Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S080840
People v. Rogers

Filed 7/25/13



Plaintiff and Respondent,



Los Angeles County


Super. Ct. No. BA109525

Defendant and Appellant.

A jury convicted defendant Glen Rogers of the first degree murder of

Sandra Gallagher (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 and arson of property (§ 451,

subd. (d)). One special circumstance was found true; that defendant was

previously convicted of first degree murder. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2) [prior-murder-

conviction special circumstance].) Following a penalty trial, the jury returned a

verdict of death. The trial court denied the automatic motion to modify the

penalty verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and imposed the death sentence for the murder

and a determinate term of two years for the arson conviction. This appeal is

automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the judgment in its entirety.


All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.



Guilt Phase

A. Introduction

On September 29, 1995, defendant Glen Rogers, a drifter from Ohio who

had frequented McRed‟s bar in Van Nuys for several weeks, picked up Sandra

Gallagher at the bar and strangled her to death several hours later, burning her

body in the passenger compartment of her pickup truck. Defendant fled from

California to Mississippi,2 then to Bossier City, Louisiana, where, on November 2,

1995, he picked up Andy Lou Sutton at the It‟ll Do Lounge. Defendant spent the

night with Sutton in her apartment and left the following day, telling her he had to

go to Jackson, Mississippi, to retrieve a truck, but would return. Instead,

defendant traveled to Tampa, Florida, where, on November 5, he picked up Tina

Cribbs at the Showtown bar in Gibsonton, on the outskirts of Tampa. Defendant

took Cribbs to his Tampa motel room where he stabbed her to death that same day.

The following day defendant, driving Cribbs‟s car, returned to Sutton‟s apartment

in Bossier City, Louisiana. The next night, on or about November 7, defendant

stabbed Sutton to death in the bedroom of her apartment.


On October 9, 1995, defendant met Linda Price in Jackson, Mississippi,

and murdered her three weeks later, on October 31. The prosecution sought to
admit evidence of three out-of-state murders committed by defendant in the six-
week period following Gallagher‟s murder in Van Nuys—the murder of Price in
Jackson, Mississippi, on October 31, 1995; the murder of Tina Cribbs in Tampa,
Florida, on or about November 5, 1995; and the murder of Andy Lou Sutton in
Bossier City, Louisiana, on November 8, 1995—to establish that Gallagher‟s
murder was pursuant to a common design or plan and premeditated. (Evid. Code,
§ 1101, subd. (b).) The trial court ruled evidence of the Cribbs and Sutton
murders admissible on that basis, but excluded evidence of the Price murder from
the guilt phase. Evidence of that murder was, however, admitted as part of the
prosecution‟s case in aggravation at the penalty phase. Accordingly, the facts
surrounding the Price murder are only relevant to the penalty phase and will be
considered below along with the other penalty phase evidence.


Defendant fled in Cribbs‟s car from Louisiana through Tennessee to

Kentucky, where he was ultimately apprehended by Kentucky state police after a

high-speed pursuit through several towns.

B. Prosecution Evidence.

1. Defendant murders Sandra Gallagher in Van Nuys.

On September 28, 1995, Sandra Gallagher, age 33, had lunch with her

husband Stephen at a restaurant in West Los Angeles. Gallagher was happy, as

she had won approximately $1,200 in the state lottery. She showed her husband

the lottery ticket claim form, indicating she was going to the lottery office to

submit the form. Gallagher was driving a black and silver Ford F-150 pickup

truck with Colorado license plates she had obtained from her recently deceased

father, who lived in Colorado. Her husband testified she was wearing a pair of

distinctive earrings she had purchased from a Ross department store. An

employee at the California State Lottery office in Van Nuys testified Gallagher

came into the office that afternoon to claim her $1,279 in prize winnings.

In September 1995, Mamdouh Saliman owned McRed‟s bar on Victory

Boulevard in Van Nuys. McRed‟s was a full service bar that served all varieties of

drinks. Saliman also owned CJ‟s, another bar on Victory Boulevard, one block

west of McRed‟s, that only served beer and wine. Saliman went to McRed‟s on

the afternoon of September 28. When he parked his car, he noticed a truck with

Colorado license plates in the parking lot. Around 3:00 or 4:00 p.m., Gallagher

walked into McRed‟s and said hello to Saliman, asking, “Don‟t you remember

me?” Saliman, who remembered Gallagher because she had previously been a

host at one of his other bars, replied, “I remember your face, but I don‟t recall your

name.” Gallagher told Saliman her nickname, “Sam,” and he gave her a hug.

Gallagher told Saliman she had won a lottery prize. When he asked where she had


been, she replied that she had moved to Colorado after she left her employment

with him.

Rein Keener worked as a bartender at McRed‟s in September 1995. Keener

arrived at work at between 5:30 and 6:00 p.m. on September 28 and noticed a

truck with Colorado license plates parked in the lot. Upon entering the bar,

Keener saw Gallagher standing with Saliman, who called her over and introduced

her to Gallagher. Saliman told Keener that Gallagher used to live in the

neighborhood and that she was a “really nice gal.” He asked Keener to look after

Gallagher and “steer [her] away from the loser leeches” at the bar. After Saliman

left the bar, Keener ate dinner and Gallagher played pool. At one point the two

began conversing and Gallagher told Keener her father had passed away and that

she had just gotten back from Colorado. Gallagher also told Keener she had just

won the lottery and was planning to go to Sacramento the following day to see her

three sons.

At approximately 7:00 p.m. that evening, defendant arrived at McRed‟s.

He had recently become a frequent customer of the bar, showing up two or three

times a week during the latter part of September 1995. The first time defendant

patronized McRed‟s, he approached Keener and asked for her phone number.

Keener told defendant she did not go out with men she did not know. Defendant

showed up at McRed‟s during each of Keener‟s shifts for the next three weeks,

repeatedly asking for her phone number. During one conversation with defendant,

Keener told him she was in law school and wanted to be a prosecutor. Defendant

responded that he thought women made “lousy prosecutors.” He produced a

laminated badge and claimed he worked for the government and traveled from

state to state “looking for people.” Keener did not believe defendant and felt he

was just trying to impress her. Defendant began buying roses for Keener from a

flower lady who frequented the bar. He also tried to impress her by pulling out


what appeared to be “wads of hundred dollar bills” and buying drinks for everyone

in the bar.

When defendant entered McRed‟s on the evening in question he was

wearing cowboy boots, blue jeans, and a brown leather belt with “a fancy cowboy-

style buckle.” His bleached-blond hair was long and feathered, and he had a

neatly trimmed beard and moustache. He approached Gallagher, who “brushed

him off” and continued to play pool. Defendant then left the bar. Gallagher‟s

husband testified she called him at around 8:00 or 8:30 p.m. to tell him she was at

McRed‟s and was thinking of staying and singing with the band.

On September 28, 1995, Cristina Walker and her boyfriend, Michael Flynn,

were staying at defendant‟s apartment at 6645 Woodman Avenue. Walker and

Flynn had moved into defendant‟s apartment a few days earlier after he had

offered to rent them his spare bedroom. September 28 was Flynn‟s birthday, and

he, Walker and defendant had made plans to meet that evening to celebrate.

Walker and Flynn drove to CJ‟s bar and subsequently met defendant in front of the

bar. Walker was driving her car and had her two dogs with her. Defendant,

Walker and Flynn stayed at CJ‟s for approximately one and one-half to two hours.

While there, Walker had two beers and defendant and Flynn each had

approximately four beers. When Walker indicated she liked “mixed drinks,”

defendant told her he knew a bar up the street that served cocktails. Walker told

defendant she was not yet 21 years of age. Defendant told her not to worry,

stating he would tell the bartender (Keener), whom he knew “real well,” that she

was his sister. Defendant told Walker he had spent prior weekends with Keener

and was planning on spending the upcoming weekend with her. Walker drove the

short distance to McRed‟s, where the three arrived at approximately 8:00 to 8:30

p.m. When they arrived the bar was crowded. When Keener saw defendant arrive


she gave him an “irritated look.” Defendant told Keener that Walker was his sister

and the three ordered drinks.

At some point in the evening defendant asked Keener for a ride home,

stating that because he worked for the government he “couldn‟t get caught with a

DUI.” Keener declined. Shortly afterwards, defendant approached her again,

“pinned” her up against the door to the storage room, and put his arm around her

back, “trying to be kissy and huggy.” Defendant told Keener, “I always get what I

want.” Keener ducked out of defendant‟s reach and went back to work.

Later in the evening defendant pointed to Gallagher, commenting to Walker

and Flynn that he thought she was “cool” and “pretty.” Defendant announced that

he was going to buy Gallagher a drink and approached her table. Walker saw

Gallagher look up at defendant with a “big smile” on her face. Gallagher then

turned toward Walker and Flynn and invited them to join her and defendant at her

table in front of the band. Gallagher introduced herself and defendant began

ordering drinks for everyone at the table. Thereafter, Gallagher joined the group

“off and on,” playing pool and then returning to the table whenever defendant

ordered more drinks.

Sometime between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m., Gallagher sat down with

defendant, Walker, and Flynn, and remained with the group for the rest of the

evening. Defendant had had approximately six to eight beers; Flynn

approximately three to four beers. Walker was served approximately three to four

mixed drinks, and Gallagher was drinking vodka and grapefruit juice. Keener

testified that after three rounds, she began diluting Gallagher‟s drinks because she

was watching out for her. Between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., Keener “cut [Gallagher]

off.” Defendant and Gallagher were observed talking, dancing together, and

“being playful.” Keener testified that defendant tried to pull Gallagher onto his

lap and tried to kiss the back of her neck, with Gallagher “playfully” resisting.


Keener later saw Gallagher kiss defendant on the cheek and sit on his lap. Keener

put Gallagher‟s large black purse behind the bar for safekeeping.

Towards the end of the evening, Gallagher and Walker went to the ladies

room where Gallagher told Walker, “I really like your brother,” indicating

defendant had asked her to go home with them. She asked Walker if that would

be all right; Walker said it would be okay. At approximately 1:20 a.m., defendant,

Gallagher, Walker, and Flynn left McRed‟s. Their plan was to return to CJ‟s, then

go to the 7-Eleven to buy some beer, and then go to defendant‟s apartment.

Defendant and Gallagher left together in Gallagher‟s truck; Walker and

Flynn drove in Walker‟s car. They went to CJ‟s, stayed a short while, then went

to the 7-Eleven store. Walker pulled alongside Gallagher‟s truck while defendant

and Flynn went inside and returned with cigarettes and beer. Walker and Flynn

then drove back to defendant‟s apartment in Walker‟s car; Gallagher followed

with defendant in her truck. Upon arriving, Walker was unable to find a parking

space and double-parked on Woodman Avenue. Walker was not feeling well;

Flynn told her he would park her car and clean it out because the dogs had made a

mess, and meet her up at defendant‟s apartment.

Defendant and Gallagher, who were also double-parked on Woodman

Avenue, stayed inside Gallagher‟s truck while Flynn, who saw an empty parking

space across the street, attempted to make a U-turn to park Walker‟s car. At that

point, approximately 2:00 a.m., Los Angeles Police Department Officer David

Hovey saw Flynn make an illegal U-turn and detained him. The officer testified

Flynn was “extremely drunk.” He was arrested for driving under the influence and

placed in the back of the patrol car. Flynn testified that as the police car drove off

with him, he looked back towards Gallagher‟s truck and saw silhouettes that

looked like defendant and Gallagher were arguing or fighting, with one of them

holding their arms high over the other‟s head or neck. Flynn testified he told the


arresting officer that “something weird” was going on and pointed at Gallagher‟s

truck. Officer Hovey did not recall Flynn trying to draw his attention to anything

as they pulled away.

Sometime during the night, Walker awoke in her room inside defendant‟s

apartment. She saw defendant lying on the carpet next to her, with no shirt on and

his pants unbuttoned. Defendant was awake and staring at Walker. She asked

defendant, “What the hell are you doing?” Defendant replied, “Where is your

boyfriend?” Walker jumped up and said, “What do you mean, where is my

boyfriend? What time is it?” Defendant told Walker it was 5:00 a.m. Walker ran

to the window and looked for her car, which had been impounded upon Flynn‟s


Walker asked defendant what he was doing in her room. Defendant told

her he went into her room to “check” on her, and asked again, “Where is your

boyfriend?” Walker, believing Flynn had taken her car, began to shout

profanities. Defendant responded, “Oh, don‟t worry, honey, he went to jail.”

Walker asked defendant what he was talking about and began to cry. Defendant

told her Flynn was “a real idiot” and had made an illegal U-turn in front of a cop.

He related that Flynn had been handcuffed and arrested, and her car impounded.

Walker then asked defendant, “Where is that girl?,” meaning Gallagher.

Defendant had a “blank look on his face,” and responded, “I got bigger problems

than you, honey, I got bigger problems.” When Walker asked what he meant,

defendant repeated two or three more times, “I got bigger problems,” and stated, “I

am just going to have to call some people in, I am going to have to do it.” Walker

again asked, “What do you mean? Where is Sam? Where is that girl at?”

Defendant looked at Walker and stated, “She‟s dead.”

Walker stopped crying because defendant “had this look in his eye.”

Walker asked defendant, “What did she [Gallagher] do to you, what is going on?,”


trying to make it seem like she was “on [defendant‟s] side.” Defendant just stared

back at her. Walker tried to act normally by changing the subject and stating she

was unsure how to get Flynn out of jail. Defendant put his arm around her and

leaned forward to kiss her. Walker told defendant “no,” saying she loved Flynn.

Defendant apologized and told Walker that he loved her like a “sister.” Defendant

then stated he was going to try to get Flynn out of jail, and left the room.

Walker dozed off to sleep; when she awoke it was light outside. She

dressed “as fast as [she] could,” put leashes on her dogs, and opened the door into

the living room where defendant was lying on the living room floor in his

underwear, appearing to be “out cold.” Walker saw Gallagher‟s purse, a

distinctive yellow pack of cigarettes she had been smoking, and her Ford truck

keys on the kitchen bar or counter. Walker took her dogs, left the apartment at

approximately 8:00 a.m., ran to the 7-Eleven store and called her grandmother‟s

house. Her mother‟s boyfriend, Stewart, came to the phone and Walker told him

to come get her right away. He arrived within 15 minutes and Walker got into his

truck with her dogs. She asked him to help get her “stuff” out of defendant‟s

apartment, explaining that Flynn was in jail and that, “I think this guy I am staying

with, he killed this girl last night.”

