IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
Plaintiff and Respondent,
TIMOTHY BRIAN STOWELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
Since 1996, the Legislature has directed that upon conviction of lewd and
lascivious acts with a child, in violation of Penal Code section 288, a defendant
shall be ordered “to submit to a blood . . . test for evidence of antibodies to the
probable causative agent of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)” “if
the court finds that there is probable cause to believe that blood, semen, or any
other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV [human immunodeficiency virus]
has been transferred from the defendant to the victim: [¶] . . . [¶] For purposes
of this paragraph, the court shall note its finding on the court docket and minute
order if one is prepared.” (Pen. Code, § 1202.1, subds. (a), (e)(6)(A), (B).) The
question presented is whether a defendant may challenge such an order on appeal
if he has failed to object to the absence of an express finding of probable cause or
We conclude that appeal of an HIV testing order on this basis should be
subject to the general rule requiring a timely objection. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant Timothy Brian Stowell was charged with violating Penal Code
sections 288, subdivision (a) (lewd and lascivious acts with a minor), and 289,
subdivision (j) (sexual penetration of a minor with a foreign object). Because
defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in any regard, we
recount the facts only briefly as distilled from the Court of Appeal opinion.
On July 25, 1998, Tracie H. and her four-year-old daughter, Taylor—the
victim—spent the day with defendant and his girlfriend, LeaAnn Thompson. That
evening, they returned to the motel where defendant and Thompson lived
(Thompson was the resident manager). Tracie decided she and Taylor would
spend the night. They went to sleep in the bedroom while defendant and
Thompson remained in the living room. About 2:30 a.m., Tracie was awakened
by Taylor’s “rustling” in the bed and told her to settle down. Tracie then heard
a male voice say “tight little pussy” and Taylor say “Don’t, Tim. Quit it.” She
asked, “Taylor, what is he doing to you?” Taylor responded, “He’s got his
finger in my pee-pee.” Tracie immediately took Taylor from the bed and left
In the companion case of People v. Butler (Dec. 1, 2003, S107791) __
Cal.4th __, we consider the cognizability of an HIV testing order, absent a timely
objection, for insufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of probable cause.
When interviewed by the police, defendant first stated that he had no
recollection of getting into the bed with Taylor or of touching her. In a second
interview, he admitted inserting his finger into Taylor’s vagina.
The jury found defendant guilty on both counts. The court determined
he was ineligible for probation and sentenced him to six years in prison. It also
ordered him to submit to a blood test for HIV, as recommended in the probation
department’s presentence report.
On appeal, defendant sought to have the testing order invalidated
because the trial court had failed to state on the record its finding of probable
cause to believe that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of
transmitting HIV had been transferred from him to Taylor2 or to note the finding
in the court docket or minutes.
In an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment.
With respect to the HIV testing, the court held defendant had forfeited any
challenge by failing to object at the time the order was imposed.
Penal Code section 1202.1 provides in relevant part that “[n]otwithstanding
Sections 120975 and 120990 of the Health and Safety Code, the court shall order
every person who is convicted of . . . a sexual offense listed in subdivision (e) . . .
to submit to a blood . . . test for evidence of antibodies to the probable causative
agent of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) . . . .” (Pen. Code,
§ 1202.1, subd. (a).) Penal Code section 1202.1, subdivision (e)(6)(A)(iii)
For convenience throughout the remainder of the discussion, we will use
“probable cause” to denote “probable cause to believe that blood, semen, or any
other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV has been transferred from the
defendant to the victim.” (Pen. Code, § 1202.1, subd. (e)(6)(A).)
includes “[l]ewd or lascivious conduct with a child in violation of Section 288,”3
but with the proviso that testing shall be ordered only “if the court finds that there
is probable cause to believe that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of
transmitting HIV has been transferred from the defendant to the victim: [¶] . . .
