IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Ct.App. 2/4 B141201
RODNEY DAMON RELIFORD,
Los Angeles County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. BA132911
In People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903 (Falsetta), we rejected a due
process challenge to Evidence Code section 1108, which allows evidence of the
defendant’s uncharged sex crimes to be introduced in a sex offense prosecution to
demonstrate the defendant’s disposition to commit such crimes. We also found
that the trial court there had properly declined to give defendant’s special limiting
instruction and announced that “[i]n future cases, defendants may request an
instruction based on revised CALJIC No. 2.50.01 (1999 rev.) [(6th ed. pocket
pt.)], which contains language appropriate for cases involving the admission of
disposition evidence.” (Falsetta, supra, at p. 922.) “Without passing on each
specific paragraph, or considering issues not before us, we think revised CALJIC
No. 2.50.01 adequately sets forth the controlling principles under section 1108.”
(Id. at p. 924.)
Instead of clarifying the law, however, the dictum approving the 1999
revised CALJIC No. 2.50.01 spawned considerable debate in the Courts of
Appeal. Now that the issue is squarely presented here, we conclude that the
Falsetta dictum was correct and that the 1999 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01
correctly states the law. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal, albeit on
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
M.S. met defendant in early August 1991 at a Hollywood dance club. They
dated and had a brief sexual relationship before she moved out of state. In 1993,
M.S. moved back to Los Angeles. Between May 1993 and March 1996, she
occasionally ran into defendant at sporting events and parties but exchanged only a
few words with him.
On March 8, 1996, M.S. went to the Hollywood club with a female friend.
Defendant was at the club, too, but she spoke with him only briefly and kept
moving. In the parking lot, after the club had closed, defendant grabbed her arm
and demanded she go with him to get something to eat. He pushed her into his car
and locked the door. Her purse and keys were still in her friend’s car.
While defendant drove, he reminded her of “the time that we shared in ‘91”
and said he loved her. After she complained that her friend was waiting for her
back at the club, defendant increased the music volume. Eventually, he said the
car was running out of gas and pulled onto the shoulder. Defendant used his cell
phone to ask someone to call the American Automobile Association. M.S. then
borrowed defendant’s cell phone to call her girlfriend but could not reach her.
When she tried to call her father, defendant unplugged the phone.
Defendant put his hand on her leg and said he was going to “take what’s
mine, what’s mine. I remember how it felt back in 1991, and I’m going to feel
that same feeling again.” Despite her protestations, he raped her. M.S. tried to
resist, but he was twice her size and restrained her arms. Defendant stopped only
when the tow truck arrived. After putting some gas in the car, defendant offered
to drive her home. M.S. trusted him, believing “he had already done what he had
wanted to do.” But, instead of taking her home, defendant drove around again,
parked, and said, “I’m not going to let you go home until you fuck me the way I
want you to fuck me.” He forced her into the back seat, inserted his finger into her
vagina, took it out, and inserted it once more into her vagina and then into her
anus. Next, he inserted his penis into her vagina and told her to “start moving.”
When M.S. refused to cooperate, defendant pulled her hair and slapped her. M.S.
was too weak and tired to escape but, with one last effort, she was able to scratch
defendant’s face, which evidently caused him to withdraw.
During the drive to M.S.’s house, defendant told her she was still his
“homegirl” and acted as though nothing had happened. M.S. ran, crying, to the
bathroom when she got home and told her mother that defendant had raped her.
She had scratches and bruises on her arms and legs. They went directly to the
hospital, where M.S. reported the crime to the police.
The defense contended the acts were consensual.
