Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 11/30/06

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE JAIME P., a Person Coming Under )
the Juvenile Court Law.
___________________________________ )
)
)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S135263
v.
Ct.App. 1/4 A107686
JAIME P.,
) Solano
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. J32334

In this case, we consider the continued vitality of In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8
Cal.4th 68 (Tyrell J.), upholding a warrantless search of a juvenile probationer by
an officer who lacked reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity and was
unaware that the juvenile had consented to such a search as a condition of his
probation. We conclude that developments subsequent to Tyrell J., including the
recent high court decision in Samson v. California (2006) 547 U.S. ___ [126 S.Ct.
2193] (Samson), our own decision in People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318
(Sanders), and lower court cases and scholarly comment critical of Tyrell J., have
convinced us that it should be overruled.
1

---

FACTS
The following uncontradicted facts are taken from the Court of Appeal
opinion in this case. Minor Jaime P. appeals from the juvenile court’s denial of
his motion to suppress evidence and the court’s sustaining of the allegations that
he drove a vehicle without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)) and carried a
loaded firearm (Pen. Code, § 12031, subd. (a)(1); further statutory references are
to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated), while associated with a criminal
street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)
On April 27, 2004, Fairfield Police Officer Moody detained minor and
three other persons after observing what he believed to be traffic violations. The
officer first observed the driver of the car turn corners without signaling and then
pull over to the curb, again without signaling. (The People conceded these
violations standing alone would not have justified a vehicle stop, as no other
vehicles were affected; see Veh. Code, § 22107.)
Moody pulled in behind the car and saw two passengers exit. The officer
detained and questioned them, testifying later that he did so because a home on the
block had recently been the target of gang violence. Minor, who was driving the
vehicle, and another person remained seated in the front seat. After a backup
officer arrived, Moody turned his attention to the individuals remaining in the car.
Minor could provide only a school identification and said he did not have a
driver’s license.
While talking to minor, Officer Moody observed a box of ammunition in
plain view on the front floorboard. Moody then ordered minor and his passenger
to exit the vehicle and pat-searched all four individuals. The only weapon located
at that time was a padlock tied to a bandana, found on one of the passengers who
initially exited the vehicle. After determining that none of the four individuals had
a valid driver’s license, Moody called a tow truck to remove and store the car. An
2

---

inventory search of the vehicle revealed a loaded .44-caliber handgun beneath the
rear passenger seat.
Minor was arrested and, after being advised of his constitutional rights at
the police station, he admitted that he was a member of the Calle San Marco
(CSM) gang. He indicated that he had given a ride to the other three occupants of
the vehicle and that one of them had produced the gun, which they passed around
but did not take out of its holster. At the jurisdictional hearing, Detective Golez
testified that CSM is a gang of 150-200 members in Fairfield and is a subset of the
Sureño gang; its members are “foot soldiers” of the Mexican Mafia, a prison gang.
Golez indicated that she believed minor to be an active member of CSM, based
upon his admission, his associates, his style of dress, and graffiti found at his
residence.
Based upon this and other evidence not relevant here, the juvenile court
denied minor’s motion to suppress the firearm, relying upon minor’s probation
search condition to justify the officer’s action. The record shows minor was on
probation with the condition, among others, that he submit his person and
property, including his vehicle and residence, to a warrantless search and seizure
by any peace officer at any time, with or without probable cause. The juvenile
court then sustained the delinquency petition, finding true the allegations that
minor drove a vehicle without a license, was a gang member and carried a loaded
firearm. The juvenile court continued minor as a ward of the court and placed him
on further probation.
Among other issues, minor contended on appeal that the juvenile court
erred by denying his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeal, acknowledging the
scholarly criticism of Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68, but deeming itself “bound by
its precedent,” rejected the contention and reached the remaining appellate issues.
We will reverse.
3

---

DISCUSSION
Does a juvenile’s probationary search condition justify an otherwise illegal
search and seizure if the officers conducting the search are then unaware that the
juvenile is on probation and subject to the search condition? Our decision in
Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68, held that the officers’ prior knowledge of the
probation condition was not necessary in a juvenile case. We reasoned, in part,
that “imposing a strict requirement that the searching officer must always have
advance knowledge of the search condition would be inconsistent with the special
needs of the juvenile probation scheme. That scheme embraces a goal of
rehabilitating youngsters who have transgressed the law, a goal that is arguably
stronger than in the adult context. [Citations.] . . . [T]he condition of probation
permitting police . . . to conduct warrantless searches is imposed by the juvenile
court to serve the important goal of deterring future misconduct.” (Tyrell J.,
supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 86-87, italics added.) We also relied upon the reduced
expectation of privacy that probationers, as a general matter, hold, and reasoned
that suppressing the evidence under the circumstances presented would not further
the purpose of the exclusionary rule. (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 86, 89.)
Justice Kennard dissented in Tyrell J. (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68, 90
(dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Her dissent found no significant differences in the
purposes for, and rationale supporting, search conditions imposed on adult
parolees (see In re Martinez (1970) 1 Cal.3d 641, 646; People v. Gallegos (1964)
62 Cal.2d 176, 178), and those imposed on juvenile probationers. (Tyrell J.,
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 96 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) In the dissent’s view, the
holdings in Gallegos and Martinez, “that a search may not be justified by a parole
search condition of which the searching officer is unaware, should be dispositive
of this case.” (Ibid.)
4

---

We recently considered whether prior knowledge of a search condition is
required to uphold an otherwise unlawful search of the residence of an adult
parolee, concluding the search “may not be justified by the circumstance that the
suspect was subject to a search condition of which the law enforcement officers
were unaware when the search was conducted.” (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p.
335, italics added, fn. omitted.) This is so, we reasoned, because “whether a
search is reasonable must be determined based upon the circumstances known to
the officer when the search is conducted.” (Id. at pp. 332, 334, italics added.)
Sanders explained that the “primary purpose of the exclusionary rule [is] to deter
police misconduct” (id. at p. 332), and that to admit evidence seized during a
search that the officer had no reason to believe was lawful, merely because a
search condition had been imposed, “would legitimize unlawful police conduct”
(id. at p. 335).
Much of the foregoing Sanders analysis would seemingly apply to searches
of juvenile probationers. Although Sanders noted that a number of commentators
had criticized our ruling in Tyrell J., nonetheless “[b]ecause this case does not
involve a juvenile, we need not, and do not, decide,” whether the reasoning of
Tyrell J. is correct. (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 335, fn. 5.) We will address
that question here.
We have recognized that reexamination of precedent may become
necessary when subsequent developments indicate an earlier decision was
unsound, or has become ripe for reconsideration. (E.g., Moradi-Shalal v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296-297, and cases cited.)
As we explain below, developments occurring subsequent to our Tyrell J. decision
convince us that it was incorrectly decided, and that it has generated and will
continue to generate inequitable and legally unjustified results unless we overrule
it.
5

