Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 11/24/03

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S106681
v.
) Ct.App.
5
F036242
DANIEL SAPIEN LOPEZ,
Fresno
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. 640276-2

The crime of carjacking requires the “felonious taking” of a motor vehicle.
(Pen. Code, § 215.)1 Similarly, the crime of robbery requires the “felonious
taking” of personal property. (§ 211.) California courts, following common law,
have long held that the “taking” element of robbery requires that a defendant gain
possession of the victim’s property and asport or carry it away. (See People v.
Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165 (Cooper); Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law
(3d ed. 1982) § 2, pp. 343-344 (Perkins).) Does the felonious taking element of the
crime of carjacking, like robbery, require asportation or movement of the motor
vehicle? We conclude that it does. Because the Court of Appeal came to a
contrary decision, we reverse that court’s judgment.

1
Except as otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
1

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I. BACKGROUND
On July 1, 1999, Wa Vue Yang was seated inside his van in a parking lot
when defendant approached him and offered to sell him a watch. When Yang
replied that he had a watch, defendant pulled out a gun and shot at the ground. He
pointed the gun at Yang and ordered him out of his van. Yang complied, but left
his keys in the ignition. Defendant sat in the van and threw his backpack onto the
passenger seat. As Yang began to leave, he remembered that he had left some
checks inside the van. Deciding that defendant’s weapon was an air gun, Yang’s
fear subsided. He returned to the van to retrieve his checks. Defendant pointed his
gun at Yang and pulled the trigger twice, but the gun did not fire. Defendant fled
from the van and left his backpack, containing identification, in the van.
Defendant committed a series of other unrelated crimes. After a court trial,
the trial court found defendant guilty of multiple felony offenses, including
carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)) for the criminal activity against Yang (count V).
Under the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), the
court imposed a lengthy term of imprisonment.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the carjacking conviction. It rejected
defendant’s claim that, because the vehicle had not been moved or the engine
started, there was insufficient evidence of a completed carjacking and he was guilty
only of attempted carjacking. Determining that carjacking and robbery are not
analogous crimes, the court held that actual movement of a motor vehicle is not
required to complete the offense of carjacking. We granted review to settle the
conflict between this case and People v. Vargas (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 456
(Vargas), which held that carjacking requires movement of the vehicle because
robbery is an analogous statute and it requires movement of the property taken.
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II. DISCUSSION
Carjacking is defined as “the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the
possession of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, or from the
person or immediate presence of a passenger of the motor vehicle, against his or
her will and with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person
in possession of the motor vehicle of his or her possession, accomplished by means
of force or fear.” (§ 215, subd. (a), italics added.)
Robbery is defined as “the felonious taking of personal property in the
possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will,
accomplished by means of force or fear.” (§ 211, italics added.)
Defendant relies on Vargas, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 456. He argues that,
because the Legislature used the same “felonious taking” phrase in defining
carjacking, it intended that the phrase be given the same meaning as the analogous
provision in the robbery statute. Following the common law crime of larceny,
California courts have construed the taking element of robbery to include two
necessary elements: caption or gaining possession of the victim’s property, and
asportation or carrying away the loot. (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 852;
Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1165; see also People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th
935, 945-947; Perkins, supra, § 2, pp. 343-344.) The Attorney General responds
that the Legislature created a new crime of carjacking, which, although resembling
the crime of robbery in some respects, is a separate crime with meaningful
differences. Although we agree with the Attorney General that “[t]he analogy
between robbery and carjacking is imperfect” (People v. Hill (2000) 23 Cal.4th
853, 860), “[t]here is no evidence the Legislature intended to adopt a ‘felonious
taking’ requirement different from that for robbery.” (Vargas, supra, 96
Cal.App.4th at p. 463.)
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In construing a statute, our role is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as
to effectuate the purpose of the law. (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605,
621.) In determining intent, we must look first to the words of the statute because
they are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. (People v. Lawrence
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 230.) If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous,
the plain meaning of the statute governs. (Id. at pp. 230-231.) “If, however, the
language supports more than one reasonable construction, we may consider ‘a
variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to
be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative
construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.’ [Citation.]
Using these extrinsic aids, we ‘select the construction that comports most closely
with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than
defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would
lead to absurd consequences.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Sinohui (2002) 28 Cal.4th
205, 211-212.)
Section 215, subdivision (a), requires the “taking” of a motor vehicle.
Defendant claims that the plain meaning of the word “taking” requires proof of
asportation. However, terms such as “asportation,” “carries or drives away,” or
“movement” do not appear in the statute. The plain meaning of “taking” does not
necessarily impute an asportation requirement. (See Carter v. United States (2000)