The jury also heard evidence that defendant had previously been convicted
of assaulting another woman with the intent to commit rape. On August 11, 1991,
S.B and her friends went to a dance club in Los Angeles and then arranged to meet
at a nearby Denny’s Restaurant. Defendant offered to drive S.B., and she
accepted. After S.B. got into the car, defendant announced he first needed to stop
by a friend’s house. He told her to wait in the car. After defendant returned to the
car, he said he needed to stop by his house to get money. She accompanied him
into the apartment complex. He pulled her into a dirty apartment, where “bitch”
and “fuck you” were spray-painted on the walls. He picked her up and carried her
into a room with a mattress on the floor. S.B. was very much afraid and screamed,
but defendant put his hand over her mouth, got on top of her, and tried to spread
her legs. S.B. kicked him and tried to get him off as he struggled to remove her
one-piece outfit, but he was too heavy. When she told him she was menstruating,
he said he would let her go if she “jacked him off.” After defendant ejaculated, he
told her to wash her face and hands and said he would take her to Denny’s. As
they walked out of the apartment, defendant acted like a “gentleman.” As soon as
he opened the car door, however, S.B. grabbed her purse and keys and fled. She
waited until defendant drove away and then called 911.
Defendant was convicted of forcible rape of M.S. (Pen. Code, § 261, subd.
(a)(2)) and of two counts of sexual penetration by a foreign object (id., § 289,
subd. (a)) and sentenced as a second strike offender to a total term of 37 years in
prison. In a published opinion affirming the judgment, the Court of Appeal held
the trial court had erred in instructing the jury with the 1999 revised version of
CALJIC No. 2.50.01 but deemed the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant petitioned for review. The Attorney General also petitioned for
review to challenge the Court of Appeal’s holding that the instruction violated the
federal Constitution. We granted both petitions.
The 1999 revised version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01, as modified in this case,
“Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the
defendant engaged in a sexual offense other than that charged in the case.
“ ‘Sexual offense’ means a crime under the laws of a state or of the United
States that involves any of the following:
“Contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of the defendant
and any part of another person’s body.
“If you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense in 1991
involving S[.]B[.], you may, but are not required to, infer that the defendant had a
disposition to commit the same or similar type sexual offenses. If you find that the
defendant had this disposition, you may, but are not required to, infer that he was
likely to commit and did commit the crime of which he is accused.
“However, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant committed a prior sexual offense in 1991 involving S[.]B[.], that is not
sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the
charged crime. The weight and significance of the evidence, if any, are for you to
“You must not consider this evidence for any other purpose.”
Defendant offers two objections to the 1999 version of CALJIC No.
2.50.01: (1) the instruction is “likely to mislead the jury concerning the
supposedly limited purpose for which they may consider the prior crimes
evidence,” and (2) the instruction is “likely to mislead the jury concerning . . . the
prosecution’s burden of proof.” We reject both contentions.
The first part of the instruction permits jurors to infer the defendant has a
disposition to commit sex crimes from evidence the defendant has committed
other sex offenses. The inference is a reasonable one.1 As we stated in Falsetta,
“evidence that [the defendant] committed other sex offenses is at least
circumstantially relevant to the issue of his disposition or propensity to commit
these offenses.” (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 915.) Prior to the enactment of
Evidence Code section 1108, evidence showing the defendant’s disposition was
excluded “ ‘ “not because it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has
too much.” ’ ” (Ibid.) With the enactment of section 1108, however, trial courts
We are not presented with, and do not decide, whether the uncharged sex
acts must be similar to the charged offenses in order to support the inference. (See
Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th 903, 926 (conc. opn. of Brown, J.).)
may no longer deem such evidence unduly prejudicial per se, but must instead
engage in a careful weighing process under Evidence Code section 352. Thus,
when the evidence is admissible, it may support an inference—as the instruction
provides—that the defendant is predisposed to commit sex offenses.
The instruction next informs the jurors they may—but are not required to—
infer from this predisposition that the defendant was likely to commit and did
commit the charged offense. This, again, is a legitimate inference. A jury may
use “the evidence of prior sex crimes to find that defendant had a propensity to
commit such crimes, which in turn may show that he committed the charged
offenses.” (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 923; id. at p. 920 [“evidence of a
defendant’s other sex offenses constitutes relevant circumstantial evidence that he
committed the charged sex offenses”].)
