Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S133850
Pilimai v. Farmers Ins.


Filed 7/13/06

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

ISOFEA PILIMAI,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
S133850
v.
) Ct.App.
3
C047483
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE
COMPANY, )
)
Sacramento
County
Defendant and Respondent.
Super. Ct. No. 03CS00611

This case presents several questions regarding whether a party to an
uninsured motorist arbitration pursuant to Insurance Code section 11580.2 is
eligible to recover costs and prejudgment interest. Specifically, we are asked to
decide (1) whether the cost-shifting provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section
998 apply to such arbitrations; (2) whether the award of such costs, together with
the arbitration award, can exceed an insurer’s “maximum liability” under
Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (p)(4), which “shall not exceed the
insured’s underinsured motorist coverage limits”; (3) whether prejudgment interest
pursuant to Civil Code section 3291 is available for an uninsured motorist
arbitration; and (4) whether, if costs are available under Code of Civil Procedure
section 998, those costs include deposition and exhibit preparation costs.
1



We conclude that (1) the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 998
do apply to arbitration conducted pursuant to Insurance Code section 11580.2; (2)
the “maximum liability” provision of Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision
(p)(4) does not preclude recovery of costs under Code of Civil Procedure section
998 that, added to the arbitration award, exceed the coverage limits; (3)
prejudgment interest is not available in the present action because it is not an
action for “personal injury” within the meaning of Civil Code section 3291; and
(4) such costs may include deposition and exhibit preparation expenses. We
therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case are not in dispute. On February 6, 1999, Isofea
Pilimai was injured in an automobile accident with an uninsured driver. Pilimai
filed a petition to compel arbitration with Farmers Insurance Exchange Company
(Farmers), his insurance carrier, under the uninsured motorist provisions of his
insurance policy. The policy limit for uninsured motorist coverage in Pilimai’s
policy was $250,000.
On March 21, 2003, prior to the arbitration, Pilimai served a settlement
demand pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998 on Farmers, offering to
settle the case for $85,000, which was refused.
After conducting an arbitration, the arbitrator found Pilimai was entitled to
recover damages in the amount of $556,972. The arbitrator entered an award “in
that amount less the $15,000 credit that [Farmers] is entitled to, or the amount of
the uninsured motorist policy limits which will have to be proven by declaration of
the court upon a petition to confirm this arbitration award.” The arbitration award
was silent on the subject of costs and prejudgment interest.
2

Both Pilimai and Farmers timely filed petitions to confirm the award as a
judgment in the trial court. Only Farmers, however, set its petition for a hearing.
In Farmers’s petition, it sought to reduce the judgment to the $250,000 policy
limit, less the $15,000 credit to which it was entitled under the policy.
In Pilimai’s petition and in his opposition to Farmers’s petition, he sought a
judgment in the same amount, plus costs and prejudgment interest. Pilimai
claimed he was entitled to recover his costs of suit and prejudgment interest based
on Code of Civil Procedure section 998 and Civil Code section 3291. His
memorandum of costs sought $266.80 in filing fees, $2,683.07 in deposition costs,
$195.51 in exhibit costs and $14,975.85 in expert witness fees. Pilimai also
requested $36,470.22 in prejudgment interest pursuant to Civil Code section 3291.
The trial court entered judgment in the amount of $235,000. The trial court
concluded that Pilimai had met the requirements of eligibility for costs and
prejudgment interest under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 and Civil Code
section 3291, because plaintiff had recovered more than the settlement offer
refused by defendant, and because the two statutes applied to arbitration.
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the insurance policy limited recovery to the
$235,000, and an award of costs and prejudgment interest that, together with the
arbitration award, would exceed that limit was disallowed.
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment with respect to
costs and prejudgment interest. It reasoned that Code of Civil Procedure section
998, and by implication Civil Code section 3291, allowed recovery of such costs
pursuant to arbitration, and that any insurance agreement purporting to limit
recovery to the amount of policy coverage must be read in light of such statutory
authorization. “As a general rule of construction, the parties are presumed to
know and to have had in mind all applicable laws extant when an agreement is
3

made. These existing laws are considered part of the contract just as if they were
expressly referred to and incorporated. [Citation.] [¶] As a result of this general
rule that applicable statutes are considered part of the contract, we conclude the
parties had section 998 and Civil Code section 3291 ⎯ and their respective cost-
shifting mechanisms ⎯ in mind when they entered into this contract.
Consequently, those two statutory provisions must therefore constitute part of this
contract unless the contract expressly excluded them.” The Court of Appeal
further concluded that “[n]othing in the insurance policy explicitly waives the
protections of section 998 and Civil Code section 3291.”
The Court of Appeal also rejected Farmers’s argument that its position is
supported by Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (p)(4), which declares
that “maximum liability of the insurer providing the underinsured motorist
coverage shall not exceed the insured’s underinsured motorist coverage limits, less
the amount paid to the insured by or for any person or organization that may be
held legally liable for the injury.” The Court of Appeal interpreted the “maximum
liability” provision to refer to “compensatory damages recoverable by Pilimai, not
the costs of the proceedings or prejudgment interest that arise directly from
[Farmers’s] status as a litigant in the arbitration and subsequent court
proceedings.” In its dispositional paragraph, the Court of Appeal directed the trial
court “to enter a new judgment in favor of Pilimai and against Farmers in the
principal sum of $235,000 plus: (a) award prejudgment interest pursuant to Civil
Code section 3291; and (b) award Pilimai’s costs (including the arbitration costs)
incurred after his section 998 demand . . . .” We granted review.
4

II. DISCUSSION
A. Do the Cost-shifting Provisions of Code of Civil Procedure Section
998 Apply to Uninsured Motorist Arbitrations Conducted Pursuant
to Insurance Code Section 11580.2?

