Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 7/8/04

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S104862
v.
) Ct.App.
C033593
CLYDE MOSBY,
) Sacramento
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. 99F03070

Thirty years ago this court held that before accepting a criminal defendant’s
admission of a prior conviction, the trial court must advise the defendant and
obtain waivers of (1) the right to a trial to determine the fact of the prior
conviction, (2) the right to remain silent, and (3) the right to confront adverse
witnesses. (In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 863.) Proper advisement and
waivers of these rights in the record establish a defendant’s voluntary and
intelligent admission of the prior conviction. (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th
1132, 1178-1179 (Howard); North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25, 31.)
When, immediately after a jury verdict of guilty, a defendant admits a prior
conviction after being advised of and waiving only the right to trial, can that
admission be voluntary and intelligent even though the defendant was not told of,
and thus did not expressly waive, the concomitant rights to remain silent and to
confront adverse witnesses? The answer is “yes,” if the totality of circumstances
surrounding the admission supports such a conclusion.
1

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I
On April 13, 1999, defendant Clyde Mosby was arrested for selling a $20
piece of rock cocaine to an undercover police officer. He was charged with one
count of selling cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)), and it was
alleged he had a prior felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11370, subds. (a) & (c)).1
At trial, the prosecution offered three witnesses: Detective Chaplin, who
bought the cocaine, described its purchase; Detective Reyes, who was present at
the arrest, identified the rock of cocaine as the one he had seized; and chemist
Edwin Smith testified that the rock contained cocaine base. Defendant’s attorney
cross-examined each detective. Defendant did not testify, although his co-
defendant did.
After the trial court learned that the jury had arrived at its verdict, the trial
court asked defendant whether he wanted a jury trial on the bifurcated prior
conviction allegation.
“The Court: The question is, should this jury return a guilty verdict as to
Mr. Mosby, the hearing on whether it is true he did suffer such a prior conviction.
Mr. Dawson [hereafter defense counsel].

1
The allegation that defendant had been previously convicted of felony
possession of a controlled substance, if found to be true, would render defendant
ineligible for probation (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370).

When a defendant is alleged to have been previously convicted or to have
previously served a term in state prison, trial on such an allegation becomes
necessary only if the defendant is convicted of the charged offense. Thus,
defendants who elect a jury trial routinely ask to bifurcate trial so that the case on
the charged crime will be tried first. If the jury returns a guilty verdict on the
charged crime, then the truth of the alleged prior will be tried, either to the jury
before it is discharged or to the trial judge.

