Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 7/14/05

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S118180
v.
Ct.App. Fifth F039200
VICTOR MANUEL MARTINEZ,
Merced
County
Defendant and Appellant. )
Super.
Ct.
No.
25556

A jury convicted defendant of attempting to manufacture
methamphetamine. Treating the state agency that disposed of the hazardous
substances found at the illegal drug laboratory as a crime victim, the trial court
ordered defendant to reimburse the agency for its clean-up costs of $5,402.67.
The court did so under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f), which requires
restitution to a crime victim when, “as a result of the defendant’s conduct,” the
victim “has suffered economic loss.” We conclude that this statute was an
improper basis for the restitution order because the agency was not a direct victim
of defendant’s criminal conduct. The exclusive statutory basis for reimbursement
to the agency is provided by Health and Safety Code sections 11470.1 and
11470.2, which establish special procedures by which public entities such as the
Department of Toxic Substance Control, the agency involved here, may recover
their costs of cleaning up hazardous substances, or their precursors, at illegal drug
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manufacturing sites. Because these special procedures were not followed here, the
reimbursement order is invalid.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Around 9:30 a.m. on January 7, 2001, Joe Demello of the Fresno County
Sheriff’s Department stopped defendant as he was driving a Honda hatchback
away from a Merced County residence that was under surveillance as a suspected
site of an illegal methamphetamine laboratory. After stopping defendant, Demello
walked around the hatchback and saw through its large rear window that it
contained various objects—including a metal cylinder, bags of ice, and a stained
cardboard box—that the officer, based on his experience, believed were associated
with methamphetamine manufacture. A later search of the premises revealed a
“super lab” capable of manufacturing large quantities of methamphetamine.
Defendant was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine, a controlled
substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a).) A jury acquitted him of
the charged offense, but it convicted him of the lesser included offense of attempt
(Pen. Code, § 664) to manufacture a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11379.6, subd. (a)). The trial court imposed a prison term of two years and six
months and ordered restitution of $5,402.67 to the Department of Toxic
Substances Control (Department) under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision
(f).
Defendant appealed. He challenged the validity of the trial court’s
restitution order made under Penal Code section 1202.4, arguing that the
Department was not a direct victim within the meaning of that statute, and
therefore it was not entitled to reimbursement of costs incurred in removing the
hazardous waste from the illegal drug laboratory. In response, the Attorney
General maintained the order was proper because it reimbursed the government
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for clean-up costs resulting from defendant’s crime, rather than for expenses
incurred in investigating or prosecuting him.
The Court of Appeal upheld the order. It noted that the Legislature has
expressly directed the Department, once it is notified by a law enforcement agency
of the presence of hazardous substances in an illegal drug laboratory, to remove
“waste material from the unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance.”
(Health & Saf. Code, § 25354.5, subd. (b)(1).) The court concluded that the
$5,402.67 the Department spent in clean-up costs resulted directly from
defendant’s criminal conduct, thus making the Department a direct victim and
therefore entitled to receive restitution under the direct victim provision of Penal
Code section 1202.4.
Defendant petitioned for a rehearing in the Court of Appeal, contending
that the court’s analysis had overlooked Health and Safety Code sections 11470.1
and 11470.2, which expressly allow the prosecutor, either by means of a civil
action or a criminal proceeding, to seek recovery of the costs of destroying
controlled substances or their precursors. Defendant asserted that because the
Department was not a direct victim of his attempt to manufacture
methamphetamine, these Health and Safety Code provisions are the exclusive
means through which the Department could recoup its clean-up costs. The Court
of Appeal denied defendant’s rehearing petition.
In considering the Department to be a direct victim, thus entitling it to
restitution under Penal Code section 1202.4, the Court of Appeal created a conflict
with two previous Court of Appeal decisions, People v. Narron (1987) 192
Cal.App.3d 724 (Narron), and People v. Brach (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 571
(Brach). Those two cases concluded that Health and Safety Code sections
11470.1 and 11470.2 provide the exclusive remedies for the recovery of costs
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incurred in disposing of controlled substances. We granted review to resolve the
conflict.
II. RELEVANT STATUTES
We begin with a review of the statutes at issue here. On June 8, 1982, the
voters of California adopted Proposition 8, an initiative amending our Constitution
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)) to grant “victims of crime a constitutional
right” to receive restitution from defendants convicted of crimes that caused the
victims economic loss. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1122; People
v. Broussard (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1067, 1069.) In response, the Legislature enacted
an array of statutes covering restitution or recovery of expenses by crime victims.
Among those statutes are Health and Safety Code sections 11470.1 and 11470.2,
as well as Penal Code section 1202.4.
In March 1983, at the urging of the Attorney General, state Senator Barry
Keene introduced Senate Bill No. 1121 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) to add sections
11470.1 and 11470.2 to the Health and Safety Code. The purpose of the bill was
“to require those who engage in illegal drug activities” to repay the costs incurred
