Citation 48 Cal. 4th 574, 229 P.3d 12, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 87
People v. Taylor
Filed 4/15/10
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S062562
v.
BRANDON ARNAE TAYLOR,
San Diego County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. SCF113815
In 1996, a San Diego County jury convicted defendant Brandon Arnae
Taylor of the first degree murder of 80-year-old Rosa Mae Dixon, forcible rape of
an elderly victim while engaged in a residential burglary, forcible oral copulation,
residential burglary, and first degree robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189,
261, subd. (a)(2), 667.61, subds. (a), (c), (d), 1203.09, subd. (f), 288a, subd. (c),
459, 460, 211, 212.5, subd. (a); unless otherwise specified, all further statutory
references are to this code.) The jury also found true the special circumstance
allegations that defendant murdered Dixon while committing rape, oral copulation,
and burglary. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(C), (F), (G).) A second jury, impaneled after
the first deadlocked on penalty, returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied
defendant‟s automatic application for modification of the death verdict (§ 190.4,
subd. (e)), and sentenced defendant to death. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239,
subd. (b).) For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment.
1
I. FACTS
A. Guilt phase
1. Prosecution evidence
Around 9:30 p.m. on June 23, 1995, 80-year-old Rosa Mae Dixon sat in the
living room of her San Diego home conversing with her sister Betty Hayes, who
was visiting from Kansas. The women were startled and “scared to death” when
they looked up and saw defendant calmly standing in the room staring at them.
Defendant, who was 22 years old at the time and lived nearby, apparently had
entered the house from the back after tearing a hole through a mesh screen.
After mumbling something that might have been his name, defendant
closed the front door over the security screen and sat down on the couch between
the two women. When Dixon rose and asked defendant what he wanted, he
grabbed the front of her nightgown. At Dixon‟s direction, Hayes went into the
front bedroom to call 911, but when she picked up the telephone, defendant chased
after her, jerked the receiver out of her hand, and pulled the cord from the wall.
Defendant then grabbed Hayes by her clothing, took hold of Dixon in the same
manner, and pushed the two women down the hall to a bedroom in the back of the
house.
At some point before defendant forced Dixon and Hayes to the back
bedroom, one of the women came outside onto the front porch, yelled for help,
and then ran back into the house. Dixon‟s next-door neighbor, Erik Kirkpatrick,
heard the cry and came to investigate. Receiving no response to his knock on the
front door, Kirkpatrick went to the side of the house, looked through a window,
and saw defendant on his knees hunched over Dixon. After hearing a male voice
mumble something like, “I don‟t want to have to hurt you,” and a female voice
2
respond, “Okay, just don‟t hurt me,” Kirkpatrick quickly returned to his own
house to call 911 and waited for police to arrive.
Kirkpatrick‟s momentary look through the side window occurred just as
events in the back bedroom had started to unfold. Defendant first pushed Dixon to
the floor at the foot of the bed, removed her panties and pulled down his shorts.
His first attempt to penetrate her was unsuccessful. He then picked up Dixon and
slammed her onto the floor near the side of the bed, banging her head and
knocking Hayes to her knees in the process. With more room to maneuver in the
new location, defendant managed repeatedly to penetrate Dixon‟s vagina with his
penis. Meanwhile, Dixon started breathing hard and gasping for air. At one point,
defendant withdrew his penis, raised Dixon‟s head and attempted to place his
penis inside her mouth. She resisted, turning her head to the side and saying,
“No,” while still struggling to breathe. When defendant released Dixon‟s head
and let it drop to the floor a short time later, she was ashen and no longer breathing
or moving.
Defendant then turned his attention to Hayes, swinging around to face her
with his penis in his hand and asking if she “wanted it.” When he did so, Hayes
noticed there was semen on the tip of his penis. Defendant pulled up his shorts
and started out of the room, passing Hayes‟s purse, which was sitting open on a
table. He dug through it, complaining about finding only a few dollar bills until he
discovered and pocketed about $65. Defendant continued on through the kitchen
and out the back door.
Defendant got only as far as the back fence before being apprehended by
Officers Gassmann and Caropreso, who, along with several other officers, had
responded within minutes to Kirkpatrick‟s 911 call reporting a burglary in
progress. When the officers asked defendant why he was in the yard, he first
replied he thought the house was vacant. Defendant then offered that a White
3
male named John Hall, who had left before the officers‟ arrival, “just raped an old
woman inside the house.” A third officer retraced defendant‟s route back to the
Dixon residence but found no evidence of a second assailant. Less than one hour
later, the officers conducted a curbside lineup in the alley behind Dixon‟s house,
and both Hayes and Kirkpatrick identified defendant.
Meanwhile, other officers had discovered Dixon lying on the floor of the
back bedroom with her nightgown bunched up around her waist. There was blood
on her leg and underneath her pelvic area, and she was unresponsive and not
breathing. Rescue efforts, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and
emergency heart medications, restored Dixon‟s pulse, and she was taken to the
intensive care unit of a nearby hospital. But she soon suffered seizures and kidney
failure and never regained consciousness. The following evening, after being
declared brain dead, she was removed from life support.
At trial, Hayes and Kirkpatrick again identified defendant as the man who
had entered Dixon‟s home and sexually assaulted her. The results of DNA testing
of blood and sperm collected from Dixon and from defendant at the time of his
arrest also identified defendant as the perpetrator. Sperm found inside and on
Dixon‟s body and clothing and on defendant‟s shirt was consistent with
defendant‟s sperm, and the probability of a random match to the DNA profile was
about 1 in 1,300 African-Americans. Blood on vaginal swabs taken from Dixon
and from defendant‟s penis, hands, and clothing was consistent with Dixon‟s
blood and not consistent with defendant‟s blood. More precise testing of the blood
established that the probability of a random match to that DNA profile in the
general population was 1 in 400 billion among Caucasians.
The prosecution‟s medical experts testified that Dixon died from the
extreme fear, pain, and stress the sexual assaults caused. Mark Super, M.D., the
deputy medical examiner who performed the autopsy, explained that Dixon‟s
4
natural hormonal responses to the physiological stress and psychological trauma of
the struggle and the rape caused her to experience abnormal heart rhythms, which
led to cardiac arrest, which in turn deprived her brain of oxygen and ultimately led
to her death. He found Dixon‟s numerous abrasions and bruises to be consistent
with a struggle, and he believed the two large tears on the vaginal walls and large
accumulation of blood deep inside the vagina to be consistent with forcible rape.
In Dr. Super‟s view, Dixon would not have died when she did but for the sexual
assault, although he acknowledged on cross-examination that either vascular or
heart disease was a contributing cause of her death, and that a younger woman
would have survived the attack.
Cardiologist Thomas Diggs, M.D., who attended to Dixon at the hospital,
similarly concluded that Dixon‟s death was due to cardiac arrest resulting from the
stress, fear, and extreme pain the sexual assaults caused. Although Dr. Diggs
found nothing in Dixon‟s medical records suggesting an illness that would have
caused her death, he conceded that Dixon suffered from diabetes and high blood
pressure, and had once undergone testing that disclosed an enlarged heart. He also
acknowledged that it would be possible for fear alone to cause cardiac arrest in an
80-year-old woman.
Nurse Teresa Kinsey, a member of the Sexual Assault Response Team
(SART) who examined Dixon while she was in critical condition in the hospital‟s
intensive care unit, also testified regarding the extent of Dixon‟s injuries. She
explained that the large amount of blood inside Dixon‟s vagina indicated she had
suffered internal injuries from a “brutal amount of force,” and that such injuries
more typically occur in a rape involving use of a foreign object like a knife.
Kinsey acknowledged, however, that an 80-year-old woman was more likely to be
injured during a rape than a younger woman.
5
Officers and other police department personnel testified regarding
defendant‟s calm and cool demeanor, cooperative manner, and stable mood from
the time they placed him in the back of the patrol car shortly after the crimes until
they processed and booked him into county jail nearly eight hours later, around
6:00 a.m. the next day. Officers Gassmann and Caropreso described defendant as
calm and cooperative during the curbside lineup. Timothy Jones, the officer who
collected a urine sample from defendant approximately two hours after his arrest,
recalled that defendant exhibited “normal” mannerisms and “didn‟t seem upset
about the situation at all.” Nurse Meredith Jackson likewise found defendant
cooperative and able to follow directions while she was collecting sexual assault
crimes evidence such as blood, saliva, penile secretions, and pubic hair from
defendant around 2:30 a.m. Officer Gaughen, who had custody of defendant at the
central police facility from the early morning hours until he was transported to
county jail, saw no change in defendant‟s mood and nothing unusual about his
behavior that suggested he needed either medical attention or psychiatric
evaluation.
Law enforcement personnel also testified that although defendant‟s breath
smelled mildly of alcohol, his speech and movements appeared to be normal and
he exhibited no other signs of intoxication. A breath sample taken from defendant
around 5:00 a.m. indicated he had a nominal blood-alcohol level of .01 percent. In
addition, a comprehensive drug screen of defendant‟s urine and blood collected
near the time of his arrest showed no reportable amounts of methamphetamine,
benzodiazepines, cocaine, opiates, antidepressants, barbiturates, or PCP. Separate
testing for the presence of LSD in defendant‟s urine likewise returned no
reportable results.
6
2. Defense evidence
The defense posited that when defendant entered Dixon‟s home, he lacked
the intent to steal or commit any other felony and, therefore, did not commit a
burglary at that point, and that Dixon suffered cardiac arrest, not from the sexual
assaults, but from the fright of encountering defendant unexpectedly in her living
room. In support of that theory, the defense presented the testimony of pathologist
Paul Wolf, M.D., who opined, based on Dixon‟s medical records, that she had
preexisting heart disease and had suffered a heart attack at least 10 days before her
death, which made her more vulnerable to a cardiac arrest caused by trauma. Dr.
Wolf explained that Dixon‟s fright on seeing defendant in her living room played
a large part in the cardiac arrest, but that there was no way to determine as a
medical certainty whether Dixon‟s initial fright or the subsequent pain from the
rape caused her to suffer cardiac arrest.
The defense also attempted to show that defendant‟s long-standing, serious
mental illness impaired his ability to form the mental state necessary for first
degree murder. The defense retained psychiatrist Mark Cerbone, M.D., to
evaluate defendant‟s mental health. In arriving at a diagnosis, Dr. Cerbone met
with defendant for 20 minutes in county jail and reviewed records such as prior
psychological assessments, police reports, and summaries of interviews with
defendant‟s mother and others.
Dr. Cerbone‟s review of the various materials disclosed that defendant had a
long history of abusing drugs, including methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine,
and LSD. For instance, defendant began using methamphetamine when he was
between the ages of 12 and 14, and for three years ingested a half-gram of the
substance daily. At age 16, defendant was twice admitted to an inpatient
psychiatric rehabilitation program, where he was diagnosed with polysubstance
dependence and given antipsychotic medications to control his behavior, which
7
included threats of violence. During the program, defendant also exhibited
paranoid and delusional thinking, such as accusing the facility‟s psychiatrist of
conspiring with his mother to sell his martial arts ideas to the creators of the
television series Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles. After defendant‟s release from the
rehabilitation facility the second time, he resumed abusing drugs and alcohol and
continued to exhibit paranoid delusions.
Dr. Cerbone opined that defendant suffered from several mental illnesses,
including methamphetamine dependence, cannabis dependence, substance-
induced psychotic disorder, and psychotic disorders not otherwise specified. He
also explained that chronic use of methamphetamine and LSD can cause
overreaction to nonexistent threats. Dr. Cerbone acknowledged having testified at
a pretrial competency hearing that defendant also suffers from a severe, long-
standing antisocial personality disorder, but stated he changed his diagnosis after
obtaining additional information, including records indicating that defendant‟s
father suffered from schizophrenia.
Psychopharmacologist Steven Stahl, M.D., testified that a chronic user of
methamphetamine often develops paranoia, depression, disordered thinking, and
impulsivity. But when a longtime methamphetamine user also ingests LSD, the
likelihood he will experience paranoia and psychosis is even greater. And because
these substances deplete the brain‟s stores of neurotransmitters, their behavior-
altering effects can exist long after they are eliminated from the body. Moreover,
when a chronic abuser of methamphetamine and LSD consumes alcohol, the likely
result is paranoia, impulsiveness, and lack of inhibition.
The defense also called forensic and clinical toxicologist Randall Baselt,
Ph.D., who analyzed the urine sample collected from defendant shortly after his
arrest. According to Dr. Baselt, the sample showed the presence of LSD and
amphetamine, but no reportable level of methamphetamine. Dr. Baselt also
8
concluded by extrapolation that at the time of the crimes, defendant‟s blood-
alcohol level was between .12 to .14 percent.
B. Penalty phase
1. Prosecution evidence
After the jury that convicted defendant deadlocked on penalty, the trial court
declared a mistrial and impaneled a second jury. Because the prosecution based
its case in aggravation largely on the circumstances of the crimes, the new jury
heard much of the same testimony the prosecution had presented at the guilt phase.
Thus, Hayes and Kirkpatrick again described the events inside Dixon‟s home that
had caused her cardiac arrest and subsequent death. Medical experts testified, as
they did at the guilt phase, about the extent of Dixon‟s injuries and the cause of
her death. Likewise, police officers and other forensic professionals repeated their
earlier testimony about defendant‟s arrest, his calm, cooperative demeanor, and
the results of DNA and toxicology testing of defendant‟s semen, blood, and urine,
which identified defendant as the perpetrator of the sexual assaults and showed no
reportable amounts of methamphetamine, LSD, or any other controlled substance.
The prosecution also presented evidence of four instances of prior violent
conduct or threats of violence. Twenty-year-old Jason L. testified that defendant
had sexually assaulted him as a youth. Jason, his mother, defendant, and
defendant‟s mother lived together as a family for about eight years. While at
home alone one day after school when Jason was eight and defendant was 12 or
13, defendant asked Jason to masturbate and orally copulate him, and then
threatened him with a steak knife when he refused. After Jason acquiesced and
orally copulated defendant, defendant sodomized him, telling the sobbing child to
scream into a pillow if it hurt and to calm down, “like nothing had happened.”
Defendant then dictated a note for Jason to write, describing the incident and
9
promising never to talk about it, which defendant took from him and kept. Jason
later told his mother what happened, and she told defendant‟s mother, but the
matter went no further.
Testimony by police and sheriff‟s deputies described defendant‟s violent
encounters with law enforcement on two occasions. Less than one year before
committing the capital crimes, defendant confronted a plainclothes officer who
made eye contact with him on a downtown San Diego sidewalk. Defendant
angrily threatened, “I will fuck you up,” when the officer denied defendant‟s
accusation that he was staring at him. Defendant also violently resisted efforts to
move him to a new cell while he was being held in San Diego County jail awaiting
trial in the case. In that incident, six deputies removed defendant from his cell
using pepper spray and an electrically charged shield after he disobeyed an order
to relocate to a different cell module. Defendant ultimately walked out of his cell,
but then lowered his head, raised his fists in the air, and charged at the officers,
breaking free of their hold and running some 500 feet before finally being
subdued.
As a fourth incident of prior violent conduct, through a stipulation, the
prosecution presented evidence that defendant, upon hearing his former counsel
express doubt about his competence to proceed to trial, sprang out of his chair,
lunged at her, and called her a vulgar name, but did not strike her.
The prosecution placed into evidence an American Red Cross adult CPR
certification card issued to defendant that was found in his pocket at the time of
his arrest. Captain Burson of the Placer County Fire Department, who was the
instructor of a CPR and first aid class defendant attended six months before
committing the capital crimes, testified that defendant received an “A” in the
course, which had included instruction on how to recognize the signs and
symptoms of shock and respiratory distress.
10
The prosecutor also called numerous witnesses to testify about the impact of
Dixon‟s death on her family, friends, and the community at large.
2. Defense evidence
The defense presented an extensive case in mitigation that emphasized the
unconventional, unconstrained, and disruptive upbringing that hindered
defendant‟s normal development into adulthood, and the continual decline in
defendant‟s mental health that was manifested by his drug addiction and
significant changes in his behavior as a youth.
Defendant‟s mother, Pauletta Taylor, testified that she moved from the East
Coast to San Diego with defendant when he was six years old. When defendant
was about eight years old, they began residing with Taylor‟s partner, Rosemary L.,
and L.‟s young son Jason L. Rosemary L. considered herself a “second mother” to
defendant, but disciplined him harshly and often used drugs in front of him,
including LSD and methamphetamine. By the time defendant was 14 years old,
he had gone from smoking marijuana with school friends to using heavier drugs
such as PCP, methamphetamine, and cocaine with a tougher crowd, sometimes
disappearing for days at a time.
Taylor told the jury she sought help for her son‟s drug problem by
committing him to Harbor View Hospital, an inpatient rehabilitation facility.
Defendant complained bitterly about how he was being treated there and
eventually persuaded his mother to let him come home. But after defendant
reverted to his former behavior, Taylor again committed him to Harbor View.
Later, during a family therapy session at the facility, Taylor disclosed to defendant
that he had been conceived as a result of his father raping her. Defendant, who
was already upset about his mother‟s lesbian lifestyle and his father‟s absence,
11
was devastated by the disclosure of the circumstances of his conception because it
shattered his dream that his parents would someday reunite.
As Taylor further explained to the jury, following defendant‟s second release
from Harbor View, they moved from San Diego‟s Ocean Beach area to the North
Park area in the hope that the new environment would help defendant stay away
from drugs. After the move, however, defendant‟s behavior changed significantly.
He spent most of his time in his bedroom with the blinds drawn and the lights off,
and complained that neighbors and strangers were watching and filming him.
When defendant did interact with others, he would often stare at them or become
confrontational. He was also delusional. For example, he continued to insist that
Taylor and Dr. Sambs, the treating psychiatrist from Harbor View Hospital, had
sold defendant‟s martial arts moves to the producers of Teenage Mutant Ninja
Turtles. Finally, after an incident in which defendant wrestled with Taylor over a
shotgun and locked himself in the bathroom, Taylor ordered him to move out, and
he started living on the streets or in a shelter. Defendant later moved back in with
his mother and her partner and was sometimes employed, but only for short
periods of time.
Numerous witnesses who had known defendant at various points in his youth
and young adulthood likewise testified about the substantial changes in his
behavior over time. For instance, a former girlfriend testified that in seventh grade
defendant was a nice and understanding person, dressed well, and was optimistic
about life, but that when she saw him several years later, he was dirty, disheveled,
and sad and hopeless about his life. Friend and neighbor Melville Goot, who had
hired defendant to be the doorman at his short-lived downtown San Diego jazz
club, testified that defendant sometimes said strange, childlike things, like
suggesting the Power Rangers might be able to help them. Several witnesses
related incidents in which defendant would get a “glassy look” and disappear
12
mentally. Others observed that, while watching movies or television shows,
defendant would often converse with himself or laugh inappropriately. Still other
witnesses described incidents in which defendant lost control and became
confrontational and violent over seemingly trivial matters, and then walked off as
if nothing had happened.
The defense presented the testimony of three experts to explain the sources
and nature of defendant‟s mental illness and developmental deficiencies.
Psychiatrist Samuel Benson, M.D., had evaluated defendant at the defense‟s
behest, first for purposes of competency and later for the penalty phase. Dr.
Benson opined that defendant suffers from paranoid schizophrenia and substance
abuse. According to Dr. Benson, defendant has exhibited all of the symptoms of
schizophrenia, including hallucinations, delusions, psychotic denial and paranoia,
emotional and social withdrawal, and severe difficulties with abstract thinking.
Dr. Benson also explained that in the initial stages of schizophrenia, which
typically occur during late adolescence or early adulthood, the symptoms wax and
wane.
Dr. Benson disagreed with other mental health experts who had diagnosed
defendant as having antisocial personality disorder, and he noted that several of
the treating psychiatrists had prescribed strong antipsychotic medications for
defendant. Furthermore, Dr. Benson explained, his own present diagnosis was
based on information the other experts lacked, including the medical records of
defendant‟s father, who likewise suffered from schizophrenia.
A specialist in addiction medicine, Alex Stalcup, M.D., concurred in Dr.
Benson‟s diagnosis of schizophrenia and testified about the relationship between
drug addiction and mental illness. Dr. Stalcup‟s review of defendant‟s family
background and mental health history showed all of the risk factors that predispose
an individual to both schizophrenia and drug addiction: a family history of
13
addiction, mental illness, and trauma (in defendant‟s case, his early exposure to
drugs and discomfort with his mother‟s homosexuality). According to Dr.
Stalcup, schizophrenics often use methamphetamine because it gives them a
feeling of pleasure that their mental illness prevents them from experiencing, and a
schizophrenic who is under the influence of that substance might seem normal
because the drug increases focus and energy.
Like Dr. Benson, Dr. Stalcup disagreed with the mental health experts who
diagnosed defendant as having an antisocial personality disorder. As Dr. Stalcup
explained, a paranoid schizophrenic may exhibit antisocial behavior, such as
rudeness, speaking out of turn, and making threats. But whereas an individual
with an antisocial personality is cold, calculating, and directed by self-
gratification, a schizophrenic suffers from a psychosis and delusions that make
him feel threatened, persecuted and anxious. In Dr. Stalcup‟s opinion, defendant‟s
behavior was impulsive, not manipulative, and he consistently acted in a
counterproductive way that did not benefit him.
Psychologist/sociologist Nathan Hare, Ph.D., testified regarding the impact
of society on the development of African-American males. Based on a review of
defendant‟s family and medical history, Dr. Hare concluded that defendant‟s
developmental progress had been substantially hindered by a number of factors,
including the instability of his early childhood, his father‟s absence, his shame
over his mother‟s homosexuality, and his exposure to drugs and abuse at the hands
of his mother‟s partner. Because of defendant‟s arrested development, he lacked
social skills and the ability to deal with authority, and he had no sense of identity.
According to Dr. Hare, these deficiencies set up defendant for failure in the other
stages of development and led to his self-imposed isolation, during which time he
experienced delusional thinking.
14
The defense again called its own experts to testify about the extent of
Dixon‟s injuries and cause of her death. Dr. Wolf testified, as he had at the guilt
phase, that Dixon may have suffered a series of small, undetected heart attacks
related to her diabetes well before the sexual assaults. Emergency medicine
physician Steven Gabaeff, M.D., testified that Dixon‟s long-standing history of
atrophic vaginitis, which is characterized by thin and dry vaginal mucosa, made
her vagina more susceptible to tearing from the sexual assaults.
Finally, the defense presented testimony on the appropriateness of imposing a
sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Former correctional officer
James Esten testified that an inmate convicted of special circumstance murder is
automatically confined in a prison with the highest security level, under direct and
constant observation by correctional staff. Based on information he received from
the defense team and his own meeting with defendant, Esten believed defendant
would pose no threat to other inmates or prison staff if confined in such a setting
for life.
3. Prosecution’s rebuttal
In rebuttal, the prosecutor presented three mental health experts who
challenged the defense evidence relating to defendant‟s mental illness. Forensic
psychiatrist Steven Ornish, M.D., testified that he had reviewed all of the records
in the case and found no evidence the crime was the result of a psychosis or a
delusion; rather, it was committed purposefully by someone with predatory,
antisocial traits. Although conceding there was some evidence defendant had
exhibited symptoms of psychosis, Dr. Ornish attributed such behaviors to
defendant‟s use of LSD and methamphetamine, which can mimic the symptoms of
schizophrenia.
15
Psychiatrist William Hocter, M.D., who treated defendant when he was in
county jail during the prosecution of his case, testified about defendant‟s mental
health during that period of time. Defendant exhibited no symptoms of
schizophrenia and, until three months before the penalty retrial, denied he suffered
from the illness or needed treatment. Then, in February 1997, defendant gave Dr.
Hocter a “laundry list” of his symptoms and requested medication. Based on
defendant‟s description of his symptoms, some of which Dr. Hocter found
“unusual,” Dr. Hocter ruled out malingering and diagnosed defendant as suffering
from a psychotic disorder not otherwise specified.
The prosecution‟s rebuttal concluded with the testimony of clinical and
forensic psychologist Gregg Michel, Ph.D., one of the court-appointed mental
health experts who had evaluated defendant for purposes of a competency hearing.
In his report for that proceeding, Dr. Michel had diagnosed defendant as
malingering and having an antisocial personality disorder, and he saw nothing
suggesting defendant suffered from schizophrenia.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Pretrial denial of requests for substitution of trial counsel
Six times before trial, defendant requested, or appeared to request,
substitution of his appointed counsel. The trial court denied all but the final
request. Defendant now challenges these rulings. We conclude, however, that the
trial court did not err in failing to replace defendant‟s counsel earlier in the
proceedings.
