Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S130080
People v. Trujillo

Filed 12/11/06

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
S130080
v.
) Ct.App.
6
H026000
MANUEL ALEX TRUJILLO,
Santa Clara County
Defendant and Respondent.
Super. Ct. No. CC125830

Following a jury trial at which defendant was convicted of a felony, the
court found an allegation that defendant had suffered a prior conviction for a
violent felony within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law “not to be a strike”
and sentenced defendant to prison accordingly. Asserting that the trial court erred
in finding that the alleged prior conviction was not a strike, the People appeal,
relying upon Penal Code section 1238, subdivision (a),1 which permits an appeal
by the People from “An order setting aside all or any portion of the indictment”
(subd. (a)(1)), from “An order or judgment dismissing or otherwise terminating all
or any portion of the action” (subd. (a)(8)), and from “The imposition of an
unlawful sentence” (subd. (a)(10)). The Court of Appeal ruled that the People
could appeal under section 1238, subdivision (a)(10), reversed the trial court’s

1
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1


order that the alleged prior conviction was not a strike, and remanded to the trial
court for a retrial of the prior conviction allegation.
We agree with the Court of Appeal that the People may appeal from the
judgment pursuant to section 1238, subdivision (a)(10) on the grounds that
defendant’s sentence is unlawful because the trial court erred in ruling that the
alleged prior conviction was not a strike. Accordingly, we need not, and do not,
address whether this appeal also is authorized by subdivision (a)(1) and
subdivision (a)(8) of section 1238. We disagree, however, with the Court of
Appeal’s conclusion that the trial court erred in ruling that the alleged prior
conviction was not a strike. Thus, we affirm in part and reverse in part the
judgment of the Court of Appeal.
FACTS
An information was filed on March 7, 2002, charging defendant Manuel
Alex Trujillo with robbery in the second degree in violation of section 211, and
assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of
section 245, subdivision (a)(1). The information further alleged that defendant
had personally inflicted great bodily injury in committing the charged crimes in
violation of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). The information alleged that
defendant had suffered three prior convictions, two of which were alleged to be
prior “strike” convictions for serious or violent felonies within the meaning of the
Three Strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
Prior to trial, the court bifurcated the determination of the truth of the prior
conviction allegations from the determination of defendant’s guilt of the charged
crimes, and defendant later waived his right to a jury determination of the truth of
the prior conviction allegations. The jury subsequently found defendant guilty of
assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and not guilty of
2
robbery. The jury found not true the allegation that defendant had inflicted great
bodily injury.
The court held a bench trial on the prior conviction allegations. The court
admitted into evidence, without objection by defendant, certified copies of records
showing that defendant previously had been convicted of inflicting corporal injury
in violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a) in 1991, of assault with a deadly
weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1) in 1989, and had been
committed to the California Youth Authority for receiving stolen property in
violation of section 496 in 1987.
The prosecutor argued that defendant’s prior convictions for inflicting
corporal injury and assault with a deadly weapon were both serious felonies within
the meaning of section 1192.7, and thus constituted strikes under the Three Strikes
Law. The prosecutor acknowledged that neither offense was specifically listed as
a serious felony in subdivision (c) of section 1192.7, but argued that both offenses
came within subdivision (c)(23), which defines as a serious felony “any felony in
which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon.”
Defense counsel conceded that defendant’s prior conviction for assault with
a deadly weapon “is clearly a strike” because the information in that case alleged
that defendant committed the assault “with a deadly weapon, to wit, a knife.” The
parties disagreed, however, over whether defendant’s prior conviction for
inflicting corporal injury was a strike.
The documents submitted by the People to prove the prior conviction for
inflicting corporal injury reflected that a felony complaint was filed on August 7,
1991, charging defendant with inflicting corporal injury, with a further allegation
under section 12022, subdivision (b) that defendant personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense. A second count charged
defendant with assault with a deadly weapon, “two wit, a knife.” A reporter’s
3
transcript of proceedings on September 5, 1991, reflects that defendant pled guilty
pursuant to a plea bargain to inflicting corporal injury. The court agreed to impose
a sentence of two years in prison, adding: “The D.A.’s office has agreed to
dismiss count 2, the assault with a deadly weapon. They’ve also agreed to strike
the allegation that you used a knife in the commission of the felony.” A probation
report prepared prior to sentencing reflects that defendant was interviewed on
September 16, 1991, and admitted stabbing the victim with a knife during an
argument, stating: “I stuck her with the knife.”
The prosecutor argued that the prior conviction for inflicting corporal
injury was a serious felony based upon defendant’s statement recounted in the
probation report that he had personally used a knife. Defense counsel argued the
prior conviction was not a serious felony because, regardless of the probation
report, defendant “was convicted merely of [section] 273.5, and the use allegation
that would have elevated it into a strike or into a serious or violent crime at the
time was stricken. Therefore I think whatever he said in the probation report is
not relevant and not something the Court can look at because it undermines the
conviction itself.”
The trial court found “that the defendant did, in fact, suffer all three prior
felony convictions that are alleged in the Information,” and found that defendant’s
prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon was a strike, but agreed with
defense counsel that defendant’s prior conviction for inflicting corporal injury was
not a strike because the allegation that defendant had personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense had been stricken. The court
observed that the prosecutor in the prior case “settled the case with the
understanding the knife allegation would not be used. It went away. The
defendant relied on that.” Accordingly, the trial court found that defendant’s prior
conviction for inflicting corporal injury “is not a strike.” The court further found
4
true the allegation that defendant had served a prior prison term based upon his
prior conviction for inflicting corporal injury within the meaning of section 667.5,
subdivision (b).
On March 7, 2003, defendant was sentenced to a term of seven years in
prison, consisting of the midterm of three years for assault by means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury “doubled because of the strike,” plus one year
for the prior prison term. The People filed a notice of appeal on April 30, 2003.
The Court of Appeal ruled that the People could appeal pursuant to section
1238, subdivision (a)(10), which permits the People to appeal “[t]he imposition of
an unlawful sentence,” and held that the trial court erred in ruling that defendant’s
prior conviction for inflicting corporal injury was not a strike. The Court of
Appeal concluded that the striking of the allegation that defendant had personally
used a deadly or dangerous weapon as part of the plea bargain in the prior
proceeding did not bar the use of the underlying facts of the prior conviction in the
present proceedings. We granted review.
DISCUSSION
People’s Right to Appeal
“The prosecution in a criminal case has no right to appeal except as
provided by statute. [Citation.] ‘The Legislature has determined that except under
certain limited circumstances the People shall have no right of appeal in criminal
cases. [Citations.] . . . [¶] The restriction on the People’s right to appeal . . . is a
substantive limitation on review of trial court determinations in criminal trials.’
[Citation.] ‘Appellate review at the request of the People necessarily imposes
substantial burdens on an accused, and the extent to which such burdens should be
imposed to review claimed errors involves a delicate balancing of the competing
considerations of preventing harassment of the accused as against correcting
5
possible errors.’ [Citation.] Courts must respect the limits on review imposed by
the Legislature ‘although the People may thereby suffer a wrong without a
remedy.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Williams (2005) 35 Cal.4th 817, 822-823.)
Section 1238 “governs the People’s appeals from orders or judgments of
the superior courts.”2 (People v. Douglas (1999) 20 Cal.4th 85, 89-90.)
Subdivision (a)(10) of section 1238 provides that the People may appeal from
“[t]he imposition of an unlawful sentence,” and defines an “unlawful sentence” as
“the imposition of a sentence not authorized by law or the imposition of a sentence
based upon an unlawful order of the court which strikes or otherwise modifies the
effect of an enhancement or prior conviction.”
The People assert that the sentence in the present case is unlawful as
defined in subdivision (a)(10) because it is “based upon an unlawful order of the
court which . . . modifies the effect of a[] . . . prior conviction.” Specifically, the
People argue that the sentence is based upon the trial court’s allegedly erroneous
order that defendant’s prior conviction for inflicting corporal injury is not a strike
because the allegation in that case that defendant had personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense had been stricken as part of a

