IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S124503
v.
Ct.App. 3 C044625
JONATHAN JOSEPH SHELTON,
) Sacramento
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. 00F05251
In this case we granted review on two issues concerning a negotiated plea
agreement that includes a sentence “lid” constraining the maximum sentence that
the trial court may impose: (1) Must the defendant obtain a certificate of probable
cause to challenge on appeal the trial court’s legal authority to impose the
maximum or “lid” sentence? (2) Is a challenge that is based on the multiple
punishment prohibition of Penal Code section 654 barred by rule 4.412(b) of the
California Rules of Court, which states that “[b]y agreeing to a specified prison
term personally and by counsel, a defendant who is sentenced to that term or a
shorter one abandons any claim that a component of the sentence violates [Penal
Code] section 654’s prohibition of double punishment, unless that claim is
asserted at the time the agreement is recited on the record”?
On the first issue, we conclude that inclusion of a sentence lid implies a
mutual understanding and agreement that the trial court has authority to impose
the specified maximum sentence and preserves only the defendant’s right to urge
1
that the trial court should or must exercise its discretion in favor of a shorter term.
Accordingly, a challenge to the trial court’s authority to impose the lid sentence is
a challenge to the validity of the plea requiring a certificate of probable cause. In
view of this conclusion, the second issue is moot in this case, and we do not
decide it here.
Because the Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion, we reverse its
judgment.
I
On February 4, 2003, the District Attorney of Sacramento County filed a
complaint charging defendant Jonathan Joseph Shelton with six felony counts:
one count of stalking in violation of a protective order (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd.
(b)), two counts of making a criminal threat (id., § 422), two counts of repeated
violation of a protective order (id., § 273.6, subd. (d)), and one count of burglary
(id., § 459). At the preliminary hearing on March 28, 2003, the magistrate found
that the prosecution had presented evidence sufficient to support each of the
charges except burglary, and he ordered that defendant be held to answer on the
remaining five counts of the complaint. At the prosecutor’s request, the complaint
was deemed to be an information.
On May 30, 2003, the parties appeared in superior court and announced a
plea agreement under which defendant would plead no contest to two counts—
stalking in violation of a protective order (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (b)) as alleged
in count one of the information and making a criminal threat (id., § 422) as alleged
in count three of the information—for which defendant would be sentenced to a
prison term not to exceed three years and eight months. The trial court explained
the sentencing provision of the plea agreement to defendant in these words: “And
the lid is three years eight months. Which means that the agreement is that I
cannot sentence you to more than three years and eight months and you can argue
2
for something less than three years and eight months. However, the sentence that I
will impose will be a Penitentiary [that is, prison] sentence.”
The trial court advised defendant of the constitutional rights he would be
waiving by entering the pleas of no contest. The prosecutor then recited the
factual basis for the pleas: “On and between January 7th of 2003 and February
2nd, 2003, in Sacramento County, the defendant maliciously and repeatedly
followed and harassed Dawn Acerbis and made a credible threat with the intent
she be placed in reasonable fear for her safety and the safety of her immediate
family. The above conduct occurred while the restraining order was in place in
Case Number 02M12679. [¶] And on or about January 15th of 2003 in
Sacramento County the defendant willfully and unlawfully threatened to kill
Dawn Acerbis with the specific intent that she take that as a threat. Further, the
threatened crime on its face and the way it was made conveyed an immediate and
specific gravity of purpose to Dawn Acerbis and further Dawn Acerbis was
reasonably in sustained fear of her safety and the safety of her family based on
that.” Defendant then formally entered his no contest plea to the two counts. The
remaining three counts of the information were “taken under submission for
dismissal at the time of Judgment and Sentence.”
On July 17, 2003, the parties appeared before the trial court for judgment
and sentence. Defendant’s attorney argued that the multiple punishment
prohibition of Penal Code section 654 applied to the two counts to which
defendant had pleaded no contest because “[t]he threat occurred at the time of the
stalking and is also one of the elements of the stalking,” and, therefore, any
sentence imposed for the criminal threat should be stayed. The prosecutor replied:
“Well, we pled to three [years] eight [months] regarding those counts. There were
other counts that could have been pled to. I didn’t know [the] defense was going
3
to raise a 654. . . . It would be my position that although it is part of the same
course of conduct, they are clearly different elements and he pled to both.”