The San Diego County Public Defender‟s Office first represented defendant
in this case, but withdrew within weeks of the appointment based on a conflict of
interest. The trial court then appointed Mary Ellen Attridge of the office of the
San Diego County Alternate Public Defender to represent defendant.
16
Six months later, at a pretrial hearing on January 25, 1996, Attridge told the
trial court that defendant might not be competent to stand trial and requested a
competency hearing pursuant to section 1368.1 Attridge indicated defendant was
uncooperative, uncommunicative, delusional, and paranoid, and had told her he
was experiencing auditory and visual hallucinations. When defendant responded
that he believed counsel had “turned against [him],” Attridge asked that the district
attorney be excused from the courtroom. The trial court dismissed the request,
saying, “this is not a Marsden hearing.”2 Nonetheless, defendant continued to
complain about counsel, calling her “insubordinate” and claiming he had “asked
her constantly to do what I say as an attorney and [she had] not.”
As defendant continued to complain, counsel attempted to talk over him so as
to prevent his comments from appearing on the record. The trial court quickly
interceded, declared a doubt as to defendant‟s mental competence, and ordered the
proceedings suspended. In response to the trial court‟s ruling, defendant stated:
“Excuse me, Judge. I have fired this attorney.” The trial court brushed aside the
comment, stating, “I know you have,” and proceeded to schedule the mental
competency evaluation. After the trial court set an evaluation date and ended the
hearing, defendant rose from his chair, lunged at Attridge, and yelled, “You have
no client, you fucking cunt.”
1 Section 1368 requires the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine a
defendant‟s present mental competence if “a doubt arises in the mind of the judge
as to the mental competence of the defendant” (id., subd. (a)) or “[i]f counsel
informs the court that he or she believes the defendant is or may be mentally
incompetent” (id., subd (b).).
2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
17
At a subsequent hearing one month later on February 22, 1996, the trial court
indicated it had reviewed and agreed with a report by the court-appointed
psychologist, Dr. Gregg Michel, who concluded that defendant suffered no mental
infirmities that rendered him incompetent to stand trial. When defense counsel
requested jury trial on the issue and asked to make an offer of proof outside of the
prosecutor‟s presence, the trial court granted the request.
Following defense counsel‟s offer of proof, the trial court asked defendant if
he understood what was happening. Defendant replied, “So far my attorney
believes that I am incompetent and for that reason I decide that I need another
attorney.” The trial court reminded defendant that another attorney, John Lee, had
been added to the defense team to help resolve defendant‟s apparent
dissatisfaction with lead counsel. But defendant was not appeased, noting, “Mr.
Lee works with Mrs. Attridge and . . . [w]e don‟t get along at all.” Defendant
reiterated that he did not believe Attridge could represent him, and referred to her
as “insubordinate” and “rude.” The trial court responded, “Because of the mental
competence problem, I do not feel a Marsden [hearing] would be proper at this
point so we have to settle the 1368 problem and then we‟ll handle the Marsden
problem.”
Later in the hearing, with the courtroom now reopened to the public and the
prosecutor present, defendant renewed his request for another attorney, saying, “I
no longer accept her legal advice.” The trial court indicated that it would not
change counsel at this point, but defendant persisted, blurting out, “They are all
against me” and “She is not helping me.” However, the trial court ignored
defendant‟s remarks and conferred with the attorneys about various issues
concerning the competency trial.
The parties were in court again the next day to select their experts and set
competency trial dates. Once those arrangements had been made, the prosecutor
18
brought to the trial court‟s attention legal precedent establishing that a defendant
seeking substitution of counsel is entitled to a Marsden hearing even when
proceedings have been suspended under section 1368. Confirming with defendant
that he wanted a hearing to determine whether new counsel would be appointed,
the trial court cleared the courtroom except for defendant and his counsel.
At the Marsden hearing, defendant detailed his complaints about counsel.
According to defendant, counsel was providing him with misleading legal advice
and lashing out at him when he asked for something. He called her “brutal” and
“insubordinate” and claimed she ignored his requests, including his request for a
speedy trial.
Upon the trial court‟s request for a response, counsel first expressed the view
that defendant‟s dissatisfaction was based on a mental defect. She had no idea
what defendant meant by “lashing out” and believed he called her “insubordinate”
because she expressed a doubt as to his competence. As for not acceding to his
requests, counsel explained that she refused to give defendant a copy of the police
report in his case because she feared it might fall into the hands of another inmate
who would use it to testify falsely against defendant. Regarding defendant‟s
demand for speedy trial, counsel indicated that the case was not ready to go to trial
and she believed defendant was more lucid when he initially agreed to waive his
speedy trial rights. Defendant declined the trial court‟s invitation to reply to
counsel‟s explanation, stating, “She said it all.”
Finding no breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and no reason
counsel could not adequately represent defendant in the future, the trial court
denied defendant‟s motion for substitution of counsel. It remarked that counsel
was highly competent and well respected, and expressed the view that any
problems between attorney and client were the result of defendant‟s willful and
defiant attitude or a mental problem, whether feigned or not.
19
On April 8, 1996, the section 1368 trial began. Initially, the parties prepared
for a jury trial. However, after the noon recess, counsel announced she would
waive defendant‟s right to a jury trial. Defendant objected, and again expressed
his dissatisfaction with counsel. When the trial court explained to defendant that
the law permitted counsel to waive a jury, even against his wishes, defendant
responded: “I fired her. I have constantly repeated that she is not my attorney.”
The trial court reminded defendant, “You do have an attorney.” But defendant
took issue with the trial court, saying, “No I don‟t, [not] one that will defend or
represent me in the manner that I need to be represented.”
One week later, on April 15, 1996, the trial court determined that defendant
was competent to stand trial and ordered reinstatement of criminal proceedings.
The parties then discussed setting the guilt phase trial for a date in July. Noting
that July was three months away, defendant asked how long it would be before he
could see another attorney. He stated that the trial court‟s competency finding
“means I can fire [trial counsel] now.” After defendant confirmed he wanted
another attorney, the trial court cleared the courtroom and conducted a second
Marsden hearing.
At this hearing, defendant reiterated his earlier assertion that counsel was
“not representing” him. He complained that the competency hearing was a
proceeding he had not wanted. “Things that she said to you,” defendant remarked,
“my public defender would have not. . . . My public defender would not have
questioned my sanity.”
The trial court found insufficient grounds to relieve defense counsel of her
appointment and denied defendant‟s motion for substitution of counsel. However,
the next morning, April 16, it reconvened with defendant and his counsel and
announced it had changed its mind regarding the Marsden motion. The trial court
noted that it had conducted the competency hearing at defense counsel‟s request
20
over defendant‟s objection, and that both members of the defense team had
testified about their contacts with defendant. Given these developments, the trial
court found more validity to defendant‟s asserted distrust of his attorney. In the
trial court‟s view, although counsel had handled the case appropriately, the
attorney-client relationship had deteriorated and the breakdown warranted
appointment of new counsel.3
Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant his
request to substitute counsel until April 16, after the competency hearing, and that
the error resulted in an unreliable competency hearing. He argues that despite his
repeated and clear expressions of distrust of counsel and desire for a new attorney,
the trial court first ignored, then never fully addressed, his concerns over an
irreconcilable breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.
When a defendant seeks substitution of appointed counsel pursuant to People
v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, “the trial court must permit the defendant to
explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of inadequate
performance. The defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the
appointed counsel is not providing adequate representation or that defendant and
counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective
representation is likely to result.” (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 604;
see also People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 603.)
We review the denial of a Marsden motion for abuse of discretion. (People
v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1085.) Denial is not an abuse of discretion
“unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace counsel would
3 The court reappointed the San Diego County Public Defender‟s Office to
represent defendant.
21
substantially impair the defendant‟s right to assistance of counsel.” (People v.
Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 604.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant‟s request for
substitution of counsel on February 23, before the competency hearing.
Immediately upon being apprised of its duty to conduct a Mardsen hearing even
though it had suspended the proceedings pursuant to section 1368, the trial court
provided defendant with an opportunity to air his complaints. After then
considering counsel‟s responses to each of defendant‟s grievances, the trial court
was entitled to credit counsel‟s explanations and to conclude that defendant‟s
complaints were unfounded. (People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696.) For
instance, the trial court reasonably could find that counsel had properly refused to
provide defendant with the police reports in his case because of concern the
documents would fall into the hands of a would-be jailhouse informant who might
use the police reports to fabricate evidence against defendant. The trial court
reasonably could conclude, moreover, that replacement of counsel was not
required because any deterioration in the attorney-client relationship that had
occurred was due to defendant‟s willful, defiant attitude or to a mental problem
that was either feigned or real. “[A] defendant may not force the substitution of
counsel by his own conduct that manufactures a conflict.” (Ibid.)
Defendant posits that the trial court‟s decision to replace counsel after the
competency hearing supports his argument that it should have ordered substitution
before commencing the hearing. Indeed, he asserts, if his cursing and lunge at
counsel did not irretrievably damage the attorney-client relationship, it is hard to
imagine anything that would. Contrary to defendant‟s suggestion, however,
heated words alone do not require substitution of counsel without a showing of an
irreconcilable conflict. (People v. Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 696.) And whereas
defendant‟s earlier requests for new counsel were supported by generalized
22
expressions of distrust and dissatisfaction, the competency hearing both
crystallized and validated the reasons for his distrust. The trial court could
reasonably conclude that allowing counsel to continue to represent defendant after
testifying against him at a competency hearing held against his wishes would
substantially impair defendant‟s right to the effective assistance of counsel. But
the trial court‟s decision to replace counsel at that point does not call into question
its earlier denial of defendant‟s Marsden motion. The mere “ „lack of trust in, or
inability to get along with,‟ ” counsel is not sufficient grounds for substitution.
(People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1070.) Nothing in the record supports
defendant‟s assertion that a desire to expedite trial drove the trial court‟s refusal to
substitute counsel before the competency hearing.
We agree with defendant that the trial court erred when it brushed aside his
initial requests for substitution of counsel in the belief that the question of
defendant‟s competence to stand trial first had to be resolved.4 “[W]hile the trial
court may not „proceed with the case against the defendant‟ before it determines
his competence in a section 1368 hearing [citation], it may and indeed must
promptly consider a motion for substitution of counsel when the right to effective
assistance „would be substantially impaired‟ if his request were ignored.
[Citation.]” (People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 88.)
However, contrary to defendant‟s assertion, the trial court‟s error does not
compel reversal. This is not a case like People v. Solorzano (2005) 126
4 After the denial of defendant‟s first Marsden motion, on February 23, 1996, a
Marsden hearing was not required on April 8, 1996, when defendant had a brief
exchange with the trial court in which he again insisted that Attridge was not his
attorney. A trial court is not required to conduct a Marsden hearing each time a
defendant makes the same complaint about counsel. (People v. Clark (1992) 3
Cal.4th 41, 104.)
23
Cal.App.4th 1063, in which the trial court refused to hold any Marsden hearing
until after the results of a competency hearing. In Solorzano, the defendant‟s
complaints about his counsel pertained to counsel‟s deficiencies in handling the
competency hearing, at which, over defendant‟s objection, he was adjudged
competent. On these facts, the Court of Appeal concluded it could not find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had not affected the competency
hearing‟s outcome. (Id. at pp. 1069-1071.) Here, by contrast, the trial court
conducted a first Marsden hearing in which defendant communicated his
complaints about counsel before the competency proceedings occurred, and as
previously discussed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
substitution of counsel at that point. Defendant thus fails to show that the trial
court‟s initial failure to hold a Marsden hearing prejudiced him.
The facts here closely resemble those in People v. Govea (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 57, in which the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court‟s error
in refusing the defendant‟s requests for a Marsden hearing while criminal
proceedings were suspended under section 1368 was not prejudicial. There, as
here, the defendant claimed he had a conflict with his attorney after counsel
declared a doubt as to the defendant‟s competence, and he made numerous
requests for substitution of counsel. (People v. Govea, supra, at pp. 59-61.)
Although the trial court initially refused to consider the defendant‟s grounds for
seeking new counsel, it conducted a Marsden hearing before the competency
proceeding and did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant‟s request for
substitution of counsel at that time. (Govea, at p. 62.) Like the trial court in this
case, the trial court in Govea ultimately found the defendant competent and
appointed new counsel. Given that the “trial court gave defendant everything he
sought,” the Court of Appeal concluded, the trial court‟s delay in conducting a
24
Marsden hearing did not prejudice the defendant. (Govea, at p. 62.) We reach the
same conclusion here.
B. Jury selection issues
1. Constitutionality of death qualification process
Defendant contends that California‟s procedure for selecting jurors in capital
cases violates his rights under the federal and state Constitutions. As explained
below, many of defendant‟s contentions are similar to those we have previously
rejected, and we find no grounds for revisiting our prior holdings. As to those
assertions we have not previously addressed, none casts doubt on the
constitutionality of California‟s death qualification process.
Under the due process clause of both the federal and state Constitutions, a
capital defendant is entitled to an impartial jury at the guilt and penalty phases of
trial. (People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 425; People v. Blair (2005) 36
Cal.4th 686, 741.) “To achieve the constitutional imperative of impartiality, the
law permits a prospective juror to be challenged for cause only if his or her views
in favor of or against capital punishment „would “ prevent or substantially impair
the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror” ‟ in accordance with the court‟s
instructions and the juror‟s oath. [Citations.]” (Blair, supra, at p. 741.) “Death
qualification” in a capital case is thus an inquiry into whether the prospective
juror‟s views and attitudes would interfere with his or her ability to “ „ “faithfully
and impartially apply the law in the case.” ‟ ” (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th
472, 498.)
As defendant acknowledges, both this court and the United States Supreme
Court have concluded that death qualification and the removal of prospective
jurors who would automatically vote for death or for life do not violate the
constitutional right to an impartial jury. (See People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d
25
932, 956-957; Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176-177.) Defendant
contends, however, that current empirical studies conclusively establish that death
qualification results in a jury that is more prone to convict and to vote for death,
thus undermining the reasoning of those prior decisions. We have previously
considered the studies defendant cites and found them inadequate to warrant
disturbing our precedent. (People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1120; People
v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1198-1199; see also Lockhart v. McCree,
supra, 476 U.S. at p. 173 [assuming for purposes of the opinion that empirical
studies adequately establish death qualification produces more conviction-prone
juries, but upholding the constitutionality of death qualification nonetheless].) We
reach the same conclusion here.
We also follow our prior decisions in rejecting defendant‟s contention that
death qualification violates his right to a jury selected from a representative cross-
section of the community. (People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 412; see also
Lockhart v. McCree, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 173-177.) And we reject defendant‟s
further assertion that death qualification violates his right to a representative jury
because empirical studies show that the process results in a disproportionate
number of ethnic minorities, women, and religious individuals being removed
from capital juries. As the high court explained in rejecting a defendant‟s claim of
an unrepresentative jury, unlike the impermissible removal of ethnic minorities or
women from jury service, “ „[d]eath qualification‟ . . . is carefully designed to
serve the State‟s concededly legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury that can
properly and impartially apply the law to the facts of the case at both the guilt and
sentencing phases of a capital trial. There is very little danger . . . that „death
qualification‟ was instituted as a means for the State to arbitrarily skew the
composition of capital-case juries.” (Lockhart v. McCree, supra, at pp. 175-176,
fn. omitted.)
26
None of defendant‟s remaining challenges to the death qualification process
requires extended discussion. Contrary to defendant‟s assertion, the prosecution
did not violate his constitutional rights by using peremptory challenges against
“death qualified” prospective jurors who had expressed skepticism about the death
penalty. (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 557-559; People v. Pride (1992)
3 Cal.4th 195, 230.) Nor does death qualification provide prosecutors an
impermissible advantage by obtaining conviction-prone juries. (See Lockhart v.
McCree, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 175-176 [finding it unlikely that death
qualification skews the composition of capital juries in the state‟s favor].)
Defendant‟s Eighth Amendment challenge to death qualification is in essence a
restatement of his claims under other constitutional provisions, which, as in
People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1212-1213, we find lacking in merit.
We likewise find flawed the premise underlying defendant‟s assertion that death
qualification, by eliminating the segment of the community that opposes the death
penalty, skews the data courts typically rely on to determine “evolving standards
of decency” for Eighth Amendment purposes. Through the death qualification
process, individuals may be excused not only for their unyielding opposition to
capital punishment but also for their intractable support of it. (People v. Lewis
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 482; People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 741.) We
reject defendant‟s contention that death qualification is irrational because it
disqualifies individuals based on their moral beliefs when the penalty phase
determination is “ „inherently moral and normative.‟ ” (People v. Prieto (2003)
30 Cal.4th 226, 263, quoting People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 779.)
Disqualified jurors are properly excused for cause, not on the basis of their
personal, moral beliefs regarding the death penalty, but because of their inability
to “temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.”
(Lockhart v. McCree, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 176; see People v. Stewart (2004) 33
27
Cal.4th 425, 446 [a juror‟s personal opposition to the death penalty is not a
permissible basis for excluding him from a capital case jury].)
2. Constitutionality of Code of Civil Procedure section 223
In several pretrial motions pertaining to jury selection, defense counsel
requested that the attorneys, in addition to the court, conduct sequestered voir dire.
The trial court denied the motions, noting that “[v]oir dire is to be done by the
judge unless the court does find good cause,” and concluding that counsel had not
shown good cause.
The voters enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 223 (section 223) in
1990 by passing Proposition 115. (As added by Prop. 115, § 7, approved by
electorate, eff. June 6, 1990.) When first enacted, the statute abrogated the former
rule requiring individual, sequestered voir dire in capital cases (People v. Waidla
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713), and allowed attorney-conducted voir dire only on a
showing of good cause.5
Defendant contends that the version of section 223 in effect at the time of his
trial violated the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions
because it placed voir dire in criminal cases in the trial courts‟ hands while Code
5 At the time of defendant‟s trial, section 223 provided: “In a criminal case, the
court shall conduct the examination of prospective jurors. However, the court may
permit the parties, upon a showing of good cause, to supplement the examination
by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or it shall itself submit to the
prospective jurors upon such a showing, such additional questions by the parties as
it deems proper. Voir dire of any prospective jurors shall, where practicable,
occur in the presence of the other jurors in all criminal cases, including death
penalty cases. . . .”
28
of Civil Procedure section 222.5 authorized attorneys for civil litigants to question
prospective jurors without having to make a good cause showing.6
As defendant acknowledges, we have previously rejected the same equal
protection challenge to section 223. (See, e.g., People v. Robinson (2005) 37
Cal.4th 592, 613; People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 511-513.) We decline
to revisit the issue here. (People v. Ramos, supra, at p. 512 [strict scrutiny is
inapplicable because the right to voir dire is not based on the Constitution;
differences in voir dire procedures are reasonably related to the former statute‟s
legitimate purpose of curbing jury selection abuses in criminal cases].)7
3. Manner of conducting voir dire
As previously noted, the trial court impaneled two juries in this case. The
first convicted defendant as charged and found true the three special circumstance
allegations, but deadlocked on penalty. The second, which the trial court
impaneled for retrial of the penalty phase, returned a verdict of death. Below, we
address defendant‟s claims regarding the first jury‟s selection. In a later section
(see post, pt. II.D.2.), we will consider defendant‟s challenge to selection of the
jury that decided penalty.
6 Effective January 1, 2001, after the trial in defendant‟s case, the Legislature
amended section 223 to provide counsel in criminal cases a limited right to question
prospective jurors without having to make a showing of good cause. (Stats. 2000,
ch. 192, § 1; see People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 455, fn. 18.)
7 Defendant suggests that the Legislature‟s amendment of section 223 after trial in
his case, which gave counsel for each party a “limited right” to question
prospective jurors directly, undermines our previous holdings. However, at the
time we considered the equal protection challenges in those decisions, we were
aware of the statute‟s amendment. (People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp.
612-613, fn. 10; People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 512, fn. 5.) Defendant
provides no basis, other than the mere fact of the amendment, that warrants
reexamining the point.
29
a. Denial of motion for individual sequestered voir dire
Defense counsel filed several pretrial motions concerning the voir dire of
prospective jurors. In one, counsel asked that voir dire be done either individually
and sequestered or in small groups of 15 to 20 prospective jurors. Counsel argued
that individual voir dire was necessary to probe the strong biases the
circumstances of the case — a young African-American man accused of
committing sexual assaults that caused the death of an elderly White woman —
were likely to evoke.
After hearing, the trial court denied defendant‟s request, finding no need to
deviate from its customary practice of questioning prospective jurors in open
court. The trial court rejected the argument that jury selection done in a large
group is tainted by an inherent herd instinct, in which potential jurors feel
pressured to answer questions about their biases neutrally, rather than truthfully.
In the trial court‟s view, “[a]ttitudes within the community are fairly fixed” on the
subject of the death penalty and “if people are against it, they say so and if they
aren‟t[,] they say so.” The trial court also noted that potential jurors would have
several days to complete a questionnaire in which they could privately express
their feelings about the death penalty, and would be questioned based on their
written responses. The trial court also indicated that although it planned to
conduct the group voir dire itself, it would allow the attorneys to ask questions
directly in the event a prospective juror wanted to be questioned in chambers,
outside the presence of other jurors.
Defendant contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights by
refusing to conduct individual, sequestered voir dire.
Initially, we disagree with respondent‟s assertion that defendant has forfeited
his claim because he did not challenge any juror for cause or exercise all of his
peremptory challenges at trial. A defendant‟s failure to raise a for-cause challenge
30
or to exhaust all peremptory challenges is relevant to the question whether he has
preserved a claim on appeal that members of his jury were unacceptable to him.
(People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 904; People v. Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th at
p. 589.) But a defendant who has made a timely objection to group voir dire and
proposed that the trial court question prospective jurors individually has done all
that is necessary. (People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 513, fn. 6.) Thus,
defendant‟s claim that the trial court erred in refusing his request is properly
before us.
However, the claim fails on the merits. As we have repeatedly observed,
there is no federal constitutional requirement that a trial court conduct
individualized, sequestered voir dire in a capital case. (People v. Lewis, supra, 43
Cal.4th at p. 494; People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 511-513.) Nor did the
trial court‟s denial of the motion for individual, sequestered voir dire violate any
of defendant‟s rights under the state Constitution or state law. (People v. Lewis,
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 494; People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 713-714
[denial of motion for individual, sequestered voir dire reviewed for abuse of
discretion].) Section 223 provides in relevant part that “[v]oir dire of any
prospective jurors shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other
jurors.” Group voir dire may be “impracticable” when it has resulted in “actual,
rather than merely potential, bias.” (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 288.)
Here, however, defendant does not suggest that either the trial court‟s comments
or the responses of other prospective jurors to the trial court‟s questioning
influenced any prospective juror, and we find nothing in the record to indicate that
group voir dire resulted in actual bias. (Cf. People v. Lewis, supra, at pp. 494-495
[evidence that 16 jurors changed their questionnaire answers after being
“educated” during the voir dire process did not establish actual bias]; People v.
31
Vieira, supra, at p. 289 [the possibility that prospective jurors may have answered
questions to please the trial court shows at most potential, not actual, bias].)
Furthermore, the trial court acted well within its discretion in determining
that group voir dire was “practicable” in this case. Though aware it had discretion
to order individual, sequestered voir dire, the trial court, for the reasons it stated,
reasonably rejected the argument that a “herd instinct” required a departure from
its usual practice of questioning prospective jurors in large groups. Moreover,
prospective jurors received lengthy questionnaires to complete on their own time,
and the trial court, aided by counsel, conducted individualized voir dire when
further inquiry into a questionnaire response was required or requested by any
prospective juror who wished to discuss sensitive issues privately in chambers.
The trial court‟s approach to voir dire was reasonable on this record. (Cf. People
v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 514 [group voir dire was practicable where the
trial court used juror questionnaires and allowed counsel privately to question
certain prospective jurors].) Accordingly, we find that in denying defendant‟s
motion for individualized voir dire of all prospective jurors, the trial court neither
abused its discretion nor violated defendant‟s constitutional rights.
b. Adequacy of questioning on potential racial bias
Defendant contends the trial court violated his right to an impartial jury
because its voir dire was inadequate to discover racial bias in the prospective
jurors.
The trial court gave prospective jurors at the first trial a questionnaire
containing 98 questions, four of which concerned racial attitudes. One asked
generally whether the prospective juror had “any racial or ethnic prejudices.”
