Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S124205
In re Derrick B.

Filed 8/10/06

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

_____________________________________

In re DERRICK B., A Person Coming )
Under the Juvenile Court Law )
____________________________________)
)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S124205
v.
) Ct.App.
5
F043067
DERRICK B.,
Fresno
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. 0094031 - 1

Here we conclude that a juvenile offender may not be ordered to register as
a sex offender under Penal Code section 290 if his offenses are not among those
listed in subdivision (d)(3).1
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the age of 17 Derrick B. was committed to the California Youth
Authority. The commitment followed four years of juvenile court intervention
beginning when Derrick was accused of lewd and lascivious acts with a child
under 14. (§ 288, subd. (a).) Derrick was then 13 years old and living with the
family of a 10-year-old girl. While she slept, he reached under her clothes and
touched her chest, buttocks, and vagina. Pursuant to an agreement, Derrick was
1


declared a ward of the court for having committed the lesser offense of sexual
battery (§ 243.4). He was ordered to live in a group home and attend sex offender
treatment, as conditions of probation.
Derrick failed in several group home placements. During the course of his
wardship he admitted to counselors that he had sexually assaulted a number of
victims. He also reported his own sexual victimization at the hands of his parents’
friends.
In 2002, Derrick was found to have committed a misdemeanor weapons
offense, continued as a ward, and again ordered to undergo sex offender treatment.
In 2003, Derrick admitted misdemeanor violations for assault and battery. The
court sent Derrick to the California Youth Authority, choosing his earlier sexual
battery offense as the basis for the principal term. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602,
subd. (a).) The court also directed that he register as a sex offender upon his
release. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, with a modification of
precommitment credit.
The only issue before us is the validity of the section 290 registration order.
II. DISCUSSION
Three provisions of section 290 must be analyzed to resolve this question.
Subdivision (a)(2)(A) requires registration by adults convicted of various
sex offenses, including sexual battery (§ 243.4).2

(footnote continued from previous page)

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(A) provides: “Any person who, since
July 1, 1944, has been or is hereafter convicted in any court in this state or in any
federal or military court of a violation of Section 207 or 209 committed with intent
to violate Section 261, 286, 288, 288a, or 289, Section 220, except assault to
commit mayhem, Section 243.4, paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), or (6) of subdivision
(a) of Section 261, or paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 262 involving the

(footnote continued on next page)
2


Subdivision (d)(3) pertains to juveniles sent to the Youth Authority. It lists
specific offenses giving rise to a registration requirement upon discharge or
parole.3 Sexual battery is not included in this list.
A third subdivision authorizes a court to require registration in connection
with unlisted offenses if the court makes certain findings and states reasons for the

(footnote continued from previous page)

use of force or violence for which the person is sentenced to the state prison,
Section 264.1, 266, or 266c, subdivision (b) of Section 266h, subdivision (b) of
Section 266i, Section 266j, 267, 269, 285, 286, 288, 288a, 288.5, or 289, Section
311.1, subdivision (b), (c), or (d) of Section 311.2, Section 311.3, 311.4, 311.10,
311.11, or 647.6, former Section 647a, subdivision (c) of Section 653f,
subdivision 1 or 2 of Section 314, any offense involving lewd or lascivious
conduct under Section 272, or any felony violation of Section 288.2; or any
statutory predecessor that includes all elements of one of the above-mentioned
offenses; or any person who since that date has been or is hereafter convicted of
the attempt to commit any of the above-mentioned offenses.” (Italics added.)
3 Section 290, subdivision (d)(1) provides: “Any person who, on or after
January 1, 1986, is discharged or paroled from the Department of the Youth
Authority to the custody of which he or she was committed after having been
adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Section 602 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code because of the commission or attempted commission of any
offense described in paragraph (3) shall be subject to registration under the
procedures of this section.”
The offenses listed in section 290, subdivision (d)(3) are: “(A) Assault
with intent to commit rape, sodomy, oral copulation, or any violation of Section
264.1, 288, or 289 under Section 220. [¶] (B) Any offense defined in paragraph
(1), (2), (3), (4), or (6) of subdivision (a) of Section 261, Section 264.1, 266c, or
267, paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of, or subdivision (c) or (d) of, Section 286,
Section 288 or 288.5, paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of, or subdivision (c) or (d)
of, Section 288a, subdivision (a) of Section 289, or Section 647.6. [¶] (C) A
violation of Section 207 or 209 committed with the intent to violate Section 261,
286, 288, 288a, or 289.”
3