The trial court asked: “It wasn’t a stipulated sentence, it was a lid; is that
right?” The prosecutor replied: “Correct.” The victim, defendant’s former wife
Dawn Acerbis, addressed the court. The court then pronounced sentence,
imposing the middle term of three years on count one (stalking as defined in Penal
Code section 646.9, subdivision (b)) and one-third of the middle term consecutive,
being an additional eight months, on count three (making a criminal threat as
defined in Penal Code section 422), for a total aggregate term of three years and
eight months. The court explained that it was imposing consecutive terms “in that
the crimes were committed at different times or separate places rather than being
committed so close in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant
behavior.” The court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss counts four,
five, and six in the “interest of justice in light of the plea.”
On July 25, 2003, defendant filed a notice of appeal stating that the only
issue to be raised was that “[t]he sentencing [sic] for the violation of Penal Code
section 422 should have been stayed pursuant to Penal Code Section 654.”
The Court of Appeal concluded, first, that by entering into a plea agreement
with a sentence lid defendant had not waived the right to raise Penal Code section
654 error on appeal. Second, the court concluded that Penal Code section 654
required a stay of the eight-month term imposed for the criminal threat conviction.
Finally, the Court of Appeal determined that because the prosecution had agreed
to dismissal of the other three counts under the mistaken belief that the trial court
could impose a lawful sentence of three years and eight months on the two counts
to which defendant pled no contest, the prosecution should have the option of
vacating the pleas and reinstating the dismissed charges. The Court of Appeal
directed this disposition: “The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to
4
the trial court. If within 30 days of the issuance of the remittitur the district
attorney so requests, the trial court shall vacate defendant’s guilty plea and
reinstate the dismissed charges. Otherwise the judgment shall be modified to
impose a section 654 stay of the eight month sentence for violating section 422,
and as so modified the judgment will be affirmed.”
Justice Vance Raye dissented. In his view, by agreeing to a plea bargain
with a sentence lid, defendant “presumably reserved the right to attempt to
persuade the [trial] court to exercise its discretion and impose a lower sentence,”
but he “did not reserve the right to assert the court was without authority, by virtue
of Penal Code section 654, to impose the agreed-upon lid.”
We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review, which framed these
two issues:
“Did the appellate court have jurisdiction to address the merits of
appellant’s appeal where he failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause and in
his appeal challenged the imposition of the sentence lid to which he had agreed
pursuant to his plea bargain?”
“Where appellant agreed to a sentence lid as part of the plea bargain, does
California Rules of Court, rule 4.412(b), preclude appellant from raising a Penal
Code section 654 challenge on appeal?”
II
Did defendant need to apply for and obtain a certificate of probable cause
before he could raise on appeal his claim of trial court sentencing error under
Penal Code section 654?
Penal Code section 1237.5 provides that a defendant may not appeal “from
a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere” unless the
defendant has applied to the trial court for, and the trial court has executed and
filed, “a certificate of probable cause for such appeal.” (See People v. Mendez
5
(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1094-1095.) “Despite this broad language, we have held
that two types of issues may be raised on appeal following a guilty or nolo plea
without the need for a certificate: issues relating to the validity of a search and
seizure, for which an appeal is provided under [Penal Code] section 1538.5,
subdivision (m), and issues regarding proceedings held subsequent to the plea for
the purpose of determining the degree of the crime and the penalty to be imposed.”
(People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 780.)
The statutory requirement and its exceptions are embodied in rule 30(b)(4)
of the California Rules of Court, which provides that on appeal in a criminal case
from a superior court judgment after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a
defendant must apply for and obtain a certificate of probable cause as required by
Penal Code section 1237.5 unless “the notice of appeal states that the appeal is
based on: [¶] (A) the denial of a motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code
section 1538.5, or [¶] (B) grounds that arose after entry of the plea and do not
affect the plea’s validity.”
The crucial question here, disputed by the parties, is whether defendant’s
sentence challenge based on Penal Code section 654’s prohibition against multiple
punishment is a challenge that affects the validity of his no contest pleas. “[A]
challenge to a negotiated sentence imposed as part of a plea bargain is properly
viewed as a challenge to the validity of the plea itself” and thus requires a
certificate of probable cause. (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 79.)
Defendant insists that, by challenging the lid sentence under Penal Code
section 654, he is doing no more than arguing in favor of a lesser term, as the plea
agreement expressly permitted him to do. The Attorney General argues in
response that by accepting a plea agreement that included a sentence lid, defendant
implicitly acknowledged the trial court’s legal authority to impose the lid sentence.
