Supreme Court of California Justia
Citation 43 Cal. 4th 652, 182 P.3d 543, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 208
People v. Watson

Filed 5/8/08



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA



THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

S024471

v.

PAUL GREGORY WATSON,

Los Angeles County

Defendant and Appellant.

Super. Ct. No. A653246



Defendant Paul Gregory Watson was convicted of two counts of first degree

murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 with multiple-murder special-circumstance

findings (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). The jury found that defendant was armed with

and personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense. (§§ 12022, subd.

(a), 12022.5, subd. (a).) At the penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death.

The trial court denied defendant’s automatic application to modify the verdict

(§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and sentenced defendant to death. This appeal is automatic.

(§ 1239, subd. (b).) For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment.


1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.


I. FACTS

A. Guilt Phase

1. Prosecution’s

Case



a. The

Shooting

During early 1989 in Compton, California, the Atlantic Drive Crips were “at

war” with the Santana Block Crips. On the afternoon of Sunday, April 2, 1989, a

large group of people were passing the day at Compton’s Kelly Park.2 The

individuals in the park that day included members of the Atlantic Drive Crips and

their allies, the Kelly Park Crips and the In Hood Crips. By early evening,

between 100 and 150 people, most of whom were barbecuing, listening to music,

and playing basketball, remained in the park.

That evening, Timothy Martin was talking with a friend in front of the

Alondra Apartments when he noticed a white Cadillac, followed by another

vehicle, traveling westbound on Alondra Boulevard toward Castlegate Avenue.

The vehicles aroused his suspicion because there were “too many people in both

cars.” He was also alarmed because he believed the occupants to be members of

the Santana Block Crips. Martin rode his bicycle to the park to alert his brother to

the potential danger.

After talking to his brother, Martin rode to his house on Castlegate Avenue,

south of Caldwell Street. While Martin stood in his driveway talking to another

friend, he saw the same white Cadillac stop at the corner of Castlegate Avenue and

Caldwell Street. The front passenger, whom Martin identified as defendant in a

photo lineup and at trial, was seated on the door rail, holding an AK-47 rifle over

2 Kelly Park is bordered to the north by Alondra Boulevard, to the west by
Castlegate Avenue, to the south by Caldwell Street, and to the east by Harris
Avenue.

2

the roof of the car and aiming at Martin. The Cadillac then continued toward the

park, and five or six seconds later Martin heard about 20 gunshots. A reluctant

witness, Martin had received threats to his life from unidentified persons if he

testified.

Terry Fennell, who was associated with the Kelly Park Crips, was in the park

playing basketball about 6:00 that evening. After finishing a game, he walked to

his car on Butler Avenue to get a towel. As he returned to the park, he noticed

Tammy Eldridge and Ava Williams sitting in a black Toyota Celica parked in

front of the Compton Police Department substation on the north side of Caldwell

Street, with their three young children in the car. Eldridge and Williams were

talking with Earl Solomon, a member of the Atlantic Drive Crips. A white

Cadillac with three occupants was traveling westbound on Caldwell Street;

Fennell recognized the Cadillac as belonging to defendant. When Fennell reached

the sidewalk on the north side of Caldwell Street, 20 feet from the Cadillac, he

saw an AK-47, held by defendant, come out of the window. Defendant leaned out

of the front passenger window of the Cadillac and shot into the park. Fennell

ducked behind a parked car and continued to watch defendant. The Cadillac

passed Eldridge’s Celica; defendant turned back toward the Celica and continued

shooting, hitting Solomon in the head. Fennell could not remember if any cars

were following the Cadillac.

Fennell was standing about 35 to 40 feet from Solomon when Solomon was

shot. He went directly to Solomon’s body while Eldridge started her car and

drove away down Butler Avenue. Fennell was the first to arrive at Solomon’s

side, and left immediately after confirming he was dead. Fennell later returned to

the scene and spoke with police.

Fennell had been convicted of taking a vehicle and receiving stolen property.

Fennell’s friends in the neighborhood stopped talking with him because they did

3

not want him to come forward and testify. He and his family ultimately were

forced to move away from the neighborhood.

Gary Lomax, Fennell’s brother-in-law, was also playing basketball in the

park at the time of the shooting. His back was to Caldwell Street when he heard

the gunfire, and he turned to see what was happening. As he ran for cover, Lomax

saw two cars traveling westbound on Caldwell Street. Lomax had seen the two

cars pass the park 10 to 15 minutes before the shootings. Lomax testified

defendant was leaning out of, and trying to sit back down in, the passenger side of

one of the cars, holding what appeared to be a gun.

Between 6:00 and 6:35 p.m., Hermetta Harper, a security officer employed

by the City of Compton, was inside the police substation at Kelly Park when she

heard about 15 to 20 gunshots coming from the area of Castlegate Avenue and

Caldwell Street. Although she could not see what was going on outside, she heard

the gunfire moving westward along the south side of the park. When the firing

stopped, she saw an African-American male lying in front of the substation

bleeding profusely from a gunshot wound to the head. She approached him and

found he had no pulse. By this time, police officers were arriving at the park and

Harper returned to the substation to report a homicide.

Brian Owens, an associate of the Atlantic Drive Crips, was also in Kelly Park

that day. He saw Eldridge and Williams there in his Toyota Celica, which he had

loaned to Eldridge. Hearing gunfire, Owen looked up to see a white Cadillac

being driven westbound on Caldwell Street, with a person hanging out of the

passenger window. Owens saw the person shoot a rifle into the park, hitting

Solomon in the head. He later described the shooter as a light-skinned African-

American man wearing a white T-shirt.

After witnessing the shooting, Owens ran to his Chevrolet Cavalier, got in,

and chased the Cadillac, armed with a .45-caliber semiautomatic handgun. Some

4

cars that had been trailing the Cadillac moved behind Owens’s car and opened

fire. Owens could not recall whether he ever fired his weapon. He was hit in the

left shoulder and the head; at the time of trial a bullet remained in his head and he

was blind in his left eye. His memory of that day’s events was impaired. He

admitted he could not remember anything after seeing Solomon get shot and had

filled in the rest of the events by speaking to other individuals.

About 6:15 on the evening of the shootings, Officer Henry Johnson of the

Compton Police Department received a radio call directing him to go to Kelly

Park. As his partner drove down Alondra Boulevard, Johnson saw a late model

Chevrolet Cavalier traveling in the opposite direction, but he did not see anyone in

the driver’s seat. Johnson instructed his partner to make a U-turn and follow the

Cavalier, which went off the road and came to rest in a flowerbed near the corner

of Alondra Boulevard and Ward Avenue. Johnson ran to the Cavalier. Inside, an

African-American male (Owens) was lying unconscious across the front seats, his

arm extended toward the floor near a blue steel .45-caliber semiautomatic handgun

that smelled as if it recently had been fired. Johnson saw three large-caliber bullet

holes near the driver’s door, a large-caliber bullet hole at the left front fender, and

a similar hole at the left rear fender. The rear window was broken out, and in the

windshield was what appeared to be a bullet exit hole.

Irma Myricks and her daughter Latrice Nick lived near Kelly Park and were

at home on the evening of April 2, 1989. They both heard gunshots and looked

out their front door to see a white Cadillac traveling westbound on Caldwell

Street. Myricks saw someone hanging out of the car’s window firing a gun, and

then saw Solomon lying on the sidewalk.

Tammy Eldridge testified at trial that she and Williams were sitting in

Owens’s Celica parked in front of the police substation at Kelly Park while talking

with Earl Solomon, who was standing on the sidewalk on the north side of

5

Caldwell Street. As they talked, Eldridge heard gunshots coming from behind her

and saw people running and getting down on the ground. Eldridge tried to shield

herself and the children from the gunshots. When the shooting stopped, she

looked up to see a white Cadillac similar to one she previously had seen defendant

driving, followed by a dark blue or black car. A medium-complected African-

American man leaned out of the passenger window of the Cadillac with what

Eldridge believed to be a rifle in his hands. She then heard more shooting and

again ducked for protection. Williams’s head fell to Eldridge’s knee and, when

the firing ceased, Eldridge lifted Williams’s head, revealing a large bullet wound

to her face and causing one of her eyes to fall out of her head. Eldridge replaced

the eye and drove away to get help.

Eldridge stopped her car in front of some houses and rushed the children

inside someone’s home. Williams was not conscious or moving. Eldridge noticed

a bullet hole in the windshield of the Celica.

Alisha Dukes lived near Castlegate Avenue and Adana Street near Kelly Park

in Compton. On the evening of the shooting, she heard a car’s brakes screeching

and looked to find a car with broken glass on the passenger side stopped in the

street. A hysterical woman jumped from the car. Dukes took a baby from the car

and, after summoning help from neighbors, tried to calm the child and clean blood

and glass from its head. The adult passenger in the car appeared to be dead.

Henry Williams lived next door to Alisha Dukes. He too heard a car’s brakes

screeching and saw a woman get out yelling for help because her friend had been

shot. Williams called 911. His wife and neighbor cared for the children taken

from the car while he attended to the car’s passenger. The passenger was missing

part of her face and, believing her to be dead, Williams covered her with a blanket.

6



b. The

Investigation

Compton Police Detective Marvin Branscomb responded to Kelly Park after

the shooting and cordoned off the area to protect the crime scene. Terry Fennell

identified defendant to Branscomb as the shooter and a member of the Santana

Block Crips, going by the moniker “Potato Head.” Branscomb obtained a “six

pack” photographic lineup containing a picture of Potato Head. Branscomb

admonished Fennell that persons involved in the shooting might or might not be

depicted in the six-pack and that he should identify only the person he believed to

be the shooter. Branscomb then had Fennell examine the photographs, and he

identified defendant as the shooter. No other witnesses came forward at the scene.

Branscomb and other officers searched Caldwell Street and located one

assault rifle casing and several .45-caliber shell casings.

Branscomb unsuccessfully tried to locate defendant. The next day,

Branscomb contacted defendant’s sister, Bridgette Norflee, but was still unable to

find defendant.



c. Defendant’s

Activities

Before and After the Shooting

Sonya Stone, defendant’s former girlfriend, testified she saw defendant on

the day of the shooting driving his white Cadillac with several African-American

male passengers. Stone explained the Cadillac previously had been painted green.

Tony Carillo managed Color King Auto Painting in Compton, California. On

April 3, 1989, he generated a receipt for the painting of a Cadillac with the license

plate number 2JYC400. The receipt indicated the work was “exclusively for

Paul,” and a woman named Bridgette signed the receipt. Color King painted the

Cadillac black.

Hazel Adams, a Department of Motor Vehicles registration manager, testified

that ownership of a 1977 Cadillac coupe, license plate number 2JYC400, was

7

transferred from Paul Watson to Serita Hutchinson on June 6, 1989, in exchange

for $500.



d. Defendant’s

Arrest

On August 31, 1989, Bakersfield Police Sergeant David Haskins, seeking to

locate defendant, executed a search warrant on a Bakersfield apartment. Haskins

arrested defendant inside the apartment. Outside, Haskins located and impounded

a black Cadillac, license plate number 2JYC400.

That afternoon, Detective Martin Branscomb traveled to the Kern County jail

in Bakersfield and took defendant into his custody. Branscomb also inspected the

black Cadillac. He took a paint sample from the vehicle and discovered three

layers of paint: green, white, and black. Inside the car, Branscomb located a shell

casing.

Branscomb advised defendant of his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona

(1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694]), which he declined to

waive, and transported him to Los Angeles. During the drive, defendant, without

being informed of any specific details of his arrest, asked why he was being

charged with attempted murder3 and claimed he was not in Compton on the day of

the shooting.



e. Forensic

Evidence

Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department firearms identification specialist Edward

Robinson testified that a bullet fragment found in the Celica Eldridge was driving

was consistent with a bullet fired from an AK-47. The bullet recovered by the

coroner’s office from Williams’s brain likely was fired from an AK-47 or SKS


3

The reference to attempted murder evidently related to the shooting of

Brian Owens.

8

rifle. Robinson was unable to compare the bullet found in the Celica with the

bullet found in Williams’s brain because the bullets were damaged.



f.

Cause of Death

Forensic pathologist and chief physician for the Los Angeles County

Department of Coroner Lakshmanan Sathyavagiswaran testified that Ava

Williams died of a gunshot wound to the head. The bullet traversed her left cheek

and entered her nose before coming to rest in the right front portion of her brain.

The bullet jacket was located in the base of her skull. Given the damage to

Williams’s face, the bullet might first have hit something else, such as the car’s

window. Williams’s wounds were consistent with a high powered rifle.

Dr. Sathyavagiswaran testified Earl Solomon died of a gunshot wound to the

head, suffering subarachnoid hemorrhage with massive laceration. The wound

was caused by a high velocity weapon, such as a rifle.



g. Gang

Expert

At the time of defendant’s trial, Compton Police Sergeant Reginald Wright

served in the department’s gang homicide unit. Wright described the structure of

Black street gangs in Los Angeles, the different categories of gang membership,

the rivalries between Crips and Bloods and between various Crip sets, and the

concept of “payback,” or retaliation, between gangs. Wright described the

Santana Block Crips as a violent street gang whose hardcore members wear the

letters “SBC” on their caps, belt buckles and jackets, or who may have tattoos

referring to the gang. Formerly allies with the Atlantic Drive Crips, the Santana

Block Crips became embroiled in warfare with them, involving retaliatory

shootings, over a bad narcotics deal. Wright knew defendant by his gang moniker

Potato Head and knew he was a member of the Santana Block Crips. In Wright’s

opinion, the murders were gang motivated. Wright also testified that gang

9

members are reluctant to testify against one another, even regarding a shooting of

the witness’s own “homeboy” by a member of an opposing gang, because they

generally prefer “handling their own business” to involving the police.

2. Defense

Case



a. Eyewitness

Testimony

Curtis Jones was in Kelly Park at the time of the shootings. Jones was a

longtime member of the South Side Compton Crips, allies of the Atlantic Drive

Crips. Before the shooting, Jones saw a beige Cutlass and a black Regal being

driven past the park; a man Jones knew as Chico (Brian Owens), was chasing the

cars in another vehicle. Jones then heard seven or eight gunshots and hid behind a

tree for protection. He got only a quick glimpse of the cars as they passed and did

not see any of the occupants. Jones did not immediately inform police of his

observations and admitted having spoken to defendant while they were both

incarcerated in the Los Angeles County jail.

Jones acknowledged having previously been convicted of a felony (joy

riding).

James Randle, a “retired member” of the Compton Neighborhood Crips (also

known as In Hood) testified he saw the shooting in Kelly Park. He remembered

seeing a man in a white car apparently pulling an AK-47 back into the car through

the passenger window. The man had brown skin and a blue rag covering his face

from the nose down. Randle was friends with defendant and believed the person

in the white car had darker skin than defendant. Randle did not come forward

with this information until after speaking with defendant in jail.

Randle acknowledged having previously been convicted of felonies.

