Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 5/24/07

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

In re LEMANUEL C., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S144515
v.
Ct.App. 1/1 A109322
LEMANUEL C.,
Solano
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. J31469

Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 1800 et seq. sets forth procedures
that govern the extended detention of dangerous persons. Section 1800 originally
provided, in part, that persons under the control of the Department of Youth
Authority2 could be civilly committed to its control at the time they would
otherwise be discharged by statute if they “would be physically dangerous to the
public because of [a] mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality.”
(Stats. 2003, ch. 4, § 45.) In order to preserve the extended detention scheme’s

1
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code
unless otherwise specified.
2
Since July 1, 2005, the Department of Youth Authority has been renamed
“the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile
Facilities.” (§ 1703, subd. (c).) We refer to the “Youth Authority” because the
relevant events occurred in 2004.
1

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constitutionality, we interpreted the extended detention scheme to “require a
finding that the person’s mental deficiency, disorder, or abnormality causes
serious difficulty in controlling behavior.” (In re Howard N. (2005) 35 Cal.4th
117, 122 (Howard N.), italics added.) Here we consider defendant’s claim that his
civil commitment under section 1800 is unconstitutional because the petition did
not allege, and the trial court did not specifically find, “a serious and well-founded
risk” that he “would reoffend” if not committed.
We conclude the current extended detention scheme set forth in section
1800 et seq. satisfies the due process and equal protection clauses of our state and
federal Constitutions. The scheme’s requirements that (1) a person is “physically
dangerous to the public because of his or her mental or physical deficiency,
disorder, or abnormality” and that (2) the mental or physical3 deficiency, disorder,
or abnormality “causes [the individual] to have serious difficulty controlling his
[or her] dangerous behavior” adequately limit the scheme’s applicability to
youthful offenders whose mental deficiency, disorder, or abnormality causes them
to be physically dangerous to the public if not recommitted. (Howard N., supra,
35 Cal.4th at p. 135; see § 1800.) A further finding that an inability to control
behavior results in “a serious and well-founded risk of reoffense” is not required to
preserve the scheme’s constitutionality. Furthermore, although the adult civil
commitment statutes for Sexually Violent Predators (SVP’s) and for Mentally
Disordered Offenders (MDO’s) have different limitations on the types of
dangerous behavior that fall within their purview than the extended detention
scheme challenged here, there is no equal protection violation because persons
committed under section 1800 are not similarly situated to SVP’s and MDO’s in

3
Since physical deficiencies, disorders, or abnormalities are not at issue in
defendant’s case, we do not discuss further this aspect of the statutory scheme.
2

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several significant respects. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeal. 4
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
When defendant Lemanuel C. was 14, the juvenile court adjudged him to
be a ward of the court based on his admission that he sodomized his seven-year-
old cousin. Two years later, the court sustained a second allegation that defendant
made a false crime report alleging that his roommate had raped him. After
defendant violated his probation, the court committed him to the Youth Authority
for a maximum term of three years and two months. Before the term expired, the
court extended defendant’s Youth Authority commitment for two years pursuant
to section 1800. Before that two-year extension expired, the district attorney filed
a second section 1800 petition to further extend defendant’s civil confinement.
Using the language of the statute as it then read, the second petition alleged,
in pertinent part, that defendant, if discharged from the Youth Authority, “would
be physically dangerous to the public because of his mental . . . deficiency,
disorder, or abnormality . . . .”
Defendant waived his right to a jury on the second petition. (§ 1801.5)
The trial court heard testimony from defendant’s Youth Authority psychologist,
Dr. Marcia Asgarian. The court also received into evidence by stipulation the
probable cause hearing testimony of Dr. P. Herbert Leiderman, a Youth Authority
consulting psychiatrist who conducted a section 1800 evaluation of defendant.
Dr. Leiderman concluded that defendant suffers from a “mental disorder”

