Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S115998
People v. Langston


Filed 8/16/04

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S115998
v.
Ct.App. 3 C037845
WALTER SHANE LANGSTON,
) Sacramento
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. 00F09092

In this sentencing case, we resolve a conflict that has arisen among the
Courts of Appeal regarding the proper interpretation of Penal Code section 667.5,
subdivision (b) (hereafter section 667.5(b)), imposing (with exceptions not
pertinent here) a consecutive one-year enhancement of the term imposed for
conviction of a felony offense “for each prior separate prison term served for any
felony.” (All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.)
Does the enhancement provision include and apply to a completed, separate prior
prison term served for an escape (§ 4530, subd. (b))? In other words, if the
defendant is reimprisoned on the term he was serving at the time of the escape,
and given an additional, consecutive term for the escape itself, is the entire term of
imprisonment, interrupted by the escape, considered one separate prison term or
two?
Consistent with several other cases that have considered this question, we
conclude that a prior separate prison term for escape should be treated no
1



differently than any other prior prison term served for a felony offense, and thus
should qualify for the one-year enhancement under section 667.5(b). We will
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which reached a contrary conclusion.
FACTS
The following facts are taken largely from the Court of Appeal opinion in
this case. Defendant Walter Shane Langston was convicted by a jury of first
degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)) and receiving stolen property (§ 496,
subd. (a)). The trial court found defendant had served three prior prison terms
within the meaning of section 667.5(b). The trial court imposed the upper term of
six years for the burglary, the upper term of three years for the receipt of stolen
property to be stayed pursuant to section 654, and three consecutive one-year
terms for the prior prison terms with one of those terms stayed pursuant to section
667.5, subdivisions (d) and (g), for an aggregate prison term of eight years.
Although the court imposed the one-year enhancements for defendant’s
1992 and 1999 prior prison terms, it stayed the one-year enhancement as to the
prior prison term for defendant’s 1994 escape conviction “pursuant to section
667.5 [subds. (d) and (g)].” The court stayed the enhancement because, although
it found the escape conviction was “a legitimate conviction in that he was
convicted of the offense on the date indicated on the count,” and that he did serve
the state prison sentence, it was unclear whether the term was separately served
under section 667.5(b). The Court of Appeal modified the judgment to strike the
enhancement and, as modified, affirmed the judgment. We granted the Attorney
General’s petition for review. As indicated, we will reverse the Court of Appeal.
DISCUSSION
Section 667.5, subdivisions (b), (d), and (g) each requires that, in order to
qualify for the enhancement, the prior prison terms must have been served
separately. The question presented in this case is whether defendant’s completed
2

prison term for escape from prison is a separately served prison term within the
meaning of section 667.5(b). For the reasons that follow, we conclude it is.
Section 667.5(b) provides for an enhancement of the prison term for a new
offense of one year for each “prior separate prison term served for any felony,”
with an exception not applicable here involving a prior five-year commitment
“washout” period of freedom from custody and further felony offenses. Once the
prior prison term is found true within the meaning of section 667.5(b), the trial
court may not stay the one-year enhancement, which is mandatory unless stricken.
(See People v. Jones (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 756, 758; People v. Eberhardt (1986)
186 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1122-1123.)
Section 667.5, subdivision (d), provides: “For the purposes of this section,
the defendant shall be deemed to remain in prison custody for an offense until the
official discharge from custody or until release on parole, whichever first occurs,
including any time during which the defendant remains subject to reimprisonment
for escape from custody or is reimprisoned on revocation of parole. The
additional penalties provided for prior prison terms shall not be imposed unless
they are charged and admitted or found true in the action for the new offense.”
Subdivision (g) of section 667.5 contains the rather confusing language at
issue in this case. That subdivision provides: “A prior separate prison term for the
purposes of this section shall mean a continuous completed period of prison
incarceration imposed for the particular offense alone or in combination with
concurrent or consecutive sentences for other crimes, including any
reimprisonment on revocation of parole which is not accompanied by a new
commitment to prison, and including any reimprisonment after an escape from
incarceration.” (Italics added.)
Does the italicized language mean that, unlike other prior separate prison
terms, a consecutive prison term served for escape does not receive an
3