530 U.S. 255, 272 [comparing 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (b), one of which required
a taking while the other specified taking and carrying away].) In contrasting
“taking” from “carrying away,” one commentator noted that “A taking occurs
when the offender secures dominion over the property, while a carrying away
requires some slight movement away of the property.” (3 LaFave, Substantive
Criminal Law (2003) LarcenyTaking and Carrying Away, § 19.3, p. 74, italics
added.) Thus, we must look to extrinsic sources to determine legislative intent.
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The Legislature created the crime of carjacking in 1993. (Stats. 1993, ch.
611, § 6, p. 3508.) Prior to the enactment of section 215, the forcible taking of a
motor vehicle was charged and prosecuted as a second degree robbery. (See
People v. Duran (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1376; People v. Hamilton (1995) 40
Cal.App.4th 1137, 1141-1142; see also Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor
Analyses, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 8,
1993, p. 1.) The legislative history reveals the underlying purpose for creating the
new crime of carjacking: “According to the author [of the legislative bill]: [¶]
There has been considerable increase in the number of persons who have been
abducted, many have been subjected to the violent taking of their automobile and
some have had a gun used in the taking of the car. This relatively ‘new’ crime
appears to be as much thrill-seeking as theft of a car. If all the thief wanted was the
car, it would be simpler to hot-wire the automobile without running the risk of
confronting the driver. People have been killed, seriously injured, and placed in
great fear, and this calls for a strong message to discourage these crimes.
Additionally law enforcement is reporting this new crime is becoming the initiating
rite for aspiring gang members and the incidents are drastically increasing. [¶]
Under current law there is no carjacking crime per se and many carjackings cannot
be charged as robbery because it is difficult to prove the intent required of a
robbery offense (to permanently deprive one of the car) since many of these gang
carjackings are thrill seeking thefts. There is a need to prosecute this crime.”
(Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.)
July 13, 1993, p. 1, italics added.)
Thus, the legislative history demonstrates that carjacking was made a
separate offense because of perceived difficulties with obtaining convictions under
the robbery statute. (People v. Hamilton, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1141-1142.)
In addition, because of the potentially violent nature of the taking and growing
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frequency of the crime, the Legislature made the punishment for carjacking greater
than that for second degree robbery. (People v. Antoine (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th
489, 495; People v. Hamilton, supra, at p. 1141.)
As the Attorney General asserts, there are significant differences between
the crimes of carjacking and robbery. First, carjacking requires either an intent to
permanently or temporarily deprive; robbery requires an intent to permanently
deprive. (People v. Dominguez (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 418.) As reflected
above, the Legislature changed the intent requirement of carjacking “to close a
potential loophole.” (People v. Hamilton, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1141.)
Second, “[u]nlike robbery, which requires a taking from the person or
immediate presence of the possessor (§ 211), the Legislature expanded the taking
element to a taking from the person or immediate presence of either the possessor
or any passenger. (§ 215, subd. (a).)” (People v. Hill, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 860,
italics omitted.)
Third, robbery can involve any type of personal property, while carjacking
involves only vehicles. (In re Travis W. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 368, 373; People
v. Alvarado (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 156, 160.)
As introduced, the Assembly bill defined carjacking as “the felonious taking
or seizure of, or the exercise of control over, a motor vehicle . . . .” (Assem. Bill
No. 6 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Dec. 7, 1992, italics added.) The
italicized language was later deleted from the Assembly bill. (Assem. Bill No. 6
(1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 23, 1993.) From this amended deletion,
defendant infers that the Legislature intended that the “taking” include a movement
or asportation requirement. However, we do not find the deletion particularly
telling. We agree with the Attorney General that it was just as likely that the
Legislature dropped the language as surplusage, or did so to conform to the original
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version of the Senate’s carjacking bill, which only specified a “taking.” (Sen. Bill
No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 4, 1993.)
Also, in one version of the Senate bill, the Legislature redefined the offense
of carjacking to include “the attempt to take, a vehicle.” (Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-
1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 17, 1993.) In the next Senate amendment, the
Legislature deleted the “attempt to take” language from the definition of
carjacking. (Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 8, 1993.)
Defendant argues that the Legislature was presumably aware that the absence of
asportation—not just caption—is a recognized basis for distinguishing attempts
from completed taking offenses such as larceny and robbery. (See, e.g., People v.
Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 753; People v. Shannon (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 649,
654; People v. Green (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 991, 1000.) He posits that the deletion
of an attempted taking from the definition of carjacking reflects that the Legislature
intended to require the elements of caption and asportation for a completed
carjacking. In other words, it intended to maintain the usual distinction between a
completed taking offense and an attempted taking offense.
However, another difference between completed and attempted offenses is
the punishment imposed. Persons guilty of attempting an offense are sentenced to
one-half the term of imprisonment prescribed upon a conviction of the offense