Unuva Miller also witnessed the shooting at Kelly Park. At the time of the

shooting, Miller was near the park on Caldwell Street. She saw a beige car and a

10

black car drive down Caldwell Street. She believed the cars might have been

Buicks, Monte Carlos, or Cutlasses. One of the individuals in the beige car was

carrying a rifle, but she could not identify the person other than to say he was

wearing a black hat. Although Miller had known defendant for five or six years,

she did not recognize him as the individual with the gun. Miller testified despite

having been threatened by the Atlantic Drive Crips, who accused her of setting up

the shooting because she had had a child with a Santana Block Crips member.

Miller admitted, however, she was so focused on getting her daughter out of the

park that she might not have observed all of the cars involved.

Private investigator Arthur Runnels testified Timothy Martin told him that a

person in the Cadillac shot through the driver’s side window and that he was

unable to identify the shooter.

Joseph Widby was a longtime member of the Atlantic Drive Crips and was

friends with Earl Solomon. Widby was in the park at the time of the shooting. He

heard gunshots and saw a person leaning out of the window of a white Cadillac

holding what appeared to be an AK-47. Widby saw that one of the other

passengers in the Cadillac was holding a .45-caliber gun and both individuals were

aiming their guns at the park. Widby saw Brian Owens driving a black car behind

the Cadillac. Widby had known defendant for several years and testified that he

was not the man holding the AK-47 ― his hair was longer than defendant’s and

he was skinnier and lighter skinned than defendant. Widby also denied there was

a gang war between the Atlantic Drive Crips and Santana Block Crips, instead

claiming the story of the feud had been fabricated by police.

Widby testified he would not lie for defendant and did not want an innocent

man to be charged with a crime. In addition, Widby testified he was concerned his

testimony might offend Solomon’s parents because he had been friends with

Solomon. Widby also admitted speaking with defendant while incarcerated.

11

Widby acknowledged he was, at the time he testified, serving a 10-year term

in a federal prison in Petersburg, Virginia, on a conviction of being a felon in

possession of a gun.



b. Police

Incompetence

The defense sought to establish that the police investigation of the offenses

was marred by error.

Hermetta Harper, recalled by the defense, testified that Timothy Martin told

her what he had seen, but that she did not inform the police until two or three

weeks before trial.

Compton Police Officer Ronald Thrash testified he responded to Kelly Park

within five minutes of the shooting. Thrash spoke with Terry Fennell at the scene

and, according to Thrash, Fennell told him he was standing on the southwest

corner of Caldwell Street and Butler Avenue at the time of the shooting, contrary

to Fennell’s testimony that he crossed to the north side of the street when the

shooting occurred. Thrash also admitted he made a mistake in his report as to the

location of Earl Solomon’s body.

District Attorney investigator Adam Khan accompanied the prosecutor, Mark

Ashen, to Oregon to interview Gary Lomax. Lomax described to Khan and Ashen

a white or green Chevrolet as being involved in the shooting. Lomax’s signed

statement, drafted by Khan, stated the car was white. Khan admitted he had

mistakenly failed to indicate the car could have been green.



3.

Prosecution’s Rebuttal

Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Michael Winter testified that while

working at the Los Angeles County Men’s Central Jail, he was assigned to

monitor the gang modules. For a period in 1991, defendant and Curtis Jones were

housed in the same module. Deputy Winter further testified that inmates housed

12

in the same modules have access to each other’s cells and can spend time together

in group areas. He was unsure whether defendant and Jones were ever released to

the common areas at the same time.

B. Penalty Phase

1. Prosecution

Case

Bruce Bromley testified that, on January 28, 1990, he was incarcerated at Los

Angeles County’s Wayside Honor Ranch. On that date, Bromley placed a cup of

juice on the table where defendant was sitting, and defendant brushed the cup off

the table. Bromley told defendant he did not know defendant owned the table.

Defendant stood up and looked at Bromley, then sat down again. As Bromley

walked away, he was punched from behind. The blow landed on the right side of

his face and he was knocked almost unconscious and fell to the ground. As he

came to, defendant said, “Don’t you ever talk that way to me again,” then walked

away. The right side of Bromley’s face became swollen and he had a black eye.

Bromley acknowledged he had suffered two grand theft convictions.

Brett Hornick testified that, on February 19, 1990, he was incarcerated at

Wayside Honor Ranch. When Hornick walked behind the jail’s lunch area that

afternoon, a blanket was put over his head and he was beaten; five dollars was

stolen from his sock. After Hornick removed the blanket, he saw defendant

running away. Hornick sustained a broken nose, but did not report the assault.

Between 3:00 and 4:00 the next morning, Hornick saw defendant and three

other inmates attack a Caucasian inmate lying in the bunk next to Hornick. One of

defendant’s cohorts beat the victim’s head with a table squeegee and then, with the

help of defendant and the other inmate, pulled the victim off his top bunk and went

through his pockets, “taking what they could from him.” The victim was bleeding

from his head and face and was convulsing, and his eyes rolled back in his head.

13

About two minutes later, defendant and his cohorts pulled another Caucasian

inmate from his bunk by the hair, again beating the victim and going through his

pockets.

Hornick acknowledged he had suffered felony convictions for possession of

stolen property, attempted robbery, burglary and sexual assault.

The prosecution introduced evidence of defendant’s January 28, 1990

conviction for misdemeanor battery upon Bromley. The prosecution also

introduced defendant’s March 11, 1985 and April 29, 1985 convictions for felony

possession for sale of cocaine and his December 3, 1986 conviction for possession

of cocaine.

2. Defense

Case

a.

Lay

Testimony

Defendant’s mother, Mary Louise Cooper, testified she never married

defendant’s father or the father of defendant’s sister. She provided for her family

with government assistance and her salary as a maid. She had a difficult time

caring for defendant because she had epileptic seizures and back problems.

Cooper’s boyfriend, Devon Williams, moved into the home when defendant was

three years old, but he did not make any significant financial contribution to the

household because he spent all his money on drugs.

Devon Williams died when defendant was 13 years old. Cooper then quit her

job and defendant tried to help support the family. According to Cooper, on some

days defendant would work instead of going to school. Cooper was aware that

defendant began selling drugs at the age of 14 and that he involved himself in

gangs after he returned from prison.

14

Cooper explained she sympathized with the parents of the victims, as

defendant had once been shot and nearly died. She pleaded, however, for the jury

not to sentence defendant to death.

Defendant’s uncle, James Walker, testified to his role in defendant’s life. He

visited with defendant regularly while he was growing up and never knew him to

do anything wrong. He described defendant as a nice boy. Walker never saw

defendant involved in any gang activity, and was surprised to hear defendant had

been convicted of murder because he was a nice and respectful boy. Walker

believed defendant should be spared the death penalty because of his potential to

grow and help other people.

Defendant’s aunt, Dorotheria Mitchell, testified defendant was a good boy.

Mitchell believed defendant was in the situation he was in because he was forced

to provide for his family at such an early age. She also explained that the

neighborhood where defendant was raised did not provide a good environment.

Ailine Jackson testified she had known defendant since he was 12 years old.

She described him as a happy and nice child who would help his mother and

neighbors with chores. Because defendant often complained of being bored at

home because his immediate family engaged in very little recreation, Jackson

would allow him to join her family’s activities.

Jackson described defendant’s chaotic family life. His stepfather Devon

Williams was an unemployed drug addict who used heroin in the house. When

defendant was 13 or 14, Williams would send him out late at night to buy his

drugs. Defendant’s mother gave her children very little supervision and it

appeared to Jackson she put Williams’s needs before the children’s. According to

Jackson, after defendant’s mother stopped working, defendant quit school so he

could work full time. Jackson saw a change in defendant at this time.

15

When defendant went to prison for selling drugs at the age of 19, Jackson

testified, he became “harder” and more arrogant. He explained to her he had to

join a gang in prison for protection. Jackson did not believe defendant committed

the murders.

Anita Masterson, Jackson’s sister, testified she had known defendant from

the time he was 10 or 11 years old. Defendant often played at her house with her

two sons. She described defendant as being a “good boy” who was polite and

helpful. Masterson was surprised by defendant’s previous incarceration because

she had thought him to be such a nice boy.

Vincent Masterson, Anita Masterson’s son, testified he was a childhood

friend of defendant’s. Defendant seemed to care less about his education as he

entered high school and had to get a full-time job when he was in the ninth grade.

Vincent never saw defendant use drugs, and defendant never tried to sell drugs to

him. After getting out of prison, defendant appeared “harder” and “too grown up.”

Vincent felt defendant lacked a positive role model. He believed defendant should

not be sentenced to death because he had the potential for rehabilitation.

Sylvia Stanley, who lived in defendant’s neighborhood, described him as a

good child who was liked by everyone. Stanley testified defendant began selling

drugs at age 18 or 19, but she did not think he used them. Defendant returned

from prison with tattoos and a “thuggish” demeanor.

b.

Expert

Testimony

Forensic Psychologist Adrienne Davis interviewed defendant, his family

members, and his childhood neighbors, and reviewed probation, parole, and police

reports pertaining to the current and previous crimes in order to evaluate his

background, mental state, and personality and help explain to the jury how he

came to be the person he was at the time of trial.

16

Dr. Davis testified that during defendant’s early years, he was very dependent

upon his mother and demanded much of her attention; he did not know his father.

Defendant’s family was very poor. Devon Williams entered defendant’s life when

he was four or five years old and became his father figure. During this time, social

workers sometimes reported that defendant’s house was in disarray and the

children were dirty.

Devon Williams created inconsistency in defendant’s life. On one hand, he

helped defendant with his homework and encouraged him to work hard. But on

the other hand, he was a drug addict who sent defendant out to buy his drugs.

Defendant was upset by Williams’s death and thereafter his schoolwork suffered.

Ailine Jackson’s influence was also inconsistent. Defendant respected

Jackson and she had a very strong influence on him. But she also used drugs, even

in defendant’s home.

Defendant became the “man of the house” at age 16 or 17. He felt obligated

to care for his epileptic mother and quit school to work full time. When he lost his

job, he began selling drugs. Despite having been a nonaggressive child, he was

changed by Devon Williams’s death and his experiences in prison. According to

Dr. Davis, defendant’s involvement with drugs increased the possibility of his

becoming involved in violent behavior.

II. JURY SELECTION ISSUE

Defendant, an African-American, claims the prosecutor used peremptory

challenges in a racially discriminatory manner to excuse nine African-American

prospective jurors. He thus argues the trial court’s denial of his motion under

People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler) violated his state and federal

constitutional rights to equal protection and a representative jury. (Batson v.

Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 86 (Batson); Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 271-

272.)

17

A. Legal Standard

Both the state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory

challenges to remove prospective jurors based solely on group bias. (Batson,

supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277.) In Johnson v.

California (2005) 545 U.S. 162 (Johnson), “the United States Supreme Court

reaffirmed that Batson states the procedure and standard to be employed by trial

courts when challenges such as defendant’s are made. ‘First, the defendant must

make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts

gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” [Citations.] Second, once

the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the “burden shifts to the State to

explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral

justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, “[i]f a race-neutral explanation is

tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike

has proved purposeful racial discrimination.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Cornwell

(2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 66-67, quoting Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 168; see also

Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. ___, ___ [128 S.Ct. 1203].)

Moreover, as Johnson explains, “a defendant satisfies the requirements of

Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to

draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at

p. 170.) At step three, “the trial court ‘must make “a sincere and reasoned attempt

to evaluate the prosecutor’s explanation in light of the circumstances of the case as

then known, his knowledge of trial techniques, and his observations of the manner

in which the prosecutor has examined members of the venire and has exercised

challenges for cause or peremptorily . . . . ” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Reynoso

(2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919.) A prosecutor’s reasons for exercising a peremptory

challenge “need not be sufficient to justify a challenge for cause.” (People v.

Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 165.) “Jurors may be excused based on ‘hunches’

18

and even ‘arbitrary’ exclusion is permissible, so long as the reasons are not based

on impermissible group bias.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th

1153, 1186, fn. 6.) “[T]he trial court is not required to make specific or detailed

comments for the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor’s race-

neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court

as genuine.” (People v. Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 919.) Inquiry by the trial

court is not even required. (See People v. Reynoso, supra, at p. 920.) “We

presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner

and give great deference to the trial court’s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons

from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a sincere and

reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its

conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal. [Citation.]” (People v. Burgener

(2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 864.)

We review a trial court’s ruling at step three for substantial evidence.

(People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 971.)

B. Factual

Background

The prosecutor initially used four peremptory challenges, the second through

fourth of which were used against African-Americans. After the fourth challenge,

defendant made a Wheeler motion. The trial court found a prima facie showing

and asked the prosecutor to give his reasons for challenging the three African-

American prospective jurors.

The prosecutor explained he excused D.H. because of her substantial

exposure to gang members while growing up in Compton and her belief that a

driveby shooting does not warrant the death penalty. Next, the prosecutor stated

he challenged P.H. because she had been an identification witness to a crime and

thus might have preconceived notions about the identification issue in this case.

19

The prosecutor also based his excusal on the circumstance that she had a friend in

state prison who committed more than one murder, but did not believe her friend

deserved the death penalty. P.H. also indicated she would not vote for the death

penalty if it were on the ballot, and she previously had been disappointed with the

police. Finally, the prosecutor explained that he excused D.G. because she had

been unable to identify the perpetrator of a purse-snatching incident she had

witnessed, her brother was a counselor with the California Youth Authority who

told her stories about the wards and their troubles, and she expressed opposition to

the death penalty.

The trial court denied the Wheeler motion, concluding the prosecutor had

stated “a sufficient basis of concern as to the three jurors individually and

collectively” and finding no indication of “systematic exclusion” of the jurors

based on race.

The prosecutor then immediately challenged O.K., an African-American

woman, and defendant renewed his Wheeler motion. The prosecutor explained

that he was concerned O.K. would be overly sympathetic to defendant in light of

her employment as a social worker working with abused children. The prosecutor

also cited O.K.’s belief that the death penalty should only be applied when the

defendant’s guilt is “absolutely certain,” suggesting she would hold the

prosecution to a higher standard than the law requires. Finally, the prosecutor

suspected O.K. would be sympathetic to defendant in light of her son’s multiple

arrests for dealing drugs. The court concluded the prosecutor had stated

“legitimate prosecutorial concerns” on an objective basis aside from that of race,

and again denied defendant’s motion.

After excusing two other prospective jurors, the prosecutor challenged N.B.,

an African-American woman, and defendant again renewed his Wheeler motion.

The prosecutor explained he had challenged N.B. because of her opposition to the

20

death penalty and because her husband had been convicted of manufacturing

phencyclidine (PCP), which might render her overly sympathetic to persons in

custody. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, finding that a juror’s

reluctance to impose the death penalty was a proper basis for a peremptory

challenge.

After excusing two more prospective jurors, the prosecutor exercised another

peremptory challenge against T.S., an African-American man. Again, the

defendant renewed his Wheeler motion. The prosecutor stated he excused T.S.

primarily because he had grown up in a gang neighborhood and counted many

members of the Bloods street gang among his friends. The prosecutor did not

want T.S. to substitute his own knowledge of gangs in place of the expected

testimony of the gang expert witness. The prosecutor also explained that he was

concerned about T.S. because he had been late twice, appeared to be generally

immature, and had suggested he might hold the prosecution to too strict a standard

of proof. The trial court denied the motion, finding the prosecutor had articulated

a nonracial basis for the peremptory challenge.