[¶] For purposes of this paragraph, the court shall note its finding on the court
docket and minute order if one is prepared.” (Pen. Code, § 1202.1, subd.
In this case, the trial court ordered HIV testing, but did not make an express
finding of probable cause. Nor did the court enter an appropriate notation in the
docket or minute order. On appeal, defendant contended these deficiencies
rendered the order invalid. Addressing the threshold question of the scope of
review, the Court of Appeal applied the analytical framework this court utilized in
In 2002, the Legislature amended Penal Code section 1202.1,
subdivision (e)(6), to expand the list of enumerated offenses. (See Stats. 2002,
ch. 831, § 1.) It now provides:
“(e)(6)(A) Any of the following offenses if the court finds that there is
probable cause to believe that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of
transmitting HIV has been transferred from the defendant to the victim:
“(i) Sexual penetration in violation of Section 264.1, 266c, or 289.
“(ii) Aggravated sexual abuse of a child in violation of Section 269.
“(iii) Lewd or lascivious conduct with a child in violation of Section 288.
“(iv) Continuous sexual abuse of a child in violation of Section 288.5.
“(v) The attempt to commit any offense described in clauses (i) to (iv),
“(B) For purposes of this paragraph, the court shall note its finding on the
court docket and minute order if one is prepared.”
Subdivision (e) also includes:
“(1) Rape in violation of Section 261 or 264.1.
“(2) Unlawful intercourse with a person under 18 years of age in violation
of Section 261.5 or 266c.
“(3) Rape of a spouse in violation of Section 262 or 264.1.
“(4) Sodomy in violation of Section 266c or 286.
“(5) Oral copulation in violation of Section 266c or 288a.”
An HIV testing order pursuant to these provisions does not require a finding of
People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 352-356 (Scott), and People v. Smith (2001)
24 Cal.4th 849, 852-853 (Smith), to determine the cognizability of certain
sentencing decisions. In Scott, the court distinguished between unauthorized
sentences—those that “could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstances in
the particular case” (Scott, at p. 354)—and discretionary sentencing choices—
those “which, though otherwise permitted by law, were imposed in a procedurally
or factually flawed manner.” (Ibid.) As to the former, lack of objection does not
foreclose review: “We deemed appellate intervention appropriate in these cases
because the errors presented ‘pure questions of law’ [citation] and were ‘ “clear
and correctable” independent of any factual issues presented by the record at
sentencing.’ [Citation.] In other words, obvious legal errors at sentencing that are
correctable without referring to factual findings in the record or remanding for
further findings are not waivable.” (Smith, at p. 852.) With respect to the latter,
however, the general forfeiture doctrine applies and failure to timely object forfeits
review. Such “[r]outine defects in the court’s statement of reasons are easily
prevented and corrected if called to the court’s attention.” (Scott, at p. 353; see
also People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 232-237.)
Drawing on the analysis in Scott and Smith, the Court of Appeal below
found defendant had forfeited his claim on appeal. First, the trial court could have
readily corrected the defect in its order upon timely notification. Second, given
the uncertainties in the evidence adduced at trial, “whether the trial court could
have ordered a blood test depended upon factual issues in the record or requires a
remand for further findings.” “We cannot substitute for the trial court in
reconstructing what happened, which must be based not only on the medical
testimony but on the credibility of the testimony as to what happened. This is
precisely the type of circumstance that required a timely objection, which would
have resulted in a finding that we could review on appeal.”
Although we agree with the Court of Appeal’s result in this case, we do not
adopt the analytical template of Scott and Smith for issues arising under Penal
Code section 1202.1. Since HIV testing does not constitute punishment (see
People v. McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, 83), it cannot properly be considered a
sentencing choice. While the order is made at the time sentence is imposed, the
Legislature enacted section 1202.1 and related HIV testing statutes as health and
safety measures to combat the spread of AIDS, not to increase criminal penalties.