Walker and Stewart went back to defendant‟s apartment. Stewart waited in

the hallway while she entered the apartment. Defendant was still sleeping on the

floor. Walker stated, “Glen, Glen, wake up,” and touched his shoulder.

Defendant “came to his feet quickly,” seemed embarrassed his pants were off, and

put his blue jeans on. Walker told him her grandmother was sick in the hospital

and that she needed to go home immediately to babysit her sisters. She told

defendant that her mother‟s boyfriend was outside and that she needed to get her

stuff out of the apartment. Defendant told Walker she did not need to leave, as he


was going to Las Vegas and she could have the apartment to herself. She declined

the invitation.

Stewart assisted Walker in collecting most of Flynn‟s and her belongings

from the apartment and loading them into his truck. Because the truck was full

and Walker wanted to remove all of Flynn‟s and her belongings from the

apartment as soon as possible, she went down the street to the residence of her

friend, Cindy Keller, who also had a truck. Walker explained the situation to

Keller and asked her to help her move the rest of her things out of defendant‟s

apartment right away. Walker and Keller went back to defendant‟s apartment and

got the remainder of Walker‟s belongings as defendant stood in the hallway near

the door watching them. At one point, when Keller was in the hallway and

defendant was in the kitchen, Walker asked defendant, “What happened to that girl

last night?” Defendant told Walker, “You know what, she ran off with some

Mexican last night . . . some Mexican walked up and she walked away with him.”

Defendant then began going through Gallagher‟s large black purse,

removing numerous items and nonchalantly tossing them over his shoulders with

both hands, which conduct made Walker even more nervous. Walker observed

defendant remove a wallet and checkbook from the purse. Defendant left the

room briefly; during that time Walker looked inside Gallagher‟s purse and also

noticed Gallagher‟s earring on the floor.

On September 29, 1995, at approximately 6:30 a.m., Hoora Kushan, a nurse

at the Laurel Wood Convalescent Hospital located at 13000 Victory Boulevard,

arrived at work and drove into the hospital‟s rear parking lot. She observed a

pickup truck parked near some trash cans in an area of the lot where no other cars

were parked. The driver‟s side door was partially open, and she could see the arm,

elbow, and part of a leg of a man who was leaning into the truck towards the

passenger side, as if he was reaching for something from the dashboard. He had


shoulder-length “blondish” hair and was wearing blue jeans and a shirt with

rolled-up or short sleeves. Kushan testified the man‟s hair resembled defendant‟s

hair. Kushan parked, got out of her car, and again looked toward the pickup truck

and saw the same man with long blond hair leaning towards the passenger side,

but slumped over. As she looked more closely, Kushan saw smoke coming from

the dashboard on the passenger side. She observed that the pickup had Colorado

license plates.

Kushan went inside the hospital and asked the nurses if they knew who

owned the truck. One of the nurses suggested they go back outside and get the

license plate number so they could announce it on the hospital‟s public address

system. When Kushan went back outside, she saw flames coming from the hood

of the pickup. Another hospital employee tried to put out the fire using a fire

extinguisher. Kushan ran back inside the hospital and asked someone to call 911.

At approximately 6:40 a.m., fire department personnel arrived and

extinguished the fire. Los Angeles Fire Department arson investigator Tim

Hamson arrived at the scene of the fire at approximately 7:20 a.m. Hamson was

informed by firefighters at that time that there was a body in the cab of the pickup,

which he confirmed. Hamson noted the truck was a 1977 Ford half-ton extended

cab pickup with Colorado license plates.

Hamson smelled gasoline in the passenger compartment of the pickup. The

lower extremities of the female body inside the truck were charred to the bones,

but the floor carpet underneath the body was mainly intact, indicating gasoline had

been poured over the body and surrounding areas of the passenger compartment

and ignited. In Hamson‟s opinion, the fire had been intentionally set to conceal a

homicide. About 7:10 a.m., Los Angeles Police Department Detective Michael

Coblentz arrived at the scene. A purse containing documents and photographs, as

well as a marriage certificate, was found inside a locked metal compartment in the


bed of the pickup. Detective Coblentz discovered that the victim in the truck was

Sandra Gallagher.

On October 1, 1995, Dr. Frisby, a forensic pathologist with the Los Angeles

County Coroner‟s Office, performed an autopsy on Gallagher‟s body. Dr. Frisby

was supervised by Dr. James Ribe. Dr. Ribe performed most of the dissection of

the neck and Dr. Frisby dissected most of the other parts of the body. Dr. Frisby

prepared the autopsy report and Dr. Ribe reviewed the report. Gallagher‟s back

was “severely charred” down to the muscle. The front portion of her body was

“less charred.” Gallagher‟s right lower leg was severely burned, down to the

muscle and bone.

Drs. Frisby and Ribe concluded Gallagher died from asphyxia due to

manual strangulation. This conclusion was based on the presence of red bruising

or bleeding on the right and left sternohyoid muscles, a hemorrhage on the right-

hand side of the lower part of the voice box and on the left side of the voice box,

bruising to the thyroid gland, broken cartilage on the left side of the throat, and

multiple hemorrhages inside Gallagher‟s tongue. Drs. Frisby and Ribe also

concluded that Gallagher was already dead at the time her body was burned, as

determined from the lack of carbon monoxide in her bloodstream and the absence

of black material in her windpipe. The absence of any petechiae (blood spots) in

Gallagher‟s eyes suggested there was no shifting or loosening of the position of

the hand at the time of the strangulation. Dr. Ribe opined it would have taken at

least one minute of “continuous compression” for the victim to die of

strangulation, and that the victim would likely lose consciousness within six to 10

seconds of complete neck compression. Gallagher‟s killer would therefore have

needed to continue to strangle her after he saw her lose consciousness in order to

ensure her death. Gallagher was found to have .10 percent by volume of alcohol

in her bloodstream.


On October 5, 1995, at 10:30 a.m., Detective Coblentz served a search

warrant at defendant‟s apartment on Woodman Avenue. Nobody was inside the

apartment, which had little furniture. A yellow metal hoop earring belonging to

Gallagher was recovered from the kitchen floor. The earring was identified by

Gallagher‟s husband as one of a set she had purchased at a Ross department store

and which she was wearing when they had met for lunch the day before her

murder. A yellow pack of cigarettes was also found on the kitchen counter. Both

Walker and Flynn testified the pack of cigarettes looked like the type Gallagher

had been smoking when they were together with her and defendant on the night of

her murder.

2. Defendant travels to Louisiana and meets Andy Lou Sutton.

In early November 1995, Andy Lou Sutton was living in a one-bedroom

apartment with her roommate, Theresa Whiteside, at the Port Au Prince apartment

complex in Bossier City, Louisiana. Whiteside testified Sutton was a “very

beautiful girl” who had red hair and an “outgoing personality.”

On November 2, 1995, Whiteside and Sutton went to the It‟ll Do Lounge in

Bossier City. While they were sitting at the bar defendant walked in. He was

dressed in blue jeans, a striped dress shirt, and had long blond hair. Sutton

commented to Whiteside, “I like that.” Whiteside then left to go to Mr. Bill‟s

Lounge, where she worked as a bartender. Later that evening, Sutton called

Whiteside and told her she would have “someone staying over that night,” and that

Whiteside‟s pillow and blanket would be on the couch. Whiteside returned to

their apartment at approximately 3:00 a.m. on November 3, 1995. At that time,

Sutton introduced defendant to Whiteside.

At approximately 10:00 a.m., Whiteside, Sutton and defendant woke up,

“sat around,” and talked. Defendant told Whiteside and Sutton he was a truck


driver and drove “18 wheelers.” Later that day, Sutton told Whiteside that

defendant had to go to Jackson, Mississippi, to retrieve his “18 wheeler,” and

asked if the red pickup defendant was driving would be all right if left in the

apartment complex parking lot. Whiteside told Sutton “yes.” Sutton had no car;

she and Whiteside subsequently drove defendant in Whiteside‟s car to the

Greyhound bus terminal in Shreveport, Louisiana. Defendant told them he would

return in several days and gave Sutton a kiss upon exiting Whiteside‟s car. Sutton

gave defendant her telephone number and defendant asked Whiteside to “take

care” of Sutton.

3. Defendant travels to Florida and murders Tina Cribbs.

On the afternoon of November 4, 1995, defendant arrived by taxi and

checked into the Tampa 8 Inn on East Columbus Drive in Tampa, Florida. He

rented a room for two days, indicating his name was Glen Rogers and giving a

home address in Jackson, Mississippi. The clerk on duty testified defendant had

long blond hair and “gorgeous blue eyes.” Defendant claimed his truck had

broken down and stated he was very tired and would “probably sleep the first


On the morning of November 5, taxi driver Donald Daughtry picked up

defendant from the motel and drove him to the Showtown bar in Gibsonton,

Florida, a small town on the outskirts of Tampa where a community of carnival

workers spent their winter break. Defendant asked Daughtry to let him off a short

distance away from the bar. Defendant entered the bar a little before 1:00 p.m. At

that time Lynn Jones was working as the bartender. She testified defendant

appeared tall and “good looking,” with long blond hair and “beautiful blue eyes.”

When Jones asked defendant in local parlance if he was “with it,” meaning with

the carnival, defendant did not understand her question. When she explained what


she meant, he told Jones he “drove trucks for the carnival,” and began acting

“flirtatious” with her. Defendant stayed at the bar nearly five hours.

Late in the afternoon, Tina Cribbs and three female friends entered the bar.

Cribbs was 34 years old, had “reddish” hair, and was driving a white Ford Festiva

her mother had purchased for her earlier that year. Cribbs and her friends sat at a

table together. Defendant sent over a round of drinks to the women. Although

defendant had told bartender Jones his name was Glen, she overheard him tell the

women that his name was “Randy.” At one point defendant approached one of

Cribbs‟s friends, Jeanie Fuller, and asked if she was married or single. When

Fuller replied that she had a boyfriend, defendant stated he did not date married

women or girls with boyfriends. Cribbs‟s three friends left the Showtown bar late

in the afternoon; Cribbs remained at the bar with defendant where they talked for

another hour. Cribbs was expecting her mother to meet her at the bar that evening.

At approximately 6:30 p.m., Cribbs told Jones she was going to give defendant a

ride and asked Jones to tell her mother she would return in 20 minutes. Cribbs and

defendant were then seen leaving the bar together.

Cribbs‟s mother, Mary Dicke, arrived at the bar approximately 20 to 30

minutes after Cribbs had left. Jones told Dicke that her daughter had given

someone a ride and would “be right back.” Dicke waited another 30 to 45

minutes, then began calling Cribbs‟s pager at between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. Dicke

received no response and became worried. Dicke and Cribbs had a system

whereby if there was an emergency she would input the number 69. Over the

course of the evening, Dicke paged Cribbs with their emergency code over 30

times, getting no response. Dicke eventually returned home and called the police

because she instinctively knew her daughter was “in trouble.”

At approximately 9:00 p.m. that same evening, Chenden Patel, the owner of

the Tampa 8 Inn, noticed defendant leaning into a small white car in front of his


room. Patel walked past the room and saw defendant standing at the door with

two suitcases. A short while later, defendant came into the office and paid Patel

for two additional days, extending his rent to Tuesday morning, November 7. He

asked Patel for a “Do Not Disturb” sign; she told him she did not have one.

Defendant then told Patel he did not want any maid service or anyone going into

his room. The next morning, Monday, November 6, at approximately 9:00 a.m.,

Patel observed defendant drive away in the white car. Later that morning she

noticed a handwritten note on the door of his room that read, “Do Not Disturb.”

Later that same morning, Monday, November 6, Cribbs‟s purse was found

by an attendant on top of a trash can at a rest stop on Interstate 10, just east of

Tallahassee. At that time, unsuccessful attempts were made to call the telephone

number listed on the identification in the purse.

On Tuesday, November 7, at approximately 10:00 a.m., a housekeeper

found Cribbs‟s body in the bathtub of the motel room defendant had rented.

Responding Tampa police officers found the handwritten “Do Not Disturb” sign

still on the front door. The bed was unmade and the television was on. Blood-

soaked shoes, pants, and towels were piled on the bathroom floor next to the toilet.

The officers observed blood smeared on a counter and floor of the foyer, as well as

on the bathroom shower stall. Blood had also dripped down from the sink counter

and bathtub and toilet fixtures. Cribbs‟s body was found face-up in the bathtub

with articles of clothing in between her legs. Several cigarette butts and a small

gold bracelet were found in the sink drain.

Tampa Police Homicide Detective Julie Massuchi examined Cribbs‟s body

and noted numerous stab wounds, including a “very significant stab wound to the

right buttocks area,” a “large stab wound under the left breast,” and smaller nicks

on the chest area. There was also a long “defensive” scratch wound on the wrist

area, as well as numerous bruises to the arms and back. A pair of black jeans and


a shirt with tears in them were found in the pile of blood-soaked clothing on the

bathroom floor. The stab wounds on the body corresponded to the tears in the

jeans and shirt. Based on this finding, Detective Massuchi believed the victim was

clothed at the time she was stabbed to death. It appeared the homicide happened

“some time” prior to the discovery of the body, as the body showed lividity,

indicating it had been in the bathtub for some time.

On that same day, Cribbs‟s mother Mary Dicke was watching the news on

television and learned that a “Jane Doe” had been found murdered in a motel.

Dicke knew from the description of the victim that it was her daughter, and

notified the police. Ernest Bruton, who had possession of Cribbs‟s purse found at

the freeway rest stop, was also alerted to the newscast of the homicide and turned

the purse over to authorities.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the first degree murder

of Tina Cribbs in Florida on May 7, 1997.

4. Defendant returns to Louisiana and murders Andy Lou Sutton.

On Wednesday morning, November 8, 1995, Theresa Whiteside woke up

and Andy Sutton told her defendant had returned to Bossier City and was outside

in the parking lot cleaning up a car he had purchased for her. A neighbor, Sterling

Fontenont, testified he saw defendant walking back and forth between a white

Ford Festiva and a red truck that morning. Defendant entered the women‟s

apartment and, when Whiteside asked what kind of car he had purchased for

Sutton, he replied “some kind of Ford,” “some ‟90 model,” stating he had paid a

friend $8,400 for it. Whiteside made arrangements to meet defendant and Sutton

later that day at the It‟ll Do Lounge, and left the apartment.

