but called them Mary and Greg in her statement.

“Cercy thought Bo and Mary were arguing about a long object in Bo’s

hand. Mary said something to the effect of ‘[G]ive it back,’ but Bo put what

looked like a foot-long gun in the front part of his waist band. Mary again said to

‘[G]ive it back,’ but Bo said, ‘No, I need this. It could be money for us.’ Mary

said she did not want any part of it and walked towards University Avenue. Cercy

told Mary to get into her car but Mary refused, said she would be all right, and

kept walking. Cercy heard Bo tell Greg he would take care of it and walked by

Cercy’s car. As the man she called ‘Bo’ passed[,] Cercy asked him his name, but

the man kept walking. Cercy thought he was going after Mary.

“Cercy parked along the roadside and about 15 minutes later heard what

sounded like three firecrackers going off. She estimated the time as between

midnight and 4:00 a.m. Cercy then drove towards University Avenue and back

but did not see anyone. A couple of hours later, she saw Bo at the water washing

his hands and wiping them on the ground. Cercy drove back to Rainbow Village

where she saw Bo washing his hands [again] in a basin just outside the Village.

She again parked on the roadway.

“About 20 to 30 minutes later, Cercy heard two male voices, one of which

sounded white, talking behind her car. The person with the white voice said,

‘Leave her alone; she’s got two kids.’ A few seconds later there was a knock on

the window of the driver’s door and Cercy saw a man wearing a pea coat. He

asked her name and where she was staying. [Cercy told the man she was staying

11



with Harry Shorman.] When he asked what color bus Harry owned, Cercy asked

the man why he was questioning her. The man said he was going to kill her.

Cercy immediately blanked the man’s face out of her mind and could give no

description[,] including the color of his skin. The man walked away without

saying anything else.”

Chaffee spoke with Cercy about what she had seen and about the man she

called Bo. Chaffee had a description of Bo from Cercy: White, blond, tall, thin,

and about 25 years old. He recognized that the prosecution’s case rested on

circumstantial evidence. Thus, Chaffee believed it would be important to

corroborate Cercy’s story about seeing the possibly armed Bo arguing with Gioia

the night of the killings. He believed it would have been helpful to determine

whether Bo existed.

Chaffee knew the area around Rainbow Village consisted of two

communities: permanent residents and transient visitors. Many of the transient

visitors were followers of the Grateful Dead. Chaffee knew both victims were

members of the Grateful Dead community, not part of the Rainbow Village

community. Similarly, he spoke to people who surmised Bo was tied to the

Grateful Dead community. Thus, Chaffee agreed at the evidentiary hearing that it

would have been logical to do an investigation in the Grateful Dead community to

try to locate Bo.

In conducting his investigation, Chaffee spoke only with Rainbow Village

residents; though Chaffee had a description of Bo, he did not know where to look

further for him. He did not talk to anyone in the Grateful Dead community. The

band had left the area, but Chaffee did not ask anyone how one might go about

tracking down Deadheads. He did not know that the band published an itinerary.

He knew the band returned to the Bay Area during the pretrial period, but did not

send anyone to the concert or concerts to speak with any Deadheads. He did not

12



ask the Alameda County Public Defender’s investigations unit to do any

investigation, either in the Grateful Dead community or elsewhere. He also did

not ask his assisting attorney, Susan Walsh, to do any investigation. Instead,

Chaffee conducted his investigation personally, in order to get a feel for the

potential value of each witness at trial.

We adopt these unopposed findings concerning the scope of the defense

investigation.

C. Tactical Justifications for the Scope of the Investigation

The referee found James Chaffee a “truthful and believable” witness. We

accept that credibility finding.

The referee found that Chafee offered the following tactical justifications

for the scope of his investigation. Chaffee viewed Cercy’s testimony as a “double-

edged sword” because she might or might not come across well on the stand, but

her testimony would at least “muddy the water” for the prosecution. Chaffee did

not look for Bo in the Grateful Dead community because he wanted to try the case

on Cercy’s testimony. He was uncertain whether Bo existed and believed the state

of the record as it stood after Cercy’s preliminary hearing testimony could not be

improved. While it might have been helpful to know if Bo existed and Cercy’s

testimony could be corroborated, Chaffee elected to go ahead without

corroboration.

Neither side objects to these findings concerning Chaffee’s proffered

justifications for conducting his investigation in the manner he did, and we adopt

them.

D. Analysis

We conclude that under the professional norms prevailing at the time, it

was deficient for defense counsel not to make any attempt to confirm the existence

of “Bo” by conducting an investigation in the Grateful Dead community.

13



Chaffee testified that he decided to try the case on Cercy’s testimony alone.

He made this decision even though Chaffee himself testified he had concerns

about Cercy. According to the referee’s undisputed findings, about half the time

Chaffee believed Cercy was telling the truth, which means that about half the time

he thought she might be dissembling. Chaffee was informed that Cercy might be

unreliable and was concerned she might not present well on the stand. Indeed,

Chaffee’s concerns were sufficiently strong that he preferred not finding Cercy

and having her preliminary hearing testimony reread at trial to finding her and

having her testify live, concluding that the state of the evidence presented in her

preliminary hearing testimony was “as good . . . as it would ever be” for the

defense.

However, Chaffee’s decision to rest the defense case on Cercy’s potentially

shaky testimony and to not present corroborating evidence was not the product of

a reasoned judgment that potentially corroborating witnesses were untrustworthy

or problematic and would weaken the case. Chaffee agreed, and the referee found,

that additional proof of Bo’s existence would have been helpful. Instead, the

decision was a consequence of Chaffee’s limited investigation’s having yielded no

corroboration. Having failed to turn up confirming witnesses in the course of his

investigation, Chaffee had no choice but to go it alone with Cercy.

The real issue, then, is whether the investigation leading up to the decision

not to present corroborating evidence was itself reasonable. (See Wiggins v.

Smith, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 523; In re Lucas, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 725.)

Chaffee had an obligation to conduct a reasonable investigation or make a

reasonable decision that rendered further investigation unnecessary. (Strickland,

supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 690-691; In re Lucas, at p. 722.) We assess the

reasonableness of his decision to limit his investigation according to the prevailing

14



norms at the time, the information available to Chaffee, and Chaffee’s actual

strategy. (See Wiggins v. Smith, at pp. 523-526; In re Lucas, at p. 725.)

The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice published at

the time described the duty to investigate this way: “It is the duty of the lawyer to

conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all

avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the

event of conviction. . . . The duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused’s

admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or the accused’s

stated desire to plead guilty.” (1 ABA Stds. for Crim. Justice (2d ed. 1982 supp.)

std. 4-4.1, italics added.) These standards have consistently been relied on by the

United States Supreme Court as relevant indicia of the prevailing practice norms.

(See Rompilla v. Beard, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at pp. 2465-2466];

Wiggins v. Smith, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 524.)

At the evidentiary hearing, fellow attorneys in Chaffee’s office offered

more detail concerning standard practice in death cases at the time. David

Andersen was the intake public defender when Thomas was arrested. He

submitted an initial request for investigation to the public defender’s investigations

unit. He testified that use of investigators was routine practice, use of second

attorneys to assist in investigation was routine practice, and conducting an

investigation into the Deadhead community would have been routine. Dean

Beaupre, chief assistant public defender at the time, testified that he would have

authorized funding for such an investigation.

As the referee found, and the parties do not dispute, Chaffee conducted no

investigation for supporting witnesses or corroborating evidence outside Rainbow

Village, despite knowing or having strong reason to suspect that both the victims

and Bo came not from Rainbow Village but from the distinct Deadhead

community.

15



We conclude this omission was unreasonable. Chaffee’s apparent strategy

was twofold: he wanted to cast doubt on the prosecution’s circumstantial

evidence, including the apparent lack of motive, and he wanted to offer the jury

the possibility of an alternate killer. Given this strategy, any evidence adding to

the plausibility of the alternate-killer theory would have been critical. Did Bo

exist? Did he have ties to the victims? What was the subject of the argument

Cercy reported witnessing between Bo and Gioia? Did Bo own or have access to

a gun? Given the actual defense strategy, these were crucial questions. Given the

knowledge that Gioia and Kniffin were Deadheads who had come to Berkeley for

a show, and reason to suspect that Bo (if he existed) was likewise a member of this

transient Deadhead community, a reasonable attorney would have made some

effort to trace Bo in that community.