4 Defendant’s extended commitment at issue ended on December 13, 2006.
Rather than dismiss the case as moot, we choose to retain the case for decision.
We exercise our discretion to decide this otherwise moot case because it raises
important issues that are capable of repetition but likely to evade review.
(Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 524, fn. 1.)
3

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known as reactive attachment disorder.5 As a result, defendant has “difficulty in
forming social relationships and sees individuals as objects rather than as sentient
human beings.” Dr. Leiderman also concluded that defendant suffered from
“pedophilia.” Dr. Leiderman characterized defendant as “an adventitious
predator” who is attracted to “youngsters, boys particularly.” The psychiatrist
added that, “whenever circumstances permit, [defendant] takes advantage” of
youngsters who are “mentally weaker” and “less able to defend themselves.” Dr.
Leiderman noted that defendant lacks “cognitive skills for self-reflection which
could enable him to develop self-corrective maneuvers and thus avoid potentially
dangerous situations.” Dr. Leiderman added that defendant admitted engaging in
several incidents in the Youth Authority involving impermissible sexual activities
with other wards “that, if caught, would have been cited.” Dr. Leiderman
mentioned that, although defendant described his several sexual misconduct
incidents as “consensual,” defendant was “beginning to rethink what consensual
behavior is” and appeared receptive to a “possible treatment program” in the
Youth Authority to work on this issue. Dr. Leiderman concluded, however, that
defendant’s reactive attachment disorder causes him to pose a danger to the
community.
Dr. Asgarian worked with defendant in a Youth Authority group home
program designed to help rehabilitate sex offenders through group psychotherapy.
She testified that defendant initially seemed motivated and actively participated in
weekly group therapy. However, after about eight months, defendant told Dr.
Asgarian that he “didn’t want to participate any more.” Defendant often did not
attend the therapy sessions; when he came to the group, he “would shut down,”

5
The parties agree that the mental disorder is “reactive attachment disorder,”
although Dr. Leiderman referred to it as “reactive detachment disorder.”
4

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hide his face under his jacket, and refuse to talk. Before he “shut down”
completely, defendant indicated that he “would reoffend if he didn’t receive
appropriate treatment.” Dr. Asgarian believed defendant did not make any
significant progress towards his sex offending issues during the treatment period
from the late fall of 2002 to early 2004.
The court granted the petition, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that
testimony and evidence presented at the section 1800 hearing established that
defendant would “be a physical danger to the public by virtue of a mental
deficiency, disorder, [or] abnormality” and that he “has a serious difficulty in
controlling his behavior within the meaning of Kansas v. Crane [(2002) 534 U.S.
407 ].”6 The court extended defendant’s commitment for an additional two years.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the granting of the section 1800 petition. We
granted defendant’s petition for review.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends section 1800 violates his right to due process of law
because it does not expressly require an allegation in the petition, and a finding by
the trier of fact, that there was “a serious and well-founded risk that [he] would
reoffend if not committed.”
A. Background
At the time of defendant’s trial, an extended detention under section 1800
required only one finding: that a person “would be physically dangerous to the
public because of [a] mental . . . deficiency, disorder, or abnormality . . . .” (Stats.

6
Kansas v. Crane, supra, 534 U.S. at pages 412-413, held that, as a matter of
due process, individuals may be involuntarily committed as sexually violent
predators only after there is a finding that, as a result of mental illness, they have
serious difficulty controlling their dangerous behavior.
5

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2003, ch. 4, § 45.) As noted above, in order to preserve the statute’s
constitutionality, we interpreted section 1800 to require a second finding: that a
mental deficiency, disorder, or abnormality causes serious difficulty in controlling
the person’s dangerous behavior. (Howard N., supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 131-135.)
We then held that the finding of serious difficulty in controlling dangerous
behavior “must be alleged in the petition for extended commitment (§ 1800), and
demonstrated at the probable cause hearing (§ 1801) and any ensuing trial
(§ 1801.5).” (Howard N., supra, at p. 135.) 7
The section 1800 petition here did not allege that defendant had serious
difficulty in controlling his dangerous behavior. However, the trial court made an
explicit finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, to that effect—even though the statute
did not yet expressly require such a finding.8
In resolving the issue whether due process required section 1800 to include
an additional finding of serious difficulty in controlling a person’s dangerous
behavior, we analyzed two decisions of the United States Supreme Court
involving civil commitments of sexually violent predators (Kansas v. Hendricks
(1997) 521 U.S. 346 (Hendricks); Kansas v. Crane, supra, 534 U.S. 407 (Crane))

