Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S119066
In re Salazar

Filed 6/6/05


Plaintiff and Respondent,
Ct.App. 2/4 B117225
Los Angeles County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. LA025781
__________________ _________________ )
Ct. App. 2/4 B137034
on Habeas Corpus.
Los Angeles County
____________________________________) Super.
Ct. No. LA025781
A jury found petitioner Jose Salazar guilty of killing 11-month-old Adriana
Krygoski, who had been left in his care, and convicted him of second degree
murder and assault on a child resulting in death. While his appeal was pending
(B117225), he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (B137034) in which he
alleged, inter alia, that the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office withheld
and was withholding exculpatory information in the form of evidence to impeach
the forensic pathologist who testified at his trial, Dr. James Ribe, in violation of
Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady). The Court of Appeal issued an
order to show cause, remanded the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary
hearing, and ultimately granted relief in a published opinion.

Although the Court of Appeal failed to discuss an essential element of a
Brady claim—i.e., whether the district attorney’s office had suppressed the
allegedly exculpatory evidence—we decline to remand the matter to the Court of
Appeal for reconsideration because we also find that the evidence allegedly
suppressed was not “material” within the meaning of Brady. We therefore reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Around 7:30 a.m. on November 18, 1996, Kimberly Krygoski dropped off
her 11-month-old daughter, Adriana, with the babysitter, Joanne Moreau. Adriana
had been playing in her crib after waking up. She had a couple of bruises on her
forehead but was otherwise healthy.
Moreau found Adriana to be a “fussy” eater that morning and, when she put
the baby down for a nap, thought she might be developing a cold. As Moreau
prepared to leave the house to run some errands, she planned to take the sleeping
baby along, but petitioner offered to stay and take care of her instead.1 Moreau
checked on Adriana just before leaving. Adriana lifted her head, and Moreau
noticed that her eyes were red. She took Adriana’s temperature, which was
normal, and examined her. Other than the cold symptoms, the baby seemed to be
“fine,” so she let Adriana go back to sleep. Moreau left Adriana alone with
petitioner around 10:20 a.m.
At 11:46 a.m., petitioner called 911 to report that Adriana was barely
breathing, that her body was shaking, and that she did not seem to know “where
she’s at.” When the paramedics arrived seven minutes later, they found Adriana
lying in the hall, next to a large amount of vomit. Her breathing was very shallow,

Petitioner, who was the boyfriend of Moreau’s daughter, Sheree Beckwith,
had been staying at Moreau’s apartment since his outpatient shoulder surgery two
weeks earlier.

and she had no muscle control. Petitioner appeared calm and said he did not know
what had happened.
By the time Adriana arrived at the emergency room at Northridge Hospital,
she was unresponsive and was making only minimal respiratory efforts. Dr.
Harold Lowder felt a “very boggy” area in the back of her head, which indicated a
serious injury. Adriana never regained consciousness.
Petitioner told Dr. Lowder that Adriana had had a choking episode while he
was feeding her and that she may have subsequently had a seizure. The CT scan,
however, indicated substantial head injuries—subdural hematoma, brain swelling,
and skull fractures—that could have been caused only by extreme force, such as
an auto accident or beating and shaking of the child.
Dr. Lowder opined that the injuries had been caused by 10 to 15 seconds of
moderately severe shaking of the baby, possibly with her head striking against a
hard surface. In his experience, injuries of this severity were caused by an auto
accident, a fall from a great height, or violence—and, in each case, the loss of
consciousness was immediate. It would not have been possible for Adriana to
have sustained these “extremely severe” injuries days or even hours earlier, nor
could these injuries have been self-inflicted or the result of a fall onto a table.2
Had the paramedics not been called, Adriana would have died within minutes.
Because the history petitioner recounted was inconsistent with the injuries Dr.
Lowder observed, he asked the hospital staff to contact the police.
Dr. Gilbert Mellin, a radiologist at Northridge Hospital, examined the CT
scan and agreed that Adriana’s multiple skull fractures were the product of

Earlier that morning, while petitioner’s girlfriend was watching her,
Adriana fell and hit the side of her head on the coffee table, but she quickly
recovered her spirits and was laughing and having a good time. The previous
week, Adriana fell and hit her forehead on the table while learning to walk, but
once again she recovered and continued playing.

multiple severe impacts. The injuries could not have been caused by a bump on a
coffee table or a fall from a bed or high chair, nor could they have been self-
inflicted or accidental.
Dr. Dorothy Calvin, a pediatric ophthalmologist, examined Adriana and
found her optic nerves were swollen with edema. She opined that Adriana’s
injuries had been inflicted deliberately, most likely by shaking, and agreed with
the other experts that they could not have been self-inflicted or the product of a
Adriana was declared brain dead on November 20, 1996, at 4:00 a.m. and
was taken off life support a few hours later.
Meanwhile, petitioner gave several statements to police.
He told Officer Jaime Chacon that he had tried to feed Adriana because she
was crying, but she threw up. When her eyes started “acting funny,” he tried to
cheer her up by tossing her into the air a couple of times. He called 911 when she
did not improve.
After petitioner was arrested, he told Officer Chris Mezich that he had been
playing with Adriana in the living room and that he had fed her about half a jar of
baby food when she suddenly started coughing, choking, and spitting up green
vomit. He called 911 when her eyes started blinking rapidly and rolled back in her
Petitioner told Detective Terry Lopez that he brought Adriana to the living
room when she woke up from her nap crying; that he was feeding her from a jar of
baby food when she knocked the spoon from his hand and spit food onto his T-
shirt and shorts; that he went to the kitchen to get paper towels to clean up; that
she crawled towards the bedroom while he was in the kitchen; that he next heard
her choking and gasping for air; and that she rolled over onto her side, her eyes
flickering, and then went limp, vomited, and appeared to have a seizure.