2

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“[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I’ve spoken with Mr. Mosby, and at this
time he’s willing to, first of all, waive jury on that issue. He will leave that in the
hands of the court.
“But secondly, at [t]his time, I am in agreement that he will admit the
enhancement, which essentially, absent unusual circumstances, makes him
probation ineligible and allow the court to do what it will at sentencing if that
becomes a necessary issue.
“The Court: Well, your understanding is he’s willing to waive the jury?
“[Defense Counsel]: Waive the jury and actually admit the prior offense.
“The Court: We can deal with that afterwards.
“Mr. Mosby, it’s alleged in the information that you were convicted of a
felony violation, a drug offense, back on or about May 5th of ’93, that’s alleged in
the information, so that if that’s true, you were convicted on this charge, this
present charge, it would make you ineligible for probation, do you understand
that?
“The Defendant: Yes.
“The Court: You are entitled to have this jury, if they should find you
guilty, you’re entitled to have this jury determine the truth of the allegation that
you suffered this prior felony conviction.
“You’re entitled to have the jury hear that and make a decision on whether
that’s true or not.
“Do you understand that?
“The Defendant: Yes.
“The Court: Do you waive and give up your right to have this jury make a
determination as to whether you suffered such a prior conviction?
“The Defendant: Yes.
“The Court: And you join in that, [defense counsel]?
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“[Defense Counsel]: I do.”
The jury then returned and delivered its verdict finding defendant guilty of
selling cocaine. After discharging the jury, the court returned to the prior
conviction allegation.
“The Court: [Defense counsel], since Mr. Mosby wants the court to hear
that matter, or prepared to admit the prior –
“[Defense Counsel]: He’s prepared to admit the prior.
“The Court: Mr. Mosby, can you understand that you are entitled—you
already waived having the jury determine the truth of this prior felony conviction
of yours that’s alleged. You are . . . entitled to have the court hear the matter, as
well, to make a determination.
“Do you understand that?
“The Defendant: Yes.
“The Court: Do you waive and give up your right to have the court make
that determination?
“The Defendant: Yes.”
The court then read the allegation that on May 5, 1993 defendant was
convicted of drug possession in violation of Health and Safety Code section
11350; defendant admitted that he had been so convicted. Defendant was
sentenced to a prison term of three years and eight months.
Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court’s incomplete rights
advisements rendered his admission of the prior conviction invalid. The Court of
Appeal disagreed. It said: “It would frankly be absurd for this court to find that
the defendant’s admission of his prior conviction—a prior plea of guilty—was not
voluntary and intelligent when he knew he did not have to admit but could have
had a jury or court trial, had just participated in a jury trial where he had
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confronted witnesses and remained silent, and had experience in pleading guilty in
the past, namely, the very conviction that he was now admitting.”
Defendant petitioned for review in this court, arguing that the Court of
Appeal’s decision created a conflict with other Court of Appeal opinions. We
granted review.
II
A. Our Decision in In re Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d 857
In
Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243 and footnote 5, the United
States Supreme Court explained that a defendant seeking to plead guilty is denied
due process under the federal Constitution unless the plea is voluntary and
knowing. “Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes
place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination . . . . [Citations.] Second, is the right to
trial by jury. [Citation.] Third, is the right to confront one’s accusers.” (Id. at p.
243.) In Boykin, the defendant pled guilty to five counts at a proceeding in which
“the judge asked no questions of petitioner concerning his plea, and petitioner did
not address the court.” (Id. at p. 239.) Given that truly “silent record,” the high
court refused to presume a knowing and voluntary waiver of these constitutional
rights. (Ibid.) In the wake of Boykin, we held in In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122,
that “each of the three rights mentioned—self-incrimination, confrontation, and
jury trial—must be specifically and expressly enumerated for the benefit of and
waived by the accused prior to acceptance of his guilty plea.” (Id. at p. 132, italics
added.)
Some five years later, in In re Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d 857, we adopted as a
judicial rule of criminal procedure the requirement that the three Boykin-Tahl
admonitions must also be given “before a court accepts an accused’s admission
that he has suffered prior felony convictions.” (Id. at p. 863, italics added.)
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Of note here is a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court that
the federal Constitution’s right to a jury trial does not extend to the factual
determination of whether a defendant has suffered a prior conviction. (Apprendi
v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490.) Nor does our state Constitution afford
such a right. (People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 23; see also People v.
Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 326.) That right is purely statutory in
origin. (Pen. Code, §§ 1025 [same jury that tried criminal charge must try prior
conviction allegation], 1158; People v. Epps, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 23.) When
trial is required by statute, we shall assume for the purpose of this discussion that a
defendant’s due process trial rights, at least under our state Constitution,
encompass the rights to remain silent and to confront witnesses. (Cal. Const., art.
I, § 15.) Here, defendant was advised only of his right to trial, which he waived
before admitting the prior conviction. Thus, we must decide whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, defendant’s admission was voluntary and intelligent
despite the trial court’s failure to advise defendant of the rights to remain silent
and to confront witnesses.
B. Standard of Review for Yurko Error