Another asked whether the prospective juror had “any bias for or against the
defendant based upon his race.” A third explained that the defendant in the case
32
“is African American” and asked the prospective juror whether “this fact [would]
affect you as a juror at all.” The fourth asked whether the prospective juror could
be “impartial . . . in the case where an African American male is accused of
committing crimes against a [C]aucasian female.” The questions called for yes-or-
no or multiple-choice answers, and further directed, “If „Yes,‟ Please describe” or
“Please explain,” followed by three or four lines for additional comment.
Defendant complains generally that during voir dire the trial court conducted
no inquiry into the racial views of any juror who served on the first jury. More
specifically, he asserts that the written responses of three jurors contained
contradictions or ambiguities that required follow-up questions on the issue of
race. In support of his complaint, he cites the trial court‟s failure to ask follow-up
questions of two jurors who indicated they had no “racial or ethnic prejudices,”
had no bias for or against defendant based on his race, and would not be affected
by the fact that defendant is African-American, but who also answered “No” when
asked if they could be impartial jurors in a case where an African-American man
is accused of committing crimes against a Caucasian female. Defendant also cites
the trial court‟s failure to ask follow-up questions of another juror who, when
asked whether she had any racial or ethnic prejudices, marked both “mild” and
“none,” and explained: “On occasion I find myself fearful around large numbers
of [B]lacks, Hispanics— or even [W]hites — if it is an unsafe area.” Given the
cross-racial nature of the crimes, defendant argues, the trial court had to conduct
searching voir dire of the sort designed to reveal subtle racial biases that might
affect the prospective jurors‟ view of the evidence, and its failure to do so violated
his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury.
Defendant has forfeited this claim of error because his counsel failed to
suggest follow-up questions the trial court could have asked the prospective jurors
or otherwise complain about the adequacy of the trial court‟s voir dire. At the
33
time the trial court denied counsel‟s motion for attorney-conducted voir dire, it
expressly offered counsel an opportunity to suggest supplemental questions while
voir dire was in progress, and stated it would permit counsel to ask questions
directly when voir dire was being conducted in chambers. The record suggests
defense counsel found no need to take the court up on its offer. Defendant,
therefore, has not preserved for appeal his claim of inadequate voir dire. (People
v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 620.)
But even were defendant‟s claim properly before us, it would fail on its
merits. “[A]dequate inquiry into possible racial bias is . . . essential in a case in
which an African-American defendant is charged with commission of a capital
crime against a White victim.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 660; see
also Mu’min v. Virginia (1991) 500 U.S. 415, 424 [the 14th Amend. requires
inquiry into racial prejudice in cases involving a Black defendant accused of
violent crimes against a White victim].) However, because the trial court “is in the
best position to assess the amount of voir dire required to ferret our latent
prejudice, and to judge the responses” (People v. Taylor (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th
1299, 1314), it has wide discretion in conducting voir dire in areas of inquiry that
might disclose juror bias and “ „in deciding what questions should be asked on
voir dire.‟ ” (People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 737.) It abuses that
discretion if its failure to ask questions renders the defendant‟s trial
“ „fundamentally unfair‟ ” or “ „ “if the questioning is not reasonably sufficient to
test the jury for bias or partiality.” ‟ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 737.)
Having reviewed the questionnaire, the written responses, and the voir dire of
the jurors who served on the first trial, we conclude the trial court‟s inquiry into
possible racial bias provides no basis for reversing. The questionnaire included
four questions that elicited from prospective jurors whether they held any racial
biases and whether the circumstance defendant was an African-American man
34
accused of committing crimes against a White woman would affect their
impartiality. (Cf. People v. Taylor, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 1316 [in
prosecution where the potential for racial bias against the defendant exists, the trial
court‟s inquiry should elicit from prospective jurors their actual biases].) The
record discloses several instances in which the trial court did inquire further into
the subject of racial prejudice when warranted.8 Moreover, as to all but three of
the seated jurors, nothing in the questionnaire responses suggests that further
inquiry into possible racial bias was necessary.
Regarding the three seated jurors whose questionnaire responses defendant
now claims warranted further questioning regarding racial bias, it is unclear from
the record why the trial court did not conduct additional questioning. (See People
v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 448 [the juror‟s ambiguous answers on the
questionnaire prompted a need for clarification on oral voir dire].)
But even were the trial court‟s questioning of these prospective jurors
deficient as defendant claims, the voir dire, when viewed as a whole (People v.
Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 661), was not so inadequate as to render his trial
fundamentally unfair. In People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at page 620, we
found that the assertedly flawed voir dire examination of a prospective juror did
not result in a fundamentally unfair trial, noting that defense counsel had an
opportunity to suggest additional questions to be put to specific individuals but
apparently saw no need to do so. We found, moreover, that defense counsel‟s
failure to exhaust the entire allotment of peremptory challenges and the fact the
first jury deadlocked on penalty were “ „ “strong indication[s] „that the jurors were
8
For instance, the trial court probed the racial attitudes of a prospective juror
who indicated in his questionnaire that he had “moderate” racial prejudices “with
all races and ethnicities,” and ultimately excused the prospective juror for cause.
35
fair, and that the defense itself so concluded.‟ ” ‟ ” (Id. at p. 619.) These factors
dictate a similar result here.
We reject defendant‟s assertion, which he bases on People v. Stewart, supra,
33 Cal.4th 425, that the trial court relied too heavily on the questionnaires and
asked too few questions during voir dire. In Stewart, we concluded the trial court
committed reversible error in excusing five prospective jurors for cause based
solely on their questionnaire responses without any follow-up questioning
regarding their views on the death penalty. (Id. at pp. 441-455.) Here, the juror
questionnaire gave the prospective jurors a clear opportunity to disclose views
about racial bias that would warrant their excusal from the jury. (People v. Avila,
supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 531 [the trial court properly excused jurors for cause based
solely on their questionnaire responses where the questionnaire was expansive and
detailed, and the jurors‟ answers were unambiguous].) Furthermore, the trial court
questioned every juror who served on defendant‟s first jury, observing their
responses and demeanor and thereby gleaning “valuable information” about their
states of mind. (People v. Stewart, supra, at p. 451.) Under these circumstances,
the trial court‟s conclusions regarding the jurors‟ impartiality are entitled to
deference. (Id. at pp. 450-451.)
Nor, contrary to defendant‟s suggestion, was the examination into possible
racial bias in this case akin to the inadequate voir dire that led to reversal of the
defendant‟s conviction in People v. Wilborn (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 339. In
Wilborn, the African-American defendant‟s trial strategy was to challenge the
credibility of the White officers who stopped and then arrested him for a drug
offense. (Id. at pp. 342-343.) Both orally and by written motion, defense counsel
asked that the prospective jurors be questioned about racial bias, but the trial court
refused to inquire into the subject, saying it “ „would rather not get into race.‟ ”
(Id. at p. 343.) The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that under the
36
circumstances of the case, the trial court had an obligation to make “some inquiry”
into racial bias. (Id. at p. 348.) Because none was made, the appellate court
concluded, the defendant was deprived of his right to an impartial jury. (Ibid.)
Here, by contrast, the prospective jurors‟ responses to four questions likely to
elicit racial biases, coupled with the trial court‟s observation of their demeanor
during questioning, provided the trial court with an ample basis for ferreting out
prospective jurors whose racial bias would interfere with their ability to be
impartial. Furthermore, defense counsel did not ask for additional inquiry on the
subject of racial bias and the record contains nothing to suggest the trial court
would have refused such a request. Defendant‟s reliance on Wilborn is, therefore,
misplaced.
For similar reasons, the New Jersey Supreme Court‟s decision in State v.
Williams (N.J. 1988) 550 A.2d 1172, which reversed an African-American
defendant‟s conviction and death sentence, does not assist defendant. Noting that
the trial court‟s voir dire consisted of only one question on racial bias, the
Williams court observed, “When the defendant is a member of a cognizable
minority group, a more searching voir dire should be conducted, if requested.”
(Id. at p. 1190, second italics added; see also People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th
515, 539 [in a case involving an interracial killing, the trial court must question
prospective jurors about racial prejudice “on request”].)
4. Prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror T.B.
Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion under People v.
Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler) and Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S.
79 (Batson), which asserted that the prosecutor impermissibly exercised a
peremptory challenge against an African-American female prospective juror based
on group bias.
37
The governing principles are well settled. “Under Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d
258, „[a] prosecutor‟s use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on
the basis of group bias — that is, bias against “members of an identifiable group
distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds” — violates the right
of a criminal defendant to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section
of the community under article I, section 16 of the state Constitution. [Citation.]
„Such a practice also violates the defendant‟s right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. [Citations.]‟ ” (People v. Hawthorne (2009) 46 Cal.4th
67, 77-78.)
“Batson states the procedure and standard trial courts should use when
handling motions challenging peremptory strikes.” (People v. Lewis and Oliver
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1008.) “First, the defendant must make out a prima facie
case „by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of
discriminatory purpose.‟ [Citation.] Second, once the defendant has made out a
prima facie case, the „burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial
exclusion‟ by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.
[Citations.] Third, „[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must
then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial
discrimination.‟ [Citation.]” (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168, fn.
omitted (Johnson).)
After the trial court here concluded its voir dire of the prospective jurors, the
parties proceeded to exercise their peremptory challenges. The prosecution
exercised its fourth peremptory strike against Prospective Juror T.B., a young
African-American woman. Defense counsel immediately asked to approach the
bench, but the trial court denied the request. The peremptory challenges continued
until the trial court called a recess. After the prospective jurors left the courtroom,
defense counsel presented his objection to the prosecutor‟s strike against T.B.,
38
claiming that the prosecutor had excused the prospective juror in violation of the
state and federal constitutional principles espoused in Wheeler and Batson.
Counsel acknowledged that one other African-American woman then was in the
jury box, but asserted, “[W]e are deficient,” and argued that the only reason the
prosecutor excused T.B. was because of her race.
The trial court asked the prosecutor what she “ha[d] to say about that.” The
prosecutor inquired, “Is the court asking me to give reasons?” The trial court
replied: “Tell you something, I know they have to make a showing. However, in
this type of a case, I think it is important that the records be complete.”
In response to the trial court‟s request for “some type of a basis” for excusing
T.B., the prosecutor first explained: “She is 23 years old, which I have a rating as
to youth and life experience, so it is a standard form I use for all the jurors. When
I use the form, that‟s a negative being that age. I have an 18 to 29 range which is a
negative, 23 years old, single, no children, basically no life experience . . . .” The
prosecutor then explained that her “main reason” for excusing T.B. “is that [T.B.]
said she was undecided on death.” The prosecutor indicated she also felt T.B. had
not been forthright about a crime for which her brother had been arrested in 1989.
The trial court disagreed with that assessment, interjecting that T.B. disclosed on
the juror questionnaire that her brother had been arrested for manslaughter and
discussed the issue in chambers, saying she felt her brother had been treated fairly.
The prosecutor added, finally, that T.B. did not vote.
The trial court then asked defense counsel whether he had anything further to
say. Counsel responded, “Submit it.” The trial court then denied the Wheeler
motion without comment.
Initially, we reject defendant‟s argument that, because the trial court asked
the prosecutor to state her race-neutral reasons for excusing T.B., we should
proceed immediately to the third step of the Batson analysis — determining
39
whether the record supports the prosecutor‟s race-neutral explanations — without
first determining whether defendant established a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination. Defendant relies on the high court‟s statement in Hernandez v.
New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, that “[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral
explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the
ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether
the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.” (Id. at p. 359.)
However, a trial court‟s request that the prosecutor provide reasons for his or her
exercise of a peremptory challenge is not an implicit finding the defendant has
established a prima facie case, and does not moot the issue, in every instance. “In
determining whether to infer a trial court finding of a prima facie case under
Wheeler, we look to the whole record, examining the court‟s remarks in context.”
(People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 605, fn. 2.) For example, in People v.
Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 746, where the trial court had stated it did not
believe the defendant had made a prima facie case under Wheeler, we declined to
infer a contrary finding from the trial court‟s request that the prosecutor justify the
peremptory challenges at issue “for purposes of completing the record on appeal.”
(See also People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1091-1092.) By contrast, in
People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415, we determined that by asking the
prosecutor for an explanation, the trial court had impliedly found a prima facie
case because “ „nothing in the record suggest[ed]‟ ” the trial court found
otherwise. (Id. at p. 471, quoting People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 605, fn.
2.)
Viewing the record as a whole and examining the trial court‟s remarks in
context (People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 605, fn. 2), we conclude that
unlike in Lewis, the trial court in this case made no implicit finding that defendant
established a prima facie case of intentional racial discrimination. To the contrary,
40
the trial court‟s exchange with the prosecutor strongly suggests it found that
defendant failed to establish a prima facie case under Wheeler, but wanted to
“complet[e] the record on appeal.” (People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 476;
see also People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1018 [trial court‟s comments
implied prima facie case had not been made].) The record shows the trial court
responded to the prosecutor‟s apparent surprise at being asked to comment on
defendant‟s motion by explaining: “I know they have to make a showing.
However, in this type of a case, I think it is important that the records be
complete.” Fairly read, the trial court‟s statement presupposes that the defense
had not made a prima facie showing. Furthermore, although the trial court
interrupted the prosecutor to contradict her assertion that T.B. had not been
forthright about her brother‟s criminal history, it did not make factual findings
regarding the credibility of any of the prosecutor‟s other race-neutral reasons.
Instead, after the prosecutor finished stating her reasons, the trial court simply
denied the Wheeler/Batson motion without comment. (People v. Hawthorne,
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 78 [a finding of a prima facie showing would not be
implied where the trial court announced it had found no prima facie case but asked
the prosecutor to “ „protect the record‟ ” by stating reasons, then repeated its ruling
without further explanation].) Indeed, in his opening brief, defendant himself
observes that “the judge did nothing but listen to the reasons given by the
prosecutor and then immediately deny the [Wheeler]/Batson motion.” Defendant
makes that point to argue that the trial court‟s denial of his Wheeler/Batson motion
is not entitled to deference because the trial court failed to engage in any
meaningful evaluation of the prosecutor‟s justifications. But his observation
41
equally supports the conclusion, which our review of the record as a whole bears
out, that because the trial court found no prima facie case of discrimination, it
never intended to undertake a third-stage analysis.9
Having determined that the trial court impliedly found defendant failed to
establish a prima facie case under Wheeler/Batson, we apply the standard the high
court articulated in Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. 162, and undertake an independent
review of the record to decide “the legal question whether the record supports an
inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of race.” (People v.
Hawthorne, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 79, italics omitted [reviewing court uses
independent review to assess a finding of no prima facie case when it is unclear
from the record whether the trial court used the strong-likelihood standard
Johnson disapproved].) Under Johnson, a defendant satisfies the requirements of
Batson‟s first step “by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial court to
draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” (Johnson, supra, at p. 170;
see also People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 341 [defendant must show an
inference of discrimination arising from the totality of the relevant facts].) The
defendant “should make as complete a record of the circumstances as is feasible.”
(Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280.)
9 We note that in asking the prosecutor to make a record of her race-neutral
reasons for excusing the jurors in question, even though finding no prima facie
case, the trial court followed “better practice.” (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41
Cal.4th 313, 343, fn. 13 [such information assists the trial court in evaluating the
challenge and the reviewing court in assessing the ruling on appeal]; see also
People v. Howard, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1020.) Nonetheless, “[w]e again urge
trial courts to make express findings on the existence of a prima facie case, so that
reviewing courts need not determine this important question on the basis of
implication.” (People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 605, fn. 2; People v.
Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 716-717, fn. 5.)
42
Here, defendant‟s showing was meager. In arguing the Wheeler motion,
defense counsel merely pointed out that T.B. was an African-American woman
and submitted the question on that basis alone, without referring to the juror‟s
questionnaire or voir dire answers, responding to the prosecutor‟s stated reasons
for the excusal, or pointing to any other evidence that would permit an inference
of discrimination. That the prosecutor excused a single African-American
prospective juror, without more, does not support the inference the excusal was
based on race, especially given defendant‟s acknowledgment during the hearing
that another African-American woman then was seated on the jury. (People v.
Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 69-70; see also People v. Hamilton (2009) 45
Cal.4th 863, 899 [motion based only on excusal of a single African-American
prospective juror failed to establish a prima facie case].) As we have observed,
“ „the small absolute size of this sample makes drawing an inference of
discrimination from this fact alone impossible.‟ ” (People v. Bonilla, supra, 41
Cal.4th at p. 343; see also People v. Howard, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1018, fn. 10.)
Nor does our independent review of the record disclose any other basis for
inferring the prosecutor excused T.B. because of her race. We have previously
described the type of evidence that may be particularly useful regarding this
inquiry. For instance, it is relevant whether the record shows that the prosecutor
“ „ “struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire, or
has used a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the group.” ‟ ”
(People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 779.) Also significant is whether the
prosecutor failed to engage the prospective jurors “ „ “in more than desultory voir
dire, or indeed to ask them any questions at all.” ‟ ” (Ibid.) Although the
defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to claim
discriminatory excusals under Wheeler, it is relevant “ „ “if he is, and especially if
43
in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of
the remaining jurors belong.” ‟ ” (Kelly, at pp. 779-780.)
Both defendant and T.B. are African-American. And although neither the
questionnaire nor the voir dire examination discloses the race or ethnicity of the
seated jurors, we will assume for argument‟s sake that a majority of the jurors
were White, like the victim. However, the record is otherwise devoid of any
evidence supporting an inference of discrimination. First, although the record here
does not disclose the racial or ethnic makeup of the juror pool, nothing suggests
the prosecutor “ „ “struck most or all” ‟ ” (People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p.
779) of the African-Americans from the venire. As noted above, defense counsel
began his argument on the Wheeler/Batson motion by acknowledging that an
African-American woman was then seated in the jury box, and there is nothing
from which to infer that the prosecutor exercised a strike against her.
We note that the prosecutor asked T.B. no questions. Ordinarily, this
circumstance is relevant to our inquiry. (People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p.
779.) But, as previously noted in part II.B.2., at the time of defendant‟s trial in
1996, the trial court, not the parties, had primary responsibility for conducting voir
dire. (§ 223, added by Prop. 115, § 7, eff. June 6, 1990.) Neither the prosecutor
nor defense counsel asked questions of any prospective juror during voir dire in
open court. Thus, the prosecutor‟s failure to ask T.B. any questions is not
significant here. (People v. Johnson, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1328.) Notably,
before excusing T.B., the prosecutor had reviewed T.B.‟s answers on a
questionnaire containing 98 questions. (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 598-
599, fn. 5 [noting the trial court‟s remark that when every juror has answered an
extensive questionnaire, “ „it can never be a perfunctory examination‟ ”].)
Moreover, the prosecutor observed the trial court‟s voir dire of T.B., which
covered her friendship with a deputy marshal, her brother‟s experience in the
44
criminal justice system, her ability to follow the law as instructed by the trial
court, and her attitudes regarding the death penalty. Indeed, defendant complains
that the trial court questioned T.B. more closely than it did a seated juror who
likewise indicated on her questionnaire she was undecided about the death penalty.
Finally, the record discloses obvious race-neutral reasons for excusing T.B.:
she was single and very young, and had not registered to vote. (See People v.
Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 139 [the prospective juror‟s youthful age, marital
status, and failure to register to vote were proper concerns for the prosecutor
because they suggested the juror was uninvolved in society]; People v. Sims
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 429-430 [the prosecutor stated proper race-neutral reasons
for excusing the prospective juror on the ground the juror‟s youthfulness and lack
of maturity affected her ability to accept responsibility in a death penalty case].)
Based on our consideration of the relevant factors as well as the entire record of
voir dire, we conclude the record fails to support an inference that the prosecutor
excused T.B. on the basis of her race.
We reject defendant‟s assertion, based on our decision in People v. Silva
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 385, that the trial court‟s failure to make “ „a sincere and
reasoned attempt to evaluate‟ ” the prosecution‟s explanation and clearly to
express its findings requires reversal. Silva does not guide our inquiry here. We
have found it proper for trial courts to request and consider a prosecutor‟s stated
reasons for excusing a prospective juror even when they find no prima facie case
of discrimination; indeed, we have encouraged this practice. (People v. Bonilla,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 343, fn. 13; People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 723-
724.) However, the trial court is not required to do this at the first stage of a
Wheeler/Batson analysis, and the trial court‟s invitation here to the prosecutor to
state her reasons for excusing T.B. did “not convert [this] first-stage
Wheeler/Batson case into a third-stage case.” (People v. Howard, supra, 42
45
Cal.4th at p. 1020; cf. People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 138 [where the
reviewing court upholds a trial court‟s finding of no prima facie case of
discrimination, it need not then review the trial court‟s evaluation of the
prosecutor‟s proffered reasons for the strikes at issue].)
Finally, because the trial court‟s request did not “convert [this] first-stage
Wheeler/Batson case into a third-stage case” (People v. Howard, supra, 42 Cal.4th
at p. 1020), we also “decline defendant‟s invitation to engage in comparative juror
analysis” (id. at p. 1019). As we have explained, “[w]hatever use comparative
juror analysis might have in a third-stage case for determining whether a
prosecutor‟s proffered justifications for his [or her] strikes are pretextual, it has
little or no use where the analysis does not hinge on the prosecution‟s actual
proffered rationales . . . .” (People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 350.)
C. Guilt phase issues
1. Use of competency hearing evidence at the guilt phase
Before trial, defense counsel moved in limine for an order precluding the
prosecutor from presenting at the guilt or penalty phase any evidence that had
been developed for the section 1368 competency hearing. In particular, defense
counsel sought to prevent the prosecutor from using as evidence in aggravation
defendant‟s records from Harbor View Hospital, the inpatient drug rehabilitation
facility where defendant had received treatment at age 16. The prosecutor had
subpoenaed the Harbor View records after reading, in the report of a defense-
retained competency expert, that defendant had been hospitalized there.
The trial court conducted two hearings on the motion. At the first, the trial
court observed and the parties agreed that under People v. Arcega (1982) 32
Cal.3d 504 (Arcega), defendant‟s statements to the court-appointed psychiatrists,
Drs. Cerbone, Haroun, and Michel, and the fruits of any such statements, were
46
inadmissible in the prosecutor‟s case-in-chief. However, at the second hearing,
the trial court ruled that if during the guilt phase the defense called any expert who
had testified at the competency hearing, then the prosecutor could use the
witness‟s prior testimony for impeachment.
The defense called Dr. Cerbone as an expert witness at the guilt phase, and
he testified that defendant suffered from substance-induced psychotic disorders,
psychotic disorders not otherwise specified, and various forms of substance
dependence. Dr. Cerbone arrived at those diagnoses after interviewing defendant
and reviewing numerous materials, including police and investigative reports,
psychiatric evaluations by four other mental health experts, hospital records, and
summaries of interviews with friends, family, and members of defendant‟s
household during his adolescence and young adulthood. Defense counsel handed
Dr. Cerbone the Harbor View records for reference, and he used them extensively
during his testimony. For instance, Dr. Cerbone testified he had learned from the
records that defendant began using methamphetamine when he was between 12
and 14 years old, that the facility‟s treating psychiatrist had prescribed
antipsychotic drugs, and that during defendant‟s hospitalizations, he periodically
exhibited lack of impulse control, excessive responses to provocation, and
paranoid behavior. Dr. Cerbone also testified that while defendant was at Harbor
View, he was sometimes so imposing and threatening that he had to be physically
restrained and sedated.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor‟s questioning drew from both the
Harbor View records and the reports of the other mental experts who had
evaluated defendant for competency, including Dr. Cerbone himself. For
example, over defense objection, the prosecutor asked Dr. Cerbone why his
present diagnosis differed from the one he had offered at the competency hearing,
which was antisocial personality disorder. Quoting from the reports of Harbor
47
View‟s treating psychiatrist, court-appointed competency expert Dr. Michel, and
the defense-retained competency expert, Dr. MacSpeiden, the prosecutor asked
Dr. Cerbone why no other expert had diagnosed defendant as psychotic. Finally,
again over defense objection, the prosecutor asked Dr. Cerbone about two
incidents, described in the Harbor View records, in which defendant had
threatened staff. The prosecutor read from the records that defendant once told a
staff member, “I will kill you, rip off your head, and stuff it down your neck,” and
that on another occasion defendant called a staff member a “bitch, cunt, whore.”
Dr. Cerbone responded that defendant was withdrawing from drugs at the time,
which likely manifested itself in impulsive, threatening behavior.
