Supreme Court of California Justia
Citation 45 Cal.4th 980- original opinion 45 Cal.4th 1062b- opinion modified on March 18, 2009- no change in judgment.

People v. Ramirez

Filed 2/26/09

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S156775
v.
) Ct.App.
5
F050212
JESSIE JOSE RAMIREZ,
Madera
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. MCR021366

Here we hold that grossly negligent discharge of a firearm (Pen. Code,
§ 246.3, subd. (a))1 is a necessarily included offense of discharge of a firearm at an
inhabited dwelling (§ 246).2
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
Several Chowchilla police officers went to an apartment where a man was
reportedly holding a gun to a woman’s head. After the officers identified
themselves and ordered the occupants to come out, Sergeant David Noblett
knocked on the front window. Immediately, a shotgun was fired through the

1
We will refer to this offense as “grossly negligent shooting” and to the
statute as section 246.3(a). Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
We will refer to this offense as “shooting at an inhabited dwelling.”
3
Because we have limited review to a narrow legal question, we have
condensed the factual background from the Court of Appeal’s opinion. We accept
the Court of Appeal’s statement of facts unless a party calls the Court of Appeal’s
attention to any alleged omission or misstatement in a petition for rehearing. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2).) Neither party here sought rehearing.
1


window. Noblett was not struck, but was knocked backwards by the blast and hit
with glass. He took cover behind a car. Two to six more shots were fired from the
window.
Defendant’s wife Samantha briefly emerged carrying their five-year-old
daughter, but returned to the apartment with the child. Two or three more shots
were fired from the window; additional shots came from a rear window.
The officers again ordered the occupants to come out. Samantha did so.
But after she set the child on the ground and told her to go to the officers,
Samantha went back inside. Chief Jay Varney picked up the child and ran for
cover.
After several more shots came from inside the apartment, Samantha again
emerged, saying that defendant had put down his gun. Defendant then came out
with his hands up. He said, “I am your man, the gun’s on the couch.”
Some shots fired during the standoff struck three neighboring apartments.
In one, a slug pierced three walls. The bedroom where an eight-month-old girl
was sleeping was in the pathway of the one-ounce projectile. In another
apartment, shotgun pellets broke a window and hit the living room wall. An
occupant sustained a minor injury.
Defendant testified that, although he fired through the window after hearing
the police officers knock and identify themselves, he was not shooting at them.
Defendant was convicted, inter alia, of 10 counts of grossly negligent
shooting and three counts of shooting at an inhabited dwelling.4 While the record

4
Defendant was also convicted of the attempted murder of Officer Noblett
(§§ 187, 664), assault with a firearm on Noblett (§ 245), being a felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)), and child endangerment (§ 273a,
subd. (a)).
An enhancement for participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)) applied to all but the child endangerment conviction. This enhancement
was based on testimony that defendant was a member of a criminal street gang,

(footnote continued on next page)
2


would support a higher number, the Court of Appeal assumed that defendant fired
only 10 shots, based on the fact that 10 spent shells were found in defendant’s
apartment. Here, the parties agree that three of the grossly negligent shooting
counts and the three counts of shooting at an inhabited dwelling were based on the
same acts.
Defendant was sentenced to 15 years to life, plus 30 years four months.
Defendant contends that three of the grossly negligent shooting convictions
must be reversed because that crime is a lesser included offense of shooting at an
inhabited dwelling. The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment.
We reverse the judgment as to three of the grossly negligent shooting counts.
II. DISCUSSION
In California, a single act or course of conduct can lead to convictions “of
any number of the offenses charged.” (§ 954; see People v. Montoya (2004) 33
Cal.4th 1031, 1034 (Montoya).) However, a judicially created exception to this
rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.
(People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 692; People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d
351, 355.)
There are two tests for determining whether one offense is necessarily
included in another: the “elements” test and the “accusatory pleading” test. (See
generally People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 288.) We apply the “elements”
test here because this case involves the conviction of multiple alternative charged
offenses. “Courts should consider [both] the statutory elements and accusatory