attempted. (§ 664, subd. (a).) Indeed, a staff analysis prepared for a legislative
committee suggests that the Legislature focused on the difference in punishments
that are generally imposed for completed and attempted offenses. The staff
analysis comments: “This bill would include an attempt within the definition of
carjacking, thereby providing for a full term for attempted carjacking. [¶]
Proponents have not indicated why attempted carjacking should be treated
differently from virtually all other attempts.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 17, 1993, p. 4.) Thus, it
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appears more likely that the Legislature’s subsequent deletion of the “attempt to
take” language from the definition of carjacking reflected a desire to maintain the
general punishment scheme for attempted offenses, rather than a commentary on
the substantive elements of the crime.
Nevertheless, the carjacking statute’s language and legislative history—
reflected in the author’s explanation for the new crime—demonstrate that
carjacking is a direct offshoot of robbery and that the Legislature modeled the
carjacking statute on the robbery statute. The definition in the carjacking statute
(§ 215, subd. (a)) tracks the language in the robbery statute (§ 211). “Both involve
‘the felonious taking’ of property that is ‘in the possession of another’ person.
Both require that the taking be from the ‘person or immediate presence’ of the
person. Both are ‘accomplished by means of force or fear.’ ” (In re Travis W.,
supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 373; cf. Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 227,
235 [federal carjacking statute modeled on federal robbery statutes].)
The carjacking statute itself reflects the overlap between carjacking and
robbery. It states, “This section shall not be construed to supersede or affect
Section 211. A person may be charged with a violation of this section and Section
211. However, no defendant may be punished under this section and Section 211
for the same act which constitutes a violation of both this section and Section 211.”
(§ 215, subd. (c); see People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 700 [§ 215 permits
multiple convictions of carjacking and robbery based on the same conduct, but
prohibits multiple punishment for the same act].)
In the related crime of unlawful driving or taking of a motor vehicle, the
statute similarly proscribes the taking of a vehicle under specified conditions.
(Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a),
provides: “Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without
the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently or
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temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the
vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle, or any person who is a
party or an accessory to or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized taking or
stealing, is guilty of a public offense . . . .” (Italics added.) “To satisfy the
asportation requirement for robbery, ‘no great movement is required, and it is not
necessary that the property be taken out of the physical presence of the victim.’ (2
Witkin & Epstein [Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988)] Crimes Against Property, §
641, p. 723.) ‘[S]light movement’ is enough to satisfy the asportation requirement.
(Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1165; People v. Pham (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 61,
65 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 636].)” (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 852.) Consistent
with the common law on takings of larceny and robbery, California courts have
long construed the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle to also require
asportation—“ ‘[a]ny removal, however slight.’ ” (People v. White (1945) 71
Cal.App.2d 524, 525; see also People v. Ragone (1948) 84 Cal.App.2d 476, 479;
People v. Lewis (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 119, 125; 2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal
Law (3d ed. 2000) § 67, pp. 95-96.)
When legislation has been judicially construed and a subsequent statute on a
similar subject uses identical or substantially similar language, the usual
presumption is that the Legislature intended the same construction, unless a
contrary intent clearly appears. (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329; see
also People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 112 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.).) Moreover,
if a term known to the common law has not otherwise been defined by statute, it is
assumed that the common law meaning was intended. (3 Wharton, Criminal Law
(15th ed. 1995) § 342 , p. 350; see also § 7, par. 16; Carter v. United States, supra,
530 U.S. at p. 266 [“we have not hesitated to turn to the common law for guidance
when the relevant statutory text does contain a term with an established meaning at
common law”]; People v. Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 946 [by adopting the
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phrase “felonious taking” as used in the common law with regard to larceny and
robbery statutes, the Legislature in all likelihood intended to incorporate the same
meanings attached to those phrases at common law].) Because the “felonious
taking” in the crime of robbery has an established meaning at common law and the
same “taking” language appears in the carjacking, robbery, and unlawful taking or
driving of a vehicle statutes, we presume that the Legislature intended the same
meaning, unless a contrary intent clearly appears.
The Attorney General claims that because the Legislature expanded the
taking element to include the possessor or any passengers (§ 215, subd. (a)), a
contrary intent does appear for construing the “taking” element for carjacking
differently. He relies on People v. Hill, supra, 23 Cal.4th 853, in which we
commented that “[t]he analogy between robbery and carjacking is imperfect. . . .
By extending carjacking to include a taking from a passenger, even one without a
possessory interest (assuming the other elements of the crime are present), the
Legislature has made carjacking more nearly a crime against the person than a
crime against property.” (Id. at p. 860.) Moreover, we refused to construe the
element “against his or her will” in lockstep with the robbery statute and held that
an infant can be the victim of a carjacking even though he or she is unaware of the
taking or too young to give or withhold consent. (Id. at pp. 855, 860-861.)