---

As noted, Tyrell J. justified its holding on three broad grounds: (1) “the
special needs of the juvenile probation scheme” (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p.
87); (2) “the important goal of deterring future misconduct” (ibid.); and (3) the
reduced expectation of privacy that probationers, as a general matter, hold (id. at
pp. 83-86). In combination, these three factors convinced us that suppressing the
evidence under the circumstances presented in that case would not further the
purpose of the exclusionary rule. (Id. at p. 89.) But our subsequent decision in
Sanders, coupled with the analysis in another appellate case, People v. Hester
(2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 376, 398-405 (Hester), demonstrate that these grounds
may no longer be entitled to much weight.
In Sanders, we relied on In re Martinez, supra, 1 Cal.3d 641, and its “rule
that whether a search is reasonable must be determined based upon the
circumstances known to the officer when the search is conducted and is consistent
with the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule—to deter police misconduct.”
(Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 332, italics added.) An officer acting in reliance
on a search condition may act reasonably, even in the absence of any
particularized suspicion of criminal activity, and such a search does not violate the
suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy. (See People v. Reyes (1998) 19
Cal.4th 743, 754 [parole search condition].)
With respect to the reasonable expectation of privacy of one subject to a
search condition, Sanders observed that “[a] parolee’s expectation of privacy
certainly is diminished, but it is not eliminated” (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p.
332, fn. omitted), and “whether the parolee has a reasonable expectation of
privacy is inextricably linked to whether the search was reasonable” (id. at p. 333).
Sanders continued by observing that despite a “diminished expectation of privacy”
held by one subject to a search condition, the search cannot be justified if the
officer is unaware of the condition. (Ibid.) Thus, in Sanders’s view, despite being
6

---

subject to a search condition, a person retains a reasonable expectation the officers
will not undertake a random search supported by neither reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity nor advance knowledge of the search condition. (Ibid.; see also
Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 96-97 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)
As for deterrence of criminal acts, Sanders reviewed the decision in United
States v. Knights (2001) 534 U.S. 112 (Knights), allowing a search of an adult
probationer’s house by an officer aware of the suspect’s search condition.
Sanders observed that Knights would not extend to the situation in Sanders,
stating “[b]ut if an officer is unaware that a suspect is on probation and subject to a
search condition, the search is not justified by the state’s interest in supervising
probationers or by the concern that probationers are more likely to commit
criminal acts.” (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 333, italics added.) As the
dissent in Tyrell J. observed, requiring the officers be aware of the search
condition would not itself affect the goal of deterrence: The very existence of a
probation search condition, whether for adults or juveniles, should deter further
criminal acts, and that deterrent effect would not be eroded merely by requiring
that searching officers be aware of that condition. (See Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th
at pp. 96-97.)
What of Tyrell J.’s reliance on “the special needs of the juvenile probation
scheme”? (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 87.) In Sanders, we left open the
question whether such special needs indeed exist and would justify Tyrell J’s
holding. (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 335, fn. 5.) Justice Kennard’s dissent in
Tyrell J., doubted the validity of the majority’s reliance on such special needs,
observing that in that case, as here, the search was conducted by a police officer
acting without knowledge of the search condition, rather than by a probation
officer having an ongoing supervisory relationship with the probationer, whose
welfare he or she sought to promote. (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 92 (dis. opn.
7

---

of Kennard, J.).) In other words, the dissent questioned whether the special needs
of the juvenile probation scheme could be promoted by allowing a police search
not premised on prior knowledge of that condition.
Before addressing further the “special needs” rationale, we note that
Sanders identified a substantial body of scholarly commentary critical of our
Tyrell J. analysis. (See Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 328-329.) The gist of
these articles is that Tyrell J. eroded the Fourth Amendment protections for
juveniles by giving police an incentive to conduct a warrantless search,
unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, in the bare hope that a
search condition may exist.
Published opinions of various Courts of Appeal, recognizing the inherent
analytical inconsistencies between Tyrell J. and Sanders, have applied the
reasoning of Sanders to cases involving adult probationers. (See, e.g., In re
Joshua J. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 359, 363 [observing that Sanders “dismantled
the foundation and cornerstones of Tyrell J.”]; Myers v. Superior Court (2004)
124 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1251-1256; People v. Hoeninghaus (2004) 120
Cal.App.4th 1180, 1191 [“the court has changed the analysis it uses to determine
the propriety of a warrantless search in cases involving a search condition,” and
has “abandoned Tyrell J.’s analysis”]; People v. Lazalde (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th
858, 863-864; Hester, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 397-398 [applying Sanders
rationale to both adult and juvenile offenders, and confining Tyrell J. to its facts];
People v. Bowers (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1268-1270 [noting Sanders’s
disapproval of most of Tyrell J.’s rationale].
In Hester, police acting without a warrant or reasonable suspicion stopped a
vehicle possibly involved in criminal street gang activity. (Hester, supra, 119
Cal.App.4th at p. 382.) A car search uncovered a loaded firearm. The People
attempted to justify the search because three of the occupants (two adults and a
8

---

juvenile) were on probation and had consented to warrantless searches. (Hester,
supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 392.) Hester ruled that the rationale of our decision
in Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th 318, would invalidate the search as to both the adult
and juvenile occupants. (Hester, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 404-405.)
In Hester’s view, Sanders had disapproved of each doctrinal underpinning
supporting Tyrell J. except possibly for the “unique considerations related to the
juvenile justice system.” (Hester, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 404.) Hester
continued by finding that “[t]he People have failed to identify any juvenile justice
system considerations that would require this court to sanction police conduct that
otherwise violates the Fourth Amendment.” (Ibid.) Recognizing, however, that
Tyrell J. remained as precedent binding on the lower courts until expressly
overruled, Hester limited that case to its facts, “the stop of a juvenile in a public
place,” rather than “the detention of a lawfully operated” (id. at p. 405)
automobile: “To do otherwise would encourage police misconduct, especially in a
high-crime neighborhood, such as the one in this case.” (Hester, supra, 119
Cal.App.4th at pp. 404-405.)
The foregoing cases agree that the only remaining Tyrell J. rationale
possibly left untouched by Sanders is “the special needs of the juvenile probation
scheme.” (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 87.) As noted above, the dissent in
Tyrell J. doubted that those needs would be promoted by allowing a police search
not premised on knowledge of the probation search condition. (Id. at p. 92 (dis.
opn. of Kennard, J.).)
In the present case, the People initially insisted that because minor
supposedly lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy, he was not “searched” in
the constitutional sense. But, as the Attorney General later conceded, the People’s
major premise is incorrect, because under both Sanders and Tyrell J., a search
condition may diminish, but does not entirely preclude, a reasonable expectation
9