In addressing whether Code of Civil Procedure section 998 applies to
Insurance Code section 11580.2 arbitrations, we first consider the meaning and
purpose of these statutes.
Code of Civil Procedure section 998 provided, at the relevant time:
“(a) The costs allowed under Sections 1031 and 1032 shall be withheld or
augmented as provided in this section. [¶] (b) Not less than 10 days prior to
commencement of trial or arbitration (as provided in Section 1281 or 1295) of a
dispute to be resolved by arbitration, any party may serve an offer in writing upon
any other party to the action to allow judgment to be taken or an award to be
entered in accordance with the terms and conditions stated at that time. . . . [¶]
. . . [¶] (d) If an offer made by a plaintiff is not accepted and the defendant fails to
obtain a more favorable judgment or award in any action or proceeding other than
an eminent domain action, the court or arbitrator, in its discretion, may require the
defendant to pay a reasonable sum to cover costs of the services of expert
witnesses, who are not regular employees of any party, actually incurred and
reasonably necessary in either, or both, preparation for trial or arbitration, or
during trial or arbitration, of the case by the plaintiff, in addition to plaintiff’s
costs.” (Italics added.) The above reference to arbitration was added to Code of
Civil Procedure section 998 in 1997. (Stats. 1997, ch. 892, § 1.)
The purpose of Code of Civil Procedure section 998 is to “ ‘encourage
settlement by providing a strong financial disincentive to a party — whether it be a
plaintiff or a defendant — who fails to achieve a better result than that party could
have achieved by accepting his or her opponent’s settlement offer. (This is the
5

stick. The carrot is that by awarding costs to the putative settler the statute
provides a financial incentive to make reasonable settlement offers.)’ ” (Scott Co.
v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1116.)
Insurance Code section 11580.2 governs the provision of uninsured and
underinsured motorist arbitration. As we explained in Mercury Ins. Group v.
Superior Court (1998) 19 Cal.4th 332 (Mercury Insurance): “At its core, in
Insurance Code section 11580.2, the law states that, generally, an automobile
liability insurance policy that an insurer issues or delivers to an insured owner or
operator covering damages that a third party shall be legally entitled to recover for
bodily injury from the insured owner or operator shall also cover damages that the
insured owner or operator shall be legally entitled to recover for bodily injury
from an uninsured owner or operator. (Id., subd. (a)(1).) In this aspect, its
purpose is to require a ‘type of self-protection’ on the part of insured owners or
operators. [Citations.]
“In addition, in Insurance Code section 11580.2, the law states that such an
automobile liability insurance policy shall also ‘provide that the determination as
to whether the insured shall be legally entitled to recover damages, and if so
entitled, the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between the insured and
the insurer or, in the event of disagreement, by arbitration’ — meaning contractual
arbitration. (Id., subd. (f).) In this aspect, its purpose is to offer a means of
resolving disputes that is more expeditious and less expensive than litigation.
[Citations.] Its beneficiaries include the insurer and the insured, who are each
thereby given a right against litigating these issues. [Citation.] But they also
include the courts themselves, which are thereby freed from entertaining such
litigation.” (Mercury Insurance, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 341-342.)
6

Farmers argues that an uninsured motorist arbitration pursuant to Insurance
Code section 11580.2 is not an arbitration within the meaning of Code of Civil
Procedure section 998, subdivision (b). In particular, it relies on the language of
Code of Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (b) that arbitration subject to that
statute’s provisions be “as provided in section 1281.”1 Code of Civil Procedure
section 1281, which defines the scope of the California Arbitration Act (CAA),
provides: “A written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or
a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon
such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.” Farmers focuses on the
word “agreement” and postulates that the Legislature, in referring to arbitration
“as provided in section 1281” must have intended to refer only to arbitrations
subject to written agreements. An uninsured motorist arbitration pursuant to
Insurance Code section 11580.2, Farmers argues, is mandated by statute rather
than the result of a voluntary agreement, and therefore does not fall within the
scope of arbitration subject to the cost-shifting provisions of Code of Civil
Procedure section 1281.
This argument is without merit. In Mercury Insurance, supra, 19 Cal.4th
332, we considered the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 —
which, like 1281, is part of the CAA — to an uninsured motorist arbitration
pursuant to Insurance Code section 11580.2. At issue in that case was the question
whether a trial court has “the authority to ‘consolidate’ a contractual arbitration
proceeding between an insurer and an insured as to uninsured motorist coverage in

1
Code of Civil Procedure section 998 also refers to arbitration as provided in
Code of Civil Procedure section 1295. That section concerns medical malpractice
arbitration and is not pertinent to the present case.
7



the insured’s pending action against third parties — strictly speaking, does it have
authority to join the insurer as a defendant as to uninsured motorist coverage
issues ⎯ for all purposes, including trial, in order to avoid conflicting rulings on a
common issue of law or fact?” (Mercury Insurance, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 337.)
In answer to that question, we first affirmed that arbitration pursuant to
Insurance Code section 11580.2 is a form of contractual arbitration governed by
the CAA. “This law is implicated because the uninsured motorist coverage law
requires an automobile liability insurance policy, which is a contract [citation], to
provide for arbitration.” (Mercury Insurance, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 342, italics
omitted.)
We next considered the scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2,
subdivision (c), which authorizes a trial court to “order intervention or joinder of
all parties in a single action or special proceeding . . . as to all or only certain
issues.” We concluded that this joinder was authorized “for all purposes,
including trial.” (Mercury Insurance, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 345-346, italics
omitted.) Applying Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c) to the
case at hand, we concluded that because a contractual arbitration proceeding could
be consolidated with a pending civil case involving a third party, so too could an
uninsured motorist arbitration. As we stated: “In a word, under the contractual
arbitration law as it appears in Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, the general
right to contractual arbitration of uninsured motorist coverage . . . may have to
yield if there is an issue of law or fact common to the arbitration and a pending
action or proceeding with a third party and there is a possibility of conflicting
rulings thereon.” (Mercury Insurance, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 347-348.)
8

