Filed 6/26/06 (reposted same date for counsel listing correction)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S127602
v.
Ct.App.
1/2
A085450
JAY SHAWN JOHNSON,
Contra Costa County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. 96-0691-4
Both the United States and the California Constitutions prohibit the
exercise of peremptory challenges solely because of group bias. (Batson v.
Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258.)
In this case, defendant objected at trial that the prosecutor had challenged three
African-American prospective jurors on the basis of their race. The trial court
found that defendant had not established a prima facie case of group bias and
overruled the objection. Following his conviction of second degree murder and
assault resulting in the death of a child under the age of eight, defendant argued on
appeal that the court erred in not finding a prima facie case of group bias. The
Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the judgment. We granted review.
On review, we held that, in order to establish a prima facie case of group
bias, “the objector must show that it is more likely than not the other party’s
peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias.”
(People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1306.) Applying this standard, “we
1
uph[e]ld the trial court’s finding that defendant failed to establish a prima facie
case that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges improperly.” (Ibid.) We
also held that “Batson does not require state reviewing courts to engage in
comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal.” (Ibid.) We remanded the
matter to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings. This time, the Court of
Appeal affirmed the judgment, and we denied review.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question
regarding the applicable test to establish a prima facie case, and reversed.
(Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162 [125 S.Ct. 2410].) It held that
“California’s ‘more likely than not’ standard is an inappropriate yardstick by
which to measure the sufficiency of a prima facie case.” (Id. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct.
at p. 2416].) Instead, the court held, “a defendant satisfies the requirements of
Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to
draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” (Id. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p.
2417].) Applying this standard, the court concluded that the inferences in this case
“that discrimination may have occurred were sufficient to establish a prima facie
case under Batson.” (Id. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2419].) It remanded the matter
to this court “for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.” (Ibid.)
We must now decide what those further proceedings should be. To decide
this question, some background discussion is necessary. In its opinion in this case,
the high court explained the three-step procedure that applies when a defendant
objects at trial that the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges
discriminatorily. “First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case ‘by
showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of
discriminatory purpose.’ [Citation.] Second, once the defendant has made out a
prima facie case, the ‘burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial
exclusion’ by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.
2
[Citations.] Third, ‘[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must
then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial
discrimination.’ [Citation.]” (Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___
[125 S.Ct. at p. 2416], fn. omitted.) Here, because the trial court found that
defendant had not made out a prima facie case, it did not move on to steps two and
three. We now know that the trial court erred in this respect.
Defendant argues that we must reverse the judgment outright and order a
new jury trial. The Attorney General argues that we should remand the matter for
the trial court to conduct steps two and three and determine whether discrimination
did, in fact, occur. The federal courts generally remand for further hearings in this
situation. In Batson itself, the high court remanded the matter and instructed, “If
the trial court decides that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful
discrimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a neutral
explanation for his action, our precedents require that petitioner’s conviction be
reversed.” (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 100; see also Miller-El v. Dretke (2005)
545 U.S. 231, ___ [125 S.Ct. 2317, 2323] [reviewing a case in which the state
appellate court had “remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether
Miller-El could show that prosecutors in his case peremptorily struck prospective
black jurors because of race”].) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also
remanded for further proceedings. (E.g., Williams v. Runnels (9th Cir. 2006) 432
F.3d 1102, 1110 & fn. 14; Paulino v. Castro (9th Cir. 2004) 371 F.3d 1083, 1093;
Fernandez v. Roe (9th Cir. 2002) 286 F.3d 1073, 1080.)