At approximately 3:00 p.m., the three met up at the It‟ll Do Lounge. When

Whiteside arrived, she saw defendant‟s red truck outside the bar. Defendant


approached Whiteside, put his arm around her, and told the bartender to get her

“whatever [she] wanted.” Whiteside, who felt uncomfortable with defendant‟s

arm around her, extricated herself and sat down with Sutton, while defendant

remained at the end of the bar. Whiteside told Sutton she did not want defendant

staying at the apartment anymore and that he “needed to go.” Sutton responded

she would “take care of that.” The three then decided to go to the Touch of Class


Defendant and Sutton stopped for cigarettes and then met Whiteside at the

second bar at approximately 4:00 p.m. They ordered beers. Defendant began

playing with the back of Whiteside‟s hair. Whiteside motioned that she did not

want defendant to touch her, and told him, “If you can‟t hang, you don‟t need to

be hanging around us,” by which she meant he should leave if he could not handle

his alcohol. By then, defendant appeared drunk. Sutton asked if she could take

defendant back to the apartment and let him “sleep it off.” Whiteside told Sutton

that would be okay, indicating she would call Sutton later. At approximately 4:30

p.m., defendant and Sutton left the bar together and Whiteside went to work.

Between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. that night, neighbor Sterling Fontenont

arrived at the apartment complex and observed defendant and Sutton park their

vehicle in the lot, get out of the car, and walk together towards Sutton‟s apartment.

Despite defendant‟s earlier representation that he and Sutton would meet

Whiteside at the bar where she worked later that night, they never showed up. At

approximately 11:00 p.m., Whiteside called Sutton, but the phone rang

unanswered 10 to 12 times and the answering machine did not pick up the call.

Whiteside arrived home at between 3:00 and 3:30 a.m. on Thursday morning and

noticed defendant‟s red truck still parked in the lot. She had to unlock the

deadbolt to gain entry into her apartment; Sutton was not in the habit of using the

deadbolt. As Whiteside entered the apartment, she heard another door shut. The


lights were on in all the rooms, but it appeared to Whiteside that no one was in the

apartment. Whiteside hollered for Sutton, who did not answer. The bedroom door

was shut, but the blanket and pillow had not been left out on the couch for

Whiteside. She turned on the television, lay down on the couch in the living room

and fell asleep.

Around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m., Whiteside awoke because the television volume

had been turned up to “maximum capacity.” She grabbed the remote control from

the coffee table, turned off the television, and fell back to sleep. At approximately

10:00 a.m. she heard a knock on the door, got up, and let Sutton‟s ex-boyfriend,

Thomas Bryant, into the apartment. Bryant related that he had repeatedly

attempted to call the apartment, only to receive a recording that the phone was out

of service. Whiteside went to the bedroom, knocked on the door, and receiving no

answer, entered the room.

Sutton‟s bedding was “all wrapped up tightly like a present.” Whiteside

called out “Andy,” then pulled off the bedding and found a body with a pillow

over the head and so much blood around the chest area that Whiteside was unable

to tell if it was a man or a woman. She pulled the pillow off the head and saw “the

most horrible agonizing facial features that she had ever seen.” Sutton‟s arm was

back behind her head and there were cut marks on her right wrist. Bryant entered

the bedroom and attempted to turn on the light, but found it inoperable. The

telephone was on the floor with the receiver uncradled. When Whiteside tried to

call 911 from the telephone in the living room, she was unable to get a dial tone.

Whiteside and Bryant ran out to the parking lot and called 911 from

Bryant‟s cell phone. While outside, Whiteside noticed defendant‟s red truck was

still parked in the lot. Bossier City police officers arrived and found a knife in the

bedroom under a pile of clothing. The knife had been removed from a butcher

block knife set in the kitchen.


An autopsy performed on Sutton‟s body revealed 14 stab wounds,

including defensive wounds on her fingers and wrist, one of which had penetrated

the muscles. There were stab wounds to Sutton‟s abdomen, upper body, back,

shoulders, and torso. The cause of death was determined to be multiple stab

wounds, some of which were more than six inches deep.

5. Defendant’s flight to Kentucky, where he is apprehended.

A registration check on the red pickup left in Sutton‟s apartment complex

parking lot revealed it was registered to defendant in Mississippi. A warrant was

obtained for defendant‟s arrest and an all-points bulletin broadcast for his


On November 13, 1995, Kentucky State Police set up surveillance on state

Highway 52 in Ravenna, Kentucky, near where defendant was visiting a relative.

Defendant was observed in Cribbs‟s white Ford Fiesta with a Tennessee license

plate and the officers gave chase. Defendant, who was drinking while driving,

began throwing half-full beer cans at the pursuing officers‟ vehicles. The high-

speed pursuit continued for 50 miles, through four towns, with defendant running

red lights and driving on the wrong side of the highway, until his vehicle was

rammed and he was taken into custody. Numerous items recovered from Cribbs‟s

Ford Fiesta were identified as belonging to her. Florida and Mississippi license

plates were recovered from the vehicle. Additional items in the car, including a

cooler packed with food, a comforter, and Social Security cards belonging to

Whiteside‟s two sons, were identified by Whiteside as having been stolen from the

apartment she shared with victim Sutton.

C. Defense Evidence.

Defendant took the stand in his own defense. On September 28, 1995, he

had been living at 6645 Woodman Avenue in Los Angeles for a period of several

weeks. His girlfriend was the apartment building manager and he was the


maintenance man; when they broke up, he lost the job and sold his furniture. He

confirmed that on September 28 he began drinking beer at CJ‟s at 11:00 a.m.

Christina Walker and Michael Flynn were staying in his apartment. Defendant

called his friend Steve Kele, met him at a bank, and received $1,000 from Kele.

Defendant returned to CJ‟s, then went to his apartment to change clothes, then

went back to CJ‟s and drank more beer. Walker and Flynn met him at CJ‟s at

approximately 5:30 p.m., where they stayed and drank beer for several hours.

They then drove in Walker‟s car the one block to McRed‟s, arriving at

approximately 7:30 p.m.

Inside McRed‟s, defendant approached Gallagher, who introduced herself

as “Sam,” and invited the three to join her. The four sat together at a table,

defendant purchasing approximately six to eight rounds of drinks for the group.

Defendant and Gallagher danced, and Gallagher kissed him and sat on his lap.

Defendant claimed he had been intimately involved with bartender Rein Keener

during the prior few weeks, and that if she appeared irritated with him it was

because she did not want to reveal her personal life while at work. He denied

Keener resisted his advances at one point in the evening, and denied telling her, “I

always get what I want.”

Gallagher agreed to leave McRed‟s with defendant, Walker and Flynn, and

the four left shortly before closing, at approximately 1:20 a.m. They went back to

CJ‟s, where defendant intended to meet Steve Kele. Defendant rode in

Gallagher‟s truck; Flynn was with Walker in her car. After having a round of

drinks at CJ‟s, they went in both vehicles to a nearby 7-Eleven, where Flynn and

defendant purchased beer. Flynn and Walker then sped off in Walker‟s car toward

the apartment. According to defendant, Kele pulled up in his Lincoln, and he told

Kele, “Follow us. We‟re going to the apartment.” Kele agreed. As Gallagher and

defendant approached defendant‟s apartment building in Gallagher‟s truck,


defendant saw police lights and heard sirens in front of the building. Defendant

testified Gallagher told him there was a warrant out for her arrest for failing to

appear in court and she did not want to be arrested or have her truck impounded.

Gallagher and defendant pulled into a nearby strip mall parking lot, with Kele

pulling in behind them. Defendant and Gallagher got out of the truck and spoke to

Kele, then they both got into Kele‟s car and the three drove to defendant‟s

building, parking in the underground garage.

According to defendant, Kele and Gallagher went up to the apartment with

him. Walker was lying on her bed with her door open, so he closed the door, and

Kele and Gallagher entered the apartment. The three talked, and at one point

Gallagher stated she wanted to go back down to her truck to change her clothes.

Kele took Gallagher back to her truck. Defendant stayed in the apartment, drank a

few more beers, then passed out. After Kele left with Gallagher, defendant never

saw Gallagher again.

Defendant woke up at approximately 6:00 a.m. When he awoke, neither

Kele nor Gallagher were in the apartment. At approximately 6:30 a.m., he spoke

with Walker. Defendant admitted telling Walker he had “bigger problems” than

her problem of Flynn being arrested for drunk driving, and admitted telling her

Gallagher was dead. He did not call the police because he did not know “for sure”

if Gallagher was dead. Walker then “passed right back out” or fell asleep.

Defendant denied that Gallagher‟s purse or keys were in the apartment, or that he

searched her purse. Defendant left the apartment, walked to a pay phone, and

called Kele. At approximately 11:00 a.m., Kele went to defendant‟s building and

picked him up. The two then spent the day together.

Two days after the murder, defendant left on a bus for Jackson, Mississippi,

where he planned to renew his truck driver‟s license, and then head back to his

hometown of Hamilton, Ohio. He had no plans to return to California. He


stopped to gamble in Las Vegas, then took a bus to Jackson, Mississippi. Two

weeks after arriving in Jackson, he drove his red truck to Ohio, staying in Ohio for

“a week or two” and then returning to Mississippi. Defendant insisted he did not

kill Gallagher. He confirmed he had been convicted of first degree murder in

Florida in 1997, and of forgery in Ohio in 1987.

Penalty Phase

A. Prosecution Evidence.

1. The Murder of Linda Price in Jackson, Mississippi.

On October 9, 1995 [ten days after Gallagher‟s murder but prior to the

murders of Cribbs in Florida and Sutton in Louisiana], Kathy Carroll, her husband,

her son, and her younger sister, Linda Price, went to the Mississippi State Fair in

Jackson, Mississippi. Price was 34 years old, and Carroll testified she “had long

red hair, and she was slim. She was real pretty. She smiled all the time.” They

arrived at between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m., went to the beer tent, sat at a table drinking

and listening to the band. An hour or two after arriving, Carroll noticed defendant

standing nearby. Defendant had long blond hair and blue eyes. Carroll and her

husband got up from their table and danced. When they returned, defendant was

sitting at the table with Price. Price introduced defendant to Carroll and her

husband. Price asked Carroll “over and over,” “Ain‟t he real good looking?”

Carroll observed defendant and Price drinking beer and dancing before she and her

husband left.

Three days later, on October 12, Price called her mother, Carolyn Wingate,

and asked her to come to the Sun-N-Sand Motel in downtown Jackson. When

Wingate arrived, Price ran down the stairs and stated, “Mother, I have someone I

want you to meet,” adding, “You will just love him to death. He is precious. I

found the love of my life.” Defendant came down the stairs and Price introduced

him to Wingate as Glen Rogers. Defendant indicated his truck had been stolen at


the state fair and asked Wingate if she could give them a ride to “the place where

they take the stolen vehicles.” Wingate, Price and defendant drove in Wingate‟s

car to the impound lot. Defendant and Price looked around the lot and located

defendant‟s red truck. The three went to the police station where defendant

obtained a receipt to retrieve his vehicle, then returned to the impound lot and

recovered the truck.

On October 16, 1995, defendant and Price rented a two-bedroom apartment

in Jackson, Mississippi. Carroll visited her sister at the apartment five to six

times, and on each occasion Carroll saw defendant‟s truck parked in the lot. Price

drove defendant‟s truck while defendant did some work for a construction

company. Price and defendant went to Wingate‟s house “quite often” during the

following two weeks.

Wingate went to Price‟s apartment early on the morning of October 30.

She told Price she had been contacted regarding a job Price had applied for, and

that Price was to start work the next morning. Price told her mother she would

stop by her house early the next morning before heading to the job. Caroll also

went to Price‟s apartment on October 30, to tell her an appliance store had called

her as a reference for Linda Price and Glen Rogers in connection with a stereo

they had rented. At that time defendant stated to Carroll in “a mean way,” “I‟m

Glen Rogers.” Carroll made plans to bring her children over to Price‟s apartment

the following evening, which was Halloween.

That same day, October 30, Price called her second older sister, Marilyn

Reel, who came over with her family and “sat with her all day.” At one point

defendant appeared and stated to Price, “I know that was you talking because I

could hear your big mouth everywhere.” Price was upset by the comment and

cried. Later that evening, Reel‟s husband asked Price if she wanted to go out with

them for a few beers. Price asked defendant if he would come and he stated, “It


don‟t matter,” “[w]e can go with him.” The group went to the Sportsmen‟s

Lounge on Highway 80 in Jackson. When defendant overheard Price tell her sister

that she loved her, he commented to Price, “Don‟t be telling her that.” Price

replied, “Glen, I'm always telling my sister that.” Price and her sister then went to

the ladies room, where Price started crying. Price asked Reel to bring her children

to the apartment the next evening for Halloween.

On the morning of October 31, Price did not go to her mother‟s house as

expected. Wingate went to her daughter‟s apartment at approximately 9:00 a.m.

At that time, Wingate did not see defendant‟s truck in front and no one answered

when she knocked on the door. Wingate waited for Price, but Price never showed

up. As it was out of character for Price not to keep an appointment, Wingate

began looking for her. Later in the evening, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Carroll

brought her children to Price‟s apartment. At that time, Carroll did not see

defendant‟s truck. She knocked on the door but there was no answer. Carroll left

the apartment and called her mother, telling Wingate she could not find Price.

The next day, November 1, Wingate returned to the apartment and looked

into a window. The apartment was “dimly lit,” but Wingate could see that the

shower curtain in the bathroom was drawn closed around the bathtub. Wingate

became more concerned, as Price was an “immaculate housekeeper” who never

kept the shower curtain drawn around the tub. Wingate called the police and filed

a missing person‟s report the following morning.

On November 3, Wingate and the police went to the apartment, were

admitted by a maintenance man, and found Price dead in the bathtub. Jackson

Police Detective Chuck Lee arrived and found the living room in “disarray,” with

cassette tapes, beer cans, and ashtrays full of cigarette butts scattered on the floor.

There were blood smears on the kitchen floor and a garbage can that contained

bloody paper towels. A mop on the kitchen counter had blood on the mop head.


Written on the bathroom mirror in red lipstick were the words, “Glen, we

found you.” The shower curtain was drawn closed around the bathtub. Detective

Lee pulled the curtain aside and found Price in the bathtub completely nude, on

her back, with a washcloth covering her face. Her body had several stab wounds,

including a cut to her neck “from ear to ear” that was “completely slashed open,”

two stab wounds under her right breast, one stab wound above her right breast, one

stab wound on her right side just below the armpit, and one stab wound to her

right shoulder blade area.

When Wingate returned to her house following the funeral several days

later, she received a phone call from a man who asked, “Is this Linda‟s mother?”