imposition. (§ 290, subd. (a)(2)(E).)4 The Attorney General relies on this
subdivision to defend the juvenile court’s order. The reliance is misplaced.
The well-settled objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and
effectuate legislative intent. (People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 240
(Trevino); People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 621.) To determine that
intent, we turn first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and
ordinary meaning. (Trevino, at p. 241; Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 280.)
When the statutory language is clear, we need go no further. If, however, the
language supports more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to a variety of
extrinsic aids, including the objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the
legislative history, the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part, and
contemporaneous administrative construction, as well as questions of public
policy. (People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059, 1063; Granberry v. Islay
Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 744; People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d
1002, 1007-1008.)
Under section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(E), a court may order registration for
unlisted offenses if it “finds at the time of conviction or sentencing that the person
committed the offense as a result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual
gratification.” (Italics added.) This language is clear. “Conviction” and
“sentencing” are terms of art usually associated with adult proceedings. Because

4 Section 290, subdivision (a)(2) sets out the categories of persons required
to register as sex offenders. Subdivision (a)(2)(E) provides for the registration of
“[a]ny person ordered by any court to register pursuant to this section for any
offense not included specifically in this section if the court finds at the time of
conviction or sentencing that the person committed the offense as a result of
sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification. The court shall state on
the record the reasons for its findings and the reasons for requiring registration.”
4


the Legislature used these terms, we construe this subdivision as applying only in
cases of adult convictions.5
In People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843 (Burton), we held that a capital
defendant’s prior juvenile adjudications, though serious offenses, were not prior
felony convictions within the terms of section 190.3, factor (c).6 As we explained:
“Welfare and Institutions Code section 203 provides that ‘[a]n order adjudging a
minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a
crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a
criminal proceeding.’ This court and the Courts of Appeal have consistently
agreed that adjudications under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 are not
criminal convictions. (E.g., People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 844-847; In
re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 955; Leroy T. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals
Bd. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 434, 439; People v. Sanchez (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 216,
218-219; see also People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 294-295.)” (Burton, at p.
861, italics added.)
“We must assume that the voters, when they enacted section 190.3, were
aware of Welfare and Institutions Code section 203 and judicial constructions of
its terms. (People v. Weidert, supra, 39 Cal.3d 836, 844.) With such an
awareness, the voters cannot have intended the term ‘prior felony conviction’
contained in section 190.3, factor (c) to refer to juvenile court adjudications. We
employ a presumption that when the language of a statute uses a term that has
been judicially construed, the term is used in the precise sense which the court
gave it. (Weidert, supra, at pp. 845-846.) Consistent with past decisions and in

5 A juvenile tried as an adult would, of course, be treated as an adult for
purposes of the registration requirement.

6 “The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction” is one of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances the trier of fact in a capital case is to
consider in choosing between the death penalty and life imprisonment without
possibility of parole. (§ 190.3, factor (c).)
5


the absence of any evidence the voters intended a different interpretation for
section 190.3, factor (c), we conclude evidence of juvenile adjudications is not
admissible under factor (c). (See People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 294-
295.)” (Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 861-862.)7
The same reasoning bolsters the conclusion that the Legislature, in
choosing the terms “conviction” and “sentencing” in its 1994 enactment of
section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(E),8 was aware of Welfare and Institutions Code
section 203 and judicial constructions of its terms, including Burton, supra, 48
Cal.3d 843, and the cases it cites.
In re Bernardino S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 613 (Bernardino S.) provides
additional support for this construction. Bernardino S. was accused of performing
a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14. He admitted the
allegations, was adjudged a ward, and required to register as a sex offender under

