Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 6/7/04

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

In re Marriage of LYNN E. and
TERRY GODDARD.
____________________________________)
)
LYNN E. JAKOBY,
Respondent,
S107154
v.
Ct.App. 2/5 B147332
TERRY GODDARD,
County of Los Angeles
Appellant;
Super. Ct. No. BD300950
MICHAEL G. YORK,
Appellant.

A trial of an issue of fact in a civil matter may proceed in the absence of
one of the parties and a default judgment may issue if the trial court is satisfied
that that party “had 15 days’ notice of such trial.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 594, subd.
(a).) If such notice was served by a party, Code of Civil Procedure section 594,
subdivision (b) provides that proof of such notice of trial “may be made by
introduction into evidence of an affidavit or certificate . . . or other competent
evidence.”
1

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In the present case, the husband in a marriage dissolution action did not
appear for trial and a judgment was entered. The husband appealed, arguing that
the notice of the trial date that had been served by opposing counsel had not been
entered into evidence. The notice of trial had been filed, however, and was in the
court file. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, concluding the failure to
introduce the notice into evidence was harmless error.
We granted review to decide whether the failure to enter into evidence the
notice of trial, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 594, subdivision (b)
constitutes a jurisdictional defect or is subject to harmless error analysis. For the
reasons that follow, we conclude the error is subject to harmless error analysis and
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 10, 1999, Lynn E. Jakoby filed a petition for dissolution of her
marriage to Terry Goddard. On May 22, 2000, Goddard filed a response and
request for dissolution of marriage.
On August 3, 2000, Jakoby filed a motion for attorney fees and costs for
Goddard’s failure to answer interrogatories and to provide a “Preliminary
Declaration of Disclosure,” including a schedule of assets and debts. A hearing
was held on August 30, 2000, at which Goddard and his counsel, Michael G.
York, failed to appear. The court ordered Goddard to respond to the
interrogatories and provide a preliminary declaration of disclosure, including a
schedule of assets and debts, by September 15, 2000, and imposed sanctions and
costs in the amount of $2,023. The court set the matter for trial on October 25,
2000, and directed Jakoby to give notice of the ruling and of the date of trial.
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On August 31, 2000, Jakoby filed a notice of ruling stating that trial had
been set for October 25, 2000. Attached to the notice was a proof of service that
showed it had been served by mail on York, Goddard’s counsel.1
On October 25, 2000, Goddard and York failed to appear for trial and the
court granted the petition for dissolution of marriage.
Goddard and York appealed from the resulting judgment. Goddard argued
that the trial court erred in conducting the trial in his absence because Jakoby had
not introduced into evidence proof of the notice of trial as required by Code of
Civil Procedure section 594, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 594(b)). Relying
upon the decision in Irvine National Bank v. Kwang-Weihan (1982) 130
Cal.App.3d 693 (Irvine), Goddard asserted that the notice of trial in the court file
was insufficient. The Court of Appeal rejected Goddard’s argument, finding
Jakoby’s failure to introduce proof of the notice of trial to be harmless error in
light of the circumstance that “there is an uncontroverted under-oath showing and
no dispute that notice of trial was given in full compliance with section 594,
subdivision (a).”2

