Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S058092
People v. Harris

Filed 8/29/05



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA



THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

S058092

v.

Los Angeles County

MAURICE LYDELL HARRIS,

Super. Ct. No. YA020916

)


Defendant and Appellant.





A jury found defendant Maurice Lydell Harris guilty of the attempted

murder of Bernard Canto (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664)1 and the murders of Alicia

Allen and her fetus (§ 187), finding that he committed the murders under the

special circumstances of felony-murder robbery, felony-murder burglary (§ 190.2,

subd. (a)(17)(A), (G)), and multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)). The jury also

found defendant guilty of robbery and burglary (§§ 211, 459), and found that he

personally used a firearm in the commission of the attempted murder (§ 12022.5),

that he was personally armed during the commission of the murders, the robbery,

and the burglary (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and that he inflicted great bodily injury in

the commission of the attempted murder (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). After a penalty

trial, the jury returned a verdict of death for the murder of Allen, and life without

the possibility of parole for the murder of Allen’s fetus. The court denied the

automatic motion to modify the verdict of death (§ 190.4) and imposed that

sentence. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).)


1

Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Penal Code.

1


We affirm the judgment.

I. FACTS

A. Guilt Phase

1.

Prosecution

Evidence

At 10:25 p.m. on August 9, 1994, a Gardena police officer on patrol saw

Bernard Canto stumble and fall to the pavement in front of his police car on South

Vermont Boulevard. Canto stated he had been shot near where his van was

parked. The police found Canto’s van parked nearby in front of the gated

apartment complex where defendant lived. On the passenger side of the van they

found blood and nine-millimeter shell casings. Across the street they found a

bloody shirt and a pair of bloody shorts containing a wallet, papers, and phone

cards bearing Canto’s name, $150 in cash, and a beeper.

The security officer on duty at defendant’s apartment complex told police

that, earlier that night, two men talked to him for a short time in the security

office, and approximately a half-hour later he heard gunshots outside the security

gates. He saw a white car and a blue car that had been in the middle of the street

back up and drive off in the wrong direction down South Vermont Boulevard.

At 11:11 p.m., within an hour of Canto’s shooting, the Gardena police

responded to a call regarding a shooting at Canto’s house on West Marine Avenue,

approximately 1.6 miles from the site of the South Vermont Boulevard shooting.

Loud music could be heard coming from inside the house. A chain-link fence

surrounded the house, and a security gate on the front door was shut and locked.

The police went to the back of the house through an open gate and found a

bloodstain and a jammed nine-millimeter Beretta handgun on the driveway. Inside

the house they found Canto’s fiancée, Alicia Allen, who was 17 weeks pregnant,

2

lying face down on the bed with her hands tied behind her back with a sock and

twine. She had been shot twice in the head. Allen and her fetus were dead.

In the dining room police found an open key box on the wall and keys

scattered on the floor. The living room couch was in disarray, and amidst the

upended cushions police found a gold chain and a broken fingernail with nail

polish matching that worn by Allen. The bedroom had been ransacked. A nine-

millimeter handgun and bullets were in a dresser drawer that had been pulled out

of the dresser and placed on the bed, and expended bullets and shell casings were

found on the floor.

The gun found in the driveway, which bore no discernable fingerprints, had

fired all of the bullets used to shoot Allen and Canto, as well as the bullets from

the bedroom. The bloodstain in the driveway possessed genetic characteristics

consistent with defendant’s blood. From the area where the bloodstain was found,

police found trace amounts of human genetic material that did not match either

Allen or defendant and that could have come from any bodily fluid. The police

could not determine how long that material had been on the driveway.

Several of Canto’s neighbors on West Marine Avenue testified that on the

night of August 9, 1994, they saw two Black men dressed in dark clothing

approach Canto’s house. One of the men stayed on the sidewalk in front of the

security gate, and the other went to the front door where he met and talked to

Allen, and then went inside with her. Within 10 or 15 minutes the neighbors heard

three or four gunshots in quick succession, and shortly thereafter saw two Black

men fleeing on foot eastward on West Marine Avenue, at least one of whom was

limping. One of the men was husky and six feet tall and may have worn his hair

in dreadlocks or a ponytail. The other man was thin and may have worn a hat.

The neighbors did not see anyone else come out of Canto’s house, or see anyone

3

get into a car and drive away. (The record gives no indication of the identity of

the other person.)

Although Canto survived the shooting of August 9, 1994, he was murdered

in Chicago in November 1995, and therefore was unavailable to testify at trial in

1996. The prosecution read into the record the transcript of his preliminary

hearing testimony.

Canto testified that in August 1994, he earned a living by restoring and

selling cars bought at auction. He paid cash for the cars, and often kept large sums

of money in the house he shared with Allen on West Marine Avenue. On August

9, 1994, at 8:30 p.m., Canto received a call from defendant, whom he considered

to be his friend and with whom he had engaged in several business dealings.

Defendant told Canto to pick him up at the corner of Normandie and Rosecrans

Avenues and defendant would repay a debt of $1,500 he owed Canto. Canto left

his house at 9:30 or 10:00 p.m., picked up defendant, and drove back to

defendant’s apartment complex on South Vermont Boulevard. He and defendant

went upstairs to defendant’s apartment, but because defendant had forgotten his

keys they could not get in. On their way back to Canto’s van they stopped and

talked to the security guard of the apartment complex and asked him if he had an

extra key to the apartment. Canto and defendant then got back into Canto’s van

and returned to an address at Normandie and Rosecrans Avenues where defendant

retrieved his apartment keys from his girlfriend. Canto and defendant then

returned to defendant’s apartment complex.

Canto testified that he parked his van in front of defendant’s apartment, got

out, locked the door, walked around the van, and heard repeated gunshots. He

turned around and saw defendant shooting at him from seven feet away, with his

arm outstretched holding a black nine-millimeter gun. Canto asked defendant,

“Maurice, why?” Defendant laughed. Canto testified bullets hit him in the back,

4

side, and hip. He fell, then got up and walked to the side of the street where he

encountered the police car.

Canto told police that when he left his house that evening everything was in

order. Allen was alive, wearing a pair of diamond earrings, a gold chain, an

engagement ring, a gold wedding band, a class ring, and another gold ring. Three

of these rings she wore all the time and never took off. He kept $500 in cash in

the bedroom drawer. When Canto returned to the house after a month in the

hospital, he did not specifically check for missing items, but he did note that the

$500 in cash and a car phone were missing.

Canto did not at first identify defendant as the man who shot him. At the

scene of the shooting, when paramedics were attending to his wounds, he told

police his shooter was a Black male, 29 to 30 years old. A detective of the

Gardena Police Department testified that when he interviewed Canto in the

intensive care unit of the hospital in the early morning of the second day following

the shooting, Canto first told him a Black male had come up and shot him for no

apparent reason. The detective testified that it was clear Canto did not know at the

time of that interview that Allen was dead, and when the detective told Canto that

Allen had been murdered less than an hour after he had been shot, Canto became

very upset, started to cry, and had to be sedated. The detective returned to the

hospital the next day and interviewed Canto again. Canto then identified

defendant by name as his shooter, described in detail the events of the night of the

shooting, and picked defendant’s photograph from a photo lineup.

Canto admitted that he lied the first two times the police interviewed him

when he denied knowing the identity of his shooter, and explained that he did so

because he was not thinking straight, was in pain, and intended to “take care of the

matter” himself by killing defendant.

5



Regina Mills testified that for three or four weeks before September 16,

1994, the date of his arrest, defendant stayed with her at her Los Angeles

apartment. Defendant had short hair, but Mills saw him wear a long, curly-haired

wig the entire time he was staying with her. She testified defendant limped and

used a cane, and she saw a long, deep, burn-like injury starting near the knee and a

hole that looked like a gunshot wound on defendant’s right leg. She saw an injury

on a toe on his right foot.

Mills testified that while staying at her apartment, defendant met with other

men and women, often left the apartment for an hour or two, and made and

received numerous phone calls. Mills overheard defendant on the phone say, in a

stressed and worried tone, that he should have gone to Allen’s funeral, and that

someone who “lived” was in the hospital. Two days before defendant’s arrest,

Mills heard him talk about leaving town. Defendant told Mills the police were

looking for him and that he had injured his leg in a shootout during a robbery

during which “another guy” had also been shot. He said he thought he shot a

pregnant woman. In exchange for her testimony, Mills received immunity from

prosecution for charges of harboring a fugitive and receiving stolen property, and

was placed in a witness relocation program.

When the police arrested defendant at Mills’s apartment, defendant was

carrying a map of Atlanta, telephone numbers for Amtrak railway and Greyhound

Bus, marijuana, and a tube of mascara. He was wearing eyeliner, and he was

limping. He initially identified himself to the police as Kenny Jordan.

Defendant’s duffle bag contained men’s clothing, medicine, six Greyhound Bus

tickets to Atlanta, cash, and a large amount of cocaine. After his arrest, defendant

called Mills and threatened to kill her because he thought she had informed the

police of his whereabouts.

6



2. Defense Evidence

Defendant testified about the night of the shootings. He admitted that he

had told no one the version of events he gave at trial. He denied killing Allen and

her fetus, and explained that the shooting resulted from a drug deal gone bad. He

explained he went to Canto’s house to deliver cocaine and encountered two men

who shot and tried to kill him before he made his escape.

Defendant informed the jury that he had been convicted of federal drug

possession charges in 1988 and was incarcerated in a federal prison until August,

1993. He was on a Christmas furlough in 1992 when he met Canto. When he was

released from federal prison he worked at World Class Coach, an auto body shop

in Los Angeles where Canto often brought cars for repair.

Defendant and Canto went into business together dealing drugs. Defendant

described himself as “kind of a popular guy,” who had a lot of drug world

connections because of his recent federal incarceration and explained that he and

Canto had engaged in seven large-scale cocaine deals and numerous marijuana

deals between March and August of 1994. He said his role in these deals was “the

middle man” who put together buyers with sellers and explained how he was able

to get cheaper prices from certain “contacts” and thereby increase his profits. He

had expertise in the “cutting and cooking” of cocaine; he explained how he would

use a microwave oven to turn powdered cocaine into rock cocaine, and how he

would use specially fashioned metal boxes to compress what he called “procaine”

into a “dummy kilo” of fake cocaine to be used to swindle people in drug deals.

Defendant told the jury he was motivated by the “greed and easy money and ego

and thrill” associated with drug sales.

On the morning of August 9, 1994, Canto contacted defendant at his

apartment and told him he had a deal set with buyers from Chicago who wanted to

purchase a kilogram of cocaine for $16,000. Defendant went to Canto’s house on

7

West Marine Boulevard to discuss the details of the transaction; defendant would

get the cocaine and Canto would page defendant when he was ready to receive the

drugs on behalf of the buyers. That afternoon, defendant went to his supplier,

“Greg,” who did not have the exact amount of cocaine defendant wanted but who

did have a dummy kilo of fake cocaine defendant had made for him earlier in the

week. Greg and defendant decided to use the fake cocaine in the deal with Canto,

and Greg agreed to give defendant an additional nine ounces of real cocaine, worth

about $4,500, as his payment for conducting the sale of the fake cocaine.

Defendant explained that although there was a lot of trust between drug dealers, he

decided not to tell Canto the cocaine he would deliver to the buyers was fake.

Defendant testified Canto paged him around 10:00 p.m.2 Twenty minutes

later, defendant drove up to his apartment complex on South Vermont Boulevard

and saw Canto standing on the street leaning into a midsized car. Defendant and

Canto went upstairs to defendant’s apartment. Defendant testified he began to

have second thoughts about going through with the deal with the fake cocaine

because the buyers now knew where he lived; he also stated, however, that he was

not concerned that at the time of the exchange the buyers would test the kilo and

discover the fraud because Canto told him the buyers were in a hurry and would

take the cocaine and go directly to the airport and leave for Chicago. He

explained, “most of the time, believe it or not, that is how it goes.” He thought

that a possible way to get out of making the deal would be to make a complaint at

the security office of the apartment complex that one of his cars was missing and


2

Defendant testified on direct examination that Canto initially paged him

“around 10:00 p.m.” On cross-examination, he said that the shootings inside the
house on West Marine Boulevard, which occurred substantially later than the
paging, happened just after 10:00 p.m. (Canto encountered the police on South
Vermont Boulevard just after he was shot at 10:25 p.m.; Canto’s neighbors
reported the shootings at West Marine Boulevard at 11:11 p.m.)

8

have the security officer contact the police. Defendant acknowledged that his

“greed outweighed his [concerns about] safety,” and it never occurred to him to

merely tell Canto that he had not been able to get the amount of cocaine he

wanted.

On their way back to the buyer’s car to get the money, defendant and Canto

did stop to talk to the security guard at the apartment complex. The conversation

lasted about 10 minutes. Canto then got the money from the buyers. Defendant

and Canto returned to defendant’s apartment where defendant gave Canto the kilo

of fake cocaine. Canto then told defendant he wanted four more ounces of cocaine

right away. Defendant agreed to get it from Greg and bring it to Canto’s house as

soon as possible. Canto left, and two minutes later defendant took the $16,000

back to Greg’s apartment, stayed there for 20 minutes, picked up the extra four

ounces of cocaine for Canto and $200 in cash, and left for Canto’s house on West

Marine Avenue.

Defendant testified that when he got to Canto’s house, he parked the car

behind Canto’s red van in the driveway. When he got inside the house, a man put

a gun to his side and said, “Come on in, boy.” Another man pushed him to the

ground, kicked him, and tied his hands behind his back with an extension cord.

Someone asked him where their money was, and said, “Go do something.” He

could not see the faces of these people, but he could hear their footsteps in the

house and he heard someone go out the back door.

Defendant decided his only chance to survive was for him also to go out the

back door, so he loosened his hands from the extension cord behind his back and

started to run. He heard gunshots, and thought the people inside the house were

shooting at him. As he was going down the back steps a man who was taller than

he and who had long hair grabbed him from the front, “like a bear hug.” A second

man grabbed him from behind, then reached in and put a gun between defendant

9

and the first man, who was still holding him in the bear hug. The second man then

shot defendant in the right leg and defendant fell to the ground. The first man also

cried out that he had been shot. Defendant assumed that he and the first man had

been hit by the same bullet.

The second man then pointed the gun at defendant and tried to shoot him in

the face but the gun jammed and the man threw the gun to the ground. Both the

first and second man then ran around one side of the house. Defendant ran in the

opposite direction around the other side of the house and through the front gate to

his car. He drove to his girlfriend’s house in Inglewood and stayed there for two

or three days. From there he went to Greg’s house in Pasadena and stayed there

until he was healed, about three weeks.

Defendant testified he spent time at Mills’s apartment before his arrest on

September 16, 1994. He feared returning to his own apartment; he continued to

conduct his drug business from Mills’s apartment. Defendant stated that Mills

sold marijuana for him and that he used her apartment to store cocaine. He denied

wearing makeup or a wig. He explained that the mascara in his pocket at his arrest

must have gotten there when Mills gave him some marijuana and he put it in his

pocket. He denied telling Mills about the events at Canto’s house.

Defendant

acknowledged

that he did have earlier plans to go to Atlanta to

visit a girlfriend but changed his plans before August 9, 1994, and at the time of

trial he did not know how to contact his Atlanta girlfriend. He testified that he had

also lost contact with the girlfriend in Inglewood, and that Greg died in 1994 or

1995 while defendant was awaiting trial. He further acknowledged that he gave

false identities to police both when he was arrested for drugs in 1988 and when he

was arrested for Allen’s murder on September 16, 1994, and that he gave false

information on an employment application, on his California driver’s license

application, and on his rental application.

