IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JASON CARL SCHULLER,
Defendant and Appellant.
S272237
Third Appellate District
C087191
Nevada County Superior Court
F16000111
August 17, 2023
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger,
Jenkins, and Evans concurred.
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Evans
concurred.
PEOPLE v. SCHULLER
S272237
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
California defines the crime of murder as the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice aforethought. The
prosecution here relied on a theory of express malice, which
requires an intent to unlawfully kill. (See People v. Lasko (2000
23 Cal.4th 101, 107 (Lasko); Pen. Code, § 188.) Under the
doctrine of imperfect self-defense, however, “[i]f a person kills
. . . in the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in
self-defense, the belief negates what would otherwise be malice,
and that person is guilty of voluntary manslaughter . . . , not
murder.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1116.) A
defendant charged with murder is entitled to an instruction on
imperfect self-defense when there is substantial evidence to
support the theory. (See People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th
142, 162 (Breverman).
In this case, the Court of Appeal found that the trial court
erred in denying defendant’s request for an instruction on
imperfect self-defense. The court further concluded that the
error was a matter of state law only, and thus subject to the
“reasonable probability” standard for evaluating prejudice set
forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).
The court explained, however, that even if it were to assume the
instructional error was subject to the stricter “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard that applies to federal
constitutional errors (see Chapman v. California (1967) 386
U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman)), it would still find Schuller had suffered
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no prejudice based on the “overwhelming evidence that [he] was
not acting in any form of self-defense.” (People v. Schuller (2021
72 Cal.App.5th 221, 238 (Schuller).
We granted review to decide the appropriate standard for
evaluating prejudice in this context. We now hold that when the
record contains substantial evidence of imperfect self-defense,
the trial court’s failure to instruct on that theory amounts to
constitutional error and is thus subject to review under the
federal Chapman standard. “A jury misinstruction that relieves
the prosecution of its burden to prove an element of the crime —
by either misdescribing the element or omitting it entirely —
violates [the federal Constitution].” (People v. Hendrix (2022
13 Cal.5th 933, 942 (Hendrix); see People v. Wilkins (2013
56 Cal.4th 333, 349 (Wilkins) [“incomplete” or “misleading”
instruction on element of the crime constitutes federal
constitutional error].) When imperfect self-defense is at issue,
the malice element of murder requires the People to show the
absence of that circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.
(People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 463 (Rios).) Thus, when
there is substantial evidence to support the theory, the failure
to instruct on imperfect self-defense amounts to an incomplete
instruction on an actual element of murder, namely malice. In
the absence of such an instruction, jurors would have no reason
to conclude they cannot find malice (and thus cannot return a
verdict of murder) if they harbor a reasonable doubt as to
whether the defendant acted in the actual, but unreasonable,
belief in the need for self-defense. Because this form of
misinstruction precludes the jury from making a finding on a
factual issue that is necessary to establish the element of malice,
it qualifies as federal error. (See In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S.
358, 364 (Winship) [“the Due Process Clause protects the
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accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged”]; Neder v. United States (1999
527 U.S. 1, 10 (Neder) [“erroneous instruction [that] precludes
the jury from making a finding on the actual element of the
offense” amounts to constitutional error].
We further hold that the Court of Appeal’s harmless error
analysis did not comport with the standards for evaluating
prejudice required under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18. As we
recently clarified in In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 (Lopez),
that standard compels the reviewing court to reverse the
conviction unless it concludes that no “rational juror who made
the findings reflected in the verdict and heard the evidence at
trial could have had reasonable doubt regarding the findings
necessary to convict the defendant [absent the instructional
error].” (Id. at p. 591.) Because the court’s analysis indicates
that it did not “fully appreciate[] the proper standard for
harmlessness” (id. at p. 568), we reverse the judgment affirming
Schuller’s conviction and remand the matter with directions
that the court reconsider whether the failure to instruct on
imperfect self-defense was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(See id. at p. 592 [remanding question of prejudice where court’s
analysis showed it did not apply the standard that Chapman
requires].
I.
BACKGROUND
The Nevada County District Attorney charged defendant
Jason Schuller with the first degree murder of W.T. and further
alleged that Schuller had personally used and discharged a
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firearm causing death. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 12022.53.)1 Schuller
pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and the case proceeded
to trial.
A. Trial Court Proceedings
1. Evidence at trial
a. Prosecution’s case-in-chief
Jesse McKenna, W.T.’s neighbor and close friend, testified
that Schuller visited W.T. frequently and had temporarily lived
at his residence. In early 2016, however, W.T. told McKenna
that Schuller was no longer welcome at his home. On the night
of March 20, 2016, McKenna returned from a dinner and was
surprised to see Schuller’s vehicle, a white Chrysler 300, parked
outside of W.T.’s home. Shortly after McKenna entered his
house, he heard multiple rounds of gunshots and then saw
Schuller’s car speed away from W.T.’s home.
As McKenna approached W.T.’s residence he saw W.T.’s
daughter H.T., who lived in a second-floor unit directly above
W.T., pacing in front of the window. McKenna knocked on H.T.’s
door and asked her if she had heard gunshots. She said she was
uncertain what she had heard, but that a noise had caused her
apartment to rattle. McKenna then went downstairs to check
on W.T. When he entered the residence, he saw “flames coming
out of [the] house” and W.T.’s burning body lying on the floor.
McKenna ran back to his house to retrieve a fire extinguisher.
When he returned, H.T. had come down to her father’s
apartment. As McKenna tried to put out the fire, he noticed that
all four burners of the gas stove had been opened and “turned
on full bore without flames,” like someone was trying to “blow
1
All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
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the place up.” McKenna called 911 and provided a description
of Schuller’s car.
H.T. testified that Schuller had become friends with her
father and started staying on his couch from time to time. On
the night of March 20, 2016, she observed Schuller’s car parked
outside her father’s apartment. Shortly thereafter, she heard a
succession of sounds like metal hitting metal coming from the
residence and then “a very loud sound that physically shook the
house.” She then observed Schuller’s vehicle leaving the home
at a high rate of speed. When H.T. entered the apartment, she
observed smoke and her father’s body lying on the ground
surrounded by shell casings, with his dentures out of his mouth.
Shortly after Schuller was seen leaving W.T.’s residence,
police began pursuing a white Chrysler 300 in the area.
Schuller was driving the vehicle and refused to stop, resulting
in a 38-mile high-speed pursuit that ended only after the
vehicle’s tires were punctured with strip spikes. The handgun
used in the shooting of W.T. was found in the car.
Investigating officers testified that 13 shell casings were
recovered from the area near W.T.’s body. A gun case, a gas can
and a large knife were found on the kitchen table. Although
there was significant blood spatter on the walls and floor, there
was no blood on the knife. W.T.’s cell phone was found under
the table with a bullet lodged in it. The apartment had
sustained fire damage and smelled of gas. Nevada County Fire
District Chief Jim Turner determined that gasoline had been
poured on the body and ignited. An autopsy revealed W.T. had
sustained nine gunshot wounds to the left side of his head, with
five shots entering the “facial area” and four shots entering
above his ear in the “cranial area.” W.T.’s body also exhibited
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significant burn injuries. According to the pathologist, the
nature of the burn markings indicated W.T.’s body had been
ignited after he was dead.
b. The defense’s case
Schuller testified that he met W.T. after moving from
Nebraska to California in 2013. Over the next few years,
Schuller lived with W.T. from time to time and visited him often.
In 2016, Schuller was injured in a car accident and began
experiencing visions of his dead ancestors and a “beautiful
light.” He described the light as “a gift of god” and had heard
voices telling him to be “careful who [he] share[d] the light with.”
