Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S102965
People v. Holmes

Filed 2/19/04

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S102965
v.
Ct.App. 4/2 E027589
HENRY JAMES HOLMES,
Riverside
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. RIF 091270

There are two types of guilty or no contest pleas in California: (1) a
conditional plea, where the plea is conditioned upon receipt of a particular
disposition; and (2) an unconditional or open plea. (People v. Hoffard (1995) 10
Cal.4th 1170, 1181.) When taking a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere
(hereafter no contest) to an accusatory pleading charging a felony, Penal Code
section 1192.51 requires a trial court to “cause an inquiry to be made of the
defendant to satisfy itself that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that
there is a factual basis for the plea.” We granted review in this case to consider
whether the trial court established a sufficient factual basis for appellant’s guilty
plea as required by section 1192.5. In doing so, we provide guidelines for the trial
courts regarding how to comply with their obligations under section 1192.5 and
what constitutes a “factual basis for the plea.”

1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.


In order to comply with the statutory mandate of this factual basis
requirement where a conditional plea is taken, we conclude that a trial judge must
garner information regarding the factual basis either from the defendant or the
defendant’s counsel. If the trial court inquires of the defendant regarding the
factual basis, the judge may develop the factual basis for the plea on the record
through the court’s own examination by having the defendant describe the conduct
that gave rise to the charge (People v. Watts (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 173, 179
(Watts)), or question the defendant regarding the factual basis described in the
complaint or written plea agreement. (See, e.g., United States v. Sias (5th Cir.
2000) 227 F.3d 244, 245, fn. 1; United States v. Montoya-Camacho (5th Cir.
1981) 644 F.2d 480, 487 (Montoya-Camacho).) If the trial court inquires of
defense counsel regarding the factual basis, it should request that defense counsel
stipulate to a particular document that provides an adequate factual basis, such as a
complaint, police report, preliminary hearing transcript, probation report, grand
jury transcript, or written plea agreement. (People v. Wilkerson (1992) 6
Cal.App.4th 1571, 1576-1579 (Wilkerson).) Under either approach, a bare
statement by the judge that a factual basis exists without the above inquiry is
inadequate. (People v. Tigner (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 430, 434, 435 (Tigner).)
In the present case, the trial court asked defendant whether he did what was
charged in the complaint. Because the complaint adequately contains a factual
basis for the plea, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal that the trial
court complied with the section 1192.5 factual basis requirement.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 18, 2000, defendant-appellant Henry James Holmes was charged
in a two-count complaint alleging assault with intent to commit rape (a felony
under section 220) and sexual battery (a misdemeanor under section 243.4, subd.
2
(d).). The complaint lists the charged offenses, name of the defendant and victim,
date and location of the charged offenses, and a brief description of the factual
basis for the charged offenses. Count 1 of the complaint states, “[T]he above
named defendant(s) committed a violation of Penal Code section 220, a felony, in
that on or about March 24, 2000, in the County of Riverside, State of California,
he did willfully and unlawfully assault Sandra R., with the intent to commit rape.”
Count 2 of the complaint states that “he did willfully and unlawfully direct and
indirectly touch an intimate part of another person, to wit: Sandra R., for the
purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, and sexual abuse, against the will
of said person.” Other than the complaint, the record contains no facts regarding
the underlying offense.
On May 10, 2000, defendant entered a plea of not guilty. At his
arraignment, a public defender was appointed to represent him. Following the
arraignment, but prior to his plea, defendant sent two letters to the court. In the
first letter, filed on May 22, 2000, defendant asked that his case be dismissed
because the police report was incomplete and omitted the name of a witness whose
testimony could exculpate him. The second letter, filed on May 30, 2000, claimed
that the police report omitted key facts about his contact with the woman at the
bus station – the basis of the alleged sexual assault. The letter described the events
preceding the arrest on March 24, 2000, and claimed that the victim had offered
defendant sex for money and requested a ride. In response, defendant alleged he
pushed the victim away, knocking her down.
On June 1, 2000, defendant appeared with counsel and entered a plea of
guilty to count 1 in the complaint – assault with intent to commit rape. As part of
the plea, count 2 – the misdemeanor sexual battery charge – was dismissed and
defendant was promised a sentence of two years in state prison. At the plea
hearing, defendant acknowledged that he had read and signed the felony plea
3
form. The plea form included a section, initialed by defendant, that stated, without
elaboration, that “there is a factual basis for my plea.” Both the prosecution and
defense counsel signed the form.
The trial judge next attempted to ascertain the factual basis for the plea.
The following exchange occurred:
“THE COURT: After examining the defendant, [the] Court determines that the
defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. He understands the
charges against him and consequences of his plea. Mr. Holmes, did you get a
copy of your Complaint, your felony Complaint?
“DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
“THE COURT: Did you do what it says you did in Count 1 on March 24th, 2000
in Riverside County?
“DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
“THE COURT: [The] Court finds there is a factual basis for the plea. The
defendant has personally and orally entered his plea of guilty to the offenses in
open court. The plea has been accepted in open court by the prosecuting attorney.
The plea is free and voluntary and the plea bargain is approved.”
Defendant then waived preparation of a probation report and the court imposed the
two-year prison term referenced in the agreement.
Following sentencing, defendant filed a third letter with the court on June
15, 2000. In it, defendant professed his innocence, claiming that he did not
sexually assault the victim and that his crime should be reduced to a misdemeanor.
The letter also asked to withdraw the guilty plea. On June 17, 2000, defendant
signed a notice of appeal, which was filed by trial counsel on July 28, 2000,
attacking the validity of the plea. A request for a certificate of probable cause was
granted on July 28, 2000. Defendant’s trial counsel withdrew on July 24, 2000,
and special counsel was appointed for the motion to withdraw the plea. The
4
hearing was set for August 14, 2000, but the motion was withdrawn because the
trial court no longer had jurisdiction to hear the motion.
Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court failed to establish a
sufficient factual basis for his guilty plea under section 1192.5. The Court of
Appeal affirmed, agreeing that the court had a duty under section 1192.5 but that
the duty was fulfilled by the court’s inquiry. We granted defendant’s petition for
review on February 13, 2002, limiting the issue to be argued to “whether the trial
court failed to establish a sufficient factual basis for defendant’s plea, as required
by Penal Code section 1192.5.”
II. THE SECTION 1192.5 STANDARD
Section 1192.5 provides that for a conditional plea of guilty or no contest,
the trial court is required to “cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to
satisfy itself that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual
basis for the plea.” While there is no federal constitutional requirement for this
factual basis inquiry, the statutory mandate of section 1192.5 helps ensure that the
“constitutional standards of voluntariness and intelligence are met.”2 (People v.
Hoffard, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1182, fn. 11.) We have not yet addressed what a
trial court must do to comply with section 1192.5.

