Supreme Court of California Justia
Citation 42 Cal.4th 822 original opinion
People v. Watson

Filed 12/17/07

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S131052
v.
Ct.App. 2/6 B172763
JOEY R. WATSON,
San Luis Obispo County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. F340614

Penal Code section 26841 provides for the transfer of a mentally ill prisoner
to a state hospital under the jurisdiction of the Department of Mental Health if it is
determined that such a transfer would expedite the prisoner’s rehabilitation. A
prisoner transferred pursuant to this statute is to remain in the state hospital “until
in the opinion of the superintendent [of the hospital] the person has been treated to
the extent that he or she will not benefit from further care and treatment in the
state hospital.” (§ 2684.) In the present case we must decide whether a person
transferred from a state prison to Atascadero State Hospital (Atascadero) for acute
mental health treatment pursuant to section 2684 is subject to prosecution under
section 4501.5, which provides that any person “confined in a state prison who
commits a battery” upon a nonprisoner is guilty of a felony. Section 4504 defines
a person “confined in a state prison” as an inmate confined in certain prisons

1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
1


specified in section 5003, which list does not include Atascadero, as well as a
person who, at the time of the offense, is “temporarily outside the walls or bounds
of the prison.” (§ 4504, subds. (a) & (b).)
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that a prisoner transferred to
Atascadero pursuant to section 2684 is a person “confined in a state prison,”
because such a prisoner is “temporarily outside the walls and bounds of the
prison” within the meaning of that phrase as defined by section 4504, subdivision
(b). Therefore, a section 2684 transferee is subject to prosecution for battery
under section 4501.5 and to the increased punishment provided upon conviction
under that statute. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s decision to the
contrary.
I
The facts underlying this case are not in dispute. While serving a prison
sentence, defendant Joey Reuben Watson was transferred from a state prison to
Atascadero for mental health care treatment pursuant to section 2684.2 During the
admissions process at Atascadero, a registered nurse directed defendant to shower
and get dressed. Upon leaving the shower, defendant lunged at the nurse and
struck him in the face two or three times.
Defendant pleaded no contest to the offense of committing battery by a
prisoner on a nonconfined person, in violation of section 4501.5, and admitted one
prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of California’s

2 Section
2684,
subdivision (a), provides for the transfer of mentally ill
prisoners to state hospitals. Upon certification by the Secretary of Corrections and
Rehabilitation and with the approval of the Director of the Department of Mental
Health, “the superintendent of the hospital shall receive the prisoner and keep him
or her until” the superintendent of the hospital determines treatment no longer is
needed. (§ 2684, subd. (a).)
2


“Three Strikes” law. (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i).) He was
sentenced to four years in state prison. The appellate court reversed the judgment,
holding that it was legally impossible for defendant to have violated section
4501.5, because he had been transferred from prison to Atascadero and thus no
longer was “confined in a state prison.” In response to the people’s petition for
rehearing, the Court of Appeal acknowledged two Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Division of Adult Operations regulations that conflicted with the
court’s interpretation of sections 2684 and 4504, subdivision (b), the latter of
which section sets forth the relevant definition of the phrase “ ‘confined in’ a
prison.” The appellate court, although concluding that deference to these
regulations was unwarranted, modified the opinion to acknowledge but reject this
regulatory authority, and thereafter denied plaintiff’s petition for rehearing.
It is questionable whether defendant’s claim is cognizable after a no contest
plea. (§ 1237.5; People v. Padfield (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 218, 227.)3 However,
review in this court was sought and granted solely on the issue of whether an
inmate who is under a prison sentence and who has been transferred to a state
hospital pursuant to section 2684 is subject to punishment under section 4501.5.
Accordingly, because the foundational issue of appealability is not before us, we
decide only the substantive issue presented.
II
Although the crime of battery frequently constitutes a misdemeanor, section
4501.5 makes it a felony for any person confined in a state prison to commit a