1
Goddard claims that the notice of ruling filed on August 31, 2000, is not
part of the record on appeal and, therefore, could not properly be considered by
the Court of Appeal or this court. He is incorrect. The notice was filed in the
superior court in this case and was properly included in the clerk’s transcript.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5(b)(3)(A); 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997)
Appeal, § 537, p. 579.)
2
In his reply brief in this court, Goddard argues for the first time that the
notice of trial was defective because the proof of service did not comply with
Code of Civil Procedure sections 1013a and 594, subdivision (a). He did not,
however, petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeal calling attention to any
alleged misstatement of fact in its opinion. We therefore decline to address this
argument. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 28(c)(2).)
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II. DISCUSSION
The Court of Appeal recognized that the evidentiary rule of section 594(b)
is mandatory but held that the failure of a prevailing party to comply with this rule
is not a jurisdictional defect. If compliance is not jurisdictional, then a party’s
failure to comply with section 594(b)’s evidentiary rule will not render a
subsequent judgment voidable if the failure is harmless error. (People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) If jurisdictional, then the judgment is voidable and
reversible on appeal even where, as here, it is clear from the record that the
required notice was given. (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (1971) 4
Cal.3d 545, 549 (County of Santa Clara); 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996)
Jurisdiction, §§ 276, 278, pp. 840-842, 843-844.)
The due process clauses of the United States and California Constitutions
require that a party be given reasonable notice of a judicial proceeding. (Scott v.
McNeal (1894) 154 U.S. 34, 46; Harrington v. Superior Court (1924) 194 Cal.
185, 188.) This notice requirement is codified in subdivision (a) of Code of Civil
Procedure section 594 (hereafter section 594(a)), which states that a party may
proceed in the absence of an adverse party with a trial that involves issues of fact
if proof is made to the court that “the adverse party has had 15 days’ notice of
such trial.”
Section 594(b) requires a party to enter into evidence such notice of the
trial: “The notice to the adverse party required by subdivision (a) shall be served
by mail on all the parties by the clerk of the court not less than 20 days prior to the
date set for trial. . . . If notice is not served by the clerk as required by this
subdivision, it may be served by mail by any party on the adverse party not less
than 15 days prior to the date set for trial . . . . If notice is served by the clerk,
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proof thereof may be made by introduction into evidence of the clerk’s certificate
pursuant to subdivision (3) of Section 1013a or other competent evidence. If
notice is served by a party, proof may be made by introduction into evidence of an
affidavit or certificate pursuant to subdivision (1) or (2) of Section 1013a or other
competent evidence. The provisions of this subdivision are exclusive.” (Italics
added.)
In order to determine whether the provision of section 594(b) regarding
proof of the notice of trial is mandatory and, if so, whether the failure to comply
with that portion of section 594(b) is jurisdictional, we begin with the language of
the statute as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. (Hunt v. Superior
Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 984, 1000.) Section 594(b) was added by amendment in
1975; prior to that time there had been no statutory requirement calling for
evidence of notice of trial to be introduced at trial. (Stats. 1975, ch. 1001, § 1,
p. 2345.) Section 594(a) requires that proof “shall” be made to the court’s
satisfaction, “as specified in subdivision (b),” that the adverse party has had 15
days’ notice of the trial. Section 594(b) continues that such proof “may be made
by introduction into evidence of an affidavit . . . pursuant to Section 1013a or
other competent evidence.” Code of Civil Procedure section 1013a provides for
proof of service by mail. The final clause of section 594(b) notes that the
“provisions of this subdivision are exclusive.”
We first consider the import of the word “may” in the statutory phrase:
“proof may be made by introduction into evidence of an affidavit or . . . other
competent evidence.” (§ 594(b), italics added.) The word “may” could be read in
this context to make the entire evidentiary provision permissive. If the provision
is permissive, then it would serve only as an optional means of reinforcing “to the
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court’s satisfaction” that the adverse party has had 15 days’ notice of the trial as
required in section 594(a). Reading the entire evidentiary provision to be
permissive is supported by the use of “shall” rather than “may” elsewhere in
section 594(b).
A better explanation for the choice of “may” rather than “shall,” however,
is that it precedes two evidentiary alternatives set forth in the statute. The statute
requires either “introduction into evidence of an affidavit or certificate,” or the
introduction of “other competent evidence.” (§ 594(b).) Coupled with the
presence of an exclusivity clause that allows no other option for providing proof to
the satisfaction of the trial court, the statutory language best supports the
conclusion that the overall evidentiary provision is mandatory, but the form of
proof, be it either introduction into evidence of compliance with Code of Civil
Procedure section 1013a, or other competent evidence, is at the discretion of the
party attempting to proceed in the absence of its adversary. Our Courts of Appeal
have found accordingly that section 594(b)’s evidentiary rule is mandatory.
(Irvine, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d 693, 697; San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Development Commission v. Smith (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 113, 126 (San
Francisco Bay).)
While the statutory language supports the conclusion that section 594(b)’s
evidentiary rule is mandatory, it does not settle the question whether the failure to
comply with its mandate is jurisdictional. Nor is the legislative history of
assistance. The history reveals that Senate Bill No. 847 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.),
introduced on April 10, 1975, was designed to amend section 594 and remedy the
fact that section 594 “now is silent as to who must give, the manner of giving, and
the means by which proof may be made of giving the requisite notice” of trial
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where an adverse party is absent and the other party wishes to proceed with the
hearing or trial. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 847 (1975-1976
Reg. Sess.), Aug. 21, 1975; see also Assem. 3d reading analysis, Sen. Bill No. 847
(1975-1976 Reg. Sess.), June 2, 1975.)3 The legislative history does not
illuminate whether the failure to comply with section 594(b)’s evidentiary rule is
jurisdictional.
In determining whether section 594(b)’s evidentiary rule is jurisdictional, it
is helpful to observe that jurisdictional errors can be of two types. A court can
lack fundamental authority over the subject matter, question presented, or party,
making its judgment void, or it can merely act in excess of its jurisdiction or
defined power, rendering the judgment voidable. (Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
McConnell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 715, 725-727; Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal
(1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288, 290; Spreckels S. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1921)
186 Cal. 256, 260.) In the present case, Goddard contends that section 594(b) is
jurisdictional in the latter sense, i.e., a trial court that has rendered a judgment
notwithstanding the lack of compliance with section 594(b) has acted in excess of
its jurisdiction.