6
A negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract, and it is interpreted
according to general contract principles. (People v. Toscano (2004) 124
Cal.App.4th 340, 344; People v. Gipson (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1069;
People v. Haney (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1037; People v. Alvarez (1982) 127
Cal.App.3d 629, 633.) “The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to
give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. (Civ. Code, § 1636.) If
contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs. (Civ. Code, § 1638.) On the
other hand, ‘[i]f the terms of a promise are in any respect ambiguous or uncertain,
it must be interpreted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of
making it, that the promisee understood it.’ (Id., § 1649; see AIU [Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 807,] 822.)” (Bank of the West v. Superior Court
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1264-1265.) “The mutual intention to which the courts
give effect is determined by objective manifestations of the parties’ intent,
including the words used in the agreement, as well as extrinsic evidence of such
objective matters as the surrounding circumstances under which the parties
negotiated or entered into the contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the
contract; and the subsequent conduct of the parties. (Civ. Code, §§ 1635-1656;
Code Civ. Proc., 1859-1861, 1864; [citations].)” (Morey v. Vannucci (1998) 64
Cal.App.4th 904, 912; see also People v. Toscano, supra, at p. 345.)
Applying these principles, we begin with the language of the plea
agreement concerning sentencing, as the trial court recited it on the record. The
agreement’s terms regarding sentencing were, first, that the court could not impose
a prison sentence longer than three years and eight months; second, that defendant
could “argue for something less than three years and eight months”; and, third,
that defendant would be sentenced to state prison rather than be granted probation.
The second term, permitting defendant to “argue for” a lesser term, is ambiguous
because it could mean either, as defendant argues, that he was permitted to argue
7
on any ground for a lesser term or, as the Attorney General argues, that he was
permitted to argue for a lesser term only by urging the trial court to exercise its
sentencing discretion in favor of a lesser term.
To resolve the ambiguity, we consider the circumstances under which this
term of the plea agreement was made, and the matter to which it relates (Civ.
Code, § 1647) to determine the sense in which the prosecutor and the trial court
(the promisors) believed, at the time of making it, that defendant (the promisee)
understood it (id., § 1649).
From a defendant’s point of view, the purpose of a sentence lid is to protect
the defendant from a greater sentence. Thus, a sentence lid provision in a plea
agreement necessarily implies the defendant’s understanding and belief that in its
absence the trial court might lawfully have imposed a greater sentence. If the
maximum sentence authorized by law were at or below the specified sentence lid,
the lid provision would be superfluous and of no benefit to the defendant.
From a prosecutor’s point of view, a sentence lid necessarily implies an
understanding and belief that the sentence lid is itself a sentence that the trial court
may lawfully impose. If the prosecutor understood or believed that the trial court
lacked authority to impose the lid sentence, there would be no utility or benefit to
specifying that particular length of time as the maximum sentence.
Thus, the specification of a maximum sentence or lid in a plea agreement
normally implies a mutual understanding of the defendant and the prosecutor that
the specified maximum term is one that the trial court may lawfully impose and
also a mutual understanding that, absent the agreement for the lid, the trial court
might lawfully impose an even longer term.
Viewed in this light, when a plea agreement includes a specified maximum
sentence, a provision recognizing the defendant’s right to “argue for a lesser term”
is generally understood to mean only that the defendant may urge the trial court to
8
exercise its sentencing discretion in favor of imposing a punishment that is less
severe than the maximum punishment authorized by law. In this case, it is
reasonable to conclude that both the prosecutor and the trial court believed, when
the plea bargain was made and accepted by the court, that defendant understood it
in the same manner, as reserving to him a right to argue for a sentence less than
the specified maximum of three years and eight months only on the ground that
the trial court should impose a lesser sentence in the exercise of its sentencing
discretion, and not on the ground that the trial court lacked authority to impose the
specified maximum sentence.
This understanding of the provision giving defendant a right to “argue for”
a lesser sentence is reinforced by the prosecutor’s remarks at the sentencing
hearing that he did not know defendant intended to raise a challenge to the court’s
sentencing authority under Penal Code section 654, that the sentence lid of three
years and eight months had been a term of the bargain, and that other counts could
have been chosen. The implication of those remarks was that the prosecutor did
not understand or believe that defendant had reserved a right to argue that the trial
court lacked authority to impose the specified maximum sentence of three years
and eight months. Thus, under the totality of the circumstances presented here, we
conclude that the mutual intention of the parties, as determined by application of
contract principles, was that under the plea agreement’s provision permitting
defendant to “argue for” a sentence less than the specified maximum of three years
and eight months, defendant did not reserve a right to argue that the trial court
lacked authority to impose the specified maximum sentence.