10

B. Penalty Phase



1. Prosecution Evidence

At the penalty phase, Alicia Allen’s mother, Pamela Gunn, testified to the

close relationship she had with Allen, her only child, whom she raised alone. She

related how Allen was artistic, and had done well in high school where she was on

the debate team. She was a cheerleader and a dancer. Allen had attended some

college, but subsequently left school and left home. Gunn testified that on

Mother’s Day 1994, just months before the murders, Allen had showed off a

diamond engagement ring and spoken of plans to marry Canto and return to

college in the fall. Gunn described how she learned of the murder, and of the

emotional and financial costs involved in planning and attending the funeral. She

presented a photograph of Allen’s gravesite and testified about the emotional toll

she and her family experienced at the mortuary in viewing Allen’s naked body and

seeing two gaping bullet wounds to the head, broken fingernails, and an “ugly”

autopsy incision. She testified about the impact Allen’s death had had on her.

Allen’s grandmother also testified about the impact of Allen’s death and her

viewing of the body.

On cross-examination, the defense established that Gunn had not had direct

contact with Allen for over a year, that she had not known where Allen lived, and

that Allen was working at minimum wage jobs.



2. Defense Evidence

Defendant’s community college track coach testified that he was a hard

worker and a quiet, respectful student who had the potential to be a world-class

athlete. An employee at Edwards Air Force Base testified that while defendant

was an inmate at the Boron Federal Prison for his 1988 drug possession

conviction, she supervised his work on projects at the airbase. He and other

inmates were bused to the airbase from the prison grounds. She supervised his

11

work for eight or nine months, during which time she found him to be quiet when

spoken to, and an average and obedient worker. He treated her with respect. A

deputy attorney general who knew defendant through a church-sponsored prison

ministry fellowship testified defendant stayed in his home for two weeks during

his federal prison furlough. He found defendant to be respectful and interested in

sports. Finally, Canto’s ex-wife testified she had seen Canto with $6,000 in cash

in a brown paper bag and she could not account for the source of the money. She

had never seen Canto with illegal drugs.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jury Selection Issues

Defendant claims the trial court erred in granting four of the prosecution’s

challenges for cause. He also claims the court excused a qualified juror and, in

conducting assertedly inadequate voir dire, restricted his ability to determine the

qualification of three other jurors.

“The trial court may excuse for cause a prospective juror whose views on

the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of that

juror’s duties.” (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 601; see also Wainwright

v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412.) On appeal, we will uphold the trial court’s ruling if

it is fairly supported by the record, and we accept as binding the trial court’s

determination as to a prospective juror’s true state of mind when that juror has

made conflicting or ambiguous statements. (Smith, at p. 602.)

Because the record supports the trial court’s findings that Prospective Juror

L.S.’s personal feelings would prevent her from being able to impose the death

penalty, and because the voir dire of Prospective Jurors J.R., D.B., and J.P. was

not inadequate, defendant’s claims of error have no merit.

12

In the 17-page written questionnaire, Prospective Juror L.S. indicated she

would “probably get cold feet” and would not want the personal responsibility of

deciding to actually impose the death penalty. During voir dire, she stated that she

would have to be convinced “that there was [sic] no kind of mitigating

circumstances at all before I could see being responsible for putting somebody to

death.” The court explained, “[t]he law does not say in order to come back with

death there be no mitigating circumstances,” and “[when] the aggravating factors

so substantially outweigh the mitigating then the juror should vote for death and

not otherwise.” When asked, “Could you follow that instruction or are you going

to want something else to use, some different standard of your own?,” L.S. replied,

“It is like I said. It would have to be overwhelmingly is how I feel about it.

Overwhelmingly aggravating circumstances.”

Defendant argues the trial court should have ceased voir dire when L.S.

said she did not like the death penalty but could impose it under “overwhelmingly

aggravating circumstances.” He argues the following colloquy should not have

occurred:

“Court: I want to know within your heart of hearts in your case, not some

other case, this case, if you could actually give both sides a fair call on penalty if

we have a penalty phase or are you going to set an unrealistic standard for yourself

that could never be met?

“L.S.: I don’t think I can put somebody to death, no.

“Court: Both sides are entitled to have 12 jurors that, if necessary, can

make that choice and make the choice based on the law that I outlined and make it

fair for the defendant, fair for the prosecution, the sides they represent here. Do

you believe you are a juror who can do that or do you think that your abilities are

substantially impaired by your feelings about the death penalty?

13

“L.S.: Really I don’t think that I could vote for the death penalty, no . . . .

Not knowing any circumstances about the case or like you say mitigating and

aggravating, I am 80 or 90 percent sure I couldn’t do it.”

Defendant did not object to this voir dire and therefore has forfeited the

claim for appeal. (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 88.) In any event,

the claim has no merit. Contrary to defendant’s assertions, the additional

questioning was not misleading or confusing. These questions aided in

determining whether L.S. harbored any bias that would prevent her from following

the instructions to consider aggravating and mitigating evidence (People v. Cash

(2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 721–722), and allowed the court to identify a juror whose

death penalty views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of her

duties as a juror (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 47). L.S.’s

answers also demonstrated her inability and unwillingness to engage in the

weighing process necessary to determine whether death was the appropriate

penalty, and the trial court reasonably could find substantial impairment in L.S.’s

abilities to perform duties as a juror. (See People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th

425, 447; People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 558-562.) We reject

defendant’s assertion that Prospective Juror L.S. was improperly excused.

Defendant’s challenge to the adequacy of the voir dire of Prospective Jurors

J.R., D.B., and J.P. also lacks merit. J.R. indicated in the questionnaire that he was

not comfortable with the death penalty and that he would “always vote for life

imprisonment without possibility of parole and reject the death penalty, regardless

of the evidence presented at trial.” During voir dire by the court he said that he

had held these beliefs about the death penalty for a long time. D.B. stated in the

questionnaire that he believed the death penalty was appropriate in some

circumstances and should be used as a last resort, but also stated he would always

vote for life imprisonment, and that the responsibility of making such a decision

14

was more than he could handle. Brief voir dire by the court revealed that D.B.

would always vote for life without possibility of parole. J.P. gave conflicting and

confusing answers to questions posed in both the questionnaire and voir dire, and

the court determined she was not capable of understanding the basic concepts

involved in a death penalty case.

Defendant claims the court did not ask enough questions to resolve the

apparent ambiguities shown in these jurors’ answers. We disagree. “ ‘[W]e pay

due deference to the trial court, which was in a position to actually observe and

listen to the prospective jurors. Voir dire sometimes fails to elicit an unmistakably

clear answer from the juror, and there will be times when “the trial judge is left

with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully

and impartially apply the law. . . . [T]his is why deference must be paid to the trial

judge who sees and hears the juror.” ’ ” (People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p.

559.) Such findings by the trial court are generally binding if the prospective

juror’s responses are equivocal or conflicting. (Id. at p. 558; People v. Ashmus

(1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 962.) The record supports the court’s findings that each of

these prospective jurors lacked either the ability or the willingness to engage in the

performance of duties as jurors in a death penalty case, and we defer to its decision

that no further questions were necessary.

B. Guilt Phase Issues



1. Evidentiary Rulings

a. Admission of Evidence





i. Videotape of victim

Defendant claims the court committed error in admitting a videotape of

Alicia Allen taken two weeks before her murder. He renews the objection made at

trial pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 that the tape was more prejudicial

than probative.

15

Courts should be cautious in the guilt phase about admitting photographs of

murder victims while alive, given the risk that the photograph will merely generate

sympathy for the victims. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 677.) But the

possibility that a photograph will generate sympathy does not compel its exclusion

if it is otherwise relevant. (People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1230.) The

decision to admit victim photographs falls within the trial court’s discretion, and

an appellate court will not disturb its ruling unless the prejudicial effect of the

photographs clearly outweighs their probative value. (People v. Navarette (2003)

30 Cal.4th 458, 495.)

Allen’s mother testified that Allen regularly wore numerous pieces of

jewelry that she never took off, including a diamond engagement ring and a high

school class ring. The prosecution played a silent, 40-second-long portion of a

videotape taken of Allen at a child’s birthday party two weeks before her death.

Her mother identified the engagement ring and several necklaces shown on the

videotape, and testified that with the exception of a small “pinky” ring, none of the

jewelry shown in the videotape or any other pieces of Allen’s jewelry were ever

recovered.

Defendant claims the videotape was more prejudicial than probative, and

the videotape showing a children’s birthday party was emotionally charged and

served to highlight Allen’s “innocent nature.” We disagree. The videotape was

relevant to proving Allen owned and wore jewelry that allegedly was stolen during

the course of the murders, and was not made inadmissible, as defendant argues,

because the prosecution could have established the same relevant fact by other

means. (People v. Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 495–496.) We have

reviewed the videotape and agree with the trial court that although it was taken

during the course of a child’s birthday party, it does not engender an emotional

16

reaction but is neutral and unremarkable. The court acted within its discretion in

admitting the evidence.

ii.



Canto’s

preliminary hearing testimony

Defendant next claims the court erred in admitting Canto’s preliminary

hearing testimony. Because defendant objected only to the deletion of certain

portions of Canto’s testimony and not to its admission per se, he failed to preserve

this claim for appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353.)

In addition, the claim lacks merit. “The confrontation clauses of both the

federal and state Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to confront

the prosecution’s witnesses. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const.[,] art. I, § 15.)

That right is not absolute, however. An exception exists when a witness is

unavailable and, at a previous court proceeding against the same defendant, has

given testimony that was subject to cross-examination.” (People v. Cromer (2001)

24 Cal.4th 889, 892.) Such statements are not made inadmissible by the hearsay

rule if the cross-examination was made “with an interest and motive similar” to

that at the prior proceeding. (Evid. Code, § 1291, subd. (a)(2).) In this case,

Canto’s death rendered him unavailable to testify at trial. (Evid. Code, § 240,

subd. (a)(3).) Accordingly, the prosecution introduced an edited version of

Canto’s preliminary hearing testimony. (Id., § 1291, subd. (b).)3

Defendant argues that at the time of the preliminary hearing, counsel did

not know of Canto’s illegal drug activities, and consequently he did not have an

opportunity to cross-examine with the same interest and motive as he would have,

3

Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (b), provides: “The admissibility

of former testimony under this section is subject to the same limitations and
objections as though the declarant were testifying at the hearing, except that
former testimony offered under this section is not subject to: ¶ (1) Objections to
the form of the question which were not made at the time the former testimony
was given, ¶ (2) Objections based on competency or privilege which did not exist
at the time the former testimony was given.”

17

had Canto been available at trial. He asserts that the testimony gave the jury a

false and misleading impression of Canto’s credibility and thereby undermined

defendant’s right to a fair determination of guilt and penalty. Defendant cannot

now be heard to complain that the defense did not know of Canto’s drug dealing

prior to the preliminary hearing; by his own admission at trial, he and Canto had

been engaged in drug dealing for some time before August 9, 1994.

Moreover, a defendant’s interest and motive at a second proceeding is not

dissimilar to his interest at a first proceeding within the meaning of Evidence Code

section 1291, subdivision (a)(2), simply because events occurring after the first

proceeding might have led counsel to alter the nature and scope of cross-

examination of the witness in certain particulars. (People v. Alcala (1992) 4

Cal.4th 742, 784.) The “motives need not be identical, only ‘similar.’ ” (People v.

Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 850.) “Both the United States Supreme Court

and this court have concluded that ‘when a defendant has had an opportunity to

cross-examine a witness at the time of his or her prior testimony, that testimony is

deemed sufficiently reliable to satisfy the confrontation requirement [citation],

regardless whether subsequent circumstances bring into question the accuracy or

the completeness of the earlier testimony.’ ” (People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th

309, 343; see California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149.)

Defendant’s interest

and motive in cross-examining Canto at the preliminary hearing were similar to

those at trial: to challenge Canto’s credibility and discredit his account of the

shooting. Defense counsel conducted an in-depth cross-examination twice as long

as the direct examination, which succeeded in eliciting evidence that challenged

Canto’s credibility.4 Accordingly, defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine


4

Canto admitted he twice lied to police when asked if he knew the identity

of his shooter.

18

Canto at the preliminary hearing satisfied the confrontation clause, and any

objection to the preliminary hearing testimony would have lacked merit.





iii. Testimony regarding Canto’s statements

Two witnesses testified about statements Canto made after the shootings.

Defendant claims the court erred in admitting the evidence.

At the preliminary hearing Canto denied being a “loan shark” and described

himself as a businessman who fixed and resold cars bought for cash at auction.

Detective Davila of the Gardena Police Department impeached Canto when Davila

testified for defendant on direct examination regarding a small portion of a

telephonic interview he conducted while Canto was still in the hospital. He

testified Canto admitted that the reason he had large quantities of cash at his house

was because he was in the illegal “loan shark” business.

On cross-examination of Davila, the prosecution established that Canto

initiated the telephonic interview in the hospital by asking a nurse to call the police

so he could “set the record straight” and tell the police information regarding his

shooting and the murder of Allen, and so he could explain that at all prior police

contacts, he had lied when he denied knowing the identity of his shooter. Over

objection that it was beyond the scope of direct examination, Davila then testified

about what Canto told him were the events of the evening of August 9, 1994,

wherein Canto said that he had lent money to defendant, that defendant had

contacted him that afternoon in order to repay the loan, that while driving

defendant to and from his apartment in an effort to get the money owed, defendant

shot him, that he lied to the police initially when he told them he did not know the

identity of the shooter, that he explained “if it took him the rest of his life, he was

going to get even and take care of the defendant himself,” but after learning while

in the hospital that Allen had been murdered, Canto decided it “was no longer

personal” and wanted the police to get involved. With the exception of his

19

admission that he was a “loan shark,” this was essentially the same evidence Canto

testified to at the preliminary hearing.

Defendant claims the court erred in admitting the portion of Canto’s

hospital interview elicited during cross-examination because that testimony was

beyond the scope of direct examination.

A witness may be cross-examined on any matter within the scope of direct

examination. (Evid. Code, § 773.) “Where part of an act, declaration,

conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same

subject may be inquired into by an adverse party . . . .” (Id., § 356.) “ ‘In

applying Evidence Code section 356 the courts do not draw narrow lines around

the exact subject of inquiry. “In the event a statement admitted in evidence

constitutes part of a conversation or correspondence, the opponent is entitled to

have placed in evidence all that was said or written by or to the declarant in the

course of such conversation or correspondence, provided the other statements have

some bearing upon, or connection with, the admission or declaration in

evidence. . . .” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 959.)

Further, the jury is entitled to know the context in which the statements on direct

examination were made. (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 520 [where

defense counsel elicited portions of investigative interview with witness,

prosecution not foreclosed from inquiring into context of statements on redirect

examination of witness and cross-examination of investigator].)

Canto’s admission to Davila that he participated in illegal loan shark

activity contradicted his preliminary hearing testimony and was placed into

evidence by defendant. The prosecution was entitled to present the entire context

in which Canto made the admission, including his explanation of the events of the

August 9 shooting, which he asserted arose out of his loan shark activity. The

20

court did not err in allowing Davila to testify to the remainder of Canto’s hospital

admission.

Defendant further claims these statements elicited on cross-examination of

Davila were inadmissible hearsay. By not objecting to admission of the

statements as hearsay, defendant failed to preserve the issue for appeal. (People v.

Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 681.) Were we to consider the claim on the

merits, it would fail. The statements were admissible for the nonhearsay purpose

of placing Canto’s statements into context. (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th

137, 190.)

