Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S113086
People v. Majors

Filed 7/1/04


Plaintiff and Respondent,
) Ct.App.
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. SCD156302

A victim enters the defendant’s vehicle under an implicit threat of arrest.
Does this evidence satisfy the force or fear element of simple kidnapping? (Pen.
Code, § 207, subd. (a) (hereafter section 207(a)).)1 We conclude it does, and
therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
On August 15, 2000, 18-year-old Alesandria M. was riding home on her
bicycle. She was an employee at the Zany Brainy store at Mira Mesa Market
Center. Earlier that day, Alesandria had purchased a gift at Zany Brainy for her
brother’s birthday. Just prior to starting home, Alesandria returned to Zany Brainy
and made a second purchase.
After Alesandria had been riding for approximately 10 to 15 minutes,
defendant Gaylon Michael Majors, wearing sunglasses and standing in the street

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

next to a white van, flashed a badge and asked her to stop. He told her he was a
security guard at the Mira Mesa mall and had received a call saying someone on a
bicycle was suspected of a theft at the Zany Brainy store. Alesandria got off her
bike and showed defendant the items in her backpack, her payment receipts, and
her identification. Defendant told Alesandria she would have to return with him to
the store and speak to the security guard to resolve the issue. He tried to put her
bike in the van, but it did not fit, so he “said to go ahead and lock my bike up at
the school right across the street.” While Alesandria did so, defendant took her
backpack and put it in the van.
When she returned to the van, Alesandria asked to see defendant’s badge
again. While defendant was not in uniform, Alesandria testified that “I felt scared
that maybe if he was undercover or something like that that I would get in more
trouble. So I took his badge again. I was not really sure what to look for.” The
badge said “security guard” on it. On the other side of the badge was an orange
laminated card. Alesandria did not ride off because she “was really scared that
if . . . he was who he said he was, that I would be in jail, that I would have to
explain to my parents why I was there, even though I knew inside that I was
innocent of stealing.”
Alesandria testified she was afraid she would be arrested if she did not get
into the van. She believed defendant had the authority to arrest her because he
displayed a badge and identified himself as a security officer. Alesandria had
never dealt with the police before, and was afraid not to get in the van. She
testified, “I believed what he said about being a security guard and that we would
have to go back to the . . . mall, to clear things up. And I actually worked at Zaney
Brainey [sic], so I was confident about getting the manager to clear everything up
for me.” “He told me I would have to go with him.” “I requested to see his badge
because I didn’t believe him. But at the same time I didn’t want to not believe him
if he was telling the truth. I didn’t want to make a situation worse than it had
already been.” Defendant did not do anything to cause her to be afraid for her
safety before she got into the van. He did not display any weapons, threaten, or
touch Alesandria until they parked at the mall.
Once Alesandria and defendant were in the van, defendant appeared to make
a call on his cell phone. “He made it sound like maybe he was talking to a partner
or somebody, saying that the suspect was apprehended.” Alesandria asked if she
could call her parents. Defendant told her “that we could once we got there.”
Once they arrived at the mall, defendant said “they were going to have to check
with the manager to see if they could look at their cameras.” This caused
Alesandria apprehension apparently because she knew from her employment there
were no cameras at Zany Brainy.
Defendant ultimately drove to an isolated area of the mall. Alesandria started
to get out of the van, but defendant grabbed her by the hair and slammed her head
into the passenger side window. He then pulled back her hair so she was facing
him, told her to go to the back of the van, and said he would not hurt her.
Alesandria grabbed for defendant’s throat, but defendant grabbed her head again,
and tried to force her head between her legs. He ultimately threw her into a bench
seat in the back of the van, and told her if she cooperated he would not hurt her.
He then straddled her, pinning her arms to her chest, and struck her twice on the
side of her head saying, “I don’t want to be mean to you, so just do what I say.”
Alesandria was screaming and crying, and kicking defendant. Defendant asked
Alesandria if she wanted to die, and she said yes. Defendant said, “Okay, you are
going to die.” Alesandria continued to kick defendant, and he eventually released
her, saying, “Get out bitch.” Alesandria reported the matter to a security guard
and the police.
Defendant’s fingerprint was found on one of Alesandria’s Zany Brainy
purchase receipts. Defendant was also positively identified at trial by a woman
who lived at the location where defendant initially stopped Alesandria. On the day
of his arrest, defendant was seen driving a white van. When arrested, he was in
possession of a canvas briefcase containing an orange laminated card, sunglasses,
binoculars, a digital camera, and a dildo.
The jury was instructed that both kidnapping for rape and simple kidnapping
required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Alesandria “was unlawfully moved
by the use of physical force or by any other means of instilling fear,” and that her
movement was “without her consent.” “Consent” was defined as “act[ing] freely
and voluntarily and not under the influence of threat, force, or duress. . . . Consent
requires a free will and positive cooperation in act or attitude.” With respect to the
crimes against Alesandria,2 defendant was convicted of kidnapping for rape
(§ 209, subd. (b)(1)), simple kidnapping (§ 207(a)),3 assault with the intent to
commit rape (§ 220), and false imprisonment by violence and menace (§§ 236,
237, subd. (a)).
A divided Court of Appeal reversed defendant’s convictions for kidnapping
and kidnapping for rape for insufficiency of the evidence regarding the element of
force or fear. The majority stated, “This case appears to be a classic case of