---

of privacy, i.e., a reasonable expectation that officers will not undertake a random
search supported by neither evidence of criminal activity nor advance knowledge
of the search condition. (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 333; see Tyrell J., supra,
8 Cal.4th at pp. 86, fn. 5 (maj. opn.); id. 96-97 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) This
reasoning would apply with equal force to juvenile or adult probationers.
Indeed, the high court’s decision in Samson, supra, 547 U.S. ___ [126 S.Ct.
2193], reinforces Sanders’s view that persons on probation or parole who are
subject to a search condition nonetheless retain some residual expectation of
privacy. Samson involved a parolee search conducted by officers aware of the
parolee’s consent-to-search condition, and held that, applying the usual “ ‘totality
of the circumstances’ ” test to determine reasonableness, the Fourth Amendment
did not prohibit such officers from conducting a suspicionless search of the
parolee. (Samson, supra, 547 U.S. at p. ___ [126 S.Ct. at p. 2197].) Samson
reasoned that parolees have a greatly reduced expectation of privacy by reason of
their parolee status and their consent to warrantless searches. (Samson, supra, 547
U.S. at pp. ___ [126 S.Ct. at pp. 2198-2199].) In this respect, Samson is
consistent with our own decision in People v. Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th 743,
allowing “suspicionless” searches of parolees with search consent conditions, as
long as the search is not “arbitrary, capricious or harassing.” (Id. at p. 752.)
But under Samson, both parolees and probationers retain some expectation
of privacy, albeit a reduced one. Indeed, Samson noted that “parolees have fewer
expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to
imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.” (Samson, supra, 547 U.S. at p.
___ [126 S.Ct. at p. 2198].) This reasoning severely undercuts Tyrell J’s
conclusion that juvenile probationers who are subject to a search condition have
no reasonable expectation of privacy whatever. (See Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at
p. 87.)
10

---

Samson also appears to support minor’s view that the high court approves
of our Sanders holding requiring prior knowledge of the search condition as a
protection against harassing searches. In Samson, Justice Stevens in dissent
accused the majority of allowing law enforcement officers in California
“unfettered discretion” to conduct parolee searches. (Samson, supra, 547 U.S. at
p. ___ [126 S.Ct. at p. 2207] (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) The Samson majority
disagreed, responding that, under California law, suspicionless searches of
parolees could not be conducted without prior knowledge of the person’s parole
status. (Samson, supra, 547 U.S. at p. ___, fn. 5 [126 S.Ct. at p. 2202, fn. 5],
citing Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 331-332.) This language could reasonably
be read as approving Sanders as a protection against arbitrary parolee searches.
Certainly, nothing in Samson suggests any disapproval of this aspect of Sanders.
As noted above, the officers in Samson were well aware of the parole search
condition.
Responding to the question whether a search by an officer unaware of a
probation condition would promote the special needs of the juvenile probation
system, the People simply claim that the Tyrell J. rule would discourage criminal
behavior by juvenile probationers who know they may be searched at any time. In
Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 333, we rejected a similar “deterrence”
justification for searching adult parolees or probationers. We stated that “if an
officer is unaware that a suspect is on probation and subject to a search condition,
the search is not justified by the state’s interest in supervising probationers or by
the concern that probationers are more likely to commit criminal acts.” (Ibid.,
italics added.)
As Justice Kennard’s dissent in Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pages 97-98,
observed, the very existence of a probation search condition, whether for adults or
juveniles, should amply deter further criminal acts, and that deterrent effect would
11

---

not be eroded merely by requiring that searching officers be aware of that
condition. If there are other “special needs” of the juvenile probation system that
would be undermined by the rule we propose, the People do not identify them, nor
do we discern any.
The majority in Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at page 87, opined that the goal
of rehabilitating juvenile offenders “is arguably stronger than in the adult context.”
But it is certainly arguable that the state’s interest in reducing the unduly high
recidivism rate among adult parolees is on a par with, if not greater than, the need
to assure that juveniles probationers do not reoffend. (See Samson, supra, 547
U.S. at p. ___ [126 S.Ct. at p. 2200] [quoting a statistical study indicating that
“California's parolee population has a 68-to-70 percent recidivism rate”].) Yet, as
we have seen, despite the state’s interest in monitoring adult parolees, our decision
in Sanders would invalidate the search of an adult parolee under the circumstances
presented in this case.
Amicus curiae Los Angeles County District Attorney argues that under the
doctrine of parens patriae, a special relationship exists between the juvenile
probationer and the state such that a special need arises to supervise and monitor
the juvenile, subject only to his or her right to be free from “arbitrary, capricious
and harassing searches.” First, we believe that a search founded on neither
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity nor advance knowledge of a probation
search condition can aptly be characterized as arbitrary. Second, we cannot permit
application of the doctrine of parens patriae to defeat the primary purpose of the
exclusionary rule—to deter police misconduct. (See Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at
pp. 324, 332.) Assuming, as amicus curiae does, that juveniles have a greater need
for repeated random and routine searches and for supervision than adult offenders,
that need would not be impaired by requiring that the officers conducting such
searches be aware of the search condition.
12