(footnote continued from previous page)

that gang members achieve status through acts of violence, and that killing a
police officer confers the highest status.
The attempted murder and assault counts were also enhanced by personal
use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and personal and intentional discharge of a
firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (c)).
3


pleading in deciding whether a defendant received notice, and therefore may be
convicted, of an uncharged crime, but only the statutory elements in deciding
whether a defendant may be convicted of multiple charged crimes.” (People v.
Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1231.) Under the “elements” test, we look strictly to
the statutory elements, not to the specific facts of a given case. (See, e.g., People
v. Murphy (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 979, 983-984.) We inquire whether all the
statutory elements of the lesser offense are included within those of the greater
offense. In other words, if a crime cannot be committed without also committing a
lesser offense, the latter is a necessarily included offense. (Montoya, supra, 33
Cal.4th at p. 1034; Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 288.)
Defendant contends that the crime of shooting at an inhabited dwelling
(§ 246) cannot be committed without also committing a grossly negligent shooting
(§ 246.3(a)). He is correct.
Section 246 provides in pertinent part: “Any person who shall maliciously
and willfully discharge a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house . . . is guilty of a
felony . . . . [¶] As used in this section, ‘inhabited’ means currently being used for
dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not.”5

5
In full, section 246 provides: “Any person who shall maliciously and
willfully discharge a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house, occupied building,
occupied motor vehicle, occupied aircraft, inhabited housecar, as defined in
Section 362 of the Vehicle Code, or inhabited camper, as defined in Section 243 of
the Vehicle Code, is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for three, five, or seven years, or by imprisonment
in the county jail for a term of not less than six months and not exceeding one
year. [¶] As used in this section, ‘inhabited’ means currently being used for
dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not.”
4


The elements of this offense are (1) acting willfully and maliciously, and
(2) shooting at an inhabited house. (See Judicial Council of Cal. Crim. Jury
Instns. (2008) CALCRIM No. 965.)6
Section 246.3(a) provides: “Except as otherwise authorized by law, any
person who willfully discharges a firearm in a grossly negligent manner which
could result in injury or death to a person is guilty of a public offense and shall be
punished by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by
imprisonment in the state prison.”
The parties agree that the elements of section 246.3(a) are: “(1) the
defendant unlawfully discharged a firearm; (2) the defendant did so intentionally;
(3) the defendant did so in a grossly negligent manner which could result in the
injury or death of a person.” (People v. Alonzo (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 535, 538
(Alonzo); see CALCRIM No. 970.)
This case created a conflict in the Courts of Appeal as to whether a
violation of section 246 necessarily includes a violation of section 246.3(a). In
People v. Overman (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1344 (Overman), the Court of Appeal
concluded that it does.
The
Overman court reasoned that shooting at an inhabited building is
grossly negligent because a significant risk of injury or death is foreseeable.
(Overman, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1362.) “Unlike section 246, section 246.3
does not require that an inhabited dwelling, occupied building, or any other
specific target be in the defendant’s firing range. But like section 246, section
246.3 involves discharge of a firearm under circumstances presenting a significant
risk that personal injury or death will result. Section 246 proscribes discharging a
firearm at specific targets, the act of which presumably presents a significant risk

6
A violation of section 246 is a general intent crime. (People v. Watie
(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 866, 879; People v. Jischke (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 552,
556; People v. Froom (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 820, 826.)
5