Using Hill as a springboard, the Attorney General further argues that
because carjacking is “more nearly a crime against the person than a crime against
property” (People v. Hill, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 860), movement of the vehicle is
unrelated to the serious potential for harm to the victim, and thus is not required.
Using the facts of this case as illustration, he claims that a defendant who gains
possession and control of a vehicle using threats of violence, exposes the victim to
the same risks, irrespective of whether the vehicle moves. However, the legislative
history indicates that the Legislature was specifically concerned with the
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“considerable increase in the number of persons who have been abducted” in their
vehicles and the associated danger to the driver or passenger. (Assem. Com. on
Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 1993, p.
1.) Indeed, the facts in Hill illustrate the increased risks involved with abductions
during a carjacking. There, defendant took the victim’s car and drove off with the
victim and her seven-month-old daughter still in the car. The infant was unbuckled
from her carseat, and rolled around the front seat as the vehicle moved. Given the
unique nature of the taking and the identical threat of violence and serious potential
for harm to all occupants of the car, we analogized the crime of carjacking with
kidnapping and found no reason in logic or policy for the Legislature to have
precluded an infant from being a victim of a carjacking. (People v. Hill, supra, 23
Cal.4th at pp. 859-860.)
The Attorney General admits that by limiting section 215 to one specific
type of property, a motor vehicle, the Legislature focused on criminal conduct akin
to hijacking that preys on victims in vulnerable circumstances. (People v. Hill,
supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 859-860; People v. Duran, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p.
1376 [§ 215 “was passed in 1993 to address what was then an increasingly
dangerous problem of people being abducted from their cars, sometimes at
gunpoint”].) Nevertheless, he is correct that a completed carjacking occurs
whether the perpetrator drives off with the carjacking victim in the car or forcibly
removes the victim from the car before driving off. (People v. Duran, supra, at pp.
1375-1377 [vehicle driven with victims inside]; People v. Hamilton, supra, 40
Cal.App.4th at p. 1140 [vehicle driven without victims inside].) The inherent
dangers and risk of harm to the victim is the same whether the perpetrator drives
off or remains stationary after forcibly removing the victim from the vehicle. The
Attorney General further argues that the purpose of an asportation requirement in
larceny and robbery is to provide an external and observable manifestation of the
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wrongdoer’s possession and control over the property. (See People v. Alamo
(1974) 34 N.Y.2d 453, 457-458 [315 N.E.2d 446, 449]; Dressler, Understanding
Criminal Law (2d ed. 1995) Theft, § 32.05, pp. 515-516; 2 Burdick, The Law of
Crime (1946) § 500, pp. 265-266.) Unlike robbery of personal property, in which
dispossession is made by physically removing the property from the victim’s
possession, the forcible removal or expulsion of the victim from his van and
defendant’s entry into that van perfected the caption requirement, without the need
for the observable act of moving the van. (See People v. Alamo, supra, 34 N.Y.2d
at p. 458 [movement or motion of car not essential to show possession and control
of car under larceny statute].) Thus, he posits that the legislative concern with
abductions means only that movement of the vehicle should be a sufficient, but not
a necessary condition for carjacking.
Although the Attorney General’s arguments are reasonable, we agree with
defendant that they are policy arguments reserved for the Legislature. As it stands,
based on the language of the statute and its legislative purpose, carjacking adapts
and expands specific elements of robbery to address increasing auto theft incidents
by perpetrators who may not intend to permanently deprive possession of the
vehicle, but whose criminal acts nevertheless heighten the risk of harm to a broader
range of victims than were covered under the existing crime of robbery. Thus, the
Legislature expanded the taking element to include takings from either the
possessor or any passenger, including an infant, but neither the words of the
carjacking statute nor the legislative history indicates that the Legislature intended
to alter the meaning of “felonious taking” with respect to the requirement of
asportation. The legislative history is replete with comparisons between robbery
and the new crime of carjacking. Noting the deficiencies in charging and
prosecuting a carjacking under the robbery statute, the Legislature affirmatively
adjusted the carjacking elements—as distinct from robbery—to include a taking
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from a passenger, even one without a possessory interest, and to include an intent
to temporarily deprive a person of possession of the motor vehicle. (§ 215, subd.
(a).) Yet the legislative history is silent as to whether the Legislature intended to
further distinguish the crime of carjacking from the crime of robbery by
eliminating the asportation requirement. In the absence of a contrary intent, we
presume that in adopting the phrase, “felonious taking,” from the robbery statute,
the Legislature intended that those same words within section 215 be given the
same construction.
Finally, the Attorney General contends that even if there is an asportation
requirement, defendant’s act of forcibly removing the victim from his van satisfied
it. Again asserting that asportation serves only as an observable manifestation of
dominion and control, he argues that “[t]here is no reason in logic or policy why
physical dispossession may be made by slight movement of the property but not
the exile of the owner.” That may be so, but the argument is not supported by the
plain language of the statute. Section 215, subdivision (a), requires “the felonious
taking of a motor vehicle . . . from . . . [the] person or immediate presence” of the
possessor or passenger. (Italics added.) It does not require the felonious taking of
the possessor or passenger from the motor vehicle.2 Consequently, defendant’s
conduct is punishable as an attempted carjacking. (Vargas, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th
at p. 463 [carjacking conviction reduced to lesser included offense of attempted
carjacking].)