The prosecutor then excused two consecutive African-American jurors and

defendant renewed his Wheeler motion after each challenge. As to the first, T.J.,

an African-American man, the prosecutor explained that he appeared

noncommittal and indecisive and repeatedly expressed concern that a defendant

could be “set up” or evidence could be withheld, leading to the execution of an

innocent person. The trial court concluded the prosecutor’s reasons were race-

neutral and relevant to the proceedings, holding there had been no purposeful

discrimination.

As to the second, G.W., an African-American man, the prosecutor stated he

had excused G.W. because of his belief that an unintentional shooting of an

individual would merely constitute an accident and because he would not vote for

21

the death penalty in an election due to his religious beliefs. The prosecutor also

noted G.W. seemed strong-willed and “very, very” opinionated. The trial court

stated, “I am not at this point prepared to find that persons have been excluded

systematically on the basis of race and, therefore, the motion is denied.”

After excusing one other prospective juror and accepting the jury four times,

the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to exclude S.B., an African-

American woman. In response to defendant’s renewed Wheeler motion, the

prosecutor explained he excused S.B. because she seemed confused, could not get

past guilt phase issues in answering voir dire questions, and appeared biased

against the death penalty. Finding the prosecutor had articulated “legitimate

concerns” regarding S.B., the trial court denied defendant’s motion.

The prosecutor excused three more prospective jurors without objection

before the jury was accepted by both parties.

C. Analysis

As the trial court found, and as discussed below, the record supports a finding

that the prosecutor did not purposefully discriminate against any of the prospective

jurors, either individually or collectively. The record also reflects that the jurors

and alternate jurors selected and sworn in this case were a diverse group: Among

the seated jurors, four were White, six were Black, one was Hispanic, and one

described himself as “Filipino Afro”; among the alternates, three were White and

one was Black. These circumstances further support the inference that the

prosecutor acted in good faith and without discriminatory purpose in exercising

peremptory challenges.

22

1. D.H.

As stated above, the prosecutor justified his challenge to D.H. on the grounds

that she had substantial exposure to gang members and believed a driveby

shooting does not warrant the death penalty.

During Hovey voir dire,4 D.H. explained she believed in the death penalty in

certain circumstances and would have to hear all the evidence to determine

whether a death sentence was appropriate in this case. She also expressed her

understanding of the gravity of the sentencing decision and said she would not

“take it lightly.” She explained, however, that in the case of a gang-related

driveby shooting, she might be disinclined to vote for death because “being the

age that I am, I hear it. I’m around it. And it ― so it’s just different reasons. I

guess it could be different reasons why people could do it.”

During general voir dire, D.H. said she had gone to school with gang

members in Compton and South Central Los Angeles, specifically members of the

In Hood, Rolling 60’s, and Compton Crips. She did not, however, like to be

around gang activity.

D.H. thus had substantial exposure to gangs, resulting in her possible

reluctance to impose a death sentence in a case, such as this one, involving a gang-

related driveby shooting. This was a relevant, race-neutral reason for the

prosecutor to exercise a peremptory challenge against her.

A comparative juror analysis does not further defendant’s claim, as none of

the seated jurors had similar exposure to gang activity.5 Defendant compares D.H.


4

Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80 (Hovey).

5

Whether a court must perform a comparative juror analysis for the first time

on appeal to evaluate the prosecutor’s reasons for peremptorily challenging
prospective jurors is an issue that is currently pending in this court in People v.
Lenix
(S148029), rev. granted January 24, 2007. For purposes of argument only,


(footnote continued on next page)

23

with seated juror M.P., an African-American man. Preliminarily, we question

whether the comparison of a prospective juror assertedly excused on account of

his race with a seated juror who was a member of the same race does anything to

further the Batson/Wheeler analysis. In any event, the comparison of D.H. with

M.P. does not assist defendant. Although M.P. had some exposure to gang

members and gang activity in his capacity as a plumber for the Los Angeles

Unified School District, for the prosecutor to afford this experience less weight

than he did D.H.’s upbringing in a gang-infested community would have been

reasonable. M.P., moreover, did not share D.H.’s apparent bias against imposing

the death penalty on facts similar to those in this case.

Thus, the trial court’s ruling as to D.H. is supported by substantial evidence.

2. P.H.

The prosecutor asserted he challenged P.H. because she had been an

identification witness to a crime, she believed a friend of hers was appropriately

sentenced to life without the possibility of parole despite having committed

multiple murders, she would not vote for the death penalty if it were on the ballot,

and she had previously been disappointed with how the police investigated a

shooting she witnessed. The trial court’s denial of the Wheeler motion as to

prospective juror P.H. is supported by substantial evidence.

During Hovey voir dire, P.H. explained she had a childhood friend who was

serving a life sentence for murder. This friend had “committed murders on

numerous occasions” and “would take a life, you know, for any reason.” She did



(footnote continued from previous page)

we assume in this case that such an analysis is required. (See People v. Guerra
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1106.)

24

not, however, feel he deserved the death penalty because of the neighborhood he

grew up in, the fact that he came from a single-parent family, and because “this

was a common way of life where he lived and where I lived.” She opined these

factors did not excuse her friend’s behavior, but contributed to his conduct.

During general voir dire, P.H. explained that, two years earlier, she had

witnessed a fatal shooting. She reported her observations to police but was never

called to testify as a witness. The fact she was never called as a witness indicated

to her that the police did not take the crime seriously and that it was “just no big

deal to them, you know, just another life.” After witnessing the shooting, she felt

sorry for both the victim and the shooter. She also could “relate” to prosecution

witnesses because she had been a witness to the shooting, but would not

“necessarily” assume prosecution witnesses had greater credibility.

P.H.’s voir dire answers thus suggested she might be overly sympathetic to

an individual with defendant’s background and might have developed certain

biases as a result of witnessing a fatal shooting.

Defendant argues the prosecutor’s explanation for his challenge of P.H. was a

pretext for racial discrimination, in that he did not challenge other jurors with

similar characteristics. Seated Jurors D.G. (a Caucasian woman), and M.P., A.C.,

and J.L., and seated Alternate Juror F.M. (all African-American men), each had

witnessed crimes in the past. Moreover, J.L. and F.M. had expressed complaints

about law enforcement. In fact, F.M. had a pending lawsuit against the Los

Angeles County Sheriff’s Department for breaking into his residence and holding

his family at gunpoint. Further, defendant claims P.H. held views on the death

penalty similar to those espoused by a number of non-African-American jurors

whom the prosecutor did not challenge. None of these jurors, however, had the

combined characteristics of being a witness to a crime and expressing anti-law-

enforcement sentiments. More importantly, unlike any of these seated jurors, P.H.

25

had a friend who was imprisoned for murder but she did not believe he deserved

the death penalty despite his having committed multiple murders.

The trial court’s ruling as to P.H. was supported by substantial evidence.

3. D.G.

The prosecutor explained he challenged D.G. because she had witnessed a

crime but was unable to identify the perpetrator, her brother was a counselor with

the California Youth Authority, and she expressed anti-death-penalty-sentiments.

Importantly, the prosecutor indicated that “she is the one I’m really concerned

about with the identity issue because this happened basically so fast that she

couldn’t I.D. because of surprise element [sic]. She may feel that if there’s a

surprise element in any particular situation, that that may compromise a witness’s

I.D. . . .” Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion the prosecutor

articulated adequate race-neutral reasons for excusing D.G.

In her questionnaire, D.G. indicated that she had been a witness to a purse

snatching and that her brother worked for the Youth Authority. She also indicated

she generally did not support the death penalty, she believed the death penalty was

used too often, and she did not think California should have the death penalty

today.

During Hovey voir dire, D.G. stated she was “not for the death penalty,” but

could impose a death sentence under the appropriate circumstances. She would

vote against the death penalty if it were on the ballot.

During general voir dire, D.G. explained that about eight years before

defendant’s trial, she was the victim of a purse snatching. She had reported the

crime to police but was unable to give an accurate description of the assailant. Her

brother was a security officer for the California Youth Authority and he sometimes

would tell D.G. “a sad story from an inmate’s point of view.”

26

D.G.’s questionnaire and voir dire answers suggested she would have

sympathy toward defendant as a result of the stories her brother had told her about

his work with the California Youth Authority, and she was unsupportive of the

death penalty. Moreover, D.G. had trouble describing her assailant when she was

the victim of a purse snatching, triggering the prosecutor’s valid concern that she

might reject the identification testimony in this case.

Again, a comparative juror analysis does little to further defendant’s claim.

Like D.G., seated Juror M.P. was unable to provide details about a driveby

shooting he had witnessed because it happened too fast. In addition, seated Juror

C.D.’s mother worked at the Federal Correctional Institution in Terminal Island

and seated Alternate Juror P.H. had worked as a jailer in Nevada. None of the

jurors, however, shared both characteristics relied upon by the prosecutor in

excusing D.G.

The trial court’s ruling as to D.G. was supported by substantial evidence.

4. O.K.

The prosecutor justified his challenge to O.K. on the basis that O.K. might be

too sympathetic to defendant in light of her background in social work, her

concern for abused children, and her son’s history of legal problems. In addition,

the prosecutor cited O.K.’s unwillingness to impose the death penalty unless she

was “absolutely certain” of the defendant’s guilt.

In her questionnaire, O.K. stated she had worked for the Los Angeles County

Department of Children’s Services and in that capacity had made court

appearances on behalf of minor children. She had an associate degree in social

welfare and had taken courses in behavioral sciences, such as counseling,

psychology, and sociology. She also indicated her third son had been

incarcerated. This son had been arrested or charged with crimes many times and

27

had been apprehended for selling narcotics to an undercover police officer.

Finally, in her questionnaire, O.K. indicated that the purpose of the death penalty

was “to apply when absolutely certain.”

During Hovey voir dire, O.K. stated the death penalty is warranted in some

cases but not others, and was too seldom used. When asked about her answer in

the questionnaire that the death penalty should only be used when “absolutely

certain,” she explained she would not apply a standard of “no doubt whatsoever

about guilt,” but would apply the law as instructed by the judge.

In response to general voir dire questioning, O.K. said her son had been

caught several times trying to sell drugs to undercover police officers. She

believed her son was still involved in criminal activity but she did not often see

him.

O.K. also explained that, in her capacity as a children’s service worker for

the Department of Children Services, she helped to protect children from abuse

and tried to find them compatible homes.

On this record, the prosecutor’s concern about O.K.’s ability to remain

objective in light of her background as a social worker was reasonable. The

prosecutor noted that, based on the defense’s Hovey voir dire, defendant

apparently would be presenting evidence of abuse and neglect during his

childhood, and O.K. might be overly sympathetic to him as a result. The

prosecutor also reasonably might have questioned O.K.’s ability to remain

objective in light of her son’s criminal history. The record also provides some

support for the prosecutor’s concern that O.K. might hold him to too strict a

burden of proof.

Moreover, a comparative juror analysis does not reveal purposeful

discrimination. Like O.K., seated Jurors A.R. and A.C. had loved ones who had

been incarcerated. None of those jurors, however, shared O.K.’s background in

28

social work or expressed a tendency to hold the prosecution to too strict a burden

of proof.

Because the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing O.K. were race-neutral and

were borne out by the record, the trial court’s determination was supported by

substantial evidence.

5. N.B.

The prosecutor assertedly challenged N.B. because of her anti-death-penalty

beliefs and because her ex-husband had been convicted of manufacturing PCP.

In her questionnaire, N.B. expressed the belief that the death penalty should

only be used in “extreme” cases, with the word “extreme” underscored. She also

said she believed the death penalty is used too randomly. N.B. disagreed

somewhat with the propositions that someone who intentionally kills one or two

people should receive the death penalty and that convicted murderers should be

swiftly executed. N.B. also revealed in her questionnaire that her ex-husband had

been incarcerated in 1982 for burglary and “manufacturing.”

During Hovey voir dire, defense counsel asked N.B. how she might sentence

a defendant who she was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt had intentionally

killed two people “in cold blood.” She explained that under such a scenario she

“would have a tendency to go with life without parole. It would have to be totally

extreme for me to go with death.” Upon questioning by the prosecutor, however,

N.B. explained that she would be “open” to either sentence in a case where the

defendant was convicted of intentionally and deliberately killing two people.

As with the other jurors, a comparative juror analysis does not reveal racial

discrimination by the prosecutor. Seated Juror D.G. answered questions regarding

the sentencing of a defendant who intentionally killed two people without legal

justification and not in self-defense by explaining that the issue was not “cut [and]

29

dried” and that she would have to know all of the circumstances. Seated Juror

C.D. disagreed somewhat that a person who intentionally kills two people should

be sentenced to death because her determination would have to be based on the

facts of the case. She also strongly disagreed that convicted murderers should be

swiftly executed because she did not “know any facts.” Seated Juror A.G. did not

believe all killers should receive the death penalty and disagreed somewhat that a

defendant who intentionally kills one or two people without legal justification

should be sentenced to death. A.G. also disagreed somewhat with the proposition

that convicted murders should be swiftly executed because he believed defendants

should be allowed to exhaust all appeals. Also, seated Alternate Jurors F.G. and

P.H. indicated in their questionnaires that they did not fully agree with the

proposition that anyone who kills one or two people without legal justification

should be sentenced to death because they believed the sentencing determination

should depend on the facts of the case.

While these jurors’ answers to the questionnaire contain similarities to N.B.’s

answers, none of them expressed in their voir dire testimony the degree of

opposition to the death penalty N.B. did. For example, N.B. explained during voir

dire that she would likely vote against the death penalty if it were on the ballot and

that her death penalty determination might be swayed by her religious beliefs.

N.B. also wavered when asked whether she could impose the death penalty on a

defendant who had been convicted of intentionally killing two people. None of

the comparable jurors held so steadfastly to their anti-death-penalty beliefs under

voir dire questioning.

In addition, although seated Jurors A.R. and A.C. had family members who

had been incarcerated, neither of these jurors also expressed anti-death-penalty

sentiments similar to those expressed by N.B.

30

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the prosecutor

had bona fide, race-neutral reasons for excusing N.B.

6. T.S.

The prosecutor stated he excused T.S. because he was young, inexperienced,

and had extensive exposure to gang members. The prosecutor also was concerned

about T.S. because he had been late twice, appeared to be generally immature, and

had suggested he might hold the prosecution to too strict a standard of proof.

In response to the questionnaire inquiry why crime rates were increasing,

T.S. stated it was because “Republicans [were] in the presidency,” an answer

deemed immature by the prosecutor. He also explained his belief that the death

penalty should be imposed when a defendant had been found guilty “without a

shadow of a doubt.”

During Hovey voir dire, T.S. was generally supportive of the death penalty,

but indicated it should be imposed only if the defendant was found guilty “without

a doubt.”