Defendant was also charged with crimes unrelated to this victim or the
issue before us. Hence, we do not discuss them further.
Section 207 provides in relevant part: “(a) Every person who forcibly, or
by any other means of instilling fear, steals or takes, or holds, detains, or arrests
any person in this state, and carries the person into another country, state, or
county, or into another part of the same county, is guilty of kidnapping.
[¶] . . . [¶] (f) Subdivisions (a) to (d), inclusive, do not apply to any of the
following: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) To any person acting under Section 834 or 837.”

asportation by fraud, not by force or fear.” In all other respects as to the crimes
against Alesandria, the judgment was affirmed.
We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review to consider whether
evidence that a victim entered a defendant’s vehicle under threat of arrest is
sufficient to satisfy the force or fear element of section 207(a) kidnapping.
Section 207(a) provides, “Every person who forcibly, or by any other means
of instilling fear, steals or takes, or holds, detains, or arrests any person in this
state, and carries the person into another . . . county, or into another part of the
same county, is guilty of kidnapping.” The language “any other means of
instilling fear” was added in 1990. (Stats. 1990, ch. 55, § 1, p. 393.) Section
207(a) expressly “do[es] not apply to . . . : [¶] . . . [¶] . . . any person acting
under Section 834[4] or 837.”5 (§ 207, subd. (f)(2).)
As can be seen by this language, in order to constitute section 207(a)
kidnapping, the victim’s movement must be accomplished by force or any other
means of instilling fear. We have observed that even prior to the 1990 amendment
adding the language “any other means of instilling fear,” our cases held “that a
taking is forcible if accomplished through fear.” (People v. Hill (2000) 23 Cal.4th
853, 856 & fn. 2 (Hill).) As these earlier cases explain, the force used against the
victim “need not be physical. The movement is forcible where it is accomplished

Section 834 provides: “An arrest is taking a person into custody, in a case
and in the manner authorized by law. An arrest may be made by a peace officer or
by a private person.”
Section 837 provides: “A private person may arrest another: [¶] 1. For a
public offense committed or attempted in his presence. [¶] 2. When the person
arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence. [¶] 3. When a
felony has been in fact committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the
person arrested to have committed it.”