that personal injury or death will result. Section 246.3 proscribes discharging a
firearm in any grossly negligent manner which presents a significant risk that
personal injury or death will result. [¶] The only difference between sections 246
and 246.3 is that section 246 requires that a specific target (e.g., an inhabited
dwelling or an occupied building) be in the defendant's firing range. Section
[246.3] does not include this requirement. Both crimes, however, involve the
intentional discharge of a firearm in a grossly negligent manner which presents a
significant risk that personal injury or death will result.” (Ibid.)
The Attorney General disagrees. He contends that section 246.3(a), unlike
section 246, requires “the actual presence of a person in harm’s way.” He points
to the following italicized language in section 246.3(a): “Except as otherwise
authorized by law, any person who willfully discharges a firearm in a grossly
negligent manner which could result in injury or death to a person is guilty of a
public offense . . . .” (Italics added.)
This ambiguous phrase does not support the analytical leap the Attorney
General attempts. As we explain in greater detail below, the legislative history
confirms that the Legislature intended no requirement that an actual person be in
proximity to the grossly negligent shooting. The risk element of section 246.3 was
included to ensure that the statute would not apply to hunting or target practice in
remote locations, posing no foreseeable risk of human injury, based on abstract
theories of criminal negligence. The risk element requires the likely presence of
people in the area, not the actual presence of a specific person. Requiring the
prosecution to prove a particular person was present is impractical and was never
intended.
It is well settled that the proper goal of statutory construction “is to
ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, giving the words of the statute their
usual and ordinary meaning. When the statutory language is clear, we need go no
further. If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable
interpretation, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the objects to be
6
achieved, the evils to be remedied, legislative history, the statutory scheme of
which the statute is a part, contemporaneous administrative construction, and
questions of public policy. (In re Derrick B. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 535, 539.)”
(Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 783.)
Although he urges the statutory language is clear, the Attorney General
does not oppose defendant’s request that we consider the legislative history of
section 246.3(a). We have previously consulted that history in interpreting the
statute. (See People v. Robertson (2004) 34 Cal.4th 156, 167 (Robertson).)
The bill enacting section 246.3 was introduced in response to the
phenomenon of celebratory gunfire. “Section 246.3 was enacted primarily to deter
the dangerous practice that exists in some communities of discharging firearms
into the air in celebration of festive occasions. (People v. Clem [(2000)] 78
Cal.App.4th [346], 350; People v. Alonzo (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 535, 539-540
[referring to the crime as constituting a reckless act that endangers the public
directly and that also generates the risk of responsive gunfire].)” (Robertson,
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 167.)
According to the City of Los Angeles, “ ‘The practice of discharging a
firearm into the air is a dangerous and frequently fatal activity in some
communities of Los Angeles. Every New Years and Fourth of July, as well as
other times, brings new stories of innocent persons injured and killed by errant
bullets. Falling bullets can obtain a velocity sufficient to penetrate buildings and
vehicles and more than sufficient to cause severe injury or death, often at a
considerable distance from the point of firing.’ ” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen.
Floor Analyses, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3066 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) June
10, 1988.)
As originally introduced, the bill provided: “Except as specifically
authorized by law, any person who willfully discharges a firearm in any
incorporated city, or while in any public place, or in any prohibited area of an
7
unincorporated territory, as defined in Section 12031, is guilty of a felony.”
(Assem. Bill No. 3066 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 8, 1988, § 1.)
The bill was first amended to restrict its reach to certain cities and to
shootings that occurred “under circumstances or conditions likely to injure or kill
another person.” The fact that a shooting “occur[red] in the presence of others”
was to be “a factor to consider” in determining the likelihood of injury to another
person.7
The Attorney General agrees with defendant that this amendment and later
related amendments were “spurred by gun and defense advocates who were
concerned that the statute might ensnare hunters or citizens engaged in target
practice.” “The problem with the bill in its current form is that it could ostensibly
be construed to make felons out of citizens who want to shoot at tin cans or rabbits
from the road.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Republican Analysis of Assem.
Bill No. 3066 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 12, 1988.)
The bill was later amended to extend the statute’s reach beyond cities and
to require that injury or death of another be reasonably foreseeable.8 Another

7
The amended language read, “Except as specifically authorized by law, any
person who willfully discharges a firearm while in a city which has enacted an
ordinance prohibiting or restricting the discharge of a firearm within the
boundaries of the city without a police permit is guilty of a felony if the discharge
of that firearm occurs under circumstances or conditions likely to injure or kill
another person. The discharge of a firearm occurring in the presence of others
shall be a factor to consider as to whether the discharge of a firearm under those
instances constitutes a circumstance or condition likely to injure or kill another
person.” (Assem. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 3066 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) Mar.
10, 1988.)
8
“Except as otherwise authorized by law, any person who willfully
discharges a firearm under circumstances or conditions and in a manner which
reasonably could be foreseen by that person to result in injury or death to another
person is guilty of a felony.” (Assem. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 3066 (1987-
1988 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 24, 1988, § 1.)
8


amendment mandated that the willful shooting be done with gross negligence and
made the offense a “wobbler.”9
A fifth amended version was finally enacted, prohibiting willful shooting
“in a grossly negligent manner which could result in injury or death to a person.”
(Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 3066 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 11, 1988, §
1.)10
As the Attorney General notes, the first case to interpret section 246.3 was
Alonzo, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th 535. Alonzo shot a gun into the air while standing
in a busy parking lot. He argued that firing a gun straight up into the air was not
grossly negligent conduct within the meaning of section 246.3. The trial court’s
order setting aside the charge was reversed on appeal.
After reciting the purpose of the legislation and its history, the Alonzo court
concluded that defendant’s conduct violated section 246.3. “Since the Legislature
did not define ‘gross negligence’ for purposes of the statute, it appears from the
statutory language and the legislative history that it intended that term to have the
meaning commonly attributed to it in criminal law, but to criminalize such
conduct only if, under the circumstances, it actually had the potential for
culminating in personal injury or death.
“Gross negligence, as a basis for criminal liability, requires a showing that
the defendant’s act was ‘ “such a departure from what would be the conduct of an
ordinarily prudent or careful [person] under the same circumstances as to be