7
In 2005 and 2006, the Legislature added the phrase “that causes the person
to have serious difficulty controlling his or her dangerous behavior.” That
language now follows the word “abnormality” in section 1800. (Stats. 2005, ch.
110, § 1; Stats. 2006, ch. 538, § 668.) The Legislature amended sections 1801 and
1801.5 (effective July 21, 2005) to include similar language. (Stats. 2005, ch. 110,
§§ 3, 4.)
8
In light of defendant’s pretrial argument that due process required a finding
that his mental deficiency, disorder, or abnormality caused “lack of control” of his
dangerous behavior and the trial court’s explicit finding in language similar to that
approved in Crane, defendant did not suffer prejudice by the fact that his petition
did not allege a serious difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior or by the fact
that the court did not make such a determination at the probable cause hearing.
(People v. Hayes (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 34, 49-51.)
6

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and two of our own decisions interpreting and applying the high court’s decisions
to California’s SVP law (§ 6600 et seq.) (Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19
Cal.4th 1138 (Hubbart); People v. Williams (2003) 31 Cal.4th 757 (Williams)). In
so doing, we concluded that the constitutional principles set forth in those cases
apply to all civil commitment schemes, including the extended detention scheme
at issue here. (Howard N., supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 128-132.) We reiterate here
that, because “civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection” (Addington v. Texas
(1979) 441 U.S. 418, 425; Howard N., supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 127) the extended
detention civil commitment procedures under section 1800 et seq. must comport
with due process.
We summarize the holdings in Hendricks, Crane, Hubbart, and Williams
below before addressing whether an explicit, separate “serious and well-founded
risk of reoffense” finding is constitutionally required for a section 1800 extended
detention civil commitment.
In
Hendricks, the high court held that the challenged Kansas SVP civil
commitment law satisfied due process because the defendant’s “admitted lack of
volitional control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerousness, adequately
distinguishe[d] [him] from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.” (Hendricks, supra,
521 U.S. at p. 360.) In so holding, the court noted that it previously had
“sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of
dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as ‘mental illness’ or
‘mental abnormality’ [citations],” and it clarified that, for an involuntary civil
commitment, due process requires a showing of dangerousness as well as a
showing of a mental disorder linked to a difficulty of controlling dangerous
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behavior, rather than a “finding of dangerousness, standing alone.” (Hendricks,
supra, 521 U.S. at p. 358.)
In Hubbart, we upheld our state’s SVP law, which allows for a civil
commitment of a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense if
certain conditions are met, including that the person has “ ‘a diagnosed mental
disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it
is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.’ (§ 6600,
subd. (a).)”9 (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1158.) In deciding that our SVP
law satisfied due process requirements, we relied on Hendricks. We reasoned that
our SVP law “establishes the requisite connection between impaired volitional
control and the danger posed to the public” because it requires a finding of a
mental disorder resulting in dangerousness and links that finding to a finding that
the mental disorder caused “the inability to control dangerous sexual behavior.”
(Ibid.)
In
Crane, the United States Supreme Court reconsidered the Kansas SVP
law and explained that its decision in Hendricks had set forth “no requirement of
total or complete lack of control.” (Crane, supra, 534 U.S. at p. 411.) The court
explained that, to satisfy due process, “[i]t is enough to say that there must be
proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior” that, “when viewed in light of
such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity
of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous
sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects

9
At the time Hubbart was decided, the quoted language of section 6600,
subdivision (a)(1) was designated section 6600, subdivision (a). (See Historical
and Statutory Notes, 73D West’s Ann. Welf. & Inst. Code (2006 supp.) foll. §
6600, pp. 64-65.)
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him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an
ordinary criminal case. [Citations.]” (Crane, supra, 534 U.S. at p. 413.)
In
Williams, we interpreted Crane as confirming the principle set forth in
Hendricks that “a constitutional civil commitment scheme must link future
dangerousness to a mental abnormality that impairs behavioral control, while . . .
making clear that the impairment need only be serious, not absolute.” (Williams,
supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 773.) We concluded that “a commitment rendered under
the plain language of the [Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA)] necessarily
encompasses a determination of serious difficulty in controlling one’s criminal
sexual violence” (id. at p. 777), as required by Crane, because “the SVPA requires
a diagnosed mental disorder affecting the person’s emotional or volitional
capacity that predisposes the person to commit sex crimes in a menacing degree.
(§ 6600, subd. (c).)” (Williams, supra, at p. 776.)
B. Due Process
We now consider whether defendant’s civil commitment under section
1800 violates his constitutional right to due process of law because the statute does
not expressly require an allegation in the petition, and a finding by the trier of fact,
that there was “a serious and well-founded risk” that he “would reoffend” if not
committed.
One key condition for an SVP determination in California is that there is “a
diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety
of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal
behavior.” (§ 6600, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) We agree with the Court of
Appeal in the present case that (1) the italicized phrase “modifies the clause, ‘that
makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others,’ ” and (2) a person
thus is a danger for SVP purposes “ ‘in that it is likely’ [he] would reoffend,” i.e.,
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commit another “sexually violent offense” (§ 6600, subd. (a)(1)), and, (3)
therefore, “the likelihood of reoffending is the very crux of the person’s
dangerousness to the public” in the context of an SVP determination under section
6600 et seq.
Our recent cases analyzing the meaning of the term “likely” in the context
of California’s SVP law shed light on whether an explicit, separate finding of a
serious and well-founded risk of reoffending is constitutionally required in order
to extend defendant’s detention under section 1800.
In People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888 (Ghilotti), we
considered the meaning of the term “likely” in section 6601, subdivision (d),
which governs the initiation of SVP proceedings. That section states that a
prosecutor may not file an SVP petition unless two mental health professionals
conclude that the potential SVP “has a diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she
is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and
custody.” (§ 6601, subd. (d), italics added.)
We decided that, in this context, the term “likely” does not mean “more
likely than not” and therefore does not require a prediction of a greater than 50
percent chance of reoffending. (Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 915-919.) We
ruled that an evaluator “must conclude that the person is ‘likely’ to reoffend if,
because of a current mental disorder which makes it difficult or impossible to
restrain violent sexual behavior, the person presents a substantial danger, that is, a
serious and well-founded risk, that he or she will commit such crimes if free in the
community.” (Id. at p. 922.)
Citing Hubbart and Hendricks, we observed that our SVP law “emphasizes
the themes common to valid civil commitment statutes, i.e., a current mental
condition or disorder that makes it difficult or impossible to control volitional
behavior and predisposes the person to inflict harm on himself or others, thus
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producing dangerousness measured by a high risk or threat of further injurious
acts if the person is not confined. [Citations.]” (Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p.
920.) We concluded that our SVP law satisfies due process because it is limited in
scope to “the confinement and treatment of persons who have already been
convicted of violent sex offenses, and who, as the result of current mental
disorders that make it difficult or impossible to control their violent sexual
impulses, represent a substantial danger of committing similar new crimes
[citations] . . . .” (Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 924.)
In Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228 (Cooley), we relied on
Ghilotti in construing the word “likely” to mean that a potential SVP poses a
“serious and well-founded risk” of reoffending in the context of section 6602,
subdivision (a). (Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 256.) Section 6602, subdivision
(a), requires a finding of probable cause that the person named in the SVP petition
“is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon release.”
(Italics added.)
In People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979 (Roberge), we analyzed the
word “likely” in the context of section 6000, subdivision (a)(1), which sets forth as
a condition for an SVP determination that a person “has a diagnosed mental
disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it
is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” (Italics
added.) Relying on both Ghilotti and Cooley, we construed “likely” in this
context to mean “a substantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk,” of
reoffending. (Roberge, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 988, italics added.)
The “serious and well-founded risk” language derives from our decisions
interpreting California’s SVP law. Those decisions, and Roberge in particular,
reveal that a “serious and well-founded risk” of reoffending is merely another way
of referring to the necessary finding of future dangerousness in the context of the
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SVP law that requires a prior conviction of a sexually violent offense, not a
separate required finding. We are convinced that, in the context of an extended
civil commitment under section 1800, the required findings that the defendant, if
discharged from the Youth Authority, “would be physically dangerous to the
public” because of his mental disorder and that the risk of future dangerousness
exists because the mental deficiency causes “serious difficulty in controlling [his]
dangerous behavior” (§ 1800) satisfy due process because they establish “the