through the giving of orders which the victim feels compelled to obey because he
or she fears harm or injury from the accused and such apprehension is not
unreasonable under the circumstances.” (People v. Stephenson (1974) 10 Cal.3d
652, 660 (Stephenson); People v. Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808, 814 [section
207(a) “encompasses any movement of a victim which is substantial in character
[citation], and accomplished by means of force or threat of force”]; People
v. Guerrero (1943) 22 Cal.2d 183, 189 [the gravamen of the offense of kidnapping
is “some form of compulsion”]; People v. Dagampat (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 492,
495 (Dagampat) [“The requisite force or compulsion need not consist of the use of
actual physical force or of express threats”].) We have also observed that the
concepts of consent and force or fear “are clearly intertwined.” (In re Michele D.
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 609 (Michele D.) [addressing force]; Hill, at p. 855
[kidnapping generally must be “against the will of the victim, i.e., without the
victim’s consent”].)
These alternative bases for committing kidnapping, i.e., “forcibly, or by any
other means of instilling fear,” while stated in the disjunctive, are not mutually
exclusive. As noted, prior to the 1990 addition of the language “any other means
of instilling fear,” we had held that threats of force satisfy the force element of
section 207(a). Given the similarity between a “threat of force” and “any other
means of instilling fear,” there are inevitably now circumstances that constitute
both force and fear within the meaning of this statute. As the Attorney General
notes, “the mechanism by which a threat of force produces the movement of the
victim necessary for a kidnapping is fear, specifically, the fear that the threat of
force will be carried out.”
In contrast to the use of force or fear to compel asportation, “asportation by
fraud alone does not constitute general kidnapping in California.” (People
v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 517, fn. 13; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1,
64, 63 [“defendant tricked [victim] into believing she was simply being taken on a
quick trip to her sister’s house and back”], overruled on other grounds in People
v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 239 and People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826,
834, fn. 3.) This long-standing rule is premised on the language of section 207,
which for general kidnapping, at issue here, requires asportation by force or fear,
but for other forms of kidnapping proscribes movement procured only by “fraud,”
“entice[ment],” or “false promises.” (§ 207, subds. (a)-(d); see People
v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 602-603, overruled on other grounds in
Martinez, at p. 237; People v. Rhoden (1972) 6 Cal.3d 519, 526-527.)
Thus, in Stephenson, supra, 10 Cal.3d 652, we reversed two kidnapping
convictions. (Id. at pp. 659-660, 662.) In one, the victim entered the vehicle
voluntarily because he thought it was a taxi. (Id. at p. 656.) In the other, the
victim accepted a ride from a stranger. (Id. at p. 657.) We concluded the victims
“were enticed to get voluntarily into defendant’s car by deceit or fraud.” (Id. at
p. 659.)
By contrast, in People v. La Salle (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 139, 143, 146
(disapproved on other grounds in People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 496,
fn. 12, 498), the victim entered the car not voluntarily, but because the defendant
had her two-and-a-half-year-old daughter in the car, and could have driven away
with her. While “she was afraid to get into the car, she was more afraid not to get
in, because of what could happen to her daughter . . . . [S]he felt she had no
choice but to cooperate. The jury was entitled to conclude that this was not a case
of inducement by fraud or deceit, but one wherein the victim was forced to
consent to defendant’s demands.” (La Salle, at p. 146, original italics; Dagampat,
supra, 167 Cal.App.2d at p. 495 [“court could reasonably have found that [victim]
did not willingly enter the car, but did so because of a fear of bodily harm induced
by [one defendant’s] order to get into the convertible, defendants’ ‘dirty looks,’
the sudden approach of [another member of defendants’ group] from the
drugstore, and his recollection of the fight in which” the other defendant stabbed a
different victim].)
Of course, it goes without saying that asportation may be accomplished by
means that are both fraudulent and involve force or fear. For example, a defendant
who claims to have a gun but who in fact does not could not successfully argue he
induced the movement of the victims who credited his statement solely by fraud.
The question in this case is whether movement accomplished by the implicit
but false threat of arrest satisfies the elements of force or fear in section 207(a), or
whether such movement is simply asportation by fraud. While not addressing the
precise factual scenario presented here, kidnapping cases involving fraudulent
arrest date back over a century.
In People v. Fick (1891) 89 Cal. 144, 147, 152-153, we distinguished Ex
Parte Sternes (1889) 82 Cal. 245, in which a deputy sheriff lawfully executed an
arrest warrant, and upheld the kidnapping conviction of the defendant constable.
In Fick, the defendant arrested the victim, but then took her to a house of “ill-
fame.” (Fick, at p. 147.) We observed that the language of former section 2076
“necessarily implies that the arrest and conveying to another county must be
without the consent of the person injured, and without any lawful authority
therefor. . . .” (Fick, at p. 150.) In response to the defendant’s contention that his
action was not kidnapping because “he was acting under a warrant,” we stated, “it
is not unreasonable to believe that [defendant], when he made the arrest, intended
to do with his prisoner just what the evidence shows that he did do, and that he had