---

Justice Baxter’s dissent largely repeats the points made in his dissent in
Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 341, where he advocated a rule allowing
suspicionless searches of adult parolees by officers unaware of their parole status
or advance consent to search. Indeed, he urges us to “revisit” Sanders in light of
Samson. (Dis. opn., post, at p. 12.) But as we have explained (ante, at p. 10),
Samson involved officers who were aware of the search condition and thus adds
nothing of import to our Sanders analysis. Indeed, at one point Samson appears to
endorse Sanders’s insistence that the searching officer have such knowledge, at
least absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (Samson, supra, 547 U.S. at
p. __, fn. 5 [126 S.Ct. at p. 2202, fn. 5].) The dissent stresses the fact that the
searching officer here believed he had observed traffic violations warranting a
stop, but as the Attorney General has conceded, that belief was a legally mistaken
one that could not justify the detention. To allow searches of probationers or
parolees based solely on the officer’s supposed subjective “belief” that legal cause
existed for a search predictably would invite repeated harassment and arbitrary
searches.
The dissent places great emphasis on Samson’s use of a “totality of
circumstances” test in measuring the validity of a search of a probationer or
parolee (see Samson, supra, 547 U.S. at p. __ [26 S.Ct. at p. 2197]), but as
Sanders explains, the reasonableness of a search must be determined based on the
circumstances known to the officer when the search is conducted. (Sanders, supra,
31 Cal.4th at pp. 333-335.) Here, the arresting officer had neither reasonable
suspicion of any criminal activity nor advance knowledge of a search condition
that might have justified the search. The totality of these circumstances amounts
to very little and does not justify the officer’s search.
13

---

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we overrule In re Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68,
and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal to the extent it is inconsistent
with this opinion.
CHIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.

14

---

DISSENTING OPINION BY BAXTER, J.

In finding the juvenile court erroneously denied suppression of the loaded
firearm found in the juvenile probationer’s car, the majority adopts the rule that,
when an officer detains a juvenile driving on a public street, without advance
knowledge that the juvenile is subject to a search and seizure condition of
probation but with a mistaken belief that a traffic violation has occurred, any
contraband subsequently found in the car must be suppressed, notwithstanding the
juvenile’s greatly reduced expectation of privacy due to the probation condition
and other circumstances surrounding the detention and subsequent search.
Because the majority’s rule flouts the federal constitutional standards that govern
evidence suppression in California, I dissent.1
A. The Facts of the Challenged Detention and Search
In this case, the juvenile was subject to a validly imposed condition of
probation that required him to submit his person and property, including his car, to
warrantless searches and seizures at any time, with or without probable cause.
While driving a car on a public street with three companions, the juvenile
was pulled over by a police officer for a perceived traffic law violation, which

1
In the absence of express statutory authority, California courts may not
exclude evidence seized in violation of either the state or federal Constitution
unless exclusion is compelled by the federal Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28,
subd. (d); In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 884-890.) Accordingly, we
review issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from police searches
and seizures under federal constitutional standards. (People v. Robles (2000) 23
Cal.4th 789, 794.)
1

---

perception later proved incorrect. The officer made no attempt to search the
juvenile or his car for contraband at the outset of the stop. Instead, the officer
followed routine traffic stop procedures and asked the juvenile for his driver’s
license, which the juvenile said he did not have. As the two spoke, the officer saw
a box of ammunition in the car in plain view. Further inquiry disclosed that none
of the car’s occupants possessed a valid driver’s license, and the officer ordered
the car impounded.
A loaded firearm was discovered during a subsequent inventory search of
the impounded car. The juvenile court denied the juvenile’s motion to suppress
the firearm evidence.
B. Totality of the Circumstances Analysis
In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 (Tyrell J.) upheld the admission of
evidence obtained through the warrantless search of a juvenile by a police officer
who was unaware of the juvenile’s probation search condition at the time of the
search. In doing so, Tyrell J. stated categorically that a minor subject to a
probation condition allowing warrantless searches has “no reasonable expectation
of privacy” over contraband on his person. (8 Cal.4th at p. 74, italics added; see
also id. at p. 86.) Today the majority overrules Tyrell J. by adopting a different
rule that, without exception, the absence of advance officer knowledge of a
juvenile’s probation search condition compels exclusion of the fruits of a
suspicionless detention and subsequent search of the juvenile probationer’s car.
Recent Fourth Amendment decisions, however, make it apparent that both
categorical approaches are wrong.
Earlier this year the United States Supreme Court decided Samson v.
California (2006) __ U.S. __ [126 S.Ct. 2193] (Samson), which emphasizes the
now-familiar principle that courts are to examine the “ ‘totality of the
circumstances’ ” in determining whether a particular search is reasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (Samson, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [126
2

---

S.Ct. at p. 2197].) Samson and other recent United States Supreme Court
decisions demonstrate that many of the notions underlying today’s majority
holding should be rejected as obsolete. By neglecting to faithfully apply the high
court’s totality of the circumstances analysis and instead requiring the suppression
of evidence based on outdated reasoning and ill-conceived criticisms of Tyrell J.,
the majority reaches a result flatly at odds with current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
Samson affirmed that a parolee search condition can “so diminish or
eliminate a [parolee’s] reasonable expectation of privacy that a suspicionless
search by a law enforcement officer would not offend the Fourth Amendment.”
(Samson, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [126 S.Ct. at p. 2196], fn. omitted.) Although the
officer in Samson had knowledge of the lawfully imposed search condition at the
time of the challenged search, while here the officer did not, Samson reiterated
that the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment must be
determined by the “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ ” surrounding the search.
(Samson, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [26 S.Ct. at p. 2197].)
Tyrell J. was decided long before Samson and another fairly recent high
court decision concerning probationers, United States v. Knights (2001) 534 U.S.
112 (Knights). Nonetheless, the end result of Tyrell J., if not its analysis, holds up
under these later decisions. Under Knights and Samson, the exclusionary rule
does not require suppression of evidence obtained as a result of a search that is
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and “[w]hether a search
is reasonable ‘is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it
intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ” (Samson, supra,
__ U.S. at p. __ [126 S.Ct. at p. 2197], quoting Knights, supra, 534 U.S. at pp.
118-119.)
3