in seizing and destroying unlawful substances akin to “the charges imposed under
existing law for abating other nuisances.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 1121 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 16, 1983, p. 2.) The
bill sought to alleviate the financial burden on law enforcement agencies—
especially those in small, rural areas—of eradicating marijuana plants and closing
clandestine drug labs. (Assembly, 3d reading analysis, Sen. Bill No. 1211 (1983-
1984 Reg. Sess.) as amended August 25, 1983, p. 2.) By permitting law
enforcement to recover its clean-up costs, the legislation sought to ensure that
“those who engage in illegal drug activities” would “bear the costs of eliminating
their abuses.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1121 (1983-
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1984 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 16, 1983, p. 2.) The new legislation took effect
on January 1, 1984.
Health and Safety Code section 11470.1 allows a civil action against “[a]ny
person who manufactures or cultivates a controlled substance or its precursors.”
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11470.1, subd. (a)(1).) The action “may be brought by the
district attorney, county counsel, city attorney, the State Department of Health
Services, or Attorney General.” (Id., § 11470.1, subd. (d).)
Instead of bringing a civil action under Health and Safety Code section
11470.1, the prosecution can, under section 11470.2, seek recovery of costs
incurred by the governmental entity in removal or destruction of the controlled
substances or their precursors by filing a petition for cost recovery in the criminal
proceeding “in which the defendant has been charged with the underlying
offense.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 11470.2, subd. (b).)
Here, the trial court ordered defendant to reimburse the Department for
$5,402.67 it had spent in disposing of the toxic substances found at the illegal drug
lab site where defendant was working. The court looked to Penal Code section
1202.4’s restitution provisions as authority for the award. That Penal Code
section, like Health and Safety Code sections 11470.1 and 11470.2, was enacted
by the Legislature in 1983 (Stats. 1983, ch. 1092, § 320.1, p. 4058) in response to
the voters’ passage of Proposition 8 described earlier. (Review of 1983 Selected
Calif. Legislation (1984) 15 Pacific L.J. 559, 561.) As originally enacted in 1983,
Penal Code section 1202.4 provided for restitution to crime victims; it made no
mention of restitution to entities, governmental or otherwise, as crime victims.
Not until 1994 did the Legislature amend Penal Code section 1202.4 to expressly
permit restitution to a “government, governmental subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality” when it “is a direct victim of a crime.” (Pen. Code, § 1202.4,
former subd. (p), added by Stats. 1994, ch. 1106, § 3, p. 6550; since amended by
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Stats. 1996, ch. 629, § 3, p. 3468 [moving provision into subd. (k)] & Stats. 1999,
ch. 584, § 4, [dividing subd. (k) into pars. (1) and (2) and adding par. (3)].)
We apply the statutory scheme in existence in 2001 when defendant
committed his crime. In 2001, Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (k)
provided that for the purposes of the section the term “ ‘victim’ ” includes “all of
the following: [¶] (1) The immediate surviving family of the actual victim. [¶]
(2) Any corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint
venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency or instrumentality, or any
other legal or commercial entity when that entity is a direct victim of a crime. [¶ ]
(3) ‘Derivative victims’ as defined in Section 13960 of the Government Code.”
(Stats. 1999, ch. 584, § 4, italics added.) All the derivative victims enumerated in
the referenced section are natural persons. (Gov. Code, former § 13960, subd.
(a)(2), Stats. 1998, ch. 895, § 1.4, repealed by Stats. 2002, ch. 1141, § 10.)
III. RELEVANT CASES
Two Court of Appeal decisions deserve discussion because, as in this case,
they involved the applicability of Health and Safety Code sections 11470.1 and
11470.2 when a governmental entity seeks recovery of its costs of hazardous
substance clean up. Neither opinion was cited by the Court of Appeal here.
In Narron, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d 724, the defendant pleaded guilty to
cultivating marijuana and was ordered by the trial court, as a condition of
probation (Pen. Code, former § 1203.1), to pay the county’s costs of cleaning up
hazardous chemicals found during a search of his mobile home. (Narron, supra,
at p. 729.) On appeal, the defendant challenged the restitution condition, arguing
that the county’s exclusive remedy for recouping its clean-up costs was to comply
with either section 11470.1 or section 11470.2 of the Health and Safety Code.
The Court of Appeal in Narron concluded that if the Legislature had
intended to permit government recoupment of clean-up costs by way of a
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restitution probation condition, it would have had no reason to enact the two
Health and Safety Code sections. (Narron, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 739.) The
court explained: “Prior to the legislation, such costs were recoverable only upon a
criminal conviction, and then only as a part of a restitution condition where
probation was granted.” (Id. at p. 740.) It noted that Health and Safety Code
sections 11470.1 and 11470.2 represent a balancing of two competing concerns
reflected in the legislative history of the two statutes—that law enforcement not go
unreimbursed for controlled substance eradication or clean-up costs and that
defendants receive certain procedural protections before reimbursement can be
imposed. (Ibid.) For example, a criminal defendant who contests a petition for
recovery filed in the prosecution for a drug offense is entitled to a jury trial before
recovery can be granted (Health & Saf. Code, § 11470.2, subd. (d)); and if the
People bring a civil action against a person who aids, abets, or profits from
controlled substance manufacture, that defendant is entitled to have liability
proven by clear and convincing evidence (§ 11470.1, subd. (e)(1)). Given the
contrast between these strict procedural requirements—filing a formal petition,