Chaffee testified that he did not know how to contact anyone in the

Grateful Dead community, nor was he aware that the band published an itinerary.

However, Chaffee had a description, a nickname (“Bo”), and the resources of the

Alameda County Public Defender’s investigations unit at his disposal. The

office’s chief investigator at the time, Thomas Rauch, testified that he could and

would have conducted a search with this information as a starting point. Though

the Dead and their followers had left town by the time Chaffee was appointed,

Chaffee had the license plate of the “Dead On” bus that had been parked in

Rainbow Village the night of the murders and by checking its registration could

have identified its owner, Deadhead Randy Turley.3 Chaffee knew the Grateful

Dead had come back to the Bay Area for one or more additional shows in the fall

of 1985, presumably bringing with them itinerant Deadheads. Despite this, he

3

The referee expressly concluded Chaffee could have discovered Turley in

this fashion.

16



never asked an investigator to conduct any search in the Grateful Dead

community, nor did he ask anyone more familiar with that community how he

might go about tracking down a Deadhead. A reasonable attorney in 1985,

charged with representing a capital defendant, would have pursued what leads

Chaffee had in the Grateful Dead community, the community from which the

victims and Bo came.

Chaffee justified limiting his search for corroborating witnesses to Rainbow

Village by explaining that he was unsure Bo existed; he “was not certain he

‘wanted to press to[o] hard on whether or not such a person actually existed’ ” and

was afraid he might not find what he was looking for. The difficulty with this

explanation is twofold. First, it is inconsistent with Chaffee’s seeking

corroboration in Rainbow Village. If the proffered justification had been

Chaffee’s actual tactical reason at the time, he would not have sought

corroboration in Rainbow Village either. Once he did so, there was no reason not

to also look in the Deadhead community. Second, whatever Chaffee’s doubts,

looking for Bo had no downside, a point Chaffee conceded at the evidentiary

hearing. On the one hand, an investigation might have yielded corroborating

evidence and demonstrated Bo’s existence; on the other, even if Chaffee found

nothing, an investigation could not have disproved Bo’s existence. Moreover,

whether Chaffee failed to investigate or investigated further and found nothing, the

prosecution would still have highlighted the absence of corroboration, so not

investigating did nothing to insulate the “Bo” theory from attack. Chaffee’s

concessions that to find Bo or corroboration of Cercy would have been helpful,

and that Cercy’s testimony was potentially shaky and in need of corroboration,

underline the importance of investigating further. In short, the possibility of

17



failure could not justify refusing to investigate, because such refusal guaranteed

failure.4

As proof of ineffectiveness, Thomas points to Chaffee’s decisions to resist

the assistance of a second attorney or public defender investigator in preparing for

trial. We need not second-guess the procedures Chaffee employed. Different

counsel may choose to conduct investigations in different ways, and it is for

counsel, not this court, to decide how to obtain the information needed to prepare

adequately for trial. (See In re Hall (1980) 30 Cal.3d 408, 425 [declining to

criticize counsel for electing to forgo use of trained investigator].) What matters is

the substance of the investigation—whether counsel in fact explored those avenues

reasonable counsel would have pursued in light of what was known and in light of

the chosen defense strategy. It is because Chaffee did not do so, and not because

of the manner of his investigation, that we find his performance deficient.

Contrary to our conclusion, the referee found Chaffee had conducted an

adequate investigation, accepting Chaffee’s tactical justifications as sufficient.

However, the ultimate question whether or not Chaffee’s investigation was

adequate is not one we referred to the referee; our referral was confined to

ascertaining what Chaffee did, why he did it, and what he would have found had

he done things differently. In any event, a finding on adequacy is a mixed

4

This is not to suggest in any way that every decision to curtail investigation

in an area based on the improbability of finding evidence is ineffective assistance.
(See Rompilla v. Beard, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2463].) Courts
must be careful not to second-guess resource allocation; it is for counsel to decide
what leads are or are not worth exploring. Here, however, Chaffee did not offer
the need to devote resources to investigation in other more promising areas as a
tactical justification for not looking. This is understandable; aside from casting
doubt on the prosecution’s evidence, trying to offer a credible alternative killer
was the main defense. If counsel chooses a given approach as the main defense,
then it behooves counsel to conduct a reasonable investigation in that area.

18



question of fact and law that we review de novo (In re Ross, supra, 10 Cal.4th at

p. 201),5 and it is ultimately for this court to make the findings on which the grant

or denial of Thomas’s petition must rest (In re Visciotti, supra, 14 Cal.4th at

p. 349). While the record supports the referee’s findings concerning what Chaffee

did and why, it does not support the referee’s ultimate conclusion that Chaffee’s

investigation was adequate under prevailing norms.

We conclude that Chaffee failed to conduct a reasonable investigation for

evidence to corroborate Vivian Cercy’s testimony and support the theory that

someone other than Thomas was the actual killer. His decision to proceed with

Cercy’s testimony alone was a consequence of this unreasonably limited

investigation and thus was not a justifiable tactical decision. Consequently,

Thomas has demonstrated that his counsel’s performance was deficient.

III. Prejudice

Because defense counsel’s performance in at least one respect fell below

the line of reasonable practice, we must consider whether counsel’s omissions

prejudiced Thomas. It is for Thomas to demonstrate “a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694; accord, In re Cox,

supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1020.) We conclude he has not done so.

In this case, the existence or not of prejudice is a function of three factors:

(1) the witnesses and other evidence Chaffee could have located with a reasonable

investigation; (2) the value of any testimony those witnesses could have provided;

and (3) the strength of the case against Thomas. (See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard,

supra, ___ U.S. at pp. ___ [125 S.Ct. at pp. 2467-2469] [analyzing prejudice by

5

The Attorney General concedes as much and thus concedes that the

referee’s finding on this question is entitled to no deference.

19



measuring fruits of a proper investigation against the case actually presented to the

jury]; In re Lucas, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 733-735 [same].) We address each in

turn.

A. The Witnesses a Reasonable Investigation Would Have Yielded

According to the referee, of the witnesses upon whose testimony Thomas

now relies, Chaffee knew or could have discovered the existence of four: Claus

von Wendel, Jong Cheol Cho, Lee Andersen, and Randy Turley. Of these,

Chaffee contacted only von Wendel.

In contrast, the referee found that Chaffee could not reasonably have

learned of the existence of the following potential witnesses before trial: Daniel

Adams, Megan Barry, James Berney Royster, David Kohn, Robert Herbert, Toma

Cauffield, and Mel Vapour. Furthermore, the referee concluded that Chaffee

knew of, but could not have located, potential witness Lee Andersen. Though

Thomas objects to these findings, we conclude they are supported by substantial

evidence, as discussed post, and we adopt them.

Contrary to the referee’s findings, Thomas contends that in addition to Cho,

Andersen and Turley, Chaffee could “easily” have located Adams, Barry, Royster,

Kohn, Herbert, and Cauffield. 6 The dissent implies the same. (Dis. opn. post, at

p. 6.) In evaluating this assertion, we are mindful that the issue is not whether

Thomas’s habeas corpus counsel in fact located these witnesses during


6

At oral argument, Thomas also criticized Chaffee for failing to follow up

with potential witnesses Robin van Heest, Chris Campbell, Jim Prew, Paul Harter,
and John Chandler, whose names were contained in initial police investigation
reports. Thomas has offered neither testimony nor declarations from these
witnesses and thus has failed to make any showing concerning what impact the
failure to interview them had. We need not consider them further.

20



postconviction investigation, but whether Chaffee could have been expected to

locate each one in the limited time available before trial.7

Daniel Adams: Adams was a traveling Deadhead. At the evidentiary

hearing, Adams recounted witnessing, in the days before the murders, a discussion

between Gioia and a man he knew as Bo in which Bo seemed controlling and

Gioia appeared very upset. He also reported hearing Bo say, “Sometimes a man’s

got to do what must be done” the morning after the murders, then saw him pack up

and leave Rainbow Village in a hurried fashion.

Thomas argues that Chaffee could have found Adams based on a

photograph of him appearing in a story in the San Francisco Chronicle. He

dismisses as immaterial that Adams falsely identified himself as Dan Reynolds.

Adams’s false identification of himself underlines the referee’s finding that any

investigation would have been complicated by the fact members of the Grateful

Dead community frequently used only nicknames or aliases. It was not

unreasonable for the referee to conclude that, given Adams’s use of a false name,

Chaffee would not have been able to track him down in advance of trial or learn he

had relevant information.