enhancement under section 667.5(b) because it is deemed included in the term
interrupted by the escape? Believing that such an interpretation would lead to
absurd or illogical results, we conclude otherwise.
In reaching its contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeal in this case
reasoned that “[t]he plain language of [section 667.5,] subdivision (g) indicates
that after a defendant is committed to state prison, additional concurrent or
consecutive sentences imposed in the same or subsequent proceedings are deemed
to be part of the same prison term, including any reimprisonment after an escape
from incarceration. [Citation.] The statute does not distinguish between
reimprisonments after escape which are and are not accompanied by a new
commitment.” To the contrary, we think the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of
section 667, subdivision (g), would fail to promote the Legislature’s clear purpose
to impose a one-year enhancement for all separately served prior prison terms.
As we explain below, we discern no legislative intent to include within the
original prison term any additional but separate term resulting from the escape, as
opposed to a continuation of the original term following reimprisonment for
escape. In other words, by reason of section 667, subdivision (g), the defendant’s
original interrupted term is not deemed separate and apart from the remaining term
that must be completed following his reimprisonment. But the section would not
include the consecutive time served for the escape itself, because new crimes
committed while in prison are treated as separate offenses and begin a new
aggregate term. (People v. Carr (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 774, 780-781 (Carr);
People v. White (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 862, 867-871 (White); see People v.
Walkkein (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1409-1410 (Walkkein); People v. Cardenas
(1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 51, 59 (Cardenas).)
The foregoing construction is consistent with section 1170.1, subdivision
(c), stating that consecutive sentences imposed for additional crimes committed in
4

prison are deemed to commence when the prisoner would otherwise have been
released. That section provides in pertinent part: “In the case of any person
convicted of one or more felonies committed while the person is confined in a
state prison or is subject to reimprisonment for escape from custody and the law
either requires the terms to be served consecutively or the court imposes
consecutive terms, the term of imprisonment for all the convictions that the person
is required to serve consecutively shall commence from the time the person would
otherwise have been released from prison.” (Id., italics added.) Given the
language of section 1170.1, subdivision (c), a reasonable interpretation of the
statutory scheme is that under section 667.5, subdivision (g), the defendant’s
original interrupted term is not deemed separate and apart from the remaining term
that must be completed following his rearrest and reimprisonment.
The Court of Appeal noted, however, that “section 1170.1 was not
specifically enacted to assist in the interpretation of separately served prison terms
for purposes of section 667.5. Moreover, since the enhancement must be found
true within the meaning of section 667.5 and subdivision (g) specifically addresses
the definition of a prior separate prison term for reimprisonment after an escape,
we believe the express language in section 667.5 must prevail.” The Court of
Appeal did recognize “the apparent dichotomy between the definition of a
separately served term for escape under sections 667.5 and 1170.1.” The court
noted that “Escape from prison, whether or not by force or violence, results by law
in the imposition of a consecutive sentence. (§ 4530, subds. (a) & (b).)
Statutorily, one convicted of escape from prison in violation of section 4530
comes within the express provisions of section 1170.1, subdivision (c), ‘which
requires the term for escape be treated as a separate and additional term to be
served consecutive to the remainder of the term under which the person convicted
was already confined.’ (People v. Galliher (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 149, 153,
5

original italics [referencing former § 1170.1, subd. (b) which was redesignated
subd. (c) by the 1982 amendment].)”
As noted, prior appellate decisions support our proposed interpretation of
section 667.5, subdivision (g). Thus, Cardenas noted that it was “inconceivable
the Legislature intended a defendant’s subsequent crimes be exempt from
recidivist enhancement merely because the offense was committed inside prison
walls.” (Cardenas, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 60.) Accordingly, Cardenas held
that, to avoid absurd results, sections 667.5(b) and 1170.1, subdivision (c), must
be construed together as providing for “similar treatment of new felony offenses
whether committed in or out of prison.” (Cardenas, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p.
60.) Similarly, Walkkein observed that the purposes of these sections would be
ignored if “persons who re-offend in prison received a lesser penalty than persons
who re-offend ‘on the outside.’ ” (Walkkein, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1410.)
Carr, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at pages 780-781, seems most apposite.
There, the defendant argued that the prison sentence on his prior burglary
conviction and the consecutive sentence on his later escape conviction constituted
but a single prison term under section 667.5, subdivision (g). The Carr court
disagreed, observing that, “[a]t first blush, the last clause of section 667.5(g) . . .
might seem to support Carr’s argument. Read in context, however, it is clear that
language is intended to refer only to that portion of the original prison term for
which the defendant is reimprisoned following the escape. Any new prison
sentence imposed on a new escape conviction would not constitute
reimprisonment within the meaning of subdivision (g).” (Carr, supra¸204
Cal.App.3d at p. 780, fn. 8.) Carr relied on the foregoing language of section
1170.1, subdivision (c), and reasoned that the escape term is a separate,
“ ‘continuous completed’ ” term, which is available for enhancement under section
667.5. (Carr, supra, at p. 780.)
6