On redirect examination, Dr. Cerbone described the new evidence and
information that supported his current diagnosis, including psychiatric records
from the Veterans Administration showing that defendant‟s father was paranoid
schizophrenic. He again referred to the reports and testimony from the
competency hearing when he explained why he disagreed with the diagnoses of
the other experts who evaluated defendant for competency.
Defendant claims the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to cross-
examine Dr. Cerbone with evidence obtained in preparation for and derived from
the competency proceeding. Defendant complains specifically about the
prosecutor‟s questions disclosing the diagnoses of the other competency experts
and defendant‟s threats of violence against Harbor View staff.
When a doubt arises as to a defendant‟s competency to stand trial, the trial
court must suspend proceedings and appoint a psychiatrist or psychologist to
evaluate the defendant. (§§ 1368, 1369.) Where, as occurred here, the defendant
is not seeking a finding of mental incompetence, the trial court must appoint two
such evaluators, one of whom may be named by the defense and one by the
prosecution. (§ 1369, subd. (a).)
48
A court-compelled competency examination implicates a defendant‟s Fifth
Amendment rights. (People v. Pokovich (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1240, 1253
(Pokovich); Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 468-469 (Smith).) Nonetheless,
a defendant must submit to a competency examination by the court-appointed
experts and may not refuse to do so by invoking his right against self-
incrimination. (Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 465, 470.)
This requirement does not violate a defendant‟s self-incrimination rights because
we have established a rule of immunity providing that “ „neither the statements of
[the defendant] to the psychiatrists appointed under section 1369 nor the fruits of
such statements may be used in trial of the issue of [the defendant‟s] guilt.‟ ”
(Arcega, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 522, quoting Tarantino v. Superior Court, supra, at
p. 470.) By ensuring that a defendant will not be convicted by statements he made
in the course of a court-compelled competency evaluation, this rule “promotes
accuracy in the psychiatric evaluation” and “protects both an accused‟s privilege
against self-incrimination and the public policy of not trying persons who are
mentally incompetent.” (Arcega, supra, at p. 522.)
No decision by the United States Supreme Court addresses how Fifth
Amendment principles apply to the specific circumstances presented here. But,
taken together, the high court‟s decisions in Smith, supra, 451 U.S. 454, Buchanan
v. Kentucky (1987) 483 U.S. 402 (Buchanan), and Powell v. Texas (1989) 492
U.S. 680 (Powell) support the conclusion that the prosecutor‟s impeachment of the
defense expert in this case did not violate defendant‟s self-incrimination rights.
Smith, supra, 451 U.S. at page 468, holds that when a court compels a
defendant to submit to a competency examination and the defendant does not
place his mental state in issue at the guilt or penalty phase, the prosecution may
not call the court-appointed psychiatrist to testify in its case in aggravation
regarding the defendant‟s future dangerousness. The Smith court acknowledged
49
the appellate decisions holding that the prosecution may obtain and use evidence
from a compelled sanity examination when a defendant asserts an insanity defense
and introduces psychiatric testimony. But it found those cases inapposite because,
in Smith, the defendant had not put his competency or sanity in issue. (Id. at p.
465.)
In Buchanan, supra, 483 U.S. at pages 421-424, the defendant requested a
psychiatric examination and raised a mental status defense at trial. Under these
circumstances, the high court held, the Fifth Amendment does not preclude the
prosecution from using the examination for rebuttal to the defense testimony.
Buchanan reasoned that Smith‟s holding “logically leads to” the proposition that
“if a defendant requests a psychiatric evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence,
then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with evidence
from the reports of the examination that the defendant requested.” (Buchanan,
supra, at pp. 422-423.) A contrary conclusion, the high court explained, would
mean that the prosecution “could not respond to” the defendant‟s mental status
defense, which he based on psychological reports. (Id. at p. 423.)
In Powell, supra, 492 U.S. 680, the high court again addressed the Fifth
Amendment implications of the prosecution‟s use of a court-compelled psychiatric
evaluation at the penalty phase. In so doing, it appeared to approve the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Battie v. Estelle (5th Cir. 1981) 655 F.2d 692.
Powell explained that in Battie, “the Court of Appeals suggested that if a
defendant introduces psychiatric testimony to establish a mental-status defense,
the government may be justified in also using such testimony to rebut the defense
notwithstanding the defendant‟s assertion that the psychiatric examination was
conducted in violation of his right against self-incrimination.” (Powell, supra, at
pp. 683-684.) Powell found that Smith and Buchanan provided “some support”
for Battie. (Powell, supra, at p. 684.)
50
Here, defendant presented Dr. Cerbone‟s testimony in support of a mental
status defense at the guilt phase. Under these circumstances, the Fifth Amendment
did not preclude the prosecution from impeaching him with the evidence on which
he based his opinion, which included the Harbor View Hospital records and the
reports of the court-appointed competency experts.
The North Carolina Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in State v.
Davis (N.C. 1998) 506 S.E.2d 455. In that case, the trial court appointed Dr.
Wolfe to evaluate the defendant for competency, and she tested the defendant
while he was confined at Dorothea Dix Hospital. The defendant was eventually
found competent. During trial, the defendant presented evidence in support of
insanity and diminished capacity. The defense expert, Dr. McKee, testified that he
had reviewed the records of the defendant‟s competency evaluation at Dorothea
Dix, and during cross-examination, the prosecutor referred to those records. (Id. at
pp. 463, 466-467.) On appeal, the defendant claimed the prosecutor‟s cross-
examination violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment. The North Carolina
Supreme Court disagreed. Relying on Smith and Buchanan, it concluded that
because the defense expert had reviewed and referred to the defendant‟s
competency evaluation records, the prosecution was not foreclosed from relying
on the same materials to rebut the defendant‟s contentions. (Davis, at pp. 477-
478.)
For two reasons, we reject defendant‟s argument that notwithstanding Smith
and its progeny, the prosecutor‟s cross-examination was improper under
California law. First, the rule of immunity we established for statements made to
a court-appointed competency evaluator is founded on Fifth Amendment
principles. (Pokovich, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1253, fn. 5; Arcega, supra, 32
Cal.3d at pp. 522-523; see also People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 802-
803 [California‟s judicially declared immunity is coextensive with the 5th
51
Amend.].) Second, none of our decisions supports defendant‟s argument. For
instance, in Pokovich, supra, 39 Cal.4th at page 1254, we found that the trial court
had erred in allowing the prosecutor to impeach the defendant‟s testimony at trial
with statements he made during his mental competency evaluation. However, the
defendant in that case, although testifying on his own behalf, did not present a
mental status defense. Here, by contrast, defendant placed his mental state in issue
and presented psychiatric evidence based largely on material from the competency
examination. As previously explained, these circumstances warrant a different
result.10
2. Refusal to instruct on trespass and second degree murder
Count 1 of the information charged that defendant “did willfully and
unlawfully murder [Dixon] . . . in violation of Penal Code section 187(a)” and
further alleged as special circumstances that defendant committed the murder
while committing or attempting to commit rape, burglary, and oral copulation
within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). Counts 2, 3, and 4
charged, respectively, the substantive crimes of forcible rape, residential burglary,
and forcible oral copulation. (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 459, 460, 288a, subd. (c).) At
trial, the prosecution‟s theory of liability for count 1 was first degree felony
murder based on the three felonies named in the special circumstance allegation.
Following the prosecution‟s case-in-chief, but before defendant presented his
case, the trial court conferred with the parties on the jury instructions for the guilt
10 Given our analysis, we need not determine whether, as defendant asserts, the
Harbor View Hospital records, which derived from defendant‟s voluntary
commitment to a drug rehabilitation facility well before the crimes and court-
ordered competency evaluations, otherwise qualify for immunity under Arcega
because the prosecution would not have learned of their existence absent the
competency proceedings.
52
phase. Defense counsel requested instructions on trespass as a lesser related
offense of the charge of burglary in count 3, and second degree murder as a lesser
included offense of first degree murder as charged in count 1. According to
defense counsel, the instructions were necessary to the defense‟s twofold theory of
the case: first, that no burglary occurred when defendant entered the victim‟s
home because he lacked the intent to steal or commit any other felony at that time;
and second, that the victim‟s extreme stress and fear upon first encountering
defendant in her living room, not the sexual assaults that occurred later in the back
bedroom, caused the victim‟s fatal heart attack. Under these circumstances,
defense counsel argued, the victim‟s death was a homicide caused by a life-
threatening act that did not constitute a felony.
After hearing the prosecutor‟s opposition to instructing on both trespass and
second degree murder, the trial court denied the request. It indicated it would
revisit the issue if warranted by evidence adduced during the defense case or on
rebuttal, but found that the facts of the case did not “in any way, shape or form”
support giving the instructions the defense proposed.
After the close of evidence, trial counsel renewed the request for instruction
on trespass and second degree murder. The trial court denied the request,
repeating its earlier observation that “[t]his is a felony murder case.”
a. Trespass
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on trespass
because without such a charge, defendant could not argue his theory to the jury.
We find no error.
Trespass is a lesser related crime of burglary. (People v. Birks (1998) 19
Cal.4th 108, 118, fn. 8 (Birks).) In Birks, we held that instruction on a lesser
related offense is proper only upon the mutual assent of the parties. (Id. at pp.
53
112-113, 136; see id. at p. 134 [allowing instruction on lesser related offenses over
the prosecutor‟s objection interferes with prosecutorial charging discretion].)
Here, because the prosecutor objected to instruction on the crime of trespass, the
trial court correctly denied defendant‟s request.
We decline defendant‟s request that we reconsider our holding in Birks. As
we recently explained in denying a similar request, refusing to grant a defendant‟s
unilateral request for instructions on a lesser related offense does not violate any
“constitutional due process right to present the „theory of the defense case‟ . . . .”
(People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 148.) Defendant errs in basing his
contrary argument on the Ninth Circuit‟s decision in Conde v. Henry (9th Cir.
1999) 198 F.3d 734, as that case involved a trial court‟s failure to instruct on a
lesser included, not a lesser related, offense. As we observed in Birks, the United
States Supreme Court has “never suggested” that the federal Constitution requires
instruction on offenses other than lesser included offenses of the charged crime
when the evidence warrants. (Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 124.) Defendant cites
no decision or other authority issued since we decided Birks that warrants
reconsideration of that decision. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to
instruct on trespass.
b. Second degree murder
As to count 1, the trial court instructed the jury solely on the theory that a
person “who unlawfully kills a human being during the commission or attempted
commission of the felony crime of rape, and/or burglary, and/or forcible oral
copulation is guilty of the crime of murder, in violation of section 187 of the Penal
Code.” (CALJIC No. 8.21.) Defendant contends the trial court reversibly erred
by failing also to instruct on second degree implied-malice murder as a lesser
included offense of first degree felony murder. We disagree.
54
Although it is settled that “[s]econd degree murder is a lesser included
offense of first degree murder” (People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 745), we
have yet to decide whether second degree murder is a lesser included offense of
first degree murder where, as here, the prosecution proceeds only on a theory of
first degree felony murder. (People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 402; People
v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 16; but see People v. Anderson (2006) 141
Cal.App.4th 430, 445 [the trial court erred in failing to instruct on second degree
murder when the prosecutor argued only felony murder liability but the
information charged murder with malice aforethought].) We need not decide that
question here because, as explained below, there was no substantial evidence of
second degree implied-malice murder.
In criminal cases, even absent a request, a trial court must instruct on the
general principles of law relevant to the issues the evidence raises. (People v.
Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154.) “ „That obligation has been held to
include giving instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a
question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present
[citation], but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that
charged. [Citations.]‟ ” (Ibid.) “[T]he existence of „any evidence, no matter how
weak‟ will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense, but such
instructions are required whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty only of the
lesser offense is „substantial enough to merit consideration‟ by the jury.
[Citations.]” (Id. at p. 162.)
“Second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice,
but without the additional elements . . . that would support a conviction of first
degree murder. [Citations.]” (People v. Hansen (1994) 9 Cal.4th 300, 307.)
Malice may be express or implied. (People v. Lasko (23 Cal.4th 101, 107.)
Malice will be implied “when the killing results from an intentional act, the natural
55
consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately
performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another
and who acts with conscious disregard for life. [Citations.]” (People v. Dellinger
(1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1215; see also People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139,
152 [reaffirming Dellinger‟s articulation of the standard].)
Defendant contends he was entitled to an instruction on second degree
implied-malice murder because ample evidence supported the theory that the
initial shock and fear the victim experienced when she first encountered him in her
living room caused her fatal cardiac arrest. As defendant points out, Hayes
testified that she and the victim were “scared to death” when defendant suddenly
appeared. Furthermore, Dr. Wolf testified that the victim had preexisting heart
disease and that diabetes, clogged arteries, and high blood pressure had
compromised her lungs and heart. He also opined that the victim‟s fright at first
seeing defendant played a “large part” in the cardiac arrest that caused her death.
Contrary to defendant‟s argument, no reasonable jury could have concluded
from the above described evidence that defendant committed second degree
implied-malice murder instead of first degree felony murder. Even were we to
accept that the jury could have found defendant entered the victim‟s home with no
felonious intent, there is no evidence from which it could have inferred that his
conduct in the living room amounted to a dangerous act that he undertook
knowingly and in conscious disregard of Dixon‟s life. (People v. Dellinger, supra,
49 Cal.3d at p. 1221.) The undisputed evidence showed that defendant, who was
unarmed, stood silently in the victim‟s living room until the victim and her sister
noticed him, then introduced himself, closed the front door, and sat down between
the two women. Although defendant‟s unauthorized presence may have been
startling and stressful, his conduct was not dangerous to human life. Defendant
cites no decision, and we find none, holding that such evidence warranted
56
instruction on second degree implied-malice murder. Because there was no
substantial evidence supporting instruction on second degree murder, the trial
court properly refused defendant‟s requested instruction.
Defendant errs in asserting that the trial court‟s ruling violated his federal
constitutional due process and Sixth Amendment rights to “adequate instruction on
the defense theory of the case.” As earlier explained in connection with
defendant‟s challenge to the trial court‟s refusal to instruct on trespass, defendant
was free to argue, and did advance, to the jury his theory of the homicide, i.e., that
the victim‟s stress and fright from his sudden appearance in her living room set in
motion the fatal cardiac arrest. The absence of an instruction on second degree
murder did not result in a trial that was fundamentally unfair.
Nor, contrary to defendant‟s assertion, did the trial court‟s failure to instruct
on second degree implied-malice murder implicate defendant‟s federal
constitutional rights within the meaning of Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625.
Neither Beck nor any of the subsequent cases defendant cites requires instruction
on a lesser included offense that substantial evidence does not support. (People v.
Wilson, supra, 43 Cal.4th 1, 17.) Furthermore, and also contrary to defendant‟s
argument, this is not a case in which the jury was impermissibly “forced into an
all-or-nothing choice between capital murder and innocence.” (See Beck v.
Alabama, supra, at p. 629.) Here, the trial court gave the jury the noncapital third
option of convicting defendant of first degree felony murder but finding not true
the special circumstance allegations that made him death eligible. (People v.
Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 906.)
3. Instruction on first degree felony murder
As previously noted, count 1 of the information charged defendant with
“murder . . . in violation of Penal Code section 187(a).” Pointing to that portion of
57
the information, defendant contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try him
for first degree murder and that the felony murder instructions erroneously
permitted the jury to convict him of an uncharged crime. More specifically, he
asserts that the information‟s reference to section 187 left him charged with
second degree malice murder, not first degree felony murder, which is set forth in
a different part of the Penal Code, section 189.11
We have previously rejected arguments identical to those defendant raises
here, concluding that “if the charging document charges the offense in the
language of the statute defining murder (§ 187), the offense charged includes
murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree.” (People v.
Hawthorne, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 89; see People v. Wilson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at
p. 21.) Defendant‟s quotation of language in Green v. United States (1957) 355
U.S. 184 does not compel a different conclusion. There, the high court
characterized second degree murder as an offense that is “distinct and different”
from a “charge of felony murder.” (Id. at p. 194, fn. 14.) But the court made that
observation in connection with its holding that, under principles of double
jeopardy, a defendant convicted of a lesser degree of a charged crime may not,
upon reversal of the conviction, be retried for the greater crime. It is axiomatic
that an opinion does not stand for a proposition the court did not consider. (People
v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 106, 118.) We reject defendant‟s claim of error by
reaffirming that “[f]elony murder and premeditated murder are not distinct crimes
11 At the time of defendant‟s trial in 1996, section 189 provided as relevant: “All
murder . . . which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate . . .
rape, . . . burglary, . . . or any act punishable under Section . . . 288 . . . is murder
of the first degree.” (As amended Stats. 1993, ch. 611, § 4.5, p. 3507.)
58
and need not be separately pleaded.” (People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705,
712.)
4. No unanimity instruction on theory of first degree murder
The prosecutor‟s theory of the homicide was that defendant murdered the
victim while committing rape, burglary, and/or forcible oral copulation, and the
trial court instructed the jury accordingly. (See CALJIC No. 8.21.) Defendant
contends that because the trial court did not instruct the jurors they must
unanimously agree on which of the target offenses formed the basis of their
verdict, and because the verdict form did not specify on which of the target
offenses the verdict rested, the prosecution secured the murder conviction in
violation of his rights under the federal and state Constitutions.
To convict a defendant of first degree murder, the jury must unanimously
agree that the defendant is guilty of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt. But,
as we have repeatedly explained, the jury need not unanimously agree on the
theory underlying the first degree murder. (People v. Hawthorne, supra, 46
Cal.4th at p. 89; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 394-395.) We have
also repeatedly rejected the argument, which defendant puts forth here, that a
unanimity instruction is required under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S.
466, 490 (Apprendi), which held that the constitutional guarantees of due process
and jury trial require that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.” (See People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 617 [nothing
in Apprendi requires unanimous verdict on theory of first degree murder]; People
v. Nakahara, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 712-713 [same].)
In any event, even had the trial court erred in not giving a unanimity
instruction, the error was harmless under any standard. The jury unanimously
59
found defendant guilty of the substantive crimes of rape, forcible oral copulation,
and burglary, and it unanimously found true the associated felony-murder special-
circumstance allegations. Given these verdicts and findings, the jury necessarily
reached unanimous agreement that defendant committed a first degree felony
murder based upon rape, forcible oral copulation, and burglary. (Cf. People v.
Hawthorne, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 89-90; People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th
at p. 395.)
In resisting this conclusion, defendant makes the related argument that,
because the prosecution presented two distinct factual scenarios in support of its
burglary theory, the trial court erred in failing to give a unanimity instruction
regarding that offense. As defendant points out, the prosecution attempted to
show that a burglary occurred when he first entered the victim‟s home and/or
when he entered the back bedroom where he committed the sexual assaults, and
the defense vigorously challenged the former theory with evidence and argument.
As defendant also notes, in addition to the standard instruction on the elements of
burglary, the trial court gave a special instruction further defining the crime, which
stated: “The intent to rape need not be in the mind of the defendant at the time of
the initial entry into the structure, if he subsequently forms the intent and enters a
room within the structure.” Defendant complains that because there was no
unanimity instruction and no special findings on the verdict form, it is unclear
whether the jurors unanimously agreed that he had an intent to steal or rape when
he entered the home and/or an intent to rape and commit forcible oral copulation
when he forced the two women into the back bedroom. Therefore, defendant
continues, we cannot determine whether the jury unanimously found him guilty of
either or both of the burglaries, or whether it properly found all facts essential to a
first degree murder conviction based on the target offense of burglary. This failure
to require juror unanimity on the elements of first degree felony murder, defendant
60
contends, violated his constitutional rights to due process, a jury trial, and a fair
and reliable penalty determination.
In People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132-1133 (Russo), we discussed
the crime of burglary to illustrate “the difference between discrete crimes, which
require a unanimity instruction, and theories of the case, which do not. Burglary
requires an entry with a specified intent. [Citation.] If the evidence showed two
different entries with burglarious intent, for example, one of a house on Elm Street
on Tuesday and another of a house on Maple Street on Wednesday, the jury would
have to unanimously find the defendant guilty of at least one of those acts. If,
however, the evidence showed a single entry, but possible uncertainty as to the
exact burglarious intent, that uncertainty would involve only the theory of the case
and not require the unanimity instruction.”
It is true that burglary may be committed not only by an entry into a home
with the requisite felonious intent, but also by an entry (with the requisite
felonious intent) from within the home into a bedroom inside the home. (People v.
Sparks (2002) 28 Cal.4th 71, 86-88 [construing § 459 to include within the
definition of burglary an entry into the victim‟s bedroom within a home].)
However, this is not to say the evidence in this case showed the commission of
two discrete burglaries requiring a unanimity instruction. Rather, the evidence and
argument on alternative “entries” bore on the issue of when defendant‟s felonious
intent arose — whether before entry into the home and/or before entry into the
back bedroom — and thus concerned the theory of his liability for a singular
burglary. “The evidence merely present[ed] the possibility the jury may divide, or
be uncertain, as to the exact way the defendant is guilty of a single discrete crime.”
(Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1135.) Under these circumstances, juror unanimity
was unnecessary. (Ibid.)
61
5. Adequacy of special circumstance instruction
In connection with the charge of murder in count 1, the information alleged
that defendant committed the murder while committing rape, forcible oral
copulation, and/or burglary. In instructing on the rape-murder special-
circumstance allegation, the trial court informed the jury that to find that allegation
true, “it must be proved: [¶] 1. The murder was committed while the defendant
was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a rape. [¶] The
crime of rape is defined elsewhere in these instructions.” (CALJIC No. 8.81.17
(1991 rev.).) The trial court gave the same instruction, with appropriate revisions,
in connection with the forcible-oral-copulation-murder and burglary-murder
special-circumstance allegations.
Defendant points out that when the trial court instructed the jury with
CALJIC No. 8.81.17, it did not give the standard instruction‟s second paragraph.
The omitted portion of the instruction would have informed the jury that to find
the special circumstance allegation true, the prosecution must prove that “[t]he
murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the
[target crime] or to facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid detection. In other
words, the special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not established
if the [target crime] was merely incidental to the commission of the murder.”
(CALJIC No. 8.81.17.)
Defendant claims the trial court‟s failure to instruct the jury sua sponte with
the second paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 constituted the omission of a
necessary element of the special circumstance allegations, in violation of his
constitutional right “to a jury determination of any fact on which the Legislature
conditions an increase in [his] maximum punishment,” within the meaning of Ring
v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584. Although defense counsel did not object to the
truncated version of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 at issue here, he did request, though
62
unsuccessfully, an instruction stating that to prove the special circumstance
allegations, the prosecutor had the burden to show that “[t]he murder was
committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crimes of
burglary/rape/oral copulation . . . .” Defendant, therefore, has preserved his claim
on appeal. (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 113.)
However, the claim fails on its merits. As defendant acknowledges, we have
previously rejected the assertion that the second paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.81.17
states an element of the special circumstance that must be presented to the jury for
determination, regardless of whether the evidence warrants such an instruction.
(People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 501; People v. Monterroso (2004) 34
Cal.4th 743, 767; see also People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 113-114
[rejecting the claim that omission of the second paragraph allowed the jury to find
the special circumstance allegation true based merely on a finding the murder took
place during a robbery].) Defendant presents no persuasive grounds for
reconsidering our prior holdings on the issue.
For the same reason, we reject defendant‟s related claim that we must reverse
the special circumstance findings because the verdict forms did not require a
finding that defendant committed the murder in order to carry out or advance the
commission of the crime of robbery, rape, or oral copulation. As we observed in
People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 505, instructing with the second
paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 is proper only “where the evidence suggests the
defendant may have intended to murder his victim without having an independent
intent to commit the felony that forms the basis of the special circumstance
allegation.” We there held that the trial court did not err in failing to read the
instruction‟s second paragraph because the record lacked any significant evidence
that anything other than burglary and/or robbery motivated the murders.
(Navarette, at p. 505; see also People v. Wilson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 18.)
63
Likewise, because there was no evidence here reasonably suggesting that
defendant intended to kill the victim without also having an independent intent to
assault her sexually, the trial court did not err in omitting the second paragraph of
CALJIC No. 8.81.17. Indeed, in this case, there was no evidence suggesting
defendant harbored any intent to kill the victim, concurrently or otherwise.
Rather, the evidence showed that defendant entered the victim‟s home unarmed.