Defendant relies primarily on California, not federal, law in arguing for an
outright reversal and new trial. In past cases, including one post-Batson case, this
court has refused to order a limited remand. “The People suggest . . . that we
merely order a ‘limited remand’ to permit the prosecutor to explain his reasons for
excluding the prospective jurors in question. We observe that, although our court
3
has rejected such a procedure in prior cases (see People v. Hall [(1985)] 35 Cal.3d
161, 170-171 [trial held more than three years before reversal of judgment];
People v. Allen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 286, 295, fn. 4 [trial held nearly three years
before reversal of judgment]), the United States Supreme Court in the
subsequently decided case of Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at page 100,
employed such a remand. (See also United States v. Tindle (4th Cir. 1986) 808
F.2d 319 [remand after more than three years].) [¶] In Batson, the case had been
tried only two years prior to reversal of the judgment. In the present case, voir
dire examination commenced in November 1981, approximately six years ago. As
in Hall, we believe it would be ‘unrealistic to believe that the prosecutor could
now recall in greater detail his reasons for the exercise of the peremptory
challenges in issue, or that the trial judge could assess those reasons, as required,
which would demand that he recall the circumstances of the case, and the manner
in which the prosecutor examined the venire and exercised his other challenges.’
(35 Cal.3d at p. 171.)” (People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 226-227.)
Defendant argues that principles of stare decisis require us to adhere to our
previous decisions rather than follow the federal remand procedure. However,
developments since our most recent refusal to order a limited remand (People v.
Snow, supra, 44 Cal.3d 216), including especially the high court decision in this
case, convince us that we should now adopt the federal approach. We should at
least attempt to have the trial court resolve the matter on remand. The error in
Snow and cases it cited was one of state law. The error here was a federal
constitutional violation. The remand procedure seems to work reasonably well in
federal court. Moreover, the consequences of refusing to remand are different
now than they were in Snow. The high court has now informed us that the
California standard for a prima facie showing was too high. This circumstance
might cause more findings of error in cases tried before the high court opinion in
4
this case than have occurred in the past. In this situation, we see no compelling
reason to provide a more favorable remedy than the federal courts themselves
provide. This is especially so given the fact that the trial court did not have the
benefit of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in this case. (See Williams
v. Runnels, supra, 432 F.3d at p. 1110, fn. 14 [noting this circumstance in ordering
a limited remand].) We have recognized that in some situations the limited
remand “procedure is preferable to reversal of the judgment. (See [Pen. Code,]
§ 1260; People v. Minor (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 194, 199-200, and cases cited
therein.)” (People v. Hall, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 170.) We think this is now one
of those situations.
Defendant raises several objections to this conclusion. He argues that a
limited remand “would look like an effort to avoid the United States Supreme
Court’s decisions in Batson and [this case].” We disagree. As we have explained,
under Batson, when the defendant has stated a prima facie case of improper use of
peremptory challenges, the trial court must move on to steps two and three. A
limited remand would permit it to do so. The high court in this case held that
defendant had established a prima facie case under Batson because there were
“inferences that discrimination may have occurred . . . .” (Johnson v. California,
supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2419], italics added.) It did not hold that
discrimination did occur. The court remanded the matter to this court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion. (Ibid.) Doing what the federal
courts do—ordering further proceedings to determine whether discrimination did,
in fact, occur—would be consistent, not inconsistent, with that opinion.
Defendant argues that a limited remand is not practical for several reasons.
He points out that the prospective jurors themselves have been dismissed, and
therefore cannot be examined further. This would generally be the case with a
limited remand. The federal courts have apparently not found this to be a
5
problem. Peremptory challenges are normally held after the jurors have been fully
questioned. This circumstance presents no reason to refuse a limited remand.
Defendant also argues that too much time has elapsed since the jury
selection, which concluded in December 1998, between seven and eight years ago.