The court in White, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at pages 867-871, applied
similar reasoning to reach the same conclusion that reimprisonment after
conviction for escape fell within the provisions for enhancement under section
667.5(b). The White court reasoned: “[W]e believe our conclusion is consistent
with the legislative intent to provide additional punishment for the recidivist,
regardless of whether he commits a new felony inside prison or on the outside.
Society is at a greater risk from a hardened criminal and the protection of society
warrants harsher punishment for the habitual offender. [Citation.] It would
indeed be an unfortunate anomaly if the defendant who escaped one day before his
sentence was completed could avoid the application of section 667.5(b) because
he was serving a prison term while his confederate who waited until his lawful
release two days later before committing a new felony was subject to increased
punishment for the prior convictions. To treat the in-prison recidivist more
leniently than the out-of-prison recidivist is contrary to the legislative purpose
underlying increased punishment for the habitual offender. [Citation.]” (White,
supra, at pp. 870-871.)
The present Court of Appeal disagreed with Carr and White, relying in part
on legislative history showing that, as originally enacted (Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, §
268, p. 5139), section 667.5, subdivision (g), read as follows: “A continuous
completed period of prison incarceration imposed for the particular offense alone
or in combination with sentences for other counts or sentences to be served
concurrently or consecutively therewith including any reimprisonment on
revocation of parole or new commitment for escape from such incarceration shall
be deemed a single prior separate term for the purposes of this section.” (Italics
added.) As the Court of Appeal viewed it, “[t]he Legislature then amended
section 667.5, subdivision (g) in Statutes 1977, chapter 165, section 13, page 644,
to its current form, to differentiate between a mere revocation of parole and the
7

revocation of parole which is accompanied by a new commitment. (See In re
Kelly (1983) 33 Cal.3d 267, 271 [(Kelly)].) The purpose of the amendment was to
provide for an enhancement when a prisoner is returned to prison on revocation of
parole and, at the same time, is incarcerated for a new offense. (Ibid.)”
Dicta in our 1983 Kelly decision supports the Court of Appeal’s holding,
although that decision does not appear to have recognized the full significance of
the new language added by the 1977 amendment. Kelly properly rejected the
defendant’s argument that despite his parole violation and new commitment for
offenses while on parole, he had not served a “prior separate prison term” within
section 667.5, subdivision (g), because he essentially had been serving one
continuous prison term. (Kelly, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 269.) Kelly stressed the
absence of language in the section indicating that commitment for a new offense
while on parole would not constitute a separate term for enhancement purposes.
The court noted in dictum that, unlike the provision regarding parole revocation,
“the 1977 amendment did not intrinsically change the phrase referring to
reimprisonment after escape, which now reads: ‘. . . and including any
reimprisonment after escape from such incarceration.’ The only difference is that
this phrase is no longer interrupted by the parole revocation wording. There is no
qualifying phrase such as ‘which is not accompanied by a new commitment to
prison.’ . . . It is obvious . . . that the Legislature intended to differentiate between
the escape and parole situations (and amend one and not the other).” (Kelly,
supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 271, fn. 4, italics added.)
Thereafter, in explaining the application of section 667.5, subdivision (g),
in a parole revocation context, the Kelly court seemingly approved language in a
Community Release Board regulation to the effect that, “ ‘[i]f the person was
returned to prison to finish term [sic], for a parole violation or with a new
8

