IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S185961
v.
Ct.App. 3 C063661
LEROY STANLEY,
Yolo County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. 09-3110
By statute, a crime victim who has suffered property damage is entitled to
have the defendant pay restitution for “the replacement cost of like property, or the
actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible.” (Pen. Code, § 1202.4,
subd. (f)(3)(A); further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Here, defendant
Leroy Stanley in 2009 vandalized Patricia Short-Lyster‟s 1975 Dodge Adventurer
four-door, three-quarter-ton pickup truck, extensively denting it and damaging the
driver‟s side rear door so badly that it could no longer be opened. Some 18
months before the vandalism, Short-Lyster paid $950 for the truck, which was in
excellent condition. Her father, a former auto mechanic, had checked out the truck
and advised her to buy it.
Defendant entered a plea of no contest to felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a))
in exchange for a 16-month prison sentence and the dismissal of other charges. The
trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $2,812.94, reflecting an automotive
body shop‟s written estimate of repair cost. The Court of Appeal affirmed,
rejecting defendant‟s contention that the trial court should have limited restitution
to the victim‟s $950 purchase price of the used truck. In reaching that conclusion,
1
the Court of Appeal expressed its agreement with a decision by another Court of
Appeal, In re Dina V. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 486 (Dina V.), but its disagreement
with the opposite holding in People v. Yanez (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1622 (Yanez).
We granted review to resolve the conflict. We affirm the Court of Appeal‟s
judgment in this case.
DISCUSSION
In 1982, California voters enacted Proposition 8, an initiative measure also
known as the “Victims‟ Bill of Rights,” which added to the California Constitution
a provision that “all persons who suffer losses” resulting from a crime are entitled
to “restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses.” (Cal.
Const., art. 1, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A).) The Legislature was directed to enact
implementing legislation. (Id., art. 1, § 28, subd. (a)(8); see People v. Giordano
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 655 (Giordano).) The Legislature did so. In 1983, it
enacted section 1202.4, which is at issue here. (Stats. 1983, ch. 1092, § 320.1,
p. 4058.)
“In keeping with the [voters‟] „unequivocal intention‟ that victim restitution
be made, statutory provisions implementing the constitutional directive have been
broadly and liberally construed.” (People v. Lyon (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1521,
1525; accord, People v. Phu (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 280, 283; People v. Mearns
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 500.) Section 1202.4, at issue here, states that “in
every [criminal] case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of
the defendant‟s conduct,” the trial court must order the defendant to pay restitution
“in an amount . . . based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim . . . or any
other showing to the court.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) The statute further provides that
the trial court “shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and
extraordinary reasons” not to do so (ibid.); the restitution order must “fully
reimburse the victim . . . for every determined economic loss incurred as the result
2
of the defendant‟s criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, all of [12 listed
forms of loss]” (id., subd. (f)(3)). The first of these 12 categories is relevant here:
“Full or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property,” defined as
“the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property
when repair is possible.” (Id., subd. (f)(3)(A), italics added.)
In construing a statute, we seek “ „to ascertain the intent of the enacting
legislative body so that we may adopt the construction that best effectuates the
purpose of the law.‟ ” (Klein v. United States of America (2010) 50 Cal.4th 68,
77; Miklosy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 888.) Our analysis
starts with the statutory language because it generally indicates legislative intent.
(Klein, supra, at p. 77; Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 986.)
If no ambiguity appears in the statutory language, we presume that the Legislature
meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute controls. (Miklosy, supra,
at p. 888; see also Catlin v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 300, 304; People v.
King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 622.)
Section 1202.4‟s subdivision (f)(3)(A), the statutory provision at issue here,
gives the trial court a choice of awarding restitution to a crime victim for
“replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property
when repair is possible.” (Italics added.) The statute does not say that the
restitution awarded must be the lesser of the two. Thus, the choice whether to
award the property‟s replacement cost or cost of repair “when repair is possible” is
left to the sound discretion of the trial court. (Ibid.; see Giordano, supra, 42
Cal.4th at p. 663.)