2
Section 1238 provides, in pertinent part: “(a) An appeal may be taken by
the people from any of the following:

“(1) An order setting aside all or any portion of the indictment, information,
or complaint. [¶] . . . [¶]

“(8) An order or judgment dismissing or otherwise terminating all or any
portion of the action including such an order or judgment after a verdict or finding
of guilty or an order or judgment entered before the defendant has been placed in
jeopardy or where the defendant has waived jeopardy. [¶] . . . [¶]
“(10) The imposition of an unlawful sentence, whether or not the court
suspends the execution of the sentence . . . . As used in this paragraph, ‘unlawful
sentence’ means the imposition of a sentence not authorized by law or the
imposition of a sentence based upon an unlawful order of the court which strikes
or otherwise modifies the effect of an enhancement or prior conviction.”
6


plea bargain. This allegedly “unlawful order” modified the effect of defendant’s
prior conviction for inflicting corporal injury upon a spouse by ruling that it is not
a serious felony.
The prosecutor alleged that defendant had suffered two prior convictions
that were serious felonies within the meaning of section 1192.7. Section 667,
subd. (e)(2)(A), the Three Strikes law, requires that a defendant who is convicted
of a felony and has suffered two or more prior convictions for serious felonies be
sentenced to an indeterminate term of life imprisonment. As the prosecutor
acknowledged in the trial court, inflicting corporal injury is not one of the offenses
specifically listed in section 1192.7, but the prosecutor relied upon subdivision
(c)(23) of section 1192.7, which includes within the definition of a serious felony
“any felony in which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly
weapon.”
The trial court ruled that defendant’s prior conviction for inflicting corporal
injury was not a strike, concluding that in determining whether defendant had
personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon in committing the prior conviction,
it could not consider defendant’s statement reflected in the probation report that he
had stabbed the victim, because the allegation that defendant had personally used a
dangerous or deadly weapon in committing the prior offense had been stricken as
part of a plea bargain. If this ruling is “an unlawful order . . . . which strikes or
otherwise modifies the effect of [a] . . . prior conviction” within the meaning of
subdivision (a)(10) of section 1238, as the People contend it is, then defendant’s
resulting sentence is unlawful within the meaning of subdivision (a)(10) of section
1238 and the People may appeal. As we observed in People v. Douglas, supra, 20
Cal.4th at pages 94-95, the plain language of subdivision (a)(10) permits the
People to appeal “sentences based on assertedly unlawful underlying orders,” and
“the underlying orders may be reviewed on appeal.” (See People v. Henderson
7
(1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1235, 1237-38.) Accordingly, the People in the present
case may appeal the imposition of the sentence in order to challenge the trial
court’s ruling that defendant’s prior conviction for inflicting corporal injury is not
a strike.
Defendant argues that the People may not appeal from a finding that a prior
conviction is not true, but his argument misconstrues the circumstances of this
case. The People did not appeal from an order finding a prior conviction
allegation not true. Rather, the People properly appealed from an allegedly
unlawful sentence based upon an allegedly unlawful ruling that a prior conviction
was not a strike. As part of such an appeal from an allegedly unlawful sentence,
the Court of Appeal may review the trial court’s underlying ruling on the prior
conviction allegation.
Defendant argues, for the first time in this court, that we should hold that
permitting the People to appeal the sentence in this case “would raise serious
constitutional doubts.” Defendant acknowledges that such a holding would
effectively overturn our decision in People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826
(Monge I) and disregard the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Monge v. California (1998) 524 U.S. 721 (Monge II). We decline to do so.
In Monge I, the Court of Appeal had reversed the trial court’s true finding
on a prior serious felony allegation, and ruled that retrying the allegation would
subject the defendant to double jeopardy. We granted review to decide whether
the state and federal double jeopardy clauses “apply to a proceeding, in a
noncapital case, to determine the truth of a prior serious felony allegation.”
(People v. Monge, supra, 16 Cal.4th 826, 831 (lead opn. of Chin, J.) The lead
opinion in Monge I stated that the state and federal prohibitions against double
jeopardy do not apply to proceedings in noncapital cases to determine the truth of
8
prior conviction allegations. (Id. at p. 829.) Justice Brown concurred in this
result, creating a majority. (Id. at p. 847 (conc. opn. of Brown, J.).)
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in Monge II,
affirmed the judgment, holding that “the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
preclude retrial on a prior conviction allegation in the noncapital sentencing
context.” (Monge v. California, supra, 524 U.S. 721, 734.) The high court
observed: “Where noncapital sentencing proceedings contain trial-like
protections, that is a matter of legislative grace, not constitutional command.
Many States have chosen to implement procedural safeguards to protect
defendants who may face dramatic increases in their sentences as a result of
recidivism enhancements. We do not believe that because the States have done so,
we are compelled to extend the double jeopardy bar. Indeed, were we to apply
double jeopardy here, we might create disincentives that would diminish these
important procedural protections.” (Ibid.) We are not at liberty to, nor are we
inclined to, disregard the holding of the United State Supreme Court in Monge II.
Nor are we persuaded that we should reconsider Monge I’s conclusion that the
California Constitution’s double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial on a
prior conviction allegation in a noncapital sentencing context.
Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeal that the People may appeal
the imposition of the sentence under section 1238, subdivision (a)(10). The
People contend that the sentence in the present case is unlawful because it is based
upon the trial court’s allegedly erroneous ruling that the striking of an allegation in
the prior case that defendant had personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon
precluded the trial court in the present case from relying on defendant’s admission
that he had stabbed the victim. Thus, the People may appeal under section 1238,
subdivision (a)(10) on the ground that the resulting sentence was unlawful.
9
The Prior Conviction Was Not A Strike
Although the Court of Appeal correctly concluded that the People could
appeal the imposition of the sentence, it erred in reversing the trial court’s ruling
that defendant’s prior conviction for inflicting corporal injury was not a strike.
The prosecutor in the present case submitted the probation officer’s report, which
included defendant’s admission that he had stabbed the victim with a knife. The
trial court ruled, however, that it could not consider defendant’s admission,
because the allegation that defendant had personally used a dangerous or deadly
weapon in committing the prior offense had been stricken as part of a plea bargain,
reasoning that that the prior case had been settled “with the understanding the
knife allegation would not be used. It went away. The defendant relied on that.”
The Court of Appeal reversed, reasoning that the plea bargain in the prior case
that, in part, struck the allegation that defendant had personally used a deadly
weapon did not “bar the use of the facts underlying the stricken enhancement in
sentencing on a subsequent conviction” and concluded that “the trial court’s
refusal to consider defendant’s statement [reflected in the probation report]
constituted judicial error and deprived the prosecution of a full and fair
opportunity to prove that the prior offense was a ‘serious’ felony.” We disagree.
Although we employ different reasoning than that utilized by the trial court, we