In 1891, section 207 provided in relevant part: “Every person who forcibly
steals, takes, or arrests any person in this State, and carries him into another . . .
county, . . . is guilty of kidnaping.” (1872 Pen. Code, § 207.)

no other purpose. In other words, that her arrest was simply a means to the end he
had in view; that he never intended to take her before a magistrate, but did intend
to place her [at the house of ill-fame]. Such an act was unlawful, and as the
warrant under which [defendant] claims that he acted never authorized such a
proceeding, it affords no justification for the act now under consideration.” (Id. at
pp. 150-152.) Because it was not at issue, we did not describe in Fick what force
was used to effectuate the arrest.
In People v. Broyles (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 428, 429, the defendants spotted
a car parked in an isolated area. It was occupied by a man and a woman.
Defendant Broyles turned a flashlight into the car “and told the occupants that he
was a special deputy sheriff patrolling the back roads, that what they were doing
was wrong, and that he would have to take them in.” (Ibid.) He asked to see the
man’s driver’s license. Broyles then sent codefendant Gully back to their car to
see if the couple “had a record and if the car was stolen.” (Ibid.) Gully came back
saying there was no record and the car was not stolen. Broyles told the man he
would have to take the woman “down to the station.” (Ibid.) The woman entered
the defendants’ car “believing that these were police officers.” (Ibid.) Gully later
made a statement that during the drive “he could hear crying in the back seat and
could hear ‘somebody getting hit.’ ” (Id. at p. 430.) The Court of Appeal rejected
Gully’s claim of insufficient evidence and upheld his kidnapping conviction,
stating, “There was ample evidence that the victim . . . was induced to enter the car
driven by [Gully] by the representations made by these parties that they were
police officers; that she believed these representations, and acted through fear; that
they forced her into their car by giving orders which she felt compelled to obey;
and that some force was used while she was being transported over a space of
several miles. The evidence is sufficient to show the crime of kidnaping.” (Id. at
pp. 430-431.)
In People v. Harris (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 307, 308-309, the defendant stated
to two 15-year-old boys, William and Henry, that he had been sent by the Dallas
County Sheriff to get a particular boy. When William asked the defendant if he
had any identification demonstrating he was an officer, the defendant said,
“ ‘ “Never mind,” ’ ” and that they “ ‘must go and get in the car.’ ” (Id. at p. 309.)
When William started to walk away from the car, the defendant said, “ ‘ “If you
don’t want a damned broken leg you had better come back here, boy.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Defendant ultimately said he had to take Henry “ ‘ “down”. . . . “If you are not the
one,” . . . “I will bring you home or see you get back home.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 309-
310.) Henry testified, “ ‘I thought that he was a plain clothes police officer, and I
was kind of afraid. . . . Then I got in the car.’ ” Henry was subsequently sexually
assaulted, and the defendant convicted of kidnapping and oral copulation. (Id. at
pp. 307, 310.)
The Court of Appeal in Harris observed that while the defendant “makes no
argument and cites no authority in support of the claim that his conviction of the
crime of kidnaping is unsupported by the evidence, we feel that such claim is
effectually refuted by the recent case of People v. Brazil (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d
596. There, a gun was exhibited and the complaining witness was told to get into
the automobile because the defendant was going to take her to the police station.
While no gun was displayed in the instant case, the orders of the defendant were
carried out under fear induced by oral threats. Henry testified, when asked
whether he got into the car willingly: ‘Well, he threatened my friend and I thought
that he was a plain clothes police, and so I got in the car to keep from having any
trouble, because I didn’t want to get in any trouble with no police.’ ” (People
v. Harris, supra, 67 Cal.App.2d at p. 310.)
As can be seen, none of these cases directly hold that an implicit threat of
arrest satisfies the force element of the kidnapping statute. In Fick, the force used
to effectuate the arrest was not described. However, nothing in that case suggests
that in order to constitute kidnapping, the arrest had to involve anything other than
an assertion the victim was required to accompany the officer. In Broyles, it is
unclear whether the Court of Appeal concluded the totality of the evidence was
sufficient to demonstrate kidnapping, or whether it had alternative bases for its
holding, i.e., that the evidence demonstrated kidnapping both when the victim
entered the car because of orders from apparent police officers she felt compelled
to obey, and when force was later applied during the asportation. In Brazil, a gun
was used in effectuating the “arrest.” And in Harris, prior to the victim’s entry
into the defendant’s vehicle, the defendant threatened to break the leg of the