Of course, a prosecutor and a defendant may enter into a negotiated
disposition that expressly recognizes a dispute or uncertainty about the trial court’s
authority to impose a specified maximum sentence—because of Penal Code
section 654’s multiple punishment prohibition or for some other reason—and
9
preserves the defendant’s right to raise that issue at sentencing and on appeal.
(See People v. Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 78, fn. 8.) In that situation, the
plea agreement’s validity and enforceability would be unaffected by the ultimate
resolution of the disputed issue because each party could be understood to have
expressly or impliedly accepted and assumed the risk that the issue would be
resolved in the opposing party’s favor.
Here, however, defendant did not reserve, either expressly or impliedly, a
right to challenge the trial court’s authority to impose the lid sentence. Because
the plea agreement was based on a mutual understanding (as determined according
to principles of contract interpretation) that the court had authority to impose the
lid sentence, defendant’s contention that the lid sentence violated the multiple
punishment prohibition of Penal Code section 654 was in substance a challenge to
the plea’s validity and thus required a certificate of probable cause, which
defendant failed to secure. Absent a certificate of probable cause, the Court of
Appeal could not entertain his sentence challenge, which was the only issue
defendant raised on appeal, and it had no alternative but to dismiss the appeal.
(See People v. Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1096-1099; People v. Panizzon,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 89-90; People v. Young (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 827, 834.)
People v. Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th 773, on which defendant relies, is
distinguishable. There, the defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to two
felony counts “with an indicated maximum term of six years.” (Id. at p. 777.) The
trial court imposed a six-year state prison sentence. (Id. at p. 779.) On appeal, the
defendant argued that the trial court had abused its discretion in imposing that
sentence. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for failure to secure a
certificate of probable cause. (Id. at p. 780.)
This court reversed. We explained: “By agreeing only to a maximum
sentence, the parties leave unresolved between themselves the appropriate
10
sentence within the maximum. That issue is left to the normal sentencing
discretion of the trial court, to be exercised in a separate proceeding.” (People v.
Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 785.) We added: “This exercise of discretion is
not made standardless and unreviewable simply because its exercise is confined to
a specified range by the terms of a plea bargain that included no express waiver of
appeal. In such a circumstance, when the claim on appeal is merely that the trial
court abused the discretion the parties intended it to exercise, there is, in
substance, no attack on a sentence that was ‘part of [the] plea bargain.’ [Citation.]
Instead, the appellate challenge is one contemplated, and reserved, by the
agreement itself.” (Id. at pp. 785-786, italics added, original italics omitted.)
In Buttram, we expressly distinguished the situation, present here, in which
a defendant on appeal challenges the trial court’s authority to impose the lid
sentence: “Defendant here does not argue that the maximum sentence provided in
his plea bargain was invalid because it exceeded the legally authorized sentence
for his convictions. He simply seeks to implement the full terms of the bargain by
raising appellate challenges to the exercise of individualized sentencing discretion
within the agreed maximum that were reserved by the agreement itself. In doing
so, we conclude, he need not obtain a certificate of probable cause.” (People v.
Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 790.) Our carefully circumscribed holding was
that “absent contrary provisions in the plea agreement itself, a certificate of
probable cause is not required to challenge the exercise of individualized
sentencing discretion within an agreed maximum sentence.” (Ibid.)
Because in this case defendant does not contend that the trial court abused
its sentencing discretion, but instead that the trial court lacked authority to impose
the lid sentence, Buttram is not controlling here. More on point is People v.
11
Young, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 827, a Court of Appeal decision that this court
discussed and distinguished in Buttram. (People v. Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at
pp. 789-790.) In Young, the defendant pled no contest to all charges and admitted
“strike” allegations in return for a sentence lid of 25 years to life and reservation
of the right to ask the trial court to dismiss one or more of the “strikes.” When the
trial court declined to dismiss any of the “strikes” and imposed the lid sentence,
the defendant argued on appeal that the sentence violated constitutional
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court of Appeal
dismissed the appeal because defendant had not secured a certificate of probable
cause. The court explained: “By arguing that the maximum sentence is
unconstitutional, [the defendant] is arguing that part of his plea bargain is illegal
and is thus attacking the validity of the plea.” (People v. Young, supra, at p. 832.)