As is therefore clear from Mercury Insurance, an uninsured motorist
arbitration, although mandated by statute, nonetheless is a contractual arbitration
subject to the provisions of the CAA, including Code of Civil Procedure section
1281. Nor is there anything in the language of Code of Civil Procedure section
1281 that suggests a contractual arbitration provision in an insurance policy that is
statutorily mandated is outside the scope of the CAA. Indeed, Farmers argues
elsewhere in its brief that the cost-sharing provisions of the CAA, found in Code
of Civil Procedure section 1284.2, should apply to the present arbitration.
Moreover, nothing in Insurance Code section 11580.2 suggests that the
arbitration mandated therein is not subject to the CAA. That statute, unlike, for
example, the mandatory fee arbitration law for attorney/client fee disputes, does
not constitute “a separate and distinct arbitration scheme,” with a set of procedures
different from the CAA. (Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th 974, 983.) We
therefore presume the Legislature intended to include such arbitrations within the
ambit of the CAA.
We therefore conclude that an uninsured motorist arbitration pursuant to
Insurance Code section 11580.2 is an “arbitration” within the meaning of Code of
Civil Procedure section 998 and subject to the latter statute’s cost-shifting
provisions.2

2
Farmers also argues that costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 998
are barred by Insurance Code section 11580.26, which states in pertinent part: “No
cause of action shall exist against either an insured or insurer from exercising the
right to request arbitration of a claim under . . . Section 11580.2.” A cause of
action, stemming from a violation of a plaintiff’s primary right, is the basis for a
law suit. (See Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Corp. (2002) 28 Cal.4th, 888, 904.) A
request for costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998 is not an
independent basis for a lawsuit but is ancillary to a suit. Farmers cites no
(footnote continued on next page)
9



B. Does the Maximum Liability Provision of Insurance Code Section
11580, Subdivision (p)(4) Limit a Cost Award Pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure Section 998?

Insurance
Code
section
11580.2, subdivision (p)(4) (hereinafter Insurance
Code, section 11580.2(p)(4)) provides that “[w]hen bodily injury is caused by one
or more motor vehicles, whether insured, underinsured, or uninsured, the
maximum liability of the insurer providing the underinsured motorist coverage
shall not exceed the insured’s underinsured motorist coverage limits, less the
amount paid to the insured by or for any person or organization that may be held
legally liable for the injury.” Farmers argues that this “maximum liability”
provision precludes court awarded costs to an insured when, as in the present case,
the costs plus the damages awarded the insured would exceed the coverage limit.
We agree with the Court of Appeal that this argument should be rejected.
In
Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985 (Murillo),
we considered whether the cost-shifting provisions of Civil Procedure sections 998
could be impliedly overridden by a contrary statute. We recognized that Code of
Civil Procedure section 1032, which authorizes costs to prevailing parties,
provides in subdivision (b), that “ ‘[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by
statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any
action or proceeding.’ ” (Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 989, italics added.)
Turning to Code of Civil Procedure section 998, we stated: “Section 998
explicitly states that it ‘augment[s]’ section 1032(b). Thus, the requirements for
recovery of costs and fees under section 998 must be read in conjunction with
(footnote continued from previous page)
authority, and we have found none, for the proposition that a request for costs can
be considered a “cause of action.”
10

section 1032(b), including the requirement that section 998 costs and fees are
available to the prevailing party ‘[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by
statute.’ (§ 1032(b), italics added.)” (Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1000.)
We then determined that the statute in question, Civil Code section 1794,
subdivision (d), (hereafter Civil Code section 1794(d)), did not expressly provide
an exception to Code of Civil Procedure sections 998 and 1032. Civil Code
section 1794(d), part of the Song-Beverly Act, states: “If the buyer prevails in an
action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part
of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses,
including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court
to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the
commencement and prosecution of such action.” The act has no comparable
provision for prevailing sellers. We concluded: “Although Civil Code section
1794(d) gives a prevailing buyer the right to recover ‘costs and expenses,
including attorney’s fees,’ the statute makes no mention of prevailing sellers. In
other words, it does not expressly disallow recovery of costs by prevailing sellers;
any suggestion that prevailing sellers are prohibited from recovering their costs is
at most implied. Accordingly, based on the plain meaning of the words of the
statutes in question, we conclude Civil Code section 1794(d) does not provide an
‘express’ exception to the general rule permitting a seller, as a prevailing party, to
recover its costs under section 1032(b).” (Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 991.)
We came to the same conclusion with respect to Code of Civil Procedure section
998. (Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1000.)
We also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the legal dictionary definition
of “expressly” supported his position. The word “expressly” has been defined as
“ ‘[i]n an express manner; in direct or unmistakable terms; explicitly; definitely;
11