commitment for escape, the period will count as a single prior prison term.’ ”
(Kelly, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 276.)
Kelly involved the application of the one-year enhancement in section
667.5(b) to offenses committed on parole and accordingly its references to escapes
were dicta which we now reexamine and must disapprove. The Court of Appeal
in the present case found the Kelly dicta “well reasoned and persuasive.” But as
the Attorney General observes, a closer examination of the 1977 amendment leads
to the conclusion that Kelley erred in suggesting this amendment “did not
intrinsically change the phrase referring to reimprisonment after escape . . . .”
(Kelley, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 271, fn. 4.) Kelly seemingly overlooked the fact
that the 1977 amendment deleted the phrase “new commitment for escape from
such incarceration,” and substituted the qualitatively different term “any
reimprisonment after an escape.” (§ 667.5, subd. (g), as amended by Stats. 1977,
ch. 165, § 13, p. 646.) As Carr and White each hold, this substitution should
preclude us from construing section 667.5, subdivision (g), as including the
separate prison term served for escape within the “continuous completed period of
prison incarceration” contemplated by that section. In other words,
reimprisonment may result in a continuation or renewal of the term interrupted by
the escape, but it does not encompass the additional separate term to be served for
the escape itself.
Thus, we construe the statutory phrase “including any reimprisonment after
an escape from incarceration” in section 667.5, subdivision (g), as referring to the
completion of the original term of imprisonment, but not to the new term of
imprisonment imposed for escape. We think this interpretation is fully consistent
with, and indeed effectuates, Kelly’s view that the term “continuous completed
period of prison incarceration” in section 667.5, subdivision (g), is equivalent to
9

the stated prison commitment for the particular offense at issue. (Kelly, supra, 33
Cal.3d at p. 270.)
Defendant relies on section 1170.1, subdivision (a), requiring imposition of
an aggregate term of imprisonment for all consecutive felony convictions, whether
in the same proceeding or later, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.” But as
the Attorney General observes, this subdivision is inapplicable to in-prison
offenses, which are governed by section 1170.1, subdivision (c), requiring the
term of imprisonment for such offenses to “commence from the time the person
would otherwise have been released from prison,” i.e., after completion of the
original term.
DISPOSITION
We conclude the Court of Appeal erred in striking the enhancement for
defendant’s 1984 escape conviction. To the extent it is inconsistent with our
opinion, we overrule In re Kelly (1983) 33 Cal.3d 267. The judgment of the Court
of Appeal is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
CHIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.
10





DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J.

A defendant who is convicted of a felony and who has previously served
time in prison is subject to a one-year sentence enhancement. (Pen. Code,
§ 667.5.)1 Irrespective of the number of prior convictions, only one enhancement
can be imposed if the defendant was in prison for the prior felonies during a single
“continuous completed period of prison incarceration.” (§ 667.5, subd. (g).) That
period includes “any reimprisonment after an escape from incarceration.” (Ibid.)
Here, while in prison for a felony conviction (petty theft with a prior theft-
related conviction), defendant escaped. He was caught, was convicted of
felonious escape, and was returned to prison to complete his sentence for theft and
to serve his sentence for escape. After his release he was convicted of yet another
felony. The majority holds that two one-year enhancements under section 667.5
can be imposed: One for the theft, the other for the escape.
I disagree. Defendant served his prison sentence for theft and his sentence
for escape at the same time. Consequently, under this court’s decision in In re
Kelly (1983) 33 Cal.3d 267 (Kelly), defendant was subject to only a single one-
year sentence enhancement.

1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
1



I
In 1976, the Legislature enacted section 667.5 as part of the new
determinate sentencing law. Subdivision (b) of that statute states that a defendant
is subject to a one-year sentence enhancement for every “prior separate prison
term” served. The phrase “prior separate prison term” is defined in subdivision (g)
of section 667.5. The meaning of that definition is at issue here.
When originally enacted in 1976, section 667.5, subdivision (g) said: “A
continuous completed period of prison incarceration imposed for the particular
offense alone or in combination with sentences for other counts or sentences to be
served concurrently or consecutively therewith including any reimprisonment on
revocation of parole or new commitment for escape from such incarceration shall
be deemed a single prior separate term for purposes of this section.” (Stats. 1976,
ch. 1139, § 268, p. 5139, italics added.) Thus, a prison sentence for an escape was
not a separate term but part of the original incarceration, and therefore not subject
to a separate one-year sentence enhancement. The Attorney General does not
contend otherwise, and the majority appears to concede that this is so. (Maj. opn.,
ante, at p. 9.)
In 1977, the Legislature amended section 667.5’s subdivision (g) to
provide: “A prior separate prison term for the purposes of this section shall mean
a continuous completed period of prison incarceration imposed for the particular
offense alone or in combination with concurrent or consecutive sentences for other
crimes, including any reimprisonment on revocation of parole which is not
accompanied by a new commitment to prison, and including any reimprisonment
after an escape from incarceration.” (Italics added.) Did the amendment change
the Legislature’s declaration the previous year that a sentence for escape from
prison is part of the original incarceration? “No,” was the unanimous answer of
this court in 1983 in Kelly, supra, 33 Cal.3d 267.
2