Defendant complains that, having found the uncharged sex offense true by
a preponderance of the evidence, jurors would rely on “this alone” to convict him
of the charged offenses. The problem with defendant’s argument is that the
instruction nowhere tells the jury it may rest a conviction solely on evidence of
prior offenses. Indeed, the instruction’s next sentence says quite the opposite: “if
you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed a prior
sexual offense . . . , that is not sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he committed the charged crime.” The jury, of course, was instructed
to consider the instructions “as a whole” (CALJIC No. 1.01), just as we must view
a challenged portion “in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial
record” to determine “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has
applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.”
(Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72; accord, People v. Holt (1997) 15
Cal.4th 619, 677.) Viewed in this way, the instructions could not have been
interpreted to authorize a guilty verdict based solely on proof of uncharged
conduct. (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 923 [CALJIC No. 2.50.01
“incorporates” the admonition “not to convict defendant solely in reliance on the
evidence that he committed prior sex offenses”].)
We find additional support for our conclusion from other instructions the
jury received. For each offense, the jury was instructed that a guilty verdict
requires a union or joint operation of act or conduct and the requisite intent.
(CALJIC Nos. 3.30, 3.31, 10.65.) The jury was also instructed as to the elements
of each charged offense and told that a conviction required proof of “each” of
those elements. (CALJIC Nos. 10.00, 10.30.) No reasonable juror would believe
those requirements could be satisfied solely by proof of uncharged offenses. Even
the Court of Appeal deemed the fact “that defendant committed the previous crime
is not enough, by itself, to prove that he committed the charged offense” a
“truism.” (See also People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129 [jury is “fully
equipped” to assess a factual insufficiency of proof], adhering to Griffin v. United
States (1991) 502 U.S. 46.) Or, as other courts have stated, a conviction based
solely on the uncharged conduct is “a logical impossibility.” (People v. James
(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1354.) Defendant fails to explain how a juror could
reasonably interpret the instructions to permit a finding that defendant inserted his
finger into the victim’s vagina and anus against her will and then raped her—
without considering any of the evidence of those offenses.
The Court of Appeal contended this illogical route to conviction was
impliedly endorsed by the instruction’s penultimate sentence: “The weight and
significance of the evidence, if any, are for you to decide.” This sentence,
according to the court, “seems to suggest that the jury has the option of placing
greater weight and significance on evidence of the prior sexual offenses to satisfy
the higher standard needed to convict the defendant of the charged offense.” It
seems abundantly clear to us, however, that the instruction adequately confines the
weight and significance of uncharged offenses within constitutional bounds by
warning, in the immediately preceding sentence, that the uncharged offense is “not
sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] committed
the charged crime.” Jurors would reasonably understand that the weight and
significance they may accord this evidence must stay within these parameters.
The Court of Appeal’s analysis also fails to note the distinction between
“evidence,” which was defined for the jury as “testimony of witnesses, writings,
material objects, or anything presented to the senses and offered to prove the
existence or non-existence of a fact,” and an “inference,” which was defined as “a
deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or
group of facts established by the evidence.” (CALJIC No. 2.00.) Under CALJIC
No. 2.50.01, evidence of the uncharged offense may support the inference that
defendant had a disposition to commit the charged offense which, in turn, may
support the inference that he was likely to commit and did commit the charged
offense. The Court of Appeal erred by conflating the two and construing the
instruction as though it read “the weight and significance of this inference are for
you to decide.” By providing instead that the weight and significance of the
evidence was “for you to decide,” the instruction merely reiterates that the jury
may, but is not required to, draw the inferences described. (Cf. People v. Catlin
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 146-147 [rejecting analogous challenge to CALJIC No.