2
An American Bar Association report published shortly before section
1192.5 was enacted cites to a number of advantages to a factual basis inquiry.
(ABA Project on Min. Stds. for Crim. Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of
Guilty (Approved Draft 1968) Com. on § 1.6, p. 33.) “[T]hese inquiries provide a
more adequate record of the conviction process; this record minimizes the chances
of a defendant successfully challenging his conviction later [citation], and also
aids correctional agencies in the performance of their functions. Finally, increased
knowledge about the circumstances of the defendant’s offense provides the court
with a better assessment of defendant’s competency, his willingness to plead
guilty, and his understanding of the charges against him.” (Ibid.)
5



A. Statutory Language and Legislative History
We begin with the language of the statute as the most reliable indicator of
legislative intent behind the passage of section 1192.5. (Hunt v. Superior Court
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 984, 1000.) Again, the relevant portion of the statute states:
“The court shall also cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself
that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the
plea.” (§ 1192.5.) The plain language requires that some inquiry be made of
defendant, and that the court must satisfy itself (1) that the plea is freely and
voluntarily made and (2) that there is a factual basis for the plea. No additional
language details what will be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a factual basis
for the plea, though the connection of clauses (1) and (2) implies that inquiring
about the factual basis for the plea is closely related to the plea’s being freely and
voluntarily made.
Because the statutory language does not illuminate what is required to
establish a factual basis for the plea, we next look to the legislative history behind
the passage of section 1192.5.3 Senate Bill No. 621 (1970 Reg. Sess.), as
introduced on March 16, 1970, was designed to amend section 1192.3 and expand
the availability of conditional pleas. (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 621
(1970 Reg. Sess.), as introduced Mar. 16, 1970, pp. 1-2.) The original version of
section 1192.5 would “cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy
itself that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and in the case of a guilty plea,
that the defendant is pleading guilty because he is in fact guilty.” (Sen. Bill No.
621 (1970 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Mar. 16, 1970, italics added.) The final