---

With regard to the degree to which a search is intrusive, there was no
dispute that the juvenile in Tyrell J., like the juvenile here, was on probation under
the lawfully imposed condition that he submit his person and property to
warrantless search by any peace officer, with or without probable cause, and there
appeared no reason to doubt the juvenile had been clearly informed of this
condition. Tyrell J.’s observation—that a juvenile probationer subject to a valid
search condition “has a greatly reduced expectation of privacy” over his or her
person or property (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 87, fn. 5)—is very similar to
the United States Supreme Court’s conclusion that the existence of a probation
search condition is a “salient circumstance” that “significantly diminish[es]” the
probationer’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” (Knights, supra, 534 U.S. at
pp. 118, 120; see also Samson, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [126 S.Ct. at p. 2199]
[concluding the subject parolee “did not have an expectation of privacy that
society would recognize as legitimate”].) However, to the extent Tyrell J. flatly
stated a juvenile probationer has “no reasonable expectation of privacy” (Tyrell J.,
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 74, italics added), we may easily correct this and clarify both
that a juvenile probationer’s expectation of privacy is greatly reduced but not
eliminated, and that the existence of a valid search and seizure condition is
significant but not necessarily controlling on the question of reasonableness.
As for the degree to which a warrantless search of a juvenile probationer is
“ ‘needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests’ ” (Knights,
supra, 534 U.S. at p. 119), there is no doubt the governmental interests at stake in
the probation context are legitimate and well established. “[I]t must be
remembered that ‘the very assumption of the institution of probation’ is that the
probationer ‘is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law.’ [Citation.]
The recidivism rate of probationers is significantly higher than the general crime
rate. [Citations.] And probationers have even more of an incentive to conceal
their criminal activities and quickly dispose of incriminating evidence than the
4

---

ordinary criminal because probationers are aware that they may be subject to
supervision and face revocation of probation, and possible incarceration, in
proceedings in which the trial rights of a jury and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, among other things, do not apply [citations].” (Id. at p. 120 [addressing
adult probationers].) Indeed, California has two valid concerns with a probationer:
“On the one hand is the hope that he will successfully complete probation and be
integrated back into the community. On the other is the concern, quite justified,
that he will be more likely to engage in criminal conduct than an ordinary member
of the community.” (Id. at pp. 120-121.) As Samson observed, the high court
“has repeatedly acknowledged that a State’s interests in reducing recidivism and
thereby promoting reintegration and positive citizenship among probationers . . .
warrant privacy intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under the Fourth
Amendment.” (Samson, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [126 S.Ct. at p. 2200].)
Additionally, this case involves the special needs of juvenile probation,
which “ ‘is not an act of leniency, but is a final order made in the minor’s best
interest.’ ” (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 81.) As Justice Werdegar keenly
observes, “[t]he purposes and goals of juvenile proceedings are manifestly
different from criminal proceedings involving adults.” (People v. Reyes (1998) 19
Cal.4th 743, 768-769 (conc. & dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) “Unlike a prison
sentence and subsequent period of parole imposed on the adult offender, ‘[t]he
process of the juvenile court involves determination of the needs of the child and
society, provision for guidance and treatment for the juvenile, and protection of
the child from punishment and stigma.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, a juvenile has no
choice whether or not to accept a condition of probation that subjects him to a
warrantless search, for “[i]t would be inconsistent with the juvenile court’s
determination of the best manner in which to facilitate rehabilitation of a minor if
[the minor] could . . . elect to forgo home placement on probation and instead
5

---

choose detention at the California Youth Authority.” (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at
p. 82.)
In the adult probationer context, Knights concluded that a warrantless
investigatory search, supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and
authorized by a condition of probation, is reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, and that the search is not invalid for lacking a probation-
related purpose. Although Knights did not reach the question whether a search of
a probationer would be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if predicated
solely on a condition of probation, Samson undertook to address that question,
albeit in the context of a parolee search. (Samson, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [126
S.Ct. at p. 2198].)
Significantly, Samson concluded that California’s interest in reducing
recidivism while promoting reintegration of parolees into productive society
justified a supervisory scheme that allowed suspicionless searches. (Samson,
supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [126 S.Ct. at p. 2200].) Therefore, the searches in this case
and in Tyrell J. are in line with the suspicionless searches the Fourth Amendment
allows for parolees and, presumably, for probationers.2
Applying the proper analysis to the facts of this case, I conclude the
detention of the juvenile and the warrantless search of his vehicle were reasonable
within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment, despite the officer’s lack of
knowledge of the juvenile’s probation search condition, given the totality of the

2
Although the high court acknowledged that parolees have even fewer
expectations of privacy than probationers “because parole is more akin to
imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment” (Samson, supra, __ U.S. at p. __
[126 S.Ct. at p. 2198]), it also reiterated the point that “a State’s interest in
reducing recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and positive citizenship
among probationers and parolees warrant privacy intrusions that would not
otherwise be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment” (id. at p. __ [126 S.Ct. at p.
2200], italics added).
6

---

following circumstances: (1) as in Samson, supra, __ U.S. at page __ [126 S.Ct. at
page 2200], California’s significant interests in “reducing recidivism and thereby
promoting reintegration and positive citizenship” among juvenile probationers
would be advanced by a probation oversight system that allows suspicionless
searches; (2) here, the juvenile probationer was subject to a validly imposed
condition of probation that required him to submit his person and property,
including his vehicle, to a warrantless search and seizure at any time, with or
without probable cause; (3) the probation condition greatly diminished the
juvenile’s subjective and objective expectations of privacy, especially while in a
car on a public street (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078);3 (4) the officer
stopped the juvenile’s car—not on an arbitrary whim, or out of caprice, or because
he sought to harass the occupants—but with what the officer believed was proper
justification based on the juvenile’s failure to signal when turning and pulling over
to the curb4 (see post, pt. C); (5) the juvenile’s probation condition provided legal
authority for the type of detention that occurred; (6) although the officer
apparently misjudged the propriety of the traffic stop, he made no attempt to
search the juvenile or the car for contraband at the outset of the stop; (7) instead,
the officer followed routine traffic stop procedures and asked for the juvenile’s
driver’s license; (8) as the officer spoke with the juvenile and ascertained that the

3
“ ‘[I]n light of the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on
the public highways, individuals generally have a reduced expectation of privacy
while driving a vehicle on public thoroughfares.’ ” (People v. Wells, supra, 38
Cal.4th at p. 1087.)
4
Even if a probationer might otherwise bear the burden of showing a search
was undertaken in a capricious, arbitrary, or harassing manner when the officer
has knowledge of a probation search and seizure condition, I believe that in
situations where awareness of the probation condition is lacking at the time of the
search, the People might appropriately shoulder the burden of showing it was not
conducted in a capricious, arbitrary, or harassing manner. Here, any such burden
was met.
7