T.S. acknowledged during general voir dire that he had had contact with

members of the Bloods street gang when he lived in Compton. He admitted to

being close friends with some gang members, but insisted he was not involved in

gang activity and that his exposure to gangs would not bias him. Neither the court

nor the defense challenged the prosecutor’s assertion that T.S. was late to the

proceedings twice on the day he was excused.

This record provides support for the prosecutor’s conclusion that T.S. was

too immature, irresponsible, and potentially biased to serve as a juror in this case.

Moreover, a comparative juror analysis is not helpful to defendant here, as none of

the jurors accepted by the prosecutor exhibited characteristics similar to those that

31

led him to excuse T.S. Notably, the prosecutor also challenged D.H. in part

because of her extensive exposure to gangs.

Thus, the record provides substantial evidence to support the trial court’s

determination as to T.S.

7. T.J.

The prosecutor explained he challenged T.J. because he was noncommittal,

expressed some anti-death-penalty views, and was overly concerned about

condemning an innocent man.

During Hovey voir dire, T.J. expressed the opinion that the death penalty was

appropriate only in certain cases, such as the killing of a child. He later indicated

he strongly agreed that someone who kills an innocent person should receive the

death penalty. He was unsure, however, whether he could vote for death in a case

where one person was intentionally killed and another was an innocent bystander.

T.J. also stated that in order to vote for the death penalty, he would have to have

“no doubt” about the defendant’s guilt and that the defendant should have the right

to appeal to “whatever extent” necessary to ensure his guilt.6 He explained the

“no doubt” standard should be applied to the appeal process, but he would not

apply that standard at trial.

T.J.’s voir dire answers revealed his uncertainty about whether he could

impose the death penalty on the facts of this case. His answers were also

equivocal as to what standard of proof he believed appropriate in a death penalty

case. These answers gave rise to legitimate, race-neutral prosecutorial concerns.

6

T.J.’s juror questionnaire is not included in the record and has apparently

been lost or destroyed. During Hovey voir dire, however, counsel questioned T.J.
about his questionnaire answer that the death penalty should only be imposed
when there is no doubt about the defendant’s guilt. The questioning revealed that
T.J. had underlined the words “no doubt.”

32

Defendant’s claim fares no better under a comparative juror analysis. Seated

Juror A.G. expressed his belief that the death penalty should only be imposed

when there is no doubt about the defendant’s guilt, and seated Jurors J.P., M.P.,

and R.R., as well as seated Alternate Juror P.H., all believed in the importance of

the appellate process for defendants sentenced to death. None of these jurors,

however, exhibited the same equivocation with respect to crucial issues as did T.J.

On this record, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling as to T.J.

8. G.W.

The prosecutor explained he exercised a peremptory challenge against G.W.

because he expressed some opposition to the death penalty, he believed that the

unintentional shooting of a victim merely constituted an accident, and he appeared

to be too stubborn and opinionated to appropriately participate in jury

deliberations. The record supports these relevant, race-neutral concerns.

Based on his juror questionnaire and his voir dire testimony, G.W. seemed

more supportive of the death penalty than many of the seated jurors. According to

his questionnaire, he agreed that the intentional killing of one individual warranted

the death penalty, he strongly agreed that a defendant sentenced to death should be

swiftly executed, and he strongly believed in the adage “an eye for an eye.”

During Hovey voir dire, he explained he would have no problem imposing the

death penalty if the crime warranted such a sentence. He also stated he would

“probably” vote for the death penalty if the defendant were convicted of a

premeditated murder. When questioned, however, about a crime in which one

victim was the intentional target and another victim was an innocent bystander,

G.W. opined the killing of the bystander would constitute an accident. He also

asserted he would make his own penalty decision and would not be swayed by

other jurors. Finally, G.W. asserted he could impose the death penalty because it

33

is established law but, due in part to his religious beliefs, he would not vote for the

death penalty if it were on the ballot. These views legitimately could cause the

prosecutor to excuse G.W.

A comparative juror analysis also fails to provide support for defendant’s

claim of purposeful discrimination. Most significantly, no other juror accepted by

the prosecutor shared G.W.’s belief that the unintentional killing of an innocent

bystander would merely constitute an accident. This belief was understandably of

concern to the prosecutor in light of the circumstance that defendant would be

death eligible only if convicted of murdering both victims. G.W., moreover, was

unwilling to vote for the death penalty in an election and the prosecutor had the

impression G.W. was too strong willed to fairly serve as a juror.

The record therefore provides substantial support for the trial court’s

conclusion that the prosecutor did not engage in purposeful discrimination in

excusing G.W.

9. S.B.

The prosecutor asserted he excused S.B. because she seemed confused, was

unable to conceptualize penalty phase issues in answering voir dire questions, and

appeared predisposed against the death penalty. These reasons are supported by

the record.

During Hovey voir dire, S.B. exhibited significant confusion about the death

penalty determination. First, she said the death penalty should be imposed in a

case where the defendant was found guilty and a death sentence was “his last

choice.” When informed that the penalty imposed was not the defendant’s choice,

she responded: “[B]ut he have [sic] to be found guilty by the twelve jurors first.”

S.B. then acknowledged the sentence was to be determined by the jury, but

insisted it did not have to recommend a sentence of death. She also stated that, in

34

her opinion, “the death penalty is for once you find a person guilty — once you

find a person guilty, the death penalty is for that reason.”

When asked by the prosecutor whether a crime would have to be as heinous

as those of Richard Ramirez and Charles Manson to deserve the death penalty,

S.B. answered, “that or worse, yes.” The prosecutor then attempted to clarify

whether S.B. could recommend the death penalty for a defendant who killed fewer

people than Ramirez and Manson. S.B. explained: “The case have [sic] to go to

trial and the defendant have [sic] to be found guilty before I believe that they

could go to the gas chamber.”

S.B.’s answers reflected substantial confusion regarding the penalty phase

process. In addition, they imply an unwillingness on her part to vote for death on

the facts of this case. Because none of the other jurors exhibited such confusion,

particularly not in addition to a potential unwillingness to impose the death penalty

on the facts of this case, a comparative juror analysis does not further defendant’s

claim of discrimination. Thus, the record provides substantial evidence to support

the trial court’s determination as to S.B.

III. ISSUES RELATING TO GUILT

A. Admission of Crime Scene and Autopsy Photographs

Defendant claims the trial court erred in admitting crime scene and autopsy

photographs of the victims over his objection because the photographs were more

prejudicial than probative and were cumulative of other evidence. (See Evid.

Code, § 352.) In addition, defendant asserts the trial court’s error in admitting the

35

photographs violated his rights to due process, a fair jury trial and a reliable capital

trial under the federal Constitution. 7

Before trial, the prosecutor sought a ruling on the admissibility of a number

of photographs, specifically People’s exhibits 6A-F, 9B, and 11.8 Exhibits 6A-F

are crime scene photographs of the body of Earl Solomon: 6A shows the victim’s

body from the waist up; 6B depicts the victim’s entire body outlined in chalk; 6C

shows the victim’s body from a distance, covered by a sheet; 6D is a closeup of

the victim’s tattooed arm; 6E focuses on blood splatters near the victim’s covered

body; and 6F depicts the victim’s entire covered body and the blood splatters on

the sidewalk. Exhibit 9B, an autopsy photograph, depicts a large exit wound in

the back of Earl Solomon’s head. Exhibit 11, also an autopsy photograph, shows a

large bullet wound to Ava Williams’s face.


7

Defendant here and in a number of other claims urges that the error or

misconduct he is asserting infringed various of his constitutional rights to due
process and a fair trial. What we stated in People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412,
441, footnote 17, applies here: “[I]n most instances, insofar as defendant raised
the issue at all in the trial court, he failed explicitly to make some or all of the
constitutional arguments he now advances. In each instance, unless otherwise
indicated, it appears that either (1) the appellate claim is of a kind . . . that required
no trial court action by the defendant to preserve it, or (2) the new arguments do
not invoke facts or legal standards different from those the trial court itself was
asked to apply, but merely assert that the trial court’s act or omission, insofar as
wrong for the reasons actually presented to that court, had the additional legal
consequence
of violating the Constitution. To that extent, defendant’s new
constitutional arguments are not forfeited on appeal. [Citations.] [¶] In the latter
instance, of course, rejection, on the merits, of a claim that the trial court erred on
the issue actually before that court necessarily leads to rejection of the newly
applied constitutional ‘gloss’ as well. No separate constitutional discussion is
required in such cases, and we therefore provide none.”
8 The prosecutor initially sought to introduce exhibits 6A-G, but conceded the
photograph originally identified as 6F was largely duplicative of 6E. He therefore
withdrew that photograph and renumbered the exhibits 6A-F.

36

The prosecutor argued the photographs were relevant to prove intent and the

cause of death. He also argued that exhibits 6A-F were relevant to corroborate

witness testimony, and that exhibit 6D was probative of motive. Defense counsel

objected under Evidence Code section 352, arguing that intent to kill and the cause

of death, as proven through exhibits 9B and 11, could be established by other, less

inflammatory evidence. The trial court overruled the objection.

“The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create

substantial danger of undue prejudice . . . .” (Evid. Code, § 352.) “The jury can,

and must, be shielded from depictions that sensationalize an alleged crime, or are

unnecessarily gruesome, but the jury cannot be shielded from an accurate

depiction of the charged crimes that does not unnecessarily play upon the

emotions of the jurors.” (People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 454.) We

review the trial court’s ruling under Evidence Code section 352 for abuse of

discretion (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 449), and a reviewing court

will reverse a trial court’s exercise of discretion to admit crime scene or autopsy

photographs only when “the probative value of the photographs clearly is

outweighed by their prejudicial effect.” (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83,

134.)

We have viewed the photographs contained in exhibits 6A-F, 9B, and 11 and

conclude they are highly probative of motive, intent, and the cause and manner of

death. Although unpleasant, they depict the nature of the crime without

unnecessarily playing upon the jurors’ emotions. (People v. Ramirez, supra, 39

Cal.4th at p. 454.) The probative value of the photographs thus is not clearly

outweighed by their prejudicial effect.

In addition, the photographs were not made inadmissible by the prosecutor’s

ability to prove motive, intent, and cause of death through other evidence. (See

37

People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 624 [“[P]rosecutors, it must be

remembered, are not obliged to prove their case with evidence solely from live

witnesses; the jury is entitled to see details of the victims’ bodies to determine if

the evidence supports the prosecutor’s theory of the case.”].) Furthermore,

autopsy and crime scene photographs are not made inadmissible because they are

offered to prove an issue not in dispute (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514,

545), and are admissible even if repetitive of other evidence, provided their

probative value is not substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect, as we

have determined is true here (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1199; People

v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 441).

B. Impeachment of Joseph Widby

Defendant next argues the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to

impeach defense witness Joseph Widby with the fact that at the time of his

testimony he was serving a 10-year federal prison sentence for a conviction of

being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Before Widby took the stand, the trial court ruled that neither Widby’s 1975

assault conviction nor his 1979 robbery conviction was subject to exclusion on the

ground of remoteness. In addition, defendant conceded Widby could be

impeached on the basis of his more recent federal firearm conviction. Defendant

moved the trial court, however, for a ruling that the fact and length of Widby’s

custody status was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352. The prosecutor

argued the fact that Widby was then serving a 10-year prison sentence was

relevant to his credibility because it showed he did not have anything to lose by

committing perjury. The trial court ruled Widby’s custody status and the length of

his prison term were admissible under the prosecutor’s theory of relevance. On

38

cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited from Widby that he was “basically at

the beginning” of a 10-year term in federal prison.

Evidence Code section 788 provides in relevant part: “For the purpose of

attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be shown by the examination of the

witness . . . that he has been convicted of a felony . . . .” We have held that the

predecessor to Evidence Code section 788 did not permit the impeachment of a

witness with the length of the sentence imposed for the conviction at issue.

(People v. Smith (1966) 63 Cal.2d 779, 790; see also People v. Wynn (1941) 44

Cal.App.2d 723.)

With the adoption of the so-called truth-in-evidence rule by the passage of

Proposition 8 in 1982, the California Constitution was amended to read: “Except

as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in

each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any

criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings,

or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in

juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory

rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352,

782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or

constitutional right of the press.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d).)

Respondent notes that in People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 291, we

concluded that the truth-in-evidence rule “supersedes all California restrictions on

the admission of relevant evidence except those preserved or permitted by the

express words of [California Constitution, article I,] section 28 [, subdivision] (d)

itself.” We continued: “The limitations on impeachment evidence contained in

Evidence Code sections 787 and 788 do not fall within any of section 28[,

subdivision] (d)’s stated exceptions to [the] general rule that relevant evidence is

admissible.” (People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 292.) Respondent thus

39

argues that our holding in Smith ― that a witness may not be impeached under

Evidence Code section 788 with the length of the prison sentence ― did not

survive the truth-in-evidence rule. Here, the prosecutor offered information about

Widby’s prison sentence to prove not the fact of the underlying conviction under

Evidence Code section 788, but rather that Widby had nothing to lose by lying.

(Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (f) [impeachment of witness with existence or

nonexistence of bias, interest, or motive].)

We have never considered whether a witness may be impeached with the

length of a prison sentence when offered not to prove the fact of the conviction,

but rather to prove the witness has some other motive or bias. We need not decide

that issue here, however, as any alleged error was harmless.

“Absent fundamental unfairness, state law error in admitting evidence is

subject to the traditional Watson test: The reviewing court must ask whether it is

reasonably probable the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant

absent the error.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439, citing People v.

Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)

Even apart from the matter of Widby’s federal prison term, the prosecutor

thoroughly impeached Widby’s credibility. On cross-examination, Widby

admitted he had suffered three prior felony convictions and was friendly with the

Santana Block Crips, who had once been allied with Widby’s gang, the Atlantic

Drive Crips. In fact, Widby displayed for the jury Atlantic Drive Crips and

Santana Block Crips tattoos on his left wrist. Also, Widby testified he had spoken

to defendant while they were both incarcerated at the Los Angeles County jail,

thereby supporting the prosecutor’s argument that defendant solicited Widby’s

testimony.

Moreover, although other defense witnesses called into question the

eyewitness identifications of defendant as the shooter, the jury clearly rejected

40

their testimony by returning a guilty verdict. It is not reasonably probable the

jury’s categorical rejection of their testimony was based solely on the fact that

Widby was serving a 10-year federal prison sentence.

Finally, the evidence against defendant was overwhelming. Multiple

eyewitnesses identified defendant as the shooter and defendant’s vehicle as the

vehicle involved. Defendant had a motive for the killings, given the active gang

war between defendant’s gang and Atlantic Drive Crips, Solomon’s gang.

Defendant himself had been shot by an Atlantic Drive Crips member several

months before he committed these offenses. In addition, defendant’s behavior

after the shootings reflected a consciousness of guilt: He had his car repainted and

fled to Bakersfield. Also telling of defendant’s state of mind was his spontaneous

statement to Detective Branscomb that he did not know why he was being charged

with attempted murder and that he was not in Compton on the day of the shooting,

before officers had informed him of the details of the charges on which he was

being held.

In light of all of the evidence, it is not reasonably probable the verdict

would have been more favorable to defendant had the trial court excluded

evidence of Widby’s federal prison term.