3
Appellant requests us to take judicial notice of the legislative history of
section 1192.5. Respondent does not object to its inclusion. We grant this
request.
6


italicized clause was amended in committee to the present language of section
1192.5 before passage of the bill and signature by the Governor on September 15,
1970. (Stats. 1970, ch. 1123, § 3, pp. 1192-1193.)
B. Court of Appeal Cases
The seminal Court of Appeal case to consider the nature and scope of the
inquiry required by section 1192.5 is Watts, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d 173. The
defendant in Watts did not argue that no factual basis existed for his plea, but
rather that he should be able to withdraw his plea because the trial court made no
on-the-record inquiry as to the factual basis. (Id. at p. 178.) The sole reference to
the factual basis came in a statement by Watts’s attorney, who stated that he had
advised Watts of the legal consequences of a guilty plea. (Id. at pp. 180-181.)
The Watts court found this statement insufficient to meet the requirements of
section 1192.5.4 Instead, the court looked to federal case law to encourage the
trial courts to develop the factual basis on the record, either by asking the
defendant to describe his conduct, making specific reference to grand jury or
preliminary hearing transcripts, or eliciting information from the defense attorney.
(Watts, at pp. 179-180, citing 1A Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure (3d
ed. 1999) Pleas, § 174, pp. 197-198 [procedures designed to ensure defendant
knows that his acts do constitute offense with which defendant is charged];
Santobello v. New York (1971) 404 U.S. 257, 261.) Notably, Watts did not require
the trial court to question the defendant personally about each element in the
charged offense, nor did it require the trial court to believe that the defendant is

4
Ultimately the court found the trial court’s failure to make specific
reference to a factual basis was error, but harmless in light of the factual record in
the grand jury transcript and presentence report. (Watts, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at
p. 182.)
7


guilty. (Watts, at p. 180; see also People v. West (1970), 3 Cal.3d 595, 608.)
Statements and admissions made by defense counsel or the district attorney were
also adequate to establish the factual basis for the plea. (Watts, supra, 67
Cal.App.3d at p. 180, quoting Williams v. State (Fla. 1975) 316 So.2d 267, 273
[“We hold that the court may satisfy itself by statements and admissions made by
the defendant, his counsel, and the prosecutor . . . .”].)
The subsequent cases by our Courts of Appeal coalesce around the basic set
of legal principles described in Watts. The trial court may cause a factual basis
inquiry to be made of defendant by directly questioning defendant, or by garnering
statements and admissions by his counsel.5 (Wilkerson, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p.
1576.) When both parties stipulate on the record to a document, such as a police
report, the factual basis requirement is met. (People v. Enright (1982) 132
Cal.App.3d 631, 634-635; Watts, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at p. 182.) A summary
recitation that “ ‘[t]here’s a factual basis,’ ” however, absent any other attempt by
the trial court to develop a factual basis, is not adequate under the Watts standard.
(Tigner, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 435.) A reference to a complaint containing

5
The statute requires that the “inquiry to be made of defendant,” (§ 1192.5)
but we conclude that stipulation by counsel of the plea’s factual basis is consistent
with the legislative purpose of the statute. While defendant may not be in a
position to recognize whether his acts do or do not “ ‘constitute the offense with
which he is charged,’ ” (Tigner, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 433), defense
counsel is well suited to make such a determination. Nearly all California
authority takes a similar stance. (See Watts, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at p. 180 [“It
should be emphasized that the California Penal Code does not require the trial
court to interrogate a defendant personally . . . .” “It is also clear that the court
need not obtain general information about the crime directly from the defendant in
order to establish the factual basis for the plea.”]; Wilkerson, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1576 [“The trial court should ask the accused to describe the conduct that
gave rise to the charge . . . or elicit information from either counsel.” (Italics
added)].)
8


a factual basis for each essential element of the crime will be sufficient under
section 1192.5 to establish the factual basis for the plea.6 (See, e.g., United States
v. Corporan-Cuevas (1st Cir. 2001) 244 F.3d 199, 203 [“ ‘The method by which
the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the charge is determined may vary
from case to case, depending on the complexity of the circumstances and the
particular defendant. In some cases, a judge may do this by reading the indictment
. . . .’ ”]; Montoya-Camacho, supra, 644 F.2d at p. 486 [“The indictment may be
used for this purpose if it is factually precise and sufficiently specific to show ‘the
accused’s conduct on the occasion involved was within the ambit of that defined
as criminal.’ ”].) While the trial court is not required to develop the factual basis
on the record by asking defendant to enumerate his proscribed actions, it must
otherwise ensure that some reference on the record to other factual sources is
present.7 (Tigner, 133 Cal.App.3d at pp. 434-435.)