In 1995, as mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeal decided Yanez, supra, 38
Cal.App.4th 1622; it held that restitution awarded to a crime victim should be
governed by the measure of damages allowable in civil tort actions. According to
Yanez, in the case of damaged but repairable property an award of restitution
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should be limited to the lesser of either the value of the property or the reasonable
cost of repair. (Id. at p. 1627.) Shortly thereafter, we said in People v. Carbajal
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121, that restitution in criminal cases need not “reflect
the amount of damages that might be recoverable in a civil action.” (The opinion
made no reference to Yanez.)
A dozen years later the Court of Appeal in Dina V., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th
486, expressly disagreed with the decision in Yanez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 1622.
In upholding a restitution award covering the cost of repair for the crime victim‟s
damaged car, Dina V. explained: “To limit the amount of restitution to the
replacement cost, because that would be the manner of determining damages in a
civil case, is neither required nor logical. [To do so would require] that the victim
find a similar vehicle, in similar precrime condition . . . at the victim‟s time and
expense. . . . Limiting the amount of restitution to the replacement cost would not
make the victim whole.” (Dina V., supra, at p. 489.) We agree with Dina V. As
we have noted on page 3, ante, section 1202.4‟s subdivision (f)(3)(A) is devoid of
language stating that a trial court‟s restitution award should be limited to the lesser
of the “replacement cost” of the victim‟s damaged property or “the actual cost of
repairing the property when repair is possible.” The statute leaves the choice to
the trial court.1
Here, repair of the victim‟s vandalized pickup truck was possible, as
indicated by the automotive body shop‟s written repair estimate of $2,812.94 that
the victim presented at the preliminary hearing. After defendant‟s plea of no
contest to felony vandalism, the trial court ordered him to pay in restitution to the
victim the estimated repair cost of $2,812.94. The court added that “if it ends up
costing less to repair the car, then restitution will be reduced appropriately.” (We
1
Insofar as People v. Yanez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 1622 is inconsistent with
our conclusion here, we disapprove it.
4
note that defendant never presented, either at the preliminary hearing or at the time
of sentencing, any evidence of the replacement cost of a comparable truck.)
Defendant does not challenge the reasonableness of the repair estimate. His
contention is that because the roughly $2,813 cost of repair awarded in restitution
was nearly three times the $950 the victim had paid for the 1975 Dodge
Adventurer pickup — bought 18 months before defendant‟s 2009 extensive
vandalism of the truck — the amount of restitution exceeded the bounds of reason
and gave the victim a “windfall.” According to defendant, the trial court should
have awarded the victim no more than the amount she had paid for the used truck
plus an additional 10 to 15 percent “surcharge” to compensate for her
“inconvenience” in having to replace the truck. But, as we have pointed out,
under section 1202.4‟s subdivision (f)(3)(A), the trial court had discretion to
award the victim as restitution the “actual cost of repairing” her vandalized truck,
so long as repair was “possible.” On the facts presented, the trial court did not
abuse its broad discretion in ordering defendant to pay the $2,812.94 to repair the
victim‟s truck he had vandalized.
In upholding the trial court‟s restitution order, the Court of Appeal
suggested that it might be difficult for the victim in this case to find another “1975
Dodge Adventurer in „excellent‟ condition for $950,” noting that “the longer it
would take the victim to find one, the greater her loss-of-use damages would be.”
The Court of Appeal added: “[T]he victim‟s father, a former mechanic, advised her
to buy the truck, from which one can rationally infer it was a good bargain at
$950. . . . The fact that the repairs will cost about three times the victim‟s purchase
price does not mean that she will receive a windfall: It means she will have her
truck back in the same condition it was before defendant vandalized it. This
comports with the spirit of Proposition 8 [the “Victims‟ Bill of Rights”] and the
text of the implementing legislation.” We agree with the Court of Appeal.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
KENNARD, J.