He contends that memories have faded during that time, and it would be too
difficult for the trial court to attempt to undertake steps two and three at this late
date. This circumstance is, indeed, a concern, as we have explained in our
previous cases refusing to order a limited remand. But a comparable amount of
time has elapsed in some of the cases that the federal courts have remanded for a
hearing. (E.g., Williams v. Runnels, supra, 432 F.3d 1102 [trial held in March
1998; remand ordered in January 2006]; Paulino v. Castro, supra, 371 F.3d 1083
[remand ordered five years after the state appellate court decision and a longer
time after trial]; Fernandez v. Roe, supra, 286 F.3d 1073 [remand ordered about
seven years after trial].) Indeed, in the most recent of these cases, the court
ordered a remand “even though the state represented to the district court that the
prosecutor no longer remembers why he utilized his peremptory challenges and
could not locate the jury selection notes.” (Williams v. Runnels, supra, at p. 1110,
fn. 14.) In recent years, we have asked trial courts to undertake possibly even
more difficult tasks. In Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, for
example, we remanded a capital case to the trial court over seven years after trial
to settle the appellate record in various ways. If, as is the case, federal courts
routinely hold a hearing under these circumstances to attempt to determine
whether there was a federal constitutional violation, we see no reason for
California courts not even to try to make this determination.
In this case, the court and parties have the jury questionnaires and a
verbatim transcript of the jury selection proceeding to help refresh their
recollection. The prosecutor may have notes he took during the jury selection
6
process. Defendant argues that the record itself has “effectively poisoned the
well,” making a fair hearing on remand impossible. Both the trial court and the
appellate courts have drawn inferences from the trial record regarding possible
reasons for the prosecutor’s exercise of the peremptory challenges. (See People v.
Johnson, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 1325-1326 [discussing grounds suggested in the
trial record for the prosecutor to have reasonably exercised his peremptory
challenges].) This circumstance does not make it impossible for the court on
remand to judge the sincerity of any explanation the prosecutor may now make for
his challenges and the overall propriety of those challenges. We are confident that
the trial court can and will provide defendant a fair hearing on remand.
Defendant also points out that because the trial judge is now an appellate
court justice, the matter on remand may have to be heard by a different judge.
This circumstance does not make a limited remand impossible. Every time a
hearing is held in federal district court on habeas corpus review of a state case the
hearing will be before someone other than the state trial court judge. The judge on
remand will have the trial record, including the jury questionnaires, to assist in
conducting the second and third Batson steps. In Fernandez v. Roe, supra, 286
F.3d at page 1080, for example, the court remanded the matter “to the district
court to conduct an evidentiary hearing, including review of the jury
questionnaires, to determine whether there was a Batson violation in the trial
court.” Again, we see no reason not to do what the federal courts do to attempt to
determine whether there was, in fact, a Batson violation.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor waived his right to state his reasons
for exercising the peremptory challenges by failing to do so at trial. He notes that
after the trial court found defendant had not established a prima facie case, it gave
the prosecutor the opportunity “to make a further record.” The prosecutor
declined to do so. We attach no legal significance to this circumstance. After the
7
trial court found no prima facie case, the prosecutor was not required to state his
reasons for his peremptory challenges. That he did not do so at that time should
not deprive him of the opportunity to do so on remand now that we know the trial
court erred in failing to find a prima facie case.
Defendant argues that even in federal court, the remand procedure has not
always resulted in a valid determination. He cites two appeals in the same case:
U.S. v. Alcantar (9th Cir. 1987) 832 F.2d 1175 (Alcantar I); U.S. v. Alcantar (9th
Cir. 1990) 897 F.2d 436 (Alcantar II). In Alcantar I, the court found the district
court had erred in not permitting defense counsel to attempt to rebut the
prosecutor’s statement of reasons for the peremptory challenges. It remanded the
matter for the district court to conduct a new hearing. (Alcantar I, supra, at p.
1180.) On remand, the district court found no improper exercise of peremptory
challenges and reaffirmed the conviction. (Alcantar II, supra, at p. 438.) This
time, after reviewing the proceedings on remand, the appellate court again
reversed and ordered a new trial. For reasons specific to the case, it found the
hearing on remand “inadequate to test the genuineness of any of the prosecutor’s
proffered justifications for his peremptory strikes.” (Id. at p. 440.) Defendant also
asks us to judicially notice court documents in one of the cases in which the Ninth
Circuit ordered a remand. (Fernandez v. Roe, supra, 286 F.3d 1073.) We grant
the request. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) The documents show that, on remand,
the district court could not make the required determination due to lack of memory
and other reasons. Accordingly, it granted relief on habeas corpus and ordered a
new trial.