requisite connection between impaired volitional control and the danger posed to
the public.” (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1158.) In other words, due process
is satisfied because section 1800 requires a finding of a mental disorder resulting
in dangerousness, and it properly links that finding to a second required finding
that the mental disorder causes the inability to control dangerous behavior.
In In re Michael H. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1074 (Michael H.), the Court
of Appeal reached a different conclusion. There, the court held that, in order to
uphold the constitutionality of section 1800 et seq., it was necessary to construe
“the statutory scheme to require that the person’s mental deficiency, disorder, or
abnormality causes serious difficulty in controlling his or her behavior, resulting
in a serious and well-founded risk of reoffense.” (Id. at p. 1080, italics added.)
The court reasoned that our holding in Howard N. compelled construction of the
extended detention scheme to require a “serious [and] well-founded risk of
reoffense” finding. It reached that conclusion because it determined that the SVP
law’s due process requirements apply to the extended detention scheme and
because the court believed that cases affirming the constitutionality of the SVP
law “have required such a finding.” (Michael H., supra, at pp. 1090-1091.)
For several reasons, we disagree with Michael H. First, as noted above, the
extended detention scheme set forth in section 1800 et seq. already includes the
requirement that the defendant would be physically dangerous to the public
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because of a mental deficiency, disorder, or abnormality that causes serious
difficulty in controlling behavior. Consequently, the statutory scheme does not
require a separate “serious and well-founded risk of reoffense” finding to preserve
its constitutionality.
Second, Michael H. rests on the unfounded assumption that the SVPA
requires a separate, explicit finding of a “serious [and] well-founded risk of
reoffense” to preserve its constitutionality. To the contrary, the “serious and well-
founded risk of reoffense” language found in some California SVP cases merely
explains the “likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior”
component of the dangerousness finding required for an SVP commitment.
Both the CALJIC SVP jury instruction (CALJIC No. 4.19) and the current
CALCRIM SVP jury instruction (CALCRIM No. 3454) appropriately reflect our
understanding of the role that the “serious and well-founded risk of reoffense”
language plays in an SVP proceeding. CALCRIM No. 3454 provides, in pertinent
part, that to prove an allegation that a person is an SVP, the People must prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that “1. (He/She) has been convicted of committing
sexually violent offenses against two or more victims; [¶] 2. (He/She) has a
diagnosed mental disorder; [AND] [¶] 3. As a result of that diagnosed mental
disorder, it is likely that (he/she) will be a danger to the health and safety of others
because (he/she) will engage in sexual violent predatory criminal behavior.” The
instruction goes on to explain that “[a] person is likely to engage in sexually
violent predatory criminal behavior if there is a serious and well-founded risk that
the person will engage in such conduct if released into the community.” (Ibid.) In
the same paragraph, the instruction further explains that “[t]he likelihood that the
person will engage in such conduct does not have to be greater than 50 percent.”
(Ibid.) The above instruction defines “likely to engage in sexually violent
predatory criminal behavior” in terms of a “serious and well-founded risk of such
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behavior,” but the instruction does not require the trier of fact explicitly to make a
separate finding of a “serious and well-founded risk of reoffense.”
CALJIC No. 4.19 is similar. It provided, in pertinent part, that to prove an
allegation that a person is an SVP, the People must prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that he or she is “a person who, (1) has been convicted of a sexually violent
offense against two or more victims for which he or she received a [determinate]
sentence and (2) has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes him or her a danger
to the health and safety of others in that he or she will engage in sexual violent
predatory criminal behavior.” The instruction went on to explain that the trier of
fact “may not find [a person] to be a sexually violent predator based on prior
offenses without [relevant] evidence of a currently diagnosed mental disorder that
makes [him] [her] a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that
[he] [she] will engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior.” (Ibid.)
As noted above, the “serious and well-founded risk of reoffense” language
found in some SVP cases and reflected in CALCRIM No. 3454 simply explains
the “likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior” component
of the future dangerousness finding required for an SVP commitment. Contrary to
the analysis in Michael H., we conclude that neither the SVP law nor the section
1800 extended detention scheme requires a separate “serious and well-founded
risk of reoffense” finding. We disapprove In re Michael H., supra, 128
Cal.App.4th 1074, to the extent it holds otherwise.
For all the reasons indicated, we are convinced that an extended detention
commitment rendered under section 1800 et seq. includes a determination
regarding future dangerousness caused by a person’s mental deficiency, disorder,
or abnormality and that due process does not require a separate finding of a
“serious and well-founded risk of reoffense.” We conclude the section 1800
extension scheme satisfies due process because the defendant’s “lack of volitional
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control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerousness, adequately
distinguishes [him] from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly
dealt with exclusively through criminal [or section 60210] proceedings.”
(Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 360.)
C. Equal Protection
Defendant also contends that the extended commitment proceedings under
section 1800 violate the equal protection clause of our state and federal
Constitutions. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) In this court,
defendant’s equal protection argument rests on his belief that it is “easier to civilly
commit juvenile offenders than their adult counterparts subjected to the SVPA or
MDO Act (MDOA),”11 because the requirement of future dangerousness is more
narrowly “limited or circumscribed by statute” in the MDOA and the SVPA than
the requirement of future dangerousness in the extended detention scheme set
forth in section 1800. 12