9
“Except as otherwise authorized by law, any person who willfully
discharges a firearm in a grossly negligent manner is guilty of a public offense and
shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by
imprisonment in the state prison.” (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 3066 (1987-
1988 Reg. Sess.) June 2, 1988, § 1.)
10
The fourth amendment declared that the bill was to take effect immediately
as an urgency statute. (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 3066 (1987-1988 Reg.
Sess.) June 16, 1988, § 3.)
9


incompatible with a proper regard for human life, or, in other words, a disregard of
human life or an indifference to consequences.” ’ (People v. Penny (1955) 44
Cal.2d 861, 879, quoting 26 Am.Jur., Homicide, § 210, p. 299; CALJIC No. 3.36.)
It is beyond dispute that shooting a gun in a commercial area where people are
present constitutes gross negligence under this definition.
“Therefore, the only remaining issue is whether respondent’s grossly
negligent behavior could have resulted in injury or death to a person. We have no
difficulty in concluding that it could. The shooting of a gun under the
circumstances presented in this case not only presented the possibility of hitting a
member of the public, it also presented the very real possibility that it would
generate responsive gunfire. The fact that the gun was pointed up in the air does
not change this reality. In fact, this was precisely the type of behavior that the
statute was intended to deter. The author of the bill explained that it ‘addresse[d]
the reckless and senseless discharge of weapons on holidays that resulted in the
death of at least 2 persons, . . . in the Los Angeles area alone.’ (Letter from Assem.
Richard Polanco to Gov. George Deukmejian for signature on Assem. Bill No.
3066, Sept. 12, 1988.) Therefore, the magistrate properly denied respondent’s
motion to set the charge aside.” (Alonzo, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at pp. 539-540.)
The Attorney General relies on Alonzo’s statement that the Legislature
intended section 246.3(a) to criminalize grossly negligent shooting “only if, under
the circumstances, it actually had the potential for culminating in personal injury
or death.” (Alonzo, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 539, italics added.) From this the
Attorney General argues that section 246.3(a), unlike section 246, requires “the
actual presence of a person in harm’s way.”11

11
A committee analysis of the final bill arguably supports the Attorney
General. It stated that the added language “which could result in injury or death”
“makes it clear that the discharge of the firearm must actually create a danger to a

(footnote continued on next page)
10


The argument fails both logically and factually. The question boils down
to this: In order to prove a violation of section 246.3(a), does the prosecution have
to show that an identifiable person was actually in danger of injury or death from
the defendant’s grossly negligent shooting, or is it sufficient to prove it was
reasonably foreseeable that human injury or death might result under the
circumstances? The latter interpretation is borne out by the legislative history.
The phenomenon that gave rise to the statute was celebratory gunfire in an urban
setting. It seems clear that the Legislature intended to proscribe such grossly
negligent conduct precisely because it could cause injury or death. Given this
reality, it is equally clear that the Legislature did not intend to require proof that a
given person was actually so endangered. Imposing such a burden on the
prosecution would render the statute largely unenforceable in the very
circumstances that prompted its enactment. No one knows where shots fired
recklessly into the air are likely to land.
Thus we conclude that section 246.3(a) is a necessarily included lesser
offense of section 246. Both offenses require that the defendant willfully fire a
gun. Although the mens rea requirements are somewhat differently described,
both are general intent crimes. The high probability of human death or personal
injury in section 246 is similar to, although greater than, the formulation of
likelihood in section 246.3(a), which requires that injury or death “could result.”
The only other difference between the two, and the basis for the more serious
treatment of a section 246 offense, is that the greater offense requires that an
inhabited dwelling or other specified object be within the defendant’s firing range.