C. Guilt Phase Instructions



1.

CALJIC No. 8.65

Defendant contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury with CALJIC

No. 8.65, which states: “When one attempts to kill a certain person, but by

mistake or inadvertence kills a different person, the crime, if any, so committed is

the same as though the person originally intended to be killed, had been killed.”

Citing People v. Birreuta (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 454, defendant argues that at the

time of his offense in 1989, the doctrine of transferred intent could not be applied

41

where one killed his intended victim and also accidentally killed an unintended

victim. The impact of CALJIC No. 8.65 was crucial, defendant asserts, because of

the prosecutor’s theory at trial that defendant’s intended victim was Earl Solomon

and that Ava Williams was an innocent bystander. The prosecutor thus argued in

summation that defendant was guilty of murdering Ava Williams under a theory of

transferred intent.

Although defendant did not object to this instruction at trial, he may

challenge it on appeal because it implicates his substantial rights. (§ 1259; see

People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 235.)

In People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, the defendant, who killed his

pregnant wife, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter of the wife and second

degree felony murder of the fetus. Carlson held “there can be no doubt that the

doctrine of ‘transferred intent’ applies even though the original object of the

assault is killed as well as the person whose death was the accidental or the

unintended result of the intent to kill the former” and in that case, “if defendant

was guilty of the killing of his wife without malice, i.e., voluntary manslaughter

[citation], he would normally be guilty of the voluntary manslaughter of the fetus.”

(Id. at p. 357.) Because California law precluded a conviction of manslaughter of

a fetus, the Carlson court reversed the murder conviction as to the fetus, finding

the felony murder rule inapplicable. (Id. at pp. 354-358.)

In Birreuta, the Court of Appeal disagreed with Carlson, reasoning the

doctrine of transferred intent was meant to “insure the adequate punishment of

those who accidentally kill innocent bystanders, while failing to kill their intended

victims.” (People v. Birreuta, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 460.) Birreuta

continued: “When the intended victim is killed, however, there is no need for such

an artificial doctrine. The defendant’s premeditation, deliberation, intent to kill

and malice aforethought are all directly employable in the prosecution for

42

murdering his intended victim. The accidental killing may thus be prosecuted as a

manslaughter or second degree murder without ignoring the most culpable mental

elements of the situation. There is no danger that a premeditated killing will go

unpunished or be treated as a manslaughter because the murder of the intended

victim will presumably be the subject of prosecution.” (Ibid.)

In 2002, we disapproved Birreuta on this point and adopted the reasoning in

Carlson, holding: “Whether one conceptualizes the matter by saying that the

intent to kill the intended target transfers to others also killed, or by saying that

intent to kill need not be directed at a specific person, the result is the same:

assuming legal causation, a person maliciously intending to kill is guilty of the

murder of all persons actually killed. If the intent is premeditated, the murder or

murders are first degree.” (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 323-324.)

Defendant acknowledges Bland, but contends its reasoning cannot be applied

retroactively to justify the transferred intent instruction here. Thus, defendant

argues, under Birreuta he cannot be held liable for the murder of Ava Williams

under a theory of transferred intent.

“In determining whether a decision should be given retroactive effect, the

California courts undertake first a threshold inquiry, inquiring whether the

decision established new standards or a new rule of law. If it does not establish a

new rule or standards, but only elucidates and enforces prior law, no question of

retroactivity arises. [Citations.] Neither is there any issue of retroactivity when

we resolve a conflict between lower court decisions, or address an issue not

previously presented to the courts. In all such cases the ordinary assumption of

retrospective operation [citations] takes full effect.” (Donaldson v. Superior Court

(1983) 35 Cal.3d 24, 36-37, italics added; see also People v. Gallego (1990) 52

Cal.3d 115, 170 [“for questions of retroactivity concerning matters of state law we

adhere to the test employed in Donaldson”].)

43

Birreuta acknowledged its conflict with Carlson but explained that the

discussion in Carlson was dicta, “unsupported by any real analysis.” (People v.

Birreuta, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 458.) At least one other case decided prior

to defendant’s offense, however, acknowledged the conflict between Birreuta and

Carlson. (See People v. Czahara (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1468, 1472-1473.) The

conflict was acknowledged by this court in People v. Scott (1996) 14 Cal.4th 544.

In Scott, the defendant was convicted of the attempted murder of the intended

victim and murder of an unintended victim based upon transferred intent. We

concluded that applying the transferred intent doctrine to convict the defendant of

murdering the unintended victim did not preclude also convicting the defendant of

attempted murder of the intended victim. The defendant in Scott, citing Birreuta,

argued such liability treated him “as if he intended to kill two people rather than

one.” (Scott, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 551.) Scott noted that “in cases involving

crimes relating to both intended and unintended victims, reliance on the doctrine

[of transferred intent] to assign criminal liability has led to mixed results,” citing

Birreuta and Carlson among other cases. (Id. at p. 552.) Scott ultimately declined

to pass on the soundness of Birreuta, stating “the facts of the case presented here

do not involve the fatal shooting of both an intended and unintended victim.”

(Ibid.)

Although we declined to pass on Birreuta in Scott, we faced the issue directly

in Bland, and resolved the acknowledged conflict among the lower courts. While

defendant attempts to dismiss Carlson’s reasoning as “dicta,” there appears little

doubt Carlson’s reasoning conflicted with the later-decided Birreuta, a conflict

noted in several cases, including Scott, and created uncertainty in the law. In fact,

the first sentence in Bland reads: “We granted review to resolve issues involving

transferred intent and proximate causation.” (People v. Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at

p. 317, italics added.) Bland itself did not hesitate to apply its reasoning to the

44

defendant before that court. “Where, as here, the Supreme Court resolves a

conflict between lower court decisions, there is ‘no clear rule on which anyone

could have justifiably relied’ ” to bar retroactive application. (People v. Walsh

(1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1106, fn. 10.)

Thus, the trial court did not err by instructing on transferred intent in a

manner consistent with Bland.



2.

CALJIC No. 2.03

Defendant next argues that his state and federal constitutional rights to due

process, an impartial and properly instructed jury, and a fair and reliable trial were

violated by instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.03 as follows: “If you find

that before this trial the defendant made a willfully false or deliberately misleading

statement concerning the crimes for which he is now being tried, you may

consider such statement as a circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of

guilt. However, that conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt, and its

weight and significance, if any, are matters for your determination.”

Specifically, defendant argues the instruction permitted irrational inferences

and was impermissibly argumentative, thereby undermining evidence supporting

his mistaken identity defense.

As defendant concedes, we have rejected identical arguments in other cases.

(E.g., People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 713.) He offers no persuasive

reason to reconsider these decisions.

IV. ISSUES RELATING TO PENALTY

A. Exclusion of Testimony by Criminologist

Defendant contends the trial court’s exclusion of the proffered testimony of

his penalty phase investigator Joel Sickler was erroneous under state evidentiary

45

law and violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to present

mitigating evidence.

Defendant called Sickler, a criminologist, to testify about defendant’s

background and explain why people with similar backgrounds turn to gangs and

crime. Sickler was also to testify that a person with defendant’s background

would adjust well to prison life and, if sentenced to life without the possibility of

parole, would not be a management problem. Sickler began his testimony by

informing the jury that he had a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice and a

master’s degree in criminology. He explained that he had worked for seven years

for the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives, advising courts on

appropriate sentencing options for over 500 felony offenders. In private practice,

Sickler acted as a sentencing consultant, testifying in four penalty phase hearings

with respect to the defendant’s background and identifying mitigating factors.

At this point, the prosecutor objected to Sickler’s testimony, arguing that

Sickler could not testify as to the proper sentence for defendant and that he lacked

personal knowledge of defendant’s background. The prosecutor contended only

witnesses who actually knew defendant properly could present background

evidence.

Defendant argued that Sickler would not render an opinion on the proper

sentence, but rather would testify to defendant’s character, background, and

history as mitigating evidence under section 190.3, factor (k). Defense counsel

informed the court that Sickler’s testimony would be based on a variety of records,

including Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and prison records,

and interviews with family members. Defense counsel advised the court that

Sickler would “synthesize” the information in the records and give an “historical”

view of what happened in defendant’s life.

46

The trial court found no authority for an expert to “synthesize” information

already presented through other witnesses and no need for Sickler to testify to

defendant’s background in light of the other testimony presented. The court

questioned whether Sickler had the expertise to testify to defendant’s propensity

for violence or whether he would adjust well to prison life. Nevertheless, the trial

court decided to conduct a hearing under Evidence Code section 402.

Accordingly, in a hearing outside the jury’s presence, Sickler testified that as a

sentencing investigator, he analyzed criminal defendants’ backgrounds, including

personal history, character, and prior criminal record, and determined whether a

defendant was suitable for probation or other alternative sentencing. His role in

this case was to identify mitigating factors, which he did by interviewing

defendant’s friends and family members and reviewing social services, court,

prison, and police records.

According to Sickler, AFDC records were relevant to show that defendant’s

mother, as a teenager, gave birth to defendant and his sister and that the family had

been abandoned by defendant’s father. He explained it would not be sufficient for

the jurors simply to read the records without the help of his expert testimony

because they might not be able to make the correlation between delinquency and

being raised by a single mother, living in poverty, being abandoned by a father,

and having a negative male role model in the home.

Sickler also reviewed police and prison reports of defendant’s acts of

violence while incarcerated to determine whether defendant would be a

management problem if sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Sickler

acknowledged he was not qualified to offer an opinion as to how defendant would

actually adjust to life in prison, and that his testimony would be limited to how a

hypothetical individual with defendant’s background would adjust to prison life.

Sickler further acknowledged he was not a psychologist and could not testify to

47

the psychological profile of someone with defendant’s history of poverty, but

rather could only testify regarding the general population.

Defense counsel argued Sickler’s testimony should be admitted because, he

asserted, the rules of evidence are relaxed at the penalty phase and Sickler could

provide relevant testimony based on the AFDC and prison records and his

interviews with witnesses. Counsel explained that it was insufficient simply to

provide the jury with the records themselves because Sickler would give an

overview of the mitigating evidence based on the records and interviews, which

would then be “corroborated” by the lay witnesses. The defense also argued that

the prosecution opened the door to evidence of defendant’s good behavior in

prison by putting on evidence of defendant’s violent acts while incarcerated, and

suggested that Sickler could describe pertinent differences between custodial

conditions in local facilities and state prison.

The trial court excluded Sickler’s testimony, finding that Sickler was not an

expert on any relevant issues, but ruled that the defense could present the reports

reviewed by Sickler through a duly qualified expert.

Expert opinion testimony is admissible only if it is “[r]elated to a subject that

is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would

assist the trier of fact.” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) “A person is qualified to

testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his

testimony relates. Against the objection of a party, such special knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education must be shown before the witness may testify as

an expert.” (Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a).) “ ‘The competency of an expert is

relative to the topic and fields of knowledge about which the person is asked to

make a statement.’ ” (People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 39.) We review the

48

trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony for abuse of discretion.

(People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 627.)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Sickler’s proposed

testimony. As the court reasoned, Sickler characterized himself not as an expert,

but as a penalty phase investigator whose role was to collect and analyze records

and information from lay witnesses about a defendant’s background, and to

“synthesize” such data for the jury. Although the stresses of prison life and an

individual’s ability to adapt to such circumstances are subjects beyond common

experience and expert testimony thereon likely would have likely been helpful to

the jury (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a)), Sickler was not qualified to offer such

testimony. Sickler had a significant educational background in criminal justice

and was experienced in noncapital sentencing alternatives, but he was not a

psychologist and candidly acknowledged he was not qualified to offer an expert

opinion as to the psychological impact of defendant’s upbringing on his current

behavior or how defendant would actually adjust to life in prison.

Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Sickler’s

testimony, defendant’s federal constitutional claim also lacks merit. A capital

defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant mitigating evidence at

the penalty phase. (Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4.) But “the

United States Supreme Court never has suggested that this right precludes the state

from applying ordinary rules of evidence to determine whether such evidence is

admissible.” (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 995.)

Even if the trial court had abused its discretion in excluding Sickler’s

proposed testimony, however, any error would have been harmless under both the

state and federal standard. Penalty phase error is prejudicial under state law if

there is a “reasonable possibility” the error affected the verdict. (People v.

Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 961.) This standard is identical in substance and

49

effect to the federal harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard enunciated in

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 38

Cal.4th at p. 961.)

Defendant intentionally fired an AK-47 into a crowded park, at one point

aiming at a car containing two innocent women and their children. He shot and

killed a rival gang member and an innocent teenage mother of two. Further

testimony regarding defendant’s underprivileged background was largely

cumulative of testimony by defendant’s family members and friends that had been

presented to the jury and was unlikely to overcome the heinous nature of these

killings. In addition, evidence that a prisoner similar to defendant might adjust

well to prison life likely would have been outweighed by the evidence of

defendant’s continued violence while in custody, even taking into account possible

differences between local facilities and state prison. Based on these facts, there is

no reasonable possibility that the penalty verdict would have been different had

the jury been presented with Sickler’s testimony.

B. Removal of Juror J.L.

Defendant claims the trial court’s decision to inquire into potential juror

bias and remove, over defense objection, Juror J.L. violated state common law and

defendant’s state constitutional right to a unamimous jury verdict.

1. Facts

On the second day of penalty phase deliberations, D.G., the jury’s

foreperson, sent a note to the court, stating, “What do we do if we have a juror that

has admitted he does not believe in the death penalty, under any circumstances?”

The trial court consulted with counsel and determined that “the appropriate

procedure would be to have the foreperson come out and determine who the juror

is and if that is the position that that person has taken, then have that juror, once

50

identified, come out and make a determination whether or not that juror does take

that stance. If so, then that juror should be removed and an alternate selected at

random and the jury instructed to begin to deliberate from the inception.”

Defense counsel objected, arguing that the juror had survived extensive voir

dire questioning and should not be disqualified because, in the heat of

deliberations, he developed “grave reservations” about capital punishment.

Defense counsel suggested that the court question D.G. about the note and

admonish the entire jury that they had been qualified as capital jurors and should

deliberate to the best of their ability.

The trial court declined to admonish the entire jury, viewing such a procedure

as coercive. Instead the court concluded that it would inquire of D.G. and then,

rather than allowing counsel to question her directly, would invite counsel to raise

any lingering questions at sidebar. During the ensuing inquiry the foreperson

stated that Juror J.L. had spoken with his minister the previous evening and had

decided that he could not “bring himself to take another human life.”

Defense counsel suggested the court inquire of J.L., and the court agreed.9

The court then engaged in the following colloquy with J.L.:

“The Court: Is it your position that you could not vote for the death penalty

under any circumstances no matter what the evidence in the case is?”

“[J.L.]: Right.

“The Court: It’s without regard to what evidence is presented in the case?

“[J.L.]: Right.


9 The record is not entirely clear whether defendant later objected to questioning
J.L. After Defense Counsel John Johnson requested that J.L. be called, Cocounsel
John Doyle stated, “We would object as being brought out and inquired of.”