WE CONCUR:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion People v. Stanley
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 187 Cal.App.4th 120
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No.
S185961Date Filed: July 9, 2012
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
SuperiorCounty: Yolo
Judge: Paul K. Richardson
__________________________________________________________________________________
Counsel:
Robert Navarro, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Charles A. French and Jeffrey D.
Firestone, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Ashford & Strasser and Laura Bean Strasser for National Crime Victim Institute as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Robert NavarroP.O. Box 8493
Fresno, Ca 93747
(559) 452-0934
Jeffrey D. Firestone
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street, Suite 125
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
(916) 324-5168
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment of conviction of a criminal offense. This case presents the following issue: Did the trial court err in awarding the victim restitution for the costs of repairing her damaged truck, when the estimated cost of the repairs was over three times the purchase price she paid 18 months earlier?
| Date: | Citation: | Docket Number: |
| Mon, 07/09/2012 | 54 Cal. 4th 734, 279 P.3d 585, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 260, 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7810, 2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9450, 2012 Cal. LEXIS 6360, 2012 WL 2686050 | S185961 |
| 1 | The People (Plaintiff and Respondent) Represented by Jeffrey Firestone Office of the State Attorney General P.O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA 94244 |
| 2 | Leroy Stanley (Defendant and Appellant) c/o Ruby Flores 131 Shasta Place Woodland, CA 95696 Represented by Robert Navarro 1295 N. Wilson Avenue, Suite 3 Fresno, CA 93728 |
| 3 | National Crime Victim Law Institute (Amicus curiae) Represented by Laura Bean Strasser Ashford & Strasser 11400 Atwood Road Auburn, CA 95603 |
| Opinion Authors | |
| Opinion | Justice Joyce L. Kennard |
| Disposition | |
| Jul 9 2012 | Opinion: Affirmed |
| Dockets | |
| Sep 1 2010 | Received premature petition for review Defendant and Appellant: Leroy Stanley, Attorney: Robert Navarro |
| Sep 3 2010 | Case start: Petition for review filed Defendant and Appellant: Leroy Stanley, Attorney: Robert Navarro |
| Sep 3 2010 | Record requested |
| Sep 8 2010 | Received Court of Appeal record |
| Oct 22 2010 | Time extended to grant or deny review The time for granting or denying review in the above-entitled matter is hereby extended to and including December 2, 2010, or the date upon which review is either granted or denied |
| Nov 10 2010 | Petition for review granted Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno and Corrigan, JJ. |
| Feb 10 2011 | Counsel appointment order filed Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, Robert Navarro is hereby appointed to represent appellant on the appeal now pending in this court; appellant's brief on the merits must be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date of this order |
| Mar 11 2011 | Opening brief on the merits filed Defendant and Appellant: Leroy Stanley, Attorney: Robert Navarro |
| Mar 23 2011 | Compensation awarded counsel Attorney Robert Navarro |
| Mar 30 2011 | Request for extension of time filed By the respondent, requesting a 30-day extension until May 11, 2011, to file the answer brief on the merits; by Jeffrey D. Firestone, Deputy Attorney General |
| Apr 5 2011 | Extension of time granted On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including May 11, 2011 |
| May 11 2011 | Answer brief on the merits filed Plaintiff and Respondent: The People, Attorney: Jeffrey Firestone |
| May 20 2011 | Request for extension of time filed Attorney Robert Navarro counsel for appellant is requesting to June 30 (30 days) to file reply brief on the merits (to court for permission) |
| May 24 2011 | Extension of time granted On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including June 30, 2011 |
| Jun 20 2011 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) Defendant and Appellant: Leroy Stanley, Attorney: Robert Navarro |
| Jul 21 2011 | Application to file amicus curiae brief filed For National Crime Victim Law Institute, in support of respondent; by Laura Bean Strasser, counsel |