3
The proper procedure would have been for defendant to enter a “ ‘slow
plea,’ ” submitting the issue of his guilt of the charged offense on the basis of the
preliminary hearing transcript or other documentation, and then to appeal from the
trial court’s judgment of guilt. (E.g., Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d
592, 600, 602-203.)
3


battery upon a nonprisoner.4 The term “confined in a state prison” is defined by
section 4504. Section 4504, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part, that a
“person is deemed confined in a ‘state prison’ if he is confined in any of the
prisons and institutions specified in Section 5003 by order made pursuant to
law . . . .” Section 5003, in turn, provides that the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation has jurisdiction over specified prisons and institutions.5 Atascadero
is not included among the prisons and institutions listed in section 5003. Section

4 Section
4501.5
provides:
“Every person confined in a state prison of this
state who commits a battery upon the person of any individual who is not himself
a person confined therein shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the
state prison for two, three, or four years, to be served consecutively.”
5
Section 5003 provides:
“The department has jurisdiction over the following prisons and institutions:
“(a) The California State Prison at San Quentin.
“(b) The California State Prison at Folsom.
“(c) The California Institution for Men.
“(d) The California Institution for Women.
“(e) The Deuel Vocational Institution.
“(f) The California Medical Facility.
“(g) The Correctional Training Facility.
“(h) The California Men’s Colony.
“(i) The California Correctional Institution at Tehachapi.
“(j) The California Rehabilitation Center.
“(k) The California Correctional Center at Susanville.
“(l) The Sierra Correctional Center.
“(m) The Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility at Rock Mountain.
“(n) Mule Creek State Prison.
“(o) Northern California Women’s Facility.
“(p) Pelican Bay State Prison.
“(q) Avenal State Prison.
“(r) California State Prison — Kings County at Corcoran.
“(s) Chuckawalla Valley State Prison.
“(t) Those other institutions and prison facilities as the Department of Corrections
or the Director of Corrections may be authorized by law to establish, including,
but not limited to, prisons in Madera, Kern, Imperial, and Los Angeles Counties.”
4