Over objection, the prosecution called in rebuttal Lyndon Bull, the owner

and manager of the World Class Coach Works auto body shop where both

defendant and Canto worked. He testified he had known defendant since high

school; that in late 1993 or early 1994, he had given defendant a full-time job for

$150 a week “pick[ing] up parts”; that he was training Canto to do repair

estimates; and that when defendant eventually failed to show up for work

following the shootings his friends and family and coworkers looked for him for

nearly a month but did not find him and defendant never called or showed up at

work again.

Defendant argues, as he did at trial, that this was improper rebuttal

evidence. The decision to admit rebuttal evidence rests largely within the

discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of

demonstrated abuse of that discretion. (Evid. Code, § 1093, subd. (d); People v.

DeSantis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1232.) “ ‘[P]roper rebuttal evidence does not

include a material part of the case in the prosecution’s possession that tends to

establish the defendant’s commission of the crime. It is restricted to evidence

made necessary by the defendant’s case in the sense that he has introduced new

evidence or made assertions that were not implicit in his denial of guilt.’ ”

21

(People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1199, quoting People v. Carter (1957)

48 Cal.2d 737, 753–754.)

The rebuttal testimony of Lyndon Bull as to the limited scope of

defendant’s job at the auto body shop properly challenged defendant’s testimony

that he was “basically [the] assistant manager” of the shop, that he “helped run the

place, do estimates, make sure that everybody gets paid, write the checks and pay

invoices,” and that he was gone from work starting August 1, 1994, because he

was on vacation. We find no abuse of discretion in permitting this testimony.

In addition, over a hearsay objection, Bull testified that three or four weeks

after the shooting, Canto came into the auto body shop and said defendant had

“shot him up.” Defendant argues this was inadmissible hearsay testimony. We

agree. Hearsay evidence is “evidence of a statement that was made other than by a

witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the

matter stated.” (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) Unless an exception applies,

hearsay evidence is inadmissible. (Id., subd. (b).) Canto’s statement to Bull was

an out-of-court statement, and respondent does not suggest that it comes within

any exception or that it was offered for any purpose other than to prove defendant

shot Canto. The admission, therefore, was error. The error, however, was

harmless. We have held the application of ordinary rules of evidence does not

implicate the federal Constitution, and thus we review allegations of error under

the “reasonable probability” standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,

836. (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 226–227.) Because Bull merely

repeated statements similar to Canto’s preliminary hearing testimony, it is not

reasonably probable that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Indeed,

assuming defendant has preserved a claim of federal constitutional error, and the

error did implicate federal constitutional rights, we would find the error harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.

22

b. Exclusion of Evidence





i. Evidence of Canto’s drug dealing and third party culpability

Before trial the prosecution moved in limine to exclude 23 items of

evidence proffered by defendant, which included, inter alia, two separate but

related areas of evidence of Canto’s drug dealing: (1) circumstantial evidence of

Canto’s alleged drug-related activities as witnessed by his neighbors and family;

and evidence of alleged drug-related items found in his home and in his possession

at the time of his murder in Chicago in 1995; and (2) the statements of Melvin

Walford and Cleveland James attesting to their involvement in Canto’s drug

dealing business and the details surrounding Canto’s murder. Defendant had

sought to introduce this evidence to challenge Canto’s credibility by establishing

Canto’s status as a drug dealer, and to support his theory of third party culpability

in the murders of Allen and her fetus.

The court excluded all of this proffered evidence. Defendant now claims

that in doing so, the court abused its discretion and violated various of his

constitutional rights. We conclude that the court abused its discretion in excluding

some of the evidence but find no prejudice.

The principles governing the admission of evidence are well settled. Only

relevant evidence is admissible (Evid. Code, §§ 210, 350), “and all relevant

evidence is admissible unless excluded under the federal or state Constitutions or

by statute. (Evid. Code, § 351; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d).)”

(People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 973.) “The test of relevance is whether

the evidence tends ‘logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference’ to establish

material facts such as identity, intent, or motive.” (People v. Garceau (1993) 6

Cal.4th 140, 177.) In determining the credibility of a witness, the jury may

consider any matter that has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove the

truthfulness of his testimony at the hearing, including but not limited to: a

23

witness’s character for honesty or veracity or their opposites; the existence or

nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive; his attitude toward the action in

which he testifies or toward the giving of testimony; and his admission of

untruthfulness. (Evid. Code, § 780.) Past criminal conduct involving moral

turpitude that has some logical bearing on the veracity of a witness in a criminal

proceeding is admissible to impeach, subject to the court’s discretion under

Evidence Code section 352. (See People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 295–

296.) Possession of drugs for sale, which involves the intent to corrupt others, is

conduct involving moral turpitude. (People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 317.)

The trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of

evidence. (See People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 132.) We review for

abuse of discretion a trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence. (People

v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 972; People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238,

264.)

The proffered circumstantial evidence of Canto’s alleged drug dealing

included the following: Canto’s ex-wife would have testified that she was married

to Canto for 10 years and that the marriage ended nearly two years before his

death, that he never held a “regular job,” had “a lot of money,” and traveled

extensively, and she was of the opinion that he was a drug dealer; neighbors would

have testified to a large amount of foot traffic at Canto’s house at all hours of the

day and night; Canto’s coworker would have testified that he accompanied Canto

when Canto drove to two homes and went inside for a short period of time, from

which the coworker assumed Canto was delivering drugs; the coworker also

would have testified he saw Canto carrying a concealed weapon and heard him

admit to having “shot some Bloods in Chicago”; and police officers would have

24

testified that the search of Canto’s house following the murders revealed three

bulletproof vests and a large amount of ammunition.5

The proffered statements of Walford and James, then awaiting trial in

Chicago for Canto’s murder, would have included contentions that they had been

employed by Canto for several years to transport large quantities of cocaine

between Los Angeles and Chicago, and that they shot and stabbed Canto, causing

his death, after a disagreement during a drug deal in November 1995.

The trial court considered the admissibility of all of this evidence in a

lengthy pretrial hearing on the motion in limine, and revisited the admissibility of

the statements of Walford and James at the end of the prosecution’s case-in-chief

and again during defendant’s case. When first considering the admissibility of the

circumstantial evidence during the hearing on the motion, the court recognized

that it knew very little about the case to come; indeed, it did not know of

defendant’s contention that he and Canto were dealing drugs, or of the statements

of Walford and James and details of Canto’s murder during the drug deal in

Chicago. The court ruled the circumstantial evidence irrelevant, and stated

“clearly in the guilt phase the court sees no relevance of the defense’s desire to see

Mr. Canto as a narcotic dealer and to suggest that somebody else killed him or

somebody else tried to kill him [and Allen] other than the defendant. [¶] That is

far from being relevant third party culpability evidence. It simply seeks to cast

doubt upon Mr. Canto and to, I assume, imply to the jury that others may have had

reasons to want a drug dealer dead, all of which is absolutely speculative.” The

court also stated, “if, however, the defendant testifies that these matters become


5

Defendant also asserted that a search of Canto’s Chicago residence

following his murder revealed a large amount of marijuana, but he was unable at
trial to produce evidence in support of the assertion.

25

relevant based upon his testimony or any other defense witness, we will revisit the

issue.”

Later, during the hearing on the motion, the court learned of and considered

the admissibility of the proffered statements of Walford and James. The court

concluded this did provide more substantial evidence of Canto’s drug dealing and

therefore did have a bearing on Canto’s credibility, but the statements were

hearsay, inadmissible as third party culpability evidence, substantially more

prejudicial than probative, and therefore inadmissible.

During trial the court reconsidered the admissibility of the statements of

Walford and James regarding Canto’s murder. Defendant made an offer of proof

that he would testify to his and Canto’s drug dealing business and the details of the

drug deal of the night of the murders on August 9, 1994, and argued the statements

of Walford and James were relevant to challenge Canto’s credibility and support

defendant’s contention that Canto was a drug dealer, as would the contention that

Canto carried a gun and was believed by his coworkers to be a drug dealer. The

court issued a written ruling, again finding the evidence of Canto’s murder

irrelevant, and the statements of Walford and James to be hearsay and

substantially prejudicial and to be excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section

352, and inadmissible as third party culpability evidence pursuant to People v.

Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834.

We conclude that defendant’s offer of proof that he would testify about

Canto’s drug dealing provided the foundation for the relevancy of the

circumstantial evidence that had been missing when the court initially ruled on its

admissibility. The circumstantial evidence suggesting Canto was a drug dealer

was no longer speculative and was relevant and admissible to challenge Canto’s

credibility. (See People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 295–296.) The court

should have admitted the circumstantial evidence at this point.

26

However, the jury heard substantial other evidence challenging Canto’s

credibility: police officers testified that they found several boxes each of plastic

wrap and fabric softener in Canto’s house on West Marine Avenue, items often

used to disguise distinctive odors in the packaging and transportation of large

amounts of marijuana; Canto lied to the Gardena police when he said he did not

know who shot him; he gave a false name on the rental application for the house

on West Marine Avenue; he lied to the Chicago police before he died; he admitted

he harbored bias and animosity toward defendant and wanted to “take care of

business” and kill defendant himself; and defendant himself testified in detail to

Canto’s involvement in drug dealing. The exclusion of the circumstantial

evidence of Canto’s drug dealing did not keep the jury from learning facts from

which it could assess Canto’s character and credibility. No prejudice resulted

from the court’s decision to exclude the circumstantial evidence of Canto’s drug

dealing.

We find no error in excluding the statements of Walford and James. “To be

admissible, the third party evidence need not show ‘substantial proof of a

probability’ that the third person committed the act; it need only be capable of

raising a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt. At the same time, we do not

require that any evidence, however remote, must be admitted to show a third

party’s possible culpability. As this court observed in [People v.] Mendez [(1924)

193 Cal. 39], evidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in

another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a

defendant’s guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third

person to the actual perpetration of the crime.” (People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d

at p. 833.) “[C]ourts should simply treat third-party culpability evidence like any

other evidence: if relevant it is admissible ([Evid. Code,] § 350) unless its

27

probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay, prejudice,

or confusion (§ 352).” (People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 834.)

Evidence regarding Canto’s murder in Chicago would not raise a

reasonable doubt as to defendant’s culpability for the murder of Allen and her

fetus. The prosecution established that defendant shot Canto, that defendant was

in the house when Allen and her fetus were murdered, and that the same gun was

used to shoot Canto and Allen. Defendant himself testified that he was dealing

drugs with Canto and was in Canto’s house when Allen was murdered. Neither

party presented evidence, either direct or circumstantial, which placed Walford or

James in Canto’s house at any time. The fact that Canto was involved in drug

dealing and was himself subsequently murdered by Walford and James in Chicago

in November 1995, in the course of drug dealing, neither demonstrated that

Walford or James was involved in the killings in Canto’s house in August 1994,

nor disproved the prosecution’s theory that it was defendant who shot Allen. The

court did not abuse its discretion in excluding these statements.






ii. Postmurder burglary of Canto’s house

The court also excluded evidence that seven weeks after the Allen murders,

police caught and prevented burglars from taking furniture from Canto’s house on

West Marine Avenue, and that when notified of the attempted burglary of his

home, Canto, who had only briefly returned to the house since being released from

the hospital, told the police he was not interested in anything in the house and

would not press charges. This evidence, defendant argues, challenged the critical

element of the prosecution’s case for robbery: that Allen’s missing jewelry was

taken at the time of the murders.

Several rings Allen always wore were missing when she was found dead.

Some of her fingernails were broken, suggesting she engaged in a struggle in the

28

house before she died. The prosecution argued that it was reasonable to conclude

that the killer took the missing rings. Defendant points out there was no inventory

taken of the contents of the house after the murders, and argues that the proffered

evidence of the postmurder burglary attempt was relevant to raise the possibility

that the rings were not taken at the time of the murders, but were left in the house

and later taken during the burglary.

The trial court properly excluded this evidence. The fact of an unsuccessful

attempt to burglarize Canto’s abandoned house weeks after the murders does not

alone raise a reasonable inference that the missing rings were left in the house

following the murders. Moreover, the court had discretion to exclude the evidence

under Evidence Code section 352 even if we assume it had some marginal

relevance.

Even if we were to find the court abused its discretion in excluding any or

all of the proffered exculpatory evidence including the statements of Walford and

James and the prior burglary attempt, defendant has failed to establish a

reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of the error.

At most, the additional evidence the jury would have heard was of marginal value.

Indeed, for these reasons, we would find any error harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.)

Defendant also argues the court impermissibly “conditioned” the

admissibility of this proffered evidence on his testifying. Because he failed to

raise this objection at trial (Evid. Code, § 354; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th

73, 108), defendant forfeited this argument on appeal. Moreover, the claim is

without merit. The court did not suggest that the proffered evidence would

become admissible only if defendant testified. Rather, the court indicated that as

offered, it was irrelevant, but if defendant offered other evidence, such as his own

29

testimony, demonstrating Canto was a drug dealer, the court would revisit the

admissibility and relevance of the proffered evidence.



2. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct

Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in a number of

respects. “To constitute a violation of the federal Constitution, prosecutorial

misconduct must ‘ “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a denial of due process.” ’ [Citations.] Conduct by a prosecutor that

does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct

under state law only if it involves ‘ “the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods

to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.” ’ ” (People v. Benavides,

supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 108.)

After the preliminary hearing but before Canto’s death, the prosecution

filed a “Motion for Hearing To Determine Conflict of Interest” that raised a

question whether a conflict of interest existed between defendant and his counsel,

a deputy in the Los Angeles County public defender’s office. The prosecution

stated that the Public Defender’s Office previously represented prosecution

witness Canto. Defense counsel indicated that her office had evaluated the issue

and concluded that there was no conflict. Court and counsel questioned whether

the existence of a conflict was a matter of law or fact and whether that

determination should be made by court or counsel, and the court scheduled a

hearing on those issues.

Before the hearing was held, however, Canto died. The court determined

his death rendered moot the question of whether a conflict existed, and, without

objection, took the prosecution’s motion off calendar. Counsel continued to

represent defendant throughout the guilt and penalty phases of trial; defendant

represented himself in propria persona at the motion for new trial.

30

Defendant characterizes the filing of the “Motion for Hearing To Determine

Conflict of Interest” as prosecutorial misconduct, claiming the motion “sowed the

seeds of distrust in appellant’s mind that his counsel was representing interests in

conflict with appellant’s own and that counsel was not using her best efforts on his

behalf,” and “created an atmosphere of mistrust that ultimately resulted in the

breakdown of the attorney-client relationship,” all in violation of various

constitutional rights.

Assuming for argument the issue was preserved, it is meritless. The

prosecution had the right to protect itself. Whether a conflict of interest exists

such that a defendant should have a different attorney is a very sensitive matter.

The prosecution could legitimately be concerned that if the court had not

examined the question, any conviction it received might have been doomed to

reversal on appeal even before the trial began. (See, e.g., People v. Mroczko

(1983) 35 Cal.3d 86.) We see no impropriety in the prosecution’s cautiously

seeking a determination before trial whether a conflict existed rather than waiting

for a defense challenge to a conviction after trial.