When she replied, “Yes it is,” the caller stated, “I‟m Glen‟s brother. I am looking

for Glen Rogers.” Wingate told the caller, “We are looking for him, too.” When

the caller responded, “Why?,” Wingate stated, “My daughter has ended up dead. I

want to know where he is.” The caller then commented, “I am not surprised that

your daughter is dead because anybody that has been around Glen for the last

seven years has ended up dead.” When Wingate replied, “What? What are you

doing? Why are you calling me?,” the caller responded, “Your f—ing daughter is

dead, isn‟t she?” Wingate, who had spoken with defendant “a lot of times” since

meeting him several weeks earlier, then recognized the voice as his.

2. Other Prior Violent Crimes Evidence.

The People presented evidence that in March 1991, in his hometown of

Hamilton, Ohio, police were summoned to defendant‟s house twice in one day on

reports that he was “inside tearing up the house,” and later, that he had a gun, had

threatened a live-in girlfriend, and planned to “blow away anybody that came near

his house.” During the initial call, police found the interior walls of the house

broken up from blows with a hammer, with defendant passed out on his bed.

During the second call later that day, defendant was found to be in an


“uncontrollable rage” and threatened to “blow away anyone that came to the

door.” Residents from surrounding houses were evacuated. At one point

defendant put the nozzle of a lit acetylene blow torch through a hole in the front

door, within two feet of the face of an officer who was attempting to negotiate his

surrender. When the door caught fire, officers entered the house and arrested

defendant. He was charged with aggravated menacing inducing panic and

attempted arson as a result of the incident.

In 1994, defendant and Maria Gyore were living together in Hollywood,

California. On one occasion that year, when defendant learned of Gyore‟s former

boyfriend, he beat her up, giving her a black eye and “all kinds of bruises.”

Defendant was arrested as a result of the incident. On another occasion, while still

living with Gyore in Hollywood, defendant again beat up Gyore with his hands

and fists. There was also a fire reported in the apartment that year. In 1995,

defendant and Gyore moved to the Woodman Avenue apartment in Van Nuys,

where Gyore became the apartment manager and defendant the “maintenance

guy.” In August 1995, defendant told Gyore to move out of the apartment,

threatening to kill her, her brother, and her two young sons. Family members

became fearful for Gyore‟s safety and encouraged her to leave the country. Gyore

traveled to Hungary two days later.

3. Victim Impact Evidence.

Gallagher‟s mother, Jan Baxter, and a younger sister, Jeri Vallicella,

testified how her murder “totally destroyed” the whole family. Gallagher was 33

years old at the time of her death. She had three sons who were seven, eight, and

15 at that time. When she was 23 years old, Gallagher had joined the Navy,

scoring the highest score in Butte County on the Navy‟s intelligence test. She

worked for the Navy as an aviation electronics technician, and after four years, left

the Navy with an honorable discharge. She met her husband Stephen while both


were in the Navy, and they were married in 1985. Gallagher then worked at a

submarine base for a military contractor, where she was in charge of all the

electronics at the base. The couple then moved to San Diego, where she worked

for another military contractor, Ford Aerospace, for two to three years, and then

for Southern Illinois University‟s contracting facility at the San Diego Navy base.

Gallagher‟s sister Jeri, who was five years younger than she, testified Gallagher

had been like a “second mother” to her. Gallagher‟s oldest son, Dustin, was

“devastated” by the loss of his mother and “closed up” emotionally after her death.

B. Defense Evidence.

1. Family Background.

Defendant was one of seven children born to Edna and Claude Rogers.

They lived in Hamilton Ohio, a working-class town north of Cincinnati. The

father, who worked at a paper mill for 16 years, was an alcoholic who drank every

day and was “rarely sober.” He routinely beat his wife and children. He once

threatened to kill his wife if she left him; during one beating he broke her nose and

rendered her unconscious. He kept several guns in the home. He was fired from

the mill for “drinking on the job.”

Defendant was born shortly after his father lost his job. The family lost

their home and moved to the worst part of Hamilton. The house they moved into

was “rundown,” with only two bedrooms and one bathroom, with peeling paint

and frozen pipes in the winter. Defendant and his siblings were beaten up by other

neighborhood children; their father encouraged them to fight back. There was

testimony that defendant, as a young child, ate paint chips and dirt, wet his bed,

and banged his head on the edge of his bed. Defendant was held back in third

grade and placed in several learning disability classes.

Defendant‟s oldest brother, Clay, introduced him to alcohol and drugs at

the age of 12. Defendant was beaten by his father more frequently than his


siblings because he was “a little more rebellious.” When defendant was 16 years

old, his father became disabled from a heart attack. The defense presented

testimony from several of defendant‟s siblings to establish that he, like several of

them, eventually grew up to become alcoholics.

2. Mental Health Expert Testimony.

The defense also presented the testimony of several mental health

professionals. Dr. Roger Light, a neuropsychologist, performed a number of tests

on defendant, and reviewed various educational, hospital and police reports. He

concluded defendant exhibited certain areas of cortical dysfunction in his right

frontal and temporal lobe areas that could account for impulsive behavior. Dr.

Light, however, acknowledged that defendant‟s I.Q. test results were “pretty

average,” and that “for the most part” he performed in the average to “high

average” range of functioning on the administered tests. Dr. Light also reviewed a

CAT scan taken in 1991 when defendant was hospitalized after having been struck

on the head with a pool cue. He concluded the scan revealed a “closed head

[brain] injury” that would have made it more difficult for defendant to control his

behavior, make the “right” decisions, or stop using alcohol. Dr. Michael Gold, a

neurologist, performed a PET scan on defendant‟s brain that revealed diminished

metabolic activity in areas of his frontal lobes corresponding to the injury he

suffered when struck with a pool cue. Psychologist Stuart Hart, who specialized

in the maltreatment and emotional abuse and neglect of children, interviewed

defendant‟s mother and several of his siblings, but not defendant, and reviewed

some of defendant‟s school and criminal history records. Hart concluded

defendant grew up in a “toxic” or “poisonous” social environment which,

combined with poverty and the lack of family values, was likely to produce a

negative outcome for a child. Dr. Jeffrey Wilkins, a psychiatrist, testified that


defendant‟s “chronic alcoholism” would affect brain function over the years and

correlate with an inability to control rage.

3. Seeking Clergy During Flight.

Last, there was testimony that defendant, while fleeing through Kentucky

immediately following the Sutton murder, briefly stopped at the Kentucky

Mountain Mission, a youth haven Bible camp. He entered the mission, asked for a

chaplain, was told there was none there, and returned to his car looking “really

troubled.” A worker who went outside to talk to defendant reported that when she

approached him he “just sort of grunted and shook his shoulders” and “gave her

the creeps.”

II. Discussion

A. Pretrial/Jury Selection Issue

Excusal for cause of Prospective Juror No. 3156.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in granting the prosecution‟s

challenge for cause against prospective juror No. 3156. He asserts the prospective

juror‟s responses to the written jury questionnaire, and his follow-up responses

during oral voir dire by the court, at most showed he was uninformed about the

death penalty, and not that he was categorically opposed to voting for a death

sentence. Defendant urges there was insufficient evidence to establish that his

ability to serve as an impartial juror was substantially impaired.

“Although „a criminal defendant has the right to an impartial jury drawn

from a venire that has not been tilted in favor of capital punishment by selective

prosecutorial challenges for cause,‟ „the State has a strong interest in having jurors

who are able to apply capital punishment within the framework state law

prescribes.‟ (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9.) „[T]o balance these

interests, a juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the

death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause; but if the


juror is not substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible.‟ (Ibid.; see

Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424.)” (People v. McKinzie (2012) 54

Cal.4th 1302, 1328 (McKinzie).) “ „[T]he law permits a prospective juror to be

challenged for cause only if his or her views in favor of or against capital

punishment “would „prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or

her] duties as a juror‟ ” in accordance with the court‟s instructions and the juror‟s

oath. [Citations.]‟ (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 741.)” (People v.

Duenas (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1, 10 (Duenas).)

“ „The trial court is in the best position to determine the potential juror‟s

true state of mind because it has observed firsthand the prospective juror‟s

demeanor and verbal responses.‟ (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 895

(Clark); see People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706 (Garcia), 743; see also

Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 9 [„Deference to the trial court is appropriate

because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the

individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude

and qualifications of potential jurors.‟].)” (McKinzie, supra, 54 Cal.4th at

pp. 1328-1329.) Accordingly, “ „[w]hen the prospective juror‟s answers on voir

dire are conflicting or equivocal, the trial court‟s findings as to the prospective

juror‟s state of mind are binding on appellate courts if supported by substantial

evidence. (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 779 (Wilson); see Wainright v.

Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt); accord, People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th

415, 483 (Lewis) [trial court‟s determination as to prospective juror‟s true state of

mind is binding].)” (Duenas, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 10.)

Prospective Juror No. 3156 completed the juror questionnaire distributed to

potential jurors prior to oral voir dire. His written responses reflect he was 27

years old, single, resided in Los Angeles, and was employed as a concierge for the

Regal Biltmore Hotel. In the section of the questionnaire entitled, “Attitudes


Toward Capital Punishment,” he indicated, “I don‟t know what to think about

capital punishment, if it is good or bad, right or wrong.” He indicated he felt that

way “because there has been a lot of people who received capital punishment who

did not deserve [it,] and then there were others who did.” He characterized the

strength of his views as “like many people whom I talk with.” In response to the

question asking about his views on life without the possibility of parole, he stated,

“Well if you do the crime you must do the time and if you are not capable to be in

city life anymore I am all for it.” In response to the question asking which

penalty, death or life in prison without parole, was “more severe,” he responded,

“you lose your life either way,” and then indicated he would not “always” vote for

one penalty or the other in a given case. When asked if he would want to “hear

and review all of the circumstances and facts of a case” before deciding the

appropriate penalty, as well as “all the circumstances concerning the defendant

and his background,” he answered yes. When asked in what types of cases, and

for which offenses, the death penalty should be imposed, he responded, “I don‟t

know” because “I never had to make that kind of decision.” In response to a

question on whether the death penalty was imposed too frequently in California,

he stated, “I never hear about the death penalty in California.” When asked if he

had any religious views on the death penalty, he responded, “I don‟t follow any

religion.” Last, he stated that if selected to be on a jury he would “just want to do

what is right by law.”

During oral voir dire, and after both sides had chosen and accepted the jury,

Prospective Juror No. 3156 was orally voir dired as a potential alternate juror. He

elaborated on his response in the questionnaire regarding people who received the

death penalty who “did not deserve it,” explaining that this response was based on,

“[j]ust growing up and just knowing about the few people that I‟ve known that,

you know, just didn‟t get a fair chance.” He then explained, “At this time I really


don‟t know too much about the death penalty so I‟m not for it or against it. Well,

I‟m not for it.” When asked by the court, “Are you against it? Your inclination

would be against it?,” he responded, “Yeah. Against it.” He agreed that if the

mitigating evidence was more substantial than the aggravating evidence, it “would

be easy” not to vote for death, but then suggested he could not even vote for life

without parole in that situation. When asked by the court, “Can you conceive of

anything that might cause you to vote for death?,” he responded, “No.” When

asked, “Under any circumstances?,” he responded, “Not at any.” When the court

pointed out that the prospective juror‟s opinions seemed to have become “a lot

stronger” than those he had indicated on his questionnaire, he responded that his

views had changed because, “I had time to think about it, to really think about it.

It‟s a difference when you are talking with your friends.” He then stated, “To

actually have to make that decision, I couldn‟t do it,” further suggesting it would

be “hard” to vote for death even if the defendant was “Jeffrey Dahmer or Richard


Prospective Juror No. 3156 then again reaffirmed that even if the

aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors he could not vote for life

without parole, explaining, “I just don‟t feel like I‟m in the position to really make

a decision on what punishment one should get for their crime.” When the court

observed that earlier it thought the prospective alternate juror had just made a

misstatement when indicating he could not vote for life without parole if the

mitigating evidence outweighed the aggravating evidence, he responded, “I

couldn‟t see myself voting for life or the death penalty.” When asked if it was

“the penalty you don‟t want to deal with?,” he responded, “Exactly.”

Following oral voir dire, the prosecution challenged Prospective Juror No.

3156 for cause. Defense counsel declined to “argue for him,” choosing to simply

submit the matter to the court. The court found good cause to excuse the


prospective juror on the basis that his views had evolved from his answers to the

written questionnaire to the point where it was clear he would refuse to vote for

either life imprisonment without parole or the death penalty.

The record thus reveals that Prospective Juror No. 3156‟s answers to the

written jury questionnaire and to his oral voir dire were plainly in conflict. We

find substantial evidence that his expressed reticence to deliberate on penalty in a

death case “ „ “would „prevent or substantially impair the performance of his . . .

duties as a juror‟ ” in accordance with the court‟s instructions and the juror‟s oath.

[Citations.]‟ [Citation.]” (Duenas, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 10.)

B. Guilt Phase Issues

1. Admission of evidence of Florida & Louisiana murders.

Defendant contends the trial court improperly admitted evidence of the

Florida (Cribbs) and Louisiana (Sutton) murders as probative on intent and

common design or plan in the commission of Gallagher‟s murder. He asserts the

uncharged murders were inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101,

subdivision (b) (Evidence Code section 1101(b)) because they were insufficiently

similar to the charged murder, because he did not concede identity, i.e., that he

murdered Gallagher, and because he did not dispute that the charged murder,

viewed objectively, was premeditated, and offered to stipulate as much. He

further asserts that evidence of the uncharged murders should have been excluded

under Evidence Code section 352 (Evidence Code section 352) as unduly

prejudicial, and that admission of such evidence violated his federal constitutional

right to a fair trial. We reject each of these arguments and find the other crimes

evidence properly admitted at the guilt phase.

The guiding principles are set forth in the following three paragraphs from

People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1328, 1329 (Foster): “ „Evidence that a

defendant has committed crimes other than those currently charged is not


admissible to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character or has a

criminal disposition; but evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove,

among other things, the identity of the perpetrator of the charged crimes, the

existence of a common design or plan, or the intent with which the perpetrator

acted in the commission of the charged crimes. (Evid. Code, § 1101.) Evidence

of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove identity, common design or plan, or

intent only if the charged and uncharged crimes are sufficiently similar to support

a rational inference of identity, common design or plan, or intent. [Citation.]‟

(People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369.)