2.50]; see generally Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157 [a
permissive inference “allows—but does not require”—the trier of fact of draw the
Defendant criticizes the instruction for failing to inform jurors that the
inference they may draw from prior sexual offenses is simply one item to consider,
along with all other evidence, in determining whether the defendant has been
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crime. Although
defendant correctly states the law—indeed, an equivalent sentence is included in
the 2002 revised version of the instruction—the constitutionality of the instruction
does not depend on this sentence.2 By telling jurors that evidence of prior
offenses is insufficient to prove defendant’s guilt of the charged offenses beyond a
reasonable doubt, jurors necessarily understand that they must consider all the
other evidence before convicting defendant. Indeed, they were instructed
explicitly to “consider all of the evidence bearing upon every issue regardless of
who produced it.” (CALJIC No. 2.50.2.)
We likewise reject defendant’s contention that the instruction “implies by
way of a negative pregnant that prior sex offenses proved beyond a reasonable
doubt are indeed sufficient to prove the present offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.” As we explained above, no juror could reasonably interpret the
instructions to authorize conviction of a charged offense based solely on proof of
an uncharged sexual offense. It is not possible, for example, to find each element
of the charged crimes, as the jury was instructed to do before returning a guilty
verdict, based solely on the 1991 offense. Nor is it possible to find a union or joint
operation of act or conduct and the requisite intent for each charged crime, as the
jury was also instructed to do. Hence, no reasonable jury could have been misled
in this regard. (Cf. People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 677 [rejecting analogous
challenge to CALJIC No. 2.15].)
The instruction’s last point is that the prosecution has the burden to
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant committed the
In any event, omission of the cautionary sentence was not error in this case,
inasmuch as defendant did not request its inclusion, and the trial court had no sua
sponte duty to supply it. (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 924; see generally
People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 327-328.)
uncharged sex offense. Some Courts of Appeal—including the one below—have
feared that a jury might interpret the instruction to permit conviction of the
charged offenses under the preponderance-of-the evidence standard.
We do not find it reasonably likely a jury could interpret the instructions to
authorize conviction of the charged offenses based on a lowered standard of proof.
Nothing in the instructions authorized the jury to use the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard for anything other than the preliminary determination whether
defendant committed a prior sexual offense in 1991 involving S.B. The
instructions instead explained that, in all other respects, the People had the burden
of proving defendant guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt.” (CALJIC Nos. 2.61,
2.90; see CALJIC No. 10.65.) Any other reading would have rendered the
reference to reasonable doubt a nullity. In addition, the jury was told that
circumstantial evidence could support a finding of guilt of the charged offenses
only if the proved circumstances could not be reconciled with any other rational
conclusion (CALJIC No. 2.02)—which is merely another way of restating the
reasonable-doubt standard. (See People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 383.)
The jury thus would have understood that a conviction that relied on inferences to
be drawn from defendant’s prior offense would have to be proved beyond a
We likewise reject the Court of Appeal’s assertion that the instruction, even
if correct, is too “complicated” for jurors to apply. This is not the first time jurors
have been asked to apply a different standard of proof to a predicate fact or finding
in a criminal trial. (E.g., CALJIC Nos. 2.50 [evidence of other crimes under
Evidence Code section 1101], 4.43 [necessity defense], 4.60 [entrapment], 4.74
[statute of limitations], 6.24 [admissibility of coconspirator’s statements], 7.73
[failure to file tax returns in prior years], 12.06 [lawful possession of controlled
substance].) As we do in each of those circumstances, we will presume here that
jurors can grasp their duty—as stated in the instructions—to apply the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to the preliminary fact identified in the
instruction and to apply the reasonable-doubt standard for all other determinations.