3
Section 594 was originally enacted in 1872 and required only that the
“Court, for good cause,” may halt a trial or hearing brought in the absence of the
adverse party. (Stats. 1872, ch. 6, § 157, p. 75.) The statute was amended in 1899
to require that “proof must first be made to the satisfaction of the court that the
adverse party has had five days notice of such trial.” (Stats. 1899, ch. 6, § 1, p. 5.)
After minor amendments in 1933, 1935, 1951, and 1969, in 1975 the statute was
amended to increase the notice period to 15 days and add section 594(b), which
described the proof necessary to demonstrate that notice had been given. (Stats.
1975, ch. 1001, § 1, p. 2345.)
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In addressing this contention, we observe that most procedural errors are
not jurisdictional. (Poster v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1990) 52 Cal.3d
266, 274; see also Helbush v. Helbush (1930) 209 Cal. 758, 763.) Once a court
has established its power to hear a case, it may make errors with respect to areas of
procedure, pleading, evidence, and substantive law. (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure,
supra, Jurisdiction, § 278, p. 843; see also Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Dept. of
Alcoholic Beverage Control (1961) 55 Cal.2d 728, 731 [“ ‘ “[J]urisdiction [over
the subject], being the power to hear and determine, implies power to decide a
question wrong as well as right.” ’ ”]; Armstrong v. Armstrong (1976) 15 Cal.3d
942, 950 [“Thus, a failure to state a cause of action [citations], insufficiency of
evidence [citations], abuse of discretion [citations], and mistake of law [citations]
have been held nonjurisdictional errors . . . .”].)
Moreover, the presumption in the California Constitution is that the
“improper admission or rejection of evidence . . . or . . . any error as to any matter
of procedure,” is subject to harmless error analysis and must have resulted in a
“miscarriage of justice” in order for the judgment to be set aside. (Cal. Const., art.
VI, § 13.) Code of Civil Procedure section 475 contains similar language: “The
court must, in every stage of an action, disregard any error, improper ruling,
instruction, or defect, in the pleadings or proceedings which, in the opinion of the
court, does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”
Nonetheless, certain procedural errors are jurisdictional. (Abelleira, supra,
17 Cal.2d at p. 288; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Jurisdiction, § 276, pp. 840-
842.) An error is jurisdictional “ ‘only where the clear purpose of the statute is to
restrict or limit the power of the court to act and where the effective enforcement
8