Moreover, the record does not suggest that defendant mistrusted counsel

due to the prosecutor’s conduct or that counsel failed to represent defendant

adequately. Defendant did not reveal on the record the reason he chose to

represent himself following the penalty phase, and on appeal he acknowledges that

counsel did not have a conflict of interest. The trial court stated at the hearing on

the motion for new trial that counsel “did everything she could throughout the trial

to try to convince me to allow Mr. Canto’s earlier statements to be impeached by

his alleged drug dealing and all manner of things. She took a position contrary to

Mr. Canto. She was not afraid to do so. She urged me to find that he was a dope-

dealing criminal and a liar, et cetera. I mean, everything that you would want your

advocate to do, she did . . . . Her conduct at this trial belies any suggestion that she

31

felt constrained or was constrained in any way. Just the opposite. She went after

Canto like an attack dog, and I don’t mean that in an uncomplimentary sense.”

Defendant next asserts that the prosecution caused three potential witnesses

to Canto’s murder in Chicago to change their minds about testifying on

defendant’s behalf, and thereby interfered with his right to compulsory process in

violation of various constitutional rights. Prosecutorial intimidation of, or

interference with, defense witnesses violates the Sixth Amendment right to compel

the attendance of witnesses and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.

(People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 52; People v. Mincey

(1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 460; In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 29–30.) Defendant

bears the burden of demonstrating at least a reasonable possibility that the witness

could have given testimony that would have been both material and favorable; that

the prosecution engaged in activity that was entirely unnecessary to the proper

performance of its duties and of such a character as to transform a defense witness

from a willing witness to one who would refuse to testify; and a causal link

between that misconduct and his inability to present witnesses on his own behalf.

(In re Martin, supra, at pp. 31–32.) He has not met this burden.

Before trial, Detective Dempsey of the Riverdale, Illinois, police

department cooperated with the defense and agreed to testify to the statements

made by Walford that he killed Canto because Canto was a cheating drug dealer.

In an effort to obtain Walford’s and James’s blood samples the prosecutor sent a

fax to a state attorney’s office in Illinois seeking the names and addresses of their

attorneys. The fax read in part: “In The People versus Harris, the defense

indicated in their opening statement that the defendant will testify and blame the

1994 Los Angeles crime on Mr. James and Mr. Walford. He will testify that in

arriving at the scene, he saw the two exiting the house, the crime already

completed. They finished in Chicago in 1995 what they started in Los Angeles in

32

’94.[6] [¶] The attorneys [for Walford and James] may wish to cooperate to avoid

having their clients implicated, extradited, and prosecuted for capital murder in

the state of California.” (Italics added.)

Defense counsel stated that just before the in camera hearing regarding the

admissibility of Walford’s statement, she had been contacted by Illinois trial

counsel for Walford and codefendant James who, presumably in response to the

prosecution’s inquiries, “wanted to know what her intentions were” with regard to

their clients. She further stated that the defense had recently learned the

prosecution had telephoned Detective Dempsey, and that Dempsey was now “not

sure he would be able to testify.”

Defendant argues, as he did below, that by contacting the state attorney’s

office in Illinois and Detective Dempsey, the prosecution unconstitutionally

impeded his ability to present a defense. We disagree. Defendant’s inability to

present this evidence was not due to the witnesses’ willingness or unwillingness to

testify, but to the trial court’s rulings excluding the evidence. Further, the record

does not establish that before the prosecution sent the fax to Illinois, either

Walford or James had been willing to testify on defendant’s behalf, or, if they

were, that the prosecution’s actions negatively influenced Walford or James or

Dempsey in their decisions not to testify.

Defendant also fails to establish that the evidence that might have been

presented would have been both material and favorable to the defense. Even

absent Walford’s and James’s statements regarding Canto’s drug dealing,

defendant had evidence with which to challenge Canto’s credibility. By

defendant’s own admission, he and Canto were large-scale drug dealers, and


6

Actually, defense counsel had stated only, “Mr. Harris will describe for you

when he arrived [at Canto’s house] he was confronted by two men.” Defendant
later testified he could not identify the men.

33

defendant was inside Canto’s house when Allen was murdered. The fact that two

drug dealers in Chicago later murdered Canto does nothing to suggest that

defendant was a victim rather than a perpetrator of this crime.

Defendant claims the prosecution engaged in misconduct by offering the

evidence that he has claimed in this appeal the court should have excluded and

opposing the admission of defense evidence the court did exclude. Defendant

failed to object to this alleged misconduct and thus forfeited these claims on

appeal. (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839.) Moreover, phrasing the

claim as one of misconduct adds nothing to the strength of defendant’s evidentiary

claims we have already considered. Although offering evidence the prosecutor

knows is inadmissible may be misconduct (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188,

1218), the adversarial process generally permits one party to offer evidence, and

the other party to object if it wishes, without either party being considered to have

committed misconduct. The trial court simply rules on the admissibility of the

evidence, as the court did here.

Defendant claims the prosecution engaged in misconduct when, after

urging the court to find certain evidence had no probative value, it relied on

evidence of Canto’s status as a drug dealer in its guilt phase closing argument.

Again, he failed to object to this alleged misconduct and thus forfeited the claim

on appeal. Moreover, contrary to defendant’s argument, the prosecution did not

“rely on the fact Canto was a drug dealer to bolster his argument about

[defendant’s] motivations to commit the crime.” Rather, the prosecution

commented on defendant’s own testimony and stated, “if you want to believe

Canto was a drug dealer, that’s even more reason he’s going to have some dope in

there worth stealing, and maybe a lot more cash.” The prosecution is given wide

latitude during closing argument to make fair comment on the evidence, including

34

reasonable inferences or deductions to be drawn from it. (People v. Wharton

(1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 567.) We find no misconduct.

Relying on testimony, largely from defendant himself, that he earned $150

a week plus commissions from the auto body shop, that his July and August 1994

rent checks for $695 each were returned for insufficient funds, that he was

indebted to Canto for $1,500, and that at the time he left the auto body shop he

still owed money on a $500 car he had purchased from owner Lyndon Bull, the

prosecution argued in closing at the guilt phase of trial that defendant was in debt,

needed money, and therefore had the “motive and opportunity to pull a robbery.”

Defendant claims this argument constituted misconduct. Because defendant failed

to object or seek an admonition as to this asserted instance of misconduct, and

because an admonition would have cured the alleged harm, defendant has forfeited

the claim for appeal. (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 517-518; People v.

Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 427-428.) In any event, the claim has no merit.

It is true that “[e]vidence of a defendant’s poverty or indebtedness generally

is inadmissible to establish motive to commit robbery or theft, because reliance on

poverty alone as evidence of motive is deemed unfair to the defendant, and the

probative value of such evidence is considered outweighed by the risk of

prejudice.” (People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 939, italics added.) But here,

the evidence was already presented without objection, largely from defendant’s

own mouth. The prosecutor merely commented on that evidence, which was

proper.

Moreover, evidence of a defendant’s poverty may be admissible to refute a

contention that he did not commit the offense because he did not need the money.

(People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1076.) Such is the case here.

Defendant testified on direct examination that he was not having financial

difficulties in the summer of 1994. He testified at length to the thousands of

35

dollars in profits he earned dealing drugs, and stated that “between his various

activities” his income would fluctuate from week to week. He acknowledged that

his rent checks bounced but explained it was due to his and his roommate’s

negligence in depositing paychecks and not because of an actual lack of funds on

his part. The prosecution properly refuted defendant’s assertion that he was not in

financial need at the time of the crimes and the inference that he had no financial

motive to commit robbery.



3. Alleged Judicial Bias

Defendant claims the trial court harbored a bias against him. He asserts the

bias was demonstrated in several allegedly erroneous evidentiary rulings and in

inappropriate comments and conduct by the court. In particular, he claims the

court exhibited bias against him when it made direct statements of disbelief of

defendant’s case; interjected its own objection during the cross-examination of a

police officer regarding a possible unidentified witness; interjected its own

objection during cross-examination of a police officer regarding the bullets found

in Canto’s apartment; made disparaging remarks to defense counsel during cross-

examination of the evidence technician; interjected its own objection during cross-

examination of the fingerprint technician regarding prints on the gun and the

gathering of blood evidence; and conducted its own cross-examination of

defendant.

Defendant challenged only the court’s interruption of the cross-examination

of the evidence technician regarding possible fingerprints on the gun, but he did

not object to any of the other judicial interruptions or resulting evidentiary rulings,

or to his cross-examination by the court. Although defendant failed to object to

the allegedly improper acts on the grounds of judicial bias or seek the judge’s

recusal (see People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78; People v. Seaton (2001) 26

Cal.4th 598, 698; People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1041; People v. Wright

36

(1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 411; Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subds. (a)(6)(C), (c)), we

need not decide whether defendant has forfeited this claim because it lacks merit.

A review of each complained-of act by the trial court reveals no evidence the trial

judge was biased against defendant.

Although “the trial court has both the duty and the discretion to control the

conduct of the trial” (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1108), “the Due

Process Clause clearly requires a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal.’ Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35, 46, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1464, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975), before a judge with

no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular

case. See, e.g., Aetna [Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie (1986) 475 U.S. 813,] 821-822;

Tumey [v. Ohio (1927) 273 U.S. 510,] 523.)” (Bracy v. Gramley (1997) 520 U.S.

899, 904–905.) The role of a reviewing court “is not to determine whether the

trial judge’s conduct left something to be desired, or even whether some

comments would have been better left unsaid. Rather, we must determine whether

the judge’s behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as

opposed to a perfect, trial. (United States v. Pisani (2d Cir. 1985) 773 F.2d 397,

402.)” (People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 78.) In deciding whether a trial

court has manifested bias in the presentation of evidence, we have said that such a

violation occurs only where the judge “ ‘officiously and unnecessarily usurp[ed]

the duties of the prosecutor . . . and in so doing create[d] the impression that he

[was] allying himself with the prosecution.’ ” (People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th

41, 143.) This principle was not violated here.

At a midtrial hearing out of the presence of the jury regarding the

admissibility of evidence of Canto’s murder in Chicago, the court stated, “What is

giving me a little bit of pause is defendant is arrested at time one, makes no

reference to this elaborate offer, then Mr. Canto dies, and my cynical self tells me

that what happens is once Mr. Canto dies and defendant is provided with the

37

details of that incident lo and behold—and I’d bet my right arm on it—for the first

time the defendant is now talking about bad guys from Chicago. . . . It is almost

too good to be true for the defendant.” And “[I] would be mighty curious if I

could look into your mind and that of Mr. Harris’s as to when this defense arose,

when the facts arose that jibe so neatly with the statement of two arrestees in

Chicago.” The court did not, as defendant argues, exhibit bias in these statements,

but simply commented on aspects of the evidence out of the presence of the jury.

This falls far short of “betray[ing] a bias against defense counsel.” (People v.

Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 411.)

Officer King, one of the first police officers on the scene at Canto’s house,

testified to having interviewed several of the eyewitnesses, including a man who

had flagged him down at the crime scene. An unidentified woman accompanied

that man. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked the officer if he had seen

any other officers interviewing the eyewitness or the unidentified woman. The

court interrupted on its own motion, and prevented the officer from answering the

question, stating the information sought was irrelevant. Counsel explained she did

not intend to call as witnesses any of the other officers or the eyewitness or the

unidentified woman, and the court sustained its own objection. In curbing vague

questions about unknown persons, the court did not ally itself with the prosecution

but rather exercised reasonable control of the trial to avoid irrelevant or unduly

prolonged testimony. (People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1108.)

The court interrupted the examination of a police officer and challenged the

relevancy of questions regarding a gun found in Canto’s home and the number of

bullets found in the bedroom dresser. Again, defendant fails to show this

evidences judicial bias against defendant; the court challenged questions posed to

this witness by both the prosecution and defense.

38

The court interrupted defendant’s cross-examination of the prosecution’s

evidence technician. Defense counsel attempted to ask her if fingerprints could

have been found on the magazine inside the gun discovered in the driveway of

Canto’s home. Over defense’s argument that the questions were relevant, the

court declared them to be a “waste of time” because the technician had already

testified that no fingerprints had been found on the gun. Later, after the technician

testified she had “collected one solid swatch from the stain” in the driveway,

defense counsel asked if the technician made an effort to collect the “entire

bloodstain.” The court declared the question to be “meaningless” because “I don’t

know how anyone could know if they were successful in obtaining an entire stain

off of the driveway.” In so ruling, the court properly exercised its discretion to

expedite the examination of witnesses by curbing repetitious questioning.

Nor, as defendant contends, did the court exhibit a hostile or rancorous

attitude toward defendant when it asked defense counsel to “move on” when she

attempted again to elicit information regarding the ammunition found in Canto’s

house.

Finally, defendant asserts the court displayed bias against him when the

court itself asked the following questions of defendant, without objection, after the

prosecution’s cross-examination:

“Court: When you were in the house, you say you heard a gun go off?

Who did you figure was being shot?

“Defendant: I thought I was being shot at.

“Court: At some point did it dawn on you that perhaps somebody else had

been shot in the house?

“Defendant: No.

“Court: Never did?

“Defendant: No.

39

“Court: Did you think that Mr. Canto might be in there?

“Defendant: Yes, I figured it was a possibility he was in there.

“Court: You didn’t see him, though?

“Defendant: No.

“Court: Did you think the young lady might be in there?

“Defendant: No, because I haven’t seen her. I didn’t see her earlier when I

was there.

“Court: You didn’t think she was home?

“Defendant: No, I didn’t.

“Court: Did you ever call the house later on to see if anybody got killed?

“Defendant: No, I didn’t.

“Court: Why not?

“Defendant: Just never crossed my mind.

“Court: Didn’t?

“Defendant: No.

“Court: Weren’t you curious?

“Defendant: I was more distraught.

“Court: In the next couple of days did you ever call the house or try to

contact Mr. Canto?

“Defendant: Like I said, I believe it was the next day that I read the

newspaper.

“Court: You said two days later.

“Defendant: I believe it was either that day or the next day.

“Court: It wouldn’t be in the next morning’s paper since it happened so

late.

“Defendant: I couldn’t say for sure. I couldn’t say what day it was.

“Court: You never called to find out what happened?

40

“Defendant: No.

“Court: Never did?

“Defendant: No.

“Court: You were ignorant of it until you read it in the paper?

“Defendant: Yes.”

Evidence Code section 775 “ ‘ “confers upon the trial judge the power,

discretion and affirmative duty . . . [to] participate in the examination of witnesses

whenever he believes that he may fairly aid in eliciting the truth, in preventing

misunderstanding, in clarifying the testimony or covering omissions, in allowing a

witness his right of explanation, and in eliciting facts material to a just

determination of the cause.” ’ ([People v. Carlucci (1979) 23 Cal.3d 249,] 256,

quoting Gitelson, A Trial Judge’s Credo (1966) 7 Santa Clara L.Rev. 13–14.) [¶]

The constraints on the trial judge’s questioning of witnesses in the presence of a

jury are akin to the limitations on the court’s role as commentator. The trial

judge’s interrogation ‘must be . . . temperate, nonargumentative, and scrupulously

fair. The trial court may not . . . withdraw material evidence from the jury’s

consideration, distort the record, expressly or impliedly direct a verdict, or

otherwise usurp the jury’s ultimate factfinding power.’ (People v. Rodriguez

(1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 766.)” (People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 948.)

Defendant argues the court overstepped its bounds with respect to the tone,

form, and number of questions posed. However, he did not object to the trial

court’s questioning, thus making the claim not cognizable on appeal. (People v.

Corrigan (1957) 48 Cal.2d 551, 556.) Were we to reach the merits, we would not

endorse all of the trial court’s questioning quoted above and, indeed, would find

some of it inappropriate. On the facts of this case, however, we find no prejudice.