4504, subdivision (b) provides that a person also is deemed “confined in” a prison
if “at the time of the offense, he is temporarily outside its walls or bounds for the
purpose of serving on a work detail or for the purpose of confinement in a local
correctional institution pending trial or for any other purpose for which a prisoner
may be allowed temporarily outside the walls or bounds of the prison, but a
prisoner who has been released on parole is not deemed ‘confined in’ a prison for
purposes of this chapter.” (Italics added.)
Additionally, the term “prison” is defined in section 6082, which states that
with reference to statutes commencing with section 4500, the word “prisons”
refers to “hospitals and institutions for the confinement, treatment, employment,
training and discipline of persons in the legal custody of the Department of
Corrections.”
Defendant was serving a prison sentence under a judgment committing him
to the custody of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for a term of
years, but was transferred to Atascadero pursuant to section 2684, which provides
for the transfer of mentally ill prisoners to state hospitals. Specifically, section
2684, subdivision (a), states: “If, in the opinion of the Director of Corrections, the
rehabilitation of any mentally ill, mentally deficient, or insane person confined in a
state prison may be expedited by treatment at any one of the state hospitals under
the jurisdiction of the State Department of Mental Health or the State Department
of Developmental Services, the Director of Corrections, with the approval of the
Board of Prison Terms for persons sentenced pursuant to subdivision (b) of
Section 1168, shall certify that fact to the director of the appropriate department
who shall evaluate the prisoner to determine if he or she would benefit from care
and treatment in a state hospital. If the director of the appropriate department so
determines, the superintendent of the hospital shall receive the prisoner and keep
him or her until in the opinion of the superintendent the person has been treated to
5
the extent that he or she will not benefit from further care and treatment in the
state hospital.”
In the present case, the Court of Appeal concluded that after his transfer to
Atascadero defendant was not “confined in a state prison” within the meaning of
section 4504, subdivision (a), because Atascadero is not included among the
prisons and institutions listed in section 5003. Additionally, relying upon People
v. Superior Court (Ortiz) (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 995 (Ortiz), the appellate court
concluded that a prisoner transferred to Atascadero pursuant to section 2684 is not
“temporarily” outside the prison walls and, therefore, not “ ‘confined in’ a state
prison” within the meaning of section 4504, subdivision (b). Finally, the court
concluded that Atascadero is not a “state prison” under section 6082, because
section 2684 inmates transferred to Atascadero are no longer in the custody of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, but are in the custody of
Atascadero, which is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Mental Health.
As noted above, the court also discounted the significance of two Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Adult Operations regulations that
conflicted with its conclusion regarding the temporary nature of a section 2684
transfer.
III
We must determine whether the Legislature intended that a person who is
incarcerated pursuant to a judgment committing him or her to state prison but who,
during the prison term established by the sentence, is transferred to Atascadero
pursuant to section 2684, is subject to the enhanced penalty provisions applicable
to crimes committed by prisoners as set forth in section 4501.5. We begin with
the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their
ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context, because
the language employed in the Legislature’s enactment generally is the most
6
reliable indicator of legislative intent. (Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 715; accord, City of Burbank v. State Water Resources
Control Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 613, 625.) The objective of a court construing a
statute is “to ascertain the intent of the enacting legislative body so that we may
adopt the construction that best effectuates the purpose of the law.” (Hassan v.
Mercy American River Hospital, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 715; accord, Coachella
Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment
Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1087.)
As a threshold matter, we agree with the Court of Appeal that Atascadero is
not a “ ‘state prison’ ” within the meaning of section 4504, subdivision (a),
because it is not one of the prisons and institutions listed in section 5003.
Nonetheless, as outlined above, section 4504, subdivision (b), expands the
definition of “ ‘confined in a prison’ ” to include prisoners who are temporarily
outside the walls of a prison “for the purpose of serving on a work detail or for the
purpose of confinement in a local correctional institution pending trial or for any
other purpose for which a prisoner may be allowed temporarily outside the walls
or bounds of the prison . . . .” Defendant was not serving on a work detail and was
not confined in a local correctional institution. Accordingly, we must decide
whether the transfer of a person such as a defendant, who has been committed to
serve a sentence in state prison, to Atascadero pursuant to section 2684 constitutes
“any other purpose for which a prisoner may be allowed temporarily outside the
walls or bounds of the prison,” under section 4504, subdivision (b). For the
reasons set forth below, we conclude that it does.
Section 2684 does not explicitly address the permanency of a transfer to
Atascadero or to another state hospital, and no other statute explains the meaning
of the word “temporarily,” as that term is used in section 4504, subdivision (b).
Section 2684 does specify, however, that such a transfer is for an indefinite period,
7
and does provide that the superintendent of the hospital shall keep the prisoner
“until in the opinion of the superintendent the person has been treated to the extent
that he or she will not benefit from further care and treatment in the state hospital.”
(§ 2684, subd. (a).) Section 2685 further provides that “[w]hen in the opinion of
the superintendent the mentally ill, mentally deficient or insane prisoner has been
treated to such an extent that such person will not benefit by further care and
treatment in the state hospital, the superintendent shall immediately notify the
Director of Corrections of that fact. The Director of Corrections shall immediately
send for, take and receive the prisoner back into prison. The time passed at the
state hospital shall count as part of the prisoner’s sentence.”
Moreover, as these provisions make plain, the transfer is for an unspecified
period within the term of imprisonment prescribed by the inmate’s sentence.
Unlike a person committed to a state hospital as a mentally disordered offender or
sexually violent predator, a prisoner who is transferred pursuant to section 2684
still is serving a sentence of a term of years in state prison and is confined pursuant
to a judgment committing him or her to confinement in the state prison. In the
context of the inmate’s commitment to state prison for a term of years, a transfer
to a state hospital does not constitute a permanent commitment for a specified
term. Rather, the foregoing statutes contemplate that a prisoner’s transfer to a
state hospital is temporary, and that upon completion of a successful treatment
program, the prisoner will be returned to state prison for completion of the term of
confinement prescribed by his or her sentence, with time spent in the hospital
credited toward completion of the term imposed by the sentence.6 Indeed, a