Schuller stated that he believed he was sent to “pave the way
for the second coming . . . of Christ” and that a battle was being
fought with “Satan’s army.” In March of 2016, Schuller drove to
Nebraska in response to voices directing him to perform an
operation there. Schuller claimed that during his drive to
Nebraska he was shot at and attacked with grenades but did not
suffer any injuries.
While in Nebraska, Schuller visited his sister. She
testified that Schuller seemed to be experiencing visual and
auditory hallucinations at the time of the visit, telling her that
people were “following him” and telling him to shut up. His
sister also reported that Schuller appeared to be in fear for his
life and was uncharacteristically aggressive.
Schuller eventually decided to drive back to California.
One day before the killing of W.T., Nevada police officers
stopped Schuller on suspicion of reckless driving. Schuller told
the officers that three men were trying to attack him with
needles. He further stated that “the entire police force and
agencies of the world [we]re letting Satan” do something and
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
commented on the “fake light.” At one point, an officer stepped
on an aluminum strip that produced a popping noise, causing
Schuller to believe a gunshot had been fired and that the officers
were trying to hurt him. The officers eventually allowed
Schuller to go, believing he was not a danger to himself or
others.
Schuller testified that he arrived back in California on
March 20 and went straight to W.T.’s house. After the two had
shared several drinks, W.T. asked Schuller to get rid of a firearm
that Schuller had stored at W.T.’s house. W.T. retrieved the gun
and placed it in a case on the kitchen table, asking Schuller to
take it with him when he left the next morning.
Schuller explained that he “ended up sharing the light
with” W.T., who initially experienced “over-whelming joy.”
Later in the night, however, Schuller shared the light with W.T.
again, but was unable to get the light back. Schuller testified
that W.T. looked outside with a smile on his face and said, “See,
I told you I could take it from him.” W.T. then pulled a knife
from a kitchen drawer and tried to “stab at [Schuller].”
Schuller grabbed the gun on the kitchen table and asked
W.T. if he was “Lucifer,” to which W.T. responded yes. Schuller
stated that he then put the gun down and said, “Yeah, right,
. . . . You’re not Lucifer.” As soon as Schuller set the gun down,
W.T. “went for the gun and raised the knife.” Schuller then
picked the gun up again, took a step back, and “pulled the
trigger.” Schuller said he was “in fear for [his] life” because W.T.
had a “big knife.”
Schuller was uncertain whether he fired more than one
shot but recalled the bullet hitting W.T. “right in the head and
he went down to the ground. The knife . . . f[ell] out of his hand.”
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Schuller testified that W.T. then “pushed himself up off the
ground,” which “shocked” Schuller, causing him to “jump[] back”
and “pull[ the trigger] four or five more times.” Schuller could
not recall how the knife got back on the table. When asked why
he shot W.T. four or five more times, Schuller testified he was
“scared” because W.T. had yelled “You f’d up” and was then able
to “push himself up . . . off the ground . . . without hesitation.”
After firing the second round of shots, Schuller retrieved
W.T.’s cell phone and attempted to call 911. However, he was
unable to unlock the phone, which kept ringing. Schuller then
heard a loud gasp and saw W.T.’s dentures fly at him, which
scared Schuller again, causing him to “pull the trigger three
more times.” Schuller continued trying to call 911 with W.T.’s
phone, but the phone kept ringing so Schuller shot it several
times. Schuller finally decided to leave the residence but felt “a
hundred thousand demons [sweep] through” him. Schuller
turned and saw a demon enter W.T.’s body. Schuller attempted
to “kill the demon” by pouring gasoline on W.T.’s body and
igniting it. Schuller then left the home to travel to Monterey.
On cross-examination, Schuller admitted that in his
initial statements to the police he never claimed to have shot
W.T. in self-defense because he “did not know who to trust.”
Instead, Schuller had told the police W.T. was gay and trying to
come on to him.
c. Prosecution’s rebuttal witnesses
A detective testifying as a rebuttal witness for the
prosecution explained that he had monitored calls Schuller
made to friends and family from jail after his arrest. According
to the detective, Schuller appeared “lucid and normal” during
his initial conversations about the case. In subsequent calls
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Schuller revealed that he intended to pursue a “mental health
defense.” After that intent became clear, the detective noticed a
difference in how Schuller talked in his conversations. He began
speaking “much more” about conspiracy theories, including “law
enforcement conspiring against him” and “angels and demons
. . . [a]ffecting things in his everyday life.”
The prosecution also called two forensic psychologists who
had been appointed by the court to evaluate Schuller. The first
psychologist opined that defendant was exaggerating or feigning
psychiatric distress. The psychologist did not believe Schuller
was mentally ill but acknowledged that his extensive drug use
could have caused hallucinations. The psychologist testified
that Schuller’s decision to burn W.T.’s body and then attempt to
evade police demonstrated knowledge of wrongdoing and an
understanding of consequences.
The second psychologist likewise testified that she
believed defendant was “malingering or exaggerating his mental
health condition.” The psychologist noted that during Schuller’s
initial recorded jailhouse conversations, he had discussed his
case at length but made no mention of any psychiatric
symptoms, hallucinations, seeing demons or any of the problems
that he later described to the psychologist.
2. Defense’s request for instruction on imperfect self-
defense
Prior to closing argument, the defense requested an
instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-
defense. The prosecution opposed, arguing that Schuller’s
testimony demonstrated that any alleged belief in the need to
defend himself was the result of delusions, and thus amounted
to a claim of insanity that could only be raised in the sanity
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phase of the trial. (See People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th
121, 130, 146 (Elmore) [“the doctrine of unreasonable self-
defense is [not] available when belief in the need to defend
oneself is entirely delusional”; such a claim must instead be
raised at “a sanity trial”].
The defense, however, argued that Schuller’s imperfect
self-defense claim was not based on “purely delusional belief[s]”
(Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 130), but rather was supported
by the objective circumstances of the crime scene. Specifically,
Schuller had testified that W.T. attempted to attack him with a
knife while reaching for a firearm, and a knife and an empty gun
case had been recovered from the kitchen table. According to
the defense, while Schuller’s testimony suggested his reactions
to W.T. may have been “distorted by mental illness,” there was
nonetheless sufficient evidence to support a finding that he
mistakenly believed the actual circumstances required him to
act in self-defense. (See id. at p. 146 [“defendants who
mistakenly believed that actual circumstances required their
defensive act may argue they are guilty only of voluntary
manslaughter, even if their reaction was distorted by mental
illness”].
The trial court ultimately sided with the prosecution,
concluding that Schuller’s testimony demonstrated his “reaction
[to W.T.] was produced by the mental disturbance alone, which
is the very thing that the cases talk about as being for the sanity
phase, not for the guilt phase.” The court acknowledged that a
knife was found on the kitchen table but concluded that was
insufficient to warrant an instruction on imperfect self-defense.
The court did, however, instruct the jury that it could consider
evidence of Schuller’s mental condition “in deciding whether [he
had] acted with deliberation and premeditation.”
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3. Closing argument and jury verdict
Because Schuller had admitted that he intentionally shot
W.T. in the head and the trial court had denied his request for
an instruction on imperfect self-defense, the sole issue contested
at closing argument was whether Schuller should be found
guilty of premeditated first degree murder or second degree
murder.
The prosecution emphasized to the jury that “self-defense
was [not] an option . . . in this case” and that there was “no legal
self-defense argument that [it could] even consider.” The
prosecution explained that in light of the absence of any such
possible defense, the element of malice had been conclusively
established by Schuller’s admission that he repeatedly shot
W.T. in the head. The prosecution further contended that the
manner of the killing and Schuller’s subsequent attempts to
burn the body and evade the police showed he had acted not only
with malice, but also with deliberation and premeditation.