requiring a jury trial on the petition’s allegations, imposing an elevated standard of
proof for aiders and abettors—and “the informal procedures” used in awarding
restitution under the Penal Code, the Narron court concluded that if the stringent
procedures of the Health and Safety Code were discretionary, governmental
agencies would not use them. (Narron, supra, at pp. 738-739.) Accordingly, the
Court of Appeal concluded that Health and Safety Code sections 11470.1 and
11470.2 provided “the exclusive remedy for reimbursement of the expenses” that
were recoverable by the county. (Narron, supra, at p. 729.)
In Brach, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 571, the defendants pleaded guilty to
cultivating and possessing marijuana for sale, and they were granted probation.
One condition of their probation required them to reimburse the county sheriff’s
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department for its costs in destroying the marijuana crop. On appeal, the
defendants challenged the restitution order, arguing it was infirm because the
sheriff’s department had not complied with Health and Safety Code sections
11470.1 or 11470.2. (Brach, supra, at p. 576.) The Court of Appeal
acknowledged that the two Health and Safety Code sections “provide ‘the
exclusive remedy for reimbursement of the expenses recoverable under these
statutes.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Narron, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 729.) It upheld the
order, because, despite having notice that the sheriff’s department was requesting
restitution under Health and Safety Code section 11470.2, defendants had entered
into the plea agreement without objecting to the probation condition requiring
restitution. (Brach, supra, at p. 577.)
IV. THIS CASE
As mentioned earlier, after a jury convicted defendant of attempted
manufacture of a controlled substance, the trial court sentenced him to two years
and six months in prison and ordered him to reimburse the Department $5,402.67
for its cost of cleaning up the illegal drug laboratory. The trial court based its
restitution order on Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f), which requires
restitution “[i]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result
of the defendant’s conduct.”
In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeal reasoned that defendant’s
attempt to manufacture methamphetamine “resulted in damage to the
environment,” necessitating the Department’s expenditure of $5,402.67 to clean
up toxic substances at the illegal laboratory. This expenditure, the Court of
Appeal said, “resulted directly from defendant’s actions,” and thus was “an
appropriate matter for restitution.”
In rejecting defendant’s contention that the Department was not a direct
victim of the crime, the Court of Appeal pointed to Health and Safety Code
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section 25354.5. Subdivision (a) of section 25354.5 requires law enforcement
personnel to notify the Department when, in the course of their official duties, they
become aware of a suspected “hazardous substance at a site where an illegal
controlled substance is or was manufactured.” Upon this notification, subdivision
(b) of section 25354.5 requires the Department to minimize the danger at the
illegal laboratory site posed by the hazardous substance or its precursor.
The Court of Appeal concluded: “In light of the language of [Penal Code]
section 1202.4 and the mandate in Health and Safety Code section 25354.5, we
find the Department of Toxic Substances Control was a direct victim of
defendant’s criminal activity.”
In briefing to this court, the People argue for the first time that, because
defendant did not object at trial to the restitution order as impermissible under
Penal Code section 1202.4, he may not now raise this claim. Irrespective of
whether defendant has preserved the claim, however, it is within our discretion to
decide this recurring issue for the guidance of government entities seeking clean-
up costs and of trial courts ordering restitution. (See People v. Williams (1998) 17
Cal.4th 148, 161-162, fn. 6.)
We disagree with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that subdivision (f) of
Penal Code section 1202.4 was a proper basis for the trial court’s restitution award
to the Department for its clean-up costs. Subdivision (f) of section 1202.4 requires
that, “[i]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss” resulting from
a defendant’s conduct, the trial court must order full restitution “based on the
amount of loss claimed by the victim . . . or any other showing to the court.” The
definition of the term “victim” in subdivision (k) of section 1202.4 encompasses
not only a victim who is a natural person but also a victim that is a “corporation,
business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government,
governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or
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commercial entity when that entity is a direct victim of a crime.” (Id., § 1202.4,
subd. (k)(2), italics added.)
Thus, Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (k) permits restitution to a
business or governmental entity only when it is a direct victim of crime. Before
1994, when the Legislature first inserted the direct victim language into section
1202.4, case law had recognized that restitution to the government was proper
when it was a victim of a crime, but also that restitution was not proper when a
governmental loss resulted from prosecuting a crime. (See People v. Burnett
(1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 320, 322; People v. Baker (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 550, 559.)
Relying on these cases, the Court of Appeal in Narron, decided in 1987, observed
that a government entity is a direct victim of a crime when, for example, it is a
victim of tax evasion or theft of its property. (Narron, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at
p. 732.) In People v. Crow (1993) 6 Cal.4th 952, we relied on this passage from
Narron in the course of sustaining a restitution order to the county based on
fraudulently obtaining welfare payments. (At pp. 957-958.) Thus, when in 1994
the Legislature added the direct victim language to Penal Code section 1202.4, that
term already carried a precise meaning.1