Like the Court of Appeal in People v. Young, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 827,
we here conclude that defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s sentencing
authority is in substance a challenge to the validity of the negotiated plea.
Therefore, defendant’s failure to secure a certificate of probable cause bars
consideration of this challenge and requires dismissal of his appeal.
In light of this conclusion, the other issue on which we granted review—
whether defendant’s sentence challenge under Penal Code section 654 is barred by
rule 4.412(b) of the California Rules of Court—is moot, and we do not address it.
12
DISPOSITION
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed with directions to dismiss
defendant’s appeal.
KENNARD,
J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
ARMSTRONG, J.*
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District,
Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
13
DISSENTING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J.
I respectfully dissent. In exchange for his agreement to plead no contest to
two of the five felony counts charged, defendant was promised a sentence
maximum, or “lid,” of three years and eight months. As memorialized by the trial
court, the plea agreement expressly reserved defendant’s right to “argue for
something less than three years and eight months.” Nothing in the agreement
limited the grounds upon which defendant could argue for a lesser prison sentence,
nor did the agreement include any determination that imposition of the lid
sentence (or any longer sentence) was authorized under Penal Code section 654
(section 654). For this reason, defendant’s appeal based on section 654 is not an
attack on the validity of the plea; he therefore was not required to obtain a
certificate of probable cause to pursue it.
The majority holds that a plea agreement with a sentence lid “implies a
mutual understanding” that the lid is a sentence the court could legally impose.
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.) I disagree such an agreement carries with it any such
necessary implication, in particular that it does so as to the defense’s
understanding of the agreement. The specification of a maximum sentence in a
plea agreement is consideration provided to, not by, the defendant, the defendant’s
proffered consideration being his agreement to plead guilty or no contest. Thus in
entering such a plea agreement the defendant makes no implied promise or
representation as to the legality of the lid sentence.
1
The majority asserts: “From a defendant’s point of view, the purpose of a
sentence lid is to protect the defendant from a greater sentence. Thus, a sentence
lid provision in a plea agreement necessarily implies the defendant’s
understanding and belief that in its absence the trial court might lawfully have
imposed a greater sentence. If the maximum sentence authorized by law were at
or below the specified sentence lid, the lid provision would be superfluous and of
no benefit to the defendant.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.)
The majority’s reasoning rests on a false premise. A defendant agreeing to
plead to a sentence lid does not necessarily believe that a greater sentence is
legally possible. Advised by counsel, he may believe, for example, that section
654 prohibits all the combinations of terms that would produce a higher sentence,
but at the same time be aware that because section 654 limits are subject to debate,
the prosecutor might seek a higher sentence, the court might so sentence him, and
an appeal might be unsuccessful. A defendant might, in other words, find the
certainty of a sentence lid valuable despite any beliefs he may hold about section
654.
Additionally, the plea agreement might have other provisions―such as the
prosecutor’s promise to dismiss some of the charges―that are of greater
importance to the defense than the sentence lid. That a lid in a given case may
prove of little or no value would not necessarily preclude a defendant’s agreement
to a deal that included such a lid.
Finally, in some cases―and this is one―a sentence higher than the lid may
be permitted even if under section 654 the lid is not. Here, the court could have
sentenced defendant to four years on the stalking count alone (Pen. Code, § 646.9,
subd. (b)) even if section 654 precludes the aggregate stalking/criminal threat
sentence of three years and eight months (an issue not before this court). The lid
2
was thus of value even if the specified lid sentence itself was precluded by section
654.1
In sum, the agreement on a sentence lid reflects, at most, a defendant’s
expectation that the prosecution may and probably will argue for a sentence at that
level. But simply because a defendant can anticipate the prosecutor will likely
argue that position at sentencing does not mean he necessarily agrees to that legal
position. Unless the plea agreement expressly precludes a defense argument for a
sub-lid sentence based on section 654, the defendant should not be held to such a
“mutual understanding.”
WERDEGAR, J.