conclude that the trial court correctly declined to consider the statement attributed
to defendant in the probation officer’s report in determining whether defendant
had suffered a prior conviction for a serious felony as defined in section 1192.7,
subdivision (c)(23).
As noted above, the information alleged that defendant’s prior conviction
for inflicting corporal injury in violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a) was a
serious felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)),
which, among other provisions, mandates an enhanced sentence if a defendant has
10
one or more prior felony convictions for a serious felony as defined in section
1192.7, subdivision (c). The list of serious felonies in section 1192.7, however, is
not limited “to specific, discrete offenses.” (People v. Jackson (1985) 37 Cal.3d
826, 831.) For instance, section 192.7, subdivision (c)(23), upon which the
prosecution relied here, defines as a serious felony “any felony in which the
defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon.” We have construed
such provisions “as referring not to specific criminal offenses, but to the criminal
conduct described therein, and applicable whenever the prosecution pleads and
proves that conduct.” (People v. Jackson, supra, 37 Cal.3d 826, 832.)
In Jackson, the defendant entered into a plea bargain under which he
admitted that he had suffered a prior conviction for a residential burglary. At the
time, former section 1192.7, subdivision (18) defined burglary of a residence as a
serious felony. (People v. Jackson, supra, 37 Cal.3d 826, 832; Prop. 8, § 7, as
approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982).) We gave effect to the
defendant’s admission that his prior second degree burglary conviction “involved
burglary of a residence,” but warned that, in general, “proof of the residential
character of the burglary encounters obstacles.” (People v. Jackson, supra, 37
Cal.3d 826, 836, fn. omitted.) We observed: “The record of a conviction for
second degree burglary would not prove entry into a residence, even if the
pleading included superfluous allegations to that effect. [Citation.] Moreover, the
People could not go behind that record to prove a fact which was not then an
element of the crime. [Citations.] A contrary holding, permitting the People to
litigate the circumstances of a crime committed years in the past, would raise
serious problems akin to double jeopardy and denial of speedy trial.” (Id. at
p. 836.)
In People v. Alfaro (1986) 42 Cal.3d 627, 629, we reaffirmed our statement
in Jackson that “in proving a prior conviction was a ‘serious felony’ . . . , proof
11
was limited to matters necessarily established by the prior conviction.” The
prosecution had sought to prove that the defendant in Alfaro had suffered a prior
conviction in 1974 for the serious felony of residential burglary by introducing a
copy of the information in the prior conviction, which alleged that the defendant
“ ‘entered the house of Shelby Gilbert’ ” and a minute order showing the
defendant had pled guilty to the charge “ ‘as set forth in the Information.’ ” (Id. at
pp. 630, 631.) We held that “the judgment in the 1974 burglary proceeding did
not establish that defendant had entered a residence. While the information so
alleged, such entry of a residence was not an element of the crime. Defendant’s
guilty plea constituted ‘a judicial admission of every element of the offense
charged’ [citation], but only that; it did not admit other allegations in the
pleadings. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 636.) We observed: “The virtue of this analysis
is that proof of the prior conviction is limited to matters which fall within the
doctrine of collateral estoppel and thus cannot be controverted. Proof is simple
and conclusive. The contrary view . . . — that residential entry is conduct which
can be proved like any other controverted question of fact — creates obvious
difficulties. The prosecution could then introduce documentary and testimonial
evidence to show that the prior burglary involved a residence; defendant could
introduce contrary evidence or argue that the prosecution’s evidence does not
prove the point beyond a reasonable doubt. The net result would resemble retrial
of the original burglary charge.” (Id. at pp. 634-635.)
The holding in Alfaro that in determining the truth of an allegation that a
defendant had been convicted of a serious felony the trier or fact “was limited to
matters necessarily established by the prior conviction” was short lived. (People
v. Alfaro, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 629.) We reconsidered the issue little more than a
year later in People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, overruled our holding in
12
Alfaro, and held instead that “the trier of fact may look to the entire record of the
conviction.” (People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 345.)
It was alleged in People v. Guerrero that the defendant had suffered two
prior convictions for residential burglary, which is a serious felony. The truth of
the prior conviction allegations was tried to the court, which reviewed “the record
of each conviction, which included an accusatory pleading charging a residential
burglary and defendant’s plea of guilty or nolo contendere” and found the
allegations true. (People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 345.) In holding that
the trial court “acted properly” in reviewing the accusatory pleading to determine
that the burglary of which the defendant was convicted was a residential burglary
and thus a serious felony, we held that in determining the truth of a prior
conviction allegation, the trier of fact may “look beyond the judgment to the entire
record of the conviction” (id. at p. 356) “but no further” (id. at p. 355). This rule
was fair, we observed, because “it effectively bars the prosecution from
relitigating the circumstances of a crime committed years ago and thereby
threatening the defendant with harm akin to double jeopardy and denial of speedy
trial.” (Ibid.) We expressly declined to address, however, “such questions as what
items in the record of conviction are admissible and for what purpose.” (Id. at p.
356, fn. 1.) We did not decide in Guerrero, therefore, whether the trier of fact
could consider statements attributed to the defendant in a probation report in
determining the nature of the crime of which the defendant was convicted.
In People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 230, we held that a reporter’s
transcript of a preliminary hearing is a part of the record of a prior conviction
within the meaning of the rule announced in Guerrero. We recognized that the
term “record of conviction” could be “used technically, as equivalent to the record
on appeal [citation], or more narrowly, as referring only to those record documents
reliably reflecting the facts of the offense for which the defendant was convicted.”
13
(Id. at p. 223.) We held that a reporter’s transcript of a preliminary hearing “falls
within even the narrower definition because the procedural protections afforded
the defendant during a preliminary hearing tend to ensure the reliability of such
evidence. Those protections include the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses and the requirement those witnesses testify under oath, coupled with the
accuracy afforded by the court reporter’s verbatim reporting of the proceedings.”
(Ibid.)
We expressly declined to decide in Reed whether an excerpt from a
probation officer’s report is part of the record of conviction, stating: “Whether the
probation officer’s report also falls within the more narrow definition of record of
conviction presents a closer question.” (People v. Reed, supra, 13 Cal.4th 217,
230.) We declined to reach that question because we concluded that the excerpt
from the probation officer’s report in that case was multiple hearsay that did not
fall within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal in People v. Monreal (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 670
reached the issue we left open in Reed and held that a probation officer’s report is
part of the record of a prior conviction, and a defendant’s admission reflected in
such a report may be considered in determining the nature of a prior conviction.
We disagree, however, with the holding in Monreal.