---

juvenile did not have a driver’s license, he saw a box of ammunition in the car in
plain view; (9) further inquiry led to the officer’s discovery that none of the car’s
occupants possessed a valid driver’s license, and these circumstances provided
sufficient grounds to impound the car; and (10) the loaded firearm was not
discovered during an on-site search of the car, but was found during an inventory
search after the car was impounded. Under these circumstances, the Fourth
Amendment does not require suppression of the loaded firearm evidence at the
juvenile court proceeding.
C. Arbitrary, Capricious, or Harassing Searches
As indicated, federal constitutional standards govern our review of issues
relating to the suppression of evidence obtained from police searches and seizures.
(People v. Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 794; see ante, fn. 1.) In holding the
evidence obtained from the instant search must be suppressed, the majority
reasons that a warrantless search following a detention of a probationer that is
supported by neither reasonable suspicion nor advance police knowledge of an
applicable probation condition is “arbitrary” or “harassing” and therefore
unreasonable and subject to suppression. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11, 12)
As a preliminary matter, the majority is wrong to characterize a detention
and search of a probationer as arbitrary or harassing, merely because reasonable
suspicion and advance knowledge of a probation search condition are found
lacking. An officer can act with a legitimate law enforcement purpose without
knowing the person under investigation is a probationer, and an officer’s mistaken
belief as to the sufficiency of legal grounds for a search does not transform a
search that is later found to be illegal into one that was arbitrary or harassing for
lack of a proper law enforcement purpose. Put another way, when a court later
determines that an officer’s detention of a probationer was not supported by
reasonable suspicion, the officer’s mere mistake in concluding such suspicion
existed does not render the detention and subsequent search arbitrary, capricious
8

---

or harassing. (See People v. Cervantes (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1404, 1408 [“[a]
mere legal or factual error by an officer that would otherwise render a search
illegal, e.g., a mistake in concluding that probable cause exists for an arrest, does
not render the search arbitrary, capricious or harassing”].)
More importantly, the United States Supreme Court has not ruled that,
under the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of a suspicionless search of a
probationer or parolee is dependent on the searching officer’s knowledge of a
valid search condition. Instead, the high court has commented: “Under
California precedent, we note, an officer would not act reasonably in conducting a
suspicionless search absent knowledge that the person stopped for the search is a
parolee. See People v. Sanders [(2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 331-332; Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 20.]” (Samson, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [126 S.Ct. at p.
2202], fn. 5, italics added.) It bears emphasis that the high court expressed this
point while dismissing the concern that California’s suspicionless search system
inflicts “dignitary harms that arouse strong resentment in parolees and undermine
their ability to reintegrate into productive society.” (Id. at p. __ [126 S.Ct. at p.
2202].) In doing so, the high court shows it evidently regards the matter of officer
knowledge as a California requirement that guards against the type of searches that
potentially could frustrate the goals of California’s parole system, and not as a
Fourth Amendment requirement of a reasonable search or a federal constitutional
basis for suppression of evidence.
On this last point, I observe that the majority’s categorical approach here is
similar to the approach advocated by the dissent in Samson. That is, the Samson
dissent would have adopted a bright-line rule of unreasonableness to the effect that
the Fourth Amendment does not permit warrantless searches of parolees that are
supported neither by individualized suspicion nor by special needs. (Samson,
supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [126 S.Ct. at p. 2203] (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) The
dissent also suggested “[i]t would necessarily be arbitrary, capricious, and
9

---

harassing to conduct a suspicionless search of someone without knowledge of the
status that renders that person, in the State’s judgment, susceptible to such an
invasion.” (Id. at p. __ [126 S.Ct. at p. 2207], fn. 7, italics added). Significantly,
the Samson majority did not adopt or otherwise approve of the dissent’s
categorical approaches, and this court likewise should avoid doing so here.
Indeed, the majority here is unable to cite to any high court opinion that has
embraced this particular rule in assessing when searches involving probationers or
parolees are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. That is not surprising, as
even the majority here and courts in other jurisdictions cite California decisional
law, not the federal Constitution, as the origin of that rule. (Maj. opn., ante, at p.
11; e.g., United States v. Stuckey (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 2006 WL 2390268, *3, fn. 2;
United States v. Albert (N.D.Cal. 2006) 2006 WL 2078564, *2.)
D. Stated Bases for Overruling Tyrell J.
Instead of looking to the high court’s Fourth Amendment decisions and its
totality of the circumstances analysis for guidance on whether or not the evidence
in Tyrell J. required suppression, the majority concludes Tyrell J. should be
overruled based on: (1) the conclusion in People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318
(Sanders) that the rule in In re Martinez (1970) 1 Cal.3d 641 requires the
reasonableness of a search be determined based on the circumstances known to the
officer when the search is conducted (maj. opn., ante, at p. 6); (2) Sanders’s
determination, based on the dissent’s observation in Tyrell J., that requiring officer
awareness of search conditions would not itself affect the goal of deterrence,
because the very existence of a probation search condition should deter further
criminal acts (maj. opn., ante, at p. 7); and (3) the identification in Sanders of “a
substantial body of scholarly commentary critical of our Tyrell J. analysis,” the
gist of which was that “Tyrell J. eroded the Fourth Amendment protections for
juveniles by giving police an incentive to conduct a warrantless search,
unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, in the bare hope that a
10

---

search condition may exist” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 8). None of these reasons
provides a sound analytical basis for completely rejecting Tyrell J. in favor of an
approach that finds a search following a suspicionless detention of a juvenile
probationer unreasonable per se if the officer lacks knowledge of an applicable
search condition.
1. In re Martinez
In 1970, In re Martinez found that police authorities, who did not know of a
defendant’s parole status, violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by
undertaking an investigative search lacking in probable cause that related to the
defendant’s suspected criminal activity. (In re Martinez, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p.
646.) In so concluding, In re Martinez regarded a parolee’s reasonable
expectation of privacy far more favorably and expansively than have later United
States Supreme Court decisions.
For example, In re Martinez stated: “The conditional nature of a parolee’s
freedom may result in some diminution of his reasonable expectation of privacy
and thus may render some intrusions by parole officers ‘reasonable’ even when the
information relied on by the parole officers does not reach the traditional level of
‘probable cause.’ ” (In re Martinez, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 647, fn. 6, italics added.)
In observing that a “diminution of Fourth Amendment protection[s]” “can be
justified only to the extent actually necessitated by the legitimate demands of the
operation of the parole process” (ibid.), In re Martinez concluded that unless
suspected parole violations are involved, a search by police officers to investigate
suspected criminal activity could not be undertaken without probable cause. (Id.
at p. 646.)
It is worth noting at the outset that Tyrell J. addressed the analysis in In re
Martinez and rejected the reasoning that Sanders adopted. (Tyrell J., supra, 8
Cal.4th at pp. 88-89.) Moreover, as Samson, supra, __ U.S. __ [126 S.Ct. 2193],
illustrates, the notions upon which In re Martinez was based—i.e., regarding (1)
11