Finally, the prosecution discussed how the jury should evaluate
the “mental health evidence,” noting that multiple psychologists
had testified Schuller appeared to be exaggerating his condition
as a means to avoid criminal liability.
In response, the defense argued that Schuller’s testimony
showed he was suffering from a “severe mental health crisis”
that had caused him to believe W.T. was “a physical threat . . .
and that is why he killed.” The defense theorized that Schuller’s
“delusional state of mind” had led him to believe that “W.T. was
allied with forces of darkness” and “react[] to things that weren’t
there.” According to Schuller, this evidence raised at least a
reasonable doubt whether his “paranoid beliefs” had caused him
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to act out of a perceived fear for his life rather than with
deliberation and premeditation.
The jury found Schuller guilty of first degree murder.
Following the determination of guilt, the trial proceeded to the
sanity phase. The jury was unable to reach a decision on that
issue and a second jury was empaneled. The second jury found
that Schuller was legally sane at the time of the shooting.
B. Court of Appeal Proceedings
On appeal, Schuller argued the trial court erred in
refusing to instruct on imperfect self-defense because the
evidence showed his fear of W.T. was not based purely on
delusion. The appellate court agreed, concluding that Schuller’s
account of the “shooting was not entirely delusional.” (Schuller,
supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 233.) The court explained that
Schuller had testified he feared for his life because W.T. had
come at him with a knife and a knife had been found at the scene
of the crime.
Having found error, the court next evaluated whether
Schuller had suffered prejudice. The parties disputed whether
the instructional error amounted to a violation of state law,
requiring the court to evaluate prejudice under the “reasonably
probable” standard articulated in Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818,
or a violation of the federal Constitution, requiring prejudice to
be evaluated under the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard
set forth in Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18. While acknowledging
some courts had applied the Chapman standard to a trial court’s
failure to instruct on imperfect self-defense (see People v.
Dominguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 163; People v. Thomas (2013
218 Cal.App.4th 630), the court found that our prior decisions in
Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142, and People v. Gonzalez (2018
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5 Cal.5th 186 (Gonzalez), compelled Watson review. The court
further concluded, however, that the error was harmless under
both the Watson and Chapman standards.
Schuller filed a petition seeking review of the appellate
court’s finding that the failure to instruct on imperfect self-
defense was not prejudicial.
II.
DISCUSSION
The sole question presented in this case is whether the
trial court’s error in declining Schuller’s request for an
instruction on imperfect self-defense was prejudicial.2 To
answer this question, we must address two issues. First, we
must decide what standard for evaluating prejudice —
Chapman or Watson — applies to this form of instructional
error. Second, we must assess the Court of Appeal’s finding that
the error was harmless.
2
Although the Court of Appeal noted that Schuller’s
instructional claim raised an apparent issue of first
impression — whether imperfect self-defense is available when
“a defendant’s story is that a real person attacked him, but there
are delusional components to the defendant’s description of
what happened” (Schuller, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 233) —
the People did not seek review of the court’s finding that it was
error to deny an instruction under such circumstances. Nor
have they raised that issue in their briefing before this court.
Accordingly, we have no occasion to evaluate whether Schuller’s
testimony that W.T. threatened him with a knife was sufficient
to support an instruction on imperfect self-defense. We proceed
under the assumption that such an instruction should have been
provided.
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A. Does Watson or Chapman Review Apply?
1. Overview of standards for evaluating prejudice
“The ‘generally applicable California test for harmless
error’ is set forth in Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818. [Citation.]
Under the Watson test, we deem an error harmless unless it is
‘reasonably probable’ the outcome would have been different in
the absence of the error. [Citation.] As a general matter, this
test applies to ‘ “ ‘incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly
omitted instructions that do not amount to federal
constitutional error.’ ” ’ [Citation.]
“ ‘In contrast, we evaluate the harmlessness of violations
of the federal Constitution under the standard set forth in
Chapman[, supra, 386 U.S. 18].’ [Citation.] This ‘stricter’
standard of review requires reversal unless the error is
‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] Among the
constitutional errors subject to Chapman review is
misinstruction of the jury on one or more elements of the offense.
[Citation.] This is because the federal Constitution requires
‘criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the
defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he
is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Hendrix, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 942.) Applying those principles, we have held
that Chapman review applies to instructional errors that
“misdescribe[]” (Hendrix, at p. 942) an element of the charged
offense or are otherwise “incomplete and misleading” (Wilkins,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 349) with respect to the findings
necessary to prove an element of the offense. (See People v.
Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 69.) The key inquiry is whether the
instruction operated to “preclude[] the jury from making a
finding” (Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 10) on any fact necessary
to establish an element of the offense. (See Winship, supra,
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397 U.S. at p. 364 [due process requires prosecution to prove
“beyond a reasonable doubt . . . every fact necessary to
constitute the [charged] crime”].
Here, Schuller argues that the trial court’s denial of a
request to instruct on imperfect self-defense operated to
misdescribe the malice element of murder, and thus constitutes
federal constitutional error. The Attorney General, in contrast,
argues that because “the absence of imperfect self-defense is
[not] an element of malice murder,” the error is one “of state law
only.” He further contends that our prior decisions have
repeatedly held that this form of instructional error amounts to
a failure to instruct on a lesser included offense and is thus
“governed by Watson.”
2. Summary of applicable legal principles governing
imperfect self-defense
California law separates criminal homicide into two
classes: the greater offense of murder and the lesser offense of
manslaughter. (See Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 460.) Murder
is defined as “the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with
malice aforethought” (§ 187, subd. (a)), while manslaughter is
defined as “the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice” (§ 192). Thus, the “distinguishing feature [between the
two offenses] is that murder includes, but manslaughter lacks,
the element of malice.” (Rios, at p. 460.) Malice exists when “an
unlawful homicide was committed with the ‘intention
unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature’ (§ 188), or
with awareness of the danger and a conscious disregard for life.”
(Rios, at p. 460.)3
3
While the Penal Code recognizes these two distinct forms
of malice — commonly referred to as express and implied
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“Generally, the intent to unlawfully kill constitutes
malice.” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 153.) However,
California law recognizes two circumstances where “a finding of
malice may be precluded, and the offense limited to
manslaughter, even when an unlawful homicide was committed
with intent to kill” (Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 460): (1) when
a person kills “ ‘ “in a ‘sudden quarrel or heat of passion’
[citation], or . . . [(2) when a person] kills in ‘unreasonable self-
defense’ — the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to
act in self-defense [citations].” ’ ” (Ibid.) “These mitigating
circumstances reduce an intentional, unlawful killing from
murder to voluntary manslaughter ‘by negating the element of
malice that otherwise inheres in such a homicide [citation].’ ”
(Id. at p. 461, quoting Breverman, at p. 154.) The circumstance
at issue in this case, imperfect self-defense, “obviates malice
because that most culpable of mental states ‘cannot coexist’ with
an actual belief that the lethal act was necessary to avoid one’s
own death or serious injury at the victim’s hand.” (Rios, at
p. 461; see Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 134 [“ ‘ “A person who
actually believes in the need for self-defense necessarily believes
he is acting lawfully.” [Citation.] Because express malice
requires an intent to kill unlawfully, a killing in the belief that
one is acting lawfully is not malicious’ ”].) A defendant charged
with murder is entitled to an instruction on imperfect self-
defense if there is substantial evidence to support the theory.
(See Elmore, at p. 134; Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162.