7 We went on to reject the defendant’s contention that section 190.3, factor
(b), making evidence of criminal activity involving force or violence admissible as
a factor in aggravation, excludes criminal activity of juveniles. “As we stated in
People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 295: ‘[T]he legislative history of the
identical [factor] (b) of the 1977 law makes clear that, with respect to past violent
acts, admissible “criminal activity” includes evidence of misconduct, regardless of
“conviction,” which amounts to an “actual crime, specifically, the violation of a
penal statute
,” so long as defendant was not “acquitted.” [Citations.] The
Juvenile Court Law expressly provides that a minor is eligible for wardship status
“when he violates any law . . . or . . . ordinance . . . defining crime. . . .” (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 602.) Contrary to defendant’s assertion, nothing in the 1977 or 1978
laws indicates an intent to exclude violent criminal misconduct while a juvenile as
an aggravating factor, simply on grounds the misconduct resulted in a juvenile
wardship adjudication.’ (Italics in original.) The use of prior violent juvenile
misconduct as factor (b) criminal activity, we observed, does not violate the
proscription that a juvenile adjudication ‘shall not be deemed a conviction of a
crime for any purpose’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 203): ‘It is not the adjudication,
but the conduct itself, which is relevant.’ (People v. Lucky, supra, at pp. 295-296,
fn. 24.)” (Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 862.)
8 (Stats. 1994, ch. 865, § 1, p. 4316.)
6