directly. . . . The opposite of impliedly.’ (Black’s Law Dict. (5th ed. 1979)
p. 522, col. 1.) This definition is actually contrary to buyer’s position, for Civil
Code section 1794(d)’s silence with regard to prevailing sellers does not
‘explicitly’ or ‘directly’ disable sellers from recovering their costs pursuant to
section 1032.” (Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 991.)
The
Murillo court also rejected the argument that its interpretation of Civil
Code section 1794(d) defeated the purpose of the statute: “We could not, of
course, ignore the actual words of the statute in an attempt to vindicate our
perception of the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the law. ‘ “This court has no
power to rewrite the statute so as to make it conform to a presumed intention
which is not expressed.” ’ ” (Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 993.) The court also
held that the provision for attorney fees to prevailing buyers but not sellers
sufficiently preserved the statute’s proconsumer objectives. (Ibid.)
In
Murillo, the court found no express override of Code of Civil Procedure
section 998 when there was a reference to plaintiff’s costs but not defendant’s.
Insurance Code section 11580.2, at issue in the present case, makes no mention of
costs whatever. Its main focus is on defining rules for uninsured or underinsured
motorist insurance policies involving “bodily injury liability insurance covering
liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle
. . . .” (Ins. Code, § 11580.2, subd. (a)(1).) Insurance Code section
11580.2(p)(4)’s “maximum liability” provision clearly means to limit liability of
the insurer arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle.
But it is not at all clear that the statute intends to exempt the insurer from the
general cost rules found in Code of Civil Procedure section 998, i.e., from the
obligation to pay costs arising out of its behavior as a litigant. In other terms,
Insurance Code section 11580.2(p)(4)’s reference to “maximum liability” “does
12

not ‘explicitly’ or ‘directly’ disable” an insured from recovering costs above such
liability when the conditions of Code of Civil Procedure section 998 are met.
(Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 991.)
This conclusion finds additional support in another case relied on by
Pilimai, and by the Court of Appeal below, Harris v. Northwestern National Ins.
Co. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1065 (Harris). In that case, involving the breach
of a bond, the defendant argued that it could not be assessed costs pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, based on the Bond and Undertaking Law
(Code Civ. Proc., § 995.010 et seq.). It argued that a provision of that law, Code
of Civil Procedure section 996.470, subdivision (a) which provides,
“[n]otwithstanding any other statute . . . , the aggregate liability of a surety to all
persons for all breaches of the condition of a bond is limited to the amount of the
bond,” precluded cost awards that, combined with damages, exceeds the amount
of the bond. The Harris court, rejecting this argument, stated: “This language,
however, refers only to liability for ‘breaches of the condition of the bond.’ It
does not limit liabilities of a surety which are imposed by statute rather than for
breach of the condition of the bond. [Citation.] [¶] This was made clear by the
subsequent enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 996.475, which provides
‘[n]othing in this chapter is intended to limit the liability of a surety pursuant to
any other statute.’ ” (Harris, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1065.) As the Harris
court concluded: “The obligation of appellant to pay costs is imposed by Code of
Civil Procedure section 1032 based upon appellant’s status as a party litigant, not
for breach of the condition of the bond. Here, although appellant admitted its
execution of the bond, it denied liability and litigated whether its principal, the
notary, breached the condition of the bond. As a losing party litigant, appellant is
13

properly subjected to costs in addition to the amount of the bond.” (Harris, supra,
6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1065-1066.)
Farmers correctly notes that Harris is distinguishable from the present case
inasmuch as it concerned a statute that explicitly provided that the limitation on
liability applied only to “ ‘breaches of the . . . bond’ ” and was not intended to
limit liability pursuant to “ ‘any other statute.’ ” (Harris, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1065.) But Harris does call attention to the distinction between “[t]he
obligation of appellant to pay costs . . . imposed by Code of Civil Procedure
section 1032 based upon appellant’s status as a party litigant” and breach of the
obligation set forth in the statute in question. (Ibid.) As observed above, it is not
clear that Insurance Code section 11580.2 (p)(4)’s maximum liability provision
applies to costs imposed on an insurance company through its behavior as a
litigant, specifically its failure to settle, rather than damages assessed against it as
a liability insurer.
Nor are we persuaded otherwise by the fact that the arbitration provisions
of Insurance Code section 11580.2 are intended to provide “ ‘inexpensive
resolution’ ” of disputes. (Orpustan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1972)
7 Cal.3d 988, 992.) Such inferences, based on general legislative purpose, do not
constitute express exceptions to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1032 and 998.
(Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 994.)
We therefore conclude that the “maximum liability” provision of Insurance
Code section 11580.2(p)(4) does not preclude an award of costs pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 998, even if the costs, in addition to the damage award,
would exceed the insurance policy’s maximum coverage.
14

C. Is Prejudgment Interest Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
Section 3291 Available in the Present Case?
Farmers argues that even if Pilimai may receive costs pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 998, he may not receive prejudgment interest under a
related statute, Civil Code section 3291. That statute provides in pertinent part:
“In any action brought to recover damages for personal injury sustained by any
person resulting from or occasioned by the tort of any other person, corporation,
association, or partnership, whether by negligence or by willful intent of the other
person, corporation, association, or partnership, and whether the injury was fatal
or otherwise, it is lawful for the plaintiff in the complaint to claim interest on the
damages alleged as provided in this section. [¶] If the plaintiff makes an offer
pursuant to Section 998 of the Code of Civil Procedure which the defendant does
not accept prior to trial or within 30 days, whichever occurs first, and the plaintiff
obtains a more favorable judgment, the judgment shall bear interest at the legal
rate of 10 percent per annum calculated from the date of the plaintiff’s first offer
pursuant to Section 998 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is exceeded by the
judgment, and interest shall accrue until the satisfaction of judgment.” (Ibid.)
Farmers argues, among other things, that the present case is not an “action
brought to recover damages for personal injury sustained by any person resulting
from or occasioned by the tort of any other person . . . .” Although the plain
language of the statute is consistent with Farmers’s position, Pilimai argues in
effect that the language of the statute is consistent with his own interpretation: he
is bringing an action against Farmers for the purpose of recovering damages for
personal injury resulting from the tort of another, i.e., an uninsured motorist. In
other words, under Pilimai’s reading, an “action brought to recover damages for
personal injury” does not itself have to be a personal injury action ⎯ it may be a
15