The defendant in Monreal had suffered a prior conviction for assault with a
deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury in
violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1). The prosecution sought to prove that
this prior conviction was for a serious felony because the defendant “personally
used a deadly or dangerous weapon” within the meaning of section 1192.7,
subdivision (c)(23). The People proffered the abstract of judgment, which
reflected that the defendant had been convicted after a jury trial of “assault with a
knife.” (People v. Monreal, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th 670, 674.) In order to
14
establish that the defendant had personally used the knife, as required by section
1192.7, subdivision (c)(23), the People also produced the probation officer’s
report, which stated that the defendant told the probation officer that he had
stabbed the victim with a knife.
The Court of Appeal in Monreal concluded that the statement was
admissible even though it was double hearsay because it fell within the exceptions
for an admission by a party (Evid. Code, § 1220) and a record by a public
employee (Evid. Code, § 1280). The court in Monreal then considered the issue
we left open in Reed of whether the probation officer’s report is part of the “record
of conviction,” noting that our decision in Reed had “suggested two possible
meanings for ‘record of conviction,’ either ‘the record on appeal . . . or more
narrowly, . . . only . . . those record documents reliably reflecting the facts of the
offense for which the defendant was convicted . . . .’ ” (People v. Monreal, supra,
52 Cal.4th at p. 675.) The court in Monreal concluded the probation report was
part of the record of the conviction under either definition. The probation report
certainly was part of the record on appeal, and the court in Monreal concluded the
report was sufficiently reliable, even though it recognized “that the procedural
protections which support the reliability of a preliminary hearing transcript are not
applicable to a probation officer’s report of a defendant’s admissions.” (Id. at
p. 679.) The Monreal decision thus concluded that the trial court properly
considered the defendant’s statement in the probation officer’s report in
concluding that the defendant’s prior conviction was for a serious felony because
he personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon. (See also, People v. Mobley
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 761, 796 [finding Monreal’s “reasoning and holdings
dispositive”].)
We reach a different conclusion than the court in Monreal, but for reasons
not considered in that decision; we conclude that a defendant’s statements, made
15
after a defendant’s plea of guilty has been accepted, that appear in a probation
officer’s report prepared after the guilty plea has been accepted are not part of the
record of the prior conviction, because such statements do not “reflect[] the facts
of the offense for which the defendant was convicted.” (People v. Reed, supra, 13
Cal.4th at p. 223.) We recognized in People v. McGee (2006) 38 Cal.4th 682,
691, that in determining whether a prior conviction is for a serious felony “the
nature of the conviction is at issue.” We explained that “the relevant inquiry in
deciding whether a particular prior conviction qualifies as a serious felony for
California sentencing purposes is limited to an examination of the record of the
prior criminal proceeding to determine the nature or basis of the crime of which
the defendant was convicted.” (Ibid., italics added.)
A statement by the defendant recounted in a postconviction probation
officer’s report does not necessarily reflect the nature of the crime of which the
defendant was convicted. In the present case, for example, the prosecution did not
attempt to prove that defendant used a knife and, instead, entered into a plea
bargain in which it dismissed the allegation that defendant used a deadly or
dangerous weapon and committed an assault with a deadly weapon. The
prosecution could not have compelled defendant to testify, and thus could not
have used defendant’s subsequent admission that he stabbed the victim to convict
him. Once the court accepted his plea, defendant could admit to the probation
officer having stabbed the victim without fear of prosecution, because he was
clothed with the protection of the double jeopardy clause from successive
prosecution for the same offense. (Texas v. Cobb (2001) 532 U.S. 162, 173.)
Defendant’s admission recounted in the probation officer’s report, therefore, does
not describe the nature of the crime of which he was convicted and cannot be used
to prove that the prior conviction was for a serious felony.
16
We agree with the concurring and dissenting opinion that information that
comes to the court’s attention after it has accepted a plea of guilty may be
considered by the trial court in deciding such matters as whether to withdraw its
prior approval of the plea (People v. Johnson (1974) 10 Cal.3d 868, 873) and, of
course, in determining the appropriate sentence. But we disagree with the
concurring and dissenting opinion’s leap in logic that this means that defendant’s
admission to his probation officer in the prior case that he stabbed the victim,
made after the trial court had accepted his guilty plea pursuant to a plea bargain
dismissing all allegations that he had stabbed the victim, “reflect[s] the facts of the
offense for which the defendant was convicted.” (People v. Reed, supra, 13
Cal.4th 217, 223.)
As the concurring and dissenting opinion acknowledges, “a defendant’s
guilty plea, on which a sentence has not yet been imposed, constitutes a conviction
for purposes of imposing an enhanced sentence.” (Dis. & conc. opn. of Baxter, J.,
post, at p. 5, citing People v. Laino (2004) 32 Cal.4th 878, 882 and People v.
Rhoads (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 56, 60.) Defendant’s admission in the present
case, therefore, was made after defendant was convicted and does not reflect the
facts upon which he was convicted.
Barring the use of a defendant’s statement reflected in a probation officer’s
report to prove that an alleged prior conviction was for a serious felony is
consistent with our rule in People v. Guerrero that in determining the nature of a
prior conviction, the court may look to the entire record of the conviction, “but no
further.” (People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d 343, 355.) The reason for this
limitation was to “effectively bar[] the prosecution from relitigating the
circumstances of a crime committed years ago and thereby threatening the
defendant with harm akin to double jeopardy and denial of speedy trial.” (Ibid.)
Permitting a defendant’s statement made in a postconviction probation officer’s
17
report to be used against him to establish the nature of the conviction would
present similar problems, creating harm akin to double jeopardy and forcing the
defendant to relitigate the circumstances of the crime.
A defendant’s statements in the probation officer’s report differ in this
respect from a reporter’s transcript of the preliminary hearing, which is admissible
to prove the nature of the prior conviction. (People v. Reed, supra, 13 Cal.4th at
pp. 223-229; People v. Blackburn (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1520, 1531.) The
transcript of a preliminary hearing contains evidence that was admitted against the
defendant and was available to the prosecution prior to the conviction. The
transcript of a preliminary hearing, therefore, sheds light on the basis for the
conviction.
A defendant’s statements in the probation officer’s report also differ from
an appellate court decision, which can be relied upon to determine the nature of a
prior conviction because it may disclose the facts upon which the conviction was
based. (People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 457.) We held in Woodell “that
appellate opinions, in general, are part of the record of conviction that the trier of
fact may consider in determining whether a conviction qualifies under the
sentencing scheme at issue.” (Ibid.) We warned, however, that “[w]hether and to
what extent an opinion is probative in a specific case must be decided on the facts
of that case.” (Ibid.)3
Accordingly, the trial court correctly declined to consider defendant’s
statement recounted in the probation officer’s report of the prior conviction, and