We must assume that jurors followed their instruction not to “disbelieve any

witness” or to decide the facts based on anything the court said or did, and to

41

disregard any intimations or suggestions the court may have made regarding the

believability of any witness. (CALJIC No. 1732.) Further, the evidence of guilt

was strong and the weaknesses in defendant’s assertions of innocence would have

been apparent to the jury even absent the court’s questions. It is not reasonably

probable the jury would have reached a different guilt verdict had the court

refrained from asking these questions. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,

836.)



4. Instructional Claim

Defendant contends the court erred in instructing the jury pursuant to

CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 2.02 regarding the use of circumstantial evidence. He

argues that by informing the jury, “if one interpretation of the evidence appears to

you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, it would be

your duty to accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable,” the

court permitted the jury to base a finding of guilt on a degree of proof less than

beyond a reasonable doubt. We have repeatedly rejected similar claims, and do so

again here. (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1346.)

C. Penalty Phase Issues



1. Evidentiary Claims

a. Introduction of Victim Impact Evidence

Defendant contends that the court erred in admitting victim impact

evidence. The Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution permits the

introduction of victim impact evidence, or evidence of the specific harm caused by

the defendant, when admitted in order for the jury to assess meaningfully the

defendant’s moral culpability and blameworthiness. (Payne v. Tennessee (1991)
501 U.S. 808, 825.) Such evidence violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s due

process clause when it is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial

fundamentally unfair. (Ibid.) Under California law, victim impact evidence is

42

generally admissible as a circumstance of the crime pursuant to section 190.3,

factor (a). (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 443–444; People v. Stanley

(1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 832.) “ ‘On the other hand, irrelevant information or

inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury’s attention from its proper role or

invites an irrational, purely subjective response should be curtailed.’ ” (People v.

Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 836, quoting People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d

841, 864.)

Defendant renews his objections at trial to the admission of the statements

of Allen’s mother and grandmother regarding viewing Allen’s body at the

mortuary, and the photographs of her gravesite. The evidence was properly

admitted. As a circumstance of the crime, the condition of the victim’s body is a

factor relevant to penalty. (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 990.) The

brief descriptions by Allen’s mother and grandmother of what they saw at the

mortuary were far less graphic and disturbing than routine autopsy photographs

we have previously allowed as proof of the condition of a victim’s body (e.g.,

ibid.), and the court did not err in admitting this evidence. The photograph of

Allen’s gravesite was further evidence relating to her death and the effect upon her

family, and was properly admitted as a circumstance of the murders.

Defendant also challenges the admission of evidence of a specific event at

the funeral. Allen’s mother, Pamela Gunn, and Allen’s grandmother testified that

at the end of the funeral service, the lid to the closed casket mistakenly was

opened as it was being put into the hearse, and that several attendees screamed in

horror and two people fainted, one falling on the top of the partially opened casket.

Defendant did not object to this testimony at trial and thus forfeited the claim for

purposes of appeal. (People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1205.) Had

defendant objected, the trial court probably should have excluded this specific

testimony. The mistake by funeral home personnel in allowing the casket lid to be

43

opened in sight of the mourners, and the screaming and fainting of funeral

attendees that resulted, was too remote from any act by defendant to be relevant to

his moral culpability. But, assuming defense counsel should have objected, we

find no reasonable probability of prejudice. (In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783,

811.) The testimony was very brief, consuming no more than 16 lines of

transcript, and was not significant in light of the emphasis placed in the penalty

phase on the effect of the crime itself on the victim’s family, the brutality of the

murders, and the paucity of significant mitigating circumstances. Indeed, for these

reasons we would find the admission of this evidence harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18.)

b. Exclusion of Evidence

Defendant argues the court erred in excluding evidence that was relevant

pursuant to section 190.3, factors (a) (circumstances of the offense), and (e)

(whether the victim was a participant in or consented to the homicidal act), to

rebut the prosecution’s penalty phase evidence, and in mitigation.

“The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require the jury in a capital case

to hear any relevant mitigating evidence that the defendant offers, including ‘ “any

aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the

offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” ’

([People v.] Frye [(2004)] 18 Cal.4th [494,] 1015.) In turn, the court does have

the authority to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence that does not bear on the

defendant’s character, record, or circumstances of the offense. (Ibid.) ‘[T]he

concept of relevance as it pertains to mitigation evidence is no different from the

definition of relevance as the term is understood generally.’ (Id. at pp. 1015-

1016.) Indeed, ‘excluding defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does

not impair an accused’s due process right to present a defense.’ (People v.

44

Fudge[, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p.] 1103.)” (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494,

528.)

Under this standard, we find no error.

Before trial, and again before the penalty phase, defendant moved to admit

evidence that Canto’s ex-wife had warned Allen that Canto was dangerous and

that living in the same house with him could get her killed; that Allen had actual

knowledge of Canto’s drug dealing; and that Allen in the past had used a false

driver’s license. Defendant proffered the evidence to establish that Allen’s choice

to live with Canto contributed to her own death. The court refused to admit the

proffered evidence. Defendant argues the evidence was admissible to show Allen

was not the innocent victim portrayed by the prosecution but rather a person who

made voluntary choices to live in a dangerous situation and maintain a lifestyle

that contributed to her death. We disagree. Contrary to the implications in the

concurring and dissenting opinion, the proffered evidence did not show that Allen

participated in or was otherwise associated with Canto’s or defendant’s criminal

activities. The fact that Allen had a false driver’s license and may have known

that she was living in a dangerous situation did not constitute evidence that she

participated in or consented to the acts leading up to her murder. The trial court

did not err in excluding the proffered evidence as irrelevant.

The defense proffered the testimony of Pamela Gunn, Allen’s mother, that

she had been told by others that Canto was “trouble.” The defense sought to

establish that the anguish and grief Gunn testified to in the penalty phase was not

attributable to Allen’s death, but rather to Gunn’s own guilt at her failure to

intercede in the dangerous circumstance in which her daughter was living. We

find no error in the exclusion of this testimony. “Testimony from the victims’

family members was relevant to show how the killings affected them, not whether

they were justified in their feelings due to the victims’ good nature and sterling

45

character. Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to disparage the character of

the victims” in rebuttal. (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 445.)

Defendant also argues the court erred in predicating the admission of this

proffered evidence on defendant’s testifying on his own behalf. It did not do so.

The court merely indicated that should the defense introduce evidence, either from

defendant or another source, that Allen participated in the drug activities of Canto

and defendant, the court would revisit the question.

Defendant again proffered the evidence regarding Canto’s drug dealing that

was excluded in the guilt phase, including observations of Canto’s family,

coworkers, and neighbors and their opinions that Canto was dealing drugs,

Walford’s statements regarding the murder of Canto in Chicago during a drug

deal, Canto’s possession of bulletproof vests and large amounts of ammunition,

and his admission to having shot people in Chicago. In addition, defendant

proffered evidence that Canto had been shot in the leg 19 months before August 9,

1994. He argued the evidence would allow the jury to assess the aggravating

nature of the crimes in the appropriate context. The court excluded the proffered

evidence regarding Canto’s murder as more prejudicial than probative pursuant to

Evidence Code section 352, and the remaining proffered evidence as irrelevant to

factors in mitigation.

Defendant now argues if the jury had been aware of this additional

evidence of Canto’s drug dealing and subsequent drug-related murder, they would

have understood Allen’s murder “was the result of Bernard Canto’s drug dealing

and not a cold blooded robbery by [defendant].” He argues the evidence would

have “minimized the aggravating nature of the crime” and served as a basis for a

sentence of less than death. Again, we believe the court acted within its discretion

in excluding this evidence as irrelevant to Allen’s murder. Defendant murdered

Allen, not Canto. But even if the court should have admitted it, we find any error

46

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We see no reasonable possibility the

evidence regarding Canto’s status as a drug dealer would have led to a sentence of

less than death. The jury determined that defendant bound, gagged, and shot Allen

to death in her own home. That the robbery and murder might have been

connected to the fact that Allen was associated with Canto, who earlier that

evening participated in a large-scale drug deal during which defendant sold Canto

fake cocaine, bore no relevance to the assessment of the severity of the crime.

Defendant’s moral culpability remains essentially the same. The jury’s evaluation

of defendant’s responsibility for his actions inside the house on the night of

August 9, 1994, would not have changed with additional evidence that the fiancé

of the woman he murdered was a large-scale drug dealer.



2. Limitations on Defendant’s Arguments

a. Arguments Regarding Individual Juror Responsibility

Defendant argues the court placed unconstitutional limits on his penalty

phase arguments on four occasions, by prohibiting counsel from speaking about

the jurors’ direct and individual responsibility for defendant’s fate. He argues the

court lessened the jurors’ sense of the “awesome responsibility” inherent in the

penalty decision, thereby violating his Eighth Amendment right to reliability in the

determination that death is the appropriate punishment. We disagree.

“The right to present closing argument at the penalty phase of a capital trial,

while broad in scope, ‘is not unbounded . . . ; the trial court retains discretion to

impose reasonable time limits and to ensure that argument does not stray unduly

from the mark.’ ” (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 463.) Juror

determinations may not be the product of “emotional responses that are not rooted

in the aggravating and mitigating evidence introduced during the penalty phase,”

or “extraneous emotional factors.” (California v. Brown (1986) 479 U.S. 538,

542–543.) Nor may jurors be misled “to minimize the importance of [their] role,”

47

or “to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the

defendant’s death rests elsewhere.” (Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320,

328–329, 333.)

As will appear, none of the limitations placed by the trial court could have

had the effect of misleading the jury, permitting them to act upon emotional

responses, or diminishing their sense of individual, personal responsibility for the

verdict. Instead, the court prohibited counsel from improperly inflating the jurors’

sense of their responsibility. We thus find defendant’s Eighth Amendment

argument unconvincing.

In the first instance, the court stopped counsel from arguing that the

decision the jurors would make as to penalty would have an “enormous impact”

not only on defendant, but also on his family, his attorneys, and on each juror

himself or herself. Counsel asserted that she was seeking to urge the importance

of the “individual verdict” of each juror. The court correctly disagreed; counsel’s

argument improperly sought to engage the juror’s sympathies for defendant’s

family and friends. Such sympathies have no bearing on the individualized nature

of the penalty decision. (People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 855 -856

[sympathy for defendant’s loved ones and their reaction to a death verdict do not

relate to either the circumstances of the capital crime or the character and

background of the accused].) Further, the court correctly stopped counsel from

improperly addressing as a factor in mitigation the emotional impact a death

verdict would have upon each juror. The jurors’ reactions to the penalty imposed

would constitute emotional responses “untethered to the facts of the case” (People

v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 444), not proper factors for consideration.

In the second instance, the prosecution objected when defense counsel

began to argue that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole would

protect society. In sustaining the objection the court correctly stated that the jury

48

was not to consider the “underpinnings of death penalty law” or “attempt to

protect society at large.” We have long held that the jury should not concern itself

with protecting society. (People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 807 [questions

of deterrence or cost in carrying out capital sentence are for Legislature, not for

jury considering a particular case]; People v. Love (1961) 56 Cal.2d 720, 731

[misconduct to argue general deterrent effect of capital punishment].)

In the third instance, the court stopped defense counsel from arguing that if

any one of the jurors voted for life imprisonment instead of death, defendant “will

not be executed.” In so doing, the court correctly prohibited counsel from

erroneously telling the jury that a deadlocked verdict would result in a life

sentence. (§ 190.4, subd. (b) [if jury unable to reach unanimous verdict as to

penalty, court shall dismiss jury and impanel new jury to try issue of penalty].)

In the fourth instance, the court sustained the prosecution’s objection when

defense counsel began to argue that in Utah, the death sentence is carried out by

firing squad. In the presence of the jury the court explained, “I understand what

you were getting to, the marksmen, and the bullets, and so forth, the manner in

which they are . . . . That has nothing to do with this case.” Later, out of the

presence of the jury, the court explained that it would not allow counsel to equate

jurors with “executioners standing in a firing squad.” Defendant renews the

arguments presented below, arguing that the court limited his ability to impress

upon the jury the seriousness of their role in sentencing in violation of the Eight

Amendment, citing Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, 472 U.S. 320.

We disagree. Caldwell’s prohibition against misleading the jury as to the

importance of their role “is relevant only to certain types of comment—those that

mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that allows the

jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision.” (Darden v.

Wainwright, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 184, fn. 15.) The limitation on counsel’s

49

argument here did not result in the suggestion that the jurors bore less

responsibility than they actually did. Instead, it prevented the improper suggestion

that the jurors had more responsibility than they actually did and that each one of

their votes was akin to a live round of ammunition shot by a firing squad. Such an

argument would have mischaracterized the jurors’ role in the penalty phase and

engendered an emotional response “not rooted in the aggravating and mitigating

evidence introduced during the penalty phase.” (California v. Brown, supra, 479

U.S. at p. 542.)

Contrary to defendant’s argument, the jurors were aware of the “awesome

responsibility” inherent in the decision before them and of their individual

responsibility for the verdict. The prosecutor began his argument by referring to

the “very important, very serious decision,” defense counsel referred to the

“terrible decision,” the “grievous” and “great and heavy” responsibility which will

“remain with [the jurors],” and numerous times counsel referred to the “individual

decision” which would involve the “moral conscience” of each juror.

In sum, none of the limitations imposed on defendant’s penalty phase

argument affected the reliability of the verdict.

b. Arguments Regarding Defendant’s Lack of Violent

Criminal History

In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor argued that if defendant

received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, he could commit

crimes in prison without fear of greater punishment. Defense counsel objected

that the prosecutor was improperly arguing future dangerousness. The court

sustained the objection and admonished the jury “to disregard the comments about

how the defendant might behave, or what crimes might be committed in the

future.” Later, during her closing argument, defense counsel argued without

objection that the prosecution had not presented any evidence of prior acts of

50

violence by defendant, and that specifically there was no evidence of acts of

violence during defendant’s federal or present incarceration. Counsel also argued,

“What would be one of the most fundamental concerns you are going to have? Is

society protected? And as [the prosecutor] pointed out, and correctly so, our

prisons are a part of society. Is society protected? Clearly, this man, Mr. Harris,

has demonstrated—” At this point, the court interrupted and said, “I did it for the

People, I’m going to do it for the defense, that’s not part of this game. . . . [T]he

jury is not being asked at this point to render a decision on penalty to protect

society the best way. That would invite them to speculate too much. So I’m going

to not let you do it either.” Defense counsel then continued to argue, without

objection or interruption, that the absence of any “evidence whatsoever of any acts

of violence or threat of violence” was “heavily mitigating” under section 190.3,

factor (b) (presence or absence of criminal activity involving force or violence).

Defendant claims the court prevented him from presenting his lack of

violent criminal history as a factor in mitigation and from urging the jury to

consider that because he was not a violent prisoner in the past, he would not be a

risk to other prisoners should he receive a sentence of life without the possibility

of parole. The court did err to the extent it believed neither side could argue

defendant’s future dangerousness. The prosecution may argue future

dangerousness if the argument is based on the evidence. (People v. Champion

(1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 940.) Accordingly, the defense may argue the opposite. But

any error in this case was harmless. Defendant actually gained to the extent he

prevented the prosecution from arguing that he might commit crimes in prison.

Moreover, defendant was able to argue fully the mitigating impact of his absence

of a history of violence while incarcerated. We see no reasonable possibility the

verdict would have been different had the court permitted both sides to argue

future dangerousness.