contractual action against one’s own insurance company to recover compensation
for a personal injury.
Pilimai’s argument fails for several reasons. First, it is not supported by the
literal language of the statute. An action against an insurance company to recover
policy benefits is not an action to recover “damages for personal injury” but rather
damages for breach of contract, even if that contract is to provide compensation
for personal injury. Moreover, the legislative history does not support his
position. Civil Code section 3291 was characterized throughout the various
analyses and digests leading up to its passage as pertaining to “personal injury
actions.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig. Assem. Amends., Sen. Bill No. 203 (1981-1982
Reg. Sess.) Sept. 15, 1981; Sen. Democratic Caucus, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 203
(1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 4, 1981, p. 2; Assem. Judiciary Com.
Republican Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 203 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) as amended
Aug. 19, 1981.) These references undermine Pilimai’s position that the action
itself does not have to be a personal injury action to fall within the scope of Civil
Code section 3291.
Pilimai’s interpretation is also directly at odds with Gourley v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 121 (Gourley). In that case, the plaintiff sued
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing on the ground that the
insurer refused in bad faith to fully compensate her for personal injuries suffered
in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist. We began by observing
that “[c]ourts generally agree that the purpose of section 3291 is to provide a
statutory incentive to settle personal injury litigation where plaintiff has been
physically as well as economically impaired, and thus it has been considered
inapplicable to contractual disputes, business-tort losses and arbitration
proceedings.” (Id. at p. 126.)
16

We held in Gourley that a suit for an insurer’s tortious breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not a personal injury action
that would permit recovery of interest pursuant to section Civil Code section 3291,
but rather is an action primarily “to recover economic loss caused by the tortious
interference with a property right.” (Gourley, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 123, italics
omitted.) A first party suit for breach of the covenant against the insurer “exists to
assure the insurer makes prompt payment of claims to the insured. The substance
of a bad faith action in these first party matters is the insurer’s unreasonable
refusal to pay benefits under the policy.” (Id. at p. 127.) An “ ‘action against an
insurer for bad faith is conceptually similar to an action for interference with
contractual relations, for in both actions the primary interest of the plaintiff which
is invaded by the defendant’s wrongful conduct is the plaintiff’s right to receive
performance under an existing contract.’ ” (Id. at p. 129.)
Pilimai argues that this case is distinguishable inasmuch as it involves a
direct suit for recovery of insurance proceeds for compensation of personal injury,
whereas Gourley concerned a suit against an insurer for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. This distinction, however, does not work in Pilimai’s
favor. Implicit in our observation in Gourley that a bad faith suit is brought
primarily “to recover economic loss caused by the tortious interference with a
property right” (Gourley, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 123, italics omitted), is the notion
that the right to recover damages from an insurer based on an insurance policy is a
contractual right or property right, and not a personal injury action, even when the
insurance is for compensation for personal injury. Although in the present case, as
in Gourley, the insurance policy was compensating plaintiff for personal injuries,
the money the insurer owed the insured was not the result of personal injury
inflicted by the insurer but of a contractual obligation that the insurer assumed.
17

Thus, we conclude that an “action brought to recover damages for personal
injury sustained by any person resulting from or occasioned by the tort of any
other person” within the meaning of Civil Code section 3291 must be a personal
injury action sounding in tort, and does not include an action for breach of an
insurance contract. Therefore, Pilimai may not recover prejudgment interest
pursuant to that statute.
D. Does an Award of Costs Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
Section 998 Include Deposition and Exhibit Preparation Costs?
Farmers argues that even if uninsured motorist arbitration is subject to the
cost-shifting provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 998, the only costs of
arbitration that may be recovered are expert witness fees, which are specifically
mentioned in subdivision (d) of that statute. The other costs Pilimai requested in
the memorandum of costs he submitted to the trial court (see Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 870(a)) are, as noted above, $2,683.07 in deposition costs and $195.51 in
exhibit costs.3
As noted above, Code of Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (a),
provides in pertinent part that “[t]he costs allowed under Section[ ] . . . 1032 shall
be withheld or augmented as provided in this section.” Therefore, the starting
point in determining which costs are available under Code of Civil Procedure

3
Pilimai initially argued in his answer brief in this court that he was entitled
not only to the above expenses but also to “arbitrator’s fees and expenses.” The
Court of Appeal in its disposition authorized the award of unspecified arbitration
costs, and stated in its opinion that the cost-shifting provisions of Code of Civil
Procedure section 998 would apply to arbitrators’ fees. However, Pilimai clarified
in supplemental briefing that he sought only those expenses requested in his
memorandum of costs, which did not include a request for arbitrators’ fees and
expenses. We express no opinion as to whether such fees and expenses may be
awarded pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998.
18