For nearly two decades after our decision in In re Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d
857, lack of express advisement, and waiver, of all three Boykin-Tahl rights was
viewed as error requiring automatic reversal. (See People v. Wright (1987) 43
Cal.3d 487, 493-495; In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 283, fn. 1; In re Ronald
E. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 315, 320-321.) Then, in our 1992 decision in Howard, supra,
1 Cal.4th 1132, we revisited the issue and came to a different conclusion. The
pertinent inquiry, we said, was whether “the record affirmatively shows that [the
admission] is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances”
(id. at p. 1175, italics added), applying “the test used to determine the validity of
guilty pleas under the federal Constitution.” (Ibid.) Howard explained: “[T]he
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weight of authority today makes it abundantly clear that ‘the California
interpretation of Boykin announced in Tahl is not required by the federal
Constitution . . . .’ (United States v. Pricepaul (9th Cir. 1976) 540 F.2d 417, 424-
425; [citation].)” (Id. at pp. 1177-1178.) We also said that the United States
Supreme Court “has never read Boykin as requiring explicit admonitions on each
of the three constitutional rights,” but instead looks to the test set out in North
Carolina v. Alford, supra, 400 U.S. at page 32, which asks “ ‘whether the plea
represents a voluntary and intelligent course among the alternative courses of
action open to the defendant.’ ” (Howard, supra, at p. 1177.)
By adopting in Howard the federal constitutional test of whether under the
totality of circumstances the defendant’s admission is intelligent and voluntary, we
rejected the rule that “the absence of express admonitions and waivers requires
reversal regardless of prejudice.” (Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1178.) In
replacing the old rule, the focus was shifted from whether the defendant received
express rights advisements, and expressly waived them, to whether the
defendant’s admission was intelligent and voluntary because it was given with an
understanding of the rights waived. After our Howard decision, an appellate court
must go beyond the courtroom colloquy to assess a claim of Yurko error. (See
People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 424, 438.) Now, if the transcript does not reveal
complete advisements and waivers, the reviewing court must examine the record
of “the entire proceeding” to assess whether the defendant’s admission of the prior
conviction was intelligent and voluntary in light of the totality of circumstances.
(Ibid.) That approach—reviewing the whole record, instead of just the record of
the plea colloquy—was recently endorsed by the United States Supreme Court in a
case where a federal court failed, before accepting the defendant’s guilty plea, to
advise the defendant of his right to counsel as required by rule 11 of the Federal
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Rules of Criminal Procedure. (United States v. Vonn (2002) 535 U.S. 55, 76 [122
S.Ct. 1043, 1055]; Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., rule 11(b)(1), 18 U.S.C.)
III
A. Application of Howard’s Totality of the Circumstances Test
After our 1992 decision in Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, our Courts of
Appeal have applied its “totality of the circumstances” harmless error test to a
variety of cases ranging from no advisements and waivers to incomplete
advisements and waivers.
1. Silent record cases
Truly silent record cases are those that show no express advisement and
waiver of the Boykin-Tahl rights before a defendant’s admission of a prior
conviction. (People v. Stills (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1769-1771 [without any
rights advisements or waivers the defendant was asked if he admitted priors]; see
also People v. Campbell (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 305, 309-310 [after conviction by
jury on the substantive offense, the defendant, who received no admonishments
and gave no waivers, admitted each of four alleged priors]; People v. Moore
(1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 411 [after conviction by jury on the substantive offense, the
defendant, who received no admonishments and gave no waivers, admitted a prior
conviction of assault with a deadly weapon and a prior prison term].)
Although the record was not entirely silent in People v. Johnson (1993) 15
Cal.App.4th 169, it was so nearly silent as to be indistinguishable from the three
cases just cited. A jury convicted the defendant of three crimes, but before the
jury was excused the trial court took the defendant’s admission to having two prior
convictions and having served a prior prison term. The court did so without
admonishing the defendant of his right to a trial on the priors at which he could
confront witnesses and need not testify. (Id. at p. 177.) The court made a fleeting
reference to “ ‘whether or not you want a jury trial,’ ” and without waiting for a
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response, the court then immediately asked the defendant, “ ‘[W]ere you
convicted?’ ” The defendant admitted the priors. (Ibid.) Under the totality of
circumstances, the Court of Appeal in Johnson had “no doubt” that the defendant
“was in fact aware of his right to a jury trial, his right to confront witnesses, and
his right to remain silent, all of which he had just exercised in trial.” (Id. at
p. 178.) Nonetheless, absent any advisement of those rights, the Court of Appeal
concluded that it was “impossible to determine” whether the defendant “not only
was aware of these rights, but also was prepared to waive them as a condition to
admitting his prior offenses” (ibid.), thus rendering the defendant’s admission of
the priors neither intelligent nor voluntary.
In all of the cases just discussed a jury trial on a substantive offense
preceded the defendants’ admissions of prior convictions. These defendants were
not told on the record of their right to trial to determine the truth of a prior
conviction allegation. Nor did they expressly waive their right to trial. In such
cases, in which the defendant was not advised of the right to have a trial on an
alleged prior conviction, we cannot infer that in admitting the prior the defendant
has knowingly and intelligently waived that right as well as the associated rights to
silence and confrontation of witnesses.
2. Incomplete Boykin-Tahl advisements
In
People v. Carroll (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 892, the defendant was advised
of his right to a jury trial on four prior conviction allegations. Trial on those priors
was ordered bifurcated but eventually not held because a mistrial was declared
after the jury could not reach a verdict on one of the charged crimes. At the
defendant’s second trial, there was no discussion of the priors until after the jury
returned a guilty verdict. At sentencing, defense counsel said his client was
willing to admit two priors. The trial court asked the defendant if he wanted to
waive his “ ‘right to a trial’ ” and admit “ ‘those allegations are true?’ ” (Id. at
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p. 896.) The defendant replied, “ ‘Yes.’ ” (Id. at p. 897.) The Court of Appeal
reversed, describing the record as “devoid of any meaningful effort to ensure the
defendant was making an informed decision.” (Ibid.) It acknowledged, but did
not apply, the totality of the circumstances test of Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132,
which it said permitted finding error harmless “where technical defects have
occurred” in the giving of Boykin-Tahl admonitions. (Carroll, at p. 897.)
Incomplete advisement of Boykin-Tahl rights also occurred in another
Court of Appeal decision, People v. Howard (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1660. At the
conclusion of a jury trial on a drug offense, the defendant was advised of, and
waived, the right to have a jury or court trial on a prior prison term allegation, but
he was not told of, and did not waive, the rights to silence and to confront
witnesses. On the record, the prosecutor told the defendant that at a trial on the
prior conviction the People had the right to present evidence. (Id. at p. 1664, fn.
3.) On appeal, a majority of the court concluded that the defendant had not been
“admonished as to his rights to confrontation and self-incrimination explicitly, or
in terms amounting to a reasonable substitute for explicit admonition,” thus
requiring reversal and remand for retrial of the alleged prior. (Id. at p. 1665.) The
dissenting justice was of the view that having been told of the prosecution’s right
to present evidence the defendant was adequately advised of both the right to
remain silent and to confront the witnesses against him. Having just participated
in a jury trial, the dissenter concluded, the defendant “understood” “what a trial
meant.” (Id. at p. 1666 (conc. & dis. opn. of Woods (Fred), J.).)
In
People v. Torres (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1083, also written by the
author of People v. Howard, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th 1660, the Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded for retrial the findings that the defendant had suffered prior
convictions and a prior prison term. In Torres, a jury had just convicted the
defendant of several crimes when he was advised of his right to a jury trial on the
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alleged priors. The defendant admitted the priors and did so without
admonishment, or waivers, of his rights to remain silent and to confront witnesses.
The Court of Appeal concluded that without express advisements and waivers in
the record, “it is not possible here to find defendant’s admissions” were voluntary
and intelligent. (People v. Torres, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 1082.)
In
People v. Garcia (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1242, the same division of the
Court of Appeal that had decided People v. Torres, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th 1073,
reversed and remanded for retrial prior conviction allegations admitted by the
defendant after advisement only of his right to a jury trial on those allegations.
The Court of Appeal stated that “nothing in the record suggests defendant’s prior
exposure to the criminal justice system afforded him notice of his right to
confrontation and privilege against self-incrimination” nor was he given any
“advice from which [he] could infer” that his right to confrontation, which he had
experienced “in the trial-in-chief” also applied to the trial of his priors. (People v.
Garcia, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1248.)
B. This Case