The results in these cases do not aid defendant. The Alcantar experience
merely illustrates that the trial court’s reinstatement of the judgment on remand is
subject to further appellate review, and that a second reversal may be appropriate
in a given case. The experience on remand in Fernandez v. Roe, supra, 286 F.3d
8
1073, merely shows the obvious—that at the hearing on remand, it may turn out
that the court cannot make a reliable determination. The high court has explained
that when, as here, the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the State to adequately explain the challenges. (Johnson v. California,
supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2416].) If the prosecutor cannot carry
this burden to the trial court’s satisfaction, then a retrial will be necessary. In this
case, for example, it is certainly possible that due to the passage of time or other
reasons, the trial court will find that it cannot reliably determine whether the
prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges in a permissible manner. If that
occurs, the court should order a new trial. (See People v. McGee (2002) 104
Cal.App.4th 559, 573-574.) But this circumstance does not prevent us from
remanding the matter for a hearing, just as it did not prevent the courts in
Alcantar I, supra, 832 F.2d 1175, and Fernandez v. Roe, supra, 286 F.3d 1073,
from doing so.
For these reasons, we remand the matter to the Court of Appeal with
directions in turn to remand the matter to the trial court. That court should attempt
to conduct the second and third Batson steps. It should require the prosecutor to
explain his challenges. If the prosecutor offers a race-neutral explanation, the
court must try to evaluate that explanation and decide whether defendant has
proved purposeful racial discrimination. If the court finds that, due to the passage
of time or any other reason, it cannot adequately address the issues at this stage or
make a reliable determination, or if it determines that the prosecutor exercised his
peremptory challenges improperly, it should set the case for a new trial. If it finds
9
the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges in a permissible fashion, it
should reinstate the judgment.
CHIN,
J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
BAXTER, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
10
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J.
I concur in the majority’s decision to remand this case for further
proceedings. I do so with the understanding that the error in this case was a
federal, not a state, constitutional error (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 4). As the
majority explains, the high court in Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, having
found a violation of the federal equal protection clause, ordered that case
remanded for a new hearing. The lower federal courts, following Batson, have
similarly ordered remand as a remedy for Batson violations.1 People v. Wheeler
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, however, has a different origin. As we explained in that
pre-Batson case, “the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors
on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a
representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the
California Constitution.” (Wheeler, at pp. 276-277.) Because Wheeler was based
on state law, nothing we decide today implicates the rule of automatic reversal this
court has applied for state constitutional Wheeler error.2 Although some appellate
1
See, e.g., Paulino v. Castro (9th Cir. 2004) 371 F.3d 1083; Fernandez v.
Roe (9th Cir. 2002) 286 F.3d 1073.
2
People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at page 283 (Wheeler error “prejudicial
per se”); People v. Allen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 286, 295, footnote 6 (same); People v.
Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 170 -171 (same); People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d
216, 226-227 (“reversible per se”); People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 721
(reversal “compelled”).
1
courts have employed remand as a remedy for Wheeler error,3 we leave the
correctness of those decisions for another day.