victim’s companion if he ran away.
Nevertheless, defendant fails to cite a single case in which asportation
accomplished by the threat of arrest was found to be movement motivated solely
by fraud. Indeed, implicit in the language of section 207, subdivision (f)(2), which
creates an exception to the kidnapping statute for lawful arrest by a peace officer
or a private person, is the Legislature’s understanding that unlawful arrest may,
under certain circumstances, be a form of kidnapping. As we have observed in a
somewhat different context, “[p]olice officers occupy a unique position of trust in
our society. . . . They are given the authority to detain and to arrest . . . . Those
who challenge an officer’s actions do so at their peril . . . .” (Mary M. v. City of
Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 206; Policemen’s Benevolent Assoc. of New
Jersey v. Township of Washington (3d Cir. 1988) 850 F.2d 133, 141 [police
officers exercise “the most awesome and dangerous power that a democratic state
possesses with respect to its residents—the power to use lawful force to arrest and
detain them”].)
As observed above, the concepts of consent and force or fear with regard to
kidnapping are inextricably intertwined. (See Michele D., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p.
609.) Thus, in those cases in which the movement was found to be by fraud alone,
and not force or fear, the circumstances suggest the victim exercised free will in
accompanying the perpetrator. By contrast, the threat of arrest carries with it the
threat that one’s compliance, if not otherwise forthcoming, will be physically
forced. Thus, the use of force is implicit when arrest is threatened. Contrary to
defendant’s assertion, “being arrested” is not an “esoteric” fear that stretches the
meaning of the statute. This is true regardless of whether the defendant used
deception regarding the fact of the threatened arrest. The compulsion, which is the
gravamen of the kidnapping crime, remains present.
We therefore conclude an implicit threat of arrest satisfies the force or fear
element of section 207(a) kidnapping if the defendant’s conduct or statements
cause the victim to believe that unless the victim accompanies the defendant the
victim will be forced to do so, and the victim’s belief is objectively reasonable.
We further conclude there was substantial evidence here of force or fear, i.e., that
Alesandria entered defendant’s van under such implicit threat of arrest. In making
this determination, we do not resolve evidentiary conflicts, but “ ‘view the
evidence in a light most favorable to’ ” the People, “ ‘and presume in support of
the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.’ ” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576; People v. Felix
(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 905, 910.)
First, there was substantial evidence Alesandria subjectively feared arrest.
Alesandria testified she was afraid she would be arrested if she did not get into the
van. She believed defendant had the authority to arrest her because he displayed a
badge and identified himself as a security officer. Alesandria had never dealt with
the police before, and was afraid to not get into the van. “I requested to see his
badge because I didn’t believe him. But at the same time I didn’t want to not
believe him if he was telling the truth. I didn’t want to make a situation worse
than it had already been.”
Moreover, Alesandria’s belief that she would be arrested if she did not
accompany defendant back to the mall was objectively reasonable. Defendant
approached the victim, who had been riding her bike, and stopped her by holding
up a badge. He identified himself as a security guard, and indicated he stopped
her for a law enforcement purpose. Specifically, he told the victim he had
received a call about a suspected theft from a store Alesandria had just visited
twice, and that the suspected thief was someone on a bicycle. Defendant told
Alesandria she “would have to go with him.” He then exerted control over the
victim’s belongings, at first trying to put her bike into his van. When he saw that
the bike would not fit, he told her to lock it up, thus depriving her of
transportation. He then took her backpack and put it in the van. Once the victim
was in the van, defendant continued the ruse in a manner that reinforced the notion
that he had law enforcement authority and that the victim might be in criminal
trouble: He made a phone call to tell his partner or some other interested person
that “the suspect was apprehended” and refused the victim’s request to call her
parents, telling her she had to wait until they returned to the mall to do so.
As the Attorney General notes, when defendant “implicitly threatened
Alesandria with arrest if she did not get in the van and return with him to the mall
to face the theft allegations, he necessarily threatened her with the possibility of
force if she did not comply.” This kind of compulsion is qualitatively different
than if defendant had offered to give Alesandria a ride, or sought her assistance in
locating a lost puppy, or any other circumstance suggesting voluntariness on the
part of the victim. While defendant contends this is no more than a classic case of
asportation by fraud, we disagree. As the Attorney General observes, defendant’s