10
Section 602 sets forth procedures for adjudging minors to be wards of the
juvenile court because they have violated laws “defining crime.”
11
A prisoner adjudicated to be an MDO may be civilly committed during and
after parole if the following conditions are met: (a) the “prisoner has a severe
mental disorder that is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without
treatment”; (b) the “severe mental disorder was one of the causes of or was an
aggravating factor in the commission of the crime for which the prisoner was
sentenced to prison”; (c) the “prisoner has been in treatment for the severe mental
disorder for 90 days or more within the year prior to the prisoner’s parole or
release”; (d) a mental health professional evaluated the prisoner and concluded
that criteria (a), (b) and (c) above have been met, and that due to the severe mental
disorder, the prisoner “represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others”;
(e) the prisoner received a determinate sentence for the crime referenced in (b),
and the crime is one from a list of crimes enumerated in subdivision (e). (Pen.
Code, § 2962, subds. (a)-(e).)
12
In the Court of Appeal, defendant contended section 1800 violates equal
protection because “it has fewer procedural safeguards than those required to
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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“ ‘The concept of the equal protection of the laws compels recognition of
the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate
purpose of the law receive like treatment.’ ” (In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 296,
303.) The initial inquiry in any equal protection analysis is whether persons are
“similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.” (People v. Gibson (1988)
204 Cal.App.3d 1425, 1438, italics added.)
The fact that Youth Authority wards committed under section 1800 and
adults committed as SVP’s or MDO’s are considered dangerous due to mental
disorders and therefore are subject to commitment for treatment and the protection
of the public does not lead to the conclusion that “persons committed under
California’s various civil commitment statutes are similarly situated in all respects.
They are not.” (People v. Buffington (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1158
(Buffington).) Although section 1800 is a civil commitment statute, as are the
SVPA and the MDOA, the Legislature enacted the adult civil commitment statutes
with different purposes in mind than the purpose of the section 1800 extended
detention scheme challenged here.
As we noted in Cooley, “the SVPA narrowly targets ‘a small but extremely
dangerous group of sexually violent predators that have diagnosable mental
disorders [who] can be identified while they are incarcerated.’ [Citation.]”
(Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 253.) Similarly, the MDOA narrowly targets adult