51

“The Court: That means that you would not consider the circumstances of

the crime?

“[J.L.]: Right.

“The Court: You would not consider circumstances in aggravation?

“[J.L.]: Right.

“The Court: And would you not consider circumstances in mitigation?

“[J.L.]: Right.

“The Court: You would under no circumstances without regard to what the

evidence is vote for the death penalty?

“[J.L.]: Right.”

Defense counsel then requested the court ask J.L. if he would be unable to

vote for the death penalty in any case, or if he was merely disinclined to impose

the death penalty on the facts of this case. The trial court concluded that J.L.’s

answers reflected an inability to vote for the death penalty in any case and thus

declined to question him further. The court then excused J.L. and randomly

selected an alternate to take his place on the jury.



2.

Inquiry of D.G.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by questioning D.G. regarding

J.L.

“The need to protect the sanctity of jury deliberations . . . does not preclude

reasonable inquiry by the court into allegations of misconduct during

deliberations.” (People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 476.) In fact, a

hearing is required “ ‘where the court possesses information which, if proven to be

true, would constitute “good cause” to doubt a juror’s ability to perform his duties

and would justify his removal from the case.’ ” (Id. at p. 478.) In making such

inquiry, the trial court should focus on the juror’s conduct rather than the content

52

of the deliberations. (Id. at p. 485.) Ultimately, the decision whether to

investigate is within the discretion of the trial court. (People v. Burgener, supra,

29 Cal.4th 833, 878.)

As we explained in Cleveland: “[P]roper grounds for removing a

deliberating juror include refusal to deliberate. . . . Examples of refusal to

deliberate include, but are not limited to, expressing a fixed conclusion at the

beginning of deliberations and refusing to consider other points of view, refusing

to speak to other jurors, and attempting to separate oneself physically from the

remainder of the jury.” (People v. Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 485.)

The foreperson’s note informed the court that a juror had decided after just

one afternoon of deliberations that he was unable to vote for the death penalty

under any circumstances. Thus, the note indicated to the court that the juror was

refusing to consider other points of view. Assuming the note accurately

characterized the juror’s attitude, the trial court was on notice that a juror was

refusing to deliberate and was subject to removal. (People v. Cleveland, supra, 25

Cal.4th at p. 485.) Under these circumstances, the trial court acted well within its

discretion in questioning D.G., and in fact was required to do so. (Id. at p. 478.)

Defendant argues, however, that rather than embarking on an investigation

of D.G.’s allegations, the trial court should first have reinstructed the jury

regarding their duties and allowed them to continue deliberations. We have held

that such a procedure might be appropriate in many cases, but have never

mandated it. In Cleveland, we noted that “it often is appropriate for a trial court

that questions whether all of the jurors are participating in deliberations to

reinstruct the jurors regarding their duty to deliberate and to permit the jury to

continue deliberations before making further inquiries that could intrude upon the

sanctity of deliberations.” (People v. Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 480.) But,

as Cleveland suggests, this procedure may not be appropriate in every case.

53

Where, as here, the trial court is faced with allegations that a juror would refuse to

impose the death penalty under any circumstances, the court was obligated to

conduct an investigation. (Id. at p. 478.)



3.

Discharge of J.L.

Defendant next argues that, assuming the trial court was justified in

questioning D.G., it erred in ultimately excusing J.L.

Section 1089 provides, in relevant part, “If at any time, whether before or

after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or

upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or

her duty . . . the court may order the juror to be discharged . . . .” As discussed

above, a juror’s refusal to deliberate constitutes proper grounds for removal.

(People v. Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 485.) The determination of good

cause to excuse a juror rests within the sound discretion of the court and is upheld

if supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 474.) The juror’s inability to

perform, however, must “ ‘ “ ‘appear in the record as a demonstrable reality.’ ” ’ ”

(Ibid.)

The record here meets the standard enunciated in section 1089 and

Cleveland. After a single afternoon of deliberations, J.L. consulted his minister

regarding the death penalty.10 The next day, J.L. announced to the rest of the jury

that he could not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances. When

questioned by the trial court, J.L. confirmed he could not vote for the death

penalty no matter what the evidence showed. J.L. “express[ed] a fixed conclusion


10 The record does not reflect the nature of J.L.’s conversation with his minister.
This conversation, standing alone, might have constituted juror misconduct, but
because defendant has not asserted a claim of juror misconduct in this appeal, we
do not address it.

54

at the beginning of deliberations and refus[ed] to consider other points of view,”

thereby refusing to deliberate. (People v. Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 485.)

Thus, the trial court did not err in removing J.L. from the jury.

Defendant further argues the trial court erred in failing to clarify whether J.L.

was refusing to vote for death in this case or whether he would be unable to

impose a death sentence in any case. The trial court declined to question J.L.

further, finding it clear from his answers that he would not impose a death

sentence in any case. Its finding is supported by the record. The trial court asked

whether J.L. could impose the death penalty “under any circumstances” regardless

of the evidence presented in the case, and J.L. replied that under no circumstances,

regardless of the evidence, would he vote for the death penalty.

The same reasoning dictates rejection of defendant’s argument that the trial

court’s inquiry violated Evidence Code section 1150 by intruding on J.L.’s mental

processes in deliberations: J.L., in effect, was not deliberating.

Thus, the trial court did not err in removing J.L. from the jury.

C. Penalty Phase Instructions



1.

Trial Court’s Rejection of Proposed Instructions

Defendant asserts the trial court erred in rejecting three penalty phase

instructions proposed by the defense.

First, defendant claims the trial court erred in refusing his proposed

instruction that “Whether or not you have a lingering doubt as to whether the

defendant committed the two homicides of which you have convicted him, you

may consider this as a factor in mitigation.” We repeatedly have rejected state and

federal law claims that a trial court must instruct the jury concerning lingering

doubt. (E.g., People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 653-654.) Defendant

presents no reason to revisit that conclusion.

55

Next, defendant argues the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury

that “During the penalty phase of the trial testimony has been presented from the

defendant’s mother. She has testified to her love for the defendant and she does

not wish him to be put to death. You are instructed that you may consider and

take into account as mitigating factors these expressions of love and concern for

Paul Watson in determining whether he should be sentenced to death or life in

prison without parole. This evidence may be sufficient standing alone to warrant

the return of a verdict of life without the possibility of parole.”

The trial court properly denied this instruction as argumentative. (People v.

Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 559-561.) This instruction merely highlighted

evidence the defendant wished the jury to consider in mitigation and sought

sympathy for defendant’s mother, an impermissible consideration. (People v.

Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 455-456.)

Finally, defendant argues the trial court erred in refusing a multipart

instruction that sought to guide the jury in its weighing of aggravating and

mitigating factors and its ultimate penalty determination. The proposed

instruction read as follows:

“You are instructed that you may return a verdict of life without the

possibility of parole, even though you should find the presence of one or more

aggravating circumstances. One mitigating circumstance may be sufficient for

you to return a verdict of life without the possibility of parole.

“If a mitigating circumstance or an aspect of the background, character or

your observation of the defendant arouses sympathy or compassion, so as to

persuade you that death is not an appropriate penalty, you may act in response

thereto and opt instead for life without the possibility of parole.

56

“The laws of the State of California express no preference as to which

punishment, death or life without the possibility of parole is appropriate.

Punishment is the sole province of the jury.”

The trial court properly rejected as argumentative the first part of the

proposed instruction because it states that any mitigating evidence may support a

sentence of life without the possibility of parole, without also stating that any

aggravating evidence may support a death sentence. (People v. Lenart (2004) 32

Cal.4th 1107, 1135.) Additionally, the point of the proposed instruction, to make

clear that one factor in mitigation was sufficient in and of itself to outweigh the

three factors in aggravation, was conveyed to the jury through CALJIC No. 8.88

(weight to be afforded any factor was within the discretion of the jury).

The second part of the proposed instruction was properly rejected as

duplicative in light of the trial court’s instruction that, in determining penalty, the

jury should consider pity and sympathy for the defendant. (People v. Carter

(2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1226-1227.)

Finally, although it is not error for a trial court to instruct that the law has

no preference as to penalty and that the penalty decision is the sole province of the

jury (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 852-853), neither was it error for

the trial court to refuse to so instruct defendant’s jury. The court clearly and

unambiguously instructed the jury that the decision between a sentence of death

and life without the possibility of parole was within their exclusive discretion.

Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury that it “must now determine which

of said penalties shall be imposed on the defendant” (CALJIC No. 8.84), that it

was to determine which penalty was to be imposed based on all the evidence

received during any part of the trial (CALJIC No. 8.85), that nothing the court did

or said should be taken as to “intimate or suggest what you should find to be the

facts” (CALJIC No. 17.30), and that “[e]ach of you must decide the case for

57

yourself” (CALJIC No. 17.40). Perhaps most significantly, the jury was instructed

pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.88 as follows:

“It is now your duty to determine which of the two penalties, death or

confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole, shall be

imposed on the defendant.

“After having heard all of the evidence, and after having heard and

considered the arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take into account and be

guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon

which you have been instructed. [¶] . . . [¶]

“You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem

appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. In

weighing the various circumstances you determine under the relevant evidence

which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the

aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. To

return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating

circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances

that it warrants death instead of life without parole.”

In light of these instructions, there was no room for the jury to speculate

that the laws of the State of California had a preference as to penalty. Rather, the

jurors certainly must have understood that the decision was left to their sole

discretion.



2.

Definition of Life Without the Possibility of Parole

Defendant claims the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that

a sentence of life without possibility of parole meant that defendant would never

be considered for parole. We addressed this argument in People v. Holt (1997) 15

Cal.4th 619, 687-689, holding that a trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to

58

define “life without the possibility of parole” because the term has a plain meaning

that does not require further explanation. We further concluded such an

instruction would be erroneous given the gubernatorial powers of pardon and

commutation and the possibility that the death penalty statute could be invalidated

in the future. (Id. at p. 688.) Defendant presents no reason to reconsider our

holding.



3.

CALJIC No. 8.85

Defendant next argues that his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution were violated when the trial

court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.85.11

11

CALJIC No. 8.85 (5th ed. 1988) parallels the provisions of section

190.3, instructing: “In determining which penalty is to be imposed on defendant,
you shall consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of
the trial of this case, except as you are otherwise instructed. You shall consider,
take into account and be guided by the following factors, if applicable:

“(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted

in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstance found to
be true.

“(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant, other

than the crime for which the defendant has been tried in the present proceedings,
which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or
implied threat to use force or violence;

“(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction, other than the

crimes for which the defendant has been tried in the present proceedings;

“(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was

under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;

“(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant’s

homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act;

“(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which

the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his
conduct;

“(g) Whether or not the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the

substantial domination of another person;


(footnote continued on next page)

59

Although defendant did not challenge this instruction at trial, this claim is

cognizable on appeal because it implicates his substantial rights. (§ 1259; see

People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th 168, 235.)

Defendant first argues that section 190.3, factor (b) (factor (b)) violates his

rights to due process and equal protection by failing to provide sufficient guidance

to the jury regarding their consideration of defendant’s past unadjudicated criminal

conduct. We previously have rejected this argument. (People v. Kipp (2001) 26

Cal.4th 1100, 1138.)

Next, defendant argues that factor (b) violated his rights to due process and

a reliable penalty determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by

permitting the jury to consider unreliable evidence of his unadjudicated criminal

conduct. Thus, he appears to mount a broad attack on the consideration by the

jury of unadjudicated criminal conduct generally. We often have rejected this

contention. (E.g., People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 584.)



(footnote continued from previous page)


“(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant

to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or the
effects of intoxication;

“(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime;
“(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his

participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor;

“(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime

even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other
aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for
a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on
trial. You must disregard any jury instruction given to you in the guilt or
innocence phase of this trial which conflicts with this principle.”

60

Defendant also claims that factor (b) violates state and federal

constitutional rights to equal protection and due process because it allows the

consideration of unadjudicated criminal conduct in capital sentencing, while such

conduct may not be used in sentencing noncapital offenders. His claim fails

because “capital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated and therefore

may be treated differently without violating constitutional guarantees of equal

protection of the laws or due process of law.” (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37

Cal.4th 547, 590.)

Finally, defendant argues the trial court violated his constitutional rights by

failing to delete inapplicable factors from CALJIC No. 8.85. We previously have

rejected this argument. (People v. Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 319.) Defendant

presents no persuasive reason to reconsider our precedents.



4.

Scope of Sentencing Discretion

Defendant asserts that CALJIC No. 8.88 violated his rights to due process,

a fair jury trial, and a reliable penalty determination.12 This claim is cognizable on


12 As modified at trial, CALJIC No. 8.88 (5th ed. 1988), reads as follows:
“It is now your duty to determine which of the two penalties, death or

confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole, shall be
imposed on the defendant.

“After having heard all of the evidence and after having heard and

considered the arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take into account and be
guided by the applicable factors or aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon
which you have been instructed.

“An aggravating factor is any fact, c[ondition] or event attending the

commission of a crime which increases its guilt or enormity, or adds to its
injurious consequences which is above and beyond the elements of the crime
itself.

“A mitigating circumstance is any fact, condition or event which, as such,

does not constitute a justification or excuse for the crime in question but may be
considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the appropriateness of
the death penalty.


(footnote continued on next page)

61

appeal despite defendant’s failure to object at trial because it implicates his

substantial rights. (§ 1259; see People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 235.)

Contrary to defendant’s arguments, his constitutional rights were not

infringed by the reading of CALJIC No. 8.88. First, the language in CALJIC No.

8.88 directing the jury to determine whether the aggravating circumstances are “so

substantial” in comparison to the mitigating circumstances is not

unconstitutionally vague. (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 409.)

Moreover, CALJIC No. 8.88 is not defective in requiring the jury to determine

whether the death penalty is “warranted” rather than “appropriate.” (People v.

Perry, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 320; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 781.)

Neither is it defective in failing to inform the jurors that defendant did not carry

the burden of persuading them that the death penalty was inappropriate. (People

v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 782.) Finally, the trial court need not instruct

the jury that a life sentence is mandatory if circumstances in aggravation do not

outweigh those in mitigation, or that a life sentence could be imposed even if

aggravating evidence outweighed mitigating evidence. (Id. at pp. 781-782.)



(footnote continued from previous page)


“The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean

a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale or the
arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You are free to assign whatever
moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various
factors you are permitted to consider.

“In weighing the various circumstances you determine under the relevant

evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of
the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances.

“To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the

aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating
circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole.”


62

D. Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty Law

Defendant presents a number of familiar attacks on the constitutionality of

California’s death penalty statute. We previously have rejected these arguments,

and defendant presents no compelling reason for us to reconsider those holdings.

Below we briefly describe defendant’s arguments and the cases rejecting them.

California’s death penalty law is not unconstitutional for failing to

sufficiently narrow the class of death-eligible defendants to the most serious

offenders. (People v. Perry, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 322; People v. Demetrulias

(2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 43-44.)

Allowing the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime under section

190.3, factor (a) does not lead to the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the

death penalty. (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1165; People v. Hinton

(2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 913; People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 641.)