“ „The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the

charged offense) is required in order to prove intent. [Citation.] . . . In order to be

admissible to prove intent, the uncharged conduct must be sufficiently similar to

support the inference that the defendant “ „probably harbor[ed] the same intent in

each instance.‟ [Citations.]” [Citation.]‟ (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380,

402 (Ewoldt).) „A greater degree of similarity is required in order to prove the

existence of a common design or plan. . . . [E]vidence of uncharged misconduct

must demonstrate “not merely a similarity in the results, but such a concurrence of

common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a

general plan of which they are individual manifestations.” ‟ (Ibid.) „The greatest

degree of similarity is required for evidence of uncharged misconduct to be

relevant to prove identity. . . . [T]he uncharged misconduct and the charged

offense must share common features that are sufficiently distinctive so as to

support the inference that the same person committed both acts. [Citation.] “The

pattern and characteristics of the crimes must be so unusual and distinctive as to be

like a signature.” [Citation.]‟ (Id. at p. 403.) „ “ „The highly unusual and

distinctive nature of both the charged and [uncharged] offenses virtually

eliminates the possibility that anyone other than the defendant committed the


charged offense.‟ [Citation.]” ‟ (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1003


“If evidence of prior conduct is sufficiently similar to the charged crimes to

be relevant to prove the defendant‟s intent, common plan, or identity, the trial

court then must consider whether the probative value of the evidence „is

“substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission [would] . . . create

substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the

jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)‟ (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.) „Rulings made

under [Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352, including those made at the guilt

phase of a capital trial] are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]‟

(People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1130.) „Under the abuse of discretion

standard, “a trial court‟s ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal . . . is not

required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious,

or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”

[Citation.]‟ (Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1004.)” (Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th

at pp. 1328-1329.)

The prosecution argued below that there were numerous common and

distinctive features between the charged murder of Gallagher and the out-of-state

murders so as to warrant the latter‟s admissibility on the issues of intent and

common design or plan.3 These included that: (1) the victims were all women of

approximately the same age (31 to 37 years old); (2) in each instance defendant

went to a local bar to select his victim; (3) in each instance he sought out a woman


The prosecution did not seek to introduce the other crimes evidence to

prove identity, i.e., that defendant was Gallagher‟s killer. Moreover, at defense
counsel‟s request, the instructions given to the jury on the limited purpose for
which the Florida and Louisiana murders were being admitted into evidence
instructed them that such evidence was to be considered solely on the question of


unknown to him, and unaccompanied by a man; (4) in each instance he socialized

with the victim, danced and/or talked with her, and bought her drinks in an effort

to gain her trust; (5) in each instance defendant then convinced the victim to give

him a ride or to accompany him to his residence or lodging; (6) each murder was

perpetrated in a room or small enclosed area when defendant and the victim were

alone (the cab of Gallagher‟s pickup truck; Sutton‟s bedroom while roommate

Whiteside was at work; defendant‟s Tampa motel room); (7) after each murder

defendant took property from the victim, including jewelry, money, handbags,

keys, and personal identification documents; (8) after each murder defendant

attempted to conceal the victim‟s body, clean up the crime scene, or otherwise

conceal evidence of the crime in order to buy himself time to escape; (9) after each

murder defendant quickly left town, in each instance crossing state lines within a

few days to thwart his apprehension; and (10) all of the murders were perpetrated

within a short six-week period. The trial court ultimately ruled evidence of the

Cribbs and Sutton murders (but not the Price murder)4 admissible on the issue of

intent, and thereafter reaffirmed that ruling in the face of continued defense

objections on various grounds.

The trial court was well within its discretion in ruling that the combination

of distinctive marks and similarities in all three murders was sufficient to meet the

standard for admissibility of the other crimes evidence on the element of intent,

i.e., whether the murder of Gallagher was premeditated and deliberate and

committed with express malice. Defendant selected each of his victims in a


As noted (ante, at p. 2, fn. 2), shortly after Gallagher‟s murder but before

the murders of Cribbs in Florida and Sutton in Louisiana, defendant traveled to
Mississippi, where he met Linda Price at a “beer tent” at the state fair. The two
cohabitated in a rented apartment in Jackson, Mississippi, for approximately two
weeks before Price was found murdered in the apartment. The trial court ruled
evidence of the Price murder inadmissible at the guilt phase under Evidence Code
section 1101(b).


similar manner, used a common ploy to lure them to a place where they would be

alone before murdering them, then acted in similar fashion after each murder;

cleaning up the murder scenes or otherwise attempting to conceal the victims‟

bodies to buy himself time to escape, taking personal property from each victim,

and fleeing across state lines. “ „[T]he recurrence of a similar result . . . tends

(increasingly with each instance) to negat[e] accident or inadvertence or self-

defense or good faith or other innocent mental state, and tends to establish

(provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the presence of the normal, i.e.,

criminal, intent accompanying such an act . . . .‟ (2 Wigmore[, Evidence]

(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979) § 302, p. 241.)” (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at

p. 402 (Ewoldt); see also People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1194; People v.

Lewis (2001) 25 Ca1.4th 610, 636-637; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th

312, 379.) The Cribbs and Sutton murders were “sufficiently similar [to the

Gallagher murder] to support the inference that the defendant „ “probably

harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.” [Citations.]‟ (People v. Robbins

[(1988)] 45 Cal.3d 867, 879.)” (Ewoldt, at p. 402.)

Defendant urges that the trial court‟s findings of similarity between the

three murders were overstated and renews his argument that the Cribbs and Sutton

murders were not sufficiently similar to the charged Gallagher murder to warrant

their admission below. He argues that the fact that he met his victims “in a bar”

was an insufficient ground of similarity because “there was nothing distinctive

about the fact that he „talked, danced and drank‟ in bars with women his own age.”

His argument misses the mark. The “features of substantial but lesser

distinctiveness may yield a distinctive combination when considered together.”

(People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 987.) Although several of the factors

considered below, e.g., drinking, dancing, and socializing with persons close to

one‟s age in bars, when viewed in isolation, may not appear particularly unusual


or distinctive, it was the combination of similar factors common to all three

murders—defendant‟s socializing, drinking, or dancing with women in their 30‟s,

unaccompanied by a male companion, in local bars; buying them rounds of drinks

to gain their trust; convincing them to give him a ride, or to accompany him back

to his home or lodging; killing them in a confined or secluded space (Sutton‟s

bedroom, defendant‟s Tampa motel room to which Cribbs had given him a ride,

and in the case of Gallagher‟s murder, the cab of her pickup under cover of

darkness late at night); hiding the bodies (or in the case of Gallagher, burning her

body) so as to avoid detection and buy further time to escape; fleeing from each

crime scene with the victim‟s property; crossing state lines, in each instance within

two days, to further facilitate his escape; and the fact that all three murders were

committed within the very short time span of approximately six weeks—that

rendered evidence of the out-of-state murders admissible to show that Gallagher‟s

murder was both premeditated and deliberate and committed with express malice.

Defendant specifically challenges the trial court‟s finding of similarity

between the charged murder of Gallagher and the murder of Andy Lou Sutton in

Louisiana, arguing there was no evidence that Sutton gave him a ride home from a

bar before she was murdered. But the evidence showed that on November 2,

1995, defendant initially met Sutton and her roommate Whiteside at the It‟ll Do

Lounge in Bossier City, Louisiana, and that he spent the night with Sutton in the

women‟s apartment. He then convinced Sutton and Whiteside to give him a ride

to the Shreveport bus terminal, told them he would return in a few days, kissing

Sutton and telling Whiteside to “take care” of her, traveled to Tampa, Florida,

where he murdered Tina Cribbs, and then returned to Louisiana less than a week

later in Cribbs‟s car, telling Sutton he had bought the vehicle for her. Defendant,

Sutton and Whiteside again went out drinking, first to the It‟ll Do Lounge, then to

the Touch of Class bar, and after defendant became intoxicated, Sutton obtained


Whiteside‟s permission to take defendant back to their apartment so he could

“sleep it off.” The evidence strongly supported the inference that defendant stayed

in their apartment and murdered Sutton in her bedroom that same night, before

Whiteside returned home from work at 3:00 a.m.

Thus, although there was a period of approximately one week between the

time defendant first met Sutton in a bar and convinced her to let him spend the

night in her apartment and the point at which he returned to Louisiana after

murdering Cribbs in Florida and murdered Sutton, there was little merit to defense

counsel‟s argument that the facts of Sutton‟s murder did not “fit the pattern of

picking somebody up in a bar and taking somebody home and killing them.”

Defendant also renews his argument that his offer to stipulate that the

Gallagher murder was “a first degree or nothing type of a case” should have been

accepted by the prosecutor and the trial court because the stipulation would have

“eliminate[d] the need for proving intent . . . or proving premeditation and

deliberation.” Defense counsel represented to the court that the strategy behind

his offer to so stipulate was “a way to keep . . . the Louisiana and Florida fact

pattern[s] out of the guilt phase.” The prosecution objected on several grounds,

including that the other crimes evidence being offered under Evidence Code

section 1101(b) was “much larger in a sense than just first degree murder.”

The claim is without merit. Neither the prosecutor nor the trial court was

legally obligated to accept defendant‟s proffered stipulation. Indeed, the trial

court was unauthorized to enforce such a stipulation over the prosecutor‟s

objection. A trial court cannot compel a prosecutor to accept a stipulation that

would deprive the state‟s case of its evidentiary persuasiveness or forcefulness.

(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 721, fn. 5; People v. Sakarias (2000) 22

Cal.4th 596, 629; People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 16-17; People v. Arias

(1996) 13 Cal.4th 96, 131; People v Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1007.)


“[A] criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full

evidentiary force of the case as the Government chooses to present it.” (Old Chief

v. United States (1997) 519 U.S. 172, 186-187.)

Although the circumstantial evidence that defendant premeditated

Gallagher‟s murder with express malice was strong, the prosecution had the right

to present all available evidence to meet its burden of proving the requisite mens

rea for first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Mullaney v. Wilbur

(1975) 421 U.S. 684, 704; People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 462.) Although

evidence was presented that Flynn saw “silhouettes” of defendant and Gallagher

possibly fighting in the cab of Gallagher‟s pickup, with one of them holding his or

her hands high above the other‟s head or neck, Flynn was intoxicated when he

made that observation from the backseat of a patrol car after being arrested for

drunk driving. Even though the autopsy evidence revealed Gallagher had been

strangled to death with considerable force by an assailant who held a steady grip

on her neck for at least a minute before she expired, Flynn remained the only

possible eyewitness to a physical altercation that might have led to Gallagher‟s

death. Finally, although a witness testified she saw a man with long blond hair

like defendant‟s leaning into Gallagher‟s pickup and setting fire to the passenger

compartment, this was not a full, positive identification of defendant. And

although considerable other circumstantial evidence pointed to defendant as

having killed Gallagher with premeditation and deliberation and express malice,

including his repeated statement to Walker that he had “bigger problems” than she

did, immediately followed by his admission of knowledge that “[Gallagher] is

dead,” and his callous rifling through Gallagher‟s purse in Walker‟s presence a

short time later, still, it remained the prosecution‟s burden to prove premeditation

and malice beyond a reasonable doubt (See Mullaney v. Wilbur, at p. 704; People

v. Rios, at p. 462), and its right to introduce all relevant and admissible evidence


toward that end. As explained, evidence of the Cribbs and Sutton murders was

such additional substantial evidence, admissible under Evidence Code section

1101(b) to further prove that Gallagher‟s murder was premeditated and deliberate

and committed with express malice.

Defendant also contends that evidence of the out-of-state murders was

inadmissible to prove intent because the identity of Gallagher‟s killer remained in

dispute at the guilt phase. He relies on a civil case, Hassoldt v. Patrick Media

Group, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 153, in which it was suggested that “where the

identity of the actor is in dispute and the uncharged misconduct fails to satisfy the

stringent „so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature‟ standard enunciated

in Ewoldt, the uncharged conduct is not admissible on such issues as intent,

motive or lack of mistake or accident . . . .” (Id., at p. 166.)

We have since clarified that the passage from Hassoldt is an incorrect

statement of the law. (Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1332 [“Defendant contends

. . . the evidence could not be admitted for a purpose other than identity if the

identity of the perpetrator was in dispute. We have rejected this argument.”];

People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 778 [“There is no requirement . . . that the

defendant was the perpetrator in both sets of offenses.”]; see also Alcala v.

Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1222-1227; People v. Spector (2011) 194

Cal.App.4th 1335, 1392.)

We further conclude the trial court did not “ „exercise[] its discretion in an

arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner . . . result[ing] in a manifest

miscarriage of justice[]‟ ” (Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1328-1329) when it

refused to exclude the evidence of the two out-of-state murders as unduly

prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352. Defendant suggests the other crimes

evidence unfairly characterized him as a “serial killer.” But defendant was never

labeled a “serial killer” by the prosecution. Because all other crimes evidence in a


sense may be viewed as “inherently prejudicial” (see Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at

p. 404), “ „uncharged offenses are admissible only if they have substantial

probative value.‟ ” (Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1331, quoting People v.

Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 318.) We have explained that although the other

circumstantial evidence that Gallagher‟s murder was perpetrated with

premeditation, deliberation and express malice was strong, the People were not

limited to presenting such evidence to the exclusion of the material and probative

other crimes evidence. Evidence of the Florida and Louisiana murders, which

shared numerous distinctive features and similarities with Gallagher‟s murder, and

which were committed within six weeks of her murder, had substantial probative

value to show that her murder was premeditated and committed with express


Nor did the possibility of undue consumption of time render the uncharged

murders inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352. A trial court has

discretion to exclude evidence if it concludes presentation of the evidence will

“necessitate undue consumption of time.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) Here, the court

did not abuse its discretion in concluding that admitting this probative evidence

would not be unduly time consuming.

Moreover, the limiting instructions ultimately given to the jury, as modified

at defense counsel‟s request, ensured that the other crimes evidence would not be

considered for any improper purpose. The jury was specifically instructed only to

consider evidence of the Florida and Louisiana murders for the “limited purpose of

determining if it tend[ed] to show whether defendant committed the murder [of

Gallagher] with express malice aforethought and with premeditation and

deliberation, and not as a result of rage or provocation or other heat of passion.”

In his closing argument, defense counsel emphasized that the cautionary

instructions required the jurors to “follow the law and follow this instruction about


evidence admitted for a limited purpose and set aside the emotions and make your

decision based on the facts.”

Defendant also argues that admission of evidence of the Florida and

Louisiana murders rendered his trial fundamentally unfair in violation of the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constituion.

Not so. Because the evidence was material, probative, and admitted under

Evidence Code section 1101(b) on the legitimate issue of intent, defendant‟s due

process right to a fair trial was not transgressed by the admission of such evidence.

(See People v. Caitlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 122-123.)

2. Instruction on flight (CALJIC No. 2.52)

Section 1127c provides, in relevant part, “In any criminal trial or

proceeding where evidence of flight of a defendant is relied upon as tending to

show guilt, the court shall instruct the jury substantially as follows: [¶] The flight

of a person immediately after the commission of a crime . . . is not sufficient in

itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, the jury may consider in

deciding his guilt or innocence. The weight to which such circumstance is entitled

is a matter for the jury to determine.”