At Lopez’s request, petitioner also prepared a written statement of the
morning’s events. In the statement, petitioner wrote that Adriana woke up crying
around 10:45 a.m. She looked sad and tired, so petitioner stroked her head and
tried to play with her. Around 11:25 a.m. he fed her. Adriana was swallowing
slowly, but he kept feeding her until she threw her spoon at him. When he went to
the kitchen to get her milk, she crawled away but suddenly started making faces
and noises. Her body grew stiff but her head was loose, so he started rubbing her
head, chest, and back. She failed to respond, so he put a cold towel on her head
and neck. He lifted her up and down two or three times. He then called 911, and
“they told me what was wrong with her but I don’t remember.” He placed
Adriana on her left side, as he was instructed to do, and then she vomited. Before
he could give her mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, the paramedics arrived.
During a subsequent interview with Lopez, petitioner said that after
Adriana knocked the spoon from his hand, he picked her up, shook her three times
while asking her why she was so “fussy,” and threw her in the air three times.
When he put her back on the ground, she crawled away. Then she became rigid
and started to vomit. Her eyes rolled back in her head.
The next day, petitioner told Detective William Mahle that after Adriana
had knocked the spoon from his hand, he picked her up, held her in front of him,
and asked, “Why are you doing this? Why don’t you eat?” He demonstrated a
shaking motion as he explained what he had done.
Testimony of Dr. James Ribe
Dr. James Ribe, a senior deputy medical examiner in the Los Angeles
County Coroner’s Office and the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy,
testified that the cause of death was head trauma. He observed a very large
subdural hematoma, which was caused by a violent rotational movement of
Adriana’s head, probably in a front-to-back, back-to-front direction. He also noted

hemorrhaging of the optic nerve sheaths and the retina as well as a spinal cord
contusion, both of which are suggestive of shaken-baby syndrome. The sub-
arachnoid hemorrhage was caused by a combination of shaking and the violent
impact of the back of Adriana’s head against a hard, flat surface. The contrecoup
contusion above her right eye suggested a fall from a great height or a forcible
impact of the back of her head against a hard surface. The length and scope of the
skull fractures, as well as indentations in Adriana’s skull, indicated a tremendous
amount of force must have been used, akin to an auto accident or a fall from the
third story of a building. These injuries were probably inflicted by throwing,
slamming, or swinging the back of Adriana’s head against something hard.
Dr. Ribe opined that these injuries were inflicted in a few seconds and that
Adriana lost consciousness “[e]ssentially instantaneously” thereafter. Her eyes
would have rolled back. The vomiting could have happened right away or have
been delayed 30 to 60 minutes. A seizure immediately following or within
minutes was possible. Adriana would have been in a “devastated” condition from
the moment she received these injuries and would not have been able to eat, talk,
or walk, nor would she have drifted in and out of consciousness. Without medical
attention, she would have survived no more than two hours.
Ribe also reviewed the CT scan, which was performed at 12:46 p.m. on the
day Adriana was admitted to the hospital. Although the CT scan by itself might
support the inference that the injuries were inflicted four or more hours earlier, the
pathologic findings confirmed that the injuries must have been inflicted more
Defense Evidence
Petitioner denied shaking Adriana violently or hurting her in any way. He
claimed that he could not have inflicted her injuries because he was still
recovering from outpatient shoulder surgery performed two weeks earlier.

Petitioner testified that on the day of the murder, he left the apartment
around 9:00 a.m. to drive his girlfriend to work. He returned about an hour later.
Petitioner offered to take care of Adriana while Moreau ran her errands. He sat
down to watch television and dozed off. He did not remember what time Moreau
left the apartment.
Suddenly, petitioner heard Adriana screaming and crying. He entered the
bedroom to find her sitting against the wall, crying hard. She looked tired and her
eyes were red. He asked her what was wrong, picked her up with his right hand,
and brought her to the living room. He changed her diaper, which lessened the
crying. He tried to play with her, making faces, and then left her sitting on the
floor for 15 minutes while he watched television. Petitioner noticed that Adriana
was just sitting there, so he tried to talk to her and play with her, but she looked
ready to go back to sleep. She was just blinking, not paying attention.
Petitioner next fed her some vegetables. Adriana ate very slowly, with food
dripping out of her mouth. Adriana also spit some food on his clothes. Her eyes
were red and she looked only half-awake, so he put down the spoon3 and decided
not to feed her anymore. Because there was food on his sweats and shorts, he
cleaned himself up and then noticed that Adriana still looked as though she were
“somewhere else.” Petitioner tried again to play with her. When she failed to
respond, he picked her up and asked her what was wrong. He claimed he lifted
her up to shoulder height and back down three or four times and then returned her
to the floor. While he went to get her bottle, she moved a couple of feet, but her
body began shaking. She was hitting the back of her head on the floor. Petitioner
picked her up again and noticed, apparently for the first time, that her head was

Petitioner denied that Adriana knocked the spoon out of his hand and also
denied ever saying that she did.

“loose.” He stroked her head and put her back down to get some ice to put in a
towel for her. When he put the cold compress on her chest and head, the shaking
stopped, but she started to make gurgling noises, so he called 911. He called 911 a
second time after Adriana threw up.
Dr. Charles Imbus, a pediatric neurologist, relied on the edema in the CT
scan in concluding that Adriana’s injuries must have been inflicted at least four
hours before the scan was performed. He agreed that Adriana had suffered severe
skull fractures, that they were caused by slamming the back of her head against
something solid, that she probably lost consciousness immediately after the blows
were struck, and that she might have become incapacitated, but believed there was
a good chance that she subsequently regained some functions. Although the baby
would not have been able to crawl, sit up, or eat after her injuries, she might have
been able to swallow in an uncoordinated way, make sounds that resembled
crying, and make involuntary bicycling motions that could enable her to move
along the floor. He conceded, though, that she would have remained unconscious
had she passed out a second time.
Dr. Imbus had never treated Adriana and relied instead on the CT scan and
portions of Dr. Ribe’s and Dr. Lowder’s testimony. He had not reviewed the
autopsy report. The pediatric neurologist also opined that petitioner could not
have had the full mobility of his left shoulder on November 18, although his
stitches had been removed several days earlier, and that petitioner therefore lacked
the capacity to inflict the injuries on the side of Adriana’s head, although he could
have inflicted the injuries on the back of her head.
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Petitioner was convicted by a jury of second degree murder (Pen. Code, §
187) and assault on a child causing death (Pen. Code, § 273ab) and sentenced to a
term of 15 years to life. While his appeal was pending, he filed a petition for writ