Megan Barry: Barry was a Deadhead, living principally in Chico. Barry

believed Gioia was Bo’s girlfriend, but had no personal knowledge of this fact and

could not identify the source of the information; the referee concluded this belief


7

Chaffee was assigned the case in September 1985, six months before the

start of trial. In contrast, habeas corpus counsel was appointed in 1987; as of
1997, when habeas corpus counsel filed the instant petition for writ of habeas
corpus, he had located and presented declarations from only two of the six
witnesses the dissent focuses on, Adams and Kohn. The other four (Turley, Cho,
Cauffield, and Herbert) were apparently not located, or the significance of their
potential testimony was not appreciated, until sometime between 1997 and 2002,
when they testified at the evidentiary hearing.

21



was speculative. Barry disliked Bo immensely and speculated that Bo and/or

fellow Deadhead Weston Sudduth might have killed Gioia and Kniffin over a drug

transaction.

Thomas asserts that Barry was well known in the Deadhead community and

that in a routine investigation her name would have come up frequently as

someone to interview. However, as Thomas concedes and the referee found,

Barry left Rainbow Village before the murders. Consequently, Barry had no

personal or firsthand knowledge concerning the murders nor, for that matter, did

she know Bo’s real name at the time of the murders. Although Barry testified she

met Gioia three months before Gioia died, the referee found this testimony of

doubtful credibility, contradicted by testimony from Gioia’s sister indicating that

Gioia left for California for the first time in July 1985, the month before she died.

Thus, even if Barry’s name had come up in interviews of fellow Deadheads,

nothing would have revealed that she had relevant information about the murders,

Bo, Gioia, or Kniffin or that she should be sought out any more than dozens of

other Deadheads.

James Berney Royster: Royster was a Deadhead and Rainbow Village

resident. Royster was asleep in Rainbow Village the night of the murders; his

personal knowledge was limited to confirming that a man he knew as Bo was in

Rainbow Village at the time of the murders, and relating his perception that Bo’s

appearances at Dead shows dwindled between the murders and Thomas’s

conviction.

After the murders, Royster was afraid to stay in Rainbow Village and

stayed with a friend elsewhere. Royster subsequently left the area to tour with the

band. He never contacted the police and contacted a defense investigator only

after the guilt phase of trial was over.

22



At oral argument, Thomas suggested Royster was among many witnesses

Chaffee could have found by first contacting Deadhead Randy Turley. Indeed,

Turley provided the lead that allowed habeas corpus counsel to locate Royster.

Habeas corpus investigator James Barnes testified that he found Royster by

tracking down Turley in Chico, who gave him Megan Barry’s name; talking to

Barry, who was in Connecticut and who gave him Marie Marino’s name; locating

Marie Marino in New York; from Marino, learning the whereabouts of Royster’s

parents; and from that, finding Royster.

As noted ante, the referee found Chaffee could have traced Turley. It is

also undisputed Turley was generally knowledgeable about the Deadhead

community. The difficulty, however, is that Turley was not in Rainbow Village at

the time of the murders and could not know who might have specific useful

information. Thus, at most he could have provided Chaffee only with a long list

of names or nicknames of members of the community, with no indication which of

those on the list might have actual information about the murders. The numerous

steps needed to locate Royster demonstrate the cost of such a further investigation.

Indeed, considering only these steps significantly overstates the benefit and

underestimates the cost, because Royster was one of the handful of witnesses

habeas corpus counsel felt had evidence worth presenting. Thomas offers no

evidence that defense counsel could or should have known in advance that Royster

had any relevant information and should be sought out in particular. We cannot

tell how much time was spent tracking down and interviewing other equally likely

potential witnesses based on names provided by Turley, only to determine that

they had nothing of use to say or were unwilling to cooperate.

The example of Royster thus illustrates the general problem with one of

Thomas’s main arguments, that tracking down Deadhead Turley would have given

Chaffee an entry into the Deadhead community and should have allowed him to

23



find witnesses such as Barry, Royster, and others. It is one thing to conduct such

an investigation, turning over every conceivable stone, in the context of a habeas

corpus proceeding. It is another to argue that counsel, provided with a lengthy

“cold call”-type list and a few months to prepare, would be constitutionally

deficient for failing to have an investigator run through every name on that list,

sifting through dross in the hopes of finding a few nuggets of gold, given what

little fruit a witness such as Royster could yield.8 The referee’s conclusion that

Royster could not reasonably have been located is supported by substantial

evidence.

David Kohn: Kohn first came to California four months after the murders,

in December 1985, for a Grateful Dead show. He eventually shared an apartment

in Chico with James Bowen and others. On a trip to and from a Dead show,

Bowen told him he had once “killed his brother over a woman.” Kohn did not

know what the statement meant.

Thomas asserts that if one could have found Bowen, one could have found

his “close companion,” Kohn, who could have testified to Bowen’s statement.

However, as Thomas concedes, this claim depends on an investigation’s first

making the connection that “Bo,” the unknown blond man Cercy saw, was James

Bowen, a flesh-and-blood person who left for Chico in the month after the

murders. As the referee found, the other witnesses a reasonable investigation

could have identified did not know that Bo was James Bowen; thus, the referee

concluded there was “no evidence proving that Chaffee could have established at

the time of trial that someone known as Bo was named James Bowen.” If an


8

Moreover, the referee found Royster’s testimony “generally lacking in

credibility.”

24



investigation could not make the leap from seeking “Bo” to seeking and finding

James Bowen, it likely would not turn up Kohn.

Robert Herbert and Toma Cauffield: Herbert and Cauffield came to

California from New Jersey in 1985, attending a few Grateful Dead concerts along

the way, and moved into an apartment in Chico. They were roommates of James

Bowen for a month or so in September 1985. They witnessed a discussion at their

apartment between Bo and another Deadhead, Weston Sudduth, who said words to

the effect, “How could you do it? How can you sleep with yourself at night?”

They did not know to what this referred.

Herbert and Cauffield were never in Rainbow Village. As with Kohn,

Thomas’s assertion that they could have been located depends on trial counsel’s

making the Bo-Bowen connection. Moreover, unless counsel made that

connection during the brief period immediately after the murders when Bowen

was living with Herbert and Cauffield, Herbert and Cauffield could not have been

located without an investigator’s working backward to identify and visit every

place the (apparently transient) Bowen had stayed since the murders.9 Thomas

has not shown a competent investigation would have revealed Herbert’s and

Cauffield’s identities.

Lee Andersen: In 1985, Andersen was a Deadhead and an ex-Rainbow

Village resident. He was living on the streets of Berkeley, having been expelled

from the village for excessive drinking and noise.


9

Alternatively, Chaffee might have located Herbert, Cauffield, Kohn, or

others if he had happened upon the Chico Deadhead community, presumably one
of many in California, and decided to canvass that community, but Thomas offers
no reason why Chaffee should have known this would be a particularly fruitful
line of investigation absent knowledge that Bo/James Bowen had left the Bay Area
for Chico.

25



Andersen was a potential second eyewitness to one part of the events

reportedly seen by Cercy. He was sleeping near Rainbow Village on the night of

the murders and testified at the evidentiary hearing that he saw a tall, thin man in a

pea coat or trench coat approach Cercy’s car and speak with her twice. However,

the referee found Andersen’s testimony generally lacking in credibility and further

concluded that his testimony did more to impeach than to corroborate Cercy

(notably, although Andersen was in the same area all night, he heard no gunshots).

Thomas asserts that Chaffee could have found Andersen based on

information Thomas’s girlfriend, Lenise Christy Allen, had about his whereabouts.

But Chaffee actually spoke with Allen, obtained this information, and set up a

meeting with Andersen, a meeting Andersen failed to attend. Thus, the failure to

locate Andersen did not result from Chaffee’s failing to explore a lead and was not

a consequence of ineffective assistance.

In sum, what Chaffee would have found 20 years ago with a competent

investigation is difficult to know. Perhaps he might have found some but not all of

these witnesses; if so, which of these or other potential witnesses would have been

uncovered is even more difficult to determine. Thomas bears the burden of

demonstrating that reasonably effective counsel would have located each witness;

on balance, he has not done so. We find supported by substantial evidence the

referee’s conclusions that a reasonable investigation would not have turned up

Adams, Barry, Royster, Kohn, Herbert, Cauffield, Andersen, or Mel Vapour.10


10

Vapour, a local filmmaker, taped an interview with Harry Shorman and a

woman who may have been Vivian Cercy in the days following the murders.
Thomas describes it as “ironic” that Chaffee failed to locate Vapour, but appears
not to assert that a reasonable investigation would have located him. In any event,
substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Vapour could not have been
located.