The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional for failing to impose a

proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for finding the existence of aggravating

factors, finding aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, or finding that

death is the appropriate penalty. (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126;

People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1216.)

California’s death penalty law is not unconstitutional for failing to impose a

burden of proof that death is appropriate, either beyond a reasonable doubt or by a

preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Perry, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 321;

People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1216.) Neither is the law invalid for not

requiring a jury instruction on the burden of proof. (People v. Box, supra, 23

Cal.4th at p. 1216; see also People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 731

[neither Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 nor Ring v. Arizona (2002)
536 U.S. 584 warrants reconsideration of our conclusion that the death penalty

63

statute is not unconstitutional for failing to provide the jury with instructions on

the burden of proof].)

A jury in a capital case need not make written findings or achieve

unanimity as to aggravating circumstances. (People v. Kennedy, supra, 36 Cal.4th

at p. 641; People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 730.) California’s death

penalty statute does not violate equal protection by denying capital defendants

certain procedural safeguards, such as jury unanimity and written jury findings,

while affording such safeguards to noncapital defendants. (People v. Blair (2005)

36 Cal.4th 686, 754.)

The jury properly may consider a defendant’s unadjudicated criminal

activity at the penalty phase and need not agree unanimously that the defendant

committed those acts. (People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th 581, 642; People v.

Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 541-542.)

The use of restrictive adjectives, such as “extreme” and “substantial,” in the

sentencing statute and instructions do not render either unconstitutional. (People

v. Kennedy, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 641.)

California’s death penalty statute is not unconstitutional for failing to

require a jury instruction as to which factors are aggravating and which are

mitigating, or an instruction that the absence of mitigating factors does not

constitute aggravation. (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1041.)

Finally, the federal Constitution does not require intercase proportionality

review. (People v. Kennedy, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 641.)

E. Violation of International Law

Defendant contends that the use of capital punishment as an assertedly

“regular” form of punishment for substantial numbers of crimes, rather than as an

extraordinary punishment for extraordinary crimes, violates international norms of

64

human decency. He also argues that the use of the death penalty as a “regular”

form of punishment violates the law of nations and is therefore unconstitutional

“because international law is part of our law.” We have rejected both of these

arguments (see, e.g., People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th 686, 754-755), and

defendant presents no reason to reconsider our conclusion.

V. CUMULATIVE ERROR

Defendant argues that the cumulative effect of errors in both phases of his

trial undermined the fundamental fairness of his trial and the reliability of his

sentence. Whether considered independently or together, any errors or assumed

errors are nonprejudicial and do not undermine defendant’s conviction or

sentence.

VI. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

MORENO, J.

WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD,

J.

BAXTER,

J.

WERDEGAR,

J.

CHIN,

J.

CORRIGAN,

J.

65



See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Watson
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal XXX
Original Proceeding
Review Granted

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.
S024471
Date Filed: May 8, 2008
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:
Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Donald F. Pitts

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Lynn S. Coffin and Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defenders, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
and Peter R. Silten, Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant.




__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson,
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Carol Wendelin Pollack and Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorneys
General, William T. Harter, Susan Lee Frierson, April S. Rylaarsdam, John R. Gorey and Nancy G. James,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.









Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Peter R. Silten
Deputy State Public Defender
221 Main Street, 10th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 904-5600

Nancy G. James
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 620-6089

Automatic appeal from a judgment of death.

Opinion Information
Date:Citation:Docket Number:Category:Status:Cross Referenced Cases:
Thu, 05/08/200843 Cal. 4th 652, 182 P.3d 543, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 208S024471Automatic Appealclosed; remittitur issued

WATSON (PAUL GREGORY) ON H.C. (S167108)


Parties
1The People (Respondent)
Represented by Attorney General - Los Angeles Office
Nancy G. James, Deputy Attorney General
300 S. Spring Street, 5th Floor
Los Angeles, CA

2Watson, Paul Gregory (Appellant)
Represented by Office Of The State Public Defender-Sf
Peter R. Silten, Deputy State Public Defender
221 Main Street, 10th Floor
San Francisco, CA

3Watson, Paul Gregory (Appellant)
Represented by Geraldine S. Russell
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 2160
La Mesa, CA


Disposition
May 8 2008Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Dec 13 1991Judgment of death
 
Dec 30 1991Filed certified copy of Judgment of Death Rendered
  December 13, 1991.
Nov 21 1995Counsel appointment order filed
  appointing Francis Breidenbach, Esq. to represent appellant on his automatic appeal, including any related habeas proceedings.
Dec 13 1995Application for Extension of Time filed
  By Applt to request correction of Record.
Dec 14 1995Extension of Time application Granted
  To Applt To 2-20-96 To request Corr. of Record.
Feb 16 1996Application for Extension of Time filed
  By Aplnt to request correction of Record.
Feb 22 1996Extension of Time application Granted
  To March 22,1996 To request correction of the Record
Mar 18 1996Application for Extension of Time filed
  By Applt to request correction of the Record.
Mar 26 1996Extension of Time application Granted
  To May 21,1996 To request correction of the Record
May 21 1996Motion filed
  By Applt for Order Allowing Ex Parte Inspection & Copying (of Pp. from Confidential C.T.).
May 23 1996Received:
  Copy of Applt's motion for Orders correcting, Augmenting & Settling the Record (filed in L.A. Supr. Crt.) (17 Pp. Excluding Exhibits).
May 28 1996Filed:
  Declaration of Francis Breidenbach in support of Applt's motion for Order Allowing Ex Parte Inspection & Copying.
Jul 1 1996Compensation awarded counsel
 
Jul 18 1996Order filed:
  Appellant's "motion for Order Allowing Ex Parte Inspection and Copying" Is denied as Moot.
Feb 25 1997Compensation awarded counsel
 
Mar 21 1997Motion filed
  By Applt for Transcription of Sound Recordings and Production of Transcripts (4 Pp. Excluding Exhibit.)
Mar 24 1997Motion filed
  By Applt for Modification and Reversal of Portions of Trial Court's Ruling on Applt's motion to Augment, correct & Settle Record.
Mar 28 1997Opposition filed
  By Resp to motion for Transcripts of Sound Recordings and Production Fo Transcripts.
Mar 28 1997Opposition filed
  By Resp for Modification & Reversal of Portions of Trial Court's Rulings Etc.
Apr 7 1997Response filed
  To Opposition To motion for Modification and Reversal of Portions of Trial Court's Ruling, Etc.
Apr 7 1997Filed:
  Appellant's reply to Opposition to motion for Transcription of Sound Recordings and Production of Transcript.
May 14 1997Order filed:
  Appellant's "motion for transcription of sound recordings & production of transcripts" is granted. The Los Angeles County Superior Court is hereby directed to cause a transcript of the electronic sound recording identified as People's Exhibit No. 26 to be prepared, and to cause such transcript to become part of the clerk's transcript.
May 14 1997Order filed:
  Appellant's "motion for modification & reversal of portions of trial court's ruling on appellant's motion to augment, correct, and settle the record on appeal" is grant in part and denied in part. To the extent that it concerns "trial exhibits" specified therein (Motion at pp. 1-2; Id., Exh. 1), the motion is granted as herein indicated. Los Angeles County Superior Court is directed to allow appellant's counsel to cause reproductions of the items in question to be made on such terms & conditions as the Superior Court deems reasonable. To the extent that it concerns "official reports and documents of law enforcement agencies used in support of [appellant's] arrest warrant" (Motion at p. 2), the motion is granted as herein indicated. The Superior Court is directed to determine whether any such "report" or "document" was "on file or lodged with the Superior or Municipal Court .... pertaining to the trial of the cause" (Pen. Code, sec. 190.7, subd. (a)(2); see Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 39.5(c)), & to cause each such "report" or "document" as was "on file or lodged" therewith to become part of the clerk's transcript. To the extent that it concerns the "exhibits used during [appellant's] ... preliminary hearing" (Motion at p. 2), the motion is granted as herein indicated. Superior Court is directed to order Municipal Court to allow appellant's counsel to cause reproductions of items in question to be made on such terms & conditions as Municipal Court deems reasonable. To the extent that it concerns the "Municipal Court transcripts, other than the preliminary hearing, concerning" appellant (Motion at p. 2), the motion is granted as herein indicated. Superior Court is directed to order Municipal Court to "order the transcription & preparation of the record of all proceedings" therein and to "certif[y]" the record so transcribed & prepared "to the Superior Court." (Pen. Code 190.9(a)(2); see CRC, Rule 39.5(C).) Superior Court is further directed to cause record so transcribed, prepared & certified to become part of the clerk's transcript. To the extent that it concerns the "search warrant and return for" appellant (Motion at p. 2), the motion is granted as herein indicated. Superior Court is directed to determine whether such "search warrant" or "return" was "on file or lodged with the Superior or Municipal Court ... pertaining to the trial of the cause" (Pen. Code 190.7(a)(2); see Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 39.5(C)), & to cause such "search warrant" and/or "return" as was "on file or lodged" therewith to become part of the clerk's transcript. In all other respects, the motion is denied.
Jun 11 1997Compensation awarded counsel
 