The purpose of the 1977 amendment, Kelly said, was not to change the rule
pertaining to escapes, but to revise the rule concerning parole revocations, which
are also discussed in section 667.5’s subdivision (g). Kelly explained: “[T]he
Legislature . . . amended . . . subdivision (g) . . . to differentiate between a mere
revocation of parole, and the revocation of parole which is accompanied by a new
commitment. It must be inferred that the Legislature desired the revocation
accompanied by a new commitment not to count in the ‘period of prison
incarceration’ for the offense for which parole was revoked; instead, this new
‘period of prison incarceration’ should be counted as a new term based on the new
commitment.” (Kelly, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 271.)
“In contrast,” the court in Kelly continued, “the 1977 amendment did not
intrinsically change the phrase referring to reimprisonment after escape, which
now reads: ‘. . . and including any reimprisonment after escape from such
incarceration.’ The only difference is that this phrase is no longer interrupted by
the parole revocation wording. There is no qualifying phrase such as ‘which is not
accompanied by a new commitment to prison.’ . . . It is obvious . . . that the
Legislature intended to differentiate between the escape and parole situations
(and amend one and not the other).” (Kelly, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 271, fn. 4,
italics added.) I agree.
II
The majority faults Kelly for overlooking “the fact that the 1977
amendment deleted the phrase ‘new commitment for escape from such
incarceration,’ and substituted the qualitatively different term ‘any reimprisonment
after an escape.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9.) According to the majority, the latter
phrase, unlike the original version of section 667.5’s subdivision (g) applies only
to a reimprisonment that is unaccompanied by a new prison sentence for escape.
This is a strained reading of the statutory language. This court had it right in 1983
3

in Kelly, when it construed the 1977 amendment as indicative of the Legislature’s
intent “to differentiate between the escape and parole situations . . . .” (Kelly,
supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 271, fn. 4.) The 1977 amendment, Kelly said, left
unchanged the Legislature’s original declaration in 1976 that an escapee
reimprisoned to finish his original sentence along with a new prison commitment
for escape is serving a single term of imprisonment and therefore is subject only to
a single one-year enhancement.
Legal commentators too have expressed that view. “Because of its close
relationship to time in prison, reimprisonment for escape . . . does not start the
running of a new and separate term, but is included in the old term. . . . Perhaps
the legislature felt that treating such reimprisonment as a new term would give the
sentencing judge or prosecutor too much leverage from one antisocial period in
the criminal’s life. Such reimprisonment is instead included in the term from
which the inmate escaped . . . .” (Cassou & Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in
California: The New Numbers Game (1978) 9 Pacific L.J. 5, 49.)
Although it would be reasonable to subject a prison escapee to a one-year
sentence enhancement separate from the enhancement for the original
imprisonment, that is a policy decision for the Legislature, not this court. And that
is not what the Legislature did in 1976 when it enacted subdivision (g) of section
667.5, and when it amended that provision in 1977. The 1976 enactment and the
1977 amendment of section 667.5’s subdivision (g) were passed some 30 years
ago, when sentence enhancements were far fewer and the prison terms imposed
were much shorter than in recent times. The statutory provision at issue simply
reflects the view of the Legislature at that time. One may not agree with that view,
but it is not “absurd or illogical,” as the majority asserts. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 4.)
4

I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which struck the one-
year sentence enhancement for the prior prison term served for the escape
conviction.
KENNARD,
J.
5

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Langston
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion


Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 107 Cal.App.4th 959
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S115998
Date Filed: August 16, 2004
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Sacramento
Judge: Michael G. Virga

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Robert D. McGhie, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves,
Assistant Attorney General, Janis Shank McClean, Brian R. Means, Janet E. Neeley and Sharon E.
Loughner, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jan Scully, District Attorney (Sacramento), Albert C. Locher, Assistant Chief Deputy District Attorney;
George M. Palmer, Head Deputy District Attorney (Los Angeles); and David R. LaBahn for California
District Attorney’s Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.