6
We do not decide the question of whether reference to a criminal complaint
will be sufficient in a complex case. We note that some federal cases have
decided otherwise in related contexts. (See United States v. Van Buren (6th Cir.
1986) 804 F.2d 888, 892 [holding that reading of indictment and defendant’s
admission of guilt is not sufficient factual basis determination in complex
conspiracy case.]; United States v. Dayton (1979) 604 F.2d 931, 938 [“In the case
of charges of extreme complexity, an explanation of the elements of the offense
like that given the jury in its instructions may be required . . . .”].)
7
We also approve of, though do not require in California, the practice in
other courts of including a detailed and signed factual basis account as an
attachment to the plea agreement. (United States v. Spruill (5th Cir. 2002) 292
F.3d 207, 211; United States v. Deluca (4th Cir. 1999) 2001 WL 1291, at p. * 2;
State v. Harper (Ariz. Ct.App. 1993) 868 P.2d 1027, 1028 fn. 1; State v.
Thompson
(Ariz. Ct.App. 1986) 724 P.2d 1223, 1227.) Questioning of defendant
by the trial court regarding such attachment to the plea agreement generally will
be sufficient to meet the section 1192.5 standard.
9


The factual basis required by section 1192.5 does not require more than the
establishment of a prima facie factual basis for the charges.8 (People v. Calderon
(1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 930, 935 (Calderon).) It is not necessary for the trial court
to interrogate the defendant about possible defenses to the charged crime (ibid.),
nor does the trial court have to be convinced of defendant’s guilt. (People v. West,
supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 612-613; In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 940 fn. 9 [so
long as the trial court ascertains a factual basis for the plea, it may enter a plea of
guilty or no contest despite defendant’s claim of innocence.].) The colloquy that
took place in People v. Ivester (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 328, 338-339, which the
court upheld as a sufficient factual basis for the plea, is indicative of this point.
The trial judge engaged the defendant and his codefendant wife in a factual
inquiry, beginning with, “ ‘what did you do that makes you think you are guilty of
these offenses?’ ” (Id. at p. 338.) While defendant Ivester’s responses to the
factual inquiry leave some ambiguity as to the mental state behind the charged
offense, Ivester’s statement that “ ‘I had a methamphetamine lab going in the
residence’ ” is a sufficient factual basis under section 1192.5 for the plea. (Ivester,
at p. 338, italics omitted.)

8
A closer question is raised when counsel stipulates to a factual basis for the
plea under section 1192.5, absent reference to a particular document that provides
an adequate factual basis. (People v. McGuire (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 281, 286 (dis.
opn. of Poche, J.) [“Such a stipulation reveals no more of a factual basis
supporting the plea than the plea itself.”].) While we have no occasion to decide
whether McGuire is correct, we agree with the court in Wilkerson, supra, 6
Cal.App.4th at page 1577, that the better approach under section 1192.5 is for
stipulation by counsel to a factual basis to be accompanied by reference to a police
report (Wilkerson, at p. 1577 [“So stipulated, your Honor, based on the police
reports included in the complaint.”]), reference to the probation report or
preliminary hearing transcript (People v. Gonzalez (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 707,
714-715), or to grand jury testimony (People v. Mickens (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th
1557, 1563-1565.)
10