As mentioned earlier, in this case, immediately after the jury found
defendant guilty of selling cocaine, defendant was told he had a right to a jury trial
on the prior conviction allegation. After waiving that right, defendant admitted
the truth of the allegation. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court
committed reversible error by not telling him of his rights to remain silent and to
confront witnesses. The Court of Appeal disagreed, stating: “It would exalt a
formula (Boykin-Tahl) over the very standard that the formula is supposed to serve
(that the plea is intelligent and voluntary) to suggest that a defendant, who has just
finished a contested jury trial, is nonetheless unaware that he is surrendering the
protections of such a trial” when after being advised of the right to a trial on an
alleged prior conviction the defendant waives trial and admits the prior. We agree.
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In this case, the alleged prior conviction was a plea of guilty to possessing
cocaine. Defendant argues that when he admitted the prior conviction—
immediately after a jury found him guilty of selling cocaine—he would not
necessarily have understood that trial of the alleged prior would afford him the
same rights that he had at the trial of the drug charge. We note that unlike a trial
on a criminal charge, trial on a prior conviction is “simple and straightforward,”
often involving only a presentation by the prosecution “of a certified copy of the
prior conviction along with defendant’s photograph [or] fingerprints” and no
defense evidence at all. (People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826, 838.) Here,
defendant, who was represented by counsel, had just undergone a jury trial at
which he did not testify, although his codefendant did. Thus, he not only would
have known of, but had just exercised, his right to remain silent at trial, forcing the
prosecution to prove he had sold cocaine. And, because he had, through counsel,
confronted witnesses at that immediately concluded trial, he would have
understood that at a trial he had the right of confrontation.
A review of the entire record also sheds light on defendant’s understanding.
For instance, “a defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system” is,
as the United States Supreme Court has concluded, “relevant to the question of
whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights.” (Parke v. Raley (1992) 506
U.S. 20, 37.) That is so because previous experience in the criminal justice system
is relevant to a recidivist’s “ ‘knowledge and sophistication regarding his [legal]
rights.’ ”2 (Parke, at pp. 36-37; see United States v. Dawson (9th Cir. 1999) 193