1
Cases decided after the Legislature’s 1994 addition of the direct victim
language to Penal Code section 1202.4 have preserved the distinction. For
example, in People v. Torres (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1, the Court of Appeal
invalidated a restitution order to a sheriff’s department for money its undercover
officers used to buy illegal drugs during an investigation, but which it never
recovered from the sellers. “Under the relevant case law and the statutory scheme,
public agencies are not directly ‘victimized’ for purposes of restitution under
Penal Code section 1202.4 merely because they spend money to investigate crimes
or apprehend criminals.” (People v. Ozkan (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1077.)
Recently
In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, upheld a juvenile
court restitution order to a school district that had twice been burglarized by a
minor. The order was made under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6,
subdivision (k), which permits restitution to an entity when it is “a direct victim”

(Fn. continued on next page)
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We reiterated that meaning in People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, in
which we described a provision in Penal Code former section 1203.04 permitting
restitution to entities that are “direct” victims of crime as limiting restitution to
“entities against which the probationer’s crimes had been committed”—that is,
entities that are the “immediate objects of the probationer’s offenses.” (Birkett,
supra, at pp. 232-233.)
Here, in contrast, defendant’s attempt to manufacture methamphetamine
was not an offense committed against the Department, nor was the Department the
immediate object of his crime. Therefore, the Department was not a direct victim
entitled to recover its clean-up costs under Penal Code section 1202.4. But the
unavailability of restitution under Penal Code section 1202.4 does not mean that
the Department cannot recoup its costs in disposing of hazardous substances at an
illegal drug laboratory. As noted earlier, the Legislature has expressly provided
for reimbursement of such costs through Health and Safety Code sections 11470.1
and 11470.2. Reimbursement can be obtained either by bringing a civil action
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11470.1) or, in the criminal proceeding pending against the
defendant, by filing a recovery petition (§ 11470.2). We agree with the Court of

(Fn. continued from previous page)

of a juvenile offense. Johnny M.’s break-ins at the school caused physical damage
and required clean up and repairs, made in part by salaried district employees, so
that classes and normal school operations could resume. (In re Johnny M, supra,
100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1130-1131.) The school district was thus a direct victim of
the burglaries of its school building.
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Appeal in Narron, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 729, that these provisions are the
“exclusive” means by which a government entity that is not a direct victim of a
crime may recoup its costs of eradicating or cleaning up toxic or hazardous
substances resulting from controlled substance crimes.
The Attorney General argues that restitution to the Department under Penal
Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f) is proper, indeed compelled, because that
broader provision reflects our state’s constitutional mandate that “all persons who
suffer losses as a result of criminal activity” have a right to receive restitution from
convicted criminals whose crimes result in that loss. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28,
subd. (b); People v. Birkett, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 228.) Our answer is that the
Legislature has carried out that constitutional mandate by enacting a
comprehensive scheme that allows the government to recoup its crime-related
losses. When the government is a direct victim of crime, it is entitled to restitution
under section 1202.4, subdivision (k).2 When, as in this case, the governmental
agency must dispose of hazardous substances or their precursors at an illegal drug