26



Thus, the failure to locate and obtain testimony from these witnesses was not a

prejudicial consequence of the inadequate investigation.

B. The Testimony Witnesses Would Have Provided

We turn to those witnesses a competent investigation would have located

and what testimony they might have provided.

Claus von Wendel: Von Wendel lived on a boat near Rainbow Village.

During the evidentiary hearing, he testified that he found a bag on his boat the

morning of August 16. He looked inside and saw shoes, books, a blanket-like

object, and an out-of-state license for a dark-haired male. Later that day, a blond

man came to claim the bag. Von Wendel was upset because the man said he had

spent the night on the boat and because he had left the bag without permission.

When von Wendel described the man to Deadheads James Berney Royster and

Marie Marino, they recognized him and said his name was something like “Bo.”

Von Wendel did not know Bo. At the evidentiary hearing, von Wendel identified

two photographs of James Bowen as the man who appeared on his boat.

A defense investigator spoke with von Wendel in 1986 and learned of this

incident. The investigator’s notes describe the uninvited visitor as a White male

but do not include the name Bo; they also indicate von Wendel recalled the name

on the license as Bryan or Bryant.

In the same interview, von Wendel also told the investigator of an incident

in which Thomas had threatened to kill a woman and her dog. When von Wendel

intervened, Thomas appeared to snap, left, and returned with a machete. When

Thomas was distracted, von Wendel escaped unharmed. Chaffee made a tactical

decision not to call von Wendel, reasoning that calling him would allow the

prosecution to introduce this incident. Thomas does not challenge that tactical

27



justification. Thus, the failure to call von Wendel was not a prejudicial

consequence of the defense’s limited investigation.11

Randy Turley: As discussed, Randy Turley was a traveling Deadhead.

Chaffee could have traced Turley as the registered owner of the “Dead On” bus.

However, Turley had no personal information about the murders; as Thomas

acknowledges, Turley left Rainbow Village several days before the murders and

did not rejoin the Grateful Dead tour until a week or two after. Thus, Turley

would not have been able to provide testimony directly corroborating Cercy’s

account. At the evidentiary hearing, he testified that he knew several people

named “Bo,” one of whom frequented Grateful Dead shows and, like the person

Cercy described, was tall, thin, and blond. Turley did not know whether this Bo

was in Rainbow Village at the time of the murders.

Jong Cheol Cho: Cho was a traveling Deadhead. The referee found

Chaffee knew of Cho, whose name and address were disclosed in a police report.

Cho testified that he knew someone named Bo, but no one named James Bowen.

Cho identified pictures of James Bowen as the man he knew as Bo. Cho was in

Rainbow Village the night of the murders. The morning after, he had a

conversation with Bo and another man he knew as Weston about the previous

night. Bo said either “I” or “we” “went swimming into the bay last night.” In

response, Weston jabbed Bo in the ribs and gave him a look. The conversation

ended. Cho spoke briefly with police that day, but did not mention the

conversation. Cho did not recall seeing Bo again.


11

Thomas criticizes Chaffee for not interviewing von Wendel earlier in his

investigation, but makes no showing as to what additional evidence an earlier
interview could have yielded. Thus, he has not demonstrated prejudice from any
delay.

28



The referee’s findings concerning von Wendel’s, Turley’s, and Cho’s

prospective testimony are supported by substantial evidence, and we adopt them.

C. The Case Against Thomas

Thomas must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the foregoing

additional evidence would have made a difference to the jury. In light of the

considerable evidence against him, we conclude he cannot do so.

As mentioned above, that evidence fell into four categories: (1) Thomas’s

ownership of a high-powered rifle that could have been the murder weapon;

(2) sightings of him with the victims shortly before their deaths; (3) incriminating

statements and actions by Thomas in the days following the murders; and

(4) certain additional physical evidence. We summarize that evidence, recounted

in full in our opinion on automatic appeal. (Thomas, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 505-

512.)

1. Thomas’s ownership of a .44 magnum

Gioia died from a gunshot to the face; Kniffin died from a gunshot to the

neck. A firearms expert described the differing ballistic properties of .44 magnum

handguns and rifles. Based on his examination of postmortem photographs of

Gioia’s wounds, he opined that the exit wound would be normal for a high-

powered rifle or shotgun, but was inconsistent with any he had seen made by a

handgun.

The prosecution established that Thomas had acquired a Remington .44

magnum Model 788 rifle from Lenise Christy Allen, his girlfriend. The person

from whom Allen acquired the Model 788 rifle, Martin Barbena, described its

peculiarities. Barbena testified that the rifle had no clip, but could be fired by

hand-loading each round into the chamber. The breech was recessed, so a user

had to push each round fully into place or there was a chance of jamming. If a

29



bullet were half in and half out, it would tend to simply hang; if it were out any

more than that, it would fall through the space for the charge clip. On the basis of

this testimony, the prosecutor argued that only a person familiar with that model

rifle could have committed the murders and hence that Thomas, the owner of the

rifle, was the killer.

Thomas Medlin, a Rainbow Village resident, testified that Thomas still had

his rifle the night before the murders; he saw Thomas firing it just before sunset on

August 15.

2. Thomas’s presence with Gioia and Kniffin the night of the

murders

The testimony of several Rainbow Village residents placed Thomas in the

company of the victims during the night of the murders.

Jim Prew testified that sometime after 10:00 p.m. on August 15, Thomas,

Gioia, and Kniffin were among a group of people that included Prew, Chris

Campbell, and Paul Harter, who were drinking beer in Prew’s van at Rainbow

Village. About 1:00 a.m. on August 16, Prew agreed to drive Campbell to his

home in Richmond. All except Kniffin rode along. After dropping Campbell off,

the group drove to a convenience store where they bought burritos, beer, and ale.

On the way back to Rainbow Village, they picked up Kniffin along an access road

near University Avenue, arriving at Rainbow Village about 1:50 or 2:00 a.m. The

group stood around drinking for awhile. About 3:00 a.m., Gioia and Kniffin

announced they were going to take a walk. Around that same time, Thomas left

too without saying where he was going.

Vincent Johnson testified that he spent the hours between midnight and

about 2:00 a.m. on the night of August 15-16 visiting with a friend in his bus at

Rainbow Village. Because the friend was afraid to drive on the access road by

herself, on her departure Johnson rode along with her as far as University Avenue.

30



After she dropped him off, Johnson walked back to the village alone. Near the

landfill office, he saw Thomas with a young White couple. Johnson passed within

15 to 20 feet of them. Thomas was standing and staring into space. He appeared

angry.

3. Thomas’s statements and conduct after the murders

Sometime after sunrise on August 16, a body was seen floating in the bay.

Berkeley Police Detective Fred Eihl arrived at the Berkeley dump landfill area

shortly after 11:00 a.m. Detective Eihl testified that he was standing about 30 feet

from the body, which was floating facedown. Some white upper clothing was

visible, but neither the face nor the legs could be seen. Thomas was standing

about 15 feet behind Eihl, about 45 feet from the body. As personnel from the

coroner’s office began to remove the body from the water, while the face was still

not visible and before Eihl could tell whether the body was male or female,

Thomas said, “That’s Mary.”

Because Thomas had made a tentative identification, Eihl asked him for

more information. Thomas told Eihl that he knew the victim only as Mary. Asked

when he last saw Mary, Thomas said they had partied the night before in a van just

outside the gate. Thomas’s account of the party was generally similar to that

provided by Jim Prew. Eihl asked Thomas what he did after that. Thomas told

him he saw Gioia and Kniffin as he was walking out the dump road from Rainbow

Village to Ledger’s Liquor Store. Gioia and Kniffin asked him for a match;12

Thomas stopped to give them one and smoked marijuana with them. He then

proceeded to Ledger’s, found it closed, and returned to Rainbow Village. He got

money and went to various locations to try to purchase marijuana. When it grew

12

Although Thomas claimed the victims needed a match, a waterlogged book

of matches was recovered from Gioia’s clothing.