Pursuant to this section, and without any objection by the defense,5 the trial

court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.52, Flight After Crime, as follows:

“The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime, or after he is

accused of a crime, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact

which, if proved, may be considered by you in the light of all other proved facts in


Challenges to the flight instruction given pursuant to section 1127c are

cognizable on appeal even in the absence of a contemporaneous objection. (See
People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055; People v. Visciotti (1992)
2 Cal.4th 1, 60.)


deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. The weight to which this

circumstance is entitled is a matter for you to decide.”

Defendant challenges the facial validity of the standard flight instruction on

several asserted due process grounds. He argues the instruction is “unfairly

partisan and argumentative,” permits the jury to draw irrational permissive

inferences of guilt, and is unnecessary because it improperly duplicates the

circumstantial evidence instructions. The claims that the instruction is

argumentative and permits the jury to draw arbitrary and/or biased inferences from

isolated items of evidence have long since been rejected and will not be

reconsidered here. (See People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 127-128.)

The instruction “properly advised the jury of inferences that could rationally be

drawn from the evidence,” and “[t]he jury could properly infer consciousness of

guilt from defendant‟s efforts to leave California [citation].” (Id., at p. 128.) Nor

was the flight instruction duplicative of other circumstantial evidence instructions,

as it served to “ „ma[ke] clear to the jury that certain types of deceptive or evasive

behavior on a defendant‟s part could indicate consciousness of guilt, while also

clarifying that such activity was not of itself sufficient to prove a defendant‟s guilt,

and allowing the jury to determine the weight and significance assigned to such

behavior.‟ ” (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 438, quoting People v.

Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1224.)

Defendant claims the flight instruction, as applied to him, “was not

constitutional under the facts of this case” because it invited the jury to conflate

evidence of his flight from the Florida and Louisiana murders with his prior flight

from California after Gallagher‟s murder. The argument borders on the specious.

The evidence ruled admissible at the guilt phase showed that defendant committed

three murders in three different states over the course of six weeks. After each

murder he fled with the victim‟s property, inferentially so after Gallagher‟s murder


because although her earring was found in defendant‟s apartment, her large black

purse and its contents, which Walker observed defendant rifling through, was not

left behind in the apartment and was never recovered. Defendant ultimately fled

through two more states (Tennessee and Kentucky) until finally being

apprehended after a high-speed chase through four towns that ended with police

cruisers ramming his vehicle in order to force him off the road.

Moreover, defendant took the stand in his own behalf and testified that after

leaving California he was traveling home to Hamilton, Ohio, but stopped off at

Las Vegas, Nevada, to gamble, and then at Jackson, Mississippi, to renew his

truck driver‟s license, before returning to Ohio. The prosecution was entitled to

counter this testimony with evidence that defendant remained in continuous flight

from the time he murdered Gallagher in California until he was apprehended in

Kentucky approximately six weeks later.6 The standard flight instruction given

below properly left it to the jury “ „to determine the weight and significance

assigned to such behavior.‟ ” (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 438.)

There was no error in so charging the jury.

3. Instruction on possession of stolen property as it related to murder and

arson charges (CALJIC No. 2.15)

The jury was instructed at the guilt phase with CALJIC No. 2.15, as

follows, “If you find that [defendant] was in conscious possession of recently

stolen property, the fact of that possession is not by itself sufficient to permit an

inference that the defendant is guilty of the crime of murder or arson. Before guilt

may be inferred, there must be corroborating evidence tending to prove his guilt.

However, this corroborating evidence need only be slight, and need not by itself


The prosecutor argued to the jury, “He‟s out of there immediately after

killing a person. [¶] He is out of there. He‟s out of Florida, and he‟s out of
Louisiana, and he‟s on the run, and he‟s just not on the run when he‟s arrested
from Louisiana, from Florida, he‟s on the run from all of them.”


be sufficient to warrant an inference of guilt. [¶] As corroboration, you may

consider the attributes of possession—time, place and manner, that the defendant

had an opportunity to commit the crime charged, the defendant‟s conduct, or any

other evidence which tends to connect him with the crime charged.”

Defendant contends that the giving of CALJIC No. 2.15, regarding

inferences to be drawn from evidence of his possession of stolen property, was

reversible error because it “permitted the jury to draw an irrational permissive

inference that improperly lightened the state‟s burden of proof” and “gave the jury

a fundamentally incorrect theory of culpability.” Specifically, he asserts the

instruction impermissibly allowed the jury to find him guilty of murder or arson

“based solely on the alleged fact that he was „in conscious possession of recently

stolen property,‟ ” subject only to the condition that there be “ „slight‟ ”

corroborating evidence of guilt. As explained below, under decisions of this court

filed after defendant‟s trial, the giving of CALJIC No. 2.15 in this murder case

was erroneous. As will further be explained, on this record the instructional error

was manifestly harmless.

During the prosecutor‟s guilt phase closing argument, he argued that

defendant could be convicted on several theories of first degree murder, including

the theory that Gallagher was killed during the commission of a felony, i.e.,

robbery. The prosecutor specifically referenced the court‟s instruction with

CALJIC No. 2.15, arguing there was sufficient corroborating evidence to support

an inference of guilt based on defendant‟s possession of recently stolen property.

The prosecutor emphasized that defendant was seen with Gallagher‟s purse in his

apartment on the morning of the murder, and that Walker saw Gallagher‟s earring

drop out of the purse. He pointed out the earring was later found in the apartment.

The prosecutor argued further that Walker‟s testimony concerning defendant‟s


admission that he had a “bigger problem,” followed by his statement to Walker

that Gallagher was dead, further corroborated the inference of guilt.

Following the giving of the instruction and the prosecutor‟s argument,

defense counsel indicated he was objecting to the instruction as “improper” on the

ground that “all you need is slight corroboration to go from being in possession of

some stolen property to get to murder and arson.” The court indicated the

instruction was applicable to evidence regarding defendant‟s possession of

Gallagher‟s purse, keys, and other property, as well as his possession of property

owned by Sutton‟s roommate Whiteside and Cribbs that was recovered upon his

arrest. The court concluded the prosecution had carried its burden of proof as to

those facts and that the giving of the instruction was proper.

CALJIC No. 2.15 is based on the long-standing rule allowing a jury to infer

guilt of a theft-related crime from the fact that a defendant is found in possession

of recently stolen property when such evidence is accompanied by slight

corroboration of other inculpatory circumstances tending to show guilt. (See

People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 754-758.) It is a permissive,

cautionary instruction “generally favorable to defendants; its purpose is to

emphasize that possession of stolen property, alone, is insufficient to sustain a

conviction for a theft-related crime. (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 131;

People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 176-177; People v. Johnson (1993) 6

Cal.4th 1, 37; cf. People v. Najera (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1132, 1135-1136 [defendant

argued he was prejudiced because the trial court had a duty to give CALJIC No.

2.15 sua sponte in all theft-related cases and failed to do so].)” (People v.

Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 375 (Gamache).)

On the other hand, in cases decided subsequent to the trial in this case, “we

have . . . cautioned that the instruction is inappropriate for non-theft-related

crimes, and instructing that possession of stolen property may create an inference


that a defendant is guilty of murder, as was done here, is error. (People v.

Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 101; People v. Prieto [(2003)] 30

Cal.4th [226] at pp. 248-249.)” (Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 375.) The

People recognize as much and concede that it was error to give CALJIC No. 2.15

in this case.

As for defendant‟s argument that instructing the jury with CALJIC No.

2.15 “improperly lightened the state‟s burden of proof,” “we have previously

rejected it. The instruction does not establish an unconstitutional mandatory

presumption in favor of guilt (People v. Yeoman, 31 Cal.4th at p. 131) or

otherwise shift or lower the prosecution‟s burden of establishing guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt (People v. Parson [(2008)] 44 Cal.4th [332] at pp. 355-356;

People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 248).” (Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at

p. 376.) Defendant offers no persuasive reason to reconsider these decisions.

Defendant argues that instructing a jury with CALJIC No. 2.15 in a non-

theft case is reversible error because it results in “the prosecution present[ing] its

case to the jury on alternate theories, some of which are legally correct and others

legally incorrect, and the reviewing court cannot determine from the record on

which theory the ensuing general verdict of guilt rested.” (People v. Green (1980)

27 Cal.3d 1, 69.) However, “it is well established the People v. Watson (1956) 46

Cal.2d 818, 836, test applies. (People v. Parson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 357-358;

People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 101; People v. Prieto,

supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 249.)” (Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 376.) Under that

test — whether it is reasonably probable defendant would have obtained a more

favorable result had the instruction not been given — the error here in extending

CALJIC No. 2.15 to the murder and arson charges was clearly harmless.

Gallagher was last seen alive together with defendant in her pickup truck; Flynn,

although intoxicated at the time, thought he saw defendant and Gallagher in a


physical altercation inside the pickup; a short time later Walker woke up in

defendant‟s apartment and he told her, “I got bigger problems than you, honey, I

got bigger problems,” and admitted knowledge that Gallagher was dead; and a

short while after that a man closely resembling defendant was seen setting fire to

the passenger compartment of Gallagher‟s pickup truck, in which her burned body

was later found. Additionally, the other crimes evidence, which established by a

preponderance of the evidence that defendant murdered Tina Cribbs in Florida and

Andy Lou Sutton in Louisiana within six weeks of Gallagher‟s murder in a

manner that shared many distinctive features and similarities to Gallagher‟s

murder, and the forensic results of Gallagher‟s autopsy, which showed that she

was forcibly strangled for a period of at least one minute until she expired, further

supported an inference that Gallagher‟s murder was premeditated, deliberate, and

committed with express malice.

4. Instruction on burden of proof for out-of-state murders.
(CALJIC Nos. 2.50 & 2.50.1)

Defendant contends the other crimes evidence instructions given below

require reversal because they permitted the jury to find him guilty of Gallagher‟s

murder, and find true the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance, by a

preponderance of the evidence rather than by the constitutionally compelled proof

beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The claim is without merit.

After the court determined to admit the evidence of the Florida and

Louisiana murders, defense counsel submitted a modified version of CALJIC No.

2.50, which read, “Evidence was introduced for the purpose of showing that

[defendant] committed crimes other than that for which he is on trial. This

evidence relates to two homicides alleged to have been committed by [defendant]

in November of 1995 in the states of Florida and Louisiana. [¶] Except as you

will otherwise be instructed, this evidence, if believed, may not be considered by


you to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a

disposition to commit crimes. It may be considered by you only for the limited

purpose of determining if it tends to show whether [defendant] committed the

murder alleged in Count 1 with express malice aforethought and with

premeditation and deliberation, and not as a result of rage or provocation or other

heat of passion. [¶] For the limited purpose for which you may consider such

evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other evidence in

the case. [¶] You are not permitted to consider such evidence for any other

purpose.” The instruction was read to the jury both before presentation of the

other crimes evidence and again before closing arguments and deliberations.

The jury was further instructed pursuant to former CALJIC No. 2.50.1 (6th

ed. 1996), which read, “Within the meaning of the preceding instruction [CALJIC

No. 2.50, as modified], the prosecution has the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the homicides other

than that for which he is on trial. [¶] You must not consider this evidence for any

purpose unless you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant

committed the other homicides.”7 Finally, the jury was instructed with CALJIC

No. 2.50.2, which read, in relevant part, “ „Preponderance of the evidence‟ means

evidence that has more convincing force than that opposed to it. If the evidence is

so evenly balanced that you are unable to find that the evidence on either side of

an issue preponderates, your finding on that issue must be against the party who

had the burden of proving it.”


Subsequent to the trial in this case, CALJIC No. 2.50.1 was amended with

the addition of the following language: “If you find other crime[s] were
committed by a preponderance of the evidence, you are nevertheless cautioned and
reminded that before a defendant can be found guilty of any crime charged [or any
included crime] in this trial, the evidence as a whole must persuade you beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of that crime.” (CALJIC No. 2.50.1
(7th ed. 2005).)


It is well settled that evidence of other crimes presented in the guilt phase

of a criminal trial may be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v.

Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 763 (Medina); People v. McClellan (1969) 71

Cal.2d 793, 804.) “Prior cases explain that the facts tending to prove the

defendant‟s other crimes for purposes of establishing his criminal knowledge or

intent are deemed mere „evidentiary facts‟ that need not be proved beyond a

reasonable doubt as long as the jury is convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, of

the truth of the „ultimate fact‟ of the defendant‟s knowledge or intent. (People v.

Lisenba [(1939)] 14 Cal.2d [403] at pp. 430-431, and cases cited.)” (Medina, at

p. 763.)

The jury below was fully instructed on the burden of proof required to

convict defendant of Gallagher‟s murder, arson, and to find true the prior-murder-

conviction special-circumstance allegation. They were charged with the standard

instruction on the presumption of innocence and the prosecution‟s burden to prove

defendant‟s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (CALJIC Nos. 2.90, 2.91.) They

were instructed on the requisite elements of murder and arson. (CALJIC Nos.

8.10, 8.11, 8.20, 14.80.) They were instructed that the prosecution had the burden

of proving the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance true beyond a

reasonable doubt. (CALJIC No. 8.80.1.) They were specifically instructed that

“each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to

establish the defendant‟s guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In other

words, before an inference essential to establish guilt may be found to have been

proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance on which the

inference necessarily rests must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (CALJIC

No. 2.01.) And they were further admonished, “Do not single out any particular

sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others. Consider the

instructions as a whole, and each in light of all the others.” (CALJIC No. 1.01.)