1

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Robert D. McGhie
4205 Anjou Ct.
Chico, CA 95973
(530) 891-0903

Sharon E. Loughner
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street
P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
(916) 445-8529

2


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Mon, 08/16/2004S115998

Parties
1The People (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by Sharon Elizabeth Loughner
Office of the Attorney General
300 So. Spring St.
Los Angeles, CA

2Langston, Walter Shane (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Robert D. Mcghie
Attorney at Law
4205 Anjou Court
Chico, CA

3Langston, Walter Shane (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Central California Appellate Program
2407 "J" Street, Suite 301
2407 "J" Street, Suite 301
Sacramento, CA

4California District Attorneys Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Albert C. Locher
Ofc District Attorney
Box 749
Sacramento, CA


Disposition
Aug 16 2004Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
May 16 2003Petition for review filed
  In Sacramento by counsel for Respondent {The People}.
May 20 2003Received Court of Appeal record
  One doghouse.
Jun 25 2003Petition for Review Granted (criminal case)
  George, CJ., was absent and did not participate. Votes: Moreno, ACJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, and Chin, JJ..
Jul 15 2003Filed:
  appellant's application for appointment of counsel.
Jul 28 2003Request for extension of time filed
  for resp to file the opening brief on the merits, to 8-25.
Aug 1 2003Extension of time granted
  to 8-25-03 for resp to file the opening brief on the merits.
Aug 18 2003Received Court of Appeal record
  C037845-blue envelope
Aug 22 2003Opening brief on the merits filed
  by resp
Sep 12 2003Counsel appointment order filed
  Robert D. McGhie is appointed to represent aplt. Appellant's answer brief on the merits is due w/in 30 days. (10-13-03)
Oct 10 2003Telephone conversation with:
  counsel for appellant. He will be mailing/submitting a request for extension of time on 10/14.
Oct 14 2003Request for extension of time filed
  counsel for appellant requests extension of time to November 11, 2003, to file the answer brief on the merits.
Oct 16 2003Extension of time granted
  to 11-12-03 for aplt to file the answer brief on the merits.
Nov 17 2003Request for extension of time filed
  for aplt to file the answer brief on the merits, to 12-10-03.
Nov 21 2003Extension of time granted
  to12-10-03 for aplt to file the answer brief on the merits.
Dec 11 2003Request for extension of time filed
  for aplt to file the answer brief on the merits, to 12-29-03.
Dec 18 2003Extension of time granted
  to 12-29-03 for aplt to file the answer brief on the merits.
Dec 31 2003Answer brief on the merits filed
  by aplt (40k)
Dec 31 2003Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)
  by Aplt, in three volumes
Jan 15 2004Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  counsel for resp. (People)
Feb 13 2004Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief
  from California District Attorney's Association. (rec'd in Sac.)
Feb 24 2004Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty McGhie
Feb 25 2004Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  by the Calif. District Attorney's Association in support of resp. Answers may be filed w/in 20 days.
Feb 25 2004Amicus curiae brief filed
  by Calif. District Attorney's Association in support of resp.
Mar 15 2004Request for extension of time filed
  by aplt to file a response to the A/C brief of Calif. District Attorneys' Association. To 3-30-04.
Mar 17 2004Extension of time granted
  to 3-30-04 for aplt to file the response to the a/c brief of the Calif. Dist Attys' Assn.
Apr 5 2004Received:
  (late) answer of aplt to the a/c brief of Calif. District Attorneys Assn.
Apr 7 2004Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  by aplt to a/c brief of Calif. D.A.'s Assn. (filed w/permission)
Apr 27 2004Request for judicial notice granted
  Appellant's request for judicial notice, filed 12-31-03.
Apr 28 2004Case ordered on calendar
  Tuesday May 25, 2004 at 1:30 PM (San Francisco Session).
May 25 2004Cause argued and submitted
 
Aug 16 2004Opinion filed: Judgment reversed
  and remanded to the court of appeal for further proceedings. Majority opinion by Chin, J. --------------------joined by George, C.J., Baxter, Werdegar, Brown, Moreno JJ. Dissenting opinion by Kennard, J.
Sep 16 2004Remittitur issued (criminal case)
 
Oct 22 2004Note:
  shipping department directed to transmit case record to court of appeal.
Nov 10 2004Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty McGhie

Briefs
Aug 22 2003Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Dec 31 2003Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Jan 15 2004Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
Feb 25 2004Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Apr 7 2004Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website