Within minutes of the entry, he pushed both the victim and her sister into the back
bedroom, where he sexually assaulted the victim until ejaculating, and then ran
from the house after pausing briefly on his way out to take money from an open
purse belonging to the victim‟s sister. The evidence showed, moreover, that the
victim‟s death was attributable to cardiac arrest resulting from fear, stress, and
pain, and that a younger woman likely would have survived such an attack. On
this record, there was no evidence from which the jury could have inferred that
defendant entered the victim‟s home to murder her, and that the sexual assaults
were merely incidental to the commission of that offense. The trial court thus did
not err in omitting the second paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 when instructing
the jury on the special circumstance allegations.
6. Instructions on consciousness of guilt
Prosecution witness Officer Gassmann described how he and his partner
apprehended defendant after pulling him down from the victim‟s backyard fence
shortly after the crimes. Officer Gassmann further testified that when he asked
defendant what he was doing there, defendant first said he thought the house was
vacant, and then stated that a friend of his named John Hall had just raped an old
woman inside the house but had left before the police arrived. In connection with
this evidence, the trial court gave CALJIC Nos. 2.03 and 2.52, which informed the
64
jury that it could consider defendant‟s false statements and flight from the victim‟s
home as evidence of his consciousness of guilt.12
Defendant claims the consciousness of guilt instructions the trial court gave
were constitutionally defective because they were impermissibly argumentative
(People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1135-1137) and allowed the jury to
draw irrational permissive inferences.13 (People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301,
313.) As defendant acknowledges, we have repeatedly rejected identical
challenges to the instructions at issue. (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th
318, 377; People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 710 [CALJIC No. 2.52]; People
v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 221-222 [CALJIC No. 2.03].) We decline
his invitation to reconsider the issue.
12 CALJIC No. 2.03 states: “If you find that before this trial the defendant made
a false or deliberately misleading statement concerning the crimes for which he is
now being tried, you may consider such statement as a circumstance tending to
prove a consciousness of guilt. However, such conduct is not sufficient by itself to
prove guilt, and its weight and significance, if any, are matters for your
determination.”
CALJIC No. 2.52 states: “The flight of a person immediately after the
commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a crime, is not sufficient in itself
to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in
light of all other proved facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence.
The weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to
determine.”
13 Contrary to respondent‟s suggestion, defendant did not forfeit his claim
regarding CALJIC No. 2.52 by failing to object to the instruction in the trial court.
(§ 1259 [appellate court may review an instruction, even when no objection was
made below, if defendant‟s substantial rights were affected]; People v. Wallace
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1074, fn. 7; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 982,
fn. 12.)
65
7. Instruction on reasonable doubt
The trial court gave CALJIC No. 2.90, which defines the prosecution‟s
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.14 Defendant presents a multi-pronged
challenge to the instruction‟s constitutionality.15 But the United States Supreme
Court has approved CALJIC No. 2.90‟s language (Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511
U.S. 1, 14-15), and appellate courts in California, including this court, have found
no constitutional infirmity in the language of CALJIC No. 2.90 or its similarly
worded successor, CALCRIM No. 222. (People v. Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th
at p. 221; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 501-505; People v. Flores
(2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1091-1094; People v. Rios (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th
1154, 1155-1157.) Defendant provides no persuasive reasons for revisiting the
issue.
14 The trial court instructed: “A defendant in a criminal action is presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his
guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. This
presumption places on the People the burden of proving him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. [¶] Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere
possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in
that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of
the charge.”
15 Defendant claims the giving of CALJIC No. 2.90 violated his right to due
process because it (1) implied jurors had to articulate a reason for their doubt, (2)
failed adequately to limit the scope of possible doubt, (3) failed to make clear that
the defense had no obligation to present or refute evidence or to explain that a
defense attempt to refute the prosecution‟s evidence did not shift the burden of
proof, (4) failed to inform the jury that reasonable doubt could be based on a lack
of evidence or conflict in the evidence, (5) failed to make clear that the
presumption of innocence continues throughout the entire trial, and (6) lessened
the prosecutor‟s burden of proof by suggesting that the prosecution would meet its
burden.
66
8. Instruction with CALJIC Nos. 2.02, 2.22, 2.27, and 2.51
Defendant contends that a series of instructions the trial court gave at the
guilt phase undermined and diluted the constitutional requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the charged crime.
We have repeatedly concluded otherwise. CALJIC No. 2.02, regarding how
to consider circumstantial evidence, does not compel the jury to render a verdict of
guilty on a standard lower than reasonable doubt. (People v. Nakahara, supra, 30
Cal.4th at pp. 713-714.) CALJIC No. 2.22, regarding the weighing of conflicting
testimony, did not replace the reasonable doubt standard of proof with a standard
akin to preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Nakahara, supra, at pp. 714-
715.) When given in combination with other instructions explaining the
presumption of innocence and the prosecutor‟s burden to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt each element of the charged crime, neither CALJIC No. 2.27,
regarding the sufficiency of a single witness‟s testimony, nor CALJIC No. 2.51,
regarding motive, impermissibly dilutes the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. (People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 792; People v.
Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 220-221; People v. Cleveland, supra, 32
Cal.4th at pp. 750-751.) The jury here received instructions on the presumption of
innocence, the concept of reasonable doubt, and the prosecution‟s burden of proof.
(See CALJIC No. 2.90.) We therefore reject defendant‟s claim that the challenged
instructions violated his federal constitutional right to a jury verdict based on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, and we decline to reconsider our prior holdings
regarding their constitutionality.
9. Alleged comment on defendant’s silence
During closing statements, defense counsel argued, consistently with the
defense theory of the homicide, that the evidence did not support a finding that
defendant entered the victim‟s home with the specific intent to commit robbery,
67
rape, or oral copulation, and that it was defendant‟s sudden, startling appearance in
the living room that set into motion the fright and stress that caused the victim to
suffer the fatal cardiac arrest. In rebuttal, the prosecutor asserted the defense
theory was based on a “technicality.” Focusing on defense counsel‟s
acknowledgement that defendant “may have been up to no good” when he entered
the house, the prosecutor remarked: “What is it, what‟s up to no good? What
options do we have?” The prosecutor observed that “up to no good is stealing”
and “may include the felony of rape . . . or . . . oral copulation,” and then
rhetorically asked: “What are those reasonable choices of up to no good? What is
it that you can do at someone else‟s house at night that is up to no good that would
not constitute theft or a felony? . . . Who took this stand and gave you a reasonable
explanation as to another reason that the defendant may have been there?”
Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor‟s argument. The trial court
overruled the objection. The prosecutor then continued: “I don‟t know. Did a
neighbor or a friend or somebody say that there was a debt between these two
people so [defendant] would have some reason that is up to no good of entering
through the window, but that would still be a felony. So there is no reasonable
explanation. Therefore, that argument has to fall.”
The Fifth Amendment prohibits a prosecutor from commenting, directly or
indirectly, on a defendant‟s decision not to testify on his own behalf. (Griffin v.
California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 613; People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 670
[directing the jury‟s attention to defendant‟s failure to testify runs the risk of
inviting the jury to consider the defendant‟s silence as evidence of guilt].)
Defendant contends that the prosecutor violated this constitutional prohibition
when she asked, “Who took this stand and gave you a reasonable explanation [as
to defendant‟s presence in the victim‟s home]?” In making this statement,
defendant asserts, the prosecutor was clearly referring to defendant.
68
We disagree. The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the prosecution from
commenting on the state of the evidence presented at trial, or on the defense‟s
failure to introduce material evidence or to call witnesses other than the defendant.
(People v. Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 764.) In context, the prosecutor‟s
query was a proper comment on the evidence against defendant, not an implicit
suggestion that defendant should have, or could have, provided a nonfelonious
reason for his initial entry into the victim‟s home. (See People v. Medina (1995)
11 Cal.4th 694, 755-756 [prosecutor‟s comment directed to the defendant‟s failure
to provide an innocent explanation for the prosecution‟s evidence falls outside of
Griffin‟s purview].) The thrust of the prosecutor‟s argument is further confirmed
by the question she posed immediately after the court overruled defense counsel‟s
objection, which asked whether “a neighbor or a friend or somebody” had
provided an explanation for defendant‟s entry into the victim‟s home. The
prosecutor was entitled to comment on the defense‟s failure to call witnesses other
than defendant. (People v. Cleveland, supra, at p. 764.) Contrary to defendant‟s
argument, on this record, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury understood the
prosecutor‟s remarks as an invitation to draw an improper inference of guilt from
defendant‟s decision not to testify. (People v. Medina, supra, at p. 756.)
Defendant‟s claim of Griffin error therefore fails.
D. Penalty phase issues
1. Retrial following jury deadlock at first penalty trial
Defendant contends that in permitting a second jury to decide penalty after
the first jury deadlocked on that question, the trial court violated his rights under
the Eighth Amendment and other federal and state constitutional provisions.
Armed with a lengthy string citation to statutes of other jurisdictions that mandate
a sentence of life without parole if the penalty jury deadlocks, defendant asserts
69
that California is “out of step with an emerging national consensus against
allowing retrial under these circumstances.”
We have previously found no constitutional infirmity in a death verdict
rendered by a second penalty phase jury at a retrial following the first jury‟s
deadlock on sentencing, notwithstanding that the second jury had not heard all of
the guilt phase evidence. (People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 966-967;
People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 645.) Although we have never addressed
the precise Eighth Amendment challenge defendant raises, we have determined
that “California‟s asserted status as being in the minority of jurisdictions
worldwide that impose capital punishment” does not establish that our death
penalty scheme per se violates the Eighth Amendment. (People v. Thornton
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 470; see People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 47-48.)
Likewise here, that California is among the “handful” of states that allows a
penalty retrial following jury deadlock on penalty does not, in and of itself,
establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment or “evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.” (Trop v. Dulles (1958) 356 U.S. 86,
101.)
Arguing points more typically raised in a claim of double jeopardy,
defendant further contends that compelling a capital defendant to endure the
“ „embarrassment, expenses and ordeal‟ ” (United States v. Scott (1978) 437 U.S.
82, 95) of a second trial on the question of whether he should live or die is
inconsistent with Eighth Amendment principles. But, as defendant concedes, in
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania (2003) 537 U.S. 101, 108-110, the high court held that
the double jeopardy clause did not bar a penalty retrial after appellate reversal of
the capital defendant‟s conviction, notwithstanding that in accordance with
Pennsylvania law, the defendant had been sentenced to life without parole
following juror deadlock at the penalty phase. Given that the double jeopardy
70
clause permits retrial following juror deadlock under such circumstances, we fail
to see how subjecting defendant to retrial of the penalty phase in this case could
offend the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.
2. Selection of the second jury
Defendant raises a number of challenges to the selection of the jury that
decided penalty. As explained below, none has merit.
a. Death qualification voir dire
Before selection of the penalty retrial jury, the prosecutor filed a motion
requesting that prospective jurors be questioned about their ability to impose the
death penalty on an actual killer who lacked an intent to kill in a felony-murder
special-circumstance case.16 The prosecutor argued that such questioning was
appropriate because a prospective juror who indicates, as an abstract,
philosophical proposition, an inability to impose the death penalty in a felony-
murder case absent an intent to kill, is biased and unable to follow the law, and
thus should be dismissed for cause. Defense counsel submitted written opposition
to the motion, arguing in relevant part that the proposed line of inquiry was a
constitutionally impermissible attempt to seek prospective jurors‟ advisory
opinions on the specific facts to be presented at trial.
After hearing the motion, the trial court agreed with defense counsel that,
under applicable principles, it would be improper to present prospective jurors
with the facts of the case and ask them if they would require an intent to kill in
order to impose death. But the trial court also found it would be permissible to
explain, in conjunction with the court‟s customary practice of emphasizing to
16 The prosecutor‟s motion appears to have been prompted by two members of
the first jury who remarked after the mistrial was declared that they could not vote
for the death penalty without a showing of intent to kill.
71
prospective jurors that they must follow the law, that the felony-murder rule does
not require an intent to kill, and to probe their attitudes on that point. The trial
court ruled that it would present the issue in the questionnaire, with oral
questioning as needed either in open court or in chambers.
After soliciting proposals from the parties on the wording of the question, the
trial court added question No. 85 to the questionnaire, which began with this
preface: “The law in California says that when a person is engaged in the
commission of certain felony crimes such as burglary, rape, and oral copulation,
and a death results, then he can be convicted of first degree murder. This is called
a felony murder case. Also in such a felony murder case if the person is the actual
killer, he may be subject to the death penalty even though he did not have the
intent to kill a person. That is, the death can be unintentional or accidental.”
Following this preface were four questions: (1) “Do you have any views,
attitudes, principles, or religious reasons about capital punishment that would
prevent or substantially impair your ability to follow the law in regards to capital
punishment as far as the felony murder rule is concerned?”; (2) “Would you be
able to consider imposing the death penalty in a felony murder case in which a
defendant did not intend to kill the victim?”; (3) “Would you automatically vote
for the sentence of life without the possibility of parole in a felony murder case in
which the defendant did not intend to kill the victim?”; and (4) “Would you
automatically vote for the sentence of death in a felony murder case in which the
defendant did not intend to kill the victim?”
Defendant contends that these questions violated his constitutional rights to a
fair and impartial jury and to a fundamentally fair trial. As explained below, we
disagree.
The goal of voir dire in a capital case is to disclose whether prospective
jurors hold views and attitudes that would prevent or substantially impair the
72
performance of their duties as jurors in accordance with their instructions and
oath. (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424.) “Our decisions have
explained that death-qualification voir dire must avoid two extremes. On the one
hand, it must not be so abstract that it fails to identify those jurors whose death
penalty views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their
duties as jurors in the case being tried. On the other hand, it must not be so
specific that it requires the prospective jurors to prejudge the penalty issue based
on a summary of the mitigating and aggravating evidence likely to be presented.
[Citation.] In deciding where to strike the balance in a particular case, trial courts
have considerable discretion. [Citations.]” (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th
703, 721-722.)
In People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 916-918 (Pinholster), we
approved the prosecutor‟s inquiry into the prospective jurors‟ views on imposing
the death penalty in a felony-murder case. As we explained, the prosecutor‟s voir
dire questions, although related to facts of the particular case, led to an exchange
that disclosed something about the jurors‟ attitudes in the abstract, which
ultimately informed the crucial question whether the jurors could impose the death
penalty in any burglary-murder case. (Id. at p. 918; cf. People v. Ervin (2000) 22
Cal.4th 48, 69-71 [applying the reasoning of Pinholster to conclude voir dire
questioning disclosing that the codefendant in a murder-for-hire case did not
participate in the actual killing was not an improper inquiry into specific facts of
case].)
Here, the questionnaire conveyed to prospective jurors a specific fact about
the case: defendant did not intend to kill the victim. Contrary to defendant‟s
assertion, however, nothing in the wording of the questions suggests they were
being used for the prohibited purpose of “instructing, educating, cajoling, or
prejudicing the jury” (People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 182), or that they
73
invited prospective jurors to prejudge the case. Rather, as in Pinholster, the four
questions regarding the absence of intent to kill elicited from the prospective
jurors information from which the trial court could determine their views in the
abstract. A prospective juror who, regardless of the facts, could not vote for the
death penalty in a felony-murder case absent a showing of intent to kill is properly
excused for cause because holding such a view would substantially impair the
prospective juror‟s ability to perform a juror‟s duties. (Pinholster, supra, 1
Cal.4th at p. 918.) Here, the trial court struck the proper balance (People v. Cash,
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 722) when it granted the prosecutor‟s request to explore
prospective jurors‟ views on whether the absence of an intent to kill would
substantially impair their ability to follow the law of felony murder.
Defendant further complains that the inquiry into prospective jurors‟ views
on imposing the death penalty absent a showing of intent to kill allowed the
prosecutor to eliminate all prospective jurors “who might have an open mind to
the question whether it is appropriate to execute a person who did not intend to
kill.” In support of this complaint, defendant observes that the prosecutor
exercised peremptory challenges against all three of the prospective jurors who
gave ambiguous answers to the question “Would you be able to consider imposing
the death penalty in a felony murder case in which a defendant did not intend to
kill the victim?”
Defendant‟s argument is not well taken. As discussed, the trial court added
the challenged questions to the questionnaire for the proper purpose of facilitating
the disclosure of prospective jurors‟ attitudes in the abstract, which helped inform
the trial court‟s determination whether they could impose the death penalty in any
felony-murder case where there was no showing of intent to kill. Furthermore,
defendant cites no authority suggesting that the prosecutor was not entitled to
exercise a peremptory challenge against any prospective jurors she believed would
74
refuse to vote for the death penalty absent evidence of an intent to kill. Indeed, we
have held to the contrary. (People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 460 [the
prosecutor may excuse a juror whose opposition to the death penalty makes it less
likely the juror will impose it].)
b. Adequacy of questioning on potential racial bias
Defendant claims the trial court violated his right to an impartial jury by
conducting an inadequate examination into the possible racial bias of the jurors
selected to decide the penalty retrial. We disagree.
The prospective jurors for the penalty retrial, like their counterparts at the
guilt phase, filled out a lengthy questionnaire that asked for yes-or-no or multiple-
choice responses with space provided for additional comment. Like the
questionnaire for the guilt phase, but with appropriate textual revisions, the
questionnaire for the penalty phase included four questions that elicited from the
prospective jurors their racial attitudes, inquiring, for example, whether they held
any racial biases and, if so, whether those biases were “Strong,” “Moderate,” or
“Mild.” The questionnaire also asked prospective jurors if the circumstance that
defendant was an African-American man convicted of committing crimes against
a Caucasian woman would affect their impartiality in determining penalty.17
17 The four questions eliciting the racial views of the prospective penalty retrial
jurors were the following:
“52. Do you have any racial or ethnic prejudices?
Strong ___ Moderate ___ Mild ___ None ___
A. Please explain:
B. How do you compensate for these attitudes?
“53. In this case the defendant is African American. Would this fact affect
you as a juror at all? Yes ___ No ___
If „Yes,‟ please describe:
(footnote continued on next page)
75
The trial court and counsel for both sides reviewed the questionnaire
answers. A group of 30 prospective jurors were then briefly questioned, in open
court and, where appropriate, in chambers outside the presence of the other
prospective jurors.
Defendant asserts that the trial court conducted inadequate voir dire of four
jurors whose responses to the questionnaire required follow-up questioning on
their racial views. He complains that although each of the four jurors indicated
they had “Mild” racial or ethnic prejudices, the trial court asked no questions
designed to elicit how these jurors‟ racial attitudes might affect their impartiality.
Defendant has forfeited this claim because his counsel failed to suggest any
additional questions regarding racial bias or complain about the trial court‟s
questioning. (People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 620; cf. Turner v.
Murray (1986) 476 U.S. 28, 37 (Turner) [a defendant may not challenge on appeal
the trial court‟s failure to question potential jurors on racial prejudice without
having made a specific request for such an inquiry].) As during the first jury‟s
selection, during selection of the second jury, the trial court communicated to the
attorneys that it would consider their suggestions for follow-up questions, but
defense counsel offered none.
(footnote continued from previous page)
“54. In a case where an African-American male is convicted of
committing crimes against a Caucasian female, can you be impartial
in determining the appropriate penalty? Yes ___ No ___
If „Yes,‟ please describe:
“56. Do you have any bias for or against the defendant based upon his race?
Yes ___ No ___
If „Yes,‟ please describe: . . .”
76
In any event, defendant‟s claim fails on the merits. We have reviewed the
juror questionnaire responses at issue, as well as the entire record of voir dire, and
find no support for defendant‟s claim of inadequate questioning on potential racial
bias. Although four jurors indicated they had “mild” racial prejudices, their
explanatory comments conveyed temperate, unremarkable attitudes that rendered
further inquiry unnecessary. For instance, Juror No. 1 wrote, “I feel all of us have
some ethnic prejudices and I am no different.” Moreover, all four of the jurors
responded “Yes” to the question whether they could be impartial in determining
the appropriate penalty in a case involving an African-American man convicted of
crimes committed against a Caucasian female. Contrary to defendant‟s
suggestion, on this record, the trial court was not obligated to pose the same
question orally during voir dire.
Our review of the record also discloses that the trial court was well aware of
and fully satisfied its duty to ask prospective jurors relevant questions likely to
reveal conscious or unconscious bias or prejudice. (People v. Taylor, supra, 5
Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.) Notably, the questionnaire responses of two prospective
jurors prompted the trial court to probe deeper into the subject of racial bias during
in-chambers voir dire, and the trial court ultimately excused those prospective
jurors for cause. The court personally questioned every member of the penalty
retrial jury, observing firsthand their responses and demeanor, and thereby
gleaning “valuable information” about their states of mind. (People v. Stewart,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 451.) Therefore, the trial court‟s determination regarding
the manner and scope of questioning is entitled to deference on appeal. (Ibid.)
That defense counsel did not ask the court to pose additional questions to specific
prospective jurors further suggests that the trial court‟s voir dire provided ample
basis for ferreting out prospective jurors whose racial bias would interfere with
their ability to be impartial. (People v. Taylor, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.)
77
Defendant correctly observes that the United States Supreme Court has
recognized the special risks that potential racial bias poses in the penalty phase of
a capital trial. In reversing the death sentence of an African-American defendant
in Turner, supra, 476 U.S. 28, the high court explained that the trial court‟s refusal
to ask prospective jurors any questions about possible racial bias compelled
reversal of the defendant‟s death sentence due to “a conjunction of three factors:
the fact that the crime charged involved interracial violence, the broad discretion
given the jury at the death-penalty hearing, and the special seriousness of the risk
of improper sentencing in a capital case.” (Id. at p. 37.) Turner does not assist
defendant here, however. As previously discussed, the questionnaire amply
explored the subject of racial bias, nothing in the jurors‟ responses to the
questionnaire or at voir dire compelled further inquiry, and defense counsel did
not ask the trial court to pose additional questions to specific prospective jurors.
(People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 640 [defendant‟s reliance on Turner is
misplaced where the trial court probed racial bias issue in the questionnaire, and
again orally at defense request].)
c. Prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges
Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his Wheeler/Batson motion
asserting that the prosecutor impermissibly exercised peremptory challenges
against two African-American prospective jurors and one Latina prospective juror
on the basis of their race. We disagree.
As previously explained (ante, at pt. II.B.4.), a Wheeler/Batson motion
involves a three-step inquiry. “First, the defendant must make out a prima facie
case „by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of
discriminatory purpose.‟ [Citation.] Second, once the defendant has made out a
prima facie case, the „burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial
78
exclusion‟ by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.
[Citations.] Third, „[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must
then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial
discrimination.‟ [Citation.]” (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 168, fn. omitted.)
During selection of the second jury, the prosecutor exercised her fourth
peremptory challenge against a Latina prospective juror, M.E. When the
prosecutor later used her eighth peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror
A.F., an African-American man, defense counsel asked for a conference in
chambers, but the trial court denied the request. The prosecutor‟s next peremptory
challenge was to Prospective Juror C.D., an African-American woman, and
defense counsel again sought a hearing in chambers.
After the parties had exercised several more peremptory challenges, the trial
court called a recess and, outside the jury‟s presence, heard defense counsel‟s
motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor‟s excusal of the three prospective
jurors. Defense counsel asserted that the prosecutor was “kicking off everybody
of color” and confirmed with the trial court the names of the prospective jurors in
question, but he advanced no further argument on the motion.
The trial court then invited the prosecutor to give her reasons for excusing
A.F., prefacing the request with an explanation similar to the one it gave during
selection of the first jury. The trial court stated: “Normally, I know in a Wheeler
case there has to be some type of a showing that there is a pattern; however, in this
type of case, the seriousness and the jaundiced eye that will be looking at this
record[,] . . . I think it is important that you tell me why you did kick these
people.”
The prosecutor explained she had excused A.F. because, with 28 years as a
probation officer, he came in with “precomposed [sic] ideas about the system.”
The prosecutor felt A.F. would be “very open” to defense arguments on the root
79
causes of defendant‟s behavior, given that A.F. had a “social worker therapy type
job” and a social welfare degree, and that his questionnaire answers indicated he
believed society should look at the causes of crime.
The trial court interjected, “You have said enough,” and then asked about
C.D. The prosecutor responded that she “mainly” was concerned about C.D.‟s
occupation as a psychiatric nurse and whether C.D. would “buy everything that the
doctors say on behalf of the defendant.” The prosecutor also noted that C.D. had
“started off undecided on the death penalty.”
The court again stated it had “heard enough” and indicated that the
prosecutor should move on to M.E. The prosecutor explained that one reason for
the excusal was that M.E. had served on a jury that failed to reach a verdict in a
murder case. The prosecutor was also wary of M.E.‟s attitudes on the death
penalty, citing M.E.‟s comment to the effect that she did not oppose the death
penalty but had “a problem . . . with the consistency of the death penalty and who
gets it.”