31



light out, he went to a laundromat in the area of University and San Pablo

Avenues.13 After finishing his laundry, he returned to Rainbow Village.14

Thomas Medlin testified that after Gioia’s body was found, Thomas asked

him to hold his gun cleaning kit for awhile. Medlin took the kit and hid it in his

car. Later, Thomas asked Medlin to hold his ammunition, but Medlin refused and

gave him back both the gun cleaning kit and the container with the ammunition.

Thomas told Medlin he had been “dumpster diving” (i.e., searching for

salvageable items) all the previous night and had been back and forth from

Rainbow Village into town several times.

On August 17, Berkeley Police Inspector Daniel Wolke interviewed

Thomas at Rainbow Village. Thomas’s statement generally agreed with what he

had earlier told Detective Eihl, with certain discrepancies. In the August 17

interview, Thomas said that Kniffin was not at the party in Jim Prew’s van; in the

earlier interview, he had said Kniffin was present. Additionally, he described his

encounter with Gioia and Kniffin near the landfill office somewhat differently to

Wolke than he had to Eihl. When he met Gioia and Kniffin about 1:30 a.m. on his

way to Ledger’s Liquors, Thomas told Wolke, they asked him for some marijuana

and he shared some with them, smoking it in his corncob pipe. He said he also

drank beer with them. Thomas claimed he must have lost his pipe at that time.

Thomas said he got his laundry from his car about sunrise.

Asked if he owned any guns, Thomas said he had a Remington .44

magnum bolt-action rifle without a clip. When Wolke asked to see the rifle,


13

Jim Prew testified that he saw Thomas near the intersection of Marina

Boulevard and University Avenue shortly after 9:15 a.m. on August 16, but did
not notice Thomas carrying anything.
14

The total round-trip distance involved in Thomas’s narrative was 16.8

miles.

32



Thomas told him it had been stolen late Thursday afternoon or Thursday evening

(August 15). Thomas showed Wolke a lidded Tupperware container and claimed

that the 10 or 11 bullets he kept in it were missing. Wolke asked if Thomas had

made a police report or told anyone the gun had been stolen; Thomas said no.

Thomas said he had last fired it on Thursday evening.

On August 20, Thomas again spoke with Wolke and gave another account

of the events of August 15-16, more detailed than his earlier statements and

inconsistent with them in some respects. He told Wolke that just before dark on

August 15, he had gone with David Bergman and Melody Medlin, Thomas

Medlin’s wife, to liquor stores on University Avenue. Thomas purchased ale.

After returning to Rainbow Village, Thomas ran into Tracy Scarborough. He and

Scarborough drank ale and smoked marijuana in Thomas’s car. About 9:00 p.m.,

Scarborough fell asleep. Thomas joined Gioia, Jim Prew, Chris Campbell, and

Paul Harter at Prew’s van and drank with them. They were drinking whiskey, and

Thomas returned to his car to get a pint bottle of Wild Turkey.

Later in the evening, Campbell asked for a ride to Richmond, so they all got

in the van and drove out to Richmond. At the San Pablo Dam Road exit, they

went to a convenience store and bought burritos and beer. It was 12:59 a.m. They

dropped Campbell off and returned to Rainbow Village, stopping to give Kniffin a

ride from University Avenue. They continued to drink together for 15 or 20

minutes. Then Prew said he was tired, Gioia and Kniffin left, and Thomas went

back to his car to drop off his pint of Wild Turkey. At that time, Thomas decided

to go to Ledger’s Liquors to buy some beer. Walking out past the village, he saw

Vivian Cercy’s car pointed north along the roadside. He also saw Gioia and

Kniffin near the concrete docks. Kniffin called him over to ask him if he had any

matches. Thomas gave them some wooden matches in a leather-like pouch with a

beaded design of deer mating, which he called “Peruvian love beads.” They asked

33



him if he had any marijuana. Thomas said he did and took out a wooden pipe in

which they all smoked the marijuana. They also drank beer. Thomas told Wolke

he also had a corncob pipe with a broken stem and that he must have left it behind

for Gioia and Kniffin or else lost it where they were. While Thomas was with

them, Vincent Johnson passed by on his way to Rainbow Village and said hello.

Thomas spent a total of less than 10 minutes with Gioia and Kniffin before

proceeding to Ledger’s Liquors. Finding the store closed, he returned to the

village. He got his jacket and $20 from his car. He then walked to various

locations in an unsuccessful effort to purchase marijuana. He did not see Gioia

and Kniffin on his way. He then returned to Rainbow Village, removed his jacket,

got his laundry from his car, and walked to the laundromat at University and San

Pablo Avenues. It was about daybreak when he got his laundry out of the car.

Asked what time it was when he got to the laundromat and began to do his

laundry, Thomas said it was after 6:00 a.m. Wolke asked if he knew when the

laundromat opened; defendant said it opened at 7:00 a.m., so he must have done

his laundry after 7:00 a.m. While doing his laundry, Thomas went across the

street to a bakery and got some coffee. Thomas said he ran into a man named

Claude Roseman, who lived at the UC Hotel, and he lent Roseman a dollar.

On his return to Rainbow Village, Thomas stopped by the landfill office

and noticed several people there. He then went to his car, opened the rear door,

and noticed that his rifle was missing from its case, along with a white

Tupperware container that had approximately eleven .44 magnum shells in it.15


15

During his August 17 interview, Thomas told Wolke that the thief had

taken the ammunition but left the Tupperware case, which Thomas showed
Wolke.

34



Wolke told Thomas that the police could not figure out the motive for the

murders. Thomas said he could think of plenty of reasons why somebody would

want to murder the victims. Wolke said, “Why don’t you tell me one?” Thomas

paused and then said he could not think of any at the time. Wolke asked if he

would be willing to take a polygraph test regarding his missing rifle. Thomas said

he would have to think about it and get some legal advice.

4. Additional physical evidence

Inspector Wolke testified that on August 16, he examined a sand pile north

of where Gioia’s body had been found and adjacent to the spot where Kniffin’s

body was recovered. He observed two sets of drag marks in the sand and

bloodstains on some rocks near the water. Detective Eihl testified to the same

observations. A corncob pipe with a broken stem was recovered from the area.

Thomas’s rifle and the distinctive match pouch he said he had loaned the victims

were never found.

In short, though circumstantial, the evidence against Thomas was

considerable.

In addition, the prosecution called rebuttal witnesses that cast doubt on

Cercy’s testimony. Inspector Wolke testified that he interviewed Cercy on

August 17 after Harry Shorman, the unofficial mayor of Rainbow Village and

Cercy’s boyfriend, introduced him to her. She told Wolke that she had “had quite

a bit to drink” on the night of August 15. She did not mention seeing a rifle, but

said that, while overhearing the conversation she reported, she saw a person stick a

10- or 12-inch object down his waistband. She was positive it was not a rifle. She

did not tell Wolke that someone had threatened to kill her. Additionally, Rainbow

Village resident Vincent Johnson testified that in September or October 1985,

Cercy had told him she “basically hadn’t seen anything” on the night of the

murders, and everything she had said she was told to say by Shorman.

35



Against that evidence, a competent investigation would have offered, in

addition to Cercy’s testimony, Cho’s testimony that he knew of a man named Bo

who was tall, thin, and blond and who had gone “swimming in the bay” the night

of the murders, and Turley’s testimony that he too knew of a tall, blond Deadhead

named Bo. Neither Cho nor Turley could have provided any corroboration of

what Cercy saw the night of the murders, nor could either have offered any

testimony that would materially sharpen suspicion that Bo, not Thomas, was the

true killer. In short, their evidence would not have made a difference; when

compared with the evidence against Thomas, we conclude there is no reasonable

probability it would have led to a more favorable verdict.

Our conclusion would not change even if we were to disregard the referee’s

findings that many of the habeas corpus witnesses could not reasonably have been

located or would not have been called had they been found. The sum total of the

evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing establishes that a person known as

“Bo” existed in the Deadhead community and was one of many Deadheads in

Rainbow Village in the days before and after the murders. It does nothing to move

from the realm of speculation what Bo’s ties were to Gioia, if any, whether he had

access to a weapon, whether he had reason to kill Gioia, and—given the absence

of foundation for how Cercy attached the name “Bo” to a person she had never

met—whether the blond man others knew as “Bo” was even the person Cercy saw

with Gioia the night of the murders.