of habeas corpus, alleging that the Los Angeles County District Attorney withheld
(and continued to withhold) potentially exculpatory evidence from him and his
attorney in violation of Brady and that his attorney’s performance was so deficient
as to deprive him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668.
The Brady claim asserted that the People had failed to disclose certain
impeachment material regarding Dr. James Ribe. The alleged impeachment
consisted of “changes of opinion and changes in testimony given by Dr. Ribe in
several [other] cases,” including People v. Wingfield, Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. LA020636 (Wingfield). The Court of Appeal issued an order to show
cause as to the Brady claim and remanded the matter to the superior court for an
evidentiary hearing. The purpose of the hearing was threefold: (1) “to ensure that
the District Attorney has turned over all relevant Brady material and to issue any
necessary orders compelling compliance with valid discovery requests”; (2) to
determine “when, in connection with the facts of this case, the prosecution knew
or should have known the information relating to Dr. Ribe was material to
petitioner’s defense”; and (3) to make “any other findings relevant to
determination of whether a Brady violation occurred and may have been
prejudicial to petitioner’s case.”
On May 21, 2002, the referee, Judge Michael Harwin, issued his report.
The referee found that petitioner had received all requested discovery “with the
possible exception of: a) A definitive list of all Ribe cases where timelines were
relevant; b) Personal notes of Dr. Ribe, not already disclosed and supplied, re:
timeline cases with children on which he conducted the autopsy and/or later
modified an opinion; [and] c) . . . [A] complete [Ribe] box . . . [of] case
transcripts [that counsel had already “been allowed to ‘look at’ ” and that] she
should then be allowed to compare the contents thereof to another ‘Ribe box’

maintained at a branch office of the District Attorney.” The referee further found
that the prosecutor’s “concerns” about Dr. Ribe’s testimony “arose at least by
September 26, 1996,” when police investigators met with the district attorney’s
office to discuss whether Eve Wingfield was erroneously in custody for the death
of two-year-old Lance Helms, and that “supervisory and administrative personnel
[in the district attorney’s office] were on ‘Ribe notice’ at the time of the Salazar
trial. . . . Regardless of any belief by a District Attorney supervisor that such Ribe
testimony was a ‘legitimate change of opinion,’ instead of ‘Brady material,’ its
affect [sic] was of such a magnitude that in a case where a timeline was crucial as
to which of several people had custody of a child at the time of injury, such a
change of opinion would have to be perceived as potential impeachment on cross
examination. Especially in a case so similar to Helms—a child victim, head
injuries, timeline of potential perpetrators—and where the testifying coroner was
the same. Had this Court been informed of the prior changes of opinion, it would
have ordered additional disclosure if requested and allowed further defense inquiry
on cross examination. Moreover, knowledge of the change of opinion would
likely have led any defense counsel to have known to ask for more specific
information, as opposed to a general, informal discovery letter on other Ribe
cases. Such discovery might have shown such a pattern as has resulted in the so
called ‘Ribe box’ of discovery, or additional, other, expert testimony.”
The Court of Appeal, in a published opinion, concluded that a Brady
violation occurred. The opinion reviewed Dr. Ribe’s testimony in other cases but
focused special attention on Wingfield. As recounted by the Court of Appeal, Dr.
Ribe originally testified that Lance Helms died within 30 to 60 minutes after he
was injured. Wingfield, who had been with Lance during that period, was charged
with his murder and entered a plea of no contest to a charge of manslaughter. Dr.
Ribe subsequently changed his mind about the causal facts and circumstances

leading to Lance’s death, and the district attorney’s office reopened the matter.
The Court of Appeal concluded that Ribe’s testimony in Wingfield had been
“inconsistent”; that there was a “connection” between Wingfield and this case; that
the connection could have been used to impeach Dr. Ribe’s testimony in this case;
and that the district attorney had failed to disclose the impeaching evidence to the
defense. The Court of Appeal further reasoned “that while there is sufficient
evidence in the record to affirm the conviction, we cannot be confident in the
jury’s verdict because of the Brady violation” and therefore granted relief.
We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review.
We have not previously addressed the standard of review applicable to
Brady claims. (See In re Pratt (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1314.) Conclusions
of law or of mixed questions of law and fact, such as the elements of a Brady
claim (DiLosa v. Cain (5th Cir. 2002) 279 F.3d 259, 262, fn. 2), are subject to
independent review. (In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 694.) Because the
referee can observe the demeanor of the witnesses and their manner of testifying,
findings of fact, though not binding, are entitled to great weight when supported
by substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held “that the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” (Brady, supra, 373
U.S. at p. 87.) The high court has since held that the duty to disclose such
evidence exists even though there has been no request by the accused (United
States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 107), that the duty encompasses impeachment
evidence as well as exculpatory evidence (United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S.

667, 676), and that the duty extends even to evidence known only to police
investigators and not to the prosecutor (Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419,
438). Such evidence is material “ ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.’ ” (Id. at p. 433.) In order to comply with Brady, therefore, “the
individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the
others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”
(Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 437; accord, In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873,
“[T]he term ‘Brady violation’ is sometimes used to refer to any breach of
the broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence—that is, to any suppression
of so-called ‘Brady material’—although, strictly speaking, there is never a real
Brady violation’ unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable
probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.
There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must
be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is
impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully
or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” (Strickler v. Greene (1999)
527 U.S. 263, 281-282, fn. omitted.) Prejudice, in this context, focuses on “the
materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt and innocence.” (United States v.
Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 112, fn. 20; accord, U.S. v. Fallon (7th Cir. 2003) 348
F.3d 248, 252.) Materiality, in turn, requires more than a showing that the
suppressed evidence would have been admissible (cf. Wood v. Bartholomew
(1995) 516 U.S. 1, 2), that the absence of the suppressed evidence made
conviction “more likely” (Strickler, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 289), or that using the
suppressed evidence to discredit a witness’s testimony “might have changed the

outcome of the trial” (ibid.). A defendant instead “must show a ‘reasonable
probability of a different result.’ ” (Banks v. Dretke (2004) 540 U.S. 668, 699.)
Petitioner’s claim of Brady error in this court rests entirely on the
prosecution’s alleged suppression of the November 15, 1996, follow-up
investigation report into the murder of two-year-old Lance Helms. According to
petitioner, this report reveals that Dr. Ribe changed his opinion concerning the
timeline in the Helms investigation and that Dr. Ribe’s new opinion was based on
nonmedical information and thus intended solely to fit the prosecution’s new
theory of the case. Petitioner then argues that the defense could have used Dr.
Ribe’s “flip-flop” in Wingfield to impeach his testimony concerning the timeline
in this case, that the prosecution improperly withheld the follow-up investigation
report from the defense, and that this report was “material” to the issue of
petitioner’s guilt within the meaning of Brady. After reviewing the record and the
applicable law, we find that petitioner has failed to establish true Brady error.
A. Information Concerning the Murder of Lance Helms and the
November 15, 1996, Follow-up Investigation Report of the Murder
On April 6, 1995, two-and-one-half-year-old Lance Helms died as a result
of massive internal injuries and abdominal bleeding caused by severe blunt force
trauma. His death sparked statewide criticism of the dependency court system and
the child welfare laws that determine whether children at risk become wards of the
court or are returned to their parents. (See Lewis, Chapter 417: The Welfare of
Children—A Higher Priority Than Family Reunification (2000) 31 McGeorge
L.Rev. 561, 561-562.) The present case, however, does not involve the public
outcry over the tragedy and the subsequent changes to the dependency system but
only the manner in which Lance’s murder was investigated and charged.
When Lance died, suspicion immediately focused on the boy’s father,
David Helms, and David’s girlfriend, Eve Wingfield. Lance, who had been home