section 290. (4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 616-617.) The Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that before the enactment of subdivision (d), section 290 was inapplicable
to juvenile offenders.
“Prior to 1986, Penal Code section 290 required registration only by
persons who had been ‘convicted’ of specified sex offenses. Under the juvenile
court law, a person adjudged a ward of the court has not been ‘convicted’ of
anything. Welfare and Institutions Code section 203 provides that a wardship
adjudication ‘shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose,
nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal
proceeding.’ [¶] . . . [¶]
“The Legislature’s own interpretation of the statute as applied to juvenile
wards became apparent when, in 1985, it amended Penal Code section 290 by
adopting a new subdivision (d) expressly dealing with wards of the juvenile court.
Extrinsic legislative materials strongly indicate that the preamendment statute had
no application whatever to juvenile wards: ‘Although persons, including
remanded minors, committed to Youth Authority from criminal court for specified
sex offenses must register under current law, juvenile court commitments do not
currently have to register no matter how violent their offense.’ (Assem. Office of
Research, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 888 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as
amended Sept. 12, 1985, p. 2 [3d reading analysis].) The Legislature viewed the
amendment as an expansion of the statute’s sweep to persons previously excluded.
(Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 888, 4 Stats. 1985 (Reg. Sess.), Summary
Digest, p. 553 [‘expanding the category of persons to which a criminal penalty is
applicable’]; 3d reading analysis, supra, p. 1 [‘expands application of the
registration requirements’].)
“Given this legislative interpretation of the pre-1986 statute and the
complete absence of contrary authority, it seems clear that the sole statutory basis
for requiring juvenile wards to register as sex offenders is the 1985 amendments
themselves. We turn now to the question whether those amendments can be
7
properly understood as bringing appellant within the statute.” (Bernardino S.,
supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 618-619, fns. omitted.)
The court held that Bernardino S. could not be required to register under
subdivision (d) because he had not been committed to the Youth Authority.
(Bernardino S., supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 619-620.)
The Attorney General contends that Bernardino S., supra, 4 Cal.App.4th
613, is inapposite because it was decided before the enactment of section 290,
subdivision (a)(2)(E). This argument fails. The fact that Bernardino S. was
decided before the enactment of subdivision (a)(2)(E) makes it all the more
significant that the Legislature chose to use terms that had been construed to apply
to adult offenders only.
The Attorney General also relies on In re Jovan B. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 801
(Jovan B.). There we considered the reach of section 12022.1, which increases the
penalty for a felony committed while the defendant is free on bail or his own
recognizance (O.R.). We granted review to decide whether the enhancement
applies in juvenile court proceedings and concluded that it does. (Jovan B., at p.
807.)
We explained our reversal of the Court of Appeal. “The Court of Appeal
concluded that by its plain terms, the bail/O.R. enhancement statute cannot apply
toward a juvenile ward’s maximum confinement or commitment because the
statute speaks in terms of ‘information[s],’ ‘indictment[s],’ ‘complaint[s],’
‘preliminary hearing[s],’ and ‘sentencing,’ all of which are foreign to juvenile
procedure. In particular, the Court of Appeal noted, the enhancement requires
‘conviction’ of both the ‘bailed’ and ‘while-on-bail’ offenses. (See Pen. Code,
§ 12022.1, subds. (d)-(g).) The court reasoned that because ‘[a]n order adjudging
a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a
crime for any purpose . . .’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 203), a juvenile offender cannot
meet the criteria for application of the enhancement.” (Jovan B., supra, 6 Cal.4th
at p. 811.)
8
We found the Court of Appeal’s analysis flawed, not because of the way it
parsed the language of section 12022.1, but because it interpreted the statute in
isolation. “The approach taken . . . overlooks the plain language of another
statute, Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, which provides that a juvenile
ward’s maximum confinement or commitment shall be a time equal to ‘the
maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted
of the [same] offense or offenses . . . .’ (Italics added.) Hence, for this limited
juvenile purpose, the minor’s current and prior juvenile records are to be treated as
if they were compiled in an adult context. [¶] The [Determinate Sentencing Act]
provides in detail for the enhancement of adult sentences when specified
circumstances of an offense, or of the offender’s record, suggest that a longer
period of confinement is warranted. Welfare and Institutions Code section 726
expressly adopts this system of enhancements for purposes of computing a
juvenile ward’s maximum confinement or commitment.” (Jovan B., supra, 6
Cal.4th at p. 811.)
Jovan B., supra, 6 Cal.4th 801, is clearly distinguishable. Here there is no
broader context to expand upon the clear language chosen by the Legislature.
The Attorney General’s reliance upon City of San Jose v. Superior Court
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 47 (San Jose) is likewise misplaced. In San Jose, we considered
the application of Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(2) in juvenile
proceedings. That subdivision states that upon a motion for discovery of police
records in any “criminal proceeding” the court must deny disclosure of an officer’s
conclusions following investigation of a citizen’s complaint. The minor argued
that because Welfare and Institutions Code section 203 provides that a proceeding
in a juvenile court shall not be deemed a criminal proceeding, the Legislature must
have intended that section 1045, subdivision (b)(2) not apply to juvenile court
proceedings. (5 Cal.4th at p. 53.)
We rejected the argument, noting that in Joe Z. v. Superior Court (1970) 3
Cal.3d 797, 801 (Joe Z.), “we determined that trial courts should have the same
9
degree of discretion over discovery in juvenile proceedings as in adult criminal
matters. (Joe Z., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 801.) Since that decision, discovery
practice in delinquency proceedings generally has been derived from, and
parallels, that in adult criminal cases. (Robert S. v. Superior Court [(1992)] 9
Cal.App.4th [1417,] 1422.)” San Jose, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 53-54.)
“Although Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(2) does not
expressly refer to juvenile proceedings, we believe the same considerations that
operate to protect the confidentiality of peace officer personnel records from
disclosure in the adult context similarly govern their disclosure in delinquency
cases. The Legislature’s aim in enacting Senate Bill No. 1436 manifestly was to
protect such records against ‘fishing expeditions’ conducted by defense attorneys
following the Pitchess decision [Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531].
Peace officers’ privacy interests do not vary with the age of the accused who seeks
personnel records. Indeed, discovery has been granted pursuant to Evidence Code
section 1043 in other reported juvenile cases. [Citations.] Accordingly, we
conclude that section 1045, subdivision (b)(2) applies in juvenile proceedings as
well as in adult criminal matters.” (San Jose, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 54.)
San Jose is manifestly inapposite. Our decision there was informed by the
fact that discovery practice in delinquency proceedings over the previous 23 years
had generally been derived from, and paralleled, that in adult criminal cases. (San
Jose, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 54.) By contrast, when the Legislature enacted section
290, subdivision (a)(2)(E), its previous practice, embodied in subdivisions
(a)(2)(A) and (d), was to differentiate between adults and juveniles.
Here, the Court of Appeal concluded that interpreting the phrase
“conviction and sentencing” to exclude juvenile court proceedings would render
meaningless the phrases “any court” and “any person” also found in section 290,
subdivision (a)(2)(E). However, the meaning of the phrase “any person” depends
10
on its context. For example, in subdivision (c)(1) “any person” refers to adult
offenders.9 On the other hand, in subdivision (d), “any person” refers to juvenile
offenders released from the Youth Authority, or an equivalent institution in
another state, who had committed a listed offense. (See ante, p. 3, fn. 3.) In
subdivision (a)(2)(E), the question whether “any person” refers to adults or
juveniles is resolved by the subdivision’s reference to the person as having been
subject to “conviction or sentencing.” Adults are subject to conviction and
sentencing; juveniles are not, unless they are remanded for trial as adults (Welf. &
Inst. Code, §§ 707, 707.1).
The Court of Appeal, finding the phrasing of subdivision (a)(2)(E) of
section 290 ambiguous, resorted to legislative history to determine its meaning. In
concluding that subdivision (a)(2)(E) does apply to juveniles, the Court of Appeal
found it significant that the stated purpose of the statute’s 1994 amendments was
“ ‘to increase the penalties under the sex offender registration statute, and to
broaden its scope and application.’ (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor
Analyses, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3513 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended
Aug. 26, 1994, p. 3.)” This analysis begs the question whether the purpose of
subdivision (a)(2)(E) was to broaden the application of section 290 for both adult
and juvenile offenders, or only for adults.
As originally introduced, the 1994 amendments gave a court much broader
discretion under subdivision (a)(2)(E). (See Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of