51



3. Instructional Claims

a. Victim Impact Instructions

At the close of the penalty phase, defendant requested, and the court

refused to give, the following instruction: “Evidence has been introduced for the

purpose of showing the specific harm caused by the defendant’s crime. Such

evidence, if believed, was not received and may not be considered by you to divert

your attention from your proper role of deciding whether defendant should live or

die. You must face this obligation soberly and rationally, and you may not impose

the ultimate sanction as a result of an irrational, purely subjective response to

emotional evidence and argument. On the other hand, evidence and argument on

emotional though relevant subjects may provide legitimate reasons to sway the

jury to show mercy.”

The court did instruct the jury, as requested by the prosecution, that “[if]

supported by the evidence, it is proper to consider the impact of the murder on the

victim’s family (including their pain and suffering) when determining the

appropriate penalty. You are further instructed that such evidence is to be

included within the meaning of factor (a), the circumstances of the offenses, in the

preceding instruction (CALJIC No. 8.85) and is not a separate factor in

aggravation.”

Defendant contends that the court thus instructed the jury on victim-impact

evidence in an uneven and unfair manner, interfering with the jury’s discretion to

give whatever weight it chose to any factor in mitigation or aggravation, and

allowing the jury to make a decision based upon emotion or sympathy for the

victims rather than upon logic and rationality.

We disagree. The instruction given properly informed the jury of the law

regarding victim-impact evidence. (People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 835

[§190.3, factor (a), allows evidence and argument on specific harm caused by

52

defendant, including impact on family of victim].) The court properly rejected the

defense-proffered instruction as confusing; the instruction was unclear as to whose

emotional reaction it directed the jurors to consider with caution—that of the

victim’s family or the jurors’ own. Further, the instructions given as a whole did

not give the jurors the mistaken impression that they could consider emotion over

reason, nor did the instructions improperly suggest what weight the jurors should

give to any mitigating or aggravating factor.

b. Lingering Doubt Instructions

The court also refused to give three instructions requested by defendant

regarding lingering doubt.7 Contrary to defendant’s argument, although it is

proper for the jury to consider lingering doubt (People v. Slaughter (2002) 27

Cal.4th 1187, 1219), there is neither a state nor a federal constitutional

requirement that the jury be specifically instructed that it may do so. (Franklin v.

Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164, 173-174; People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102,

166.) The lingering doubt concept is sufficiently encompassed in other

instructions ordinarily given in capital cases. (People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th

at p. 1068.) The court did not err in refusing to instruct as defendant requested.


7

Defendant requested the following instructions: (1) “The adjudication of

guilt is not infallible and any lingering doubt you entertain on the question of guilt
may be considered by you in determining the appropriate penalty.” (2) “It may be
considered as a factor in mitigation if you have a lingering doubt as to the guilt of
the defendant.” (3) “A juror who voted for conviction at the guilt phase may still
have a lingering or residual doubt whether the defendant was the actual killer.
Such a lingering or residual doubt, although not sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt at the guilt phase, may still be considered as a mitigating factor at the
penalty phase. Each juror may determine whether any lingering or residual doubt
is a mitigating factor and may assign it whatever weight the juror feels
appropriate.”

53

c. CALJIC Nos. 8.84.1 and 8.85

Defendant contends that CALJIC Nos. 8.84.1 and 8.85, in directing the jury

in the penalty phase to determine what the facts are from the evidence received

during the entire trial, unconstitutionally allowed the consideration of nonstatutory

aggravating circumstances in the determination of penalty. We have held

otherwise. (People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1180 [standard sentencing

instructions proper despite failure to limit aggravating evidence to factors

enumerated in § 190.3].)

d. CALJIC No. 8.86

Defendant testified at the guilt phase that he had been convicted of federal

drug possession charges in 1988 and was incarcerated in a federal prison until

August 1993. At the penalty phase the parties stipulated to the prosecution’s

introduction of documentation from the United States Department of Justice

regarding defendant’s 1988 federal conviction and incarceration for drug

possession. This eight-page “prison packet” included detailed information about

the prior conviction.

In closing argument the prosecutor referred to defendant’s prior conviction,

stating defendant “collided with the criminal justice system and he didn’t learn

from his mistakes. He didn’t get any better, he got worse. And if you recall from

his testimony itself, as soon as he was released from federal prison, he went back

to drug dealing. It shows a person who has very little ability to be reformed, to

repent his prior conviction. That is significant when you analyze the man. So that

definitely is a factor in aggravation.”

Defendant argues that in light of the introduction of the federal “prison

packet,” the court prejudicially erred in refusing to instruct sua sponte with

CALJIC No. 8.86, which requires the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that

54

defendant was convicted of a prior crime before the prior crime can be considered

as an aggravating circumstance.

Normally such an instruction is required, even absent a request, when

evidence of prior crimes is introduced or referred to as an aggravating factor

pursuant to section 190.3, factor (c). (People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247,

280; People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53, 60.) Under the circumstances

of this case, however, it was not necessary. Defendant first told the jury of the

conviction, and the prison packet was admitted by stipulation, so there was no

question whether he suffered the conviction. All that CALJIC No. 8.86 would

have done was to imply that the conviction was a factor in aggravation, which

would, if anything, have aided the prosecution, not defendant. Any error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

e. Refusal to Instruct on Remorse

The court refused the defense request to instruct the jury that “[y]ou may

not consider lack of remorse as an aggravating factor. Further, you may not

consider the defendant’s trial testimony in which he denied legal responsibility for

the crimes charged as evidence of lack of remorse.” Defendant argues the

instruction was necessary because there was evidence from which the jury could

infer he lacked remorse.

We disagree. The jury may consider the circumstances of the crime in

aggravation. (§ 190.2, factor (a).) Accordingly, “[t]he jury may consider the

defendant’s refusal to show any remorse in the context of the murder as an

aggravating factor.” (People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 449.) Although the

prosecution is precluded from arguing that lack of remorse can be found in

defendant’s claim of innocence (People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 243–244;

People v. Coleman (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1159, 1169), or that lack of remorse not

related to the crime is an aggravating factor (People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th

55

130, 186; People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 545), the prosecution did not

make these arguments. Thus, the proposed instruction was unnecessary. The

standard instructions, which the court gave, were sufficient.



4. Jury Deliberation Claims

a. Jurors’ Questions

Defendant argues the court prejudicially erred in answering several jurors’

questions during the penalty phase. We find no error.

The first question asked, “Please review instruction regarding severity of

penalty. One juror has expressed belief that life in prison is more punishing than

death.” Over defendant’s objection that the juror was revealing misconduct in the

deliberations and inviting the judge to become the thirteenth juror, the court

replied, “Under the law . . . and regardless of your personal belief as to what is

harder on somebody or what is more severe or what is the tougher penalty, under

the law the death penalty is the more severe penalty. Life in prison is not as severe

as the death penalty. That is the law and that is the law you have to follow. . . .

You can’t inject your own belief as to what you think is tougher or not.”

Defendant argues that by instructing the jury that death is the more severe

penalty, the court interfered with the jury’s deliberative process and thereby

increased the risk of an arbitrary and capricious decision on penalty. We disagree.

That death is considered to be a more severe punishment than life is explicit in

California law: CALJIC No. 8.88, approved in People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d

955, 977–979, states in pertinent part “[t]o return a judgment of death, each of you

must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in

comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life

without parole.” The court did not err in so instructing the jury.

The second question asked, “Please review the law regarding speculation

on whether the convicted felon may later repent if given the sentence of life

56

imprisonment.” The juror later clarified that the concern was whether it would be

appropriate for the jury to consider or speculate whether defendant might repent,

or have a change of character, while serving a life sentence. Without objection,

the court explained: “In terms of whether or not you can speculate on certain

things, the answer is no. The instructions taken as a whole clearly indicate that

you cannot base any decision in this case or resolve any issue in this case by the

process of speculating. You must base your decision upon the evidence and any

reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence in the case, not just

speculating which means just guesswork and so forth.”

Defendant now argues the court failed to address the juror’s question

regarding repentance and thereby sent the message that the jurors were not to

consider defendant’s character or propensity for repentance in their deliberations.

He argues this violated his Eighth Amendment right to have the court give

guidance as to the mitigating factors to be considered, citing McDowell v.

Calderon (9th Cir. 1999) 130 F.3d 833. Because he failed to object to the court’s

response, defendant has forfeited the issue for appeal. In any event, the claim has

no merit. The court’s response did not, as defendant contends, directly or

impliedly tell the jurors they could not consider defendant’s character or

propensity for repentance in their deliberative process. Rather, in light of the fact

that defendant presented no evidence regarding repentance, the court properly

instructed them they should not speculate about facts not before them.

The third question asked, “Please explain more to me mitigating and

aggravating and how it fits in with factor (k) extenuating circumstances. Does that

mean what positive (mitigating) things you can argue about for [sic] what has

happen [sic] to the victim [sic] (to not give him the death penalty.) If you can give

an example.” The juror later clarified he was seeking an explanation of and

examples of “extenuating circumstances” in reference to section 190.3, factor (k)

57

(“Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it

is not a legal excuse for the crime.”). Over defendant’s objection to giving any

examples of extenuating circumstances, the court explained that factor (k) was

“divided into two parts, . . . the circumstances related to the crime . . . and factors

peculiar to the defendant’s character or background. . . . The word ‘extenuate,’ or

‘extenuate the gravity of the crime’ means make less severe, make a crime not so

bad. . . . If someone, for example, was convicted of stealing some food and that

person was hungry at the time that that person stole, that would not be a legal

defense, but it would be something that the jury would consider. [¶] It would

make the crime less severe. You should not steal, but there was some, not defense

or excuse, but some reason perhaps that motivated it and made it less bad as

opposed to somebody stealing food to resell it to buy heroin with. [¶] The other

example that I thought of is if you punch somebody in the nose, you can’t do that.

But if you punch somebody in the nose because two minutes before that person

had hit your little son on the head with a rock, some big grown-up man hit your

five-year old son on the head with a rock, and you punched this fellow’s nose in,

you would probably end up being arrested and a jury would convict you of battery,

but there is something there that extenuates the gravity of your act.”

Defendant now argues, as he did below, that these examples trivialized the

weighing process and confused the jury by creating an unreasonable expectation

of what mitigating evidence could be. He argues the examples set forth an unfair

standard of comparison with the facts of the case. We disagree. The examples

given were reasonable explanations of general extenuating circumstances within

the context of criminal behavior, and were far enough removed from the

circumstances of this crime that no reasonable juror would apply the examples as

standards of evidence in mitigation. The court did not err.

58

b. Alleged Coercion of Deadlocked Jury

The court asked the jury to return separate verdicts of either “death” or “life

imprisonment without parole” on count two (the murder of Allen) and on count

three (the murder of Allen’s fetus). On three occasions, over three days of

deliberations, the jurors informed the court they were deadlocked. The jurors

reported there had been changes in the votes on count two and count three on each

of the ballots taken.8 Following each declaration of deadlock, defendant moved

for a mistrial, arguing in essence that further deliberations would be futile and the

court’s insistence in continuing deliberations constituted coercion. He now argues

the court should have declared a mistrial. We disagree.

Section 1140 provides, “Except as provided by law, the jury cannot be

discharged after the cause is submitted to them until they have agreed upon their

verdict and rendered it in open court, unless by consent of both parties, entered

upon the minutes, or unless, at the expiration of such time as the court may deem

proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is no reasonable probability that the jury

can agree.” The determination whether there is a reasonable probability of

agreement rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. (People v. Proctor,

supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 539.) “Although the court must take care to exercise its

power without coercing the jury into abdicating its independent judgment in favor

of considerations of compromise and expediency [citation], the court may direct

further deliberations upon its reasonable conclusion that such direction would be


8

On the first day, after four hours of deliberation, one ballot was taken,

revealing votes of nine to three on count two, and six to six on count three. Later
that afternoon, the second, third, and fourth ballots revealed votes of eight to four,
then seven to five, on count two, and nine to three on count three. On the second
day of deliberations, the jury reported taking an additional five ballots, revealing
consistent votes of eleven to one on count two, and fluctuating votes of eight to
four, seven to five, and four to eight on count three. The jury reached a verdict on
both counts on the third day.

59

perceived ‘ “as a means of enabling the jurors to enhance their understanding of

the case rather than as mere pressure to reach a verdict on the basis of matters

already discussed and considered.” ’ ” (People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p.

539.)

On the first occasion, the court noted that the jury had only been

deliberating for four hours and had taken only one ballot. The court polled each

juror individually to determine if any readback of testimony or clarification of the

law would be of benefit. The court answered questions submitted by several

jurors, and sent the jury back to continue deliberations.

On the second occasion, later that afternoon, the court indicated that

because three additional ballots had been taken and each revealed there had been

changes in the votes, it was not satisfied that a unanimous verdict could not be

reached. Before sending the jurors home for the weekend, the court reminded

them that each had said during the jury selection process that they “were the type

of folks who could choose between the penalties,” that each individual juror had

assured the court that he or she could vote for the punishment they thought

appropriate, whether it be life without the possibility of parole or death, and that if

at any time during the trial any juror felt unable to make such a decision, he or she

would so inform the court. Each juror was polled and indicated he or she could

make such a decision. The court instructed the jurors: “Do not take any of my

comments now or at any time in this trial as suggesting how any juror should vote

as to penalty on either count. . . . [¶] . . . I am not going to attempt to coerce a

verdict out of a jury at all, but what I will do is explore this until I am convinced

that there is no reasonable possibility of a unanimous verdict. . . . [¶] . . . Please

draw no inferences from anything that I have said or any question that I may have

asked about how I believe or feel this case should be resolved or if it should be.”

60

On the third occasion, the following day, the court again noted changes in

votes in the five ballots taken that day, and stated it was not satisfied a unanimous

verdict could not be reached.

Defendant argues the court’s comments improperly constituted subtle

insistence that a verdict should be reached and implicitly required the jurors to

move toward unanimity. Further, he argues the court abandoned its responsibility

to remind the jurors they should not surrender their individual beliefs in order to

reach a verdict. We find no abuse of discretion. In spite of the jury’s assessment

that they were “hopelessly deadlocked,” the record reasonably supports the court’s

determination that the jurors had not reached an impasse. Each successive ballot

taken revealed changes in the votes. Further, contrary to defendant’s argument,

the court’s comments did not insist that a verdict be reached. The court’s

comments informed the jury that deliberations would continue until the court was

satisfied they were deadlocked, but they were not to infer that the court believed a

verdict “should be” reached. Finally, each juror was sufficiently reminded of his

or her individual responsibilities in the deliberative process when the court polled

each juror to determine if each could make a choice and reach a verdict. (Cf.

People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 774-777 [no error in denying mistrial

motion when jury stated it was “hopelessly deadlocked” after 18 days of

deliberations].)

D. Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty Law

Defendant raises a number of facial constitutional challenges to California’s

death penalty statute, claims we have repeatedly rejected and find no persuasive

reason to reexamine. Accordingly, we continue to hold:

Section 190.2 adequately narrows the class of murder for which the death

penalty may be imposed (People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 125), and is not

overbroad, either because of the sheer number and scope of special circumstances

61

which define a capital murder, or because the statute permits imposition of the

death penalty for an unintentional felony murder (People v. Anderson (2001) 25

Cal.4th 543, 601).

Consideration of the circumstances of the crime under section 190.3, factor

(a), does not result in arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty.

Contrary to defendant’s position, “a statutory scheme would violate constitutional

limits if it did not allow such individualized assessment of the crimes but instead

mandated death in specified circumstances. (See generally Lockett v. Ohio (1978)
438 U.S. 586, 602-606.)” (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 401.) The use

of restrictive adjectives—i.e., “extreme” and “substantial”—in the list of

mitigating factors in section 190.3 does not act unconstitutionally as a barrier to

the consideration of mitigation. (People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 402;

People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 276.)