(See, e.g., McVickers, at p. 89; People v. Hall (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1009,
1018.) Instead, we conclude that the general forfeiture rationale applies, and on
that basis hold that the failure to make an express finding of probable cause and to
note that finding in the docket is not subject to review absent a timely objection.
The forfeiture doctrine is a “well-established procedural principle that, with
certain exceptions, an appellate court will not consider claims of error that could
have been—but were not—raised in the trial court. [Citation.]” (People v. Vera
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 275; see People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580,
589-590; Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184-185.)
Strong policy reasons support this rule: “It is both unfair and inefficient to permit
a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court,
could have been easily corrected or avoided. [Citations.]” (Vera, at p. 276.)
“ ‘ “ ‘The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of
calling the judge’s attention to any infringement of them. If any other rule were to
obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to his objections
until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few
judgments would stand the test of an appeal.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Saunders, at
This rationale applies with equal force to claims under Penal Code section
1202.1, subdivision (e)(6), that the trial court failed to make an express finding or
notation of probable cause. Any deficiencies in this regard are easily remedied
upon timely objection. (Cf. People v. Marchand (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1056,
1061 [“if defendant had objected to imposition of the [sex offender] registration
requirement on the ground the predicate fact was not alleged in the information,
the court could have sought to cure any prejudice from the lack of notice”].) And
such procedural defects do not implicate any fundamental or constitutional right
that might excuse the failure to object. (See People v. Vera, supra, 15 Cal.4th at
Moreover, the statute neither requires an express finding (cf. Pen. Code,
§ 1385, subd. (a)) nor contains any sanction for noncompliance. (Cf. Malengo v.
Municipal Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 813, 816 [speedy trial directive under Penal
Code section 1050 is directory only “and contains no provision for the dismissal of
a case when its terms are not complied with”].) In this circumstance, we apply the
general rule “that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the
applicable law. [Citations.]” (People v. Mosley (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 489,
496-497; see, e.g., People v. Turner (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1413-1414,
fn. 2; People v. Martinez (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) This rule derives in
part from the presumption of Evidence Code section 664 “that official duty has
been regularly performed.” Thus, where a statement of reasons is not required and
the record is silent, a reviewing court will presume the trial court had a proper
basis for a particular finding or order. (See, e.g., People v. Henson (1991) 231
Cal.App.3d 172, 182 [presuming on a silent record that the trial court properly
exercised its discretion in imposing AIDS education as a condition of probation].)
We see no reason to disregard these principles here. With respect to notation of
the probable cause finding in the docket, nothing in the statutory language or the
legislative history4 indicates the Legislature intended to make validity of HIV
testing dependent on an essentially ministerial act. Nevertheless, we admonish
trial courts that legislative directives are to be observed even when not mandatory.
To the extent a notation in the docket, particularly when accompanied by an
express finding of probable cause, focuses the court’s attention on the relevant
facts, it ensures the ensuing order will be supported by substantial evidence. (See,
e.g., People v. Guardado (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 757, 765.)
Analogizing to Penal Code section 1385, defendant contends these
procedural directives are conditions precedent to a valid order. Section 1385,
subdivision (a), authorizes a trial court to dismiss an action “in furtherance of
justice” but requires that “[t]he reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an
order entered upon the minutes.” Courts have long held that “ ‘[t]he statement of
reasons is not merely directory, and neither trial nor appellate courts have
authority to disregard the requirement.’ ” (People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937,
944 (Orin).) As we explained in Orin, “The underlying purpose of this statutory
requirement is ‘to protect the public interest against improper or corrupt [fn.
omitted] dismissals’ and to impose a purposeful restraint upon the exercise of
judicial power ‘ “lest magistral discretion sweep away the government of laws.” ’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.) Thus, the reasons cannot be “merely inferable” from the
record because that does “not fulfill the purpose of the statute that the court
indicate why its dismissal is ‘in furtherance of justice’ but on the contrary leaves
the record vague and subject to speculation as to the reasons for the court’s
action.” (Id. at pp. 944-945, fn. omitted.)