Although we find no constitutional error in the 1999 version of the
instruction, we nonetheless recognize it could be improved. The 2002 revision to
CALJIC No. 2.50.01 deletes the sentence, “The weight and significance of the
evidence, if any, are for you to decide” and inserts an additional cautionary
statement: “If you determine an inference properly can be drawn from this
evidence, this inference is simply one item for you to consider, along with all other
evidence, in determining whether the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the charged crime.” Without passing on issues not before
us—and mindful of the risk that our comments will again be misconstrued—we
think the new sentence is an improvement. It provides additional guidance on the
permissible use of the other-acts evidence and reminds the jury of the standard of
proof for a conviction of the charged offenses.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J.
At issue here is the 1999 revision of CALJIC No. 2.50.01, a jury instruction
on how to weigh evidence that has been introduced to show that a defendant has
committed a sexual offense other than the one charged. According to the majority,
this instruction “correctly states the law.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.) I, however,
am of the view that the instruction is ambiguous and potentially confusing.
The trial court here gave this instruction: “Evidence has been introduced
for the purpose of showing that the defendant engaged in a sexual offense other
than that charged in this case. [¶] . . . [¶] If you find that the defendant
committed a prior sexual offense . . . you may, but are not required to, infer that
the defendant had a disposition to commit the same or similar type sexual
offenses. If you find that the defendant had this disposition, you may, but are not
required to, infer that he was likely to and did commit the crime of which he was
accused. [¶] However, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant committed a prior sexual offense . . . , that is not sufficient by itself to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the charged crime. The
weight and significance of the evidence, if any, are for you to decide.” (Italics
added.) The instruction is a slightly modified version of the 1999 revision of
CALJIC No. 2.50.01; none of the modifications is pertinent here.
The instruction’s italicized sentence is potentially misleading. It suggests
that the jury can rely on a defendant’s prior sexual offense as the sole basis for
convicting him of the charged offense, so long as the jury finds the prior offense
true by a higher standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence. To the
contrary, a prior offense, standing alone, is legally insufficient to sustain a
conviction for the charged offense, as we explained in People v. Falsetta (1999)
21 Cal.4th 903. There, we said that when the prosecution in a case charging the
defendant with a sex offense relies on evidence that the defendant committed other
sexual offenses, the evidence of the other offenses “is not sufficient by itself to
prove his commission of the charged offense . . . .” (Id. at p. 920.)
According to the majority here, the ambiguity in the instruction cannot
cause jury confusion because to convict a defendant of a sexual crime based solely
on evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual offense is a “ ‘logical impossibility.’ ”
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.) Not true, as this example illustrates: A man sexually
assaults a woman. She cannot identify her assailant because, for example, the
assault occurs at night in an unlit room, she is blind or blindfolded, or the assailant
wears a mask. The prosecution offers proof that the defendant, who is charged
with the offense, has committed an uncharged sex crime, but it presents no
evidence that the jury finds credible that he committed the charged offense. If
given the instruction at issue here, a jury hearing such evidence might well
conclude – although improperly so – that it could convict the defendant based
solely on the uncharged crime, so long as that offense was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thus, contrary to the majority’s view, a conviction of a sexual
offense based solely on proof of a defendant’s prior sexual offense is not a “logical
In this case, however, there is no reasonable likelihood that the ambiguous
language in CALJIC No. 2.50.01 misled the jury. (See People v. Clair (1992) 2
Cal.4th 629, 662-663 [“reasonable likelihood” standard applies when reviewing
claims of ambiguous jury instructions].) The prosecution relied primarily on the
testimony of the victim, M. S., rather than on evidence that defendant had
committed a prior sex offense. Defendant did not deny having sexual relations
with M. S., claiming only that she consented. The prosecutor never suggested that
the jury could find defendant guilty based solely on his prior offense if it found
beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed that offense. On these facts, the
ambiguous language in CALJIC No. 2.50.01 could not have prejudiced defendant.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion People v. Reliford
Date Filed: February 10, 2003
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Michelle R. Rosenblatt
Attorneys for Appellant:Jonathan P. Milberg, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Attorneys for Respondent:Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Marc E. Turchin,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec,
Lawrence M. Daniels, Lance E. Winters, Valerie A. Baker and Theresa A. Cochrane, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):Jonathan P. Milberg
300 North Lake Avenue, Suite 520
Pasadena, CA 91101
Theresa A. Cochrane
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA 90013
|1||Reliford, Rodney Damon (Defendant and Appellant)|
Represented by Jonathan P. Milberg
300 North Lake Avenue, Suite 250
|2||The People (Plaintiff and Respondent)|
|Feb 10 2003||Opinion: Affirmed|
|Dec 21 2001||Petition for review filed|
counsel for appellant Reliford
|Dec 24 2001||2nd petition for review filed|
counsel for respondent The People
|Dec 24 2001||Record requested|
|Jan 2 2002||Second Record Request|
|Jan 8 2002||Received letter from:|
counsel for appellant dated Jan 7, 2002 advising court of a recent opinion.