section 998 is to identify those costs allowed under section 1032. Code of Civil
Procedure section 1033.5 enumerates such costs. These include “[t]aking,
videotaping, and transcribing necessary depositions including an original and one
copy of those taken by the claimant and one copy of depositions taken by the party
against whom costs are allowed, and travel expenses to attend depositions.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(3).) Also included are “[m]odels and blowups of
exhibits and photocopies of exhibits . . . if they were reasonably helpful to aid the
trier of fact.” (Id., subd. (a)(12).) These are precisely the types of costs Pilimai is
claiming.
Farmers argues that these costs are not allowable, citing Code of Civil
Procedure section 1284.2, which provides: “Unless the arbitration agreement
otherwise provides or the parties to the arbitration otherwise agree, each party to
the arbitration shall pay his pro rata share of the expenses and fees of the neutral
arbitrator, together with other expenses of the arbitration incurred or approved by
the neutral arbitrator, not including counsel fees or witness fees or other expenses
incurred by a party for his own benefit.” As Farmers notes, the court in Austin v.
Allstate Ins. Co. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1812 (Austin) relied on this section to
conclude that, as a general matter, costs are not available to prevailing parties in
arbitration absent agreement and, in particular, are not available in an arbitration
pursuant to Insurance Code section 11580.2.
The
Austin court also relied on Code of Civil Procedure section 1293.2, part
of the CAA, which provides: “The court shall award costs upon any judicial
proceeding under this title as provided in Chapter 6 [recovery of costs in civil
actions] . . . .” (Italics added.) Focusing on the words “judicial proceeding,” the
court stated: “There is no similar provision for awarding costs incurred in
arbitration. It is apparent that the Legislature has distinguished between costs
19

incurred in an arbitration proceeding and costs incurred in superior court to
enforce an arbitration award, allowing costs to the prevailing party only in the
latter.” (Austin, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1815-1816.)
Austin is distinguishable from the present case inasmuch as it concerned an
award of costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032. Here, we
address costs awarded pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998, which
now authorizes the award of costs after an arbitration. More specifically, Code of
Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (d), stated at the time this case was
adjudicated: “If an offer made by a plaintiff is not accepted and the defendant
fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award in any action or proceeding
other than an eminent domain action, the court or arbitrator, in its discretion, may
require the defendant to pay a reasonable sum to cover costs of the services of
expert witnesses, who are not regular employees of any party, actually incurred
and reasonably necessary in either, or both, preparation for trial or arbitration, or
during trial or arbitration, of the case by the plaintiff, in addition to plaintiff’s
costs.” (Italics added.)4
From the above language, it is apparent that once the conditions of Code of
Civil Procedure section 998 are met, a defendant may be required to pay expert
witness fees incurred during arbitration. There is nothing to suggest that the final
phrase ⎯ “in addition to plaintiff’s costs” ⎯ applies only to cases that go to trial
but not to arbitration. Indeed, it is evident that the above statute uses the term
“plaintiff” to include those pursuing a legal claim either through a civil action or

4
We note that a 2005 amendment to Code of Civil Procedure section 998,
subdivision (d) inserted the word “postoffer” between “cover” and “costs.” (Stats.
2005, ch. 706, § 13.) The Legislature has made clear that the amendment is to
apply prospectively only. (Id., § 41.)
20



through arbitration. We therefore interpret that last phrase to mean that an
arbitration plaintiff is equally able to obtain costs incurred during arbitration as is
a trial plaintiff. Reading this section with Code of Civil Procedure section 998,
subdivision (a), it is apparent that the types of costs available to an arbitration
plaintiff are those costs available under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, as
enumerated in Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. As discussed above, the
costs Pilimai is seeking for depositions and exhibit preparation are within the
scope of the latter statute.
Moreover, all that Code of Civil Procedure section 1284.2 says about the
kinds of costs at issue here ⎯ “expenses incurred by a party for his own benefit”
⎯ is that such costs are not to be included in the costs that the parties are to share.
Thus, Code of Civil Procedure section 1284.2 does not conflict with Code of Civil
Procedure section 998, subdivision (d)’s authorization of arbitration plaintiffs
under appropriate conditions to obtain costs incurred for their own benefit. And
while it is true, as the Austin court observed, that no provision of the CAA
authorizes the award of arbitration costs absent agreement, Code of Civil
Procedure section 998 itself provides the statutory authorization for such costs.
Farmers argues that Code of Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (d),
properly read, applies only to expert witness fees and not other arbitration costs.
Their argument is as follows. In general, the above statute does not of itself entitle
plaintiffs to costs because a plaintiff who makes an offer that a defendant refuses
and then obtains a judgment more favorable than the offer is, by definition, a
“prevailing party” entitled to costs not under Code of Civil Procedure section 998
but under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032. The only exception to the above
is expert witness fees, which are specifically provided in Code of Civil Procedure
section 998, subdivision (d), but not provided in Code of Civil Procedure section
21

1032 if not ordered by a court or expressly authorized by statute. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (b)(1).) Thus, the phrase “in addition to plaintiff’s costs” at
the end of Code of Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (d), Farmers argues, is
superfluous. The legislative history reveals that Senator Kopp proposed as part of
the 1997 amendments to the statute to eliminate that phrase for this reason. (Sen.
Com. on the Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 73 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as
amended May 1, 1997, p. 7.) Subsequently, the language was reinstated, and the
Senate Judiciary Committee analysis commented that “[a]lthough section 1033.5
provides for award of costs to the plaintiff as the prevailing party, Consumer
Attorneys of California and others suggest that we restore [the words ‘in addition
to plaintiff’s costs’] in order to eliminate any confusion.” (Sen. Com. on
Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 73 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) May 1, 1997.)
Nothing in the above argument, however, persuades us that we may ignore
the plain language of Code of Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (d). That
language, as explained above, puts the arbitration plaintiff on the same footing as
the plaintiff to a civil action vis-à-vis costs when the plaintiff has made an offer
that defendant has refused and obtains a judgment more favorable than the offer.
Furthermore, nothing in the above legislative history indicates that the Legislature
specifically intended costs to be unavailable to arbitration plaintiffs.
Moreover, Farmers’ interpretation would put arbitration defendants in a
better position vis-à-vis recovery of costs than arbitration plaintiffs. Code of Civil
Procedure section 998, subdivision (c)(1) provides in pertinent part: “If an offer
made by a defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more
favorable judgment or award, the plaintiff shall not recover his or her postoffer
costs and shall pay the defendant's costs from the time of the offer. In addition, in
any action or proceeding other than an eminent domain action, the court or
22