Sep 9 1999Compensation awarded counsel
 
Oct 26 1999Change of Address filed for:
  Atty Breidenbach
Mar 10 2000Received:
  Counsel for Appellant: Objection to certification of the Record and Verified Application for time within which to Prepare A Settled Statement.
May 1 2000Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Breidenbach
May 31 2000Filed:
  Applt's Application for an Order that the Record on Appeal be Augmented to Include the Preliminary Hg Transcript of C0-Defendant Johnny Newman
Jun 7 2000Opposition filed
  To Applt's Applic. for an Order that Record on Appeal be Augmented To Include Preliminary Hearing Transcript of Co-Defendant.
Jun 15 2000Received:
  Applt; dated 6/12/2000 Re no reply will be filed to the AG's Opposition to Applt's motion to Aug. Record, Matter Is Submitted.
Jun 21 2000Record augmentation granted
  Good Cause appearing Therefore, Applt's "Applic for an Order that the Record on Appeal be Aug. to Include the Preliminary Hearing Transcript of Co-Defendant Johnny Newman" Is Granted. the Superior Court of the County of LA Is Hereby directed to Cause the Reporter's Transcript of the Preliminary Examination in People V. Johnny Lane Newman, Municipal Court of the Compton Judicial District, County of La, No. Ta000359, to be Included in the Record on Appeal Herein.
Nov 20 2000Motion to withdraw as counsel filed
  Mtn. for an order to be relieved as counsel and declaration of Francis Breidenbach and Pts. and Auth.
Feb 13 2001Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Breidenbach.
Feb 15 2001Record on appeal filed
  C-25 (5,870 pps.) and R-42 (5,708 pps.) including material under seal
Feb 15 2001Appellant's opening brief letter sent, due:
  3/27/2001
Feb 28 2001Withdrawal of counsel allowed by order
  Good cause appearing, the application of appointed counsel for permission to withdraw as attorney of record for appellant Paul Gregory Watson, filed November 20, 2000, is granted. The order appointing Francis Breidenbach as counsel of record for appellant Paul Gregory Watson, filed November 21, 1995, is hereby vacated. The State Public Defender is hereby appointed as attorney of record for appellant Paul Gregory Watson for the direct appeal in the above automatic appeal now pending in this court. Michael G. Millman, as Executive Director of the California Appellate Project, is hereby appointed to serve as interim habeas corpus/executive clemency counsel of record for appellant Paul Gregory Watson. Francis Breidenbach is directed to deliver to the State Public Defender, within 30 days from the filing of this order, his copy of the record on appeal in People v. Watson and all transcript notes, appellate and habeas corpus "issues" lists, and all other appellate work product and habeas corpus investigation work product. Mr. Breidenbach also is directed to deliver to the State Public Defender, within 30 days from the filing of this order, all trial files, reports and related materials that he has obtained from appellant's trial counsel, paralegals, experts and investigators.
Apr 5 2001Order filed:
  Vacating the 3/27/2001 due date for filing AOB, due to appointment of replacement counsel on 2/28/2001.
Apr 30 2001Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from State P.D.
Jul 3 2001Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from State P.D.
Sep 4 2001Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from State P.D.
Nov 2 2001Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from State P.D.
Jan 2 2002Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from State P.D.
Jan 15 2002Appellant's opening brief letter sent, due:
  3-18-2002.
Feb 4 2002Motion filed
  Applt.'s supplemental motion to correct, augment and settle the record on appeal.
Feb 5 2002Filed:
  Supplemental declaration of service of applt.'s motion to correct, augment and settle the record.
Feb 14 2002Filed document entitled:
  reply to appellant's supplemental motion to correct, augment, and settle the record on appeal.
Feb 22 2002Filed document entitled:
  Appellant's response to respondent's reply to appellant's supplemental motion to correct, augment and settle the record on appeal.
Mar 4 2002Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from State P.D.
Mar 15 2002Request for extension of time filed
  To file AOB. (1st request)
Mar 21 2002Extension of time granted
  To 5/17/2002 to file AOB.
May 6 2002Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from State P.D.
May 17 2002Request for extension of time filed
  To file AOB. (2nd request)
May 22 2002Extension of time granted
  To 7/16/2002 to file AOB.
Jul 8 2002Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from State P.D.
Jul 16 2002Request for extension of time filed
  To file AOB. (3rd request)
Jul 22 2002Extension of time granted
  To 9/16/2002 to file AOB.
Sep 9 2002Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from State P.D.
Sep 12 2002Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  (supplemental) from State P.D.
Sep 20 2002Request for extension of time filed
  To file appellant's opening brief. (4th request)
Sep 25 2002Extension of time granted
  To 11/15/2002 to file appellant's opening brief.
Oct 2 2002Record augmentation granted in part/denied in part
  Appellant's Supplemental Motion to Correct, Augment and Settle the Record on Appeal filed February 4, 2002, is granted in the following respects. In all others respects, the motion is denied. Appellant's request for "correction" of numerous alleged errors in the trial transcripts (Motion, Section III, pp. 5-12) is denied as appellant has not shown that these are more than "immaterial typographical errors that cannot conceivably cause confusion." (Pen. Code, Section 190.8, subd. (c).) Appellant's request that pages 45, 46, 148, 149, 160, and 162 of the clerk's transcript be recopied is granted. The clerk of the Los Angeles Superior Court is directed to send legible copies of the material on those pages to the court and the parties on or before November 25, 2002 Regarding appellant's request that pages 6, 11, 60, 65, 70, 75, 80, 90, 141, 861, and 5512 of the reporter's transcript be recopied because they are illegible, the clerk of this court is directed to send legible copies of those pages to appellant and the Attorney General. Appellant's request for copies of pages 1847, 1909, 2384, 2586, 2757, and 5613-5615 of the reporter's transcript is granted. The clerk of this court is directed to send copies of those pages to appellant and the Attorney General. Regarding appellant's request for copies of pages 1083-1088 and 5015 of the reporter's transcript, the superior court is directed to conduct proceedings to determine whether these pages are missing from the reporter's transcript and, if so, to direct preparation of the missing pages, certify the same as accurate, and transmit the material to this court on or before November 25, 2002. Appellant's request for additional records to be available to all parties (Motion, Section IV, subd. (A), pp. 12-13) is granted in part and denied in part as follows. 1. Appellant has withdrawn his request for a copy of the case index. 2. Appellant's motion to augment the record with "the juror questionnaire prepared by the defense" is denied without prejudice because appellant has failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 12(a)(2) & (a)(3) of the California Rules of Court. 3. & 4. Appellant's motion to augment the record to include Court's Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 is denied as unnecessary, because exhibits are "deemed part of the clerk's transcript" under Rule 5(a)(5) of the California Rules of Court. 5. Appellant's motion to augment the record to include "a reporter's transcript of the morning proceedings of July 12, 1991," is denied because appellant has failed to show that there were oral proceedings to report on the morning of July 12, 1991. 6. Regarding, appellant's motion to augment the record to include a "reporter's transcript of the proceedings of August 7, 1991," the superior court is directed to conduct proceedings to determine whether oral proceedings were conducted on August 7, 1991 and, if so, whether such proceedings were reported and, if so, whether they were transcribed. If the proceedings were reported but not transcribed, the superior court is directed to have the proceedings transcribed, certify the resulting transcript as accurate, and transmit the material to this court on or before November 25, 2002. 7. Appellant's motion to augment the record to include a "reporter's transcript of the proceedings of September 27, 1991," is denied, because a reporter's transcript of these proceedings already appears in the record on appeal. The clerk of this court is directed to provide a copy of this portion of the reporter's transcript to appellant. Appellant's request for additional confidential records (Motion, Section IV, subd. (B), pp. 13-14) is granted in part and denied in part as follows. 1. & 2. Appellant's request for copies of all pleadings, applications, orders and other documents filed pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code section 987.2 and 987.9 is denied without prejudice, because appellant does not show whether any or all of these documents are already in the record and does not adequately identify these documents as required by Rule 5 of the California Rules of Court. 3. - 12. Regarding appellant's request for reporter's transcripts of the in camera hearings held on March 26, 1991, May 15, 1991, and June 12, 1991, June 14, 1991 (2 hearings), June 17, 1991 (2 hearings), June 19, 1991, and June 28, 1991 (2 hearings), the superior court is directed to conduct proceedings to determine whether oral proceedings were conducted on those dates and, if so, whether such proceedings were reported and, if so, whether they were transcribed. If the proceedings were reported but not transcribed, the superior court is directed to have the proceedings transcribed, certify the resulting transcripts as accurate, and transmit the material to this court on or before November 25, 2002. Appellant's application for permission to settle the record on appeal (Motion, Section V, pp. 14-15) is denied without prejudice to appellant renewing this request in compliance with Rule 7(b)(1), California Rules of Court.
Oct 4 2002Note:
  Letter sent to the parties advising that pages 5613-5615 of the reporter's transcript appear to be the same as item number 7. the "reporter's transcript of proceedings of September 27, 1991" that was ordered provided to the parties pursuant to the court's order of 10/2/2002.
Oct 10 2002Filed:
  Appellant's motion for reconsideration of the court's order denying appellan'ts request for photocopies of the juror hardship forms and questionnaires.
Nov 12 2002Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from State P.D.
Nov 15 2002Request for extension of time filed
  To file appellant's opening brief. (5th request)
Nov 19 2002Extension of time granted
  To 1/14/2003 to file appellant's opening brief. Extension is granted in light of the pendency of appellant's "Motion for Reconsideraton of the Court's Order Denying Appellant's Request for Photocopies of the Juror Hardship Forms and Questionnaires," filed on October 10/10/2002.
Dec 2 2002Request for extension of time filed
  by superior court to comply with Supreme Court's order of 10-2-2002.
Dec 2 2002Extension of time granted
  to superior court to 12-6-2002 to comply with this court's order of 10-2-2002.
Dec 2 2002Letter sent to:
  counsel: court is considering unsealing the juror questionnaires on its own motion. Counsel to advise the court by letter within 10 days whether parties object to the court doing so.
Dec 11 2002Filed:
  applt's response to court's letter of 12-2-2002.
Dec 16 2002Filed:
  respondent's response, dated 12-11-2002, to court's letter of 12-2-2002.
Jan 9 2003Request for extension of time filed
  to file appellant's opening brief. (6th request)
Jan 13 2003Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from State P.D.
Jan 14 2003Extension of time granted
  To 3/17/2003 to file appellant's opening brief. Extension is granted in light of the pendency of appellant's "Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Order Denying Appellant's Request for Photocopies of the Juror Hardship Forms and Questionnaires," filed on 10/10/2002.
Jan 15 2003Record ordered unsealed
  Appellant's motion for reconsideration, filed on October 10, 2002, is denied. On the court's own motion, the clerk is directed to unseal the original of the clerk's transcript consisting of 16 volumes containing the juror questionnaires. The clerk is directed to provide copies of these documents to the parties.
Mar 13 2003Request for extension of time filed
  to file appellant's opening brief. (7th request)
Mar 18 2003Extension of time granted
  to 5/16/2003 to file appellant's opening brief. The court anticipates that after that date, only three further extensions totaling 180 additional days will be granted. Counsel is ordered to inform his or her assisting attorney or entity , if any, and any assisting attorney or entity of any separate counsel of record of this schedule, and to take all steps necessary to meet it.
Mar 28 2003Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from State P.D.
May 14 2003Request for extension of time filed
  to file appellant's opening brief. (8th request)
May 16 2003Extension of time granted
  to 7/15/2003 to file appellant's opening brief. The court anticipates that after that date, only two further extensions totaling 120 additional days will be granted. Counsel is ordered to inform his or her assisting attorney or entity, if any, and any assisting attorney or entity of any separate counsel of record of this schedule, and to take all steps necessary to meet it.
May 29 2003Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from State P.D.
Jul 11 2003Request for extension of time filed
  to file AOB. (9th request)
Jul 17 2003Extension of time granted
  to 9-15-2003 to file AOB. The court anticipates that after that date, only two further extensions totaling 120 additional days will be granted. Counsel is ordered to inform his or her assisting attorney or entity, if any, and any assisting attorney or entity of any separate counsel of record, of this schedule, and to take all steps necessary to meet it.
Jul 28 2003Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from State P.D.
Sep 10 2003Request for extension of time filed
  to file appellant's opening brief. (10th request)
Sep 17 2003Extension of time granted
  to 11/14/2003 to file appellant's opening brief. After that date, only two further extensions totaling about 105 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon Deputy State Public Defender Peter R. Silten's representation that he anticipates filing that brief by 3/1/2004.
Sep 30 2003Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from State P.D.
Nov 4 2003Supplemental record/transcript filed
  Filed additional record on appeal, prepared and certified by the superior court in response to this court's order of 10/02/02. 3 vols. clerk's transcript (451 pp); 13 vols. of reporter's transcript (with 43 not included in page count when record was originally filed in Feb. 2001); and 10 CSR affidavits.
Nov 4 2003Letter sent to:
  counsel advising that additional record was filed this date.
Nov 12 2003Request for extension of time filed
  to file appellant's opening brief. (11th request)
Nov 17 2003Extension of time granted
  to 1/13/2004 to file appellant's opening brief. After that date, only one further extension totaling about 45 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon Deputy State Public Defender Peter R. Silten's representation that he anticipates filing that brief by 3/1/2004.
Dec 1 2003Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from State P.D.
Jan 8 2004Request for extension of time filed
  to file appellant's opening brief. (12th request)
Jan 13 2004Extension of time granted
  to 3/3/2004 to file appellant's opening brief. Extension is granted based upon Deputy State Public Defender Peter R. Silten's representation that he anticipates filing that brief by 3/3/2004. After that date, no further extension will be granted.
Jan 30 2004Counsel's status report received (confidential)
 
Mar 3 2004Appellant's opening brief filed
  (91,175 words - 301 pp.)
Mar 29 2004Request for extension of time filed
  to file respondent's brief. (1st request)
Apr 2 2004Extension of time granted
  to 6/1/2004 to file respondent's brief.
May 25 2004Request for extension of time filed
  to file respondent's brief. (2nd request)
Jun 8 2004Extension of time granted
  to 8/2/2004 to file respondent's brief. After that date, only three further extensions totaling about 150 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon Deputy Attorney General April Sylvester Rylaarsdam's representation that she anticipates filing that brief by 12/19/2004.
Jul 26 2004Request for extension of time filed
  to file respondent's brief. (3rd request)
Aug 3 2004Extension of time granted
  to 10-1-2004 to file respondent's brief. After that date, no further extension is contemplated. Extension granted based upon Deputy AG April Rylaarsdam's representation that she anticipates filing the brief by 9-29-2004.
Sep 30 2004Respondent's brief filed
  (53,642 words; 181 pp.)
Oct 14 2004Request for extension of time filed
  to file appellant's reply brief. (1st request)
Oct 18 2004Extension of time granted
  to 12/20/2004 to file appellant's reply brief.
Dec 14 2004Request for extension of time filed
  to file appellant's reply brief. (2nd request)
Dec 16 2004Extension of time granted
  to 2/18/2005 to file appellant's reply brief. After that date, only two further extensions totaling about 100 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon Deputy State Public Defender Peter R. Silten's representation that he anticipates filing that brief by late 5/2005.
Feb 14 2005Request for extension of time filed
  to file appellant's reply brief. (3rd request)
Feb 18 2005Extension of time granted
  to 4/19/2005 to file appellant's reply brief. After that date, only one further extension totaling about 40 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon Deputy State Public Defender Peter R. Silten's representation that he anticipates filing that brief by 5/2005.
Apr 14 2005Request for extension of time filed
  to file appellant's reply brief. (4th request)
Apr 20 2005Extension of time granted
  to 6/20/2005 to file appellant's reply brief. After that date, no further extension will be granted. Extension is granted based upon Deputy State Public Defender Peter R. Silten's representation that brief by 6/18/2005.
Jun 20 2005Appellant's reply brief filed
  (20,375 words; 77 pp.)
Dec 1 2006Exhibit(s) lodged
  - Peo. 6 - Posterboard w/ 6 photos (A-F); Peo. 9A &9B - two photos mounted on small board - Peo. 11 - Photo attached to a small board.
Sep 11 2007Filed:
  respondent's notice of change of counsel (case has been reassigned to Nancy G. James; Deputy AG April Rylaarsdam is no longer with the AG's Office.)
Dec 24 2007Oral argument letter sent
  advising counsel that the court could schedule this case for argument as early as the February 2008 calendar, to be held the week of February 4, 2008, in Sacramento. The advisement of "focus issues," notification that two counsel are required, and any request for oral argument time in excess of 30 minutes must be submitted to the court within 10 days of the order setting the case for argument.
Jan 3 2008Received:
  letter from Supervising Deputy State Public Defender Peter Silten, dated January 2, 2008, requesting that the court schedule oral argument for either the March or April calendar.
Feb 6 2008Case ordered on calendar
  to be argued Wednesday, March 5, 2008, at 1:30 p.m., in San Francisco
Feb 15 2008Filed:
  appellant's focus issues letter, dated February 15, 2008.
Feb 15 2008Filed:
  respondent's focus issues letter, dated February 14, 2008.
Feb 15 2008Received:
  appearance sheet from Deputy AG Nancy G. James, indicating 45 minutes for oral argument for respondent.
Feb 19 2008Received:
  appearance sheet from Deputy S.P.D. Peter R. Silten, indicating 45 minutes for oral argument for appellant.
Feb 22 2008Received:
  respondent's letter of additional authorities for oral argument, dated February 21, 2008.
Feb 26 2008Received:
  appellant's letter of additional authorities for oral argument, dated February 25, 2008.
Mar 5 2008Cause argued and submitted
 
Mar 19 2008Received:
  letter from appellant, dated March 19, 2008, regarding case recently decided by USSC (Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S.___, 2008 WL 723750, filed March 19, 2008.)
Apr 16 2008Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Russell
Apr 16 2008Order filed
  The order appointing Michael G. Millman, as Executive Director of the California Appellate Project, to serve as interim habeas corpus/executive clemency counsel of record for appellant Paul Gregory Watson, filed February 28, 2001, 2001, is hereby vacated. Geraldine S. Russell is hereby appointed to represent appellant Paul Gregory Watson for habeas corpus/executive clemency proceedings related to the above automatic appeal now pending in this court. Any "petition for writ of habeas corpus will be presumed to be filed without substantial delay if it is filed . . . within 36 months" of this date (Supreme Ct. Policies Regarding Cases Arising From Judgments of Death, policy 3, timeliness std. 1-1.1), and it will be presumed that any successive petition filed within that period is justified or excused (see In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 774-782), in light of prior habeas corpus/executive clemency counsel Francis Breidenbach's declaration, in support of his motion to withdraw, to the effect that he was unable to discharge his duty to investigate and, if appropriate, present a habeas corpus petition on behalf of appellant Paul Gregory Watson, and this court's delay in appointing replacement habeas corpus/executive clemency counsel. George, C.J., was absent and did not participate.
May 7 2008Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
 
May 8 2008Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
  opinion by Moreno, J. ----joined by George C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Corrigan, JJ.
May 20 2008Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from attorney Russell.
May 20 2008Received:
  Confidential declaration of Geraldine S. Russell.
May 21 2008Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from attorney Russell.
May 21 2008Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Russell
May 23 2008Rehearing petition filed
  by appellant. (1,925 words; 9 pp.)
May 28 2008Time extended to consider modification or rehearing
  The time for granting or denying rehearing in the above-entitled case is hereby extended to and including August 6, 2008, or the date upon which rehearing is either granted or denied, whichever occurs first.
Jun 18 2008Rehearing denied
  The petition for rehearing is denied. George, C.J., was absent and did not participate. Werdegar and Corrigan, JJ., were absent and did not participate.
Jun 18 2008Remittitur issued (AA)
 
Jun 23 2008Received:
  copy of appellant's petition of a writ of certiorari. (17 pp, excluding appendices)
Jun 25 2008Received:
  acknowledgment for receipt of remittitur from superior court.
Jun 27 2008Received:
  letter from U.S.S.C., dated June 24, 2008, advising that a petition for writ of certiorari was filed on June 20, 2008 and place on the docket June 24, 2008 as No. 07-11558.
Jul 3 2008Exhibit(s) returned
  to superior court through the Los Angeles Office of the Supreme Court.
Jul 9 2008Received:
  in l.a. office exhibits for return to superior court 9A, 9B, 11 + 1 large poster board (peo. 6)
Jul 16 2008Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from attorney Russell.
Jul 17 2008Received:
  acknowledgment for receipt of exhibits returned to superior court.
Aug 27 2008Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Russell
Sep 12 2008Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from attorney Russell.
Sep 29 2008Related habeas corpus petition filed (post-judgment)
  No. S167108.
Oct 6 2008Certiorari denied by U.S. Supreme Court
 
Jan 20 2009Filed:
  confidential declaration of attorney Russell.
Jan 22 2009Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Russell
May 7 2009Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Russell
Sep 2 2009Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Russell

Briefs
Mar 3 2004Appellant's opening brief filed
 
Sep 30 2004Respondent's brief filed
 
Jun 20 2005Appellant's reply brief filed
 
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