Thus, the relationship between murder and voluntary
manslaughter — and more specifically the relationship between
malice — in this case Schuller has conceded that he intended to
kill the victim but contends he did so in imperfect self-defense.
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murder and unreasonable self-defense — is somewhat “unique”
in our criminal law. (Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p 459.) While
“closely resembl[ing] an affirmative defense” (People v. Barton
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 199), imperfect self-defense is “not a true
defense; rather, it is a shorthand description of one form of
voluntary manslaughter. And voluntary manslaughter . . . is
not a defense but a crime . . . .” (Id. at p. 200.
We have previously held that given how California has
chosen to structure its homicide laws, when imperfect self-
defense is at issue in a murder case, the People must prove the
absence of that circumstance “beyond a reasonable doubt . . . in
order to establish the . . . element of malice.” (Rios, supra,
23 Cal.4th at p. 462, italics omitted.) The state’s duty to
disprove imperfect self-defense follows from the high court’s
decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) 421 U.S. 684 (Mullaney),
which considered the constitutionality of a Maine homicide law
that placed the burden of proving provocation as a means of
negating the malice element of murder on the defendant. Maine
defined murder as an unlawful killing with malice aforethought
and defined malice as an intentional killing in the absence of
provocation. It defined manslaughter as an intentional killing
without malice. (Id. at pp. 684–687, 696–698.) Thus, as in
California, the offense of murder in Maine required malice (id.
at p. 684), with “heat of passion on sudden provocation” (id. at
p. 703) operating to negate malice and reduce the crime to
manslaughter. Maine, however, placed the burden of proving
heat of passion on the defendant.
The Supreme Court held that under this statutory
scheme, placing the burden of proving heat of passion on the
defendant violated “the due process requirement, as defined in
[Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 364], that the prosecution prove
17
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the
crime charged.” (Mullaney, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 685.) In its
analysis, the court acknowledged that “as a formal matter[,] the
absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation is not a
‘fact necessary to constitute the crime’ of [murder] in Maine.”
(Id. at p. 697.) The court concluded, however, that the rule of
Winship is “concerned with substance rather than . . .
formalism” (Mullaney, at p. 699), and because “Maine ha[d]
chosen to distinguish those who kill in the heat of passion from
those who kill in the absence of this factor” (id. at p. 698), due
process required the state to prove the absence of heat of passion
beyond a reasonable doubt. (See id. at p. 704.
Since Mullaney was decided, we have repeatedly cited the
decision in support of the proposition that when provocation or
imperfect self-defense are at issue, the prosecution is compelled
to disprove those circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
(See Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 462; People v. Bloyd (1987
43 Cal.3d 333, 349; cf. Smith v. United States (2013) 568 U.S.
106, 110 (Smith).) California’s standard jury instructions on
voluntary manslaughter include this requirement. (CALCRIM
Nos. 570, 571.
3. The instructional error qualifies as a violation of
the federal Constitution
Although our standard instructions do not suffer the same
defect at issue in Mullaney, we agree with Schuller that the high
court’s holding bears equally on the error at issue here — a
failure to instruct on these theories when substantial evidence
supports them. Given how California has chosen to structure
the relationship between murder and voluntary manslaughter,
a trial court’s failure to instruct on imperfect self-defense
amounts to an incomplete instruction on the malice element of
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PEOPLE v. SCHULLER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
murder and is therefore subject to Chapman review for
constitutional error. (See Wilkins, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 349
[Chapman review applies to “incomplete” or “misleading”
instruction on element of the crime].
As explained above, the high court’s holding in Mullaney
makes clear that when substantial evidence of imperfect self-
defense is present, the malice element of murder requires the
People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only that the
defendant committed an unlawful, intentional killing, but also
that the defendant did not kill in an actual but unreasonable
belief in the need for self-defense. (See Mullaney, supra,
421 U.S. at p. 704 [“the Due Process Clause requires the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of
the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is
properly presented in a homicide case”]; see also Rios, supra,
23 Cal.4th at p. 462 [“If the issue of provocation or imperfect
self-defense is . . . ‘properly presented’ in a murder case
[citation], the People must prove beyond reasonable doubt that
these circumstances were lacking in order to establish the
murder element of malice” (italics omitted)]; ante, at pp. 15–18.
Stated more simply, because malice is absent when imperfect
self-defense is present, the prosecution cannot prove malice
without disproving imperfect self-defense.4 (See Rios, at p. 461
[evidence of imperfect self-defense “is relevant . . . to determine
whether malice has been established, thus allowing a conviction
4
These rules of course apply only when imperfect self-
defense is at issue. If a person has been charged with murder
and there is no evidence that would support a finding of
imperfect self-defense, the question of imperfect self-defense is
not part of the malice inquiry. (See generally Rios, supra,
23 Cal.4th at pp. 461–462.
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PEOPLE v. SCHULLER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
of murder, or has not been established, thus . . . limiting the
crime to . . . voluntary manslaughter” (italics omitted)].
Without an instruction on imperfect self-defense, the
jurors in this case were never informed that if they harbored a
reasonable doubt whether Schuller was operating under an
actual but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense, they
were required to acquit him of murder for lack of malice. (Cf.
Wilkins, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 348 [applying Chapman review
where the trial court failed to instruct jury that the continuous
transaction element of felony murder was absent if the
defendant “had reached a place of temporary safety before the
fatal act occurred”].) Indeed, the record demonstrates that at
closing argument the prosecution told the jury the element of
malice had been conclusively established because Schuller
admitted he intentionally shot the victim and had failed to
proffer any legally valid theory of self-defense. Schuller, in turn,
was unable to argue to the jury that he lacked the requisite
malice to have committed murder, arguing only that his
perceptions of W.T.’s conduct raised a reasonable doubt as to
whether the killing was committed with deliberation and
premeditation. In other words, the lack of instruction forced
Schuller to concede, and enabled the prosecution to
affirmatively argue, that Schuller’s belief in the need to defend
himself was entirely immaterial to the jury’s determination of
malice. Thus, on the record before us, it is clear the trial court’s
misinstruction precluded the jury from making a factual
finding — the absence of imperfect self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt — that was necessary to prove an “actual
element” of the charged offense of murder — malice. (Neder,
supra, 527 U.S. at p. 10, italics omitted.) Chapman review is
therefore appropriate.
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
The Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion,
reasoning that whatever merit there might be in Schuller’s
theory of federal constitutional error, two prior decisions of this
court — Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142, and Gonzalez, supra,
5 Cal.5th 186 — have held that this form of instructional error
amounts to a violation of state law only. The Attorney General
presents a similar argument, contending that “[t]hese
authorities strongly suggest that the issue in this case is
settled.” We disagree.
In Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142, we held that
manslaughter qualifies as a lesser included offense of murder,
and thus a trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on heat
of passion and imperfect self-defense when the evidence raises
a question as to those issues. (See id. at pp. 153–155.) However,
we rejected the defendant’s assertion that a trial court’s failure
to instruct on those issues qualifies as a violation of the federal
Constitution. (Id. at p. 165.) Noting that the high court had
never “recogniz[ed] a federal constitutional right to instructions
on lesser included offenses in noncapital cases” (ibid.), we held
that “the rule requiring sua sponte instructions on all lesser
necessarily included offenses supported by the evidence derives
exclusively from California law” (id. at p. 169). Thus, any
violation of that duty was subject to review under Watson’s
reasonable probability standard.