with flu symptoms, was in Wingfield’s care all day until David came home in the
evening. At that point, David asked Wingfield to redeem a ring she had earlier
pawned for him. Wingfield left Lance with David while she went to the pawn
shop. When she returned, David told her something was “wrong” with Lance.
She saw that his lips were blue, water was coming out of his mouth, his body was
limp, and he did not appear to be breathing. David called 911, but Lance could
not be revived.
Dr. Ribe supervised Lance’s autopsy, which revealed massive abdominal
bleeding from multiple fist blows to the abdomen. At the autopsy, Dr. Ribe told
police that Lance’s death was “very rapid, minutes to one hour” after the injuries
were inflicted and indicated on the death certificate that death was “rapid.” Less
than two weeks later, when the district attorney’s office asked for a time estimate,
Dr. Ribe reiterated that the injuries were “rapidly fatal—minutes to two hours
At the preliminary hearing in the prosecution of Eve Wingfield, Dr. Ribe
testified that the injuries were so extensive, “death could have supervened very
quickly, in a matter of just a few minutes from these injuries.” Because the
injuries were “not survivable for any extended period of time” and Lance therefore
could not have survived “for greater than about one hour maximum time,” Dr.
Ribe estimated that the injuries must have been inflicted “from minutes out to a
maximum of about one hour” prior to death. The wounds were very fresh and
could have been inflicted only 30 to 60 minutes before Lance died. Dr. Ribe
sometimes extended the longer end of this period, such that the injuries could have
been inflicted “within a matter of minutes to a very few hours prior to physiologic
death” and noted that he had in the past told police that it could have been
anywhere from minutes up to four hours. Dr. Ribe explained the differing
estimates by pointing out that “exactitude was not possible.” Dr. Ribe also

testified that it was possible Lance had remained alert enough to ask for water and
to attempt to drink it even after being injured.
A combination of several factors led police to focus their suspicions,
erroneously, on Eve Wingfield rather than on David Helms. First, Wingfield
misled police as to the length of time she was absent from the apartment. She told
police she had left Lance alone with David for only 10 minutes, rather than the 15
to 25 minutes she was actually away, because she was afraid of David, who had
regularly abused her. Wingfield was also unaware of Lance’s fatal injuries and
assumed Lance’s death had somehow been connected to his stomach flu;
therefore, she thought she needed to protect David from police suspicion.
Consequently, she minimized the time David was alone with Lance and falsely
denied that David had abused her.4 Second, Wingfield failed a polygraph
examination but, unknown to police, the test was unreliable because Wingfield
was pregnant. Third, as the follow-up investigation revealed, the original police
investigation was conducted in an incompetent manner. Fourth, although David
and Wingfield were both suspects, Wingfield had less of an alibi during the
timeline Dr. Ribe had identified.
After the preliminary hearing, Wingfield’s attorney advised her that he
believed the prosecution had a strong case against her; that, if she went to trial, the
jury would convict her at least of child endangerment (if not murder) and that she
would receive a life sentence; and that she would be better off taking a deal for a
10-year sentence, of which she would serve less than five years. Despite the
various timelines Dr. Ribe had discussed at the preliminary hearing, Wingfield’s

David warned Wingfield at the hospital that the police would try to blame
one of them for Lance’s death and said they needed to stick together. Later,
David’s brother threatened to kill Wingfield if she did not accept responsibility for
the child’s death.

attorney apparently focused only on the estimate that Lance had died 30 to 60
minutes after the assault and could have remained alert enough to speak and drink
water after the assault. On advice of counsel, Wingfield therefore entered a plea
of no contest to manslaughter and was sentenced accordingly.
In 1996, Wingfield expressed a desire to withdraw her plea. Her request
was supported by David’s mother, Gail Helms, who had filed a citizen’s complaint
against the original investigating police officer and had insisted from the
beginning of the investigation that David was responsible for Lance’s death. Los
Angeles Police Department Detectives Stephen Bernard and Terry Lopez
reviewed the “murder book,” including the photographs, and discovered that
Lance’s liver had suffered extreme lacerations. Based on their experience with
gunshot wounds to that organ, both detectives suspected that death was even
“more immediate” than Dr. Ribe’s timeline had described. The detectives met
with a highly experienced child abuse pathologist, Dr. Eva Heuser, who agreed
that Lance’s death was more rapid than Dr. Ribe had stated. As part of the follow-
up investigation, Lopez reinterviewed Wingfield, who provided a different
chronology of events on the day of the murder, admitted that David had abused
her in the past, and described the threats she had received from David’s family.
Detective Lopez met with Dr. Ribe on October 11, 1996, in order to review
the autopsy findings and each of Lance’s injuries. Dr. Ribe stated that Lance’s
liver had been split in half by a blow using “tremendous force,” which “likely
caused instant incapacitation, and rapid death”; that another “tremendous” blow to
the liver and diaphragm probably caused instantaneous respiratory arrest, which he
had failed to appreciate during his initial review; that the tear of the mesenteric
root, caused by a blow to the lower abdomen with “maximum force,” caused
instant or rapid incapacitation leading to death within a few minutes to one-half
hour; that another blow with maximum force resulted in a tear in the small bowel

jejunal mesentery, causing rapid death within minutes of the assault; that a tight
chest squeeze or abdominal blows had caused hemorrhages in the lungs and heart,
possibly resulting in instantaneous cardiac arrest; and that the blood loss from all
these injuries could have resulted in death within four to six minutes.5
Dr. Ribe told the detectives that Lance had died within a few minutes of the
assault and that his opinion at the autopsy was therefore unchanged. While the
“short end” of his estimate at the preliminary hearing remained unchanged, he had
come to believe the “long end” (i.e., that Lance could have survived for one to two
hours or more) was highly unlikely, based on his consultations with the chief
medical examiner, Dr. Lakshmanan Sathyavagiswaran, and two outside experts.
Dr. Ribe also cautioned that, at the preliminary hearing, he had failed to recognize
that Lance had been instantly incapacitated from these injuries and therefore
admitted that he gave the “wrong” answer when he said that Lance could have
remained alert “almost up to the very end” and could possibly have asked for
water. His change of opinion concerning Lance’s consciousness after the assault
was based on a more thorough examination of the liver, diaphragm, and heart
In an interview two weeks later, Dr. Sathyavagiswaran opined that Lance’s
blood loss would have resulted in shock and unconsciousness within a few
minutes and that death could have followed within 30 minutes of the assault.
Based on the follow-up investigation, which indicated that Lance’s injuries
were instantly incapacitating and that Lance had been in David’s custody
immediately prior to his death, the police requested that murder charges be filed