arbitrator, in its discretion, may require the plaintiff to pay a reasonable sum to
cover costs of the services of expert witnesses . . . actually incurred and reasonably
necessary in either, or both, preparation for trial or arbitration, or during trial or
arbitration, of the case by the defendant.” (Italics added.) The above, read in
context with the rest of the statute, makes clear that an arbitration defendant who
is not a prevailing party may recover costs, in addition to expert witness fees, if a
plaintiff’s judgment is less favorable than the defendant’s offer. There is no
indication that the Legislature intended to favor arbitration defendants over
arbitration plaintiffs by allowing the former but not the latter to recover the full
range of costs available to plaintiffs and defendants in a civil action. Indeed, the
legislative history of the 1997 amendments reveals that the Legislature amended
Code of Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (c) so as to “remove an
inequality in the current law which treats defendants more favorably than
plaintiffs.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 73 (1997-1998
Reg. Sess.) July 16, 1997, p. 6.)
We therefore conclude that arbitration plaintiffs such as Pilimai are eligible
for deposition and exhibit preparation costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 998, subdivision (d).
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed insofar as it recognizes
that Code of Civil Procedure section 998 costs are available to parties conducting
arbitration pursuant to Insurance Code section 11580.2, even when those costs
added to the arbitration award exceed the policy limit, and that such costs may
include expert witness fees and costs related to depositions and exhibit
preparation. The judgment is reversed inasmuch as it permits an award of
prejudgment interest pursuant to Civil Code section 3291. We remand the case
23

with directions to remand to the trial court to determine the proper cost award
consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
MORENO, J.
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD,
J.
BAXTER,
J.
WERDEGAR,
J.
CHIN,
J.
CORRIGAN,
J.

24



See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Pilimai v. Farmers Insurance Exchange Company
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion


Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 127 Cal.App.4th 1093
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S133850
Date Filed: July 13, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Sacramento
Judge:
Loren E. McMaster

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Clayeo C. Arnold, Anthony M. Ontiveros; and Leslie M. Mitchell for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Frank M. Pitre and Steven G. Ingram for the Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf
of Plaintiff and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Rust, Armenis, Schwartz, Lamb & Bills, Brian Turner; Horvitz & Levy, David M. Axelrad, Daniel J.
Gonzalez; King Warwick & Sanders and Michael A. King for Defendant and Respondent.

Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley, Mark G. Bonino and Benjamin R. Larson for State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Coddington, Hicks & Danforth, Richard G. Grotch and R. Wardell Loveland as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Defendant and Respondent.



Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Leslie M. Mitchell
1710 Broadway, #96
Sacramento, CA 95818
(916) 447-3426

Daniel J. Gonzalez
Horvitz & Levy
15760 Ventura Boulevard, 18th Floor
Encino, CA 91436-3000
(818) 995-0800


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Thu, 07/13/2006S133850

Parties
1Pilimai, Isofea (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Anthony Millaruelo Ontiveros
Law Office of Clayeo C. Arnold
608 University Avenue
Sacramento, CA

2Pilimai, Isofea (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Leslie M. Mitchell
Attorney at Law
1710 Broadway, Suite 96
Sacramento, CA

3Farmers Insurance Exchange Company (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by Daniel Joseph Gonzalez
Horvitz & Levy, LLP
15760 Ventura Boulevard, 18th Floor
Encino, CA

4Farmers Insurance Exchange Company (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by Michael A. King
King Warwick & Sanders
3249 Quality Drive, Suite 120
Rancho Cordova, CA

5Consumer Attorneys Of California (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Frank M. Pitre
Cotchett Pitre et al.
770 "L" Street, Suite 1200
Sacramento, CA

6State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Mark G. Bonino
Ropers Majeski Kohn & Bentely
80 N. First Street
San Jose, CA

7California State Automobile Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Richard G. Grotch
Coddington Hicks & Danforth
555 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 300
Redwood City, CA


Disposition
Jul 13 2006Opinion filed

Dockets
May 10 2005Petition for review filed
  Respondent (Farmers Insurance Exchange Company) by counsel.
May 12 2005Record requested
 