| Jul 29 2011 | Amicus curiae brief filed Amicus curiae: National Crime Victim Law Institute, Attorney: Laura Bean Strasser |
| Aug 29 2011 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed Defendant and Appellant: Leroy Stanley, Attorney: Robert Navarro |
| Apr 5 2012 | Case ordered on calendar To be argued on Thursday, May 3, 2012, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco |
| May 3 2012 | Cause argued and submitted |
| Jul 9 2012 | Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. Majority Opinion by Kennard, J. -- joined by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Corrigan, and Liu, JJ. |
| Jul 25 2012 | Compensation awarded counsel Attorney Robert Navarro |
| Aug 9 2012 | Remittitur issued |
| Aug 23 2012 | Received: Receipt for Remittitur |
| Briefs | |
| Mar 11 2011 | Opening brief on the merits filed Defendant and Appellant: Leroy Stanley, Attorney: Robert Navarro |
| May 11 2011 | Answer brief on the merits filed Plaintiff and Respondent: The People, Attorney: Jeffrey Firestone |
| Jun 20 2011 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) Defendant and Appellant: Leroy Stanley, Attorney: Robert Navarro |
| Jul 29 2011 | Amicus curiae brief filed Amicus curiae: National Crime Victim Law Institute, Attorney: Laura Bean Strasser |
| Aug 29 2011 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed Defendant and Appellant: Leroy Stanley, Attorney: Robert Navarro |
| Brief Downloads | |
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| May 20, 2013 Annotated by Mark Janoff | Facts: In 2009, defendant/appellant Leroy Stanley vandalized and caused extensive damage to Patricia Short-Lyster's 1975 Dodge Adventurer pickup truck. About 18 months before the vandalism, Short-Lyster had purchased the pickup truck for $950. A body shop estimated $2,812.94 in costs to repair the damage caused by the vandalism. Procedural history: Defendant/appellant plead no contest to felony vandalism and was sentenced to 16 months in prison. The trial court ordered that defendant/appellant pay restitution of $2,812.94, the full cost of the estimated repairs. On appeal of the restitution order, the Third Appellate District affirmed in full, rejecting defendant/appellant's argument that the restitution be limited by the vehicle's purchase price. The Supreme Court of California granted review to resolve a conflict between this holding and the opposite view, taken in People v. Yanez, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1622 (1995). Issues: Where a criminal defendant damages a victim's property and the court orders restitution, can the ordered amount equal the actual cost of repairs, even if the repairs exceed victim's purchase price of the property? Holding: Yes. Under California Penal Code section 1202.4(f)(3)(A), a court may order as restitution the actual cost of repair, if repair is possible. Analysis: California Penal Code section 1202.4 entitles a court to order a criminal defendant to pay his victim restitution in the amount of "the actual cost of repairing [victim's] property when repair is possible." Moreover, the statute does not include any language directing a court to order the lesser of two restitution measures. Thus, since (1) a statute ought to be interpreted in accordance with its legislative intent, (2) the legislative intent of a statute follows directly from its language, if unambiguous, and (3) the language of section 1202.4(f)(3)(A) is unambiguous, then a court may order as restitution the actual cost of repair if repair is possible. The Legislative history of section 1202.4 further supports this conclusion. That section was enacted by the California Legislature in accordance with its directive under 1982's California Proposition 8 ("Victim's Bill of Rights"), which entitled all victims of crime to restitution from the crime's perpetrator. California courts have noted on several occasions that laws implemented under the proposition be read broadly, in accordance with California voters' clear desire that these criminal victims receive restitution. Such a broad reading supports the conclusion that actual cost restitution may be court-ordered. Finally, although restitution is limited to the lesser of property value and actual repair cost in civil tort actions, there is no reason why the tort rule should govern the measure of damages to a criminal victim. Tags: actual cost restitution, California Proposition 8 1982, replacement cost restitution, restitution in criminal cases, restitution limit, vandalism restitution, victim restitution, Victims' Bill of Rights, restitution, torts |