Prior to this interview, Dr. Ribe had consulted with Dr. Heuser as to how
quickly a two-year-old child would die from massive liver injuries inflicted in an
assault. Dr. Heuser stated that death would come “very quickly, minutes.”

against David Helms. The People advised Wingfield’s attorney of the findings of
the follow-up investigation.
On September 12, 1997, Wingfield was allowed to withdraw her plea. On
May 15, 1998, Wingfield pleaded no contest to one count of child endangerment
in violation of Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (a) and was placed on
probation. When probation terminated, the case was dismissed under Penal Code
section 1203.4. David Helms was subsequently convicted of Lance’s murder.
B. Petitioner’s Discovery of Dr. Ribe’s Involvement in the Helms
Murder Investigation
On September 11, 1997, while Dr. Ribe was testifying at petitioner’s trial,
the Los Angeles Times published a story about the follow-up investigation into
Lance Helms’s murder and the effort to exonerate Eve Wingfield. The article
stated that Dr. Ribe had “changed his conclusion” and now believed that the fatal
injuries were “ ‘instantly incapacitating’ ” and quoted Wingfield’s attorney as
saying that the original investigation was “ ‘flawed’ ” in that “ ‘[w]hen the medical
examiner made his initial conclusion, he did so without a complete picture.’ ”
(Blankstein, Report Raises Questions in Child-Abuse Conviction, L.A. Times
(Sept. 11, 1997) p. B1.) Based on the article, petitioner’s attorney requested an
Evidence Code section 402 hearing. Dr. Ribe stated that he was familiar with the
newspaper article but, in response to a question whether he had changed his
opinion regarding the time of death, asked to see his original testimony in order to
refresh his recollection. Neither the prosecution nor the defense had that
testimony immediately available. When the court offered defense counsel the
opportunity to ask any other questions of Dr. Ribe, counsel said he would await
the transcript of the preliminary hearing and the coroner’s file. The district
attorney offered to obtain the transcript, and the court ordered production of the
coroner’s file.

Later that day, while Dr. Ribe was still testifying, the prosecutor provided
the defense with a copy of Dr. Ribe’s preliminary hearing testimony in Wingfield.
The defense did not request a continuance. (See United States v. Grintjes (7th Cir.
2001) 237 F.3d 876, 880.) At the end of his testimony, Dr. Ribe was excused,
subject to recall. Defense counsel never recalled the witness, nor did he cross-
examine Dr. Ribe about his opinions in the Helms murder investigation.
C. Petitioner’s Brady Claim
Petitioner claims that the prosecution violated Brady by failing to provide
him with a copy of the November 15, 1996, follow-up investigation report of the
Helms murder. We must therefore consider whether petitioner has established
each element of a Brady claim.
1. Was the follow-up investigation report favorable to petitioner?
The first element of a Brady claim is that the evidence be favorable to the
accused. (Strickler v. Greene, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 281-282.) In petitioner’s
view, evidence that Dr. Ribe altered his opinion as to the timing of Lance Helms’s
incapacitation and death was favorable to him in that it could have been used to
impeach Dr. Ribe’s testimony concerning the timeline in this case. The
impeaching value of this evidence, according to petitioner, does not depend on a
finding that Dr. Ribe’s earlier testimony was inconsistent with his testimony here.
Nor does it rest on a theory that the change in Dr. Ribe’s testimony suggested he is
incompetent. Petitioner contends instead that Dr. Ribe’s performance in Wingfield
showed that he is biased. He reasons that Dr. Ribe “relied on arguably
inappropriate non-medical ‘facts’ when he changed his opinion. . . . [I]f a
pathologist relies on non-medical facts as a foundation for his medical opinion,
and especially if he relies on such facts contrary to accepted practice, he is subject
to impeachment. . . . [¶] The fact is that Dr. Ribe takes non-medical information
and then shifts his opinion to accommodate those facts.”

The Attorney General disagrees that Dr. Ribe relied on nonmedical facts in
revising his opinion, pointing out that Dr. Ribe had failed to appreciate the
possibility of respiratory arrest in forming his original opinion and had
subsequently consulted with outside experts. The Attorney General contends
further that a change of opinion based on further research or new facts “is not
‘impeaching’ information” and that, in any event, petitioner has not shown that Dr.
Ribe’s revised opinion was wrong.
It is well settled that the prosecution’s Brady obligation to disclose material
evidence favorable to the defense encompasses impeachment evidence. (City of
Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 8.) The Attorney General does
not argue that the follow-up investigation report was unfavorable to petitioner. He
contends instead that the report is not impeaching because Dr. Ribe had a
legitimate basis for changing his opinion in that earlier case. But this objection
goes to the weight, not the character of the evidence as impeaching—or, in Brady
terms, the Attorney General is really disputing whether the evidence is material,
not whether it is favorable. We therefore find that petitioner has established the
first element of a Brady claim.
2. Was the follow-up investigation report suppressed?
The second element of a Brady claim is that the evidence must have been
“suppressed” by the government. (Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. at p. 282; Banks
v. Dretke, supra, 540 U.S. at p. 691.) Although the prosecution may not withhold
favorable and material evidence from the defense, neither does it have the duty to
conduct the defendant’s investigation for him. (People v. Morrison (2004) 34
Cal.4th 698, 715.) If the material evidence is in a defendant’s possession or is
available to a defendant through the exercise of due diligence, then, at least as far
as evidence is concerned, the defendant has all that is necessary to ensure a fair
trial, even if the prosecution is not the source of the evidence. (Coe v. Bell (6th