1
In the absence of any implication that the defense understood the lid or a
higher sentence to be legally authorized, there can, of course, be no “mutual
understanding” implied in the agreement. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.) But even the
majority’s claim that a prosecutor offering a sentence lid must believe the lid to be
authorized is flawed. The majority argues that “[i]f the prosecutor understood or
believed that the trial court lacked authority to impose the lid sentence, there
would be no utility or benefit to specifying that particular length of time as the
maximum sentence.” (Ibid.) The prosecutor, however, seeks no benefit from the
sentence lid; he or she offers it as an inducement to the defense’s acceptance of the
agreement. And, as we have seen, the defense may find the sentence lid an
attractive term even if convinced the law does not permit any longer sentence to be
imposed. As the defense might value the certainty of a specified maximum, the
prosecution might offer such a maximum as inducement regardless of either side’s
belief about what the legal sentence limit should ultimately be.
3
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion People v. Shelton
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 117 Cal.App.4th 138
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No.
S124503Date Filed: January 5, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
SuperiorCounty: Sacramento
Judge: James L. Long
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Deborah Prucha, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Madeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, ChiefAssistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez, Janet E.
Neeley, Stephen G. Herndon, Maggy Krell and Rachelle A. Newcomb, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Deborah Prucha2407 J Street, Suite 301
Sacramento, CA 95816
(916) 441-3792
Rachelle A. Newcomb
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
(916) 324-5320
Date: | Docket Number: |
Thu, 01/05/2006 | S124503 |
1 | The People (Plaintiff and Respondent) Represented by Rachelle Anne Newcomb Office of the Attorney General P.O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA |
2 | The People (Plaintiff and Respondent) Represented by Maggy Rose Krell Office of the Attorney General 1300 "I" St 14th Fl, P. O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA |
3 | Shelton, Jonathan Joseph (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by Deborah Prucha Central California Appellate Program 2407 "J" Street, Suite 301 Sacramento, CA |
Disposition | |
Jan 5 2006 | Opinion: Reversed |
Dockets | |
May 3 2004 | Petition for review filed By Respondent {The People}. |
May 3 2004 | Record requested |
May 3 2004 | Request for depublication (petition for review pending) By Respondent {The People}. |
May 5 2004 | Received Court of Appeal record one doghouse |
Jun 16 2004 | Petition for review granted (criminal case) Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown and Moreno, JJ. |
Jul 8 2004 | Counsel appointment order filed Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, Central California Appellate Program is hereby appointed to represent appellant on his appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits shall be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date respondent's opening brief on the merits is filed. |
Jul 15 2004 | Opening brief on the merits filed by Respondent. (filed in Sac.) |
Aug 10 2004 | Request for extension of time filed by appellant for an e.o.t. to Sept. 16, 2004, to file the answer brief on the merits. |
Aug 13 2004 | Extension of time granted On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including September 16, 2004. |
Sep 15 2004 | Request for extension of time filed (in Sacramento) appellant to 10-16-2004 to file appellant's opening brief on the merits. |
Sep 22 2004 | Extension of time granted To October 16, 2004 to file appellant's Opening Brief on the Merits. |
Oct 15 2004 | Answer brief on the merits filed by appellant |
Dec 17 2004 | Time for filing final brief expired; case fully briefed |
Jun 17 2005 | Change of contact information filed for: Appellant (Shelton) counsel (Central California Appellate Program) |
Oct 12 2005 | Case ordered on calendar 11-09-05, 1:30 p.m., in Sacramento |
Oct 17 2005 | Filed: Letter from Rachelle A. Newcomb, deputy Attorney General, stipulating to Justice Kennard's participation in the case even though she will not be present at oral argument. |
Oct 17 2005 | Filed: Letter from Deborah Prucha, Central California Appellate Program, on behalf of Johnathan Shelton, stipulating to Justice Kennard's participation in the case though she will not be present at argument. |
Nov 9 2005 | Cause argued and submitted |
Jan 5 2006 | Opinion filed: Judgment reversed The Court of Appeal's judgment is reversed with directions to dismiss defendant's appeal. Opinion by Kennard, J. -- joined by George C.J., Baxter, Chin, Moreno and Armstrong (assigned) JJ. Dissenting opinion by Werdegar, J. [*Orville A. Armstrong, Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Div. Five] |
Mar 2 2006 | Remittitur issued (criminal case) |
Mar 8 2006 | Received: Receipt for remittitur from CA/3, signed for by Theresa Devine, Deputy |
Sep 27 2006 | Compensation awarded counsel |
Briefs | |
Jul 15 2004 | Opening brief on the merits filed |
Oct 15 2004 | Answer brief on the merits filed |