The real difficulty with the potential case against “Bo,” however, is that it

does absolutely nothing to undermine the case actually presented against

Thomas—the fortuitous “disappearance” of his .44 magnum rifle, the multiple

witnesses who saw him with the victims, his identification of Gioia the next

morning, the repeated inconsistencies in his shifting explanations, and the corncob

pipe found at the scene. Put another way, even if listening to the habeas corpus

36



witnesses might in the abstract make one ponder a small possibility that “Bo”

might have killed Gioia and Kniffin, listening to the prosecution case would have

established in a reasonable juror’s mind the near certainty that Thomas did kill

them. We thus conclude that Thomas has not demonstrated a reasonable

probability of a more favorable outcome.

DISPOSITION

Our order to show cause was limited to a single claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Thomas’s other claims and his petition for writ of habeas

corpus will be resolved by separate orders, as is our practice. (See In re Scott,

supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 829.) The order to show cause as to Thomas’s petition is

discharged.

WERDEGAR, J.

WE CONCUR:

GEORGE,

C.J.

BAXTER,

J.

CHIN,

J.

MORENO,

J.

ELIA,

J.*


*

Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, assigned

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

37






DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J.




Petitioner was charged with two counts of murder. At trial, he blamed the

murders on a man named “Bo.” That defense was presented through the

preliminary hearing testimony of a single witness. Defense counsel, a deputy

public defender, made no reasonable efforts to locate potential witnesses to

corroborate that testimony: Refusing the assistance of the public defender’s

highly experienced staff of investigators, he insisted on undertaking the task

himself, but his own feeble efforts were utterly inadequate.

The majority concludes that defense counsel’s inadequate investigation

violated defendant’s right to effective representation. The majority insists,

however, that counsel’s incompetence did not prejudice petitioner. I disagree. In

my view, there is a “reasonable probability” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466

U.S. 668, 694) that the outcome of trial would have been different if defense

counsel had conducted a competent investigation. Therefore, I would vacate

petitioner’s two murder convictions and the judgment of death.

I

Murder victims Mary Gioia and Greg Kniffin were “Deadheads,” a name

used for followers of the Grateful Dead, a popular rock band based in the San

Francisco Bay Area. The Deadheads were nomads who followed the Grateful

Dead around the country when the band went on concert tours. In August 1985,

Gioia, Kniffin, and many other Deadheads were staying in Rainbow Village, a

1



homeless encampment in Berkeley, located next to San Francisco Bay. In the early

morning hours of August 16, 1985, Gioia and Kniffin were beaten and shot to death

at point-blank range, apparently with a high-powered rifle or shotgun, and their

bodies were thrown into the bay. There was no obvious motive for the murders.

Petitioner was not a Deadhead, but he was living in Rainbow Village at the

time of the murders. The circumstantial evidence against him at trial was strong

but not overwhelming: (1) He was seen with the two victims around 2:30 a.m.,

shortly before their deaths; (2) he owned a high-powered rifle that could have

inflicted the fatal wounds; he was seen using the rifle on the night of the murders,

but the next morning he claimed it had been stolen and later that day he said he

was worried that it had been used to shoot the victims; (3) he told the police he

was with the victims on the night of the murders, and he made somewhat

inconsistent statements about his activities that night; (4) police found a corncob

pipe near some bloodstains in the sand, not far from where the bodies were found,

and petitioner admitted that on the night of the murders he and the victims had

used a corncob pipe to smoke marijuana together; and (5) when the police

recovered Gioia’s body from San Francisco Bay, petitioner exclaimed, “That’s

Mary,” although he was about 45 feet away at the time.

The defense introduced the preliminary hearing testimony of Vivian Cercy,

who was unavailable at the guilt phase of petitioner’s capital trial. She said that

about 1:30 a.m. on the night of the murders, she saw a man and a woman who

resembled the murder victims speaking to a man with long blond hair known as

“Bo,” whose true name Cercy did not know. Bo held an object in his hand, and

Cercy heard him ask, “Do you think she’s seen anything?” The man who looked

like Kniffin replied, “No, she couldn’t have.” The woman said, “You have to give

it back”; Bo responded, “This could mean money to us, we need this.” The

woman said, “I don’t want any part of this, I’m going,” and she began to walk

2



away. Cercy invited her to spend the night in Cercy’s car; the woman refused.

Saying, “I’ll take care of this,” Bo walked after the woman. About 15 minutes

later, Cercy heard noises that sounded like firecrackers. She later saw Bo walk up

the waterfront and wipe his hands on the vegetation growing there; thereafter, Bo

washed his hands in a sink at Rainbow Village. Around 4:00 a.m., a man knocked

on the window of Cercy’s car, asked her who she was and where she was staying,

and said he was going to kill her.

The prosecution impeached Cercy’s testimony by calling a police officer

who testified that when he interviewed Cercy she admitted having quite a bit to

drink on the night of the two murders; she did not mention that on that night a man

had threatened to kill her. The prosecution also called Vincent Johnson, a resident

of Rainbow Village, who testified that Cercy had told him she had seen nothing on

the night of the murders, but that she had given a statement to the police because

her boyfriend, Harry Shorman, had asked her to do so.

After deliberating for five days, the jury convicted petitioner of one count

of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder, and it found true an

alleged multiple-murder special circumstance. At the penalty phase, it returned a

verdict of death. This court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. (People

v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489.)

In 1997, petitioner filed this habeas corpus petition alleging that his trial

attorney, Alameda County Deputy Public Defender James Chaffee, had not

conducted a competent investigation to locate potential witnesses who could

corroborate Cercy’s testimony about Bo. This court appointed a referee, Alameda

County Superior Court Judge Philip Sarkisian, to conduct an evidentiary hearing

on petitioner’s claim.

At the evidentiary hearing, Attorney Chaffee testified that he chose to do

his own investigation rather than rely on the highly trained investigators of the

3



public defender’s office, because this would allow him to talk to potential

witnesses and decide if he wanted to use them. To corroborate Cercy’s story, he

talked to residents of Rainbow Village. The people he spoke to, however, were

not Deadheads and knew nothing about Bo. By the time Chaffee spoke to these

persons, the Grateful Dead were on tour, and the Deadheads had left Rainbow

Village to follow the band. Chaffee made no effort to track down the Deadhead

community to look for Bo. This court’s referee concluded, “Chaffee did not look

for Bo among the Deadheads because he wanted to try the case with Cercy’s

testimony about a person named Bo. Chaffee was not certain he ‘wanted to press

to [sic] hard on whether or not such a person actually existed’ in part because he

was never certain Cercy had actually seen a person who might be connected with

the case . . . . He believed the state of the evidence from Cercy’s preliminary

hearing testimony was as good as it would ever be for the defense.”

At the evidentiary hearing, petitioner presented the testimony of a number

of witnesses who, he claimed, could have been located if his trial attorney had

conducted a competent investigation, and who at trial could have given

corroborative testimony supporting the defense theory that Bo, not petitioner, had

killed Gioia and Kniffin. Petitioner asserted that Bo was James Bowen, a man

who matched Cercy’s description of the person she knew as Bo, and who was in

Rainbow Village at the time of the murders. The name of Weston Sudduth, an

acquaintance of Bowen’s, figured prominently in the testimony of the witnesses.

Below, I summarize the testimony of the most significant witnesses at the

evidentiary hearing:

1. Jong Cheol Cho was a Deadhead who knew murder victims Kniffin and

Gioia, as well as two men he knew as Bo and Weston. He identified a photo of

James Bowen as being the man he knew as Bo. He spent the night of the murders

in Rainbow Village. The next day, he talked to Bo and Weston about Gioia’s

4



death. Bo said either that “I” or “we” “went swimming into the bay last night,”

after which Weston “suddenly jabbed him” in the rib and simultaneously gave him

“a look.” The conversation abruptly stopped.

2. Randy Turley owned the Dead On bus, in which he would drive people

to Grateful Dead concerts around the country. He knew someone named Bo who

sold tie-dye clothing at Grateful Dead concerts, and he identified a photo of James

Bowen as the man he knew as Bo. Although Turley’s testimony simply went to

corroborating the existence of the man named Bo, his importance to the defense

lay in the fact that he was well-known in the Deadhead community, and thus could

have assisted the defense in locating potential defense witnesses.

3. Robert Herbert came to California in July 1985. After attending some

Grateful Dead concerts he and some friends moved into an apartment in Chico, in

Butte County. He knew Randy Turley, the owner of the Dead On bus. In late

August or early September 1985, a few weeks after the two murders, a man named

James Bowen, known as Bo, moved into the apartment where Herbert was living.