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of such restrictions requires the use of extraordinary writs of certiorari or
prohibition.’ ” (County of Santa Clara, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 549.)4
We find no such “clear purpose” with respect to section 594(b)’s
evidentiary rule.5 It is evident that the rule serves to effectuate the notice

4
The Court of Appeal in a footnote provided an extensive list of those errors
that courts have held qualify as jurisdictional — both in the fundamental sense,
and as acts in excess of jurisdiction: “[C]onvicting an unrepresented accused or
prosecuting a person who has been granted immunity from such prosecution.
(People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 424, 431 [right to counsel]; People v. Backus
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 360, 381 [immunity].) . . . An unlawfully imposed sentence . . .
. (People v. Jones (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1093.) . . . [F]ailing to timely file
a notice of appeal; the lack of a final judgment; and raising an issue not listed in
the notice of appeal. (Hollister Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d
660, 674 [untimely notice of appeal]; Committee for Responsible Planning v. City
of Indian Wells (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 191, 195 [absence of a final judgment];
Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker (1990) 220
Cal.App.3d 35, 45-47 [failing to list issue in notice of appeal].) The failure to post
a bond is a jurisdictional defect barring enforcement of a preliminary injunction.
(Condor Enterprises, Ltd. v. Valley View State Bank (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 734,
741.) . . . Cases where there is exclusive federal jurisdiction may not be tried in
state courts. (Chromy v. Lawrance (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1521, 1524-1528.) . . .
The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a jurisdictional defect. (Abelleira
v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 292-293.) . . . A court commits
jurisdictional error when it decides an issue which has not been assigned to it for
decision. (Shane v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1237, 1249.) A
probation report is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a finding that a minor is not fit
for treatment in the juvenile court system. (Jimmy H. v. Superior Court (1970) 3
Cal.3d 709, 714-715.) . . . A trial court’s effort to resentence a defendant pursuant
to Penal Code section 1170 more than 120 days after the initial sentence is a
jurisdictionally void act. (People v. Roe (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 112, 117-118.) . .
. In a criminal case, the failure of the information to state facts sufficient to
negative the statute of limitations is a jurisdictional defect. (People v. Posten
(1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 633, 648.) . . .”
5
Goddard contends that our decision in Estate of Dean (1906) 149 Cal. 487
establishes that a trial court acts in excess of jurisdiction if it conducts a trial in a
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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provision of section 594(a). We considered the legislative purpose of section
594(a) at length in Au-Yang v. Barton (1999) 21 Cal.4th 958. “ ‘A proceeding
taken against [a party] in his absence is in the nature of a default. The purpose of
[section 594(a)] is to prevent the possibility of such default being taken against
one who has, by reason of insufficient notice or no notice of the time of trial, been
unable to appear.’ [Citations.] [¶] Proceeding to judgment in the absence of a
party is an extraordinary and disfavored practice in Anglo-American
jurisprudence: ‘[T]he policy of the law is to have every litigated case tried upon
its merits, and it looks with disfavor upon a party, who, regardless of the merits of
the case, attempts to take advantage of the mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or
neglect of his adversary.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 963.)
It is clear that section 594(b) serves to promote the same policy objective as
section 594(a)  to prevent judgments where one party had no notice of trial. It
does so in part by requiring that proof of notice made pursuant to section 594(a) be