C. The Proper Section 1192.5 Standard
In sum, we conclude that we should require the trial court to garner
information regarding the factual basis either from defendant or his counsel. If the
trial court examines the defendant regarding the factual basis for the plea, the court
may have the defendant describe the conduct that gave rise to the charge (Watts,
supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at p. 179), or question the defendant regarding the detailed
factual basis described in the complaint or written plea agreement. (Montoya-
Camacho, supra, 644 F.2d at p. 487.) If the trial court inquires of defense counsel
regarding the factual basis, counsel may stipulate to a particular document that
provides an adequate factual basis, such as a complaint, police report, preliminary
hearing transcript, probation report, grand jury transcript, or written plea
agreement. (Wilkerson, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1576-1579.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Next we consider the standard of review to be applied to a determination of
an adequate factual basis for a plea. We traditionally review findings of fact under
a deferential standard of substantial evidence, and findings of law under a de novo
standard. (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 893-894.) Mixed questions
of law and fact, such as whether a given factual basis for the plea is adequate
under section 1192.5, may be subject to deferential or de novo review. (Cromer,
at p. 894.) However, where the “ ‘trial court makes an individual-specific
decision,’ ” such as for juror bias or competency to stand trial, then the reviewing
court will be more inclined to utilize abuse of discretion review. (Id. at p. 895.)
Likewise, under federal law, the abuse of discretion standard is applied to
determine whether a sufficient factual basis exists for a guilty plea. (United States
v. Mitchell (4th Cir. 1997) 104 F.3d 649, 652; Higgason v. Clark (7th Cir. 1993)
984 F.2d 203, 208; United States v. Bernaugh (10th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 858, 865;
United States v. Lopez (11th Cir. 1990) 907 F.2d 1096, 1100.) Moreover, this
11
court has held that the related claim of an erroneous denial of a motion to
withdraw a plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d
679, 684.)
We conclude that, consistent with the standards noted above, a trial court
possesses wide discretion in determining whether a sufficient factual basis exists
for a guilty plea. The trial court’s acceptance of the guilty plea, after pursuing an
inquiry to satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea, will be reversed
only for abuse of discretion. (Watts, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at p. 180.) A finding
of error under this standard will qualify as harmless where the contents of the
record support a finding of a factual basis for the conditional plea. (Mickens,
supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1564; Watts, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at p. 182.)
IV. APPLICATION OF THIS STANDARD
We now consider the application of this standard to the present case. The
trial court asked defendant if he received a copy of the complaint, asked him if he
did what was described in the complaint, and then concluded that a factual basis
existed for the conditional plea. The trial court did not conduct an extensive
inquiry with defendant to develop the factual basis on the record, nor did it request
that defense counsel stipulate to a particular document that provides an adequate
factual basis. However, count 1 of the complaint to which the trial court referred
contained the charged offense, the name of defendant and victim, the date and
location of the charged offense, and a brief description of the factual basis for the
charged offense. Such a complaint provides a sufficiently precise factual account
of the charged offense of assault with intent to commit rape. In short, the trial
court’s questioning of defendant about the factual basis in the complaint was
adequate to establish that defendant was cognizant that his acts did constitute the
offense with which he was charged, notwithstanding defendant’s letters to the
court contesting his guilt. (United States v. Barker (1975) 514 F.2d 208, 222.)
12
This is sufficient under the section 1192.5 standard. (Watts, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d
at p. 178; Wilkerson, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1577; Calderon, supra, 232
Cal.App.3d at p. 935.).9 Thus, the trial court did not err.
V. CONCLUSION
We conclude that section 1192.5 requires that a trial court must garner
information regarding the factual basis either from defendant or his counsel. If the
trial court inquires of the defendant regarding the factual basis, the judge may
develop the factual basis for the plea on the record through her own examination
by having the defendant describe the conduct that gave rise to the charge, or
question defendant regarding the detailed factual basis described in the complaint
or written plea agreement. If the trial court inquires of defense counsel regarding
the factual basis, it should request that defense counsel stipulate to a particular
document that provides an adequate factual basis, such as a complaint, police
report, preliminary hearing transcript, probation report, grand jury transcript, or
written plea agreement.

9
We compare the defendant’s statement in Calderon that he intentionally
tried to kill someone with the defendant’s admission here that he did “what it says
[he] did in” the complaint. Both establish a prima facia factual basis for the
charges. (Calderon, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 935.)
13


On this basis, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
MORENO, J.
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD,
J.
BAXTER,
J.
WERDEGAR,
J.
CHIN,
J.
BROWN,
J.
14
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Holmes
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

XXX NP opn. filed 11/8/01 - 4th Dist., Div. 2
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S102965
Date Filed: February 19, 2004
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Riverside
Judge: Becky Dugan

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Cindi B. Mishkin, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and James R. McGrath, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys
General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Laura Whitcomb Halgren, Robert M. Foster,
Pamela A. Ratner Sobeck and Elizabeth A. Hartwig, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.