Herbert remembers a conversation in which a man he knew as Weston asked Bo,

“How can you sleep at night? How can you live with yourself?”

4. Toma Cauffield moved into a Chico apartment with her boyfriend,

Robert Herbert, in early August 1985. In late August, a man named James Bowen,

who was known as Bo and sold tie-dye shirts, moved into the apartment. In

September 1985, a man named Weston Sudduth came to the apartment. She heard

Sudduth yell at Bo: “How could you do it? How can you sleep with yourself at

night?” After the incident, Bo became withdrawn and he moved out soon

thereafter.

5. David Kohn came to California in December 1985, five months after the

two murders. In early 1986, he shared an apartment in Chico with James Bowen,

whom he knew as Bo. In February 1986, while driving in a car after a Grateful

5



Dead concert, Bowen said women were “evil” and he had “killed his brother over

a woman.”

6. Daniel Adams was a Deadhead. In the days before the two murders, he

heard an exchange between murder victim Gioia, who was “very upset,” and a

man he knew as Bo, who seemed “controlling.” On the morning after the

murders, Adams heard Bo say, “Sometimes a man’s got to do what must be done.”

Bo then packed and left Rainbow Village in a hurry.

II

The majority concedes that, with a reasonably competent investigation, the

defense would have been able to locate potential witnesses Cho and Turley, but it

concludes that the defense would not have been able to find potential witnesses

Herbert, Cauffield, Kohn, and Adams. The majority acknowledges that bus owner

Randy Turley was a source that could have lead to potential defense witnesses, but

it points out that at the time of trial, petitioner’s trial counsel did not know that

“Bo” was James Bowen, and that potential witnesses Herbert, Cauffield, and Kohn

were never in Rainbow Village.

I am unpersuaded by the majority’s conclusion that a competent

investigation would not have led to any of the four witnesses I just mentioned.

After all, petitioner’s habeas corpus counsel, who did not begin his own

investigation into locating potential witnesses until eight years after the murders,

managed to find nine Deadheads (Cho, Turley, Herbert, Cauffield, Kohn, Adams,

and three other witnesses whose testimony was less significant) who were familiar

with Bo and willing to testify on petitioner’s behalf. Although most Deadheads

were known to use illegal drugs and consequently distrusted the police, there is no

reason to believe that they would have felt the same way about a criminal defense

investigator, especially if they believed that the defense was representing an

innocent man charged with murder.

6



The majority also states that even if a reasonably competent investigation

would have located all of the witnesses who testified on petitioner’s behalf at the

evidentiary hearing, and those witnesses had been called to testify at petitioner’s

trial, it is not reasonably probable that the outcome of trial would have been

different. I disagree.

The witnesses who testified at the evidentiary hearing would have greatly

strengthened witness Cercy’s preliminary hearing testimony had they testified at

petitioner’s trial. They would have established that “Bo” was a real person, not a

figment of Cercy’s imagination; that Bo was in Rainbow Village on the night of

the two murders; and that Bo had an unpleasant talk with murder victim Gioia

shortly before her death. And had those witnesses been called at trial, their

testimony would have shown that several months after the two murders, Bo

admitted killing his “brother” over a woman. The word “brother” in this context

could have been a reference to a close companion rather than a sibling, and Bo’s

statement might have been considered by the jury as an admission of guilt.

Most significant, however, was the testimony of Jong Cheol Cho. He

testified that, during a conversation about the murders the day after they occurred,

Bo said he had gone swimming in San Francisco Bay the previous night, and that

Bo then suddenly stopped talking after his friend Weston elbowed him in the ribs.

Unless Bo had some innocent reason to go swimming in San Francisco Bay at

night (and the majority offers none) and an innocent reason to mention this late-

night swim during a conversation about the murders (and the majority offers

none), Bo’s statement strongly implicates him in the murders of Gioia and Kniffin,

whose killer or killers had dumped their bodies in the bay.

When a criminal defendant at trial has been denied the constitutional right

to effective representation, reversal is required if there is a “reasonable

probability”—that is, a probability “sufficient to undermine confidence in the

7



outcome”—that counsel’s incompetence affected the jury’s verdict. (Strickland v.

Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) Here, if the jury had heard the testimony

of the witnesses that petitioner presented at the evidentiary hearing, it might

nonetheless have convicted him of the two murders and imposed the death

sentence. But there is at least a reasonable probability that it would not have done

so. Notwithstanding the minimal showing by the defense in support of its claim

that Bo rather than defendant committed the murders, the jury deliberated for five

days before rendering its verdicts. These lengthy deliberations are a strong

indication that the jury found the issue of defendant’s guilt to be close and

difficult. Had defendant’s trial attorney called the witnesses who later testified at

the evidentiary hearing, his claim that James Bowen rather than petitioner

committed the murders would have been greatly strengthened, and the jury might

well have concluded there was a reasonable doubt about defendant’s guilt and

declined to convict him of the capital murders.

I would grant the habeas corpus petition and vacate petitioner’s two murder

convictions and sentence of death.

KENNARD,

J.

8



See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion In re Thomas on Habeas Corpus
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
XXX
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.
S063274
Date Filed: March 6, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

County:
Judge:


__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Alex Reisman and William A. Snyder, Jr., under appointments by the Supreme Court, and John R. Grele
for Petitioner Ralph International Thomas.




__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, George Williamson, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief
Assistant Attorneys General, Ronald A. Bass and Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorneys General, Peggy S.
Ruffra, Ronald S. Matthias and Dane R. Gillette, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent State of
California.











Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Alex Reisman
Bourdon & Reisman
861 Bryant Street
San Francisco, CA 94103
(415) 626-5134

Dane R. Gillette
Deputy Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004
(415) 703-5866


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Mon, 03/06/2006S063274

Parties
1Thomas, Ralph International (Petitioner)
San Quentin State Prison
Represented by Alex Reisman
Law Office of Alex Reisman
214 Duboce Ave.
San Francisco, CA

2Thomas, Ralph International (Petitioner)
San Quentin State Prison
Represented by William Arthur Snyder
Attorney at Law
2708 Pelham Ave.
Baltimore, MD

3Department Of Corrections & Rehabilitation (Non-Title Respondent)
Represented by Attorney General - San Francisco Office
Dane R. Gillette, Senior Assistant Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA


Disposition
Mar 6 2006Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Aug 1 1997Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed
  By Attys Alex Reisman and William A. Snyder, Jr. (131 Pp.), with Applic. for Stay of Execution (no Execution Date Set.)
Aug 1 1997Filed:
  One Vol. of Exhibits in support of Petn.
Aug 4 1997Informal response requested
  Letter sent to respondent requesting informal response (Rule 60); due 9-2-97. Any reply due within 30 days of service & filing of response.
Aug 5 1997Received:
  Table of Authorities to Petn.
Aug 25 1997Application for Extension of Time filed
  To file Informal Response.
Aug 28 1997Extension of Time application Granted
  To 10-2-97 To file Informal Response.
Sep 24 1997Informal Response filed (AA)
  (75 Pp.)
Sep 24 1997Filed:
  2 Vols. of Exhibits in support of Informal Response.
Oct 22 1997Application for Extension of Time filed
  By Petitioner to file reply to Informal response
Oct 24 1997Extension of Time application Granted
  To November 24,1997 To file reply To Informal response
Nov 24 1997Reply to Informal Response filed (AA)
  (39 Pp. Excluding Exhibit).
May 27 1999Change of Address filed for:
  Atty General - S.F. Office.
Aug 30 2000Application for stay denied
  The Motion for Stay of Execution, filed August 1, 1997, is denied without prejudice to its renewal upon the setting of an execution date in this matter.
Jan 24 2001Order to show cause issued
  The Director of the Department of Corrections is ordered to show cause in this court, when the matter is placed on calendar, why the relief prayed for should not be granted on the ground that trial counsel's failure to investigate and present evidence that another person had killed the two victims and otherwise to investigate and present evidence that would have corroborated Vivian Cercy's testimony deprived petitioner of his right to the effective assistance of counsel, as alleged in the petition for writ of habeas corpus (claim B). The return shall be filed on or before February 23, 2001. Votes: George, C.J., Mosk, Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin & Brown, J.J.
Feb 23 2001Filed:
  respondent's exhibits, Vol. III.
Feb 23 2001Filed:
  respondent's exhibits Vol. III, exhibit HH (videotape)
Feb 23 2001Written return filed
  (48 pp.)
Mar 20 2001Application for Extension of Time filed
  To file Petitioner's Traverse. (1st request)
Mar 22 2001Filed:
  Declaration in support of ext. of time to file Traverse
Mar 27 2001Extension of Time application Granted
  To 4/30/2001 to file petnr.'s traverse to OSC. (No further extensions of time contemplated)
Apr 30 2001Traverse to Return filed - (52 Pp.)
 