This court has expressly approved of former CALJIC No. 2.50.1 insofar as

it informed juries that other crimes evidence may be proved by a preponderance of

the evidence. (See People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 383; Medina,

supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 763-764.) Those decisions further specifically recognize

that the People‟s burden to prove a criminal defendant‟s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt is not diminished by such an instruction where it is given in conjunction

with CALJIC Nos. 2.90 (presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt,

prosecution‟s burden of proof) and 2.01 (each fact essential to complete a set of

circumstances necessary to establish guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable

doubt). (Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 383; Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at

pp. 763-764; see also Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72-73.)8

5. Failure to give a unanimity instruction on theory of first degree

Defendant next argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that

“if it found the [charged Gallagher] murder was of the first degree, it had to agree

unanimously on the type of first degree murder.” He acknowledges the many

decisions of this court rejecting the claim and urges us to reconsider them, but

provides no good reason to do so. We decline the invitation to do so. “[A]s long

as each juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty of

murder as that offense is defined by statute, it need not decide unanimously by

which theory he is guilty.” (People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 918; see


Defendant‟s reliance on Gibson v. Ortiz (9th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3d 812) is

misplaced. That case involved the giving of former CALJIC No. 2.50.01, an
instruction specifically tailored to prior sexual offenses, along with a modified
version of CALJIC No. 2.50.1, which instructions together permitted the jury to
“infer that the defendant committed the charged crime if it found „that the
defendant committed a prior sexual offense.‟ ” (Gibson, at p. 822.) The facts and
particular instructions at issue in that case are therefore inapposite to those in issue


People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 616-617; quoting People v. Nakahara

(2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 712 [“ „jurors need not unanimously agree on a theory of

first degree murder as either felony murder or murder with premeditation and

deliberation. [Citations.]‟ ”) The trial court was under no obligation to give a

unanimity instruction in this murder case.9

6. Instruction on “anti-jury nullification” (CALJIC No. 17.41.1).

The jurors in this case were instructed at the guilt phase with the so-called

“anti-jury nullification” instruction (see CALJIC No. 17.41.1 (1998 new) (6th ed.

1996)), which advised them that, “The integrity of a trial requires that jurors, at all

times during their deliberations, conduct themselves as required by these

instructions. Accordingly, should it occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or

expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on penalty

or punishment, or any other improper basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors

to immediately advise the Court of the situation.”

Defendant contends that “[t]he instruction . . . assures the jurors that their

words might be used against them and that candor in the jury room could be

punished. The instruction therefore chills speech and free discourse in a forum

where „free and uninhibited discourse‟ is most needed. [Citation.] The instruction

virtually assures „the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion‟ in the

jury room. [Citation.] Accordingly, the instruction improperly inhibits the free

expression and interaction among the jurors which is so important to the

deliberative process. [Citation.]”

As defendant acknowledges, although this court, in People v. Engelman

(2002) 28 Cal.4th 436 (Engelman), out of “caution” disapproved the giving of


Defendant‟s jurors were instructed that if they agreed defendant was guilty

of murder, they must unanimously agree whether the murder was first or second
degree. (See CALJIC No. 8.71.)


CALJIC No. 17.41.1 in future criminal trials in California (Engelman, at p. 440),

we nonetheless concluded “the instruction does not infringe upon [a] defendant‟s

federal or state constitutional right to trial by jury or his [or her] state

constitutional right to a unanimous verdict” (id. at pp. 439-440; see also People v.

Barnwell (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1038, 1055). We explained that the instruction

properly informed the jury it had a duty to follow the court‟s instructions, and that

“[a] juror who actually refuses to deliberate is subject to discharge by the court

(People v. Cleveland [(2001)] 25 Cal.4th [466] at p. 484), as is a juror who

proposes to reach a verdict without respect to the law or the evidence. (People v.

Williams [(2001)] 25 Cal.4th [441] at p. 463.)” (Engelman, supra, 28 Cal.4th at

p. 442.) We observed that where CALJIC No. 17.41.1 is given together with

CALJIC Nos. 17.40 (“ „The People and the defendant are entitled to the individual

opinion of each juror. [¶] Each of you must decide the case for yourself . . . .‟ ”)

and 17.50 (“instructing that in order to reach a verdict, „all twelve jurors must

agree to the decision‟ ”), the jury is “fully informed . . . of its duty to reach a

unanimous verdict based upon the independent and impartial decision of each

juror.” (Engelman, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 444.)10 And we explained that the

instruction “is not directed at a deadlocked jury” (Engelman, at p. 444) nor does it

encourage “jurors who find themselves in the minority, as deliberations progress,

[to] join the majority without reaching an independent judgment.” (Ibid.)11


Both CALJIC Nos. 17.40 and 17.50 were given below.


In Engelman, we disapproved giving CALJIC No. 17.41.1 in future

criminal trials because “[t]here is risk that the instruction will be misunderstood or
that it will be used by one juror as a tool for browbeating other jurors.”
(Engelman, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 445.)


C. Special Circumstance

Challenges to the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance.

The single special circumstance found true in this case was that “[t]he

defendant was convicted previously of murder in the first or second degree.”

(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2).) The allegation was based on defendant‟s capital conviction

in Florida, on May 7, 1997, of the murder of Tina Cribbs on or about November 7,

1995. Defendant murdered Cribbs in Florida approximately five weeks after he

murdered Sandra Gallagher in California. Defendant‟s Florida conviction was not

yet final on appeal at the time his capital trial for the murder of Gallagher

commenced in California.

Defendant contends the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance was

invalid on two grounds: (1) the Cribbs murder in Florida was committed after the

murder of Gallagher in California, and (2) the Florida conviction was not yet final

when alleged as a prior-murder-conviction special circumstance in this case. He

argues the invalid special-circumstance finding violated his Eighth Amendment

right to be free from an arbitrary and capricious death sentence. (See Spaziano v.

Florida (1984) 468 U.S. 447, 460, fn. 20.) Respondent asserts that defendant

forfeited or waived the claim on appeal by failing to raise these two specific legal

challenges to the special circumstance allegation in the trial court, and by rejecting

the prosecution‟s offer to continue the trial until the Florida murder conviction was

final on appeal if he would waive time. Respondent further contends both legal

challenges to the special circumstance finding are unsupported at law. We agree

with respondent that the claims are devoid of legal merit.

1. Procedural Background

Prior to commencement of trial, defendant filed a motion to strike the prior-

murder-conviction special-circumstance allegation. The motion did not expressly


allege the two legal grounds now urged on appeal as invalidating the special

circumstance. Instead, defendant argued the Florida conviction was invalid due to

“numerous errors of federal constitutional dimension” as outlined in defendant‟s

opening brief filed by his attorneys in the Florida capital appeal, a copy of which

was appended to defense counsel‟s two-page motion to strike.

A full hearing was conducted on the motion with defendant present.12

Defense counsel argued the merits of several federal constitutional claims raised in

the opening brief in the Cribbs murder appeal, urging they required that the special

circumstance allegation based on that Florida conviction be stricken.13 The

prosecutor refuted the merits of each claim in the Florida brief relied on by

defendant as a ground for striking the special circumstance allegation. The

prosecutor nonetheless offered to continue the trial until the Florida high court

decided the merits of the Florida appeal if defendant would waive his right to a

speedy trial in this proceeding. The trial court properly refused to predict how the

Florida Supreme Court might rule on the issues before it in the Florida appeal.


“ „[W]hen a defendant seeks to collaterally attack the validity of a prior

conviction underlying a prior-murder special circumstance, he must first allege
facts sufficient to justify a hearing on his motion to strike the special
—i.e., “allege actual denial of his constitutional rights.” (People v.
[(1984)] 36 Cal.3d [909,] 922.) The court shall thereupon conduct an
evidentiary hearing in the manner set forth in Coffey and Sumstine.‟ (Curl v.
Superior Court
[(1990)] 51 Cal.3d [1292,] 1306, italics added; see People v.
[(1967)] 67 Cal.2d [204,] 215 [„the issue must be raised by means of
allegations which, if true, would render the prior conviction devoid of
constitutional support.‟].)” (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 892-893.)


In particular, defense counsel argued at some length regarding a claim in

the Florida brief alleging that Florida prosecutors had repeated the same improper
closing argument to a number of juries in Florida capital cases, including the
penalty phase of defendant‟s capital trial. As argued by the prosecutor, however,
this claim, even if meritorious, at most would have invalidated the Florida penalty
determination and would not have invalidated defendant‟s underlying conviction
of the Cribbs murder.


Addressing defendant directly, the court stated, “At this point, Mr. Rogers, you

have the option of keeping the jurors from hearing about it [the Florida conviction]

by waiving [your right to a speedy trial]. That‟s your call.” Defendant nodded,

signaling to the court that he understood his choice. The prosecutor‟s offer to

continue the trial if defendant would waive time was declined by the defense. The

court went on to deny the motion to strike the special circumstance allegation.

2. Discussion

Both grounds asserted on appeal in support of this claim present pure

questions of law. Respondent urges us to find that defendant forfeited or waived

each ground now asserted as invalidating the special circumstance. We do not

find forfeiture or waiver of the claim. Although defendant did not specifically

argue, either in his written motion to strike the special circumstance allegation or

at the hearing on the motion, that a prior murder conviction must be final on

appeal before it can support a prior-murder-conviction special circumstance, the

gist of his argument conveyed that position insofar as he sought to convince the

court that reversal of the Florida conviction for any of the federal constitutional

errors alleged in the opening brief would necessarily invalidate the prior-murder-

conviction special-circumstance finding. Fundamentally, had the Florida Supreme

Court subsequently reversed defendant‟s conviction of the Cribbs murder for

federal constitutional error, such would have undermined the validity of this prior-

murder-conviction special-circumstance finding regardless of defendant‟s refusal

to waive time below or specifically argue these two grounds in support of his

motion to strike the special circumstance allegation. (See Johnson v. Mississippi

(1988) 486 U.S. 578, 584-586 [holding it would violate the Eighth Amendment to

allow “petitioner‟s death sentence to stand although based in part on a reversed



In any case, neither ground now urged in support of invalidation of the

special circumstance finding has legal merit. With regard to the first ground—the

fact that the murder of Cribbs in Florida was committed after the murder of

Gallagher in California—numerous decisions of this court have concluded the

controlling factor under the express language of section 190.2(a)(2) is whether

“[t]he defendant was convicted previously of murder in the first or second degree”

(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2), italics added.) The “order of the commission of the

homicides is immaterial.” (People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 596

(Hendricks); see also People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 879; People v.

Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 636; People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 107-

108; People v. Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 829,848.)

As explained in Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d 584, “Penal Code section

190.2, subdivision (a)(2) (hereafter section 190.2(a)(2)) defines the relevant

special circumstance as, „the defendant was previously convicted of murder in the

first or second degree.‟ The language of the provision is clear: on its face, it

refers simply and unequivocally to previous convictions. Moreover . . . section

190.2(a)(2) refers to convictions in prior proceedings, in contrast to subdivision

(a)(3) of the same section, which defines another special circumstance as, „The

defendant has in this proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of

murder in the first or second degree.‟ Far from superfluous, the word „previously‟

is thus essential to a harmonious reading of these two subdivisions of section


“The function of section 190.2(a)(2) is also clear—to circumscribe, as the

Eighth Amendment requires (Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 878), the

classes of persons who may properly be subject to the death penalty. Defendant

misconstrues the purpose of the provision, which he inaptly analogizes to statutes

aimed at the habitual criminal. [Citations.] Unlike recidivism statutes, however,


section 190.2(a)(2) is directed neither to deterring misconduct nor to fostering


“The unambiguous language and purpose of section 190.2(a)(2) thus

require that a person such as defendant, already convicted of murder in a prior

proceeding, must be considered eligible for the death penalty if convicted of first

degree murder in a subsequent trial. The order of the commission of the

homicides is immaterial.” (Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 595-596,

fn. omitted.)

Indeed, defendant acknowledges these settled authorities and has conceded

in his opening brief that “[s]ection 190.2, subdivision (a)(2), as interpreted by this

Court, applies even when the murder resulting in the previous conviction was

committed after the charged murder. (People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at

pp. 595-596.)” He states further, “As [this] Court has ruled, the „convicted

previously‟ phrase simply requires that the conviction be rendered before the trial

on the charged murder. (Ibid.) Thus, the prior-murder-conviction special

circumstance premises death-eligibility on a fact that arises after commission of

the charged murder for which the State seeks to execute the defendant. This Court

has rejected both state law and federal constitutional challenges to the subdivision

(a)(2) special circumstance. (People v. Hinton [, supra,] 37 Cal.4th 839, 879;

People v. Gurule [, supra,] 28 Cal.4th 555, 634-638; People v. McLain [, supra,]

46 Cal.3d 97, 107-108; People v. Grant [, supra,] 45 Cal.3d 829, 848.) Although

[defendant] disagrees with the Court‟s construction of the „convicted previously‟

language of the special circumstance, there is no point in seeking reconsideration

of a ruling the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed. Instead, [defendant] asserts his

federal constitutional claims in order to preserve them for federal habeas corpus

review in the event he does not obtain an order for a new trial in this Court.”


Regarding finality of the prior murder conviction, respondent points to the

absence of any express language in section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2) ascribing a

“finality of judgment” requirement to the term “convicted” as used in the section.

Respondent also argues that “a plain reading of the statute . . . does not support

such an interpretation, as the subsection immediately following section 190.2(a)(2)

permits . . . a special circumstance allegation if „[t]he defendant, in this

proceeding, has been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or

second degree.‟ (See Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) As „convictions‟ arising

from the same proceeding would be appealed at the same time, Penal Code section

190.2, subdivision (a)(3) would have no force or application if the statute were

interpreted to require finality in the sense of exhaustion of appellate remedies.”

Additionally, respondent points out that in the criminal law context,

relevant California decisional law generally treats the term “conviction” as the

entry of a verdict rather than a final judgment: “Thus, in People v. Castello (1998)

65 Cal.App.4th 1242, the appellate court found that „the ordinary legal meaning of

“conviction” is a verdict of guilty or the confession of the defendant in open court,

and not the sentence or judgment‟ (id. at p. 1253), and that the term „conviction is

used throughout the Penal Code to indicate the jury verdict‟ (id. at p. 1254).

Similarly, in People v. Martinez [(1998)] 62 Cal.App.4th [1454] at pp. 1460-1463,

it was concluded that the word „conviction‟ as used in the Evidence Code referred

to an adjudication of guilt for impeachment purposes. (People v. Martinez, supra,

62 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1460-1463.) Indeed, this Court adopted the narrower

definition of the term for purposes of the Three Strikes Law. (People v. Rosbury

(1997) 15 Cal.4th 206, 210; see also People v. Laino (2004) 32 Cal.4th 878, 898.)

In People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, this Court also held that for the purpose

of determining if the defendant had acquired the status of a person convicted of a

felony, one is „convicted‟ when a verdict is entered. (Id. at p. 391.)”


Defendant acknowleges this court has never ruled that a prior murder

conviction alleged under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2) must be “final,” i.e.,

affirmed on appeal or no longer subject to appeal. There is good reason for that.

The statute refers to “convicted previously,” not convicted previously and final on

appeal. (Ibid.) “When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further.”

(People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059, 1063.) Even criminal convictions final

on appeal remain subject to being overturned many years later in habeas corpus

proceedings. If the Legislature (or electorate) had intended an additional

requirement of finality on appeal, or finality after exhaustion of all avenues of

habeas corpus relief, it could have easily said so. It did not. The plain language of

the statute must control.