6
Defendant urges us to apply the rule of lenity—that language in a penal
statute that truly is susceptible of more than one reasonable construction in
meaning or application ordinarily is construed in the manner more favorable to the
(footnote continued on next page)
8


section 2684 transferee will never permanently remain a section 2684 transferee,
because as set forth by the Department of Mental Health in a chart in its Web site
concerning Atascadero, the “Disposition Alternatives” applicable to such a
transferee are parole, a return to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
or remaining at Atascadero pursuant to a civil commitment (see Pen. Code, § 2960
et seq. [Mentally Disordered Offender]; Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600 et seq.
[Sexually Violent Predator].) (See http://www.dmh.ca.gov/services_and_
programs/state_hospitals/Atascadero/Legal_Commitments.asp, as of Dec. 17,
2007.) Thus, although a prisoner transferred by the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation pursuant to section 2684 is located at Atascadero for treatment,
that transfer remains in effect only for some indefinite period within the duration
of the person’s prison sentence, and is temporary in relation to that sentence.
The Court of Appeal concluded to the contrary, reasoning only that
“inmates are transferred to Atascadero for treatment, and that may be permanent.
Moreover, the Department of Corrections has no power to control the inmates
after the transfer has occurred.”
The circumstance that a prisoner transferred to Atascadero for mental
health treatment pursuant to section 2684 may never return to prison in the event
the prisoner never sufficiently recovers from his or her mental illness, is
immaterial to the question of whether a transfer under that provision is
“temporary” within the meaning of section 4504, subdivision (b). The same result

(footnote continued from previous page)
defendant. (People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1277.) Because we conclude
that the plain language of the relevant statutes supports our conclusion that a
prisoner transferred to Atascadero pursuant to section 2684 is only temporarily
outside the prison walls, the statutes are not susceptible of more than one
reasonable construction and we appropriately do not invoke the rule of lenity.
9


might occur if a prisoner is transferred to local custody for a lengthy trial and
ultimately is sentenced to time served, yet it is clear that such a prisoner’s
confinement comes within the terms of section 4504, subdivision (b). Indeed, as
noted above, although a prisoner transferred to Atascadero pursuant to section
2684 may remain at the hospital, and indeed may remain hospitalized after
completion of the prisoner’s sentence, no person under sentence to a term in state
prison permanently will retain the status of a section 2684 transferee, because the
prisoner will be returned to prison or (if the prison sentence has expired) either
will be released or remain in the hospital pursuant to a civil commitment.
The Court of Appeal placed considerable reliance upon Ortiz, supra, 115
Cal.App.4th 995, but we are not persuaded by the court’s reasoning or conclusion
in that case. In Ortiz, the court considered whether Atascadero, because it houses
mentally ill inmates transferred from prison pursuant to section 2684, qualifies as
a “state prison” or a “place where prisoners of the state are located under the
custody of prison officials,” as contemplated by section 4573.6, which proscribes
possession of a controlled substance by “any person” in a place where inmates are
located. The court examined sections 4504 and 6082 and concluded that mentally
ill inmates transferred to Atascadero pursuant to section 2684 are in the custody of
the superintendent of the hospital and of the peace officers employed by the
hospital, but they are neither in prison pursuant to section 4504 nor placed in the
custody of prison officials pursuant to section 6082.7

7
Ultimately, the court concluded in Ortiz that section 4573.6 nonetheless
barred the possession of controlled substances by employees or other persons at
Atascadero, because inmates transferred to that institution are held in the custody
of peace officers employed by the hospital, rendering Atascadero a “place where
prisoners of the state are located under the custody of prison officials,” pursuant to
section 4573.6. (Ortiz, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1002.)
10


Although, as we observed above, there is reference in section 6082 to the
concept of an inmate’s legal custody, and thus that statute may be relevant to the
determination of whether Atascadero constitutes a prison in other contexts, the
identity of the official confining a transferred inmate has no relevance to the
determination of whether the custody is temporary, or whether a prisoner is
subject to felony prosecution for battery upon a nonprisoner under section 4501.5,
the scope of which is defined specifically by section 4504. The latter statute
makes no reference to legal or other custody; it speaks solely to a prisoner’s
location either in a specified prison or temporarily outside the prison walls.8
Similarly, the Court of Appeal’s focus upon whether the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation has the authority to “control” inmates after a
transfer to Atascadero is erroneous. Section 4504, subdivision (b) broadly defines
“ ‘confined in’ a prison” to include “any other purpose” for which a prisoner may
be allowed “temporarily outside the walls or bounds of the prison,” and makes no
reference to the retention of custody or control by the Department of Corrections
during the prisoner’s absence. (§ 4504, subd. (b), italics added.) To the extent
the Court of Appeal assumes that transfers never can be temporary, the plain
language of sections 2684 and 2685 belies that conclusion.
We observe that section 6082 sets forth an alternative definition of prisons
encompassing “all facilities, camps, hospitals, and institutions for the