9 Section 290, subdivision (c)(1) provides in pertinent part: “Any person
who is convicted in this state of the commission or attempted commission of any
of the offenses specified in subdivision (a) and who is released on probation, shall,
prior to release or discharge, be informed of the duty to register under this section
by the probation department, and a probation officer shall require the person to
read and sign any form that may be required by the Department of Justice, stating
that the duty of the person to register under this section has been explained to him
or her.” Subdivision (a)(2)(A) lists the offenses requiring registration by adult
offenders.
11


Assem. Bill No. 3513 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 2, 1994, p. 4.)
Thereafter, the proposed legislation was amended to “[c]larify that a court may
order any person to register as a sex offender for any offense not referenced in the
sex offender statute if the court finds at the time of conviction that the person
committed the offense as a result of sexual compulsion or for the purpose of
sexual gratification” and to “[r]equire a court who implements the above provision
to . . . state on the record the reasons for its findings and the reasons for requiring
registration.” (Assem. Conc. Sen. Amends., Assem. Bill No. 3513 (1993-1994
Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 26, 1994, p. 2.) This more restrictive version of the
legislation was enacted. (Stats. 1994, ch. 865, § 1, p. 4317.)
The Court of Appeal concluded, “There is no indication . . . that the
narrowing of the bill’s broad language prior to its enactment was intended to limit
its reach to adults. Rather, this narrowing was an attempt to provide courts with
guidance concerning the proper exercise of discretion.”
This reasoning overlooks the Legislature’s specific choice of the terms
“conviction” and “sentencing” in providing its guidance.
Moreover, as the Court of Appeal observed, one of the stated purposes of
the 1994 amendments was to broaden the scope of section 290.10 Enacting
subdivision (a)(2)(E) was one aspect of that expansion. The Legislature also
chose to broaden section 290 by adding to the list of offenses in subdivision
(a)(2)(A) for which an adult is required to register.11 Sexual battery was one of
the offenses added. (Stats. 1994, ch. 865, § 1, p. 4317.) By contrast, neither in
1994 nor subsequently has the Legislature added sexual battery to the offenses
listed in subdivision (d)(3) pertaining to juveniles.

10 Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Assem. Bill
No. 3513 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess) as amended Aug. 26, 1994, p. 3.
11 Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3513 (1993-1994
Reg. Sess.) as amended June 2, 1994, p. 3.
12



This disparate drafting gives rise to divergent application.
The Attorney General argues that “[n]umerous subdivisions of section 290
apply to juveniles without using juvenile terminology. If this were not so, the
registration system would not be operative for juveniles. For example, subdivision
(a)(1)(A) requires ‘every person described in paragraph (2)’ to register with the
police or sheriff within five working days when coming into a jurisdiction to
reside. Juvenile registrants must comply with this provision, even though their
offenses are not ‘described in paragraph (2)’ of subdivision (a), which is the list of
adult registrable offenses.12 If this provision did not apply to juveniles, there
would be no provision in section 290 telling juveniles when and where to
register.”
The Attorney General is doubtless correct that certain other provisions of
section 290 may be best understood as referring to juveniles, even though the
reference is not explicit. However, the fact remains that the Legislature carefully
distinguished, in subdivisions (a)(2)(A) and (d)(3), between the offenses requiring
registration by adults and those requiring registration by juveniles. In the absence
of a clear expression of its intent, we are not persuaded that the Legislature meant
to altogether abandon such differentiation in enacting subdivision (a)(2)(E).
In listing sexual battery among the registrable offenses for adults, but not
for juveniles, the Legislature may have acted intentionally or through
inadvertence. If the latter, the Legislature may correct its oversight, but it is not
our role to do so.