May 13 2005Received Court of Appeal record
  one doghouse.
May 23 2005Request for depublication (petition for review pending)
  respondent Farmers Insurance Exchange
May 31 2005Answer to petition for review filed
  by counsel for aplt. (Isofea Pilimai)
Jun 1 2005Opposition filed
  by counsel for aplt. (Pilimai) to Depub. Request of Farmers Ins. Exchange Co.
Jun 13 2005Reply to answer to petition filed
  Respondent (Farmer's Insurance Exchange) 40.1(b).
Jun 13 2005Received:
  Respondent (Farmers Insurance Exchange) request for judicial notice with exhibit.
Jun 24 2005Time extended to grant or deny review
  to and including August 8, 2005, or the date upon which review is either granted or denied.
Jul 13 2005Petition for review granted (civil case)
  Request for judicial notice granted. George, C.J., was absent and did not participate. Votes: Werdegar, ACJ, Kennard, Baxter, Chin, and Moreno, JJ.
Jul 14 2005Note:
  Records sent to Cal-Coord. Office: RT=1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, Req. for Jud. Ntc., Aplt's Appendix, Resp's. Appendix, Depub. Req. misc. docs.
Jul 25 2005Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  By counsel for appellant.
Jul 26 2005Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  By counsel for Respondent {Farmers Insurance Exchange}.
Aug 2 2005Request for extension of time filed
  counsel for resp. (Farmers Ins. Exch. ) requests extension of time to 9-26-2005, to file the opening brief on the merits.
Aug 3 2005Extension of time granted
  Respondent's time to serve and file the opening brief is extended to and including September 12, 2005.
Sep 13 2005Opening brief on the merits filed
  by counsel for (Farmers Insusrance Exchange) (40.1(b))
Oct 12 2005Answer brief on the merits filed
  by counsel for (Isofea Pilimai)
Oct 14 2005Received:
  letter from counsel for aplt. correcting case number on answer brief.
Oct 21 2005Request for extension of time filed
  Counsel for respondent requests extension of time to December 1, 2005 to file the reply brief on the merits.
Oct 25 2005Extension of time granted
  Respondent's time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including December 1, 2005.
Dec 2 2005Application to file over-length brief filed
  by counsel for resp. (Farmer's Ins. Exchange) 40.1(b))
Dec 2 2005Received:
  from counsel for respondent oversized reply brief on the merits.
Dec 6 2005Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  w/permission by counsel for respondent (Farmer's Ins. Exchange)
Jan 3 2006Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., applicant Mark Bonino, counsel separate application and brief
Jan 5 2006Request for extension of time filed
  Consumer Attorneys of Calif., amicus curiae applicant Frank Pitre, counsel application for extension of time to 1-12-06 to submit the application and a/c brief. **** granted **** 1-12-06
Jan 5 2006Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau, Applicant by Richard G. Grotch, Counsel
Jan 9 2006Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in support of respondent.
Jan 9 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
  State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in support of respondent. Answer is due within twenty days.
Jan 9 2006Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau in support of respondent.
Jan 9 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
  California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau in support of Respondent. Answer is due within twenty days.
Jan 11 2006Extension of time granted
  Consumer Attorneys of California to file application for permission to file amicus curiae brief to 1-12-2006.
Jan 12 2006Request for extension of time filed
  Consumer Attys of Calif. requests additional extension of time to 1-17-06 to file the application for permission to file amicus curiae brief.
Jan 17 2006Extension of time granted
  Consumer Attorneys of California time to serve and file the application for permission to file an amicus curiae brief is extended to and including January 17, 2006.
Jan 17 2006Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  Consumer Attorneys of California requests permission to file amicus curiae brief in support of appellant. (application and brief under same cover.)
Jan 19 2006Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Consumer Attorneys of California
Jan 19 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
  Consumer Attorneys of California in support of appellant. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Jan 27 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  by counsel for aplt. (Pilimai) to a/c brief of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
Jan 27 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  counsel for aplt. (Pilimai) to a/c brief of Calif. State Automobile Assoc. Interinsurance Bureau.
Feb 6 2006Request for extension of time filed
  counsel for respondent requests extension of time to February 22, 2006, to file the response to amicus curiae brief of Consumer Attys. of Calif.
Feb 8 2006Extension of time granted
  Respondent's time to serve and file the response to amicus curiae brief is extended to and including February 22, 2006.
Feb 22 2006Supplemental briefing ordered
  The parties are directed to file supplemental briefs addressing the following issue: If arbitration costs are recoverable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (d), did the Court of Appeal err in awarding such costs because apparently they were not requested in Pilimai's memorandum of costs? (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 870(a); see also Jones v. John Crane, Inc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 990, 1012.) Simultaneous letter briefs addressing this issue must be served and filed by March 10, 2006. Simultaneous response briefs may be served and filed by March 17, 2006. All briefs must be filed in the San Francisco Office of the Court Clerk.
Feb 23 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  counsel for Farmers Ins. Exchange (40.1(b))
Feb 28 2006Motion filed (non-AA)
  counsel for aplt. (Pilimai) Motion to Vacate Order for Supplemental Briefing and to Augment Record.
Mar 3 2006Record augmentation granted
  Appellant's motion to augment the record is granted. Appellant's motion to vacate our order for supplemental briefing is denied.
Mar 10 2006Letter brief filed
  counsel for aplt. Isofea Pilimai
Mar 13 2006Supplemental brief filed
  counsel for Farmer's Ins. Exchange, (40.1(b))
Mar 20 2006Respondent's brief filed
  counsel for Farmer's Insurance Exchange. (40.1(b))
May 2 2006Case ordered on calendar
  May 30, 2006, at 1:00 p.m., in San Francisco
May 30 2006Cause argued and submitted
 
Jul 13 2006Opinion filed
  Affirmed, reversed and remanded with directions. OPINION BY: Moreno, J. --- joined by: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, J, Corrigan, JJ.
Aug 15 2006Remittitur issued (civil case)
 
Aug 17 2006Note:
  records returned to CA/3
Aug 21 2006Received:
  from CA/3 receipt for remittitur.

Briefs
Sep 13 2005Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Oct 12 2005Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Dec 6 2005Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
Jan 9 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Jan 9 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Jan 19 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Jan 27 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
Jan 27 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
Feb 23 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
Mar 20 2006Respondent's brief filed
 
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