We grant defendant’s request that the court take judicial notice of the
legislative history of Penal Code section 1202.1. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c),
This requirement is a necessary concomitant of the nature and scope of the
discretionary authority Penal Code section 1385 vests in the trial court, which
“while broad, is by no means absolute.” (Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 945.)
Lacking a statutory definition of the “amorphous concept” “ ‘in furtherance of
justice’ ” (ibid.) and considering the impact of dismissals on the administration of
criminal justice (id. at pp. 946-947), “appellate courts have been faced with the
task of establishing the boundaries of the judicial power conferred by the statute as
cases have arisen challenging its exercise.” (Id. at p. 945.) Discharging this task
would prove impossible without an explicit statement by which to measure the
trial court’s exercise of discretion against an evolving standard. (Ibid.)
None of the foregoing concerns and considerations obtain with respect to a
probable cause finding under Penal Code section 1202.1, subdivision (e)(6). To
begin, the express terms of section 1202.1, subdivision (e)(6) do not require that
the trial court set forth its reasons in an order but only that it note the probable
cause finding on the docket. To the extent the court’s obligation is substantially
more limited in this regard, it is proportionately less significant. Furthermore, a
probable cause finding is not an exercise of the trial court’s discretion but a
determination of the facts in light of an objective legal standard. (Cf. People
v. Adair (2003) 29 Cal.4th 895, 904-905 [reasonable cause to believe the
defendant is factually innocent pursuant to Pen. Code, § 851.8 is objective legal
standard].) Accordingly, a trial court’s failure to state or note its probable cause
finding does not impair or impede a reviewing court’s ability to determine the
propriety of a testing order. HIV testing also does not implicate the administration
of criminal justice. As noted, the Legislature’s primary concern in enacting Penal
Code section 1202.1 was the health and safety concern with the spread of AIDS.
Unlike the other sex offenses listed in section 1202.1, subdivision (e) (see ante,
fn. 3), those enumerated in subdivision (e)(6)(A) can be committed without
establishing the medical predicate for possible HIV contraction—the transference
of bodily fluids. (See, e.g., People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 176 [touching
of child unnecessary; evidence sufficient if the defendant compelled child to
disrobe]; People v. Meacham (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 142, 153-154 [evidence
sufficient where the defendant instigated children to touch their own genitalia];
People v. Lanham (1934) 137 Cal.App. 737, 740 [evidence sufficient where the
defendant removed child’s panties].) A finding of probable cause to believe such
transference has occurred is therefore necessary to establish the nexus between
that medical predicate and an HIV testing order consistent with the defendant’s
constitutional rights (see People v. Hall, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1021-1022)
and the victim’s privacy interests. (See People v. Guardado, supra, 40
Cal.App.4th at pp. 764-765.)
Defendant also argues that because Penal Code section 1202.1 implicates
the interests of third parties (the victims who might be exposed to HIV infection),
an express finding of probable cause and docket notation are mandatory, from
which it follows that appeal is not subject to forfeiture. (See, e.g., In re Marinna
J. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731, 739.) Defendant cites no authority that this
consideration is relevant under the general forfeiture principle. On the contrary,
third party interests do not constitute a recognized exception, which is limited to
deprivation of certain fundamental constitutional rights or acts in excess of
jurisdiction. (See People v. Vera, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 276; cf. People
v. Adames (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 198, 211 [the defendant did not object at trial
but challenged HIV testing order as ex post facto law].)