After defense counsel declined the trial court‟s invitation to make further
argument, the court stated, “At this point I see no systematic exclusion of these
protected groups.” When defense counsel again indicated he had nothing to add,
the trial court reiterated, “I see no exclusion,” and noted that the defense itself had
“knocked off a person of color.” When the prosecutor interjected that defense
counsel‟s Wheeler/Batson objection during selection of the first jury involved only
a single strike, the trial court dismissed her point, stating: “All I care about is
what‟s before me in this case. I don‟t find any exercise of systematic exclusion at
this time.” The trial court then added, “There were reasons why you exercised
your peremptories in this case, and in this court‟s opinion, it has nothing to do
with having people of color off the jury.”
80
Initially, we must again decide whether to infer from the trial court‟s
invitation to the prosecutor to state her reasons for the challenged excusals that the
trial court found defendant had satisfied his burden of establishing a prima facie
case so as to proceed to a third-stage Wheeler/Batson analysis. “In determining
whether to infer a trial court‟s finding of a prima facie case under Wheeler, we
look to the whole record, examining the court‟s remarks in context.” (People v.
Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 605, fn. 2.)
For reasons similar to those previously discussed in connection with
defendant‟s challenge to selection of the first jury (see, ante, pt. II.B.4.), we
conclude the trial court found no prima facie case of intentional discrimination.
The trial court‟s prefatory remarks to the prosecutor when it asked her to make a
record of reasons for her strikes presupposed that the defense had not made a
prima facie case. Moreover, the trial court did not evaluate any of the prosecutor‟s
stated reasons. Indeed, the trial court‟s repeated references to finding “no
systematic exclusion” leaves little doubt that the trial court denied defendant‟s
Wheeler/Batson motion on the ground that defendant had not established a prima
facie case of discrimination. We have recognized that although the term
“systematic exclusion” is more appropriate to a claim of underrepresentation in the
jury venire, courts sometimes use the term “to describe a discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges.” (People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 549, fn. 38.) For
example, in People v. Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d at page 716, the trial court based
its finding of “ „no prima facie showing that there was a systematic exclusion‟ ” on
factors relevant to a first-stage Wheeler/Batson inquiry. (See also People v.
Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 342 [agreeing with the trial court that the defendant
failed to make a prima facie showing where the trial court denied the
Wheeler/Batson motion after finding “ „no systematic exclusion of Blacks‟ ”].)
Likewise, the trial court‟s pronouncements here that it saw no “systematic
81
exclusion,” viewed in context, are fairly understood as a finding that defendant
failed to put forth sufficient evidence from which discrimination could be
inferred.18
Nor is a different conclusion compelled by the trial court‟s remark to the
prosecutor at the end of the hearing: “There were reasons why you exercised your
peremptories . . . [that have] nothing to do with having people of color off the
jury.” We have encouraged trial courts to ask prosecutors to make a record of
their reasons for any objected-to peremptory challenges even when no prima facie
case has been established. (People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 343, fn. 13;
see also People v. Adanandus (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 496, 500-501 [the trial court
may invite the prosecutor to state race-neutral reasons before announcing its
finding on whether the defendant has met his burden in the first step of the
Wheeler/Batson test].) Viewed in context, the trial court‟s concluding comment is
reasonably understood as an observation that the prosecutor‟s proffered reasons
confirmed its finding that defendant failed to state a prima facie case of
discrimination. (Cf. People v. Hawthorne, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 80 [after hearing
the prosecutor‟s race-neutral reasons, the trial court repeated its earlier finding that
no prima facie case had been shown].)
As we did in resolving defendant‟s challenge to the denial of the
Wheeler/Batson motion he made during selection of the first jury, we have
18 As we have noted, a trial court that draws an inference of discrimination, i.e.,
that finds a prima facie showing under Wheeler/Batson, will necessarily rely on a
pattern of systematic exclusion of members of a cognizable group in the
challenged excusals. (People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 343, fn. 12;
People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 598, fn. 3.) It follows that, absent an
express finding on the issue, a trial court‟s determination there has been no
“systematic exclusion” is a finding that a prima facie showing has not been
established.
82
independently reviewed the record and conclude that defendant failed to
“produc[e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that
discrimination has occurred.” (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 170.) Defendant‟s
showing in support of his second Wheeler/Batson motion was meager. At the
hearing, defense counsel relied solely on the fact the prosecutor had exercised
three of her 10 peremptory challenges to excuse two African-American
prospective jurors and one Hispanic prospective juror. Such evidence, without
more, is insufficient to create an inference of discrimination, especially where, as
here, the number of peremptory challenges at issue is so small. (People v.
Hawthorne, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 79-80 [no prima facie showing where the
defendant‟s motion was based solely on the assertion that the prosecutor used
three of 11 peremptories to excuse African-American prospective jurors]; People
v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 343 & fn. 12 [an inference of discrimination is
difficult to discern from a small number of challenges].)
That defendant, A.F., and C.D. are African-American is some evidence
permitting an inference of discriminatory excusal. (People v. Kelly, supra, 42
Cal.4th at p. 779.) Also relevant is whether the victim and a majority of the seated
jurors are members of the same group (ibid.), and we will assume for argument‟s
sake in this case that they are. However, the record lacks any other evidence that
permits an inference of discriminatory excusal. The record does not disclose, for
example, the number of African-American or Latino prospective jurors in the jury
venire or on the jury panel at the time defendant raised his Wheeler/Batson
objections, which is evidence from which we could conclude that the prosecutor
“ „ “struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire.” ‟ ”
(Kelly, supra, at p. 779; see People v. Hawthorne, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 79-80
[noting absence of similar evidence].) Nor do we find it significant that the
prosecutor asked no questions of the prospective jurors during voir dire, as
83
discussed more fully in part II.B.4. The record shows that although the prosecutor
did not question the prospective jurors directly, she excused A.F., C.D., and M.E.
after having reviewed their answers on the 99-question questionnaire and observed
the trial court‟s questioning in open court.19 Nor is there any suggestion that the
prospective jurors excused by the prosecution were not adequately questioned.
(People v. Kelly, supra, at p. 779.) To the contrary, the record shows that all three
of the excused prospective jurors completed the 99-question questionnaire and that
the trial court questioned each as extensively as the seated jurors. Indeed,
defendant complains that A.F.‟s views on the criminal justice system were
subjected to greater scrutiny than were those of three White jurors who served on
the penalty retrial jury.
Here, the record not only fails to support an inference of discrimination, but it
also shows obvious race-neutral reasons for the excusal of all three of the
prospective jurors in question. According to the questionnaires, A.F. was
employed as a probation officer and C.D. worked as a nurse. Thus, both were
engaged in professions the prosecutor reasonably could believe would tend to
make them overly sympathetic to the defense. (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31
19
Defendant suggests in his reply brief that the prosecutor failed to engage
C.D. in “more than desultory voir dire” because she did not ask the trial court to
explore C.D.‟s views on evaluating testimony by mental health experts.
Defendant points out that, in explaining her excusal of C.D., the prosecutor stated,
“I don‟t know how much she knows or what opinions she really has about the
mentally ill, whether she is going to buy everything that the doctors say on behalf
of the defendant.” We are not persuaded that the prosecutor‟s failure to seek
additional questioning on this point supports an inference of discrimination. The
record shows, and defendant concedes, that C.D.‟s answers on her questionnaire
indicated how she would view the testimony of mental health professionals at trial.
Fairly read, the prosecutor‟s explanation for excusing C.D. was an expression of
her belief that C.D. would be inclined to credit the defense experts‟ testimony
despite her questionnaire responses.
84
Cal.4th 903, 924-925 [prosecutor may properly challenge potential jurors on the
belief that their occupations do not render them the best type of juror to sit on the
case]; United States v. Thompson (9th Cir. 1987) 827 F.2d 1254, 1260 [excusing
jurors based on their profession is wholly within the prosecutor‟s prerogative].)
As for M.E., her prior service on a deadlocked jury is an acceptable race-neutral
ground for excusing her. (People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 138; People
v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 170.)
Based on our independent review of the voir dire record, we conclude
defendant failed to carry his burden of showing an inference of discrimination, and
that the trial court, therefore, did not err in denying his Wheeler/Batson motion.20
3. Admission of victim impact evidence
Before the first penalty trial began, defense counsel filed a written motion to
exclude or limit the prosecution‟s victim impact evidence. He argued in relevant
part that the proposed testimony from numerous family members and other
witnesses was cumulative, unduly prejudicial and inflammatory, in violation of
federal constitutional principles and state evidentiary law. Counsel also pointed
out that, under applicable decisions, family members could not give their opinions
about the crime, the defendant, or the appropriate sentence.
The trial court denied the motion, ruling it would allow the witnesses to
testify about the effects the victim‟s death had on them individually and on society
at large. The trial court admonished the prosecutor, however, that the testimony
20
As with defendant‟s first Wheeler/Batson motion, because defendant failed
to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, we decline his request
that we engage in comparative juror analysis. (See People v. Howard, supra, 42
Cal.4th at pp. 1019-1020; People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 350.)
85
should be neither cumulative nor unduly emotional, and the trial court directed her
to instruct her witnesses not to offer an opinion on the appropriate punishment.
By later stipulation of the parties, the trial court‟s ruling also governed the
admission of victim impact evidence at the penalty retrial.21 Accordingly, the
prosecutor called eight witnesses to testify about the effects the victim‟s death had
on them and on the community.
According to one family member, the victim‟s death “devastated four
generations of a very close family.” Betty Hayes testified that she constantly
thinks about the sexual assaults, making her “scared all the time now,” and that her
sister‟s death “spoiled the rest of [her] life.” Five other family members echoed
similar feelings of grief and heartbreak, and some spoke of the “downward spiral”
they experienced as a result of the victim‟s death. For instance, the victim‟s
daughter, who suffered from multiple sclerosis, testified that the stress and shock
of her mother‟s death had exacerbated her disease and caused her incontinence and
loss of sight in one eye. A granddaughter indicated that in the two years since her
grandmother‟s violent death, she suffered insomnia, withdrew from friends and
activities she used to enjoy, and gained 50 pounds. A 13-year-old great-grandson
described his great-grandmother as his “best friend,” and testified that he
sometimes wakes up crying in the middle of the night thinking about her.
The victim‟s daughter and two witnesses who were not members of the
victim‟s family testified about the effects of her death on the community. For
example, the director of the afterschool program of a nearby elementary school
21 Before the penalty retrial, the parties agreed to incorporate into the record all
previous motions and rulings. Defense counsel did not present any further
challenge to the admission of the victim impact evidence.
86
where the victim had volunteered once a week testified that some of the staff and
children had known “Grandma Mae” for years, and that many of them cried when
they learned she had been murdered. The witness also showed the jury a large
card the children had decorated and presented to the victim on her 80th birthday
shortly before the crimes.
Defendant contends the admission of this victim impact evidence was
improper, unduly prejudicial, and exceeded constitutional limitations. We
disagree.
The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the admission of evidence showing
how a defendant‟s crimes directly impacted the victim‟s family, friends, and the
community as a whole, unless such evidence is “so unduly prejudicial” that it
results in a trial that is “fundamentally unfair.” (Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501
U.S. 808, 825 (Payne); see People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 235-236.)
Likewise, under state law, victim impact evidence is admissible as a circumstance
of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a) (factor (a)), so long as it “is not so
inflammatory as to elicit from the jury an irrational or emotional response
untethered to the facts of the case.” (People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153,
1180; see People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 364.) Here, the victim impact
evidence was neither unduly prejudicial nor so inflammatory that it invited the
jury to make its penalty determination on a purely irrational basis. (Payne, supra,
501 U.S. at pp. 824-825; People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1180.)
Although six family members testified, their testimony offered the personal
perspectives of four different generations of the victim‟s close-knit family, and
none was cumulative of another. Moreover, the victim impact testimony
comprised fewer than 30 of the 400 pages of reporter‟s transcript reflecting the
prosecution‟s case in aggravation. As for the substance of the victim impact
testimony, our review of the record discloses that it “concerned the kinds of loss
87
that loved ones commonly express in capital cases.” (People v. Lewis and Oliver,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1057.)
We also reject defendant‟s argument that admitting victim impact testimony
from a witness who was neither a family member nor a close friend of the victim
violated the Eighth Amendment. Our prior decisions recognize that, under Payne,
constitutionally permissible victim impact evidence includes reference “ „to the
status of the victim, and the effect of [her] loss on friends, loved ones, and the
community as a whole.‟ [Citation.]” (People v. Marks, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p.
236; see also People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1183.)
Defendant further challenges selected portions of family members‟ testimony
on the ground it constituted impermissible opinion on the nature of the crime and
defendant‟s character. For instance, defendant points out, family members
described the victim as having been “tortured . . . to death,” having experienced
“the most painful agonizing death anybody could die from,” and having “died in
pain and terror and humiliation in a puddle of blood in the safety of her own
home.” Defendant notes, moreover, that the victim‟s daughter offered her opinion
on defendant‟s character when she testified, “we are so completely, utterly, bitterly
angry at that idiot.”
As defendant correctly observes, the United States Supreme Court has made
clear that “admission of a victim‟s family members‟ characterizations and
opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence violates the
Eighth Amendment.” (Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 830, fn. 2 [leaving intact the
portion of Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496 requiring exclusion of such
evidence].) We conclude, however, that in context, the challenged testimony did
not amount to personal opinion about the crimes or defendant, and its admission
did not offend Eighth Amendment principles. Rather, the witnesses‟ comments
about the murder‟s brutality and the reference to defendant illustrated how the
88
crimes had affected them, which is proper and admissible victim impact evidence.
(People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1182 [rejecting the defendant‟s
challenge to testimony by victims‟ friend and a relative describing the murders as
“brutal” and “a savage act”].) The record shows, for example, that the comment
of the victim‟s granddaughter that the victim died “the most painful agonizing
death anybody could die from” immediately preceded her remark that “there is no
healing of that in me.” When another family member was asked about the basis of
her “downward spiral,” she explained: “The fact that the last ten minutes of [the
victim‟s] life are filled with terror and humiliation, I don‟t see any way around
that. I don‟t see any peace for myself or for my family.”
As for one family member‟s reference to defendant as “that idiot,” this
fleeting remark likewise was part of a proper expression of the harm that the
murder had caused. The witness stated: “I think I probably speak for everybody
in the grand circle. Family, close friends, we are so completely, utterly, bitterly
angry at that idiot. We are very confused. We are dealing with a murder in the
family and a dreadful murder in the family. We are dealing with social problems
and ethical problems that we never dreamed of. We are still two years later
dealing with legal problems involved. We are . . . heart broken.” Contrary to
defendant‟s assertions, the trial court admitted the challenged testimony for the
proper purpose of reminding the jury that the victim was “ „an individual whose
death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to [her] family.‟
[Citation.]” (Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825.)
In prior decisions, we have concluded there is no requirement that victim
impact evidence be limited to the testimony of a single witness who was present at
the scene either during or immediately after the crime, or that the testimony
concern only those effects of the murder that were either known or reasonably
apparent to the defendant at the time of the crimes. (People v. Carrington (2009)
89
47 Cal.4th 145, 164-165; People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 364.)
Defendant presents no persuasive reason to revisit these decisions.
4. Admission of photograph depicting victim’s injuries
As part of the case in aggravation, the prosecutor presented a color
photograph of the victim‟s genital area, groin and thighs that Nurse Kinsey, the
SART nurse, took at the outset of her examination in the hospital, approximately
three hours after the sexual assaults occurred. The photograph showed blood on
the victim‟s genital area and upper thighs.
Defendant contends the trial court erred by not excluding the photograph as
inflammatory, prejudicial, cumulative, and irrelevant. He argues the trial court
violated Evidence Code section 352 (section 352) and constitutional principles by
failing to weigh the photograph‟s relevance against its prejudicial effects and by
admitting it. We find no error.
The challenged photograph‟s admissibility was the subject of several motions
and hearings. Before the start of the guilt phase, the trial court denied a defense
motion under section 352 to exclude the photograph as inflammatory and
irrelevant. The trial court did not disagree that the photograph was distasteful, but
found it relevant to establishing a link between the evidence of blood found at the
crime scene and the evidence that the victim was sexually assaulted.
The trial court revisited the photograph‟s admissibility before the penalty
retrial, during a hearing on defense counsel‟s written exclusion motion. At the
hearing, defense counsel argued that because the photograph was taken in the
hospital more than three hours after the sexual assaults occurred, it did not
accurately depict the injuries defendant inflicted and was not relevant under
section 190.3, factor (a) as a circumstance of the crime. As defense counsel
pointed out, the emergency room physician who saw the victim nearer in time to
90
the crimes observed only a small amount of vaginal bleeding. Counsel posited
that the reddish substance the photograph showed may have been the microbicidal
Betadine or some other antiseptic agent.
The trial court again denied the motion to exclude the photograph, repeating
its prior finding that the photograph was probative and material to the evidence
showing “a lot of bleeding at the scene.” In the course of its ruling, the trial court
criticized the defense for offering no evidentiary support for its assertion that the
stains on the victim‟s thighs were not blood, and cautioned counsel against
arguing “in the dark” at trial.
The challenged photograph was once again the subject of discussion during a
break in the prosecution‟s case in aggravation, when the prosecutor sought to
substitute the original Polaroid photograph for the enlarged copy she had
presented at the guilt phase. Without abandoning his earlier objection to the
evidence, defense counsel agreed that the smaller photograph was more accurate
but asked that the trial court admit it during the testimony of the SART nurse.
The trial court ruled it would admit the Polaroid photograph and allow the
prosecutor to use the evidence as she pleased.
The prosecutor introduced the photograph during the testimony of the
cardiology expert, Dr. Diggs, who answered in the affirmative when the
prosecutor asked whether the photograph depicted the victim‟s condition before
any hospital intervention. But Dr. Diggs also indicated he saw only “a small
amount of blood” coming from the victim‟s vagina. By contrast, Nurse Kinsey
testified that, as the photograph showed, the victim‟s external vaginal area
extending down to her thighs was “grossly bloodied.”
As a general rule, a trial court has broad discretion to determine the
admissibility of a photograph challenged as unduly gruesome or inflammatory,
and we will not disturb its determination on appeal unless the photograph‟s
91
prejudicial effect clearly outweighs its probative value. (People v. Martinez
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 692.) However, a trial court‟s discretion to exclude as
unduly prejudicial evidence bearing on the circumstances of the crime is more
limited (People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 158; see People v. Bonilla, supra,
41 Cal.4th at p. 353), because at the penalty phase “the prosecution is entitled to
place the capital offense and the offender in a morally bad light.” (People v. Box
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1201; People v. Bonilla, supra, at p. 353.) In light of
these principles, and having examined the disputed photograph, we find no abuse
of discretion in the trial court‟s ruling admitting the photograph of the victim‟s
injuries at the penalty phase retrial.
We disagree with defendant‟s contention that the challenged photograph had
no probative value on the only issue before the penalty retrial jury, i.e., whether
defendant should be sentenced to life without parole or death. The photograph
was relevant to show the circumstances of the crime (§ 190.3, factor (a); People v.
Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1241); as the trial court reasonably determined, it
provided an evidentiary link between the blood stained carpet underneath the
victim at the scene and the sexual assaults defendant committed. Furthermore, the
photograph aided Nurse Kinsey in her testimony to the jury about the extent of the
victim‟s injuries from the sexual assaults. (People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th
1255, 1282 [the prosecution is not obliged to prove its case solely with live
witnesses].) It is true that the prosecution‟s witnesses apparently disagreed over
the amount of blood that appeared on and around the victim‟s vaginal area after
her admission to the hospital. But that discrepancy went to the photograph‟s
evidentiary weight, not its relevance. (People v. Sully, supra, at p. 1242.)
Nor, contrary to defendant‟s assertion, did the photograph‟s prejudicial
effects outweigh its probative value. We have reviewed the photograph and
conclude that although disturbing, it is neither unduly gruesome nor inflammatory
92
and “not of such a nature as to overcome the jury‟s rationality.”22 (People v.
Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 212.)
We also reject as unsupported by the record defendant‟s further assertion that
the trial court failed to weigh the evidence‟s probative value against its prejudicial
effects, as Evidence Code section 352 requires. “[A] court need not expressly
weigh prejudice against probative value or even expressly state that it has done so,
if the record as a whole shows the court was aware of and performed its balancing
functions under Evidence Code section 352.” (People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th
1155, 1169.) Here, the parties had previously litigated the photograph‟s
admissibility at the guilt phase of trial, with extensive argument on its prejudicial
effects and probative value. In ruling that the evidence was admissible in the
prosecutor‟s case-in-chief, the trial court determined that the photograph‟s
distastefulness did not outweigh its relevance as a link between the crime scene
evidence and the sexual assaults defendant committed. Although defense counsel
advanced a different argument for excluding the photograph at the penalty phase,
this time challenging its admission on relevance grounds, we can infer from the
denial of that motion that the trial court remained of the view, expressed in its
prior ruling, that the photograph‟s prejudicial effects did not substantially
outweigh its probative value. Viewed as a whole, the record amply demonstrates
that the trial court conducted the proper inquiry.23
22 Defendant‟s citation to empirical research concerning the effects of graphic
photographs on jury verdicts does not persuade us otherwise. Notably, defendant
did not present this material to the trial court in his exclusion motion.
23 Defendant insists the trial court‟s ruling was an expression of its displeasure
with the defense rather than a determination of his primary argument that the
timing of the photograph rendered it irrelevant. Defendant‟s reading of the record
does not withstand scrutiny. The trial court did express dissatisfaction with the
defense for failing to offer evidence to support its claim that the photograph was
(footnote continued on next page)
93
Regarding defendant‟s claim that the photograph‟s admission violated his
various rights under the federal and state Constitutions, as defendant properly
acknowledges, “ „[t]he “routine application of state evidentiary law does not
implicate [a] defendant‟s constitutional rights.” [Citation.]‟ ” (People v. Lewis,
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1284.)
5. Admission of evidence of prior unadjudicated criminal activity
The prosecution devoted part of its case in aggravation to defendant‟s past
violent conduct and threats of violence. More specifically, the prosecutor
presented testimony regarding three incidents: (1) Defendant‟s forcible sodomy
and oral copulation of Jason L., (2) his threat to “fuck . . . up” a plainclothes
officer, and (3) his assault on sheriff‟s deputies during transfer from one cell to
another in the county jail. The prosecution introduced the evidence pursuant to
section 190.3, factor (b) (factor (b)), which permits the jury at the penalty phase to
consider “[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which
involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied
threat to use force or violence.”
Defendant asserts, as he did below, that the admission of evidence of these
three prior unadjudicated incidents of violence or threats of violence as factors in
aggravation under factor (b) — and an instruction expressly permitting the jury to
consider such evidence — violated his federal and state constitutional rights.
(footnote continued from previous page)
irrelevant because it did not accurately depict the injuries defendant inflicted. But
nothing in the record suggests the trial court failed to consider defense counsel‟s
challenge to the evidence‟s relevance.
94
a. Constitutionality of section 190.3, factor (b)
Defendant presents a multipronged general attack on section 190.3, factor
(b)‟s constitutionality. He asserts first that admission of evidence under factor (b)
does not withstand constitutional scrutiny because our interpretation of that
provision treats “death differently, by lowering rather than heightening the
reliability requirements in a manner that cannot be countenanced under the federal
Constitution.” In prior decisions, we have rejected the identical argument. (See,
e.g., People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1315 [nothing in the high court‟s
decisions requires penalty phase procedures to be more rigorous than other
criminal procedures].) We have also found that the use of unadjudicated offenses
in capital proceedings, but not in noncapital matters, does not violate equal
protection or due process principles. (People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652,
701 [capital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated and may be
treated differently without offending equal protection or due process guarantees].)
Likewise, we have found no requirement under the Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth
Amendment that the jury unanimously agree on the existence of unadjudicated
criminal conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th
826, 893.) And we have previously rejected defendant‟s assertion here that the
high court‟s recent decisions on the Sixth Amendment‟s jury trial right call for a
different result on that issue. (See, e.g., People v. Hoyos, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p.