8
Indeed, the court in Ortiz acknowledged “that section 4504, subdivision (b)
defines confinement for the sole purpose of determining whether an inmate is
guilty of committing a crime while in prison,” and that statute has no bearing upon
the interpretation of section 4573.6. (Ortiz, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001.)
Nonetheless, to the extent the court concluded in Ortiz that a transfer to
Atascadero pursuant to section 2684 is not “temporary” within the meaning of
section 4504, subdivision (b), we disapprove its reasoning, for the reasons outlined
above.
11


confinement, treatment, employment, training and discipline of persons in the
legal custody of the Department of Corrections” (§ 6082, italics added), and that
Atascadero might constitute a prison under this definition. Indeed, the Court of
Appeal, as well as the parties’ briefing in this court, focused heavily upon whether
prisoners transferred to Atascadero pursuant to section 2684 remain in the “legal
custody” of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for purposes of
section 6082. But because the definitions contained in section 4504 specifically
govern the scope of section 4501.5, we need not and do not decide whether the
definition of “prisons” in section 6082 independently renders prisoners transferred
to Atascadero pursuant to section 2684 subject to the enhanced penalty provisions
of section 4501.5, or whether section 2684 transferees remain in the legal custody
of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation so that Atascadero would, in
any event, be classified as a “prison” under section 6082.
Our conclusion that a transfer to Atascadero pursuant to section 2684 is
temporary pursuant to section 4504, subdivision (b) finds support in the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Adult Operations
administrative regulations.9 California Code of Regulations title 15, section 3360,
subdivision (b) provides that “[w]hen an inmate is found to require mental health
care not available within [the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation], but
which is available in the Department of Mental Health, the case will be referred to
the director for consideration of temporary transfer to that department pursuant to
Penal Code section 2684.” (Italics added.) The regulations further specify that
“[i]nmates . . . housed in the Department of Mental Health hospitals remain under

9
Although not binding upon courts, administrative interpretations can be
persuasive in construing statutory language. (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment
& Housing Com.
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1388; 23 Cal.Jur., § 152, p. 776.)
12


the jurisdiction of the department and shall not be permitted to leave the hospital
ground without the specific authorization of the director.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit.
15, § 3369.1, subd. (c).)10
Finally, we note that our construction of section 4501.5 effectuates the
public policy underlying that statute. The punishment for violating section 4501.5
is imprisonment in the state prison “for two, three, or four years, to be served
consecutively.” By contrast, the maximum punishment for committing a
misdemeanor battery in violation of section 242 is a six-month county jail
sentence and a $2000 fine. (See § 243, subd. (a).) Like the enhanced penalty
provided in section 4501 for assaults committed by prisoners against other
persons, the substantially enhanced punishment provided in section 4501.5 for
batteries committed by prison inmates against noninmates strongly suggests a
legislative determination that further deterrence against such attacks is necessary
beyond what is provided by the misdemeanor battery statute. (See People v. Noah
(1971) 5 Cal.3d 469, 475 (Noah) [forerunner of section 4501, prohibiting
aggravated assault by one serving less than a life term, was enacted to promote
prison safety]; In re Smith(1966) 64 Cal.2d 437, 439 [“the purpose of section
4501 of the Penal Code is to promote prison safety by discouraging assaults by
prison inmates”].) Applying section 4501.5 to state prison inmates transferred to
mental health hospitals pursuant to section 2684 affords state mental health
workers the same protection as state employees employed in correctional
institutions who come into contact with prison inmates, and thus effectuates the