We therefore hold that absent an objection in the trial court, a defendant
forfeits appeal of any deficiency in the statutorily required finding supporting an
HIV testing order pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.1, subdivision (e)(6) or a
notation of that finding in the docket or minutes.5
With respect to how a defendant should object to the absence of a probable
cause notation, we note that unlike most situations implicating forfeiture, the
relevant act usually does not take place in the defendant’s presence. Rather, the
court makes the notation in the docket and minute order after the sentencing
hearing. Thus, to determine whether the court has complied with the notation
requirement the defendant will generally have to check the docket entry and
minute order after they have been prepared. If the required notation is missing, the
defendant must then submit an objection, presumably, although not necessarily, in
writing. We suggest this procedure only as guidance in preserving the notation
issue. Defendants remain free to register their objections in any reasonable and
timely manner that brings the omission to the trial court’s attention.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
CONCURRING OPINION BY BAXTER, J.
I agree with the majority that a defendant who fails to object in the trial
court forfeits appeal of any deficiency in the statutorily required finding
supporting an HIV testing order imposed under Penal Code section 1202.1,
subdivision (e)(6) as well as any failure to note that finding in the docket or
minutes. I write separately only to question the majority’s decision not to invoke
our well-settled jurisprudence relating to unobjected-to sentencing error and to
rely instead on a “general forfeiture rationale.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.) Because
the majority does not adequately explain how these doctrines differ or how to
determine which doctrine should apply, I fear that the court’s opinion will
introduce needless uncertainty into this area of the law.
The Court of Appeal relied on People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 (Scott),
in which we distinguished between unauthorized sentences—i.e., sentences that
“could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case” (id.
at p. 354)—and sentencing error deemed forfeited on appeal—i.e., “sentences
which, though otherwise permitted by law, were imposed in a procedurally or
factually flawed manner.” (Ibid.) Unauthorized sentences, we explained,
constitute a “narrow exception” to the “general requirement” that “only those
claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal.”
(Ibid.) Applying Scott’s general rule, the Court of Appeal reasoned that
defendant, by failing to object in the trial court, had forfeited his claim that the
HIV testing order was imposed in a procedurally flawed manner.
I would embrace the Court of Appeal’s straightforward analysis. The
majority, however, does not. Its rationale for refusing to do so consists of this
sentence: “Since HIV testing does not constitute punishment (see People v.
McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, 83), it cannot properly be considered a sentencing
choice.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.) In my view, the premise does not support the
conclusion. Scott nowhere limited itself to punishment and instead referred
broadly to “sentencing decisions” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 348), “sentencing
choice[s]” (id. at p. 352), and just plain old “sentences.” (Id. at p. 354.)
Moreover, the Scott rule has regularly been applied to bar a defendant from
challenging for the first time on appeal other nonpunitive sentencing decisions,
such as a trial court’s failure to commit a defendant to the California
Rehabilitation Center (e.g., People v. Lizarraga (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 689, 692;
People v. Planavsky (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1300, 1311-1315) or a trial court’s
imposition of rehabilitative probation conditions (e.g., In re Josue S. (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th 168, 170-173; People v. Torres (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 771, 782-
783). Indeed, People v. Marchand (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1060-1061—
which is cited by the majority—applied Scott to bar a defendant from challenging
for the first time on appeal a requirement that he register as a sex offender. Sex
offender registration, like HIV testing, is nonpunitive. (People v. Ansell (2001) 25
Cal.4th 868, 886; see generally Smith v. Doe (2003) 538 U.S. 84, ___ [123 S.Ct.
Accordingly, the line drawn by the majority is illusory. And, inasmuch as
the parties agreed at oral argument that the framework set forth in Scott applied to
this case, it is unnecessary. Finally, in light of the majority’s acknowledgement
that Scott is merely an application of “the general forfeiture doctrine” (maj. opn.,
ante, at p. 5), the distinction it purports to draw between the two is mystifying. I
therefore concur only in the result.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion People v. Stowell
Unpublished OpinionNP opn. filed 5/29/02 - 3d Dist.
Date Filed: December 1, 2003
Judge: Steven E. Jahr
Attorneys for Appellant:Bradley A. Bristow, under appointment by the Supreme Court; and George L. Mertens, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Attorneys for Respondent:Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys
General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Shirley A. Nelson, Rachelle A. Newcomb, Patrick J.