2
We disapprove In re Brian N. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 591 to the extent it
holds that a fire department that has incurred labor costs in fighting a fire on a
vacant lot not owned by the department is a direct victim of the crime of
unlawfully causing a fire (Pen. Code, § 452, subd. (c)) within the meaning of
Welfare and Institutions Code, section 730.6. “[S]ection 730.6 [, which is
applicable to juvenile offenders,] parallels Penal Code section 1202.4, which
governs adult restitution.” (In re Johnny M., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132.)
12

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manufacturing site, it can recoup its costs by bringing a civil action under Health
and Safety Code section 11470.1 or it can seek recovery of its costs in the criminal
proceeding pending against the defendant, as set forth in Health and Safety Code
section 11470.2.
Thus in this case, the Department may, subject to any claim of
untimeliness, bring a civil action against defendant to recover its clean-up costs, as
permitted under Health and Safety Code section 11470.1.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and that court is directed
to remand the case to the trial court, directing it to strike the portion of its order
that defendant pay $5,402.67 in restitution to the Department of Toxic Substance
Control.

KENNARD,
J.

WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C. J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Martinez
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 110 Cal.App.4th 353
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S118180
Date Filed: July 14, 2005
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Merced
Judge: Frank Dougherty

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Shama H. Mesiwala and Linnéa M. Johnson, under appointments by the Supreme Court, and William D.
Farber, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick Whelan, Janet E. Neeley,
Stan Cross and Lee E. Seale, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Linnéa M. Johnson
Central California Appellate Program
2407 J Street, Suite 301
Sacramento, CA 95816
(916) 441-3792

Lee E. Seale
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
(916) 324-5305

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Thu, 07/14/2005	S118180

Disposition
Jul 14 2005	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Aug 13 2003	Petition for review filed   by counsel for appellant (V. Martinez)
Aug 13 2003	Record requested
Aug 14 2003	Received Court of Appeal record   one doghouse
Sep 24 2003	Petition for Review Granted (criminal case)   Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown and Moreno, JJ.
Oct 15 2003	Counsel appointment order filed   Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, Central California Appellate Program is hereby appointed to represent appellant on his appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits shall be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date of this order.
Nov 5 2003	Request for extension of time filed   by appellant requesting to Dec. 15, 2003 to file the opening brief on the merits. (recv'd in Sacto) (Ok to grant - order being prepared.)
Nov 13 2003	Extension of time granted   Appellant's time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including December 15, 2003.
Dec 15 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed   by counsel for aplt. (Victor Manuel Martinez)
Dec 15 2003	Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)   by counsel for aplt. (Martinez)
Jan 14 2004	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for resp. (People) requests extension of time to February 13, 2004 to file the answer brief on the merits.
Jan 21 2004	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including February 13, 2004.
Feb 13 2004	Answer brief on the merits filed   by counsel for resp. (People)
Mar 4 2004	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   by counsel for aplt. (V. Martinez)
Mar 30 2004	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Mesiwala
Jul 19 2004	Filed:   by CCAP letter advising court of new appointment of counsel for appellant. (Linnea Johnson)
May 3 2005	Case ordered on calendar   5/24/05, 1:30pm, S.F.
May 16 2005	Filed:   by counsel for aplt. Additional Authorities for Oral Argument (40.1(b))
May 19 2005	Request for judicial notice granted   The request of Victor Manuel Martinez for judicial notice, filed in this court on December 15, 2003, is granted.
May 19 2005	Request for judicial notice granted   The request of Victor Manuel Martinez for judicial notice, filed in this court on December 15, 2003 is granted.
May 24 2005	Cause argued and submitted
Jul 14 2005	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   and remanded OPINION BY: Kennard, J. -- joined by: George, C.J., Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, JJ.
Aug 16 2005	Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Aug 22 2005	Received:   from CA/5 receipt for remittitur.
May 24 2006	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Johnson - Central California Appellate Program

Briefs
Dec 15 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed
Feb 13 2004	Answer brief on the merits filed
Mar 4 2004	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website