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

civilly commit an adult SVP or MDO.” The Court of Appeal “agree[d] that the
adult statutes generally have more procedural safeguards and require more serious
predicate offenses for commitment” but properly concluded that there was “no
equal protection violation here because persons committed under section 1800 are
not similarly situated to SVP[’s] and MDO[’s] in key respects.”
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prisoners whose “severe mental disorder was one of the causes of or was an
aggravating factor in the commission of the crime for which the prisoner was
sentenced to prison.” (Pen. Code, § 2962, subd. (b).) Therefore, adults civilly
committed under the SVPA or the MDO are labeled “sexually violent predators”
or “mentally disordered offenders” based, in part, upon the nature of their prior
convictions in addition to their potential for future dangerousness to others.
In contrast to the SVPA and the MDOA, section 1800 broadly encompasses
all youthful offenders committed to the Youth Authority who, if discharged from
that facility, “would be physically dangerous to the public” because of their mental
deficiency, disorder, or abnormality. (§ 1800.) Section 1800 does not stigmatize a
youthful offender whose detention is extended under its provisions by labeling
him or her a certain type of offender. Significantly, section 1800 does not
narrowly target specific youthful offenders in the Youth Authority based upon the
nature of their sustained allegations that resulted in a Youth Authority
commitment. Accordingly, the “serious and well-founded risk of reoffense”
language defendant argues should be grafted onto section 1800 has no application
to the challenged Youth Authority extended detention scheme.
Youth Authority wards are distinctly different from more serious adult
offenders who have committed violent or sexually violent crimes. The Legislature
may “ ‘adopt more than one procedure for isolating, treating, and restraining
dangerous persons; and differences will be upheld if justified.’ [Citation.]”
(Buffington, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158.) As the Court of Appeal in this
case appropriately recognized, “[t]he mere fact that the Legislature has made it
more difficult to commit a more serious, adult offender— especially one who
faces the stigma of being declared an SVP [or MDO]— does not give rise to an
equal protection violation.”
17

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Accordingly, we conclude defendant’s equal protection argument is without
merit.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
CHIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.

18

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion In re Lemanuel C.
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 139 Cal.App.4th 482
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S144515
Date Filed: May 24, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Solano
Judge: R. Michael Smith

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Patricia N. Cooney, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Margaret Roberts for Protection and Advocacy, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and
Appellant.

David C. Coleman, Public Defender (Contra Costa) and Ron Boyer, Deputy Public Defender, as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Mary Jo Graves,
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler and Dane R. Gillette, Assistant Attorneys General,
Martin S. Kaye, Michael E. Banister, Catherine A. Rivlin and Bridget Billeter, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Patricia N. Cooney
1108 Fresno Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94707
(510) 525-0584

Margaret Roberts
Protection & Advocacy, Inc.
1330 Broadway, Suite 500
Oakland, CA 94612
(510) 267-1200

Bridget Billeter
Deputy Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004
(415) 703-1340