2
To the extent that language in People v. Garcia, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at
page 1248, suggests that the sophistication of the crime itself, apart from a
defendant’s actual knowledge or capacity to understand the constitutional rights in
question, is relevant to a defendant’s intelligent waiver of rights, it is disapproved.
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F.3d 1107, 1110-1111 [defendant who had received full advisements in state court
action two months before he entered a guilty plea on incomplete advisements in
federal court knowingly waived rights of confrontation and silence despite lack of
advisement on either].) Here defendant’s prior conviction was based on a plea of
guilty, at which he would have received Boykin-Tahl advisements. As the Court
of Appeal here concluded: “[H]e knew he did not have to admit [the prior
conviction] but could have had a jury or court trial, had just participated in a jury
trial where he had confronted witnesses and remained silent, and had experience in
pleading guilty in the past, namely, the very conviction that he was now
admitting.”
Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court of Appeal did not err in
concluding that defendant voluntarily and intelligently admitted his prior
conviction despite being advised and having waived only his right to jury trial.3

3
We disapprove the following cases to the extent they are inconsistent with
our holding: People v. Van Buren (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 875; People v. Carroll,
supra, 47 Cal.App.4th 892; People v. Garcia, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 1242; People
v. Torres, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th 1073; and People v. Howard, supra, 25
Cal.App.4th 1660.

Ideally, a defendant admits a prior conviction only after receiving, and
expressly waiving, standard advisements of the rights to a trial, to remain silent,
and to confront adverse witnesses. (Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1178-1179
[“explicit admonitions and waivers still serve the purpose that originally led us to
require them,” and “are the only realistic means of assuring that the judge leaves a
record adequate for review”].) Although it may not be reversible error, failing to
give full advisements and obtain express waivers carries a high cost. “As a
consequence of the . . . failure to obtain valid admissions of readily provable
serious priors, appeals are filed, briefs are prepared, appellate research and record
review are conducted, argument is heard, appellate opinions are written, matters
are remanded to trial courts, defendants are transported from prisons to county
jails to courtrooms, attorneys are appointed to represent defendants, and prior
allegations are belatedly relitigated.” (People v. Garcia, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1249 (conc. opn. of Woods (Fred), J.).)
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DISPOSITION

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
KENNARD,
J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C. J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Mosby
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 95 Cal.App.4th 967
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S104862
Date Filed: July 8, 2004
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Sacramento
Judge: L. Stephen Potter*

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Elizabeth Campbell, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Steven A. Torres, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys
General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Stan A. Cross and Susan J. Orton, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

*Judge of the former Sacramento Municipal Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Elizabeth Campbell
Central California Appellate Program
2407 J Street, Suite 301
Sacramento, CA 95816
(916) 441-3792

Susan J. Orton
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
(916) 324-5279