California death penalty law is not unconstitutional for failing to impose a

burden of proof—whether beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the

evidence—as to the existence of aggravating circumstances, the greater weight of

aggravating circumstances over mitigating circumstances, and the appropriateness

of a death sentence. (People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 401; People v.

Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1136; People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469,

510-511.) The jury is not constitutionally required to achieve unanimity as to

aggravating factors. (People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 402; People v.

Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 275.) Recent United States Supreme Court

decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 and Ring v. Arizona

(2002) 536 U.S. 584 have not altered these conclusions. (People v. Brown, supra,

33 Cal.4th at p. 402; People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 275.)

Because neither capital defendants nor noncapital defendants have their

penalties fixed under the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the death

62

penalty does not in that respect violate principles of equal protection. (People v.

Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 936.) The trial court is not required to identify

which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating, or to instruct that the jury

must restrict its consideration of evidence in this regard. (People v. Brown, supra,

33 Cal.4th at p. 402.) The jury is not required to make written findings. (Ibid.;

People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 178–180.)

The failure to require intercase proportionality review does not render the

law unconstitutional. (People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 402; People v.

Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 276.) The jury need not unanimously consider

unadjudicated criminal activities as factors in aggravation, but such criminal

activities can be considered only if deemed true beyond a reasonable doubt.

Unanimity is required only as to the appropriate penalty. (People v. Anderson,

supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 590.) Prosecutorial discretion whether or not to seek the

death penalty does not render the law vague or arbitrary. (People v. Brown, supra,

33 Cal.4th at p. 403; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 152.)

Finally, California’s death penalty statute does not “fall short of

international norms of humanity and decency.” “International law does not

prohibit a sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal

constitutional and statutory requirements.” (People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th

at p. 511; see also People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 404.)

E. Cumulative Error

Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of errors in the guilt and

penalty phases require reversal. “Defendant has demonstrated few errors, and we

have found each error or possible error to be harmless when considered separately.

Considering them together, we likewise conclude that their cumulative effect does

not warrant reversal of the judgment.” (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515,

567-568.)

63

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment.

CHIN,

J.

WE CONCUR:


GEORGE, C.J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
MORENO, J.





64









CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J.




With respect to the guilt phase of defendant’s capital trial, I join the

majority in upholding the convictions for the attempted murder of Bernard Canto

(Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664),1 the murders of Alicia Allen (Canto’s fiancée) and her

17-week-old fetus (§ 187), and other crimes not pertinent here, as well as the

jury’s findings that defendant committed the murders under the special

circumstances of felony-murder robbery, felony-murder burglary (§ 190.2, subd.

(a)(17)(A), (G)), and multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)). I write separately to

clarify the problem with the trial judge’s questioning of defendant in front of the

jury during defendant’s testimony on his own behalf at the guilt phase. The

majority says that it does “not endorse all of the trial court’s questioning,” and

acknowledges that “some of it [was] inappropriate,” but it provides no guidance as

to which questions were improper or why. (Maj. opn, ante, p. 41.) As I will

explain, certain of the court’s questions may well have conveyed to the jury the

judge’s opinion that defendant’s testimony was not credible. In doing so, the

judge became an advocate for the prosecution, abandoning the neutrality required

of a judge. The error, however, was harmless.

With respect to the penalty phase of trial, I conclude that the trial court

committed prejudicial error when it excluded certain evidence proffered by

defendant. I therefore disagree with the majority’s holding that the court properly


1

Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Penal Code.

1



excluded this evidence, and I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the

judgment of death.

I

During the evening of August 9, 1994, Bernard Canto was found on a

sidewalk near the apartment complex where defendant lived. He had been shot

three times, but he survived. Later that night, neighbors saw two men come to the

house where Canto lived with his fiancée, Alicia Allen. One of the men went

inside. The neighbors later heard shots and saw the two men fleeing; one of them

was limping. When police officers came to the house, they found the body of

Allen, who had been shot twice in the head. The house had been ransacked.

When defendant was arrested, he had a gunshot wound in his leg, and he had a

large quantity of cocaine.

Before defendant’s capital trial, Canto was murdered in Chicago. At the

guilt phase of the trial, the prosecution had Canto’s preliminary hearing testimony

read to the jury. In that testimony, which the jury evidently believed, Canto said

that defendant asked for a ride to his apartment, promising to repay $1,500 that he

owed Canto. When they arrived, however, defendant suddenly shot Canto three

times and left him lying outside the apartment complex. Canto also said that after

Allen’s killing some money was missing from the home he shared with Allen and

that he had told defendant, before Allen’s murder, that he kept a large amount of

money there.

The prosecution also presented the testimony of Regina Mills, with whom

defendant stayed after Allen’s murder. She testified that defendant told her that he

was injured in a shootout that occurred in a robbery, and that he had shot a woman

who he thought was pregnant.

2



Testifying in his own defense, defendant denied shooting either Canto or

Allen. He said that Canto was a drug dealer; that he himself was a “middle man”

who put together buyers and sellers of cocaine and marijuana; and that on the

morning of the shootings Canto had telephoned him that he had buyers who

wanted a kilogram of cocaine. Defendant said that he told Canto he would buy the

cocaine and bring it to Canto, but that he actually delivered a kilogram of fake

cocaine to Canto, who gave defendant $16,000 and said he wanted four more

ounces of cocaine as soon as possible.

Defendant further testified that when he returned to the Canto/Allen house

with the last cocaine order, armed strangers tied his hands. He said he managed to

break free, but then two men grabbed him, one of them shot him in the leg, and he

heard the other man exclaim that the shot hit him too. According to defendant, the

gunman then tried to shoot defendant in the face, but the gun jammed and

defendant ran away. He insisted that he never saw Allen that night and that he did

not know she had been killed until he read about it in the newspaper.

The defense argued that the two men who defendant said had attacked him

at the Canto/Allen home must have killed Allen, and that they were the same two

men whom neighbors saw fleeing from the home shortly after shots were fired.

According to the defense, the limping man who fled from the home was not

defendant (as the prosecution had claimed), but the man who (according to

defendant’s testimony) was hit by the bullet that wounded defendant in the leg.

II

After defendant’s testimony at the guilt phase of trial, the prosecutor cross-

examined him. The trial court then asked defendant a series of questions.

Defendant contends that some of these questions could have conveyed to the jury

that the trial court was on the side of the prosecutor. I agree.

3



“ ‘The law of this state confers upon the trial judge the power, discretion

and affirmative duty . . . [to] participate in the examination of witnesses whenever

he believes that he may fairly aid in eliciting the truth, in preventing

misunderstanding, in clarifying the testimony or covering omissions, in allowing a

witness his right of explanation, and in eliciting facts material to a just

determination of the cause.’ ” (People v. Carlucci (1979) 23 Cal.3d 249, 256,

quoting Gitelson, A Trial Judge’s Credo (1966) 7 Santa Clara L.Rev. 7, 13-14.)

In asking such questions, however, “the trial court must not undertake the

role of either prosecutor or defense counsel.” (People v. Carlucci, supra, 23

Cal.3d at p. 258.) “The examination should relate to material matters and be

conducted impartially, so that the jury will not receive improper inferences as to

the judge’s opinions on the case.” (3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) § 82,

p. 116; see also People v. Camacho (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744.) “The trial

judge’s interrogation ‘must be . . . temperate, nonargumentative, and scrupulously

fair.’ ” (People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 948.) The judge “may not ask

questions to convey to the jury his opinion of the credibility of a witness” (People

v. Rigney (1961) 55 Cal.2d 236, 241) and “must not become an advocate for either

party” (ibid.).

Here, the trial court’s examination of defendant began with these questions:

“Court: When you were in [Canto and Allen’s] house, you say you heard a

gun go off? Who did you figure was being shot?

“Defendant: I thought I was being shot at.

“Court: At some point did it dawn on you that perhaps somebody else had

been shot in the house?

“Defendant: No.

“Court: Never did?

“Defendant: No.” (Italics added.)

4



The trial judge’s question—“Never did?”—did nothing to clarify the

evidence. Defendant had already answered that it had not occurred to him that

anyone in the house had been shot, and the judge’s question merely compelled

defendant to repeat his answer. Viewed in isolation, this initial part of the judge’s

questioning would be a trivial matter. But this was simply the first instance of a

recurring theme throughout the trial judge’s questioning of defendant, in the

course of which defendant had to repeat answers he had already given, answers

that seemed damaging to the defense.

The trial court’s examination continued:

“Court: Did you think that Mr. Canto might be in there?

“Defendant: Yes, I figured it was a possibility he was in there.

“Court: You didn’t see him, though?

“Defendant: No.

“Court: Did you think the young lady [Canto’s girlfriend, Allen] might be

in there?

“Defendant: No, because I haven’t seen her. I didn’t see her earlier when I

was there.

“Court: You didn’t think she was home?

“Defendant: No, I didn’t.

“Court: Did you ever call the house later on to see if anybody got killed?

“Defendant: No, I didn’t.

“Court: Why not?

“Defendant: Just never crossed my mind.

“Court: Didn’t?

“Defendant: No.

“Court: Weren’t you curious?

“Defendant: I was more distraught.” (Italics added.)

5



The trial judge’s first question that I have italicized—“Didn’t?”—once

again compelled defendant to repeat testimony apparently damaging to the

defense. The judge then immediately asked a largely rhetorical question—

“Weren’t you curious?”—that may have conveyed to the jury that the judge did

not believe defendant’s testimony.

The court went on:

“Court: In the next couple of days did you ever call [Canto and Allen’s]

house or try to contact Mr. Canto?

“Defendant: Like I said, I believe it was the next day that I read the

newspaper.

“Court: You said two days later.

“Defendant: I believe it was either that day or the next day.

“Court: It wouldn’t be in the next morning’s paper since it happened so

late.

“Defendant: I couldn’t say for sure. I couldn’t say what day it was.

“Court: You never called to find out what happened?

“Defendant: No.

“Court: Never did?

“Defendant: No.

“Court: You were ignorant of it until you read it in the paper?

“Defendant: Yes.” (Italics added.)

The trial court’s question, “You never called to find out what happened?”

was argumentative. The judge had already asked that question, and defendant had

answered it. Replying to this repetitive question, defendant again said he had not

called Canto at his home to find out what had happened. The court then

rhetorically asked, “Never did?” This was the third time the court had asked

defendant whether he had called, in addition to the questions about why he had not

6



done so. The judge’s concluding question—“You were ignorant of [the shooting

of Allen] until you read it in the paper?”—simply repeated an answer defendant

had earlier given.

The judge’s repetitive questions to defendant did not “ ‘aid in eliciting the

truth, in preventing misunderstanding, in clarifying the testimony or covering

omissions, in allowing a witness his right of explanation, and in eliciting facts

material to a just determination of the cause.’ ” (People v. Carlucci, supra, 23

Cal.3d at p. 256.) Rather, they served only to highlight for the jury implausible

aspects of defendant’s testimony, thus improperly conveying to the jury the

judge’s view that defendant’s testimony was not credible. (See People v. Rigney,

supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 241.)

Nevertheless, reversal is not required. Defendant did not object to the trial

court’s questions. (See People v. Corrigan (1957) 48 Cal.2d 551, 556 [“It is

settled that a judge’s examination of a witness may not be assigned as error on

appeal where no objection was made when the questioning occurred.”].)

Moreover, the evidence of guilt was strong, and defendant’s claim of innocence

was unpersuasive. Although the trial court should not have asked questions

revealing its disbelief of defendant’s story, the weaknesses in that story would

have been apparent to the jury, particularly after the prosecutor pointed them out

in his closing argument. Thus, it is not “reasonably probable” (People v. Watson

(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836) that the jury would have reached a different result at

the guilt phase of defendant’s trial if the trial court had not asked the improper

questions I discussed earlier. Nor were the court’s questions so damaging or

unfair as to violate defendant’s right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the federal Constitution.

7



III

Before trial, the prosecution moved to exclude all evidence tending to show

that Canto, the victim of the attempted murder, was dealing drugs that were kept in

the home he shared with murder victim Allen, his fiancée, and that Allen knew

this. Below, I briefly describe the most significant defense evidence that the

prosecution sought to exclude:

(1) Deborah Chambers, who was Canto’s former wife and the mother of

his three children, had lived with Canto for 10 years. She was expected to testify

for the defense that Canto never held a “regular job,” yet had “a lot of money,”

that he traveled extensively, and that she ended her relationship with him

approximately one year before the murders in this case because “she believed his

drug dealing activities placed her and her children in danger.” Chambers also

would testify that she warned Canto’s fiancée Allen, that Canto was a drug dealer,

and that if Allen remained with Canto she would run the risk of getting killed.

(2) Canto’s neighbors saw extensive foot traffic at Canto’s house at all

hours of the day and night;

(3) After the murders, police found three bulletproof vests at Canto’s

home, one of which had a bullet hole in it.

(4) Two defense witnesses were prepared to testify that Canto always

carried a gun.

(5) After the preliminary hearing but before trial in this case, Canto was

murdered in Chicago by one Melvin Walford. In his confession, Walford said that

he, Canto, and another man had been trafficking in cocaine for several years; that

on the day Canto was killed the three of them were in Canto’s car when Canto

accused Walford of stealing from him; that after angry words were exchanged,

Canto ordered Walford out of the car; and that Walford, angry at being ordered out

of the car, pulled out his gun and shot Canto several times, killing him.

8



All of this proffered testimony—except for the neighbors’ testimony about

the foot traffic at the Canto/Allen home—was excluded both at the guilt phase and

at the penalty phase. Although the majority acknowledges that some of this

defense evidence should have been admitted at the guilt phase to support

defendant’s claim of innocence, it concludes that the evidence was irrelevant at the

penalty phase. I disagree with the latter conclusion.

Based on the evidence proffered by defendant, considered along with

defendant’s guilt phase testimony that he and Canto were drug dealers, the jury

could have concluded: (1) Canto was a dealer who dealt drugs out of his and

Allen’s home; (2) although there was no evidence that Allen herself was dealing

drugs, she knew Canto kept drugs for sale in their home, and they jointly

possessed them (see, e.g., People v. Saldana (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 443, 455

[“the prosecution was able to prove that [the defendant] had . . . possession of the

heroin since it was found in the bedroom over which he exercised joint dominion

and control”]; People v. Crews (1952) 110 Cal.App.2d 218, 220 [evidence of

narcotics and paraphernalia found in “open sight” in their home “was sufficient to

support the finding of joint possession of husband and wife”]; see generally

People v. Newman (1971) 5 Cal.3d 48, 52; People v. Harrington (1970) 2 Cal.3d

991, 998); (3) defendant knew that Canto and Allen kept drugs and the profits

from drug sales in their home; and (4) defendant killed Allen and tried to kill

Canto to obtain the drugs and money.

The excluded defense evidence about Canto’s activities as a drug dealer and

about Allen’s knowledge of the drug dealing and her joint possession of the drugs

was admissible on two grounds. It was admissible under factor (a) of section

190.3, which allows the prosecution and the defense to introduce evidence

pertaining to “[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was

9



convicted in the present proceeding,” and it was admissible to rebut the victim

impact evidence that the prosecution presented.