---

the perception that a lawfully imposed search and seizure condition results only in
some diminution of a parolee’s privacy expectations and (2) the perceived
invalidity of a parole system that allows suspicionless searches to investigate
suspected criminal activity as well as suspected parole violations—are now
obsolete.
In light of Samson, we should revisit Sanders’s adoption of In re
Martinez’s reasoning that no circumstances other than those known to the officer
are relevant to determining whether a search of a parolee is reasonable. (See
Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 332.) First, by assessing only the reasonableness
of an officer’s suspicion in undertaking a particular search, and neglecting to
evaluate the actual reasonableness of the search in view of both the officer’s
actions and the suspect’s legitimate privacy expectations, the rule provides an
incomplete measure of whether a search does or does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Second, the rule in In re Martinez was articulated at a very different
time, when parolees were not viewed as having significantly reduced expectations
of privacy. Finally, the rule is inconsistent with the high court’s current emphasis
on the “fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry” and rejection of “bright-
line rules.” (Ohio v. Robinette (1996) 519 U.S. 33, 39.)
2. Deterrence of Recidivism and Criminal Misconduct
The majority agrees with Sanders’s conclusion, based on the dissent’s
observation in Tyrell J., that requiring officer awareness of search conditions
would not itself affect the goal of deterrence, because the very existence of a
probation search condition should deter further criminal acts. (Maj. opn., ante, at
p. 7.) I disagree. While the existence of a search condition may deter some
juvenile probationers from committing further criminal acts, a bright-line rule
requiring officer awareness inhibits the goal of deterrence by materially restricting
the lawfully imposed condition that a probationer and his property are subject to a
search and seizure by any peace officer at any place at any time. By eliminating
12

---

any distinction between the reasonable privacy expectations of a juvenile
probationer and those of a law-abiding citizen in the context of a search that
follows a suspicionless detention, and allowing juvenile probationers with greatly
reduced expectations of privacy to escape the consequences of their recidivist
misconduct in cases like this, such a rule undermines the state’s special need to
rehabilitate and reintegrate youthful offenders into productive society.
3. Incentive to Conduct Warrantless Searches
Tyrell J. reasoned: “Because [the officer] did not know whether the minor
was subject to a search condition, the officer took the chance that the search would
be deemed improper. If it had turned out that the minor was not subject to a
search condition, any contraband found in the search of the minor would have
been inadmissible in court. Thus, under our interpretation, law enforcement
officers still have a sufficient incentive to try to avoid improperly invading a
person’s privacy.” (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 89.)
On this score, the majority finds persuasive “a substantial body of scholarly
commentary” criticizing Tyrell J. for “erod[ing] the Fourth Amendment
protections for juveniles by giving police an incentive to conduct a warrantless
search, unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, in the bare hope
that a search condition may exist.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.)
These criticisms are off the mark. The United States Supreme Court has
now made it quite clear that the constitutional reasonableness of a search must be
determined in view of the totality of the circumstances. I believe the high court
most likely would reject a blanket rule of unreasonableness in the context of
probationer and parolee searches, for it has repeatedly emphasized that these
convicted lawbreakers possess significantly reduced expectations of privacy due to
legally imposed search and seizure conditions that provide for suspicionless
detentions and searches.
13

---

Moreover, the United States Supreme Court continues to caution that the
exclusionary rule generates “ ‘substantial social costs,’ ” including “setting the
guilty free and the dangerous at large.” (Hudson v. Michigan (2006) __ U.S. __
[126 S.Ct. 2159, 2163].) Because the exclusionary rule exacts a “ ‘ “costly toll”
upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives,’ ” courts must avoid its
“ ‘[i]ndiscriminate application’ ” and impose the rule only “ ‘where its deterrence
benefits outweigh its “substantial social costs.” ’ ” (Ibid.) To the extent no search
and seizure condition exists to reduce an individual’s legitimate privacy
expectations, and the totality of the circumstances do not otherwise support the
reasonableness of a search, imposition of the exclusionary rule provides ample
incentive to deter police misconduct in proper measure to the attendant social
costs. But applying the rule expansively beyond those situations in which a search
actually intrudes on a person’s reasonable privacy expectations, under the fiction
that the search condition did not even exist, as the majority does here, amounts to
an indiscriminate application violating the cardinal principle that suppression of
evidence should always be “our last result, not our first impulse.” (Ibid.)
Finally, I note the majority’s categorical rule is sure to result in absurd
applications in those situations where an officer is able to verify a juvenile’s
probationer status only after making a detention. For instance, imagine that an
officer in a future case pulls a juvenile’s car over for a perceived traffic violation,
and thereafter recognizes (or otherwise ascertains) that the juvenile is a
probationer subject to a probation search and seizure condition. The officer then
conducts an on-the-scene search of the juvenile and his car, and finds contraband.
Alternatively, imagine the officer in the instant case discovered the juvenile was
subject to a probation search and seizure condition after the car was detained and
impounded but before it was searched. Under the majority’s rule, the contraband
in both situations must be suppressed if the juvenile court determines the initial
traffic stop was illegal because it was supported neither by reasonable suspicion of
14

---

criminal activity nor by advance knowledge of an applicable search and seizure
condition.
E. Conclusion
I agree Tyrell J. should be disapproved to the extent it concludes that a
juvenile subject to a valid search and seizure condition of probation has no
reasonable expectation of privacy. In this regard, we are bound to follow the
United States Supreme Court’s analysis that suppression of evidence is not
required when the police conduct a search that is reasonable within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, and that the reasonableness of a search depends on the
totality of the circumstances. Under that analysis, a juvenile who is subject to a
valid search condition has privacy expectations that are greatly reduced but not
eliminated, and the existence of a valid search condition is significant but not
necessarily controlling on the question of reasonableness.
Here, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the challenged search
shows, among other things, that the juvenile was subject to a valid search and
seizure condition of probation that provided legal authority for an investigative
search and greatly diminished the juvenile’s objective and subjective expectations
of privacy, that the officer stopped the juvenile’s car—not arbitrarily, capriciously,
or for purposes of harassment—but for what he mistakenly perceived was a traffic
violation, and that the traffic stop was not particularly intrusive before the officer
saw a box of ammunition in plain view in the car, which justified further
investigation and ultimately led to the car’s impoundment and inventory search.
15

---

Thus, despite the officer’s ignorance of the juvenile’s probation search condition, I
would find that the traffic stop and subsequent inventory search of the car did not
violate the juvenile’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, and would hold that the
loaded firearm evidence was admissible in juvenile court.