(footnote continued from previous page)

person, instead of in the abstract.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Assem.
Bill No. 3066 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.), italics added.)
11


All the elements of section 246.3(a) are necessarily included in the more stringent
requirements of section 246.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. The matter is remanded
with directions to reverse three of the grossly negligent shooting counts.
CORRIGAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.

12


See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Ramirez
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion


Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 154 Cal.App.4th 1290
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S156775
Date Filed: February 26, 2009
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Madera
Judge: John W. DeGroot

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Joseph C. Shipp, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves and Dane R. Gillette, Chief
Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Janet E. Neely, Lloyd G.
Carter, Louis M. Vasquez and Brian Alvarez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Joseph C. Shipp
Post Office Box 20347
Oakland, CA 94620
(510) 530-9043

Brian Alvarez
Deputy Attorney General
2550 Mariposa Mall, Room 5090
Fresno, CA 93721
(559) 477-1671


Petition for review after the Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment of conviction of criminal offenses. The court limited review to the following issue: Is grossly negligent discharge of a firearm (Pen. Code, section 246.3) a lesser included offense of malicious and willful discharge of a firearm at an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, section 246)?

Opinion Information
Date:Citation:Docket Number:Category:Status:Cross Referenced Cases:
Thu, 02/26/200945 Cal.4th 980- original opinion 45 Cal.4th 1062b- opinion modified on March 18, 2009- no change in judgment.S156775Review - Criminal Appealclosed; remittitur issued

PEOPLE v. GARCIA (S157870)


Parties
1The People (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by Frank Brian Alvarez
Office of the Attorney General
2550 Mariposa Mall, Suite 5090
Fresno, CA

2Ramirez, Jessie Jose (Defendant and Appellant)
Pelican Bay State Prison
Represented by Joseph C. Shipp
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 20347
Oakland, CA


Disposition
Feb 26 2009Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Oct 1 2007Received premature petition for review
  Jessie Jose Ramirez, defendant and appellant by Joseph Shipp, CA-appointed counsel [Petition to be filed on October 9. 2007.)
Oct 9 2007Case start: Petition for review filed
 
Oct 9 2007Record requested
 
Oct 11 2007Received Court of Appeal record
  two doghouses
Nov 28 2007Time extended to grant or deny review
  The time for granting or denying review in the above-entitled matter is hereby extended to and including January 7, 2008, or the date upon which review is either granted or denied.
Dec 12 2007Petition for review granted; issues limited (criminal case)
  The petition for review is granted. The issue to be briefed and argued is limited to the following: Is grossly negligent discharge of a firearm (Pen. Code, ? 246.3) a lesser included offense of discharge of a firearm at an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, ? 246)? Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ.
Dec 28 2007Counsel appointment order filed
  Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, Joseph C. Shipp is hereby appointed to represent appellant on the appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits must be served and filed on or before 30 days from the date of this order.
Jan 18 2008Opening brief on the merits filed
  Jessie Ramirez, defendant and appellant Joseph Shipp, appointed counsel
Jan 18 2008Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  Jessie Ramirez, defendant and appellant with one volume of appendix
Feb 14 2008Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Shipp
Feb 19 2008Request for extension of time filed
  For respondent to file the answer brief on the merits, to 3-20-08.
Feb 21 2008Extension of time granted
  On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including March 20, 2008.
Mar 17 2008Answer brief on the merits filed
  the People, plaintiff and respondent Brian Alvarez, Dep. A.G.
Mar 27 2008Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  Jessie Jose Ramirez, appellant by Joseph Shipp, counse.
Dec 10 2008Case ordered on calendar
  to be argued on Thursday, January 8, 2009, at 1:30 p.m., in San Francisco
Jan 9 2009Cause argued and submitted
 
Feb 25 2009Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
 
Feb 26 2009Opinion filed: Judgment reversed
  The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions to reverse three of the grossly negligent shooting counts. Majority Opinion by Corrigan, J. -----joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin and Moreno, JJ.
Mar 3 2009Request for modification of opinion filed
  Jessie Ramirez, defendant and appellant Joseph Shipp, counsel
Mar 18 2009Request for modification granted
 
Mar 18 2009Opinion modified - no change in judgment
 
Mar 19 2009Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Shipp
Apr 2 2009Remittitur issued
 

Briefs
Jan 18 2008Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Mar 17 2008Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Mar 27 2008Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website