12 As noted above, the list of registrable offenses for juveniles is set out in section
290, subdivision (d)(3). (Ante, p. 3, fn. 3.)
13


III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed insofar as it upholds the
provision of the dispositional order requiring Derrick B. to register as a sex
offender, and the cause is remanded to the Court of Appeal with directions to
order the juvenile court to omit that provision.
CORRIGAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.

14



See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion In re Derrick B.
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion


Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 116 Cal.App.4th 1352
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S124205
Date Filed: August 10, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Fresno
Judge: Gregory T. Fain

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

E. Katherine Dashiell, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Dale J. Blea, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Stan Cross and Janet E. Neeley,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

E. Katherine Dashiell
Central California Appellate Program
2407 J Street, Suite 301
Sacramento, CA 95816
(916) 441-3792

Janet E. Neeley
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
(916) 324-5257


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Thu, 08/10/2006S124205

Parties
1The People (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by Janet E. Neeley
Office of the Attorney General
1300 "I" Street, Suite 1101
P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA

2B., D. (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by E. Katherine Dashiell
Central California Appellate Program
2407 "J" Street, Suite 301
Sacramento, CA

3B., D. (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Dale Juan Blea
Attorney at Law
49430 Road 426, Suite F
Oakhurst, CA


Disposition
Aug 10 2006Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Apr 21 2004Request for depublication filed (initial case event)
  San Joaquin County Public Defender ( non-party).
Apr 27 2004Opposition filed
  In Sacramento by Respondent {The People} to request for depublication.
Apr 27 2004Petition for review filed
  by counsel for aplt. (Derrick Anthony B.)
Apr 27 2004Record requested
 
Apr 29 2004Received:
  Appellant's errata to petition for review. (Pages 11-15 of the C/A opinion).
Apr 29 2004Received Court of Appeal record
  one doghouse
Jun 16 2004Petition for review granted (criminal case)
  Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Chin, Brown, Moreno, JJ.
Jun 30 2004Counsel appointment order filed
  Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, the Central California Appellate Program is hereby appointed to represent appellant on his appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits must be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date of this order.
Jul 27 2004Request for extension of time filed
  (in Sacramento) counsel for appellant requesting a 31-day extension to and including August 30, 2004 to file appellant's opening brief on the merits.
Aug 3 2004Extension of time granted
  On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file appellant's opening brief on the merits is extended to and including August 30, 2004.
Aug 20 2004Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  In Sacramento by counsel for appellant {Derrick Anthony B.}.
Aug 27 2004Opening brief on the merits filed
  In Sacramento by counsel for appellant {Derrick Anthony B.,}
Sep 21 2004Request for extension of time filed
  (in Sacramento) counsel for respondent The People requesting a 30-day extension to and including October 27, 2004 to file respondent's answer brief on the merits.
Sep 27 2004Extension of time granted
  To October 27, 2004 to file respondent's answer brief on the merits. No further extensions will be granted.
Sep 30 2004Received:
  Appellant's errata to Opening Brief on the Merits (Pages 10, 20 & 26).
Oct 21 2004Answer brief on the merits filed
  In Sacramento by counsel for Respondent [The People}.
Oct 21 2004Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  By Respondent {The People}.
Nov 9 2004Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  In Sacramento by counsel for appellant {Derrick Anthony B.}
Feb 22 2006Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Dashiell - Central California Appellate Program
May 2 2006Case ordered on calendar
  June 7, 2006, at 1:30 p.m., in Los Angeles
May 19 2006Request for judicial notice granted
  Appellant's request for judicial notice filed on 8-20-04, is hereby granted. Respondent's request for judicial notice filed on 10-21-04, is granted in part. Respondent's request to take judicial notice is denied as to the letter dated 9-15-99, from Attorney General Bill Lockyer to Governor Gray Davis.
May 26 2006Filed:
  Additional authorities for oral argument the People, respondent Janet Neeley, A.G.
May 26 2006Filed letter from:
  E. Katherin Dashiell, counsel for appellant, giving notice of intention to cite listed authorities during oral argument.
Jun 7 2006Cause argued and submitted
 
Aug 10 2006Opinion filed: Judgment reversed
  in part and remanded to the Court of Appeal with directions. Majority opinion by Corrigan, J. -------------------joined by: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, JJ.
Sep 12 2006Remittitur issued (criminal case)
 
Aug 8 2007Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Dashiell - Central California Appellate Program

Briefs
Aug 27 2004Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Oct 21 2004Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Nov 9 2004Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website