3
The decisions in People v. Monreal, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th 670 and People
v. Mobley (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 761 are disapproved to the extent they are
contrary to this opinion.
18


correctly determined that the prior conviction was not a serious felony within the
meaning of the Three Strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed to the extent that it
reversed the “ ‘not true’ finding on the prior conviction in Santa Clara County
Superior Court case No. 149886.” In all other respects, the judgment of the Court
of Appeal is affirmed.
MORENO, J.
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD,
J.
WERDEGAR,
J.

19





CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY BAXTER, J.

I concur in the majority’s holding that the People may appeal from the
judgment under section 1238, subdivision (a)(10) of the Penal Code (all further
unlabeled statutory references are to this code).
I dissent, however, from the majority’s determination that the trial court
correctly declined to consider defendant’s admission in the probation officer’s
report that “I stuck her with the knife.” Contrary to the majority, I conclude that a
probation officer’s report is part of the “record of conviction” that a trial court may
lawfully consider in determining whether a defendant’s prior conviction was a
serious or violent felony within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667,
subds. (b)-(i)).
I.
To properly analyze this issue, I start by reviewing our most recent
decisions on the matter. In People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217 (Reed), we noted
prior decisions had not defined the phrase “record of conviction” so as to provide
definitive guidance regarding what documents could be considered to determine
the substance of a prior conviction and the applicability of a prior conviction
sentence enhancement. (Id. at p. 223.) Reed did, however, explain that the phrase
may be used either “technically, as equivalent to the record on appeal [citation], or
more narrowly, as referring only to those record documents reliably reflecting the
facts of the offense for which the defendant was convicted.” (Ibid.) Without
deciding which definition ought to control, Reed held that a preliminary hearing
1



transcript falls within “even the narrower definition” of record of conviction
because the procedural protections afforded the defendant during such a hearing
“tend to ensure the reliability of such evidence.” (Ibid.) With respect to another
category of evidence offered in that case—certain out-of-court witness statements
contained in a probation officer’s report—Reed declined to decide whether the
report itself was part of the record of conviction and instead found the statements
in the report should have been excluded as inadmissible hearsay. (Id. at p. 230.)
In rejecting the admissibility of the statements at issue, consisting of the
probation officer’s narration of facts drawn from sources other than the defendant,
Reed distinguished the type of statement involved here: “The report fragment
does not identify the declarant or declarants from whose statements the probation
officer drew his factual summary. There is no evidence the excerpt was based on
defendant’s own admissions to the officer, so as to fall within the hearsay
exception for party admissions. (Evid. Code, § 1220; see People v. Garcia (1989)
216 Cal.App.3d 233, 237 [defendant’s admission in probation report]; People v.
Abarca[ (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1347] at p. 1351 [defendant’s admission reflected
in transcript of change of plea hearing].) Nor does any other exception to the
hearsay rule appear applicable.” (Reed, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 230, italics added.)
In People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448 (Woodell), the defendant
contended the record of conviction cannot include an appellate opinion prepared
after a defendant’s conviction and sentencing, because such a document would not
be a record leading to imposition of judgment. (Id. at pp. 454-455.) Woodell
disagreed, finding that the record of conviction is not limited to “trial court
documents,” but also “includes appellate court documents at least up to finality of
the judgment.” (Id. at p. 455.)
Earlier this year, we reiterated “the relevant inquiry in deciding whether a
particular prior conviction qualifies as a serious felony for California sentencing
purposes is limited to an examination of the record of the prior criminal
2