16

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Thu, 07/08/2004	S104862

Disposition
Jul 8 2004	Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Mar 5 2002	Petition for review filed   counsel for appellant Clyde Mosby
Mar 6 2002	Record requested
Mar 7 2002	Received Court of Appeal record   1-doghouse
May 1 2002	Petition for Review Granted (criminal case)   Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Werdegar, and Chin, JJ.
May 2 2002	Note:   Grant letter prepared and processed
Jun 14 2002	Counsel appointment order filed   Central California Appellate Program for appellant Clyde Mosby. Appellant's (opening) brief on the merits shall be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date of this order.
Jul 12 2002	Request for extension of time filed   in Sacramento by appellant for a 30 day extension until 8/14/2002 to file Mosby's Opening Brief on the Merits. Order prepared -- granted to 8/14/2002.
Jul 18 2002	Extension of time granted   appellant to and including 8/14/2002 to file the Opening Brief on the Merits.
Aug 14 2002	Request for extension of time filed   Appellant asking until August 28, 2002 to file appellant's Opening Brief on the Merits.
Aug 21 2002	Extension of time granted   To August 28, 2002 to file appellant's Opening Brief on the Merits.
Aug 23 2002	Opening brief on the merits filed   Appellant Clyde Mosby.
Sep 18 2002	Request for extension of time filed   in Sacramento by respondent for an additional 30 days to file the informal response. Voice mail message left for Deputy A.G. Orton that it is an "Answer Brief on the Merits" that is due and not an informal response. *Corrected E.O.T. request (faxed) filed 9/24/2002. Hard copy received in Sacto 9/25/2002. E.O.T. granted (10/22/2002) - order prepared.
Sep 26 2002	Extension of time granted   On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including October 22, 2002.
Oct 18 2002	Request for extension of time filed   in Sacramento by respondent for an additional 20 days [11/11/2002] to file the answer brief/merits.
Oct 24 2002	Extension of time granted   On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including November 11, 2002.
Nov 12 2002	Answer brief on the merits filed   in Sacramento by Respondent People
Dec 3 2002	Request for extension of time filed   in Sacramento by counsel for appellant Mosby for 30 days, until 1/2/2003, to file the reply brief on the merits.
Dec 9 2002	Extension of time granted   On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including January 2, 2003.
Dec 18 2002	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Campbell
Jan 2 2003	Request for extension of time filed   (second) in Sacramento by counsel for appellant for an E.O.T. of one week, until 1/9/2003 within which to file Mosby's reply brief on the merits.
Jan 7 2003	Extension of time granted   On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the Reply Brief on the Merits is extended to and including January 9, 2003.
Jan 10 2003	Request for extension of time filed   in Sacramento by respondent asking for an additional two weeks, until 1/23/2003.
Jan 15 2003	Extension of time granted   On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the Reply Brief on the Merits is extended to and including January 23, 2003.
Jan 16 2003	Received letter from:
Jan 27 2003	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   by counsel for appellant Clyde Mosby / 40(K)
Nov 20 2003	Received letter from:   Attorney Elizabeth Campbell dated 11-18-2003, advising that she will be out of the country from January 9 through January 16, 2004, and will not be available for oral argument. She will be in New York from April 22 through April 27, 2004, and will likewise be unavailable for argument during that time.
Feb 13 2004	Received letter from:   Attorney Elizabeth Campbell [appellant] dated 2-10-2004, re change in vacation schedule. She will be unavailable for oral argument from April 5 through April 11, 20004,
Apr 6 2004	Case ordered on calendar   5-5-04, 1:30pm, S.F.
Apr 23 2004	Received:   (in Sacramento) Letter from Central C.A.P. dated 4-23-2004 re cites
May 5 2004	Cause argued and submitted
Jul 8 2004	Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full   Majority Opinion by Kennard, J. -- joined by George, C.J., Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown, Moreno, JJ.
Jul 8 2004	Note:   [Court of Appeal Judgment]
Aug 11 2004	Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Aug 18 2004	Received:   receipt for remittitur CA/3.
Apr 13 2005	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Campbell - Central California Appellate Program

Briefs
Aug 23 2002	Opening brief on the merits filed
Nov 12 2002	Answer brief on the merits filed
Jan 27 2003	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website