BAXTER. J.
16

---

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion In re Jamie P.
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

XXX NP opn. filed 5/26/05 – 1st Dist., Div. 4
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S135263
Date Filed: November 30, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Solano
Judge: Dwight C. Ely

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Diana M. Teran, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler,
Assistant Attorney General, Martin S. Kaye and Ronald E. Niver, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.

Steve Cooley, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Lael R. Rubin, Head Deputy District Attorney, Brentford J.
Ferreira and Phyllis C. Asayama, Deputy District Attorneys, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and
Respondent.

---

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Diana M. Teran
1048 Irvine Avenue, PMB 613
Newport Beach, CA 92660
(949) 759-8556

Ronald E. Niver
Deputy Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004
(415) 703-5859

Brentford J. Ferreira
Deputy District Attorney
320 West Temple Street, Suite 540
Los Angeles, CA 90012
(213) 974-5916

---

Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Thu, 11/30/2006	S135263

Disposition
Nov 30 2006	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Jul 5 2005	Petition for review filed   by counsel for appellant (Jaime P.).
Jul 5 2005	Record requested
Jul 5 2005	Received Court of Appeal record   file jacket/briefs/accordian file
Aug 31 2005	Petition for review granted (criminal case)   Votes: Geroge, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ.
Sep 15 2005	Counsel appointment order filed   Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, Diana teran is hereby appointed to represent appellant on appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits must be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date of this order.
Oct 19 2005	Opening brief on the merits filed   by counsel for appellant (Jaime P.) CRC 40.1(b)
Nov 14 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed   Respondent People
Nov 30 2005	Request for extension of time filed   to January 5, 2006 to file appellant's reply brief on the merits
Dec 2 2005	Extension of time granted   On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including January 5, 2006.
Jan 9 2006	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   Jaime P., Defendant and Appellant Diana M. Teran, SC-appointed [CRC, rule 40.1]
Feb 22 2006	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Teran
Apr 25 2006	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   by L.A. County, District Attorney Phyllis C. Asayama supporting respondent The People application & brief are under same cover. [late]
May 3 2006	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   The application of the Los Angeles County District Attorney for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondent is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
May 3 2006	Amicus curiae brief filed   Los Angeles County District Attorney
May 25 2006	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   appellant, Jaime P. to amicus curiae brief of LA County District Attorney. by counsel, Diana M. Teran.
Jun 28 2006	Supplemental briefing ordered   Respondent and appellant are hereby directed to submit supplemental letter briefs discussing the relevance of Samson v. California __ US __ (2006 WL 1666974) to the issues in this case, and particularly the continued vitality of In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68. The parties are directed to file simultaneous supplemental briefs on or before July 14, 2006. Simultaneous reply briefs are due on or before July 31, 2006.
Jul 13 2006	Request for extension of time filed   to July 21, 2006, to file Respondent's (People) Supplemental Brief. [ Moot -- letter brief filed 7-14-2006 ]
Jul 14 2006	Supplemental brief filed   Respondent's Supplemental
Jul 14 2006	Received:   Letter from Diana M. Teran, counsel for appellant, objecting to respondent's request for one week extension of time. (faxed copy) [ Hard copy received 7-18-2006. ]
Jul 17 2006	Supplemental brief filed   Appellant Jaime P.'s Supplemental by Diana M. Teran, Supreme Court appointed counsel.
Jul 27 2006	Supplemental brief filed   Supplemental Reply Letter Brief of Respondent People by Ronald E. Niver, Deputy Attorney General - SF
Aug 2 2006	Supplemental brief filed   Appellant's Supplemental Reply Letter Brief
Aug 2 2006	Received:   Appellant's Errata Letter dated 7-31-2006 to correct error that appears in appellant's Supplemental Letter Brief dated July 13, 2006.
Aug 3 2006	Case ordered on calendar   September 6, 2006, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
Aug 9 2006	Application filed to:   continuance of oral argument, asking for after 9/07/2006. filed by counsel for appellant Jaime P.
Aug 9 2006	Order filed   The application of counsel for appellant Jaime P. for continuance of oral argument, filed August 9, 2006, is granted. The matter, previously set for argument on Wednesday, September 6, 2006, is to be called and continued to the October 2006 calendar.
Aug 9 2006	Argument rescheduled   to be called and continued to the October 2006 calendar
Aug 11 2006	Application filed to:   divide oral argument time, and application for permission for District Attorney of Los Angeles County to argue as amicus curiae on behalf of responsdent (two documents). Respondent asking to share 10 minutes of time with amicus curiae Los Angeles County District Attorney.
Aug 15 2006	Order filed   The request of counsel for respondent in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of respondent at oral argument is hereby granted. The request of respondent to allocate to amicus curiae District Attorney of Los Angeles County ten minutes of respondent's 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
Sep 5 2006	Case ordered on calendar   October 3, 2006, at 9:00 a.m., in Santa Barbara
Sep 7 2006	Request for Extended Media coverage Filed   By The California Channel.
Sep 7 2006	Request for Extended Media coverage Granted   subject to the conditions set forth in rule 980, California Rules of Court.
Sep 11 2006	Request for Extended Media coverage Filed   Santa Barbara News Press to serve as "pool" photographer.
Sep 14 2006	Request for Extended Media coverage Granted   subject to the conditions set forth in rule 980, California Rules of Court.
Oct 3 2006	Cause argued and submitted
Nov 30 2006	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   of the Court of Appeal. Opinion by Chin, J. -- joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Werdegar, Moreno, Corrigan, JJ. Dissenting Opinion by Baxter, J.
Jan 4 2007	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Jan 11 2007	Received:   Acknowledgment of receipt for remittitur signed for by Channing Hoo, Deputy, 1DCA4
Feb 7 2007	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Teran
Feb 20 2007	Returned record   to First Appellate District [Attention: Channing]
Mar 22 2007	Returned record   Additional record consisting of briefs, one jacket and one folder.

Briefs
Oct 19 2005	Opening brief on the merits filed
Nov 14 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed
Jan 9 2006	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
May 3 2006	Amicus curiae brief filed
May 25 2006	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website