15

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Cindi B. Mishkin
55 West Beech Street, Suite 300
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 696-0282

Elizabeth A. Hartwig
Deputy Attorney General
110 West “A” Street, Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 645-2278
16


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Thu, 02/19/2004S102965

Parties
1Holmes, Henry James (Defendant and Appellant)
California State Prison
Represented by James R. Jr. Mcgrath
Attorney at Law
1253 North Cedar St.
Glendale, CA

2Holmes, Henry James (Defendant and Appellant)
California State Prison
Represented by Cindi Beth Mishkin
Appellate Defenders Inc.
555 West Beech Street, Suite 300
San Diego, CA

3The People (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by Attorney General - San Diego Office
P.O. Box 85266
P.O. Box 85266
San Diego, CA


Disposition
Feb 19 2004Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Dec 17 2001Petition for review filed
  appellant Henry James Holmes
Dec 19 2001Record requested
  from c/a 4/2
Dec 24 2001Received Court of Appeal record
  1-doghouse
Jan 4 2002Received letter from:
  appellant {Holmes} in pro per.
Feb 13 2002Petition for Review Granted (criminal case)
  The issues to be briefed and argued shall be limited to whether the trial court failed to establish a sufficient factual basis for defendant's plea, as required by Penal Code section 1192.5. Votes: George C.J., Werdegar, Chin, Brown & Moreno JJ.
Mar 21 2002Counsel appointment order filed
  Appellate Defenders Inc. is hereby appointed to represent appellant on his appela now pending in this court. Appellant's Brief on the merits shall be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date of this order.
Apr 26 2002Received:
  Appellant's application for extension of time asking until May 20, 2002 to file appellant's opening brief on the merits.
Apr 26 2002Request for extension of time filed
  By appellant asking until May 20, 2002 to file appellant's Opening Brief on the Merits. Filed with permission.
Apr 30 2002Extension of time granted
  To May 20, 2002 to appellant's Opening Brief on the Mertis.
May 21 2002Request for extension of time filed
  Appellant asking until June 20, 2002 to file appellant's opening brief on the merits. Filed with permission - 1 day late
May 28 2002Extension of time granted
  To June 20, 2002 to file appellant's opening brief on the merits.
Jun 20 2002Opening brief on the merits filed
  In San Diego by counsel for Appellant {Henry James Holmes}.
Jun 20 2002Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)
  In San Diego by counsel for appellant {Henry James Holmes}.
Jun 26 2002Received letter from:
  Appellant {Henry Holmes} in pro per.
Jul 16 2002Request for extension of time filed
  By counsel for respondent {The People} asking until August 19, 2002 to file respondent's answer brief on the merits.
Jul 22 2002Extension of time granted
  To August 19, 2002 to file respondent's answer brief on the merits.
Aug 14 2002Request for extension of time filed
  Respondent asking until September 18, 2002 to file Respondent's answer brief on the merits.
Aug 21 2002Extension of time granted
  To September 18, 2002 to file respondent's answer brief on the merits.
Sep 13 2002Request for extension of time filed
  By respondent asking to October 18, 2002 to file Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits.
Oct 10 2002Request for extension of time filed
  In San Diego by Respondent {The People} requesting 30 days extension {November 18, 2002) to file Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits.
Oct 17 2002Extension of time granted
  To November 18, 2002 to file Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits.
Nov 18 2002Answer brief on the merits filed
  In San Diego by counsel for Respondent {The People}.
Dec 4 2002Request for extension of time filed
  By appellant asking until December 27, 2002 to file Appellant's Reply Brief on the Merits.
Dec 11 2002Extension of time granted
  To December 27, 2002, to file appellant's reply brief on the merits.
Dec 23 2002Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  in San Diego by appellant Henry James Holmes
Oct 30 2003Case ordered on calendar
  12-3-03, 9am, San Jose
Dec 3 2003Cause argued and submitted
 
Feb 19 2004Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
  Majority Opinion by Moreno, J. ------ Joined by George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin & Brown, JJ.
Mar 25 2004Remittitur issued (criminal case)
 
Apr 1 2004Received:
  Receipt for remittitur from 4 DCA Div 2.
Nov 30 2005Compensation awarded counsel
  attorney Mishkin

Briefs
Jun 20 2002Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Nov 18 2002Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Dec 23 2002Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website