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

party’s absence without proof that the absent party received notice. (Id. at pp.
491-493.) Not so. In that case, the court dismissed a probate action on the
defendant’s motion when certain plaintiffs failed to appear at trial. The Court of
Appeal reversed, finding that dismissal of the action under Code of Civil
Procedure section 581 was improper without some showing to the trial court of
notice to the absent plaintiffs. (Estate of Dean, supra, at p. 492.) In the present
case, proof of notice was on file with the court and appears in the appellate record,
but was not introduced into evidence. Moreover, in Estate of Dean we expressly
limited the scope of the opinion to the notice required for dismissal of an action,
not “what would constitute sufficient notice, or sufficient proof of such notice, to
authorize a court to proceed to a disposition of a cause in the absence of a party.”
(Ibid.)
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introduced into evidence at trial. But neither this clear statutory purpose nor the
need to avoid a miscarriage of justice is served by reversing a judgment for failure
to comply with section 594(b)’s evidentiary rule when it is clear from the record
that the prevailing party provided actual, timely notice of the trial date to the
defaulting party. We therefore conclude that failure to comply with section
594(b)’s evidentiary rule is not jurisdictional.
This was the Court of Appeal’s conclusion in San Francisco Bay, supra, 26
Cal.App.4th at page 126. There, a cross-defendant did not appear at trial, but later
asserted that the judgment was void as to him because he had not been served with
actual notice of the continued trial date. The court recognized that there was no
proof that the cross-defendant had been given 15 days’ notice of the continued
trial date, but noted that section 594 did not apply to a continued trial date (Parker
v. Dingman (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1016) and that the cross-defendant had
had actual notice of the trial dates before that point. (San Francisco Bay, supra,
26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 126-127.) The court reasoned that section 594(b)’s
evidentiary rule merely serves “ ‘to protect parties against trials, dismissals or
judgments in their excusable absence. Hence, compliance may be waived or
excused . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 127.) The court therefore held that as long as
the requirements of section 594(a) are met, such that actual notice to the absent
party has occurred, the trial court has jurisdiction to enter judgment against the
absent party whether or not the requirements of section 594(b)’s evidentiary rule
are met. (San Francisco Bay, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 127-128; see also
Isherwood v. Hyrosen Properties, Inc. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d Supp. 33, 35-37
[section 594(b) is nonjurisdictional because it otherwise would render
jurisdictional provisions of section 594(a) superfluous].)
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Goddard cites Irvine, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d 693, for the proposition that
failure to comply with the evidentiary provision of section 594(b) is jurisdictional.
Irvine is of no avail to Goddard. In that case, notice of trial was sent consistent
with Code of Civil Procedure section 1013a, and proof of service was filed with
the trial court. Nonetheless, defendant did not appear at trial and the notice of trial
was not placed in evidence. (Irvine, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at p. 695.) Irvine held
that a violation of section 594(b) results in the court being “without jurisdiction to
proceed in defendant’s absence,” even if proof of service was on file with the trial
court and is part of the record on appeal. (Irvine, supra, 130 Cal.app.3d at p. 698,
citing Wilson v. Goldman (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 573.) We agree with San
Francisco Bay’s assessment of Irvine: “The per curiam opinion in Irvine
dismissed a dispute about whether the absent party there ‘did or did not receive
actual notice of trial,’ suggesting that the arguments . . . were ‘not pertinent’ to the
issue of compliance with [section 594(b)]. To the extent that Irvine suggests that
waiver and excuse are currently subsumed within the statute’s proof requirements,
we respectfully disagree. No case has so far felt constrained by that view.” (San
Francisco Bay, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) To the degree that the decision
in Irvine, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d 693, is inconsistent with our opinion here, it is
disapproved.
We do not address the situation of a judgment entered against a party who
never received notice of a trial date. We also emphasize that compliance with
section 594(b)’s evidentiary rule is mandatory and is the most direct means of
making clear to trial and appellate courts that section 594(a)’s notice requirement
has been fulfilled. But when, as here, it is clear from the record that notice was
given consistent with the provisions of section 594(a), but was simply not received
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into evidence pursuant to section 594(b)’s evidentiary rule, the error is subject to
harmless error review and is not jurisdictional. (San Francisco Bay, supra, 26
Cal.App.4th at p. 127; Isherwood v. Hyrosen Properties, Inc., supra, 194
Cal.App.3d Supp. at pp. 36-37.)
In the present case, Goddard’s counsel, York, was given notice of the trial
date in compliance with section 594(a). Jakoby filed proof of this service of such
notice with the court prior to trial, and that proof of service appears in the
appellate record before us. At the uncontested trial, the notice of the trial date
served on Goddard’s counsel was not introduced in evidence or demonstrated by
other competent evidence, as required by section 594(b)’s evidentiary rule.
Jakoby’s failure to introduce notice of the trial date is harmless error. Like the
Court of Appeal, we conclude that the trial court’s reliance on the filed proof of
notice in satisfaction of section 594(a), even without the admission of that proof
into evidence, provides no grist for a finding that a miscarriage of justice has
occurred. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
MORENO, J.

WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD,
J.
BAXTER,
J.
WERDEGAR,
J.
CHIN,
J.
BROWN,
J.
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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion In re Marriage of Goddard
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 97 Cal.App.4th 1059
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S107154
Date Filed: June 7, 2004
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Ana Maria Luna

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Michael G. York, in pro. per., and for Appellant Terry Goddard.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Susan K. Weiss for Respondent.

Schwamb & Stabile and Mark A. Hewitt as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent.

14

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Michael G. York
Law Offices of Michael G. York
1301 Dove Street, Suite 1000
Newport Beach, CA 92660
(949) 833-8848

Mark A. Hewitt
Schwamb & Stabile
333 City Blvd. West, Suite 710
Orange, CA 92868
(714) 937-3911
15

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Mon, 06/07/2004	S107154

Disposition
Jun 7 2004	Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
May 30 2002	Petition for review filed   counsel for Terry Goddard
May 31 2002	Record requested
Jun 4 2002	Received Court of Appeal record   one envelope
Jul 10 2002	Petition for Review Granted (civil case)   Brown, J., was absent and did not participate. Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin and Moreno, JJ.
Aug 12 2002	Opening brief on the merits filed   apppellant Terry Goddard [40K]
Feb 10 2003	Received letter from:   Counse for appellant dated February 5, 2003.
Jun 16 2003	Filed:   Letter from counsel for Respondent {Lynn Jakoby} informing the court that per instructions of her client, counsel will not be filing a brief on her behalf.
Jul 10 2003	Order filed   The court, having recieved a letter on June 16, 2003 from attorney for respondent stating that, pursuant to respondent's instruction, a brief would not be filed on behalf o respondent, hereby grants permission to the law firm of Schwamb & Stabile to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondent. The brief shall be served and filed on or before August 6, 2003. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Aug 6 2003	Request for extension of time filed   Schwamb & Stabile, Mark A. Hewitt, to file Amicus Curiae Brief. asking add'l 30 days from this date. [9/5/03].
Aug 8 2003	Extension of time granted   The application of amicus curiae the law firm of Schwamb & Stabile and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file its amicus curiae brief in support of respondents herein is extended to and including September 5, 2003. Answer due by any party within 20 days.
Sep 2 2003	Request for extension of time filed   Schwamb & Stabile, Inc., aty. Mark A. Hewitt, to file a.c. brief asking add'l 30 days from this date. [10/6/03].
Sep 5 2003	Extension of time granted   To October 6, 2003 to file Application and AC Brief by Schwamb & Stabile.
Oct 6 2003	Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief   Schwamb & Stabile, Inc.
Oct 6 2003	Amicus curiae brief filed   Schwamb & Stabile, Inc.
Oct 27 2003	Request for extension of time filed   By appellant asking for a 14-day extension to November 10, 2003 to file appellant's Response to AC Brief.
Oct 31 2003	Extension of time granted   To November 10, 2003 to file Appellant's Response to AC Brief.
Nov 12 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   appellant Terry Goddard 40k
Feb 10 2004	Case ordered on calendar   3-10-04, 1:30pm, S.F.
Feb 26 2004	Received:   counsel for resp. Lynn E. Jakoby request to allow amici to use all of responden'ts time for o.a..
Feb 27 2004	Order filed   The request of respondent to allocate to amicus curiae Mark A. Hewitt of Schwamb & Stabile, Inc. all of resp's 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
Mar 10 2004	Cause argued and submitted
Jun 7 2004	Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full   Opinion by Moreno, J. -----joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, & Brown, JJ.
Jul 9 2004	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Jul 15 2004	Received:   Receipt for remittitur from 2 DCA Div.5

Briefs
Aug 12 2002	Opening brief on the merits filed
Oct 6 2003	Amicus curiae brief filed
Nov 12 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website