In addition, I write separately to underscore the majority’s holding that the
trial court, on remand, retains the discretion to decide that an accurate
reconstruction of the voir dire is impossible due to the passage of time, requiring
that the conviction be reversed. We addressed the effect of the delay inherent in
the remand remedy in People v. Snow, supra, 44 Cal.3d 216, where the voir dire
proceeding had occurred six years earlier. Although our holding in Snow that the
Wheeler error was reversible is inapplicable to this Batson violation case, our
observations concerning the six-year delay in that case remain pertinent. We
concluded in Snow that “it would be ‘unrealistic to believe that the prosecutor
could now recall in greater detail his reasons for the exercise of the peremptory
challenges in issue, or that the trial judge could assess those reasons, as required,
which would demand that he recall the circumstances of the case, and the manner
in which the prosecutor examined the venire and exercised his other challenges.’ ”
(Snow, at p. 227, quoting People v. Hall, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 171 [lapse of more
than three years].) As the majority notes, the voir dire proceedings in this case
took place between seven and eight years ago. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.) On
remand, the trial court may well decide that neither it nor the parties can reliably
reconstruct events from so long ago, notwithstanding the existence of the jury
questionnaires and verbatim transcript of the jury selection proceeding. (See
People v. Garcia, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1282 [“While we have every
3
See, e.g., People v. McGee (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 559, 571-572,
disapproved on another ground in People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 550;
People v. Williams (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1130; People v. Garcia (2000) 77
Cal.4th 1269, 1282; People v. Rodriguez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1104-1110;
People v. Rodriguez (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1023-1025; People v. Gore
(1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 692, 706.
2
confidence in the good faith and professionalism of the parties, we have less
confidence in their memories”].)
With these reservations, I concur.
WERDEGAR, J.
3
CONCURRING OPINION BY KENNARD, J.
In People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, a majority of this court held
that to make a prima facie showing that a prosecutor was unconstitutionally using
peremptory challenges for a discriminatory purpose, a defendant must show “that
it is more likely than not [that the prosecutor’s] peremptory challenges, if
unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias.” (Id. at p. 1306.) I
dissented, joined by Justice Werdegar, pointing out that the majority’s holding was
inconsistent with the views of federal courts and the courts of other states, most of
which permitted the defendant to establish a prima facie case by raising a
reasonable inference of discrimination. (Id. at p. 1335 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.);
see id. at pp. 1328-1329 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and held that a defendant need only produce evidence
sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference of group bias, rather than
prove discrimination was more likely than not. (Johnson v. California (2005) ___
U.S. ___ [125 S.Ct. 2410, 2416-2417].)
The high court returned the case to this court for further proceedings. The
question now is whether to order a limited remand to permit the trial court to
determine whether the prosecutor’s challenges were based on group bias, or to
remand for a new trial with a new jury. I agree with the majority that we should
follow the federal courts’ limited remand practice. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 3.)
Although past opinions of this court have asserted that such a remand is unrealistic
1
when, as here, over six years have elapsed since the jury was selected (People v.
Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216; see People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 170-171
[three years]), the feasibility of determining whether the prosecution’s peremptory
challenges were based on impermissible group bias is a matter best left to the trial
court after a remand of the case to that court.
KENNARD,
J.
2
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion People v. Johnson
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
XXX NP opn. filed 8/5/04 – 1st Dist., Div. 2Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No.