proceeding to determine the nature or basis of the crime of which the defendant
was convicted.” (People v. McGee (2006) 38 Cal.4th 682, 691 (McGee), italics
added.) In McGee, we held a defendant has no federal constitutional right to have
a jury decide whether a prior out-of-state conviction constitutes a qualifying
felony for purposes of a California sentencing statute. (Id. at p. 687.)
There can be no dispute that a probation officer’s report, which properly
belongs in the record on appeal in a criminal proceeding, meets the technical
definition of “record of conviction” to which Reed referred. (Reed, supra, 13
Cal.4th at p. 223.) For the reasons below, such a report also falls within Reed’s
narrower concept of the term because it “reliably reflect[s] the facts of the offense
for which the defendant was convicted” (ibid.) and additionally qualifies under
McGee as a document properly included in the record of the prior proceeding from
which the “nature or basis of the crime” can be determined (McGee, supra, 38
Cal.4th at p. 691).
Significantly, probation officers’ reports are highly relevant to a number of
important judicial and correctional determinations regarding defendants convicted
of crimes. Such reports “are used by judges in determining the appropriate length
of a prison sentence and by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . .
in deciding upon the type of facility and program in which to place a defendant,
and are also used in deciding whether probation is appropriate.” (Cal. Rules of
Ct., rule 4.411(d) (all further rule references are to these rules); § 1203, subds. (b),
(g).) Judges also refer to such reports in deciding whether and to what extent
restitution fines and costs should be assessed against a defendant. (Rule
4.411.5(a)(11); § 1203, subds. (b)(2)(C), (g).)
Given the important purposes these reports serve, the California Rules of
Court provide a detailed list of the information that must be included, including
information pertaining to “[t]he facts and circumstances of the crime.” (Rule
4.411.5(a)(2).) Additionally, the reports shall include “[a]ny statement made by
3

the defendant to the probation officer, or a summary thereof, including the
defendant’s account of the circumstances of the crime.” (Rule 4.411.5(a)(4),
italics added.) To promote reliability and transparency of the fact-gathering
process, the rules explicitly mandate that “[t]he source of all information shall be
stated. Any person who has furnished information included in the report shall be
identified by name or official capacity unless a reason is given for not disclosing
the person’s identity.” (Rule 4.411.5(c); see also rule 4.411.5(a)(2).) At their
sentencing hearing, defendants have the opportunity to challenge the accuracy of
the report and to correct any misstatements, including admissions attributed to
them. (People v. Monreal (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 670, 680; People v. Garcia,
supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 237.)
Thus, a probation officer’s report—with its recitation of the facts and
circumstances of the defendant’s crime and its inclusion of any admissions made
by the defendant—properly serves to inform official decisions regarding the
appropriate punishment, restitution fines, correctional facility, and rehabilitative
programs for the defendant based on the nature of his crime and other factors. In
light of this sanctioned use, it makes no sense whatsoever to find that the same
report cannot be considered, in a subsequent criminal proceeding, as a document
that “reliably reflect[s] the facts of the [prior] offense for which the defendant was
convicted” (Reed, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 223), or as a document in the record of
the prior criminal proceeding from which the “nature or basis of the [prior] crime”
can be determined (McGee, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 691).
Despite the obvious importance and factual reliability of a probation
officer’s report, the majority holds in this case that the “record of the prior
conviction” includes only those documents in the record that contain information
aired in trial court proceedings prior to the point of “conviction,” which in the
majority’s view is the point at which the trial court here “accepted” defendant’s
negotiated guilty plea. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16.) Pursuant to this understanding,
4

the majority regards the record of conviction as properly excluding
“postconviction” documents, such as a probation officer’s report, that reflect
information and evidence formally brought to the trial court’s attention after
acceptance of the plea, but before sentencing and before conclusion of the trial
court proceedings. (Ibid.)
I have no quarrel with the proposition that a defendant’s guilty plea, on
which a sentence has not yet been imposed, constitutes a conviction for purposes
of imposing an enhanced sentence. (See People v. Rhoads (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d
56, 58-60 [addressing a Health and Safety Code enhancement]; see also People v.
Laino (2004) 32 Cal.4th 878, 895-898 [defendant’s plea of guilty to a domestic
violence felony, even when followed by a dismissal of the defendant’s case after
his successful completion of a state diversion program, constitutes a prior
conviction under the Three Strikes law].)
But the question here is not whether a defendant’s guilty plea, standing
alone, has legal significance as a prior conviction for purposes of the Three Strikes
law. Rather, the issue is whether a trial court may assess the serious or violent
nature of the offense for which the defendant was convicted based on the
defendant’s own admissions in an official report that is prepared after his plea of
guilty but before entry of a judgment on that plea.
A trial court that initially accepts or approves of a defendant’s negotiated
guilty plea to an offense retains broad discretion at the sentencing phase to
withdraw that prior approval and negate the plea’s effect as a conviction.1 (People

1
A trial court’s withdrawal of approval “is permitted, for example, in those
instances where the court becomes more fully informed about the case [citation],
or where, after further consideration, the court concludes that the bargain is not in
the best interests of society. [Citation.]” (People v. Superior Court (Gifford)
(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1338.) Consistent with this broad discretion, the trial
court in the prior proceeding at issue declined to rule on the People’s motion to
dismiss the count charging assault with a deadly weapon and to strike the knife
(Footnote continued on next page.)
5



v. Johnson (1974) 10 Cal.3d 868, 873.) In this regard, evidence concerning the
offense at issue, whether contained in a probation officer’s report or otherwise
presented to the trial court by the time of the sentencing hearing, may be highly
relevant to whether the defendant’s plea may stand as a valid conviction. For
instance, it has been held that a trial court’s reading of a probation officer’s report
after the entry of a defendant’s negotiated plea of guilty contributed to a sufficient
factual basis for the plea and supported the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s
motion to withdraw his plea. (People v. Watts (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 173, 181-182
[also finding grand jury transcripts provided a sufficient factual basis].) In a
similar vein, when trial counsel stipulates to a factual basis for a negotiated plea,
but appellate counsel claims the plea lacks an adequate factual basis, the appellate
court may review the probation report to see if it establishes a factual basis for the
plea. (People v. Mickens (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1564-1565.) Because a
court may rely on facts disclosed in a probation officer’s report for the critical
purpose of validating the defendant’s plea and resulting conviction, it follows that
a court should be able to rely on the defendant’s uncontradicted admission of facts
in such a report for the additional purpose of determining the nature or basis of the
pleaded offense.
Notably, the majority’s cramped view is at odds with Woodell, supra, 17
Cal.4th 448, which specifically held that “appellate opinions, in general, are part
of the record of conviction that the trier of fact may consider in determining
whether a conviction qualifies under the sentencing scheme at issue.” (Id. at p.
457.) Although the majority attempts to distinguish Woodell from the situation