Notably, however, in a dissenting opinion that directly
tracks the argument Schuller presents here, Justice Kennard
argued the instructional error amounted to a violation of the
federal Constitution. (See Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at
p. 190 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.) [“murder instructions that fail
to inform the jury it may not find the defendant guilty of murder
if heat of passion is present are incomplete instructions on the
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
element of malice”].) In a responding footnote, the majority
explained that it need not address whether the misinstruction
had “caused the definition of the malice element of murder . . .
to be incomplete” (id. at p. 170, fn. 19, italics omitted) because
the defendant never raised that specific argument. The majority
concluded that the “merits” of such a theory should “await a case
in which they have been clearly raised and fully briefed.” (Ibid.;
see People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 558, fn. 5 [declining to
address whether failure to instruct on provocation resulted in
incomplete definition of malice because the defendant had not
raised that theory]; Lasko, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 113
[acknowledging that the Breverman majority had “declined to
consider whether [failure to instruct on provocation] violated the
federal Constitution by giving the jury an incomplete definition
of malice, an element of murder”].) Having specifically
preserved consideration of the theory of constitutional error that
Schuller raises here, Breverman cannot be said to preclude those
arguments.
In Gonzalez, supra, 5 Cal.5th 186, we addressed whether
the trial court’s failure to instruct on second degree murder (and
various other lesser forms of homicide) in a felony murder case
had been rendered harmless by the jury’s true finding on a
special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed
during a robbery. In deciding that question, we applied
Breverman’s rule that “[t]he failure to instruct on lesser
included offenses supported by substantial evidence [is] state
law error.” (Gonzalez, at p. 196.) We did not address, nor did
the defendant raise, the theory of federal constitutional error
that Justice Kennard discussed (and that the majority left open
in Breverman. Indeed, it does not appear that theory would
have had any relevance to the type of error at issue in Gonzalez
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
because the omitted instructions in that case — lesser forms of
homicide — did not operate to negate or otherwise modify the
elements of the charged offense of felony murder, which does not
require a showing of malice. (See People v. Dillon (1983
34 Cal.3d 441, 475 [“malice is not an element of felony
murder”].) Accordingly, we find nothing in Gonzalez that
forecloses us from finally addressing the theory of error that
Schuller raises here.
The People argue that even if Breverman and Gonzalez do
not foreclose us from considering Schuller’s argument regarding
constitutional error, we should nevertheless reject that
argument on the merits. While acknowledging that Chapman
review applies to a trial court’s failure to properly instruct on an
element of the charged offense, the Attorney General contends
the absence of imperfect self-defense is not an element of
murder, but rather amounts only to “an exculpatory theory . . .
similar to a defense.” (See, e.g., People v. Martinez (2003
31 Cal.4th 673, 685 [for purposes of deciding whether foreign
conviction satisfies prior murder special circumstance (see
§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)), the absence of imperfect self-defense does
not qualify as an element of murder].) Thus, the Attorney
General reasons, cases applying Chapman review to
instructions that relate to an element of the offense are
inapplicable.
The Attorney General overlooks that Chapman review
applies not only to instructions that omit an element of the
offense, but also to instructions that provide an incomplete or
misleading description of what is necessary to establish an
element of the offense. (See Hendrix, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 942; Wilkins, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 349.) And as discussed
above, it is well established that when imperfect self-defense is
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PEOPLE v. SCHULLER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
at issue, the prosecution cannot establish malice without
proving the absence of that circumstance beyond a reasonable
doubt. Because of that requirement, without an instruction on
imperfect self-defense, the jury is left unable to properly
evaluate whether the prosecution has sustained its burden to
prove malice. More specifically, the jury is left unaware that
even if the prosecution has proven that the defendant intended
to kill — a circumstance that generally demonstrates express
malice — the jury cannot find malice if it has a reasonable doubt
whether the defendant killed in imperfect self-defense. Thus,
the failure to instruct on that issue rendered the description of
malice —which is unquestionably an element of murder —
incomplete.
Finally, the Attorney General disagrees with our
conclusion that under Mullaney, supra, 421 U.S. 684, the State
has a constitutional duty to disprove imperfect self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt when that theory is presented in a
murder case. (See ante, at pp. 17–18.) He contends that two
subsequent high court decisions, Patterson v. New York (1977
432 U.S. 197 (Patterson) and Engle v. Isaac (1982) 456 U.S. 107
(Engle), have clarified that while states may choose to “task[]
the prosecution with proving [the] absence [of imperfect self-
defense] beyond a reasonable doubt,” they nonetheless retain
the authority to allocate the burden of proof on that issue to the
defendant. In the Attorney General’s view, because these cases
show California is not constitutionally required to disprove
imperfect self-defense, any error associated with failing to
instruct on that theory is necessarily grounded in state law and
thus subject to Watson review.
Contrary to the Attorney General’s assertions, nothing in
Patterson, supra, 432 U.S. 197, or Engle, supra, 456 U.S. 107,
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PEOPLE v. SCHULLER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
supplants Mullaney’s rule that when a state chooses to recognize
a defensive theory that operates to negate an element of the
charged offense, and the defendant presents evidence placing
that theory at issue, the due process clause requires the state to
prove the absence of that circumstance beyond a reasonable
doubt. (See Mullaney, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 704; Smith, supra,
568 U.S. at p. 110 [when a defensive theory “ ‘negate[s] an
element of the crime’. . . the Government has [a] constitutional
duty to overcome the defense beyond a reasonable doubt”].
In Patterson, supra, 432 U.S. 197, the court held only that
the principles of Mullaney do not require states to “disprove
beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all
affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.”
(Patterson, at p. 210.) Patterson involved a New York law that
defined murder differently from California. The New York law
defined the crime of murder as “causing the death of another
person with intent to do so.” (Id. at p. 205.) Thus, unlike
California or Maine, the New York law crucially did not define
murder by using the term “malice.” Instead, the sole elements
of the offense were the death of a person, the intent to kill and
causation. New York also provided an affirmative defense of
“extreme emotional disturbance” that, if proved by the
defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, would reduce the
crime to manslaughter.
In upholding the constitutionality of this legal structure,
the court noted that unlike the homicide laws at issue in
Mullaney, New York’s emotional disturbance defense did “not
serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to
prove in order to convict of murder” (Patterson, supra, 432 U.S.
at p. 207), but rather related to “a separate issue” (ibid.) distinct
from the elements of the offense. Thus, Patterson merely stands
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PEOPLE v. SCHULLER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
for the proposition that states are permitted to place the burden
of proving some forms of affirmative defenses on the defendant,
namely those that do not serve to “negative any facts” (ibid.
necessary to prove the charged offense.
In Engle, supra, 456 U.S. 107, habeas petitioners raised
multiple arguments challenging the constitutionality of a state
law that shifted the burden of proving self-defense to
defendants. In the section of the decision the Attorney General
cites, the court reiterated Patterson’s holding that states are
constitutionally permitted to assign defendants the burden of
proving some forms of affirmative defenses. (Engle, at p. 121.
However, in a separate section of the decision that the Attorney
General does not discuss, the Engle court evaluated petitioners’
alternative contention that because the homicide offenses they
had been charged with required a showing of “purposeful or
knowing behavior” (id. at p. 121), the presence of self-defense
served to “negate” (ibid.) an element of the crime, thus requiring
the State to “disprove that defense as part of its task of
establishing guilty mens rea . . . .” (Id. at p. 122.) Noting that
several federal and state courts had interpreted Mullaney and
Patterson as creating a constitutional duty to “prove absence of
self-defense if that defense negates an element . . . of the
charged crime” (Engle, at p. 122), the court found that the
petitioners’ argument stated a “colorable constitutional claim.”
(Ibid.) The court went on to conclude, however, that for
purposes of federal habeas relief, petitioners had procedurally
defaulted this claim by failing to raise it in the state court
proceedings. As a result, the court declined to address the claim
on the merits.