Cir. 1998) 161 F.3d 320, 344; U.S. v. Pandozzi (1st Cir. 1989) 878 F.2d 1526,
1529-1530.) Accordingly, evidence is not suppressed unless the defendant was
actually unaware of it and could not have discovered it “ ‘by the exercise of
reasonable diligence.’ ” (People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 715; see
generally Strickler v. Greene, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 282 [the inquiry whether cause
exists to excuse a procedural default parallels the inquiry whether the government
suppressed evidence]; Banks v. Dretke, supra, 540 U.S. at p. 691 [same].)
Petitioner asserts categorically that “[t]rial counsel could not possibly have
had knowledge of that reinvestigation report unless the prosecutor obtained it from
police and gave it to him.” The Attorney General responds that newspaper articles
concerning Dr. Ribe’s credibility appeared well before trial, that defense
counsel therefore had a basis for inquiring into Dr. Ribe’s performance in previous
cases, and that defense counsel, with reasonable diligence, could have obtained the
follow-up investigation report himself. As interesting as this debate may be, we
find it unnecessary to remand the matter to the Court of Appeal to determine
whether the follow-up investigation report was suppressed entirely or,
alternatively, whether information that could have led to its discovery was
disclosed too late for petitioner to make meaningful use of it because (as explained
in the next part) we find that the follow-up investigation report was not material.
(See U.S. v. Gonzalez (2d Cir. 1997) 110 F.3d 936, 944.)6
3. Was the follow-up investigation report material?
The third element of a Brady claim is that the suppressed evidence be
material, “for not every nondisclosure of favorable evidence denies due process.”

For the same reason, we need not address the argument of amicus curiae
California Public Defenders Association that, under Banks v. Dretke, supra, 540
U.S. 668, the People have a duty to disclose material evidence even when the
defense could reasonably obtain the evidence through independent means.

(In re Brown, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 884.) “[T]he prosecution has no general duty
to seek out, obtain, and disclose all evidence that might be beneficial to the
defense” (In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122, 135), since “the Constitution is not
violated every time the government fails or chooses not to disclose evidence that
might prove helpful to the defense.” (Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. at pp. 436-
437.) Rather, a violation occurs “ ‘only if there is a reasonable probability that,
had [it] been disclosed to the defense, the result . . . would have been different.’
[Citations.] The requisite ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to
‘undermine[] confidence in the outcome’ on the part of the reviewing court.” (In
re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 544.)
“In general, impeachment evidence has been found to be material where the
witness at issue ‘supplied the only evidence linking the defendant(s) to the crime,’
United States v. Petrillo, 821 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. [150,] 154-55, 92 S.Ct. [763,] 766 [(1972)] (Brady violation
found where government failed to disclose promise not to prosecute cooperating
witness on whom government’s case against defendant ‘almost entirely’
depended), or where the likely impact on the witness’s credibility would have
undermined a critical element of the prosecution’s case, see United States v.
Badalamente, 507 F.2d 12, 17-18 (2d Cir.1974) (same re nondisclosure of
‘hysterical’ letters that would have had ‘powerful adverse effect’ on witness’s
credibility, where that credibility was ‘crucial to the determination of [the
defendant’s] guilt or innocence’); cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911, 43 L.Ed.2d 776, 95
S.Ct. 1565 (1975). In contrast, a new trial is generally not required when the
testimony of the witness is ‘corroborated by other testimony,’ United States v.
Petrillo, 821 F.2d at 89 . . . ; [citation]; see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
at 154, 92 S.Ct. at 766 (new trial not required where newly discovered evidence is

merely ‘possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have changed the
verdict’).” (U.S. v. Payne (2d Cir. 1995) 63 F.3d 1200, 1210.)
Petitioner asserts that “[w]ithout [Dr. Ribe’s] testimony, the prosecution
could not effectively connect [him] with the time frame in which the baby suffered
the injuries that resulted in her death,” but this claim is belied by the record. Dr.
Ribe’s testimony was not the only evidence linking petitioner to the crime, since
his opinion that the death was nonaccidental was corroborated by Dr. Gilbert
Mellin, the radiologist; by Dr. Dorothy Calvin, the pediatric ophthalmologist; and
by Dr. Harold Lowder, who treated Adriana when she arrived at the emergency
room. Dr. Ribe’s opinion concerning the timing of the injuries was corroborated
by Dr. Lowder, who testified that Adriana’s symptoms, including loss of
consciousness, would have appeared immediately. Indeed, the People could have
obtained the same testimony from additional witnesses—including the chief
medical examiner, Dr. Sathyavagiswaran—who could not have been impeached
by the Helms investigation.
Petitioner’s guilt was also established by his inconsistent accounts of what
happened during the period he was alone with Adriana. He gave conflicting
reports as to when Adriana started vomiting; whether Adriana knocked the spoon
out of his hands and spit or threw food at him; whether he lifted her up, tossed her
in the air, or shook her before she vomited; and whether she was “fine” before he
started feeding her. These inconsistencies substantially undermined petitioner’s
attempt to shift the blame to others. (See People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408,
Petitioner’s guilt was additionally supported by the inconsistency between
his account of what occurred and the injuries Adriana had suffered. Indeed, it
seems quite improbable that petitioner could have picked the infant up from her
bed, stroked her head, and brought her up to eye level to “check[]” her a few times

without noticing that her skull had been fractured and the back of her head was
“very boggy.” It is equally improbable that petitioner noticed the condition of
Adriana’s head but innocently forgot to mention it to the 911 operator, especially
since petitioner informed the 911 operator that Adriana had been “fine” until she
started to have trouble breathing. Accordingly, even successful impeachment of
Dr. Ribe’s testimony would not have materially affected the jury’s assessment of
petitioner’s guilt.
Finally, it is unlikely the follow-up investigation report in the Helms
murder would even have been viewed as significant impeachment evidence in
petitioner’s case. Petitioner’s theory that Dr. Ribe shapes his testimony to fit the
prosecution’s case is neither the inevitable nor the most logical inference from the
follow-up investigation report. As Dr. Ribe explained, his opinion concerning the
Helms murder, in the main, remained consistent throughout. He merely shortened
the long end of his estimate of the time of injury and loss of consciousness based
on consultations with outside experts and closer examination of the injuries Lance
had suffered—but neither of these indicates that Dr. Ribe was biased nor that Dr.
Ribe’s modification to his earlier opinion was inaccurate or unjustified. Although
Dr. Ribe considered David Helms’s history of abusive behavior in assessing
“whether the medical evidence tended to correlate or not correlate with that type
of information” and (thus) whether his original opinion warranted a
reexamination, Dr. Ribe did not rely on those facts in revising his opinion.
Petitioner’s attempt to focus the blame for the prosecution of Eve Wingfield
entirely on Dr. Ribe also ignores the time estimates Dr. Ribe provided to police
and the district attorney as well as at the preliminary hearing that implicated David
Helms; the misleading and incomplete version of events provided by Eve