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

use allegation at the same time it accepted defendant’s plea. Instead, the court
took the People’s motion under submission and indicated it would make its ruling
at the time of sentencing.
6



here, Woodell rejected the notion that the record leading to imposition of judgment
could not include a document prepared after a conviction and sentencing. (Id. at
pp. 454-455.) Today’s decision—which categorizes a probation officer’s report as
a “postconviction” document that is not part of the record of conviction because it
is prepared after the defendant pleads guilty, even though his trial proceedings
have not concluded—would seem to require disapproval of Woodell’s holding that
the record of conviction may include a judicial opinion and other appellate
documents written after the trial proceedings but before a judgment becomes final.
Finally, although the majority’s rule happens to aid the defendant in this
particular case, other defendants may suffer from the rule’s effect of unduly
limiting the documents comprising a record of conviction. For instance, what if a
probation officer’s report contains information favorable to a defendant and shows
the prior felony conviction should not be considered a strike? Under the
majority’s analysis, a trial court would be barred from admitting and considering
such information, even though the balance of the record of conviction otherwise
supports a finding that the prior felony was serious or violent. There appears no
legal, logical, or public policy reason to limit a trial court’s review to such
misleadingly incomplete information. (See Woodell, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 456
[noting similar concern in the context of appellate opinions].)
II.
As an additional justification for its conclusion that a defendant’s admission
of facts in a probation officer’s report is outside the record of conviction, the
majority states: “Permitting a defendant’s statement made in a postconviction
probation officer’s report to be used against him to establish the nature of the
conviction would . . . creat[e] harm akin to double jeopardy and forc[e] the
defendant to relitigate the circumstances of the crime.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 18-
19, relying on People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 355.) This reasoning is
devoid of merit.
7

In People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713 (Melton), the defendant in a
capital case argued that evidence of prior criminal activity that previously had
been subject to a plea bargain should not have been admitted at the penalty phase.
Melton concluded, however, that “one is not placed ‘twice in jeopardy for the
same offense’ when the details of misconduct which has already resulted in
conviction and punishment, or in dismissal pursuant to a plea bargain or for
witness unavailability, are presented in a later proceeding on the separate issue of
the appropriate penalty for a subsequent offense.” (Id. at p. 756, fn. 17; see also
Monge v. California (1998) 524 U.S. 721, 724 [double jeopardy clause does not
extend to noncapital sentencing proceedings]; People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th
826 (lead opn. of Chin, J.) [state and federal double jeopardy principles do not bar
retrial of a prior conviction allegations].) As another court summarized, “when a
plea bargain calls for striking an enhancement, that merely means the
enhancement cannot be used to enhance the current conviction. The plea bargain
does not bar the use of the facts underlying the stricken enhancement in sentencing
on a subsequent conviction. [Citations.]” (People v. Blackburn (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th 1520, 1527.) Given these settled legal principles, it is difficult to
comprehend the majority’s double jeopardy concerns in the context of this case.
Setting aside the fact this case involves a recidivist sentencing scheme that
does not subject a defendant to double jeopardy for the same offense, and also
setting aside the legal point that double jeopardy principles are in any event
inapplicable in the noncapital sentencing context (Monge v. California, supra, 524
U.S. at p. 724), it remains unclear how the harm perceived by the majority could
be implicated by consideration of a probation officer’s report, but not also by
consideration of a preliminary hearing transcript (Reed) or an appellate opinion
(Woodell). The majority’s discussion on this point is vague, and no meaningful
distinction appears.
8

III.
The Three Strikes law makes clear the Legislature’s intent “to ensure
longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony
and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses.”
(§ 667, subd. (b).) A probation officer’s report is reasonably and logically viewed
as part of the record of a defendant’s prior conviction because: (1) a probation
officer’s report is an official document that is designed to include the facts and
circumstances of the crime; (2) the rules governing the preparation of such reports,
coupled with the opportunity afforded defendants to challenge misstatements in
the reports, contribute to the reliability of the information contained therein; and
(3) a trial court in a negotiated plea case retains broad discretion at a sentencing
hearing to affirm or withdraw its prior approval of a plea bargain based on facts
disclosed in a probation officer’s report and other information subsequently
coming to light. Given the nature and content of a probation officer’s report, as
well as the role such a report may play in the specific context of a negotiated plea,
I can only conclude that a probation officer’s report properly is considered part of
the record of the prior conviction for purposes of a serious or violent felony
determination.
That said, I do not take issue with the decisional law recognizing that a trial
court may consider the matters contained in a probation officer’s report only to the
extent the matters are relevant and otherwise admissible under the normal rules of
evidence. In this regard, the majority does not contest the determination in People
v. Monreal, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th 670, that a defendant’s admission in a
probation officer’s report is admissible in a sentencing hearing under Evidence
Code sections 1220 (party admission exception to the hearsay rule) and 1280
(public employee record exception). (People v. Monreal, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 676-678; see also Reed, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 230.) Neither do I.
9

In sum, I strongly disagree with the majority’s determination that the trial
court properly declined to consider defendant’s statement in the probation
officer’s report that “I stuck [the victim] with the knife.” Because defendant’s
admission was reflected in an official document that properly belongs in the
record of the prior conviction, and because the admission was admissible in court
under Evidence Code sections 1220 and 1280, I would affirm the Court of
Appeal’s judgment remanding the matter to the trial court for a retrial on the prior
conviction allegation.

BAXTER, J.
WE CONCUR:
CHIN, J.
CORRIGAN, J.

10



See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Trujillo
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

XXX NP opn. filed 11/10/04 – 6th Dist.
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S130080
Date Filed: December 11, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Santa Clara
Judge: Hugh F. Mullin III

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler
and Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorneys General, René A. Chacón, Kristofer Jorstad, Lawrence M.
Daniels and Ryan B. McCarroll, Deputy Attorneys General; George W. Kennedy, District Attorney, and
Neal J. Kimball, Deputy District Attorney; for Plaintiff and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Michael A. Kresser, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Respondent.



Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Ryan B. McCarroll
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 897-2391

Michael A. Kresser
100 N. Winchester Blvd., Suite 310
Santa Clara, CA 95050
(408) 241-6171


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Mon, 12/11/2006S130080

Parties
1The People (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Ryan Blake Mccarroll
Office of the Attorney General
300 S. Spring Street, Suite 1702
Los Angeles, CA

2The People (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by District Atty - Santa Clara County
70 West Hedding, West Wing
70 West Hedding, West Wing
San Jose, CA

3Trujillo, Manuel Alex (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Michael A. Kresser
6th District Appellate Program
100 N. Winchester Boulevard, Suite 310
Santa Clara, CA


Disposition
Dec 11 2006Opinion: Affirmed in part/reversed in part

Dockets
Dec 21 2004Record requested
 
Dec 21 2004Petition for review filed
  by counsel for aplt. (M. Trujillo) (40k)
Dec 22 2004Received Court of Appeal record
  file jacket/briefs/accordian file
Feb 16 2005Review granted/briefing deferred (rule 29.1) - criminal case
  Petition for review GRANTED. Further action in this matter is deferred pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in People v. Samples, S112201 (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 28.2(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 29.1, is deferred pending further order of the court. Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown, and Moreno, JJ.
Feb 17 2005Note:
  Records sent to Cal-Coord. Off.; CT=3, RT=5, 2= 2, 3= 2, 4= 2, 7, confid. envelope, Pet. for Rehrg., misc. docs. and papers.
Mar 10 2005Counsel appointment order filed
  Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, Sixth District Appellant Project is hereby appointed to represent appellant on his appeal now pending in this court.
May 18 2005Briefing ordered in previously Held case
  The petition for review in this matter was granted on February 16, 2005, and further action was deferred pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in People v. Samples, S112201, or pending further order of this court. At that time, the submission of additional briefing was also deferred pending further order of this court. Defendant is now directed to serve and file on or before June 17, 2005 a Brief on the Merits addressing whether the People can appeal under Penal Code section 1238, subdivision (a) the trial court's order finding the alleged prior conviction is "not a strike." Additional briefing is to be served and filed in a timely fashion. (See rule 29.1(a), Cal Rules of Court.)
Jun 13 2005Filed:
  notification of assigned Deputy Attorney General for The People.
Jun 17 2005Request for extension of time filed
  counsel for aplt. requests extension of time to 7-18-05 to file the opening brief on the merits.
Jun 20 2005Extension of time granted
  Appellant's time to serve and file the opening brief is extended to and including July 18, 2005
Jul 18 2005Request for extension of time filed
  Counsel for appellant requests a 30-day extension of time to file the opening brief on the merits. (8-17-05)
Jul 22 2005Extension of time granted
  To August 17, 2005 to file Appellant's Opening Brief on the Merits. No further extensions of time are contemplated.
Aug 18 2005Opening brief on the merits filed
  by counsel for aplt. (M. Trujillo) 40.1(b)
Aug 30 2005Request for extension of time filed
  counsel for respondent requests extension of time to October 18, 2005, to file the answer brief.
Sep 7 2005Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Kresser - Sixth District Appellate Program
Sep 9 2005Extension of time granted
  Respondent's time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including October 18, 2005.
Oct 13 2005Request for extension of time filed
  Counsel for respondent (People) requests extension of time to November 17, 2005, to file the answer brief on the merits.
Oct 20 2005Extension of time granted
  Respondent's time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including November 17, 2005.
Nov 17 2005Request for extension of time filed
  counsel for respondent requests extension of time to December 1, 2005, to file the answer brief on the merits.
Nov 23 2005Extension of time granted
  Respondent's time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including December 1, 2005.
Nov 30 2005Answer brief on the merits filed
  counsel for respondent (People)
Dec 20 2005Request for extension of time filed
  Counsel for defendant and appellant requests extension of time to January 20, 2006, to file the reply brief on the merits
Dec 28 2005Extension of time granted
  To January 20, 2006 to file defendant/Appellant's reply brief on the merits.
Jan 23 2006Application to file over-length brief filed
  by counsel for aplt. Manuel Trujillo (40.1(b))
Jan 23 2006Received:
  from counsel for aplt. over-sized Reply Brief on the Merits (40.1(b))
Jan 23 2006Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  counsel for aplt. Manuel Trujillo (40.1(b) Legislative History Materials
Jan 24 2006Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  counsel for aplt. (Trujillo) w/permission
Apr 26 2006Supplemental briefing ordered
  Defendant is directed to serve and file on or before May 16, 2006 a Supplemental Brief addressing whether the trial court erred in ruling that defendant's alleged prior conviction for inflicting corporal injury in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a) is "not a strike." The People may file a responsive supplemental brief on or before 20 days from the filing of defendant's supplemental brief. Defendant may file a reply supplemental brief on or before 10 days from the filing of the People's supplemental brief.
May 17 2006Supplemental brief filed
  counsel for (Manuel Alex Trujillo) (40.1(b))
Jun 1 2006Request for extension of time filed
  Respondent's supplemental brief to 6-15-06 Deputy Attorney General Ryan B. McCarroll
Jun 5 2006Extension of time granted
  Plaintiff and appellant's time to serve and file the supplemental brief is extended to and including June 15, 2006.
Jun 15 2006Supplemental brief filed
  The People, appellant Deputy A.G., Ryan B. McCarroll
Jun 27 2006Request for extension of time filed
  Counsel for respondent requests 10-day extension of time to file the supplemental reply brief.
Jul 5 2006Extension of time granted
  Respondent's time to serve and file the supplemental reply brief is extended to and including July 5, 2006.
Jul 6 2006Request for extension of time filed
  Counsel for respondent requests extension of time to July 14, 2006, to file the supplemental reply brief.
Jul 13 2006Extension of time granted
  Respondent's time to serve and file the supplemental reply brief is extended to and including July 14, 2006.
Jul 17 2006Supplemental brief filed
  counsel for resp. (reply) (40.1(b))
Sep 5 2006Case ordered on calendar
  October 3, 2006, at 1:30 p.m., in Santa Barbara
Sep 14 2006Request for judicial notice granted
  Appellant's motion for judicial notice, filed on January 23, 2006, is granted.
Sep 25 2006Received:
  from counself for aplt. Additional Authorities re: oral argument.
Oct 2 2006Request for Extended Media coverage Filed
  Len Wood of Santa Maria Times.
Oct 2 2006Request for Extended Media coverage Granted
 
Oct 3 2006Cause argued and submitted
 
Dec 11 2006Opinion filed: Affirmed in part, reversed in part
  OPINION BY: Moreno, J. --- joined by: George, C.J., Kennard, Werdegar, JJ. CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY: Baxter, J. --- joined by Chin, Corrigan, JJ.
Jan 11 2007Remittitur issued (criminal case)
 
Jan 22 2007Received:
  receipt for remittitur from CA 6
Feb 14 2007Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Kresser - Sixth District Appellate Program

Briefs
Aug 18 2005Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Nov 30 2005Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Jan 24 2006Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website