|Jan 10 2002||Received Court of Appeal record|
|Feb 13 2002||Petition for Review Granted (criminal case)|
For purposes of briefing and argument, Respondent is deemed petitioner to this court. Votes: George C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin & Moreno JJ.
|Mar 5 2002||Counsel appointment order filed|
Jonathan Milberg is hereby appointed to represent appellant on his appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits shall be served and filed on or before thirty days from the date respondent's opening brief on the merits is filed.
|Mar 12 2002||Request for extension of time filed|
to file opening brief/merits [repondent/ people]
|Mar 19 2002||Extension of time granted|
To April 15, 2002 to file respondent's Opening Brief on the Merits.
|Apr 12 2002||Opening brief on the merits filed|
|May 7 2002||Request for extension of time filed|
by counsel for appellant Rodney Damon Reliford to file answer brief to June 11, 2002
|May 9 2002||Extension of time granted|
To June 11, 2002 to file appellant's answer brief on the merits.
|Jun 7 2002||Request for extension of time filed|
appellant (Rodney Damon Reliford) request to July 11, 2002 to file answer brief on the merits. faxed to sf
|Jun 12 2002||Extension of time granted|
To July 10, 2002 to file appellant's answer brief on the merits.
|Jul 10 2002||Request for extension of time filed|
counsel for appellant request to August 9, 2002 to file anwer brief on the merits. faxed to sf
|Jul 22 2002||Extension of time granted|
To August 9, 2002 to file appellant's answer brief on the merits.
|Aug 9 2002||Request for extension of time filed|
to file answer/brief merits to Aug 23rd. faxed sf.
|Aug 14 2002||Extension of time granted|
On application of appellant and in light of counsel' showing of extraordinary circumstances, the request for a final extension of time to file appellant's answer brief on the merits is hereby granted to and including August 23, 2002.
|Aug 22 2002||Answer brief on the merits filed|
counsel for appellant
|Sep 5 2002||Request for extension of time filed|
counsel request to October 11, 2002 to file reply brief on the merits. faxed to sf
|Sep 6 2002||Extension of time granted|
To October 11, 2002 to file respondent's reply brief on the merits. No further extensions are contemplated.
|Oct 11 2002||Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)|
|Oct 16 2002||Compensation awarded counsel|
|Oct 31 2002||Case ordered on calendar|
12-4-02, 1:30pm, L.A.
|Dec 4 2002||Cause argued and submitted|
|Feb 10 2003||Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full|
Majority Opinion by Baxter, J., ----- Joined by George, CJ., Werdegar, Chin, Brown and Moreno, JJ. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Kennard, J.,
|Mar 19 2003||Compensation awarded counsel|
|Mar 25 2003||Remittitur issued (criminal case)|
|Apr 1 2003||Received:|
Receipt for Remittitur from 2 DCA. Div 4.
|Apr 12 2002||Opening brief on the merits filed|
|Aug 22 2002||Answer brief on the merits filed|
|Oct 11 2002||Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)|