S127602Date Filed: June 26, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
SuperiorCounty: Contra Costa
Judge: Patricia K. Sepulveda
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Stephen B. Bedrick, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler,Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K Sullivan and Seth K. Schalit, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Stephen B. Bedrick1970 Broadway, Suite 1200
Oakland, CA 94612
(510) 452-1900
Seth K. Schalit
Deputy Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004
(415) 703-1371
2
Opinion Information
| Date: | Docket Number: |
| Mon, 06/26/2006 | S127602A |
Parties
| 1 | The People (Plaintiff and Respondent) Represented by Seth K. Schalit Office of the Attorney General 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA |
| 2 | Johnson, Jay Shawn (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by Stephen B. Bedrick Attorney at Law 1970 Broadway, Suite 1200 Oakland, CA |
| Disposition | |
| Oct 20 2004 | Petition for review denied |
| Dockets | |
| Sep 7 2004 | Received premature petition for review counsel for aplt.. (Jay Shawn Johnson) |
| Sep 8 2004 | Case start: Petition for review filed |
| Sep 8 2004 | Record requested |
| Sep 22 2004 | Received Court of Appeal record four file jackets/briefs/two boxes |
| Oct 20 2004 | Petition for review denied Kennard, J., is of the opinion the petition should be granted. Werdegar, J., was absent and did not participate. |
| Sep 6 2005 | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| Sep 7 2005 | Remanded by U.S. Supreme Court |
| Sep 7 2005 | Filed: Letter from the Attroeny General re: Remand from the U.S. Supreme Court. |
| Sep 22 2005 | Filed: "Motion for Summary Reversal and Order for New Trial After Decision by United States Supreme Court [Opinion fled June 13, 2005] |
| Sep 28 2005 | Retained after U.S.S.C. remand; held for lead case Further action in this matter is deferred pending consideration & disposition of a related issue in People v. Ibarra, S124067. Submission of further briefing is deferred pending further order of the court. |
| Oct 21 2005 | Motion filed (non-AA) "Motion for Reconsideration of Order Deferring Briefing and Motion to Allow Case to Proceed, and Declaration of Stephen B. Bedrick" |
| Nov 16 2005 | Briefing ordered in previously Held case Appellant's "motion for reconsideration of order deferring briefing, and motion to allow case to proceed," filed on October 21, 2005, is granted. Because the United States Supreme Court remanded the matter to this court for proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion in Johnson v. California, No. 04-6964, this court assumes jurisdiction over the remaining issue in the case: Whether to order a limited remand or reverse the judgment of the superior court outright. The court deems appellant's "motion for summary reversal and order for new trial after decision by United States Supreme Court," filed on September 22, 2005, to be appellant's opening brief on the merits of this issue. Respondent is directed to file an answer brief by December 16, 2005, and appellant may file a reply brief within 20 after respondent files its brief. |
| Dec 14 2005 | Answer brief on the merits filed Respondent People |
| Dec 30 2005 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) Jay Shawn Johnson, Appellant by Stephen B. Bedrick, Counsel |
| Mar 8 2006 | Case ordered on calendar Wednesday, April 5, 2006, at 2:00 p.m., in Los Angeles |
| Mar 14 2006 | Filed: Request for continuance of oral argument date, filed by Stephen B. Bedrick, counsel for appellant Johnson. |
| Mar 14 2006 | Argument rescheduled To be called and continued to the early May 2006 calendar. |
| Apr 4 2006 | Case ordered on calendar Tuesday, May 2, 2006, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco |
| Apr 27 2006 | Received: Untimely request for judicial notice. (CRC 29.1) |
| May 1 2006 | Request for judicial notice filed (granted case) by appellant (PERM) |
| May 2 2006 | Cause argued and submitted |
| Jun 26 2006 | Opinion filed We remand the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions in turn to remand the matter to the trial court. Opinion by Chin, J. - joined by George, C.J., Baxter, Moreno, Corrigan, JJ. Concurring opinion by Kennard, J. Concurring opinion by Werdegar, J. |
| Jul 5 2006 | Request for modification of opinion filed Respondent's Motion for Modification of Opinion by Seth K. Schalit, Supervising Deputy Attorney General. |
| Jul 13 2006 | Filed: Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Motion for Modification |
| Jul 18 2006 | Time extended to consider modification or rehearing Finality of the opinion in the above-entitled case is hereby extended to and including August 25, 2006. |
| Jul 26 2006 | Request for modification denied |
| Aug 2 2006 | Compensation awarded counsel Atty Bedrick |
| Aug 18 2006 | Remittitur issued (criminal case) |
| Aug 25 2006 | Received: Receipt for remittitur, signed for by Imelda Santos, Deputy Clerk, First Appellate District, Division Two. |
| Jan 29 2007 | Returned record to First District -- one box picked up by Jordan |
| Briefs | |
| Dec 14 2005 | Answer brief on the merits filed |
| Dec 30 2005 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) |