Jun 13 2001Reference hearing ordered
  THE COURT: Based on the record in this matter and good cause appearing: The Honorable William McKinstry, Presiding Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, shall select a Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court to sit as a referee in this proceeding and shall promptly notify this court of the referee selected. After appointment by this court, the referee shall take evidence and make findings of fact on the following questions regarding the case of People v. Ralph International Thomas (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. CR83244; Judge Robert K. Byers): 1. What information did trial counsel James Chaffee have, prior to trial, concerning the possible identity of the blond man Vivian Cercy testified she saw with persons who apparently were Mary and Greg Kniffen, on the night they were killed? 2. What action, if any, did Chaffee take to investigate this information prior to trial? 3. If he investigated incompletely or not at all, what, if any, were his reasons? 4. Did Chaffee know, or could he reasonably have learned, prior to trial, of the existence, whereabouts and potential usefulness as witnesses of Megan Barry, David Kohn, Daniel Adams and and Claus von Wendel? 5. If Chaffee could have contacted these potential witnesses, what information would they have provided? 6. Would they have testified at petitioner's trial and, if so, to what effect? It is further ordered that the referee prepare and submit to this court a report of the proceedings conducted pursuant to this appointment, of the evidence adduced, and the findings of fact made. Any requests for discovery in this matter should be addressed to the referee.
Jun 25 2001Change of Address filed for:
  for appointed associate counsel William A. Snyder, Jr.
Jun 27 2001Referee appointed
  THE COURT: Based on the record in this matter and good cause appearing: The Honorable Philip V. Sarkisian, Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, is appointed to sit as a referee in this proceeding. He shall take evidence and make findings of fact on the following questions regarding the case of People v. Ralph International Thomas (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. CR83244; Judge Robert K. Byers): 1. What information did trial counsel James Chaffee have, prior to trial, concerning the possible identity of the blond man Vivian Cercy testified she saw with persons who apparently were Mary Gioia and Greg Kniffen, on the night they were killed? 2. What action, if any, did Chaffee take to investigate this information prior to trial? 3. If he investigated incompletely or not at all, what, if any, were his reasons? 4. Did Chaffee know, or could he reasonably have learned, prior to trial, of the existence, whereabouts and potential usefulness as witnesses of Megan Barry, David Kohn, Daniel Adams and Claus von Wendel? 5. If Chaffee could have contacted these potential witnesses, what information would they have provided? 6. Would they have testified at petitioner's trial and, if so, to what effect? It is further ordered that the referee prepare and submit to this court a report of the proceedings conducted pursuant to this appointment, of the evidence adduced, and the findings of fact made. Any requests for discovery in this matter shall be addressed to the referee.
Oct 29 2002Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Reisman
Apr 30 2003Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Reisman
May 7 2003Referee's report filed
 
May 7 2003Letter sent to:
  counsel inviting parties to serve and file exceptions to the report of the referee and simultaneous briefs on the merits on or before 6-6-2003. Responses, if any, should be served and filed 30 days thereafter.
May 12 2003Received letter from:
  the Hon. Philip Sarkisian, dated 4-7-2003, re: typographical omission in referee's report.
May 19 2003Filed:
  record from evidentiary hearing. (includes 15 vols. of reporter's transcript (999 pp.); petitioner's exhibits, 1-12; and respondent's exhibits, A-K).
May 23 2003Request for extension of time filed
  by petitioner to file exceptions to the referee's report and brief on the merits. (1st request)
May 29 2003Extension of time granted
  to 8/4/2003 to file the exceptions to referee's report and brief on the merits. After that date, only two further extensions totaling about 90 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon counsel Alex Reisman's representation that he anticipates filing that document by 11/3/2003. Upon the court's own motion, the time for filing respondent's exceptions to the referee's report and brief on the merits is extended to and including 8/4/2003.
Jul 31 2003Request for extension of time filed
  by petitioner to file exceptions to the referee's report and brief on the merits. (2nd request)
Aug 5 2003Extension of time granted
  to 10/3/2003 to file the exceptions to the referee's report and brief on the merits. After that date, only one further extension totaling about 30 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon counsel Alex Reisman's representation that he anticipates filing that document by 11/3/2003. Upon the court's own motion, the time for filing respondent's exceptions to the referee's report on the merits is extending to and including 10/3/2003.
Oct 6 2003Request for extension of time filed
  by petitioner to file exceptions to referee's report and brief on the merits. (2nd request)
Oct 15 2003Extension of time granted
  to 11/3/203 to petitioner to file the exceptions to referee's report and brief on the merits. Extension is granted based upon counsel Alex Reisman's representation that he anticipates filing that brief by 11/3/2003. After that date, no further extension will be granted. Upon the court's own motion, the time for filng respondent's exceptions to the referee's report on the merits is extended to and including 11/3/2003.
Nov 3 2003Exceptions/briefing filed re referee's report
  "Respondent's Brief on the Merits." (76 pp.)
Nov 3 2003Exceptions/briefing filed re referee's report
  petitioner's brief on the merits. (252 pp. - excluding appendices)
Nov 18 2003Response brief re referee's report (awaiting more)
  "Petitioner's Reply to Attorney General's Brief on the Merits." (14 pp.)
Nov 24 2003Response brief re referee's report (fully briefed)
  Respondent's response to petitioner's exceptions to the referee's findings and brief on the merits. (12 pp.)
Mar 16 2005Received:
  Letter from respondent, dated 3/16/2005, requesting the matter be set for argument at the court's earliest convenience.
Sep 12 2005Oral argument letter sent
  advising counsel that case could be scheduled for oral argument as early as the November calendar, to be held the week of November 7, 2005, in Sacramento.
Nov 9 2005Case ordered on calendar
  December 6, 2005, 2:00 p.m., in Los Angeles
Nov 16 2005Request for Extended Media coverage Filed
  By John Hancock of The California Channel.
Nov 17 2005Filed:
  letter from Sr. Asst. AG Gillette, dated 11/17/2005, stipulating that Justice Kennard may participate in determining the matter.
Nov 17 2005Filed:
  Stipulation of attorney Alex Reisman, counsel for petitioner Thomas, stipulating to Justice Kennard's participation in the case even though she will not be present at oral argument.
Nov 18 2005Request for Extended Media coverage Granted
  subject to the conditions set forth in rule 980, California Rules of Court.
Nov 28 2005Received:
  letter from appellant, dated 11-23-2005, with additional authorities.
Nov 28 2005Order filed
  The order filed Nov. 18, 2005, granting media coverage is hereby vacated.
Dec 6 2005Cause argued and submitted
 
Jan 6 2006Change of contact information filed for:
  attorney Alex Reisman.
Mar 6 2006Opinion filed: OSC discharged
  Majority Opinion by Werdegar, J. -----joined by George, C.J., Baxter, Chin, Moreno & Elia (CA 6 assigned) JJ. Dissent by Kennard, J. (NOTE: other claims and petition for writ of habeas corpus will be resolved by separate orders)
Apr 12 2006Order filed: remaining habeas corpus issues denied
  The petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed August 1, 1997, is denied as to all claims except claim B, which was resolved via a separate opinion. (See In re Thomas (Mar. 6, 2006, S063274) __ Cal.4th ___.) Claim A and claims C through N, including all subclaims, are denied on the merits. Except for claims B, L, M and N, all claims in the petition are denied as untimely. (See In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780-781; In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 763-799.) The following claims are also denied on the ground that they could have been, but were not, raised on appeal (see In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 825, fn. 3; In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756): claims J and K. Werdegar, J., was absent and did not participate.
Apr 12 2006Letter sent to:
  counsel advising that the opinion, filed on 3-6-2006, was final on 4-6-2006. No remittitur will issue.

Briefs
Feb 23 2001Written return filed
 
Apr 30 2001Traverse to Return filed - (52 Pp.)
 
Nov 24 2003Response brief re referee's report (fully briefed)
 
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website