More recently, in Smith, supra, 568 U.S. 106, the high
court adopted the argument left unaddressed in Engle,
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PEOPLE v. SCHULLER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
clarifying that under the Mullaney/Patterson framework, “[t]he
State is foreclosed from shifting the burden of proof to the
defendant . . . ‘when an affirmative defense . . . negate[s] an
element of the crime.’ [Citation.] Where instead it ‘excuse[s]
conduct that would otherwise be punishable,’ but ‘does not
controvert any of the elements of the offense itself,’ the
Government has no constitutional duty to overcome the defense
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Smith, at p. 110; cf. People v.
Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 384 [Mullaney’s principles are
inapplicable to provocation in the context of first degree murder
because provocation is merely a factor the jury can consider
when evaluating premeditation and deliberation].) Smith thus
reaffirms that because California has structured its homicide
laws so that imperfect self-defense operates to negate the
element of malice, the State is constitutionally required to
disprove such a theory in cases where the issue is presented.5
5
The People argue that language in People v. Babbitt (1988
45 Cal.3d 660 (Babbitt), supports the view that the prosecution
does not have a constitutional duty to disprove defensive
theories that negate an element of the crime. The defendant in
Babbitt argued that an instruction on the affirmative defense of
unconsciousness violated the due process clause by placing the
burden of proof on that issue on the defense. The defendant
posited that because unconsciousness operated to negate intent,
the People could not shift the burden of proof on that issue, but
instead were required to prove the absence of that circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt.
While Babbitt contains language that could be read to
suggest the People are not constitutionally required to disprove
defensive theories that negate an element of the crime (see
Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 693–694), we ultimately held
that the challenged instructions did not shift the burden on the
question of unconsciousness and therefore did not implicate the
constitutional issues addressed in Mullaney and Patterson.
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
In sum, while states retain flexibility in choosing how to
define criminal offenses, our high court’s decisions make clear
that if a state chooses to recognize a defensive theory that
operates to negate an element of the charged offense, the due
process clause requires the prosecution to prove the absence of
that circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.6 Applying those
principles here, we hold that when there is substantial evidence
of imperfect self-defense in a murder case, the trial court’s
failure to instruct on that theory precludes the jury from making
a factual finding that is necessary to prove the malice element
of murder. The error therefore amounts to a violation of the
federal Constitution and is subject to Chapman’s “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard for evaluating prejudice.
We emphasize that our conclusion is predicated on the
“unique” relationship between murder and voluntary
Moreover, Babbitt was decided before Smith, supra, 568 U.S.
106, and Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th 450, which make clear that
because imperfect self-defense negates the malice element of
murder, the People have a constitutional duty to prove the
absence of that circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. (Rios,
at p. 462; Smith, at p. 110.)
6
As our high court has acknowledged, under the approach
adopted in the Mullaney and Patterson line of cases, “the
prosecution’s constitutional duty to negate affirmative defenses
may depend, at least in part, on the manner in which the State
defines the charged crime.” (Engle, supra, 456 U.S. at p. 120.
While the court’s due process jurisprudence in this area does
appear to allow states considerable flexibility in defining
offenses in such a way as to reallocate the burden of proving
certain defensive issues (see Patterson, supra, 432 U.S. at
p. 210), those cases nonetheless make clear the structure
California has adopted with respect to homicide trigger a
constitutional duty to disprove imperfect self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
manslaughter (see ante, at pp. 15–18), and does not otherwise
modify the general rule that the failure to instruct on other
forms of lesser included offenses in noncapital cases is an error
of state law. (See Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 165.)7 We
also express no opinion on the appropriate standard of review
for instructional errors related to other forms of defensive
theories, including affirmative defenses. (See Gonzalez, supra,
5 Cal.5th at p. 199 [this court “ha[s] yet to determine whether a
trial court’s failure to instruct on a requested affirmative
defense instruction supported by substantial evidence is federal
constitutional error or state law error”]; cf. People v. Rogers
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 872 [discussing federal authorities
concluding that trial court’s failure to give a requested
instruction embodying the defense’s theory of the case “violate[s]
the defendant’s due process right to present a complete
defense”].
7
Our holding does of course apply to other forms of
voluntary manslaughter, i.e., heat of passion and imperfect
defense of others, which operate identically to imperfect self-
defense by negating the malice element of murder. (See Rios,
supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 461; People v. Randle (2005) 35 Cal.4th
987, 997 [as with imperfect self-defense, one who kills in
imperfect defense of others is “guilty of manslaughter, not
murder, because he lacks the malice required for murder”
(italics omitted)].) Thus, when the record contains substantial
evidence of heat of passion or imperfect defense of others, the
failure to instruct on those theories is likewise subject to review
under the Chapman standard. We disapprove People v.
Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 162, and People v. Randle, supra,
35 Cal.4th 987, to the extent those cases could be read to hold
otherwise.
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
B. The Court of Appeal’s Prejudice Analysis Did
Not Comport with Chapman
Having concluded that the trial court’s misinstruction (or
more precisely the court’s assumed misinstruction, see ante, at
p. 13, fn. 2) qualified as a violation of the federal Constitution,
we must next assess the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the
error was harmless. Although the court found that the
misinstruction amounted to an error of state law only (a
conclusion we have now rejected), it went on to hold that the
error was harmless even under Chapman’s stricter standard for
constitutional violations, which requires reversal unless it
appears “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained
of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” (People v. Brown
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 453, 473.
Our recent decision in Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th 562,
clarified the Chapman standard in the context of instructional
errors that “ ‘misdescri[be] . . . the elements’ ” of the charged
offense. (Lopez, at p. 568.) We explained that the “test is
exacting” (id. at p. 581), requiring reversal unless the reviewing
court is persuaded that “ ‘ “[n]o reasonable jury” ’ would have
found in favor of the defendant on the missing fact, given the
jury’s actual verdict and the state of the evidence” (id. at p. 580).
When making this evaluation, the reviewing court “ ‘does not . . .
“become in effect a second jury to determine whether the
defendant is guilty.” [Citation.] Rather a court, in typical
appellate-court fashion, asks whether the record contains
evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with
respect to the omitted element.’ ” (Id. at p. 581.) As stated by
our high court, “safeguarding the jury guarantee will often
require that a reviewing court conduct a thorough examination
of the record. If, at the end of that examination, the court cannot
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PEOPLE v. SCHULLER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would
have been the same absent the error — for example, where the
defendant contested the omitted element and raised evidence
sufficient to support a contrary finding — it should not find the
error harmless.” (Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 19.
In this case, the Court of Appeal’s harmless error analysis
focused solely on what it characterized as “overwhelming
evidence that [Schuller] was not acting in any form of self-
defense.” (Schuller, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 238.) In the
court’s view, several categories of evidence “undercut
[Schuller’s] claim of self-defense” (id. at p. 239) or “did not
entirely align with his story” (id. at p. 240), including (among
other things): (1) “[his] account of the killing radically changed
leading up to trial” (id. at p. 238); (2) two psychologists testified
that Schuller appeared to be malingering (id. at p. 239); (3) his
conduct immediately after the killing (setting fire to the body,
shooting the victim’s phone and fleeing from the scene) belied
his claim that he had tried to contact police (id. at pp. 239–240);
(4) many “aspects of [Schuller’s] testimony” were inconsistent,
thereby “undercut[ting] his credibility” (id. at p. 239); (5) the
physical evidence at the scene of the crime did not support
Schuller’s claim, in particular the fact that the knife was found
“on the table — not on the floor . . . [a]nd unlike the surrounding
area, . . . had no blood on it” (id. at p. 239); and (6) Schuller shot
the victim nine times in the head, suggesting “a personal motive,
rather than panicked self-defense” (id. at p. 240). The court
believed that, considered together, this evidence showed “there
was no reasonable possibility the error contributed to the
verdict.” (Ibid.