Wingfield; and the incompetent investigation undertaken by the original
investigating officer.7
In sum, the evidence does not strongly support—if at all—petitioner’s
claim that Dr. Ribe was a mere puppet of the prosecution and thus should have
been disbelieved in this case.8 Moreover, even if petitioner could have succeeded
in impeaching Dr. Ribe, equivalent testimony was supplied by other witnesses and
could have been supplied by still others. In light of that testimony, as well as other
circumstantial evidence of petitioner’s guilt, it is not reasonably probable the result
would have been different had the defense sought to use the Helms murder

Petitioner chose in this court to focus his claim of error exclusively on Dr.
Ribe’s conduct relating to the Helms murder and asserted, without any elaboration
or explanation, that “other” instances of Dr. Ribe’s conduct merely “exacerbated”
this “initial” Brady violation. The latter argument is improperly presented, and we
reject it on that basis. (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 214, fn. 19.) We
have also reviewed the pleadings and the entire record below and find that none of
the other cases, singly or in combination, present an issue of materiality.
In support of his claim that the evidence is material, petitioner initially
relied heavily on the fact that the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office
had assembled boxes of materials concerning Dr. Ribe’s testimony in Wingfield
and in other cases and had directed deputy district attorneys to make this
information available to defense counsel in cases where Dr. Ribe was expected to
testify. Although there seems to have been a lively debate within the office as to
whether these Ribe boxes were assembled “out of an abundance of caution” or
because of a belief the information had to be produced to the defense, this court
need not defer to a prosecutor’s opinion that information already identified is or is
not Brady material. (See People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 649.) Whether,
in this case, the district attorney followed his stated policy of resolving doubtful
questions in favor of disclosure is not for us to say, since the due process clause
“does not tax the prosecutor with error for any failure to disclose, absent a further
showing of materiality.” (Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 439.) Moreover,
since “the determination of materiality for Brady purposes is necessarily fact
specific” (State v. Bright (La. 2004) 875 So.2d 37, 44, fn. 7), it is rarely possible to
predetermine whether particular information in any individual case will be
material. We therefore accept petitioner’s subsequent concession that “[t]he Ribe
discovery box has nothing to do with whether or not there was a Brady violation at

investigation to impeach Dr. Ribe’s testimony. (See Strickler v. Greene, supra,
527 U.S. at pp. 294, 296.)9 We therefore conclude that petitioner has failed to
establish the materiality of this evidence under Brady.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the cause remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.



The Court of Appeal reasoned that Dr. Ribe’s performance in the Helms
murder investigation could have “cast doubt on the entire manner in which
[petitioner’s] case was investigated,” in that “the investigating detectives
immediately focused on petitioner as the perpetrator to the exclusion of any
others,” based on Dr. Ribe’s timeline. The premise of the Court of Appeal’s
analysis, however, is flawed. The police arrested petitioner on November 18,
1996—before Dr. Ribe even became involved—based on Dr. Lowder’s skepticism
of petitioner’s account of what had occurred, Dr. Lowder’s estimated time of
injury, and petitioner’s inconsistent statements. Moreover, any suggestion that the
police, by using different investigative methods, could have uncovered evidence
pointing to another suspect is pure speculation. (Wood v. Bartholomew, supra,
516 U.S. at pp. 6-7.)

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Salazar

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 110 Cal.App.4th 1616
Rehearing Granted


Opinion No.

Date Filed: June 6, 2005


County: Los Angeles
Judge: Michael B. Harwin


Attorneys for Appellant:

Gail Harper, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner and for Defendant and Appellant.

Kenneth I. Clayman, Public Defender (Ventura) and Michael C. McMahon, Chief Deputy Public Defender,
for California Public Defenders Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and Defendant and


Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, David P. Druliner and
Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Carol Wendelin Pollack and Pamela C.
Hamanaka, Assistant Attorneys General, Linda C. Johnson, Scott A. Taryle, Donald E. De Nicola, Robert
F. Katz, Roy C. Preminger, John R. Gorey and Michael J. Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.

Steve Cooley, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Curt Livesay, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Lael Rubin,
Head Deputy District Attorney, and Brent Riggs, Deputy District Attorney, as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiff and Respondent.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Gail Harper
P.O. Box 330057
San Francisco, CA 94133
(415) 291-8469

Michael C. McMahon
Chief Deputy Public Defender
800 S. Victoria Avenue
Ventura, CA 93009
(805) 477-7114

Michael J. Wise
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 897-2381

Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Mon, 06/06/2005S119066

1Salazar, Jose A. (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Gail Harper
Attorney at Law
P O Box 330057
San Francisco, CA

2Salazar, Jose A. (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by California Appellate Project - La
520 South Grand Avenue, Suite 400
520 South Grand Avenue, Suite 400
Los Angeles, CA

3Salazar, Jose A. (Petitioner)
Represented by Gail Harper
Attorney at Law
P O Box 330057
San Francisco, CA

4The People (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by Michael J. Wise
Ofc Of Attorney General
300 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA

5Los Angeles County District Attorney (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brent D. Riggs
Ofc District Attorney
320 W Temple St #540
Los Angeles, CA

6California Public Defenders Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Michael C. Mcmahon
Ofc Public Defender
800 S Victoria Ave.
Ventura, CA