926 [juror unanimity on the existence of aggravating factors is not required under
the reasoning of Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 536 U.S. 466, and its progeny];
People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 212 [Cunningham v. California (2007)
549 U.S. 270 does not compel a different conclusion].)
Defendant further claims that use of the same jury at both the guilt and
penalty phases of the trial deprives the accused of an impartial and unbiased jury,
and undermines the reliability of any determination of guilt, because “a jury which
95
already has unanimously found a defendant guilty of capital murder cannot be
impartial in considering whether similar but unrelated violent crimes have been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Defendant has no standing to complain that
the same jury decides both guilt and penalty because the jury that decided his
penalty was not the same jury that decided his guilt. (16 C.J.S. (2005)
Constitutional Law, § 111, p. 143 et seq. [to raise a constitutional question, the
party complaining must show that his or her rights are injuriously affected].) In
any event, we have repeatedly concluded there is no constitutional infirmity in
using the same jury that decided guilt to weigh evidence of unadjudicated crimes.
(People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 894; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th
1149, 1207-1208.) Contrary to defendant‟s assertion, we have also rejected the
argument that use of a single jury prevents defense counsel from adequately
questioning prospective jurors as to their potential biases with respect to the
alleged unadjudicated crimes without forfeiting a defendant‟s right to keep such
evidence from the jurors during the guilt phase. As in People v. Harris, supra, 43
Cal.4th 1269, the unadjudicated conduct at issue here was no more inflammatory
than the charged offenses. (Id. at p. 1316.) Moreover, because the jury that
decided penalty was selected solely for that phase of trial, defense counsel here did
not face an assertedly impermissible choice between adequate examination into
juror bias and the presentation of prejudicial evidence of crimes other than those
charged in the case.
b. Evidence of sexual assaults against Jason L.
Over trial counsel‟s renewed objection, the prosecutor called 20-year-old
Jason L. to testify about being sexually assaulted by defendant as a youth. Jason
testified that while home one day after school when he was eight years old and
96
defendant was 12 or 13, defendant threatened him with a steak knife, forced him to
orally copulate defendant, and then sodomized him.
As defendant acknowledges, we have long held that although the fact of a
juvenile adjudication is inadmissible as a factor in aggravation, juvenile criminal
activity involving force or violence is admissible as aggravating evidence under
factor (b). (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 378; People v. Lucky (1988)
45 Cal.3d 259, 295.) Defendant urges us to reconsider this holding, arguing that
because a juvenile court adjudication affords more procedural safeguards than
does the factor (b) admission process — which demands neither juror unanimity
nor instruction on the elements of the unadjudicated crime — it is “inherently
illogic[al]” to allow the prosecutor to present the underlying facts of criminal
activity but not the fact of the activity‟s adjudication.
Contrary to defendant‟s assertion, there is no illogic in the rule prohibiting
admission of the fact of a juvenile adjudication while permitting evidence of
violent juvenile criminal activity. Juvenile adjudications are inadmissible as
evidence in aggravation, not because of their evidentiary weight or reliability, but
because they are not “prior felony convictions” within the meaning of section
190.3, factor (c). (People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 861-862; see also Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 203 [order adjudging minor a ward of the court “shall not be
deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose”].) Factor (b), on the other hand,
involves evidence of violent conduct other than the capital crimes, regardless of
when the misconduct occurred or whether it led to a criminal conviction. (People
v. Lewis & Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1052.) Such evidence is permitted
because it “ „enable[s] the jury to make an individualized assessment of the
character and history of the defendant to determine the nature of the punishment to
be imposed.‟ [Citation.]” (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 544.) Thus,
although the fact of the juvenile adjudication is inadmissible, the conduct
97
underlying the adjudication is relevant to the jury‟s penalty determination and
admissible as violent criminal activity under factor (b). (People v. Lucky, supra,
45 Cal.3d at pp. 295-296, fn. 24 [“It is not the adjudication, but the conduct itself,
which is relevant”].) Defendant‟s claim of an internal inconsistency fails.24
Defendant argues that the high court‟s decision in Simmons v. Roper (2005)
543 U.S. 551, precludes admission of his juvenile criminal activity. As we
recently explained, however, Roper does not compel exclusion of such evidence.
(People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1239 [Roper‟s holding that the 8th
Amend. prohibits the execution of a condemned prisoner younger than 18 years
old at the time of the capital offense says nothing about the propriety of permitting
a capital sentencing jury to consider the defendant‟s violent conduct as a
juvenile].)
Defendant asserts finally that in instructing the jury regarding the Jason L.
incident, the trial court erred by not setting forth the elements of the crimes of
forcible sodomy and oral copulation. We have repeatedly held, however, that
absent a request, a trial court has no duty to instruct on the elements of
unadjudicated crimes admitted under factor (b). (People v. Guerra (2006) 37
Cal.4th 1067, 1147; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 588 [rule
recognizes the defense concern that such instructions may lead the jury to place
undue emphasis on unadjudicated crimes, rather than on the question of penalty].)
We also have rejected defendant‟s further argument that recent high court
24 We also reject defendant‟s contention, raised for the first time in his reply brief,
that he was unduly prejudiced by the fact the allegations of his sexual crimes
against Jason L. were being determined by the penalty phase jury 10 years after
the incident allegedly occurred. (People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 379
[defendant was not deprived of the right to a fair trial or due process by the penalty
jury‟s determination of his mental state during the commission of a crime
committed as a juvenile 16 years earlier].)
98
decisions on the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial call that rule into question.
Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at page 490, holds that a fact, other than a prior
conviction, “that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum” must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
As we have explained, however, because death is no more than the statutory
maximum once a special circumstance allegation is found true, the penalty
determination in a capital case falls outside of Apprendi‟s rule. (People v.
Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 589, fn. 14.)
c. Evidence of incident in county jail
In the notice of evidence in aggravation, the prosecution indicated it intended
to introduce under factor (b) eight incidents involving defendant‟s use or threats of
violence, including “[a]ll evidence, facts underlying, statements of witnesses and
the defendant related to the defendant‟s use or attempted use of force or violence
or the express or implied threat to use force or violence on Sheriff‟s Deputies on
March 3, 1996.” By written motion, defendant objected to all of the proposed
“other crimes” evidence on various grounds and sought a hearing on its
admissibility.
The trial court conducted the requested hearing in conjunction with the
parties‟ numerous other pretrial motions. At the outset of that hearing, the trial
court heard extensive argument on a defense motion, pursuant to Pitchess v.
Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, seeking the personnel files of the six named
sheriff‟s deputies who were involved in the March 3 incident, and granted the
motion as to the files of one officer. Later in the hearing, the trial court ruled it
99
would allow the prosecution to present the evidence of the county jail incident in
its case in aggravation, stating simply, “We already litigated that.”25
At the penalty retrial, and over trial counsel‟s renewed objection, the
prosecution called three sheriff‟s deputies to testify about the March 3, 1996,
incident at the San Diego County jail while defendant was awaiting trial in the
case. According to the officers‟ testimony, on that date, six sheriff‟s deputies
wielding pepper spray and a shock-emitting shield “extracted” defendant from his
jail cell after he refused directions to relocate to a more secure unit. When
defendant finally emerged from his cell and deputies moved closer to handcuff
him, he started cursing, then charged at them with his head down and fists raised.
Defendant ran down the hallway for about 500 feet before he was subdued. As a
result of the incident, defendant was housed in the cell used for disciplining
inmates and charged with a rules violation.
Noting that evidence of violent conduct or threats of violence admitted under
factor (b) must amount to an actual crime (People v. Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d at
p. 72), defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of the
county jail incident because the prosecutor made no effort to tie those events to a
violation of any particular penal statute. He claims, furthermore, that the trial
court compounded its evidentiary error by giving CALJIC No. 8.87, which told
the jury how to consider evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity in making its
penalty determination but failed to identify, or instruct on, the elements of the
25 The trial court did not elaborate on its ruling admitting evidence of the county
jail incident. But implicit in its ruling on the Pitchess motion was a determination
that the prosecutor had set forth substantial evidence the incident constituted an
actual crime, thus warranting a jury determination of whether that criminal activity
had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and could be considered as an
aggravating factor. (See People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72, fn. 25.)
100
crime defendant allegedly had committed.26 Defendant argues that the failure to
specify and instruct on the elements of the particular crime at issue in that incident
rendered meaningless the rule that the jury may consider evidence of
unadjudicated crimes as a factor in aggravation only when such criminal activity is
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant is correct that the penalty jury could not properly consider “other
crimes” evidence as an aggravating factor unless it was satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt he committed the criminal activity, and the trial court had a sua
sponte duty to so instruct. (People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 584;
People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-56.) But defendant points to no case
imposing a duty on the prosecutor or the trial court to identify for the jury the
actual offense defined by the criminal activity admitted as factor (b) evidence.
Indeed, to the contrary, we have held that absent a request, the trial court has no
duty to specify the names or elements of the unadjudicated crimes when
instructing the jury on factor (b) evidence. (People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th
569, 591-592; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 205-206.) The premise of this
rule is that, for tactical reasons, most defendants prefer not to risk having the jury
place undue emphasis on the prior violent crimes. (People v. Tuilaepa, supra, at
p. 592.)
Contrary to defendant‟s suggestion, the failure to identify an actual crime
does not undermine the reasonable doubt standard for considering an
unadjudicated crime as an aggravating factor. As we have explained, that standard
26 The court instructed: “Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of
showing that the defendant has committed the following criminal acts or activity
which involved the express or implied use of force or violence, or the threat of
force or violence: . . . 3) defendant‟s incident involving sheriff‟s deputies on
March 3, 1996 in the County Jail . . . .”
101
is a “foundational requirement” — which California law, not the Constitution,
imposes — to ensure that “before a sentencing juror weighs the culpable nature of
such other violent criminal conduct on the issue of penalty, he or she must be
highly certain that the defendant committed it.” (People v. Anderson, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p. 589.) Here, the trial court properly determined the legal question
whether the prosecution‟s proposed evidence in aggravation was an actual crime
involving violence or the threat of violence27 (People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th
691, 745), and informed the jurors they had to be convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant committed the alleged unadjudicated criminal act before they
could consider such evidence as a factor in aggravation. Therefore, the failure to
identify or define the specific crime constituting the criminal activity did not
render meaningless the reasonable doubt requirement or otherwise skew the jury‟s
normative determination of the appropriate penalty. (People v. Anderson, supra,
at p. 589.)
d. Evidence of threat to plainclothes officer
Over defense objection, the prosecution presented evidence of an encounter
between defendant and Officer John Cherski. On August 11, 1994, less than one
year before committing the capital crimes, defendant was in downtown San Diego
cleaning up the sidewalk with his coworkers from an urban renewal project.
Officer Cherski was in the vicinity working on a plainclothes detail. As the urban
renewal group passed the officer, defendant stopped and began to stare at him.
When Cherski looked back and made eye contact with defendant, defendant asked
what Cherski was staring at. Cherski responded that he was not staring at
27 Defendant does not suggest his conduct in the county jail incident did not
constitute a violent crime or a threat to commit a violent crime. (See, e.g.,
§ 241.1.)
102
anything. Defendant approached Cherski and told him, “I will fuck you up.”
Cherski then identified himself as a police officer and arrested defendant.
Characterizing the encounter involving Officer Cherski as “nothing more
than a non-specific future threat,” defendant contends the evidence was not
admissible under factor (b) as criminal activity involving “the use or attempted use
of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.” The
record shows otherwise. (See §§ 240 [defining crime of assault], 422 [elements of
criminal threats].)
As he did in challenging the evidence concerning the county jail incident,
defendant asserts it was error to allow the jury to consider evidence of the
encounter with Officer Cherski when the actual crime was not identified and the
jury was not instructed on its elements. As previously discussed, ante, in part
II.D.4.c., these omissions neither rendered the evidence inadmissible nor
constituted instructional error.
6. Instructions on considering unadjudicated criminal activity
In instructing on the evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity admitted
under factor (b), the trial court informed the jury: “Before a juror may consider
any of such criminal act or activity as an aggravating circumstance in this case, a
juror must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did in
fact commit such criminal act or activity. . . . [¶] If any juror is convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that such criminal activity occurred, that juror may
consider that activity as a fact in aggravation. If a juror is not so convinced, that
juror must not consider that evidence for any purpose.” (CALJIC No. 8.87 (1989
rev.) pars. 2, 3.) In connection with this charge, the trial court also instructed with
the second paragraph of CALJIC No. 2.90, which defines the reasonable doubt
standard.
103
Defendant claims the trial court erred when instructing the jury on how to
consider the evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity because it omitted the
first paragraph of the standard reasonable doubt instruction, which would have
informed the jury about the presumption of innocence and the prosecution‟s
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.28
We reject defendant‟s claim. As we have previously made clear, when, as
here, the jury is instructed it may consider evidence of unadjudicated criminal
activity as a factor in aggravation only after being convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the alleged criminal activity, no more is
required. (People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 263; People v. Benson (1990)
52 Cal.3d 754, 810 [the reasonable doubt standard in this setting provides the
substance of the presumption of innocence and the prosecution‟s burden of
proof].)
Defendant argues that the failure to instruct on the presumption of innocence
and the prosecution‟s burden of proof was error here because the trial court
misinformed the jury by remarking, “In this type of a proceeding, there are many
rules of evidence that don‟t apply because, remember, we are not talking about
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Contrary to defendant‟s assertion, the trial
court‟s comment was not a misstatement of law. “[T]he focus of the penalty
selection phase of a capital trial is more normative and less factual than the guilt
phase. The penalty jury‟s principal task is the moral endeavor of deciding whether
the death sentence should be imposed on a defendant who has already been
28 The first paragraph of CALJIC No. 2.90 states: “A defendant in a criminal
action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a
reasonable doubt whether [his] [her] guilt is satisfactorily shown, [he] [she] is
entitled to a verdict of not guilty. The presumption places upon the People the
burden of proving [him] [her] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
104
determined to be „death eligible‟ as a result of the findings and verdict reached at
the guilt phase.” (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1267.)
Furthermore, given the entire charge, it is not reasonably likely the jury
understood the trial court‟s comment as a call to ignore the given instruction on
the reasonable doubt standard applicable to evidence of unadjudicated criminal
activity. Defendant‟s suggestion to the contrary is not persuasive on this record.
7. Instruction on the jury’s sentencing discretion and deliberative
process (CALJIC No. 8.88)
Before the penalty retrial deliberations, the trial court read CALJIC No. 8.88,
which described the process of weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation
to arrive at the penalty determination. In relevant part, the instruction stated that
to impose death, the jury must be persuaded “that the aggravating circumstances
are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants
death instead of life without parole.” Defendant contends the standard instruction
is constitutionally infirm in various respects. As he acknowledges, in prior
decisions we have rejected identical assertions. CALJIC No. 8.88‟s reference to
aggravating circumstances that are “so substantial” is not impermissibly vague,
and its description of the jury‟s central duty as determining whether death is
“warranted,” rather than “appropriate,” is not misleading. (People v. Carrington,
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 199; People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1249.) Nor is
the instruction defective because it fails to convey to jurors that defendant has no
burden to persuade them that death is inappropriate. (People v. Parson (2008) 44
Cal.4th 332, 371.) Finally, CALJIC No. 8.88 is not inconsistent with section
190.3‟s mandate or the requirements of due process in failing to inform jurors that
they “shall impose” a sentence of life without parole in the event the mitigating
circumstances outweigh those in aggravation. (People v. Jackson (2009) 45
105
Cal.4th 662, 701-702; People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1279.) Defendant
fails to persuade us to revisit these issues.
8. Off-the-record proceedings
After trial ended and the parties had reviewed the trial transcripts,
defendant‟s appellate counsel asked the trial court for permission to prepare a
settled statement on oral trial proceedings the court reporter did not record. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, former rules 4(e), 7, 36, now rules 8.137, 8.346.) The written
request referenced 83 unreported matters. Following both formal and informal
discussions by the parties and a court hearing, the trial court ordered inclusion in
the record of 27 settled statements. Regarding the unreported proceedings that
could not be settled, defendant‟s appellate counsel and respondent‟s counsel
stipulated that, as to some, the parties had no independent recollection, and as to
the others, the request for a settled statement had been denied or withdrawn.
Citing the items that are not part of the record as settled statements and other
unreported discussions, defendant now claims the trial court violated section 190.9
by holding numerous pretrial and trial proceedings without a court reporter
present. In relevant part, section 190.9 provides: “In any case in which a death
sentence may be imposed, all proceedings conducted in the superior court,
including all conferences and proceedings, whether in open court, in conference in
the courtroom, or in chambers, shall be conducted on the record with a court
reporter present.” (§ 190.9, subd. (a)(1).)
Although, as defendant argues, the trial court apparently failed to comply
with section 190.9, the error is not reversible because defendant has failed to carry
his “ „burden of demonstrating that the appellate record is not adequate to permit
meaningful appellate review.‟ ” (People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 509.)
As to most of the cited instances of unreported proceedings, which include matters
106
such as discussion in chambers scheduling meetings, and sidebar conferences
during witness testimony, defendant makes no effort to establish prejudice or even
to place the unreported exchanges in context. (People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th
at p. 1281.) Although defendant suggests the trial court‟s practice of discussing
jury instructions off the record “raises red flags,” he acknowledges the trial court
recited for the record the parties‟ instructional objections. And although he
contends the trial court‟s summary of the parties‟ arguments was truncated and
incomplete, he fails to explain how the unreported discussions prevent us from
conducting an adequate review of the jury instructions the trial court gave or
refused. (People v. Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 110-112.)
Nor does defendant describe how he was prejudiced by the trial court‟s off-
the-record discussions with counsel regarding four questions the first jury posed
during its penalty phase deliberations. As above, the trial court summarized the
unreported conference on the record, including the parties‟ various objections and
its rulings, and nothing in the record suggests counsel disagreed with the trial
court‟s summation. Defendant fails to demonstrate any way in which the
unreported discussion hampers appellate review. (People v. Dykes (2009) 46
Cal.4th 731, 800, fn. 16.) Indeed, given that the first jury deadlocked on penalty,
it is unclear how defendant could show the off-the-record discussion prejudiced
him.
Defendant properly concedes he cannot demonstrate he suffered prejudice as
a result of the trial court‟s failure to comply with section 190.9. But he urges us to
reconsider the rule that places on him the burden of showing prejudice, and to
declare instead that a trial court‟s violation of section 190.9 is reversible per se.
We declined a similar invitation in People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at page
860, and do so again here.
107
We also reject defendant‟s assertion that the trial court‟s failure to conduct all
proceedings in the presence of a court reporter violated his rights to due process
and fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment. The due process clause requires
the state “to furnish an indigent defendant with a record sufficient to permit an
adequate and effective appellate review. [Citations.]” (People v. Rogers, supra,
39 Cal.4th at p. 857.) Where, as here, the procedures for using settled statements
are used to fill in the gaps and the resulting record is “adequate to permit
meaningful appellate review” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1165),
there is no due process violation (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 661-
663; People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 66-67). Nor, contrary to
defendant‟s assertion, did the violation of section 190.9 deprive defendant of his
Eighth Amendment right to a reliable death penalty determination. (People v.
Rogers, supra, at pp. 857-858.) Finally, we reject defendant‟s remaining argument
that the violation of section 190.9 constituted a deprivation of a state-created
liberty interest under Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343. Defendant cites no
case, and we are aware of none, that suggests a capital defendant has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in the presence of a court reporter at
every oral exchange that occurs during the pendency of his case. (Engle v. Isaac
(1982) 456 U.S. 107, 121, fn. 21 [mere error of state law is not a denial of due
process].) Hicks is not implicated here.
9. Challenge to the felony-murder special circumstances
Defendant contends his death sentence violates the proportionality guarantee
of the Eighth Amendment because he was rendered death eligible on the basis of
his commission of three felonies, with no requirement that the prosecution prove
any culpable mental state as to the killing. He argues that imposition of the death
penalty for negligent or accidental killings is contrary to the laws of a majority of
108
the states, recent professional opinion, and international norms, and is therefore
inconsistent with the evolving standards of decency from which the Eighth
Amendment derives its meaning.
As defendant acknowledges, we have repeatedly held that, consistent with
Eighth Amendment principles, neither intent to kill nor reckless indifference to life
is a required element of the felony-murder special circumstance when the
defendant is the actual killer. (People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1204;
People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 632; see also People v. Brasure (2008) 42
Cal.4th 1037, 1071-1072 [rejecting the argument that Western Europe‟s abolition
of the death penalty demonstrates evolving standards of decency so as to bar
capital punishment under the 8th Amend.].) Defendant offers nothing to warrant
our reconsideration of the issue. For similar reasons, we reject defendant‟s
contention that the high court‟s recent pronouncements on the Sixth Amendment
jury trial right require the jury, not the courts, to make the requisite findings of
intent to kill or reckless indifference to life. The Eighth Amendment does not
require a such a finding. Thus, there is no requirement the jury be instructed to do
so.
We likewise reject defendant‟s contention that imposing the death penalty
absent a showing of intent to kill violates international law as set forth in the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and in a resolution
by the United Nations Economic and Social Council. “We need not consider the
applicability of international treaties and laws to defendant‟s appeal . . . because he
has failed to establish his premise that he suffered violations of state or federal
constitutional law.” (People v. Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1098; see People
v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1142 [no violation of ICCPR when death
sentence is imposed in accordance with law].)
109
10. Challenges to California’s death penalty law
Defendant advances “routine instructional and constitutional challenges” to
California‟s death penalty statute (People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 303),
all of which we have consistently rejected in prior decisions. We reaffirm our
prior pronouncements as follows:
California‟s death penalty scheme is not unconstitutional in failing to assign
to the state the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an
aggravating factor. (People v. Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 227; People v.
Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 373.) Nor does any constitutional provision
require an instruction informing jurors they may impose a sentence of death only
if persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating factors and that death is the appropriate penalty. (People v. Hawthorne,
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 104; People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 533.) Recent
high court decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial —
Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, and Blakely
v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 — do not undermine our prior conclusions.
(See People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1250 & fn. 22.)
The failure to instruct the jury that the prosecution bears some burden of
persuasion regarding the jury‟s penalty determination does not violate the Sixth,
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. (People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 89;
People v. Wilson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 31.)
Nor does the failure to instruct jurors they must unanimously agree on the
existence of particular aggravating factors, but not on the existence of any
mitigating factors, violate the Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment. (People v.
McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 378; People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847,
875; see also People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 275 [constitutionality of
110
death penalty law not undercut by reasoning of Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S.
584].)
There is no constitutional requirement that a trial court instruct the jury on
the “ „presumption of life.‟ ” (People v. Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 228.)
The lack of a requirement that the jury make a written statement of its
findings and its reasons for the death verdict does not deprive a capital defendant
of the rights to due process, equal protection, and meaningful appellate review that
derive from the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (People v. Farley
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1134; People v. Wilson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 32.)
The failure to provide intercase proportionality review does not violate the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (People v. Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 724;
see also Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 [intercase proportionality
review not constitutionally required].)
When a death sentence is rendered in accordance with state and constitutional
law, international law does not bar imposition of the death penalty. (People v.
Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 228; People v. Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p.
1098.) Nor does “California‟s asserted status as being in the minority of
jurisdictions worldwide that impose capital punishment” render California out of
step with evolving standards of decency or otherwise establish that its death
penalty scheme per se violates the Eighth Amendment. (People v. Thornton,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 470; see People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 47-48.)
11. Effect of reversals on death sentence
Pointing out that the trial court instructed the penalty retrial jurors to base
their determination on “the circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was
convicted” (§ 190.3, factor (a)), defendant argues that in the event we reverse or
reduce any conviction or special circumstance finding, we must also reverse his
111
death sentence. He contends that reversal of penalty is required because the
reversal of a count or finding would “alter the landscape” the jurors considered in
determining penalty, and that reversal is mandated moreover by the Sixth
Amendment principles enunciated in Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, and its
progeny, which hold that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 490.)
Because we affirm all of the convictions and findings against defendant, we
need not reexamine whether it is proper to conduct harmless error review when an
appellate court reverses or vacates a conviction or finding the jurors considered in
determining penalty.
12. Cumulative error
Finally, we reject defendant‟s contention that the combined effect of the
errors occurring at both the guilt and penalty phases of trial so infected his trial
with unfairness as to make his resulting conviction a violation of due process and
his death sentence unreliable. There was no error reversible by itself, and any
errors that did occur, viewed collectively, do not constitute a constitutional
deprivation. Contrary to defendant‟s argument, he received a fair trial. (People v.
Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 470.)
112
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment.
CHIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
113
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Taylor
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal XXX
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S062562
Date Filed: April 15, 2010
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: San Diego
Judge: Frederic L. Link
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Alison Pease,
Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W.
Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Holly Wilkens and Matthew Mulford, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Alison Pease
Deputy State Public Defender
801 K Street, Suite 1100
Sacramento, CA 95814-3518
(916) 322-2676
Matthew Mulford
Deputy Attorney General
110 West A Street, Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 645-2227
Automatic appeal from a judgment of death.
Opinion Information
| Date: | Citation: | Docket Number: | Category: | Status: |
| Thu, 04/15/2010 | 48 Cal. 4th 574, 229 P.3d 12, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 87 | S062562 | Automatic Appeal | submitted/opinion due |
Parties
| 1 | The People (Respondent) Represented by Attorney General - San Diego Office Matthew C. Mulford, Deputy Attorney General P.O. Box 85266 San Diego, CA |
| 2 | Taylor, Brandon Arnae (Appellant) San Quentin State Prison Represented by Office of the State Public Defender-Sac Alison Pease, Senior Deputy State Public Defender 801 "K" Street, Suite 1100 Sacramento, CA |
| Opinion Authors | |
| Opinion | Justice Ming W. Chin |
| Dockets | |
| Jun 27 1997 | Judgment of death |
| Jul 3 1997 | Filed certified copy of Judgment of Death Rendered 6-27-97. |
| Sep 17 2001 | Filed: applt's application for appointment of counsel (IFP form). |
| Sep 18 2001 | Order appointing State Public Defender filed to represent applt for the direct appeal. |
| Oct 9 2001 | Date trial court delivered record to appellant's counsel (12,708 pp. record) (see Calif. Rules of Court, rule 39.50(c); the date of delivery is the date of mailing plus five days.) (Note: record was sent on 10-4-2001.) |
| Nov 9 2001 | Received: notice from superior court that the 12,708 pp. record on appeal was sent to appellant's counsel on 10-4-2001. |
| Nov 30 2001 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Jan 4 2002 | Request for extension of time filed By applt. to request correction of the record. (1st request) |
| Jan 15 2002 | Extension of time granted To 3/8/2002 to applt. to request correction of the record. The court anticipates that after that date, only two further extensions totaling 120 additional days will be granted. |
| Jan 18 2002 | Filed: amended declaration of service by mail of applt's applic. for extension of time to request correction and augmentation of record on appeal. |
| Jan 30 2002 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Mar 7 2002 | Request for extension of time filed By applt. to request correction of the record. (2nd request) |
| Mar 18 2002 | Extension of time granted To 5/7/2002 to applt. to request correction of the record. The court anticipates that after that date, only one further extension totaling 60 additional days will be granted. |
| Mar 29 2002 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| May 6 2002 | Request for extension of time filed By applt. to request correction of the record. (3rd request) |
| May 10 2002 | Extension of time granted To 7/8/2002 to applt. to request correction the record. Sr. Dep. State Public Defender Brodie anticipates fillng the request in the superior court by 7/8/2002. No further extensions will be granted. |
| May 30 2002 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Jul 5 2002 | Received copy of appellant's record correction motion (48 pp.) |
| Jul 30 2002 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Sep 24 2002 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Dec 2 2002 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Jan 27 2003 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Mar 25 2003 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| May 23 2003 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Jul 22 2003 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Sep 24 2003 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Nov 21 2003 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Jan 23 2004 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Mar 24 2004 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| May 25 2004 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Jul 6 2004 | Record certified for accuracy |
| Jul 26 2004 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Sep 16 2004 | Record on appeal filed Clerk's transcript 47 volumes (8,692 pages) and Report's transcript 59 volumes (4,750 pages), including material under seal. Clerk's transcript includes 5,489 pp of juror questionnaires. |
| Sep 16 2004 | Appellant's opening brief letter sent, due: October 26, 2004 |
| Sep 23 2004 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Oct 19 2004 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's opening brief. (1st request) |
| Oct 25 2004 | Extension of time granted to 12/27/2004 to file apellant's opening brief. After that date, only eight further extensions totaling about 450 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing that brief by 3/2006 |
| Nov 23 2004 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Dec 22 2004 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's opening brief. (2nd request) |
| Dec 30 2004 | Extension of time granted to 2/25/2005 to file appellant's opening brief. After that date, only seven further extensions totaling about 390 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon Senior Deputy State Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing that brief by 3/2006. |
| Jan 25 2005 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from the State P.D. |
| Feb 22 2005 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's opening brief. (3rd request) |
| Feb 24 2005 | Extension of time granted to 4/26/2005 to file appellant's opening brief. The court anticipates that after that date, only six further extensions totaling about 330 additional days will be granted. Counsel is ordered to inform his or her supervising attorney, if any, of this schedule, and to take all steps necessary to meet it. |
| Mar 23 2005 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Apr 21 2005 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's opening brief. (4th request) |
| Apr 27 2005 | Extension of time granted to 6/27/2005 to file appellant's opening brief. The court anticipates that after that date, only five further extensions totaling about 270 additional days will be granted. Counsel is ordered to inform his or her supervising attorney, if any, of this schedule, and to take all steps necessary to meet it. |
| May 24 2005 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Jun 21 2005 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's opening brief. (5th request) |
| Jun 23 2005 | Extension of time granted to 8/26/2005 to file appellant's opening brief. After that date, only five further extensions totaling about 300 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing that brief by the end of 6/2006. |
| Jul 25 2005 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Aug 22 2005 | Request for extension of time filed to file AOB. (6th request) |
| Aug 24 2005 | Filed: Supplemental declaration in support of application for extension of time to file AOB. |
| Aug 25 2005 | Filed: Clerk's transcript on appeal "Supplemental Master Index C" and sealed volumes 42 and 42A. (14 pp.) |
| Aug 29 2005 | Extension of time granted to 10/26/2005 to file appellant's opening brief. After that date, only four further extensions totaling about 240 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing that brief by 6/2006. |
| Sep 23 2005 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Oct 20 2005 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's opening brief. (7th request) |
| Oct 24 2005 | Extension of time granted to 12/27/2005 to file appellant's opening brief. After that date, only three further extensions totaling about 180 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing that brief by 6/2006. |
| Nov 22 2005 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Dec 20 2005 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's opening brief. (8th request) |
| Dec 22 2005 | Extension of time granted to 2/27/2006 to file the appellant's opening brief. After that date, only three further extensions totaling about 150 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon counsel Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing that brief by 7/31/2006. |
| Jan 24 2006 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Feb 22 2006 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's opening brief. (9th request) |
| Feb 24 2006 | Extension of time granted to April 28, 2006 to file appellant's opening brief. After that date, only two further extensions totaling about 90 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing that brief by July 31, 2006. |
| Apr 25 2006 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Apr 25 2006 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's opening brief. (10th request) |
| May 1 2006 | Extension of time granted to June 27, 2006 to file appellant's opening brief. After that date, only one further extension totaling about 30 additional days is contemplated. Extension is granted based upon Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing that brief by July 31, 2006. |
| Jun 22 2006 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Jun 22 2006 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's opening brief. (11th request) |
| Jun 23 2006 | Extension of time granted to August 28, 2006 to file appellant's opening brief. After that date, only one further extension totaling about 64 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing that brief October 31, 2006. Counsel is ordered to inform his or her supervising attorney, if any, of this schedule, and to take all steps necessary to meet it. |
| Aug 23 2006 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Aug 23 2006 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's opening brief. (12th request) |
| Aug 24 2006 | Extension of time granted to October 30, 2006 to file appellant's opening brief. After that date, only one further extension totaling about 30 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing that brief by November 30, 2006. |
| Oct 24 2006 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's opening brief. (13th request) |
| Oct 26 2006 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Oct 27 2006 | Extension of time granted to December 29, 2006 to file appellant's opening brief. Extension is granted based upon Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing that brief by December 29, 2006. After that date, no further extension will be granted. |
| Dec 26 2006 | Counsel's status report received (confidential) from State P.D. |
| Dec 26 2006 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's opening brief. (14th request) |
| Jan 2 2007 | Extension of time granted to January 5, 2007 to file apellant's opening brief. Extension is granted based upon Assistant State Public Defender Jay Colangelo's representation that he anticipates filing that brief by January 5, 2007. After that date, no further extension will be granted. |
| Jan 4 2007 | Application to file over-length brief filed to file appellant's opening brief. (131,923 word brief submitted under separate cover) |
| Jan 5 2007 | Filed: application to file over length brief with attached proof of service. |
| Jan 9 2007 | Order filed Appellant's "Application for Leave to File Opening Brief Longer Than 95,200 Words" is granted. |
| Jan 9 2007 | Appellant's opening brief filed (131,923 words; 446 pp.) |
| Jan 9 2007 | Note: respondent's brief due: February 8, 2007 (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.360(c)(2)) |
| Feb 1 2007 | Request for extension of time filed to file respondent's brief. (1st request) |
| Feb 2 2007 | Extension of time granted On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file respondent's brief is extended to and including April 9, 2007. |
| Apr 3 2007 | Request for extension of time filed to file respondent's brief. (2nd request) |
| Apr 3 2007 | Motion for access to sealed record filed respondent's "Application for Transcripts of Hearings Held under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118." |
| Apr 5 2007 | Extension of time granted to June 8, 2007 to file respondent's brief. After that date, only one further extension totaling about 60 additional days is contemplated. Extension is granted based upon Deputy Attorney General Matthew Mulford's representation that he anticipates filing that brief by August 7, 2007. |
| May 16 2007 | Motion for access to sealed record granted Respondent's "Application for Transcripts of Hearings Held under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118," filed on April 3, 2007, is granted. The clerk is directed to transmit a copy of the following to respondent: (1) Reporter's Transcript, 6A RT 634-640 (February 23, 1996); (2) Reporter's Transcript, 15A RT 1586-1587 (April 15, 1996); and (3) Reporter's Transcript, 16A RT 1589-1596 (April 16, 1996). Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.328(b)(1), the transcripts are to remain confidential. |
| Jun 5 2007 | Request for extension of time filed to file respondent's brief. (3rd request) |
| Jun 7 2007 | Extension of time granted to August 7, 2007 to file the respondent's brief. After that date, no further extension is contemplated. Exetension is granted based upon Deputy Attorney General Matthew Mulford's representation that he anticipates filing that brief by August 7, 2007. |
| Jul 31 2007 | Request for extension of time filed to file respondent's brief. (4th request) |
| Aug 3 2007 | Extension of time granted Good cause appearing, and based upon Deputy Attorney General Matthew Mulford's representation that he anticipates filing the respondent's brief by August 21, 2007, counsel's request for an extension of time in which to file that brief is granted to August 21, 2007. After that date, no further extension is contemplated. |
| Aug 21 2007 | Respondent's brief filed (19,047 words; 66 pp.) |
| Aug 21 2007 | Note: appellant's reply brief is due September 10, 2007. (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.360(c)(3)) |
| Sep 4 2007 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's reply brief. (1st request) |
| Sep 7 2007 | Extension of time granted Good cause appearing, and based upon Supervising Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing the appellant's reply brief by December 2008, counsel's request for an extension of time in which to file that brief is granted to November 9, 2007. After that date, only seven further extensions totaling about 390 additional days are contemplated. |
| Nov 2 2007 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's reply brief. (2nd request) |
| Nov 6 2007 | Filed: by appellant's counsel, supplemental declaration for extension of time to file the reply brief. |
| Nov 8 2007 | Extension of time granted Good cause appearing, and based upon Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing the appellant's reply brief by December 2008, counsel's request for an extension of time in which to file that brief is granted to January 8, 2008. After that date, only six further extensions totaling about 330 additional days are contemplated. |
| Jan 3 2008 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's reply brief. (3rd request) |
| Jan 7 2008 | Extension of time granted Good cause appearing, and based upon Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing the appellant's reply brief by December 2008, counsel's request for an extension of time in which to file that brief is granted to March 10, 2008. After that date, only five further extensions totaling about 290 additional days are contemplated. |
| Mar 5 2008 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's reply brief. (4th request) |
| Mar 11 2008 | Extension of time granted Good cause appearing, and based upon Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing the appellant's reply brief by December 2008, counsel's request for an extension of time in which to file that brief is granted to May 9, 2008. After that date, only four further extensions totaling about 230 additional days are contemplated. |
| May 6 2008 | Request for extension of time filed (AA) to file appellant's reply brief. (5th request) |
| May 9 2008 | Extension of time granted Good cause appearing, and based upon Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing the appellant's reply brief by December 2008, counsel's request for an extension of time in which to file that brief is granted to July 8, 2008. After that date, only three further extensions totaling about 170 additional days are contemplated. |
| Jul 14 2008 | Application for relief from default filed by appellant, to file request for extension of time to file appellant's reply brief. |
| Jul 18 2008 | Request for extension of time filed (AA) to file appellant's reply brief. (6th request) |
| Jul 18 2008 | Extension of time granted Appellant's request for relief from default is granted. Good cause appearing, and based upon Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing the appellant's reply brief by December 2008, counsel's request for an extension of time in which to file that brief is granted to September 8, 2008. After that date, only two further extensions totaling about 114 additional days are contemplated. |
| Sep 4 2008 | Request for extension of time filed (AA) to file appellant's reply brief. (7th request) |
| Sep 9 2008 | Extension of time granted Good cause appearing, and based upon Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing the appellant's reply brief by February 18, 2009, counsel's request for an extension of time in which to file that brief is granted to November 7, 2008. After that date, only two further extensions totaling about 103 additional days are contemplated. |
| Nov 6 2008 | Request for extension of time filed (AA) to file appellant's reply brief. (8th request) |
| Nov 14 2008 | Extension of time granted Good cause appearing, and based upon Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing the appellant's reply brief by February 18, 2009, counsel's request for an extension of time in which to file that brief is granted to January 6, 2009. After that date, only one further extension totaling about 45 additional days is contemplated. |
| Nov 25 2008 | Filed: by appellant, "Corrected Table of Contents and Table of Authorities to Appellant's Opening Brief" |
| Jan 2 2009 | Request for extension of time filed (AA) to file reply brief. (9th request) |
| Jan 7 2009 | Extension of time granted Good cause appearing, and based upon Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing the appellant's reply brief by March 18, 2009, counsel's request for an extension of time in which to file that brief is granted to March 18, 2009. After that date, no further extension is contemplated. |
| Apr 1 2009 | Request for extension of time filed to file appellant's reply brief. (10th request) |
| Apr 7 2009 | Extension of time granted Good cause appearing, and based upon Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease's representation that she anticipates filing the appellant's reply brief by April 9, 2009, counsel's request for an extension of time in which to file that brief is granted to April 9, 2009. After that date, no further extension is contemplated. |
| Apr 7 2009 | Appellant's reply brief filed (41,766 words; 154 pp.) |
| Jul 31 2009 | Letter sent to: Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease advising that the court is considering unsealing the confidential transcripts of three Marsden hearings on its own motion. (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.160(f)(3) & (f)(4).) Counsel is invited to serve and file a response, if she wishes, by August 10, 2009. |
| Aug 4 2009 | Received: letter from Chief Deputy State Public Defender Barry Helft, dated August 4, 2009, advising that the assigned attorney is currently on vacation and unavailable to respond to the court's July 31, 2009 letter. He requests that the court extend time to respond to August 27, 2009. |
| Aug 5 2009 | Letter sent to: Chief Deputy State Public Defender Barry Helft in response to his letter of August 4, 2009. The new August 27, 2009 due date that he proposed for filing a response to the court's July 31, 2009 letter is acceptable to the court. |
| Aug 27 2009 | Filed: by appellant, "Appellant's Response to the Court's Letter Regarding the Unsealing of Reporter's Transcripts for Marsden Hearings" |
| Sep 8 2009 | Exhibit(s) lodged Court's exhibits 8 and 141. |
| Sep 17 2009 | Record ordered unsealed On the court's own motion, the clerk is directed to unseal and make part of the public record the following sealed materials: 1. Volume 5a, page 614 (Reporter's Transcript of In Camera Hearing of February 22, 1996); 2. Volume 6a, pages 632 through 640 (Reporter's Transcript of Marsden Motion of February 23, 1996); 3. Volume 15a, pages 1586 through 1587 (Reporter's Transcript of Marsden Hearing of April 15, 1996); 4. Volume 16a, pages 1589 through 1596 (Reporter's Transcript of Marsden Hearing of April 16, 1996). |
| Nov 17 2009 | Oral argument letter sent advising counsel that the court could schedule this case for argument as early as the January calendar, to be held the week of January 4, 2010, in San Francisco. The advisement of "focus issues," notification that two counsel are required, and any request for oral argument time in excess of 30 minutes must be submitted to the court within 10 days of the order setting the case for argument. |
| Nov 19 2009 | Received: letter from Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease, dated November 17, 2009, requesting that the case not be set for oral argument for the January 2010 calendar. |
| Nov 19 2009 | Received: letter from Senior Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease, dated November 17, 2009, advising that respondent does not oppose her request regarding the scheduling of oral argument. |
| Nov 19 2009 | Letter sent to: Deputy State Public Defender Alison Pease advising that the case will not be scheduled for oral argument in January 2010. |
| Jan 6 2010 | Case ordered on calendar to be argued Wednesday, January 27, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco |
| Jan 15 2010 | Filed: appellant's focus issues letter, dated January 14, 2010. |
| Jan 15 2010 | Filed: respondent's focus issues letter, dated January 14, 2010. |
| Jan 15 2010 | Received: appearance sheet from Deputy Attorney General, Matthew Mulford, indicating 30 minutes for oral argument for respondent. |
| Jan 19 2010 | Received: letter from appellant, dated January 19, 2010 with additional authorities. |
| Jan 19 2010 | Received: from appellant, amended declaration of service by mail for "Letter Regarding Additional Authorities to be Cited by Appellant in Oral Argument" |
| Jan 19 2010 | Received: appearance sheet from Senior Deputy State Public Defender, Alison Pease, indicating 45 minutes for oral argument for appellant. |
| Jan 27 2010 | Cause argued and submitted |
| Apr 14 2010 | Notice of forthcoming opinion posted To be filed on Thursday, April 15, 2010 @ 10 a.m. |
| Briefs | |
| Jan 9 2007 | Appellant's opening brief filed |
| Aug 21 2007 | Respondent's brief filed |
| Apr 7 2009 | Appellant's reply brief filed |
| Brief Downloads | |
 | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| May 3, 2010 Annotated by cthacher | Topics: Capital offense, death penalty, death penalty appeal, death qualification, death sentence, Eighth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Fourth amendment, ineffective counsel, Marsden Motion, jury, jury instructions, voir dire, victim impact evidence, aggravated offense, first degree felony murder rape-murder special circumstance, sex crime, burglary. People v. Taylor Summary This case presents an automatic appeal from a judgment of death. In 1996, a San Diego County jury convicted defendant Brandon Arnae Taylor, a twenty-two-year old male, of the first-degree murder of Rosa Mae Dixon, an eighty-year old female. The jury determined that defendant had murdered Dixon while raping her and while also committing residential burglary and first-degree robbery in Dixon's home. After reaching these decisions, the jury deadlocked on a penalty for defendant. A second impaneled jury reached no such impasse, however, and returned a death penalty verdict. The trial court upheld this verdict and sentenced defendant to death. In presenting this appeal, defendant raises more than twenty challenges to the trial court’s decision and proceedings. Of central importance to the defendant, who is African American and has a complicated history of mental illness, substance abuse, and aggressive acts, are state and federal constitutional guarantees embodied in the fourth, fifth, and eighth amendments. Specifically, defendant challenges his ability to substitute his trial counsel (i.e., entitlement to a "Marsden hearing"), the process during the voir dire (i.e., “jury selection”), the submission of controversial evidence, the clarity of the lower court's jury instructions, and the scope of the victim impact statements. The Supreme Court of California reviewed defendant’s challenges, but still found that “there was no reversible error by itself, and any errors that did occur, viewed collectively, do not constitute a constitutional deprivation . . . [defendant] received a fair trial.” Facts and Guilt Phase On the evening on June 23, 1995, 80-year old Rosa Mae Dixon and her sister Betty Hayes sat in the living room of Dixon’s San Diego home. Around 9:30 p.m., the two women were startled – “scared to death” – by the sudden entrance of the defendant, who had snuck into the house by tearing a hole in a screen door. The defendant prevented the women from calling 911, pushed the two into a back bedroom, and forcibly raped and orally copulated Dixon. During the rape, Dixon began to have trouble breathing and ultimately stopped breathing or moving. After defendant finished with Dixon, he swung around with his penis in his hand toward Hayes and asked if she “wanted it.” Defendant then pulled up his shorts and began to leave the room, but stopped to take about sixty-five dollars from Hayes’ purse, which was sitting open on the table. Defendant escaped to the back fence before being apprehended by police officers responding to a 911 call from a neighbor that had heard the sounds of the women’s distress. Defendant, who officers report was calm and did not appear otherwise intoxicated or high at the time of his apprehension, presented several explanations for his presence in Dixon’s backyard. Witnesses, however, positively identified defendant as the assailant in a curbside line-up conducted less than one hour after his discovery and DNA evidence later conclusively linked him to the sexual assault on Dixon. Meanwhile, officers had discovered Dixon to be unresponsive, lying on the floor of the back bedroom with blood on her leg and underneath her pelvic area. Medical technicians were able to restore her pulse, but she was declared brain dead and removed from life support soon thereafter. At trial, the prosecution’s medical experts testified that Dixon died from the extreme fear, pain, and stress the sexual assaults had caused. The prosecution further claimed that these triggers caused Dixon to experience abnormal heart rhythms, which led to cardiac arrest. The defense disputed much of the prosecution’s characterization of the facts. First, “the defense posited that, when defendant entered Dixon’s home, he lacked the intent to steal or commit any other felony and, therefore did not commit a burglary at that point, and that Dixon suffered cardiac arrest, not from the sexual assaults, but from the fright of encountering defendant unexpectedly in her living room.” In support of this theory, defense pointed to Dixon’s previous heart ailments, including the fact that Dixon had suffered a heart attack within the ten days preceding her encounter with defendant. Defense also attempted to highlight that defendant had long-standing and serious mental illnesses, as well as a long history of suffering abuse by his mother’s partner and of abusing drugs including methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine, and LSD. A forensic and clinical toxicologist further concluded by extrapolation of tests conducted on defendant's urine that, at the time of the crimes, defendant's blood alcohol was between .12 and .14 percent. Together, the defense claimed that all of these issues contributed to a paranoid and delusional thinking that made it difficult for defendant to form clear thoughts, especially the mental state necessary for first degree murder. Upon weighing the evidence, a San Diego jury unanimously found the defendant guilty of the substantive crimes of rape, forcible oral copulation, and burglary, and it unanimously found true the associated felony-murder special circumstance allegations, making defendant guilty of first-degree felony murder of Dixon. The jury, however, was not able to reach a decision as to the penalty for defendant and the court had to impanel a second jury for this phase of the trial. Penalty Phase The only issue before the penalty retrial jury was whether the defendant should be sentenced to life without parole or to death. Here, the jury weighed the circumstances of the crime -- as well as defendant's past criminal activity involving "the use or attempted use or force or violence." See California Code 190.3(b) (2008). Of central relevance to this latter category was prosecution's claim that defendant had engaged in (1) forcible sodomy and oral copulation of a minor when defendant was twelve years old, (2) verbal threats to a plain clothes police officer, and (3) an assault on sheriffs' deputies during defendant's transfer from one cell to another in county jail. Defense tried unsuccessfully to exclude this evidence claiming that the admission of evidence of these three prior unadjudicated incidents of violence as factors in aggravation violated his federal and state constitutional rights. The court admitted the evidence and the jury, weighing this and the other evidence before it, decided on a verdict of death. Issues on Appeal On appeal, defense presented procedural and substantive challenges to both the guilt and penalty phases of the lower court proceedings. These included issues with defendant's ability to substitute trial counsel, the voir dire process, the submission of controversial evidence to the jury, the clarity of the court's jury instructions, and the scope of the victim impact statements articulating how Dixon's death impacted her family and community. The Supreme Court of California undertook review of defendant's challenges, noting that the defendant had requested that "in the event [the Court] reverse[d] or reduce[d] any conviction or special circumstance finding, [the Court] . . . reverse [defendant's] death sentence." Here, however, the Court affirmed all of the convictions and findings against the defendant. The Court rejected defendant's contention that there was any "combined effect" of errors that violated his due process rights or which made his death sentence unreliable. The Court further found that there was no individual reversible error that constituted a constitutional deprivation and thus concluded that defendant received a fair trial. Note: Chief Justice George, and Justices Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Moreno, and Corrigan all affirmed this judgment. Annotated by Chessie Thacher |