The court’s discussion suggests that rather than assess
whether any reasonable jury could have credited Schuller’s
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
claim of imperfect self-defense “given the . . . actual verdict and
the state of the evidence” (Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 580),
the court performed its own weighing of the evidence and its own
assessment of witness credibility. It was not the court’s role, for
example, to decide whether Schuller’s failure to raise the issue
of self-defense in his initial conversations with police
demonstrated that his trial testimony was not true or credit the
psychologists’ disputed conclusion that Schuller was
malingering. While much of the trial evidence certainly casts
doubt on Schuller’s claim of imperfect self-defense, it was
ultimately the jury’s role, not that of the reviewing court, to
assess whether such evidence showed beyond a reasonable
doubt that Schuller did not “kill[] with an actual but
unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense against
imminent death or great bodily injury.” (In re Christian S.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 778.
The court’s findings on the merits of Schuller’s
instructional claim — i.e., that he was entitled to an instruction
on imperfect self-defense — further confirm that the court’s
evaluation of prejudice did not comport with the standards of
Chapman. When assessing the merits of Schuller’s claim, the
court correctly explained that an instruction on imperfect self-
defense must be given when there is “substantial evidence” to
support such a theory. (Schuller, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at
p. 231; see Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162.) It further
observed — again correctly — that “substantial evidence [in this
context] is ‘ “ ‘evidence from which a jury composed of
reasonable [persons] could’ ” ’ ” find in the defendant’s favor on
the issue. (Schuller, at p. 231; see Breverman, at p. 162.
Applying those standards, the court found that the record did
contain sufficient evidence to require an instruction on
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
imperfect self-defense, citing Schuller’s testimony that W.T. had
threatened him with a knife and citing evidence demonstrating
that a knife was found at the scene of the crime. (Schuller, at
p. 236.) Despite that finding, the court went on to conclude that
the instructional error was harmless because the evidence
weighing against Schuller’s claim of imperfect self-defense was
“overwhelming.” (Id. at p. 238.
Had the court properly applied the standards required
under Chapman, it could not have found both that Schuller
presented sufficient evidence to support an instruction on
imperfect self-defense and that the error was harmless based
solely on the conclusion that the evidence was so overwhelming
as to compel a finding against him on that theory. (See Neder,
supra, 527 U.S. at p. 9.) In other words, if the court believed an
instruction was warranted because there was sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in Schuller’s
favor on the question of imperfect self-defense, the court could
not then, consistent with Chapman, go on to find that the error
was nonetheless harmless simply because the evidence against
imperfect self-defense was so overwhelming that no reasonable
jury could have possibly found in Schuller’s favor on that issue.
(See ibid.)8
8
In Breverman, we rejected the defendant’s argument that
“an erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is
necessarily prejudicial, on the premise that if the evidence was
substantial enough to warrant lesser offense instructions in the
first place, it must have been strong enough to affect the
outcome had the instructions not been omitted.” (Breverman,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177.) We explained that the “standard[]
of evidentiary review” used to evaluate whether an instruction
on a lesser included offense should have been provided is
“distinct” from the standard of “[a]ppellate review under
33
PEOPLE v. SCHULLER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Because the Court of Appeal’s harmless error analysis
demonstrates that it misapprehended the standard that
Chapman requires, we remand the matter to allow the court to
reconsider whether the failure to instruct on self-defense was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the appropriate
standard. (See Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 580–592
[clarifying Chapman standard and remanding question of
prejudice where the reviewing court’s analysis indicated it
“misapprehended” the appropriate standard]; cf. Yamaha Corp.
of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 15,
[where the Court of Appeal applied an erroneous standard,
“regard for the structure of appellate decisionmaking suggests
the case should be returned to the Court of Appeal”].)9
Watson.” (Ibid.) That analysis, however, involved an
application of the Watson harmless error standard. (Ibid.) It
does not apply to the higher standard of prejudice applicable
under Chapman review.
9
The Attorney General argues that even if the Court of
Appeal’s approach to evaluating prejudice did not comport with
Chapman, there is nonetheless a separate basis to support a
finding of harmlessness: the jury’s “first degree murder verdict,
and rejection of second degree murder, shows that the jury
necessarily rejected Schuller’s testimony that he acted in self-
defense, leaving no doubt the jury would have returned the same
verdict had it been instructed regarding imperfect self-defense.”
In support, the Attorney General cites People v. Manriquez
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 547. (See id. at p. 582 [jury’s first degree
murder verdict “le[ft] no doubt the jury would have returned the
same verdict had it been instructed regarding imperfect self-
defense”].) The defendant and the concurrence disagree,
arguing that the first degree murder finding does not render the
instructional error harmless because “the requirements of self-
defense are consistent with a killing undertaken with
premeditation and deliberation.” (Conc. opn. of Liu, J., post, at
p. 2, citing CALCRIM No. 571.
34
PEOPLE v. SCHULLER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
GROBAN, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
JENKINS, J.
EVANS, J.
The Attorney General did not rely on this alternative
theory below and the Court of Appeal did not address it. (See
People v. Maya (2020) 9 Cal.5th 239, 243 [declining to address
“alternative ground” raised in support of the judgment and
remanding to allow the Court of Appeal to “consider [the issue]
in the first instance”]; Central Coast Forest Assn. v. Fish &
Game Com. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 594, 606 [“it is appropriate to
remand . . . for the Court of Appeal to consider . . . unresolved
issues in the first instance”].
35
PEOPLE v. SCHULLER
S272237
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu
I agree that “when the record contains substantial
evidence of imperfect self-defense, the trial court’s failure to
instruct on that theory amounts to constitutional error and is
thus subject to review under the federal Chapman standard.”
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2; see Chapman v. California (1967) 386
U.S. 18, 24.) I further agree that where the Court of Appeal
“believed an instruction was warranted because there was
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in
Schuller’s favor on the question of imperfect self-defense” (maj.
opn., ante, at p. 33), the court could not then “perform[] its own
weighing of the evidence” to hold such error harmless (id. at
p. 32). I write separately to address two issues.
First, while I agree with today’s opinion as far as it goes, I
would hold that reversible error occurred here. The Court of
Appeal determined that instructional error occurred; the
Attorney General does not challenge that determination; and
our clarification that Chapman review applies does not
implicate it. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1, 13, fn. 2.) The Court of
Appeal “could not have found both that Schuller presented
sufficient evidence to support an instruction on imperfect self-
defense and that the [instructional] error was harmless based
solely on the conclusion that the evidence was so overwhelming
as to compel a finding against him on that theory.” (Id. at p. 33.
Because the Court of Appeal found the former, and because our
decision presents no grounds to disturb that finding, logic
1
PEOPLE v. SCHULLER
Liu, J., concurring
dictates that the error cannot be held harmless based on the
weight of the evidence.
This conclusion comports with our precedent. In
evaluating the harmlessness of an instructional error under
Chapman, a court is limited to determining whether “it would
be impossible, based on the evidence, for a jury to make the
findings reflected in its verdict without also finding the missing
fact as well.” (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 568.) Unless
the jury’s findings in this case precluded any possibility of also
finding that Schuller acted in imperfect self-defense, the
instructional error cannot be held harmless.
Because the jury’s findings that Schuller acted with
premeditation and deliberation do not preclude a finding that he
honestly but unreasonably believed he needed to act in self-
defense, the instructional error is not harmless. While
voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion is “manifestly
inconsistent” with premeditation and deliberation (People v.
Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 572), voluntary manslaughter
based on imperfect self-defense is not. Imperfect self-defense
does not require a rash or impulsive killing. Rather, the
requirements of self-defense are consistent with a killing
undertaken with premeditation and deliberation. A defendant
who acts in self-defense must honestly believe that he or she is
“in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily
injury” and that “the immediate use of deadly force [is]
necessary to defend against the danger.” (CALCRIM No. 571.
These requirements imply that a defendant has evaluated both
the danger present and alternate options for escape or de-
escalation and has concluded that “ ‘imminent danger to life or
great bodily injury’ ” requires the use of deadly force. (People v.
Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 270, italics omitted.
2
PEOPLE v. SCHULLER
Liu, J., concurring
Schuller’s self-defense claim aligns with these
requirements. He testified that after unsuccessfully attempting
to flee W.T.’s apartment and then seeing W.T. reach for a gun
and attempt to attack with a knife, he determined that
responding with deadly force was necessary. (Maj. opn., ante, at
p. 10.) Schuller’s testimony supports a conclusion that he
premeditated — that is, he “decided to kill before completing the
act[] that caused death,” a decision that “can be reached
quickly” — and that he deliberated by “carefully weigh[ing] the
considerations for and against” his decision to kill. (CALCRIM
No. 521.) A juror who credited his testimony could rationally
conclude both that he acted with premeditation and deliberation
and that he honestly though unreasonably believed he needed
to act in self-defense. Because the instructional error in this
case did not allow a juror to express both of those conclusions, it
cannot be found harmless.
Second, if Schuller’s conviction is reversed, a new trial is
likely to again raise the question of whether his belief in the
need for self-defense was “entirely delusional” or was instead
supported by an “objective correlate.” (People v. Elmore (2014
59 Cal.4th 121, 137 (Elmore).) I continue to disagree with our
determination in Elmore, a closely divided decision, that a
defendant may not argue imperfect self-defense based on a
“purely delusional belief in the need to act in self-defense.” (Id.
at p. 130; see id. at p. 154 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J., joined
by Werdegar & Liu, JJ.).
Elmore held that “unreasonable self-defense is ‘a species
of mistake of fact . . . predicated upon a negligent perception of
facts, not, as in the case of a delusion, a perception of facts not
grounded in reality.’ ” (Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 136.
Defendants may argue imperfect self-defense where an objective
3
PEOPLE v. SCHULLER
Liu, J., concurring
correlate — that is, evidence demonstrating “a motivation
arising from objective facts, not delusions” (id. at p. 138) —
supports their “mistaken[] belie[f] that actual circumstances
required their defensive act” (id. at p. 146). By contrast, Elmore
said, “[a] claim of self-defense based solely on delusion is . . . a
claim of legal insanity” and is therefore “reserved for the [trial’s]
sanity phase.” (Id. at p. 145.
But there is no reason to preclude a claim of imperfect self-
defense because of the origin of a defendant’s honest belief.
Because “California has structured its homicide laws so that
imperfect self-defense operates to negate the element of malice”
(maj. opn., ante, at p. 27), “that most culpable of mental states
‘cannot coexist’ with an actual belief that the lethal act was
necessary to avoid one’s own death or serious injury at the
victim’s hand” (People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 461). As
discussed above, self-defense requires a defendant to genuinely
believe that he or she is “in imminent danger of being killed or
suffering great bodily injury” and that “the immediate use of
deadly force [is] necessary to defend against the danger.”
(CALCRIM No. 571.) But because a “purely delusional” belief in
the need for self-defense may be just as genuine as a belief based
on an “objective correlate,” it is not clear what supports Elmore’s
conclusion that a defendant’s claim of imperfect self-defense
must be grounded in objective reality. Such an assessment goes
to the reasonableness of a defendant’s belief — a consideration
necessary to perfect self-defense but irrelevant to imperfect self-
defense, which is by definition unreasonable. (Elmore, supra, 59
Cal.4th at pp. 133–134.
Moreover, this case demonstrates that Elmore’s holding
requires highly subjective line drawing. Under Elmore, “[a]
person who sees a stick and thinks it is a snake” is entitled to
4
PEOPLE v. SCHULLER
Liu, J., concurring
assert imperfect self-defense, but someone “who sees a snake
where there is nothing snakelike” is not. (Elmore, supra, 59
Cal.4th at p. 137.) This distinction, in addition to lacking a
principled basis in the law of murder, comes with no guidance
for determining what qualifies as an “objective correlate.” Here,
the Court of Appeal held that the “large knife . . . found on the
kitchen table” and the “gun case . . . on the table” provided
objective correlates sufficient to conclude that Schuller’s belief
was not purely delusional. (People v. Schuller (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 221, 236.) But would the mere presence of a knife
in the same room as Schuller have been sufficient, even if
Schuller only imagined that W.T. lunged for it? What if W.T.
had looked at the knife in a way that Schuller interpreted as
presaging an imminent attack? What if W.T. had walked
toward the side of the kitchen where the knife was located, and
Schuller honestly believed W.T. was going to grab the knife and
attack?
There are no easy answers to such questions, yet courts
applying Elmore must answer them. (See, e.g., People v.
Ocegueda (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1409–1410 [defendant’s
uncorroborated testimony that he saw victim pull a metallic
object from his waistband provided a sufficient objective
correlate to necessitate an imperfect self-defense instruction];
People v. Leeds (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 822, 833 [father’s kicking
down of office door provided an objective correlate for
defendant’s fatal shooting despite defendant’s fear resulting
from delusional beliefs about father].) Elmore foists on trial
courts and juries “[t]he unenviable task of distinguishing such
partly delusional beliefs having some objective basis from those
that are ‘purely’ or ‘entirely’ delusional.” (Elmore, supra, 59
Cal.4th at p. 152 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) This
5
PEOPLE v. SCHULLER
Liu, J., concurring
unguided inquiry is compounded by the equally subjective
challenge of determining, in the chain of events leading a
defendant to have an unreasonable belief in the need for self-
defense, at what temporal or causal point an objective correlate
must be found.
All of this is unnecessarily confusing and complicated.
Requiring an “objective correlate” in order to assert imperfect
self-defense is inconsistent with the requirement of malice to
prove murder. Because “[t]he unreasonable belief in the need
for self-defense may stem from mental illness, negligence,
subaverage intelligence, or a variety of other causes . . . [,] it
should not matter why the killer perceived a need for self-
defense.” (Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 150 (conc. & dis. opn.
of Kennard, J.).) Where substantial evidence supports an
imperfect self-defense instruction, “the jury at the guilt phase
need not decide whether [a defendant’s] belief was delusional,
but [need] only decide[] whether that belief was genuine.” (Id.
at p. 152 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) I suggest we
reconsider Elmore in an appropriate case.
LIU, J.
I Concur:
EVANS, J.
6
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Schuller
Procedural Posture (see XX below
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 72 Cal.App.5th 221
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S272237
Date Filed: August 17, 2023
Court: Superior
County: Nevada
Judge: Candace S. Heidelberger
Counsel:
David L. Polsky, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Mary K. McComb, State Public Defender, Anne W. Lackey and William
Whaley, Deputy State Public Defenders, and Jessie Peterson for the
Office of the State Public Defender as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala Harris, Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General,
Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P.
Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs, Christopher J.
Rench, Eric L. Christoffersen, Jennifer M. Poe, Daniel B. Bernstein
and Peter H. Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
David L. Polsky
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 118
Ashford, CT 06278
(860) 429-5556
Jennifer M. Poe
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 210-7692
Opinion Information
| Date: | Docket Number: |
| Thu, 08/17/2023 | S272237 |