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Thu, 05/24/2007	S144515

Disposition
May 24 2007	Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Jun 21 2006	Petition for review filed   Lemanuel C., appellant by Patricia N. Cooney, CA-appointed counsel
Jun 22 2006	Record requested
Jun 30 2006	2nd record request   via email
Jun 30 2006	Received Court of Appeal record   file jacket/briefs/two accordian files
Aug 11 2006	Time extended to grant or deny review   to 9-19-06
Aug 23 2006	Petition for review granted; issues limited (criminal case)   Petition for review GRANTED. The issue to be briefed and argued is limited to the following: Was petitioner's civil commitment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800 unconstitutional because the petition did not allege, and the trial court did not specifically find, that there was "a serious and well-founded risk" that petitioner would reoffend if not committed? Corrigan, J., was absent and did not participate. Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ.
Sep 6 2006	Counsel appointment order filed   Patricia Cooney is appointed to represent appellant. Appellant's brief on the merits must be served and filed on or before 30 days from this order. (10-06-06)
Oct 3 2006	Request for extension of time filed   for appellant to file the opening brief on the merits, to 11-5-06.
Oct 13 2006	Extension of time granted   On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including November 6, 2006.
Oct 17 2006	Extension of time granted   The order filed October 13, 2006 is amended to read: On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including November 6, 2006.
Nov 8 2006	Opening brief on the merits filed   Lemanuel C., defendant and appellant Patricia Cooney, counsel (timely per CRC 40.1)
Nov 30 2006	Request for extension of time filed   30-days to January 5, 2007 to file the respondent's answer brief on the merits Michael E. Banister, Deputy Attorney General
Dec 8 2006	Extension of time granted   On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including January 5, 2007.
Jan 3 2007	Compensation awarded counsel
Jan 3 2007	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Cooney
Jan 4 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed   the People, respondent Michael Banister, Dep. A.G.
Jan 26 2007	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   Lemanuel C., Appellant / CRC 8.25(b) by Patricia N. Cooney, counsel
Feb 22 2007	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   Contra Costa County Public Defender Ron Boyer, Dep. Pub Def. (application/brief in support of appellant)
Feb 23 2007	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   Protection & Advocacy, Inc. Margaret Roberts, counsel (application/brief in support of appellant)
Mar 1 2007	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   Contra Costa Public Defender in support of Appellant. Answer is due within twenty days.
Mar 1 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed   Contra Costa Public Defender in support of appellant. Answer due within twenty days.
Mar 1 2007	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   Protection and Advocacy, Inc., in support of appellant. Answer is due within twenty days.
Mar 1 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed   Protection and Advocacy, Inc., in support of appellant. Answer is due within twenty days.
Mar 5 2007	Filed:   Appendix of Legislative History and Appendix of Legislative History to AC brief filed by Protection and Advocay, INC.,
Mar 6 2007	Case ordered on calendar   to be argued Tuesday, April 3, 2007, at 2:00 p.m., in Los Angeles
Mar 16 2007	Application filed to:   divide oral argument time requesting 20 minutes for appellant Lemanuel C., and 10 minutes for amicus curiae Protection & Advocacy, Inc.
Mar 21 2007	Order filed   The request of counsel for appellant in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of appellant at oral argument is hereby granted. The request of appellant to allocate to amicus curiae Protection and Advocacy, Inc. 15 minutes of appellant's 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
Mar 21 2007	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   The People, Respondent by Bridget Billeter, counsel
Mar 22 2007	Order filed   The order filed on March 21, 2007, granting permission for two counsel to argue on behalf of appellant at oral argument is amended in its entirety as follows: "The request of counsel for appellant in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of appellant at oral argument is hereby granted. The request of appellant to allocate to amicus curiae Protection and Advocacy, Inc. 10 minutes of appellant's 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted."
Apr 3 2007	Cause argued and submitted
May 23 2007	Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
May 24 2007	Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full   Majority opinion by Chin, J. --------------joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Moreno, Corrigan, JJ.
Jun 26 2007	Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Aug 22 2007	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Cooney

Briefs
Nov 8 2006	Opening brief on the merits filed
Jan 4 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed
Jan 26 2007	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Mar 1 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed
Mar 1 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed
Mar 21 2007	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website