We further take judicial notice of the subsequent decision of the Florida

Supreme Court in Rogers v. State of Florida (2001) 783 So.2d 980, in which the

Florida high court rejected all claims in defendant‟s appeal and affirmed his

convictions of the first degree murder of Tina Cribbs, armed robbery, and grand

theft of a motor vehicle, as well as the judgment of death imposed in that


D. Penalty Phase Issues

1. Exclusion of “negative victim impact evidence.”

At the penalty phase, the prosecution introduced victim impact evidence

regarding Sandra Gallagher, including testimony from her mother and younger

sister, Jeri Vallicella, establishing that she had three sons, ages 7, 8, and 15 years

old at that time of her death; that she had worked for the Navy as an aviation

electronics technician and received an honorable discharge; that she thereafter

worked at a submarine base for a military contractor where she was in charge of

all the electronics at the base; that she subsequently held jobs with two military


contractors (Ford Aerospace and Southern Illinois University‟s contracting facility

at the San Diego Navy base); that she was like a “second mother” to Vallicella;

and that her murder “totally destroyed” the whole family and “devastated” her

oldest son.

Defendant argues the trial court improperly thwarted his efforts to introduce

“ „negative victim impact‟ evidence” about Gallagher “to counter the „false

impression‟ ” created by the People‟s victim impact evidence, including evidence

of Gallagher‟s alleged involvement with a motorcycle gang; her prior convictions

and/or arrests for drunk driving; the alleged circumstance that she was on felony

probation for possession of a firearm at the time of her murder; evidence that she

was a “less-than-perfect mother and spouse”; and evidence that she once came to

work with “black eyes after „moonlighting at a biker bar.‟ ”

“[A] defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense includes the

right not to have the trial court interfere with a defendant‟s ability to receive a fair

trial. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require the jury in a capital case to

hear any relevant mitigating evidence that the defendant offers, including „ “any

aspect of a defendant‟s character or record and any of the circumstances of the

offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” ‟

([People v.] Frye [(1998)] 18 Cal.4th [894] at p. 1015.) In turn, the court does

have the authority to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence that does not bear on the

defendant‟s character, record, or circumstances of the offense. (Ibid.) „[T]he

concept of relevance as it pertains to mitigation evidence is no different from the

definition of relevance as the term is understood generally.‟ (Id. at pp. 1015-

1016.) Indeed, „excluding defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does

not impair an accused‟s due process right to present a defense.‟ (People v. Fudge

(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1103 (Fudge).)” (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494,

528 (Ramos).)


We first consider the “negative victim impact evidence” the jury was

permitted to consider at the penalty phase of defendant‟s trial. Evidence presented

to the jury separate and apart from the excluded evidence gave them an accurate

picture of Gallagher, her relationship to her husband Stephen Gallagher and her

three children (who were not fathered by him), and the fact that she frequented

bars and drank alcohol to excess. For example, the jury learned from the

testimony of Gallagher‟s sister that “sometimes [Gallagher and her husband]

would have problems.” The jury learned from the guilt phase testimony of the

owner of McRed‟s bar that Gallagher had worked for him in one of his bars in the

past. The jury knew from the testimony of McRed‟s bartender Rein Keener that at

one point during the evening of her murder Gallagher was “cut off” from being

served additional alcoholic beverages. The jury knew from the forensic expert

testimony that Gallagher was found to have a .10 percent blood-alcohol level in

her bloodstream as measured shortly after her death. As suggested to defense

counsel by the trial court at the side bar, “The jury already knows she drinks. The

jury already knows she goes to bars. The jury already knows she is apparently

playing around on her husband and he is playing around on her. There‟s no goody

two-shoes portrait here.”

Additionally, the jury learned from the testimony of sister Jeri Vallicella

that Gallagher had been hospitalized for psychiatric problems for a short period of

time sometime during the year prior to her murder. Vallicella also testified that

once Gallagher had come to her home to pick up a camping trailer the Vallicellas

had borrowed from her, and on that occasion she was accompanied by men with a

pickup truck who indicated they belonged to the Devil‟s Disciples, a motorcycle

riding group the members of whom Vallicella characterized as “wannabes.”

The defense also presented the testimony of Sidney Klessinger, the

Assistant Coordinator for Southern Illinois University at the North Island, San


Diego Naval Station. Klessinger was Gallagher‟s supervisor in 1989 when she

worked at the facility, six years prior to her murder. The defense was permitted to

elicit testimony from Klessinger that Gallagher was terminated from her

employment after six months, prior to the expiration of her probationary period, on

grounds that she dressed inappropriately in the office, used foul language, was

tardy, exhibited inappropriate displays of affection, argued with her boss, and

made computing errors. As part of Gallagher‟s responsibilities on that job, she

was charged with handling the billing of student accounts. Klessinger testified

Gallagher made “multiple errors” costing “over a hundred thousand dollars,”

requiring the paperwork to be redone and resulting in the late payment of tuition to

the school.

Against this backdrop of both positive and negative evidence admitted at

the penalty phase to characterize the murder victim, we find no abuse of discretion

and no violation of defendant‟s constitutional rights in the trial court‟s

determination to exclude certain additional evidence, related to the matters

outlined above, as collateral, of marginal probative value, and unduly

inflammatory under Evidence Code section 352. Of course, since Gallagher was

deceased, her credibility was not at issue. Although defense counsel wanted to ask

Klessinger if Gallagher had duplicated “score sheets from pool games at . . . biker

bars” during work hours, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding

such evidence under Evidence Code section 352 as cumulative to Vallicella‟s

testimony that she had once seen her sister in the company of members of a

motorcycle group, as well as cumulative to guilt phase testimony that Gallagher

played pool while at McRed‟s, and to Klessinger‟s penalty phase testimony

regarding her questionable performance while employed with Southern Illinois



Similarly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code

section 352 in excluding evidence that Gallagher had at some point in her past

been arrested and convicted of misdemeanor drunk driving, which was cumulative

to evidence already before the jury that she could drink to excess, or that a gun

was found in her possession on that occasion, which led to a probationary term

and apparently a subsequent probation violation, which evidence was

inflammatory and bore no direct relevance to the circumstances of the offense or

the defendant‟s character and record (see § 190.3; Skipper v. South Carolina

(1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4-8; Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 112-166;

Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 528), and which further bore no relevance to the

testimony of her family members regarding their devastating loss of their loved


Finally, assuming defendant‟s right to present relevant mitigating evidence

included the “negative victim impact evidence” excluded below, we conclude

there is no reasonable possibility the penalty verdict would have been different had

defendant presented the additional evidence. (See People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38

Cal.4th 932, 961.) The jury convicted defendant of Gallagher‟s murder beyond a

reasonable doubt at the guilt phase. His Florida conviction of Cribbs‟s murder

was also proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, evidence of

his murder of Andy Lou Sutton in Louisiana and Linda Price in Mississippi was

before the jury at the penalty phase, as was evidence of his prior acts of violence

toward a former girlfriend that prompted her to leave the country in fear.

Moreover, defense counsel was given considerable leeway to refute the positive

victim impact evidence regarding Gallagher‟s career and family life through

vigorous cross-examination of witnesses before the trial court ruled that any

further such evidence would be excluded as unduly inflammatory, cumulative or

irrelevant to the circumstances of the offense or defendant‟s character and record.


(§ 190.3.) There is no reasonable possibility that presentation of additional

evidence in that same vein would have resulted in a different penalty verdict.

2. Refusal to instruct on lingering doubt.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury a

requested instruction on “lingering doubt” at the penalty phase. There was no

error. “Such an instruction is not required by the federal Constitution. (Franklin

v. Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164, 174.) „[W]e repeatedly have held that although it

is proper for the jury to consider lingering doubt, there is no requirement that the

court specifically instruct the jury that it may do so. [Citations.]‟ (People v.

Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1219.)” (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th

771, 826 (Thomas).)

The trial court did instruct the jury that in making its penalty determination,

it could consider “[t]he circumstances of the crime of which defendant was

convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstance

found to be true,” as well as “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the

gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any

sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant‟s character or record that the

defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to

the offense for which he is on trial.” (CALJIC No. 8.85.) “These instructions

sufficiently encompassed the concept of „lingering doubt,‟ and the trial court was

under no duty to give a more specific instruction. [Citations.]” (People v. Hines

(1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1068.)

Last, defense counsel was permitted to argue lingering doubt in his closing

argument to the jury, and he did so, informing the jurors they could consider any

lingering doubt on the question whether death was the appropriate penalty in this

case. (See People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1068.)


3. Constitutional challenges to death penalty statute.

Defendant contends that numerous features of California‟s death penalty

law, alone or in combination with each other, violate the federal Constitution

because the category of offenders who are eligible for the death penalty is

impermissibly broad and because there are insufficient safeguards in the penalty

phase process to ensure a reliable outcome. As he acknowledges, this court has

previously rejected each of his contentions.

In particular, he contends section 190.3, factor (a), and the jury instructions

pertaining to that factor, are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. He

additionally urges the following subclaims with regard to the death penalty statute

and accompanying instructions: (1) the penalty phase instructions are

unconstitutional in that they failed to assign to the State the burden of proving

beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an aggravating factor; (2) the State was

required to bear some burden of proof at the penalty phase, and if not, then the

jury should have been instructed there was no such burden; (3) the instructions

failed to required juror unanimity as to the aggravating factors and “unadjudicated

criminal activity”; (4) the instructions were impermissibly broad by providing that

the aggravating circumstances must be “so substantial” in comparison with the

mitigating factors; (5) the instructions failed to inform the jurors that the central

determination is whether death is the appropriate punishment; (6) the instructions

failed to inform the jury that if they determined that mitigation outweighed

aggravation they were required to return a sentence of life without the possibility

of parole; (7) the instructions failed to inform the jury that even if they determined

aggravation outweighed mitigation, they could still return a sentence of life

without the possibility of parole; (8) the instructions failed to inform the jury

regarding the standard of proof and lack of need for unanimity as to mitigating


circumstances; and (9) the instructions failed to inform the jury on the

presumption of life.

Defendant further contends that the federal Constitution requires the jury to

make written findings regarding the aggravating factors; that the instructions on

mitigating and aggravating factors were unconstitutional because they used

“restrictive adjectives in the list of potential mitigating factors,” failed to delete

inapplicable sentencing factors, and failed to inform the jury that “statutory

mitigating factors were relevant solely as potential mitigators”; that the absence of

intercase proportionality review from California‟s death penalty law violates the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be protected from the arbitrary and

capricious imposition of the death penalty; and that California‟s death penalty law

violates the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution because noncapital

defendants are afforded more procedural safeguards than are capital defendants.

Each of the foregoing claims has been repeatedly rejected by this court.

(See, e.g., Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 835-836, and citations therein to

decisions rejecting each specified claim on their merits.) Defendant offers no

sound reasons for this court to reconsider those decisions here.

Defendant also urges that California‟s death penalty statute violates

international law and norms of decency. That claim too has been repeatedly

rejected by this court. (Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 837; People v. Jennings

(2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 690; People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 82, 403-404.)

4. Cumulative prejudice.

We have found one instance of instructional error at the guilt phase, the

giving of CALJIC No. 2.15 on possession of stolen property as it related to the

murder and arson charges, but found the error harmless. We have found no

penalty phase errors. Accordingly, contrary to defendant‟s final argument, we


have no occasion here to make an assessment of the cumulative impact of multiple

guilt and/or penalty phase errors on the penalty determination reached in this case.


The judgment is affirmed.






I agree entirely with the majority opinion, which I have signed. I write

separately only to comment on defendant‟s argument that the trial court erred in

admitting, at the guilt phase, evidence of two uncharged murders. (See maj. opn.,

ante, at pp. 34-44.) In my view, admitting evidence of only two uncharged

murders, and only for a limited purpose, was unnecessarily favorable to defendant.

The evidence presented at the guilt and penalty phases shows that

defendant committed four murders in four different states over a six-week period:

the charged murder in California and later uncharged murders in Mississippi,

Florida, and Louisiana. But the trial court admitted at the guilt phase evidence of

only two of the uncharged murders — those committed in Florida and Louisiana.

Evidence of the Mississippi murder was not presented until the penalty phase.

Moreover, the court instructed the guilt phase jury it could consider the two

uncharged murders solely on the question of intent. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 2, fn.

2, 36, fn. 3, 37 & fn. 4.)

The trial court had discretion, however, to admit evidence of all three

uncharged murders on the question of defendant‟s identity as the killer.

The following facts alone provide a compelling inference that defendant

committed all four murders: Within a six week period four women in four

different states on four different occasions were murdered shortly after they met

defendant, previously a stranger to them, in a bar and socialized with him; and


defendant suddenly disappeared from the area at precisely the time each murder

occurred. (As the majority opinion explains (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 36-38), there

were yet other similarities among the murders.) I can conceive of only two

possible scenarios consistent with defendant‟s not being the killer under these

circumstances, both unreasonable: (1) Another person, who left behind no

evidence of his or her existence, followed defendant from state to state and

murdered the women with whom defendant began to socialize at just the time he

chose to leave the area; or (2) it is sheer coincidence that each of the four women

was murdered by someone else shortly after defendant began socializing with

them, and that defendant happened to disappear at precisely the time of each

murder. Perhaps one might accept as coincidence two murders in two different

states under these circumstances. But when the third and then the fourth murders

are added, coincidence cannot be a reasonable explanation.

The compelling — and entirely legitimate — inference from these facts is

that defendant committed all four murders, including the charged California

murder. The evidence “ „virtually eliminates the possibility that anyone other than

the defendant committed the charged offense.‟ ” (People v. Gray (2005) 37

Cal.4th 168, 203.) These similarities “lead[] to the reasonable inference that

defendant was the person who committed all three [here, four] crimes.” (People v.

Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 748.)

Because the trial court had discretion to admit evidence of all three

uncharged murders for all purposes, including identity, it certainly did not err to

defendant‟s prejudice by admitting evidence of only two of those murders for

limited purposes. Accordingly, I agree with the court‟s rejection of defendant‟s

arguments to the contrary.



See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Rogers

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal XXX
Original Proceeding
Review Granted

Rehearing Granted


Opinion No.
Date Filed: July 25, 2013

County: Los Angeles
Judge: Jacqueline A. Connor


William Hassler, under appointment by the Supreme Court; and Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender,
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, John R. Gorey, G. Tracey Letteau
and Keith H. Borjon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

William Hassler
P.O. Box 2708
Mckinleyville, CA 95519
(7070) 362-1485

Keith H. Borjon
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 897-2366

Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Thu, 07/25/2013S080840