10
California Code of Regulations title 15, section 3000 provides “definitions
of terms as used in these regulations” and states, in relevant part, that “Department
means the department of corrections” and that “Director means the director of the
department of corrections.”
13


intent of the statute to deter attacks by prison inmates against the nonconfined
individuals with whom they come into contact. Indeed, as with the enhanced
penalty provisions specified for assaults, exempting certain inmates from the
operation of section 4501.5 would lessen the statute’s “effectiveness and to some
extent defeat its objective.” (Smith, supra, 64 Cal.2d at pp. 439-440.)
Defendant contends, however, that the intent of section 2684 is to provide
mentally ill prisoners with medical attention in order to facilitate the treatment of
acute mental illness, and that the circumstance that other persons within the
criminal justice system who are committed to state hospitals by court order are not
subject to the provisions of section 4501.5 reflects a legislative intent to exclude
all mentally ill persons confined to state hospitals from the reach of that statute.
We disagree. Although a number of Penal Code provisions provide for the
commitment of persons to state hospitals or other medical facilities for treatment
of mental illness,11 only section 2684 specifies transfer to a state hospital of
persons under commitment of a sentence to state prison. The authorization of
other types of commitments involves persons who have not yet been convicted of
a crime, have been found not guilty by reason of insanity, or have been civilly
committed after expiration of their prison sentence, but does not provide for the

11
See, e.g., Penal Code sections 1026 (providing for commitment to a state
hospital of a defendant adjudged to be legally insane at the time the offense was
committed), 1370 (providing for commitment to a state hospital or other public or
private treatment facility of a defendant adjudged to be incompetent to stand trial),
2962 and 2964 (providing for inpatient treatment of prisoners found to be mentally
disordered offenders after expiration of their prison term or upon a grant of
parole); Welfare and Institutions Code section 6601 [providing for evaluation and
possible commitment to state hospital of prisoners adjudged to be sexually violent
predators six months prior to scheduled release date or upon the revocation of
parole).
14


treatment of persons still serving a prison sentence. As such, there exists a valid
distinction between section 2684 transferees who, despite the transfer, remain
prison inmates subject to punishment pursuant to their sentences and whose time
in the state hospital is credited against their ongoing prison sentence, and other
persons committed to state hospitals pursuant to court order who are either not yet
subject to a prison sentence or have completed serving such a sentence and thus
are not subject to punishment for criminal acts.12 (People v. Romo (1967) 256
Cal.App.2d 589, 594 [in determining “correctional facility’s status as a ‘state
prison’ for purpose of the recidivism law,” it is appropriate to consider both “the
character of the institution in which the offender was confined” and “the nature of
the proceedings leading to confinement”].) 13

12
Defendant also relies upon section 3703, which provides for a transfer to a
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation medical facility of prisoners under
sentence of death who are found to be insane. Defendant, however, provides no
support for his contention that prisoners transferred pursuant to this statute are not
subject to the enhanced penalty provisions of section 4501.5. Accordingly, section
3703 does not facially or otherwise support defendant’s interpretation of sections
2684 and 4501.5, and we need not and do not decide whether a section 3703
transferee who commits a battery may be prosecuted under section 4501.
13
The same reasoning applies to defendant’s contention that application of
section 4501.5’s increased penalties to prisoners transferred to Atascadero
pursuant to section 2684 is illogical because there is no evidence section 2684
transferees, who constitute only a small percentage of Atascadero patients, present
a greater danger than other Atascadero patients confined pursuant to a civil
commitment or other court order. The Legislature reasonably may have
determined that patients serving a sentence under a judgment committing them to
state prison present more of a danger to state employees employed at Atascadero
than other Atascadero patients not currently serving a prison sentence.
15


IV
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment rendered by the Court
of Appeal.
GEORGE, C. J.
WE CONCUR:

KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.

16



See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Watson
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion


Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 125 Cal.App.4th 700
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S131052
Date Filed: December 17, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: San Luis Obispo
Judge: Barry T. LaBarbera

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Linda C. Rush, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Donald E. de Nicola, Deputy State Solicitor
General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney
General, Deborah J. Chuang, Margaret E. Maxwell and Susan S. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.



Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Linda C. Rush
P.O. Box 3074
Camarillo, CA 93011-3074
(805) 388-1517

Susan S. Kim
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 620-6449


Petition for review after the Court of Appeal reversed a judgment of conviction of a criminal offense. This case presents the following issue: Is a state prison inmate who has been transferred to a state hospital for mental health treatment (see Pen. Code, ? 2684) a person who is "confined in a state prison" for the purpose of such offenses as battery by a person confined in state prison upon a non-confined person in violation of Penal Code section 4501.5? (See Pen. Code, ? 4504.)