“misidentification of himself and his implicit threats of false arrest were simply
the vehicle for his conveyance of threats of force and fear that compelled
Alesandria to get in his van.” Thus, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate a
threat of force, and alternatively, that such a threat instilled fear in Alesandria that
such force would actually be applied. Under either the force or the fear prong of
the kidnapping statute, therefore, we conclude the evidence was sufficient.
Defendant asserts that Alesandria was not “afraid of some implicit threat of
forcible arrest,” but rather “got into the van to prove her innocence,” and was
“simply afraid of the possibility of going to jail.” It is not obvious how these
concepts of fear of “implicit threat of forcible arrest” and fear of “the possibility of
going to jail” substantially differ. In any event, contrary to defendant’s assertions,
we read the record as containing sufficient evidence from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that Alesandria’s movement was compelled by an implicit
threat of arrest.
Defendant also asserts that the Attorney General has waived the argument
that the asportation was accomplished by the threat of force because the prosecutor
did not make this argument below. Rather, he contends the “prosecution’s case-
in-chief was built entirely on arguing the show of authority vitiated consent and
instilled fear in Alesandria M. that compelled her to move.” As noted earlier,
there is little meaningful distinction and considerable overlap between the
concepts of threat of force and instilled fear. Moreover, whether characterized as
any other means of instilling fear or threat of force by the prosecution below, the
prosecutor argued at length that the only reason Alesandria got into the van was
because of defendant’s show of authority and her fear she would be arrested, and
hence her movement was not voluntary. Such argument focused the jury’s
attention on the evidence demonstrating both a threat of force and a threat that
instilled fear in Alesandria. The jury was instructed that the victim’s movement
must be compelled by either force or fear, and was free to rely on either prong in
reaching its verdict.
The Attorney General also asserts that the Legislature’s 1990 addition of the
language “any other means of instilling fear” “increase[s] the scope of liability for
kidnapping to those who use fear of any type in order to compel the movement of
their victims.” He asserts this would include, for example, threatening to report a
coworker to a supervisor for sexual harassment unless the coworker accompanies
the defendant. He further asserts, “[a] kidnapper could threaten the property,
reputation, or livelihood of the victim in order to compel the victim to comply
with the kidnapper’s demands.”
Here, it is apparent that defendant’s actions creating a threat of force would
have constituted kidnapping even prior to the 1990 amendment to section 207(a),
and that such a threat would also “instill[] fear” of the potential use of such force
in the victim under the current wording of the statute. Because we conclude there
was sufficient evidence Alesandria’s movement was accomplished by threatened
force and fear of that threatened force, we need not decide in this case what other
forms of fear would also satisfy the amended statute. We note, however, in
response to the Attorney General’s suggested broad definition, that section 207(a)
refers to “any other means of instilling fear,” not to “any fear.”
Moreover, our review of the legislative history of the 1990 amendment does
not conclusively demonstrate that any fear would now satisfy section 207(a). For
example, that history notes, “Although most kidnappings may be accomplished by
the use of force, there are instances where the kidnapper may accomplish the same
by instilling fear in the victim. For example, the kidnapper may threaten to kill a
family member. Thus, by expanding the definition of the crime to include such
situations, the bill would close a potential loophole in the law.” (Assem. Com. on
Pub. Safety, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1564 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess) as amended
Jan. 16, 1990, p. 3.) This example of violence towards one close to the victim,
rather than the victim herself, is categorically different from fear the perpetrator
will not attend a high school prom with the victim, or other fears substantially
removed from the use of force. Indeed, when we observed in Hill, supra, 23
Cal.4th 853, that our cases prior to the 1990 amendment had held “that a taking is
forcible if accomplished through fear,” we were referring to fear of “harm or
injury from the accused.” (Id. at p. 856, fn. 2, citing People v. Alcala (1984) 36
Cal.3d 604, 622, superseded by statute on other grounds; Stephenson, supra, 10
Cal.3d at pp. 659-660.) Thus, while we need not delineate in this case the precise
parameters of the language “any other means of instilling fear,” it is unlikely that
by adding this language the Legislature intended to expand the crime of
kidnapping to include movement compelled by fear of any and all negative
consequences to the victim.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case remanded to
that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.