2
We disapprove People v. Alvarado, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pages 161-162,
to the extent it suggests that the victim’s flight from the vehicle satisfies the
asportation requirement of carjacking.
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III. DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal relating to the carjacking
conviction (count V) and remand the case to that court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is otherwise
affirmed.
CHIN,
J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.
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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Lopez
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted

XXX 97 Cal.App.4th 583
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S106681
Date Filed: November 24, 2003
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Fresno
Judge: Lawrence Jones

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Joseph Shipp, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys
General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick J. Whalen, Michael A. Canzoneri and Brian G.
Smiley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Joseph Shipp
Post Office Box 20347
Oakland, CA 94620
(510) 530-9043

Brian G. Smiley
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
(916) 324-5286

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Mon, 11/24/2003	S106681

Disposition
Nov 24 2003	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
May 13 2002	Petition for review filed   by counsel for Appellant Daniel Sapien Lopez
May 13 2002	Record requested
May 17 2002	Received Court of Appeal record   one doghouse
Jun 26 2002	Petition for Review Granted; issues limited (criminal case)   The issue to be briefed and argued shall be limited to whether carjacking requires asportation. Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown and Moreno, JJ.
Jul 30 2002	Counsel appointment order filed   Joseph C. Schipp appointed to represent aplt. Aplt's brief on the merits is due w/in 30 days (8/29)
Aug 28 2002	Appellant's opening brief filed   by counsel for appellant (D. Lopez)
Aug 28 2002	Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)   by counsel for appellant with Appendix
Sep 24 2002	Request for extension of time filed   by (AG) counsel for respondent (People) requesting extension to October 28, 2002 to file the Respondent's Brief.
Sep 26 2002	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the respondent's brief is extended to and including October 28, 2002.
Oct 16 2002	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Shipp
Oct 24 2002	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for respondent requests second extension of time to November 18, 2002 to file the respondent's brief.
Oct 29 2002	Extension of time granted   respondent's time to serve and file the respondent's brief is extended to and including November 18, 2002.
Nov 18 2002	Answer brief on the merits filed   by AG counsel for respondent (People)
Dec 2 2002	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   by counsel for appellant (D. Lopez)
Aug 5 2003	Case ordered on calendar   9-3-03, 1:30pm, S.F.
Sep 3 2003	Cause argued and submitted
Sep 29 2003	Request for judicial notice granted   The request for judicial notice filed on August 28, 2003 is granted.
Nov 24 2003	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. OPINION BY: Chin, J. -- joined by: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Brown, Moreno, JJ.
Dec 17 2003	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Shipp
Dec 26 2003	Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Dec 29 2003	Note:   records returned CA 5
Jan 5 2004	Received:   Receipt for remittitur from CA 5

Briefs
Aug 28 2002	Appellant's opening brief filed
Nov 18 2002	Answer brief on the merits filed
Dec 2 2002	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website