Whalen and David Andrew Eldridge, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):Bradley A. Bristow
Central California Appellate Program
2407 J Street, Suite 301
Sacramento, CA 95816
David Andrew Eldridge
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street
P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
|1||Stowell, Timothy Brian (Defendant and Appellant)|
Represented by Bradley A. Bristow
Central Calif. Appellate Program
2407 J Street, Suite 301
|2||Stowell, Timothy Brian (Defendant and Appellant)|
Represented by Central California Appellate Program
2407 "J" Street, Suite 301
2407 "J" Street, Suite 301
|3||The People (Plaintiff and Respondent)|
Represented by Attorney General - Sacramento Office
David Andrew Eldridge, DAG
P.O. Box 944255
|Dec 1 2003||Opinion: Affirmed|
|Jul 5 2002||Petition for review filed|
by counsel for aplt (filed in Sac.)
|Jul 11 2002||Received Court of Appeal record|
|Jul 30 2002||Record requested|
Requested remaining record to ship overnight.
|Jul 31 2002||Received Court of Appeal record|
|Aug 21 2002||Petition for Review Granted; issues limited (criminal case)|
The issue to be briefed and argued shall be limited to whether, by failing to object below, defendant waived any challenge to the absence of statutorily required findings supporting the trial court's HIV-testing order. Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown and Moreno, JJ.
|Sep 4 2002||Counsel appointment order filed|
Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, the Central California Appellate Program is hereby appointed to represent appellant on his appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits shall be served and filed on or before 30 days from the date of this order.
|Sep 30 2002||Request for extension of time filed|
appellant requesting to Nov. 6, 2002 to file opening brief on the merits. *** granted *** order being prepared. (No further extensions will be granted)
|Oct 16 2002||Extension of time granted|
On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including Nov. 6, 2002. No further extensions will be granted.
|Nov 6 2002||Opening brief on the merits filed|
in Sacramento by counsel for appellant [Timothy Brian Stowell]
|Nov 6 2002||Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)|
of Legislative History from appellant. (received in Sacramento)
|Dec 5 2002||Request for extension of time filed|
by respondent asking to Jan. 6, 2003 to file answer brief on the merits. (recv'd in Sacto) **ok to grant - order being prepared.**
|Dec 11 2002||Extension of time granted|
On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file answer brief on the merits is extended to and including January 6, 2003. No further extension will be granted.
|Jan 3 2003||Answer brief on the merits filed|
in Sacramento by counsel for respondent (People).
|Jan 23 2003||Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)|
by counsel for appellant (T. Stowell)
|Jan 29 2003||Received:|
from counsel for appellant Certif. of Word Count
|Aug 5 2003||Case ordered on calendar|
9-3-03, 1:30pm, S.F.
|Aug 7 2003||Filed:|
Letter from counsel for appellant, re oral argument.
|Aug 13 2003||Compensation awarded counsel|
|Sep 3 2003||Cause argued and submitted|
|Dec 1 2003||Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full|
Majority Opinion by Brown, J. joined by George C.J., Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, JJ. Concurring Opinion by Baxter, J.
|Dec 16 2003||Rehearing petition filed|
in Sacramento by counsel for appellant (Timothy Brian Stowell).
|Dec 19 2003||Time extended to consider modification or rehearing|
The time for granting or denying rehearing in the above-entitled case is hereby extended to and including February 29, 2004, or the date upon which rehearing is either granted or denied, whichever occurs first.
|Jan 22 2004||Rehearing denied|
|Jan 22 2004||Remittitur issued (criminal case)|
|Jan 27 2004||Received document entitled:|
Receipt for remittitur - from CA3.
|Feb 24 2004||Compensation awarded counsel|
|Nov 6 2002||Opening brief on the merits filed|
|Jan 3 2003||Answer brief on the merits filed|
|Jan 23 2003||Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)|