See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Majors

Unpublished Opinion

XXX NP opn. filed 12/13/02 - 4th Dist., Div. 1
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted

Rehearing Granted


Opinion No.

Date Filed: July 1, 2004


County: San Diego
Judge: Howard H. Shore and David M. Gill


Attorneys for Appellant:

Patricia J. Ulibarri, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.


Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons,
Assistant Attorney General, Barry J. T. Carlton, Steven T. Oetting and Daniel Rogers, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Patricia J. Ulibarri
P. O. Box 19905
San Diego, CA 92159-0905
(619) 463-4297

Daniel Rogers
Deputy Attorney General
110 West “A” Street, Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 645-2283


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Thu, 07/01/2004S113086

1The People (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by Daniel Brian Rogers
Office of the Attorney General
P O Box 85266
San Diego, CA

2Majors, Gaylon Michael (Defendant and Appellant)
P.O. Box 8504
Coalinga, CA 93210

Represented by Patricia J. Ulibarri
Attorney At Law
P O Box 19905
San Diego, CA

3Majors, Gaylon Michael (Defendant and Appellant)
P.O. Box 8504
Coalinga, CA 93210

Represented by Appellate Defenders, Inc.
555 West Beech Street, Suite 300
555 West Beech Street, Suite 300
San Diego, CA

Jul 1 2004Opinion: Reversed

Jan 22 2003Petition for review filed
  by A.G. for resp
Jan 27 2003Received Court of Appeal record
  2 volumes
Mar 19 2003Petition for Review Granted (criminal case)
  Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown and Moreno, JJ.
Apr 14 2003Counsel appointment order filed
  Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, Patricia J. Ulibarri is hereby appointed to represent appellant on his appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits shall be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date respondent's opening brief on the merits is filed.
Apr 15 2003Request for extension of time filed
  by respondent (The People) requesting to May 19, 2003 to file opening brief on the merits. (recv'd in San Diego)
Apr 28 2003Extension of time granted
  To May 19, 2003 to file Respondent's Opening Brief on the Merits.
May 14 2003Request for extension of time filed
  by counsel for respondent requesting to May 28, 2003 to file opening brief on the merits. (granted - order being prepared)
May 20 2003Extension of time granted
  On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file respondent's opening brief on the merits is extended to and including May 28, 2003.
May 28 2003Opening brief on the merits filed
  in San Diego by counsel for respondent (People).
May 30 2003Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)
  in San Diego by counsel for respondent (People).
Jun 23 2003Request for extension of time filed
  appellant requesting to 7-30-03 to file answer brief on the merits. (ok to grant - order being prepared. No further extensions will be granted.)
Jun 26 2003Extension of time granted
  On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including July 30, 2003. No further extensions will be granted.
Jul 30 2003Answer brief on the merits filed
  in San Diego by counsel for appellant.
Aug 4 2003Received document entitled:
  Errata Letter from counsel for appellant. Providing page vi of the table of authorities re Answer Brief. .
Aug 11 2003Change of Address filed for:
  appellant (Mr. Gaylon Majors) by counsel.
Aug 13 2003Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  in San Diego by counsel for respondent (People).
Jan 14 2004Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Ulibarri
Feb 26 2004Received:
  From Superior Court copy of People's exhibit # 8
Apr 6 2004Case ordered on calendar
  5-6-04, 9am, S.F.
May 6 2004Cause argued and submitted
Jul 1 2004Opinion filed: Judgment reversed
  and the case is remanded to CA. Majority Opinion by Brown, J. joined by George C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin & Moreno, JJ.
Jul 15 2004Rehearing petition filed
  by counsel for appellant (Gaylon Michael Majors)
Jul 19 2004Time extended to consider modification or rehearing
  The time for granting or denying rehearing in the above-entitled case is hereby extended to and including September 29, 2004, or the date upon which rehearing is either granted or denied.
Aug 11 2004Rehearing denied
Aug 11 2004Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Aug 25 2004Received:
  Receipt for remittitur from CA4/1.

May 28 2003Opening brief on the merits filed
Jul 30 2003Answer brief on the merits filed
Aug 13 2003Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
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