Opinion Information
Date:Citation:Docket Number:Category:Status:Cross Referenced Cases:
Mon, 12/17/200742 Cal.4th 822 original opinionS131052Review - Criminal Appealclosed; remittitur issued

PEOPLE v. PATRICK (S131176)


Parties
1Watson, Joey R. (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Linda C. Rush
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 3074
Camarillo, CA

2Watson, Joey R. (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by California Appellate Project - La
520 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 400
520 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 400
Los Angeles, CA

3The People (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by Susan S. Kim
Office of the Attorney General
300 S. Spring Street, Suite 1702
Los Angeles, CA


Disposition
Dec 17 2007Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Jan 28 2005Petition for review filed
  counsel for respondent The People.
Jan 28 2005Record requested
 
Feb 4 2005Received Court of Appeal record
  one doghouse
Feb 17 2005Request for depublication (petition for review pending)
  respondent People
Feb 18 2005Answer to petition for review filed
  appellant Joey R. Watson [rule 40.1]
Mar 21 2005Time extended to grant or deny review
  to and including April 28, 2005
Mar 30 2005Petition for review granted (criminal case)
  Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown, and Moreno, JJ.
Apr 19 2005Counsel appointment order filed
  Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, Linda Rush is hereby appointed to represent appellant on his appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits must be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date respondent's opening brief on the merits is filed.
Apr 22 2005Request for extension of time filed
  respondent People
May 3 2005Extension of time granted
  On application of respondent and good cause appeairng, it is ordered that the time to serve and file opening brief on the merits is extended to and including May 29, 2005.
May 25 2005Request for extension of time filed
  opening brief/merits to 6-28-05
May 31 2005Extension of time granted
  On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file opening brief on the merits is extended to and including June 28, 2005.
Jun 27 2005Request for extension of time filed
  opening brief/merits to 7-12-05>>respondent People
Jun 30 2005Extension of time granted
  to and including July 12, 2005 for respondent to file opening brief on the merits.
Jul 8 2005Opening brief on the merits filed
  respondent
Aug 5 2005Request for extension of time filed
  to September 6, 2005, to file appellant's answer brief on the merits.
Aug 10 2005Extension of time granted
  On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including September 6, 2005.
Sep 7 2005Answer brief on the merits filed
  by appellant (Watson) CRC 40.1(b)(1)
Sep 23 2005Request for extension of time filed
  by respondent The People, asking to to 10-27-05 to file reply brief
Oct 7 2005Extension of time granted
  To October 27, 2005 to file respondent's reply brief on the merits.
Oct 27 2005Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  respondent People
Nov 16 2005Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Rush
Sep 5 2007Case ordered on calendar
  to be argued on October 3, 2007, in Santa Rosa, at 9:00 a.m. special session at the Sonoma Country Day School, 4400 Day School Place, Santa Rosa
Sep 18 2007Request for Extended Media coverage Filed
  By The California Channel.
Sep 20 2007Request for Extended Media coverage Granted
  The request for extended media coverage, filed September 18, 2007, is granted, subject to the conditions set forth in rule 1.150, California Rules of Court.
Sep 25 2007Request for Extended Media coverage Filed
  by The Santa Rosa Press Democrat
Sep 28 2007Request for Extended Media coverage Granted
  The request for extended media coverage, filed by The Santa Rosa Press Democrat on September 25, 2007, is granted, subject to the conditions set forth in rule 1.150, California Rules of Court.
Oct 3 2007Cause argued and submitted
 
Dec 14 2007Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
 
Dec 17 2007Opinion filed: Judgment reversed
  Opinion by George, C.J. ----joined by Kennard, Baxter,Werdegar, Chin, Moreno & Corrigan, JJ.
Jan 16 2008Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Rush
Jan 18 2008Remittitur issued (criminal case)
 
Jan 31 2008Received:
  Acknowledgement of Receipt for Remittitur, signed for by Victor Salas, Deputy Clerk, CA2/Div.6

Briefs
Jul 8 2005Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Sep 7 2005Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Oct 27 2005Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website