Jun 6 2005Opinion: Reversed

Sep 15 2003Petition for review filed
  respondent, The People.
Sep 16 2003Record requested
Sep 22 2003Received Court of Appeal record
  2 doghouses in b117225 and 2 doghouses in related matter B137034. shipped overnight.
Sep 26 2003Request for depublication (petition for review pending)
  respondent, The People.
Oct 6 2003Opposition filed
  by appellant (Jose A. Salazar). Opposition to depublication request.
Oct 15 2003Received letter from:
  A.G., for respondent, dated Oct 15 ,2003, responding to petnr's. letter dated Oct. 5, 2003
Nov 4 2003Time extended to grant or deny review
  The time for granting or denying review in the above-entitled matter is hereby extended to and including Dec. 12, 2003, or the date upon which review is either granted or denied.
Nov 25 2003Petition for Review Granted (criminal case)
  Brown, J., was absent and did not participate. Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter and Werdegar, JJ.
Dec 11 2003Counsel appointment order filed
  Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, Gail Harper is hereby appointed to represent appellant on his appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits shall be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date respondent's opening brief on the merits is filed.
Dec 23 2003Request for extension of time filed
  resp request to Jan. 24, 2004 to file respondent brief on the merits
Dec 31 2003Extension of time granted
  On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including January 26, 2004.
Jan 14 2004Received:
  motion to file a/c brief & brief on behalf of Abused Parents' Alliance & Medicolegal Advocates (brief & motion under seperate cover) supporting applnt Jose A. Salazar.
Jan 20 2004Note:
  Spoke to Lew Amack, amicus counsel for Abused Parents Alliance & Patricia Vildosola regarding motion to file a/c brief received 1/14/04. Counsel advised that it is premature to file amicus briefs at this time (see CRC 29.1(f). Per counsel - document withdrawn.
Jan 23 2004Request for extension of time filed
  resp request to February 25, 2004 to file opening brief on the merits
Jan 27 2004Extension of time granted
  On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including February 25, 2004. Nor further extensions of time are contemplated.
Feb 23 2004Request for extension of time filed
  counsel for respondent requesting to March 11, 2004 to file respondent's opening brief on the merits
Feb 25 2004Extension of time granted
  To March 11, 2004 to file respondent's opening breif on the merits. No further extensions will be granted.
Mar 11 2004Received:
  respondent's opening brief on the merits (oversized...needs permission to file)
Mar 11 2004Filed:
  application for permission to file respondent's brief on the merits (oversized)
Mar 17 2004Opening brief on the merits filed
  with permission.
Apr 19 2004Request for extension of time filed
  Appellant to file the Answer Brief on the Merits to 5-17-04.
Apr 26 2004Extension of time granted
  to May 17, 2004 for Appellant to serve and file the Answer Brief on the Merits.
May 14 2004Request for extension of time filed
  Appellant ( Salazar) to June 16, 2004, to file the answer brief on the merits.
May 20 2004Extension of time granted
  to June 16, 2004 for Appellant to serve and file the Answer brief on the merits.
Jun 15 2004Request for extension of time filed
  appellant asking for a 30-day extension to and including July 16, 2004 to file appellant's answer brief on the merits.
Jun 17 2004Extension of time granted
  To July 16, 2004 to file appellant's answer brief on the merits.
Jul 14 2004Request for extension of time filed
  Appellant requesting to Aug. 25, 2004 to file answer brief on the merits.
Jul 19 2004Extension of time granted
  To August 25, 2004 to file appellant's answer brief on the merits.
Aug 25 2004Request for extension of time filed
  appellant requesting to Sept. 24, 2004 to file answer brief on the merits.
Sep 3 2004Extension of time granted
  to and including September 24, 2004 for appellant to file answer brief on the merits.
Sep 23 2004Request for extension of time filed
  appellant requesting to Oct. 25, 2004 to file answer brief on the merits.
Sep 28 2004Extension of time granted
  to and including October 25, 2004 for appellant to file answer brief on the merits.
Oct 25 2004Request for extension of time filed
  appellant requesting to Nov. 24, 2004 to file answer brief on the merits.
Oct 26 2004Extension of time granted
  to and including November 24, 2004 for appellant to file answer brief on the merits.
Nov 29 2004Answer brief on the merits filed
  by counsel for appellant (Jose A. Salazar). (40k)
Dec 16 2004Request for extension of time filed
  to file respondent's reply brief/merits asking to February 18, 2005.
Dec 27 2004Extension of time granted
  to and including Feb. 18, 2005 to file respondents reply brief on the merits. No further extensions of time are contemplated.
Jan 12 2005Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Harper
Feb 18 2005Received:
  respondent's reply brief/merits--oversize
Feb 18 2005Application filed to:
  file oversize reply brief>>respondent People
Feb 25 2005Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  (with permission) by counsel for respondent (The People).
Mar 8 2005Case ordered on calendar
  Fri. 4/8/05 @9am - Los Angeles
Mar 16 2005Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  Los Angeles County District Attorney [in support of respondent]
Mar 18 2005Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  California Public Defenders Association in support of appellant.
Mar 18 2005Filed:
  Request of appellant/petitioner {Jose Salazar} to divide oral argument time.
Mar 21 2005Filed:
  Letter from appellant dated 3/21/05 - requesting the court deny the Los Angeles County District Attorney's application to file its amicus brief and request to continue oral argument to the June 2005 calendar if amicus brief is filed.
Mar 22 2005Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Los Angeles County District Attorney
Mar 22 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
  by Los Angeles County District Attorney in support of respondent. Answer due by any party within 20 days.
Mar 22 2005Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  California Public Defenders Association
Mar 22 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
  by California Public Defenders Association in support of appellant. Answer due by any party within 20 days.
Mar 22 2005Letter sent to:
  Letter sent to counsel for appellant " Today, the court granted the Los Angeles County District Attorney's application to file its amicus curiae brief and denied your request to continue oral argument to the June 2005 calendar. Any party has until April 11, 2005, in which to file an answer to the amicus curiae brief. Oral argument will be held, as scheduled, on April 8, 2005, at 9:00 a.m., but submission of the case will be deferred until April 11, 2005."
Mar 23 2005Received:
  Certificate of word count for application & amicus brief by California Public Defenders Association in support of appellant.
Mar 28 2005Order filed
  The request of counsel for appellant in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of appellant at oral argument is hereby granted.
Mar 28 2005Order filed
  The request of appellant to allocate to amicus curiae Claifornia Public Defenders Association 10 minutes of appellant's 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
Apr 7 2005Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  Atty. General Michael J. Wise, for respondent responding to a.c. brief of Calif. Public Defender's Assoc.
Apr 8 2005Cause argued (not yet submitted)
  To be submitted as of April 11, 2005
Apr 11 2005Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  By counsel for appellant to AC brief filed by Los Angeles County District Attorney.
Apr 11 2005Note:
  Submitted pursuant to direction at oral argument.
Jun 6 2005Opinion filed: Judgment reversed
  and remanded. Majority Opinion by Baxter, J. joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, Brown & Moreno, JJ.
Jun 15 2005Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Harper
Jun 21 2005Rehearing petition filed
  by counsel for appellant.
Jun 28 2005Time extended to consider modification or rehearing
  to and including September 2, 2005 or the date upon which rehearing is either granted or denied.
Aug 10 2005Rehearing denied
  Werdegar, J., was absent and did not participate.
Aug 10 2005Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Aug 17 2005Received:
  Receipt for remittitur from CA2/4
Aug 31 2005Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Harper
Oct 7 2005Note:
  Record sent to 2 DCA (5 volumes)
Oct 11 2005Received:
  [5-volumes in l.a.]

Mar 17 2004Opening brief on the merits filed
Nov 29 2004Answer brief on the merits filed
Feb 25 2005Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Mar 22 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
Mar 22 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
Apr 7 2005Response to amicus curiae brief filed
Apr 11 2005Response to amicus curiae brief filed
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website