As used in factor (a) of section 190.3, the phrase “the circumstances of the

crime” is broadly defined. It “does not mean merely the immediate temporal and

spatial circumstances of the crime. Rather it extends to ‘[t]hat which surrounds

materially, morally, or logically’ the crime.” (People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d

787, 833; see also People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 352.) Here, Canto’s

activities as a drug dealer, and Allen’s knowing acquiescence in those activities,

were circumstances that surrounded both morally and logically the murders of

Allen and the fetus she was carrying, in particular because the presence of the

drugs and the cash proceeds from drug sales provided the motive for the robbery

murders.

The evidence was also admissible to rebut the prosecution’s victim impact

evidence. In Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, the United States Supreme

Court held that in capital prosecutions the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of

cruel and unusual punishment does not bar presentation of evidence “about the

victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim’s family,” and that a state

may properly conclude that such evidence “is relevant to the jury’s decision as to

whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.” (501 U.S. at p. 827.) The

court explained that “[v]ictim impact evidence is simply another form or method

of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime

in question, evidence of a general type long considered by sentencing authorities.”

(Id. at p. 825.) The court acknowledged a concern “that the admission of victim

impact evidence permits a jury to find that defendants whose victims were assets

to their community are more deserving of punishment than those whose victims

are perceived to be less worthy” (id. at p. 823), but the court thought this concern

unfounded: “As a general matter, however, victim impact evidence is not offered

10



to encourage comparative judgments of this kind—for instance, that the killer of a

hardworking, devoted parent deserves the death penalty, but that the murderer of a

reprobate does not. It is designed to show instead each victim’s ‘uniqueness as an

individual human being,’ whatever the jury might think the loss to the community

resulting from his death might be.” (Ibid.)

Here, the prosecution’s case in aggravation at the penalty phase relied

heavily on victim impact testimony showing the effect of Allen’s death on her

mother and grandmother. As part of this testimony, the jury learned that in high

school Allen had been a cheerleader who was on the debate team and loved to

dance. Defendant should have been permitted to add to this portrait by presenting

evidence that Allen’s fiancé, Canto, was a drug dealer who kept drugs and drug

money at their apartment, and that Allen was aware of and acquiesced in this drug

dealing and, by reasonable inference, benefited financially from it.

Does the erroneous exclusion of this evidence require reversal of the death

judgment? Under state law, error at the penalty phase of a capital trial requires

reversal of a death judgment if there is a reasonable possibility that the error

affected the penalty verdict. (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1232.)

This standard “is the same, in substance and effect, as the harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.”

(People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1264, fn. 11.) In adopting this strict

standard, the court has recognized the inherent difficulty of making prejudice

determinations for penalty phase errors: “A capital penalty jury . . . is charged

with a responsibility different in kind from . . . guilt phase decisions: its role is not

merely to find facts, but also—and most important—to render an individualized,

normative determination about the penalty appropriate for the particular

defendant—i.e., whether he should live or die.” (People v. Brown (1988) 46

Cal.3d 432, 448.) “As the representative of the ‘community at large, the jury

11



applies “its own moral standards to the aggravating and mitigating evidence” ’ to

determine if death or life [imprisonment without parole] ‘ “is the appropriate

penalty for [that] particular offense and offender.” ’ ” (People v. Mendoza (2000)

24 Cal.4th 130, 192.)

Here, the evidence erroneously excluded by the trial court is unlike the

mitigating evidence customarily offered by the defense at the penalty phase of a

capital case in that it pertained primarily to the behavior of the victims, not the

defendant. Some jurors might well reject such evidence as irrelevant or

unpersuasive, or even be offended by a perceived attempt to attack the character of

the victims. Other jurors, however, may have viewed the evidence that attempted

murder victim Canto was a drug dealer and that murder victim Allen allowed

Canto to sell illegal drugs from the apartment they shared and benefited financially

from the illegal drug sales as significantly weakening the aggravating force of the

prosecution’s victim impact evidence and as making the murders of Allen and her

fetus marginally less heinous. I cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the

jury here would not have viewed the evidence in this way, nor can I say beyond a

reasonable doubt that consideration of this evidence would not have affected the

penalty verdict, causing at least some jurors to select the penalty of imprisonment

for life without possibility of parole. Apart from the circumstances of the crimes

and the victim impact evidence, the only circumstance in aggravation suggested by

the prosecution was defendant’s one prior felony conviction, for drug possession.

Because the case in aggravation was not overwhelming, I conclude that the error

in excluding the evidence was prejudicial and that the judgment should be

reversed as to penalty.

KENNARD, J.

12



See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Harris
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal XXX
Original Proceeding
Review Granted

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.
S058092
Date Filed: August 29, 2005
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:
Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Charles E. Horan

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Glen Niemy, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.





__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C.
Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, John R. Gorey and Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.






1







Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Glen Niemy
P.O. Box 764
Bridgton, ME 04009
(207) 647-2600

Rama R. Maline
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 897-2287


2

Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Mon, 08/29/2005S058092

Parties
1The People (Respondent)
Represented by Attorney General - Los Angeles Office
Mr. Rama Maline, Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street, Suite 500
Los Angeles, CA

2Harris, Maurice Lydell (Appellant)
San Quentin State Prison
Represented by Habeas Corpus Resource Center
Michael Laurence, Executive Director
303 Second Street, Suite 400 South
San Francisco, CA

3Harris, Maurice Lydell (Appellant)
San Quentin State Prison
Represented by Glen Niemy
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 764
Bridgton, ME


Disposition
Aug 29 2005Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Dec 20 1996Judgment of death
 
Dec 26 1996Filed certified copy of Judgment of Death Rendered
  December 20,1996
Mar 15 2000Counsel appointment order filed
  Upon request of applt for appointment of counsel, Glen Niemy is hereby appointed to represent Maurice Lydell Harris for the direct appeal in the above automatic appeal now pending in this court.
Mar 27 2000Received letter from:
  Superior Court; dated 3/23/2000; Re Advising Record Was mailed to Applt Counsel on 3/23/2000.
Jun 22 2000Application for Extension of Time filed
  By Applt to request Corr. of the Record.
Jun 26 2000Extension of Time application Granted
  To 8/25/2000 To Applt To request Corr. of the Record.
Jul 12 2000Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Jul 24 2000Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
Aug 9 2000Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Aug 24 2000Application for Extension of Time filed
  By applt to request corr. of the record. (2nd request)
Aug 25 2000Extension of Time application Granted
  To 10/24/2000 to applt to request corr. of the record.
Sep 22 2000Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
Sep 27 2000Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Oct 24 2000Application for Extension of Time filed
  By applt to request corr. of the record. (3rd request)
Oct 26 2000Extension of Time application Granted
  To 11/27/2000 to applt to request corr. of the record.
Nov 14 2000Change of Address filed for:
  Atty Glen Niemy
Nov 16 2000Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty NIemy
Nov 27 2000Received copy of appellant's record correction motion
  Appellant's request to correct, augment the record, examine sealed transcripts, seal other documents and settle the record (10 pp. excluding attachment)
Nov 27 2000Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
Jan 30 2001Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Mar 14 2001Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Mar 27 2001Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
May 31 2001Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
Jul 23 2001Change of Address filed for: applt. counsel Niemy.
 
Jul 25 2001Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
Oct 1 2001Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
Oct 16 2001Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Oct 17 2001Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Dec 3 2001Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
Dec 11 2001Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  (amended) from atty Niemy.
Dec 18 2001Record on appeal filed
  C-13 (3370 pp.) and R-33 (3501 pp.) including material under seal. CT includes 1428 pp. of juror questionnaires.
Dec 18 2001Appellant's opening brief letter sent, due:
  January 28, 2002.
Jan 29 2002Request for extension of time filed
  To file A0B. (1st request)
Jan 31 2002Extension of time granted
  To 3/29/2002 to file AOB.
Feb 11 2002Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
Mar 26 2002Request for extension of time filed
  To file AOB. (2nd request)
Mar 28 2002Extension of time granted
  to 5-28-2002 to file AOB.
Apr 4 2002Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
May 17 2002Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
May 22 2002Request for extension of time filed
  To file AOB. (3rd request)
May 24 2002Extension of time granted
  To 7/26/2002 to file AOB.
Jun 12 2002Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Jul 15 2002Motion filed
  by applt., to augment record appeal pursuant to Rule of Court 12(a).
Jul 19 2002Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Jul 22 2002Request for extension of time filed
  To file AOB. (4th request)
Jul 24 2002Extension of time granted
  To 9/24/2002 to file AOB.
Sep 11 2002Filed:
  Ruling on the Statement of Melvin Walford.
Sep 11 2002Record augmentation granted
  Appellant's "Motion to Augment Record on Appeal Pursuant to Rule of Court 12(a)," filed on July 15, 2002, is granted The clerk is directed to label the document attached as "Exhibit 'A'" to appellant's motion as "Ruling on the Statement of Melvin Walford (see 15 R.T. 2168-2169), and to file that document so labeled as part of the record on appeal herein.
Sep 17 2002Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
Sep 17 2002Request for extension of time filed
  To file appellant's opening brief. (5th request)
Sep 23 2002Extension of time granted
  To 11/25/2002 to file appellant's opening brief. After that date, no further extension is contemplated. Extension is granted based upon counsel Glen Niemy's representation that he anticipates filing that brief by 11/23/2002.
Nov 13 2002Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Nov 19 2002Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
Nov 21 2002Request for extension of time filed
  To file appellant's opening brief. (6th request)
Nov 26 2002Extension of time granted
  To 1/24/2003 to file appellant's opening brief. After that date, only one further extension totaling about 30 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon counsel Glen Niemy's representation that he anticiaptes filing that brief by 2/23/2003.
Dec 2 2002Motion filed
  Appellant's "Motion to Augment Record on Appeal Pursuant to Rule of Court 12(a)".
Jan 17 2003Request for extension of time filed
  To file appellant's opening brief. (7th request)
Jan 21 2003Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
Jan 22 2003Extension of time granted
  to 2/24/2003 to file appellant's opening brief. The court anticipates that after that date, no further extension will be granted. Counsel is ordered to inform his or her assisting attorney or entity, if any, and any assisting attorney or entity of any separate counsel of record, of this schedule, and to take all steps necessary to meet it.
Feb 11 2003Filed:
  Search Warrant No. 5137, including affidavit.
Feb 11 2003Record augmentation granted
  Appellant's "Motion to Augment Record on Appeal Pursuant to Rule of Court 12(a)," filed on December 2, 2002, is granted. The clerk is directed to file, as part of the record on appeal, "Search Warrant No. 5137," including affidavit, bearing page numbers 296 through 315, labeled "Exhibit A" to appellant's motion.
Feb 13 2003Request for extension of time filed
  to file appellant's opening brief. (8th request)
Feb 18 2003Extension of time granted
  to 4/15/2003 to file appellant's opening brief. Extension is granted based upon counsel Glen Niemy's representation that he anticipates filng that brief by 4/12/5003. After that date, no further extension will be granted.
Feb 25 2003Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Feb 26 2003Change of Address filed for:
  appellate counsel Glen Neimy.
Apr 1 2003Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
Apr 21 2003Application to file over-length brief filed
  to file appellant's opening brief. (364 pp. brief submitted under separate cover)
Apr 22 2003Order filed
  Appellant's application to file over-length opening brief is granted.
Apr 22 2003Appellant's opening brief filed
  (364 pp. - perm)
May 15 2003Request for extension of time filed
  to file respondent's brief. [1st request]
May 21 2003Extension of time granted
  to 7/21/2003 to file respondent's brief.
Jun 5 2003Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
Jun 25 2003Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Jul 16 2003Request for extension of time filed
  respondent's brief. (2nd request)
Jul 21 2003Extension of time granted
  to 9-19-2003 to file respondent's brief.
Sep 16 2003Request for extension of time filed
  respondent's brief (3rd request]
Sep 19 2003Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
Sep 19 2003Extension of time granted
  to 11/18/2003 to file respondent's brief. After that date, only one further extension totaling about 30 additional days is contemplated. Extension is granted based upon Deputy Attorney General Rama R. Maline's representation that she anticipates filing that brief. by 12/21/2003.
Nov 13 2003Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
Nov 14 2003Request for extension of time filed
  to file respondent's brief. (4th request)
Nov 25 2003Extension of time granted
  to 1/20/2004 to file respondent's brief. After that date, no further extension is contemplated. Extension is granted based upon Deputy Attorney General Rama R. Maline's representation that she anticipates filing that brief by 1/17/2004.
Jan 9 2004Request for extension of time filed
  to file respondent's brief. (5th request)
Jan 15 2004Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
Jan 16 2004Extension of time granted
  to 02/02/04 to file respondent's brief. After that date, no further extensions will be granted. Extension is granted based upon Deputy Attorney General Rama R. Maline's representation that she anticipates filing that brief by 02/01/04.
Jan 30 2004Respondent's brief filed
  (90,815 words - 315 pp.)
Feb 17 2004Request for extension of time filed
  to file appellant's reply brief. (1st request)
Feb 18 2004Extension of time granted
  to 4/19/2004 to file appellant's reply brief.
Mar 16 2004Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Mar 24 2004Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Apr 12 2004Request for extension of time filed
  to file appellant's reply brief. (2nd request)
Apr 15 2004Extension of time granted
  to 6/18/2004 to file appellant's reply brief. After that date, only two further extensions totaling about 120 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon counsel Glen Niemy's representation that he anticipates filing that brief by 10/15/2004.
Jun 16 2004Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Jun 18 2004Request for extension of time filed
  to file reply brief. (3rd request)
Jun 23 2004Extension of time granted
  to 8/17/2004 to file appellant's reply brief. After that date, only one further extension totaling about 60 additional days will be granted. Extension is granted based upon counsel Glen Niemy's representation that he anticipates filing that brief by 10/15/2004.
Jun 25 2004Filed:
  Supplemental proof of service of request for extension of time to file appellant's reply brief.
Jun 30 2004Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Aug 12 2004Request for extension of time filed
  to file appellant's reply brief. (4th request)
Aug 12 2004Exhibits requested
  from Los Angeles County Superior Court: Defendant's B, C, D, E, F, I and J, and People's 1, 3-25, 28-33, 38-40, 43, 48-59, 61-64, 70-73, 74A, 75 and 80.
Aug 18 2004Extension of time granted
  to 10/15/2004 to file appellant's reply brief. Extension is granted based upon counsel glen Niemy's representation that he anticipates filing that brief by 10/15/2004. After that date, no further extension will be granted.
Aug 19 2004Exhibit(s) lodged
  People's: 1, 3-25, 28-33, 38-40, 43, 48-59, 61-64, 70-73, 74A, 75 and 80.
Aug 26 2004Exhibit(s) lodged
  Defendant's: B, C, D, E, F, I and J.
Oct 8 2004Request for extension of time filed
  to file appellant's reply brief. (5th request)
Oct 13 2004Extension of time granted
  to 11/17/2004 to file appellant's reply brief. Extension is granted based upon counsel Glen Niemy's representation that he anticipates filing that brief by 11/17/2004. After that date, no further extension will be granted.
Nov 5 2004Exhibits requested
  People's 74.
Nov 9 2004Exhibit(s) lodged
  exhibit 74 - Video Tape in case.
Nov 17 2004Appellant's reply brief filed
  (41,875 words; 191 pp.)
Dec 15 2004Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Feb 4 2005Exhibit(s) lodged
  People's exhibit 88.
Apr 14 2005Oral argument letter sent
  advising counsel that case could be scheduled for oral argument as early as the late May calendar, to be held the week of May 23, 2005, in San Francisco. The advisement of "focus issues," notification that two counsel are required, and any request for oral argument time in excess of 30 minutes must be submitted to the court within 10 days of the order setting the case for argument.
Apr 25 2005Received:
  letter from atty Niemy, dated 4-19-2005, requesting that oral argument be scheduled for no earlier in the week of May 23 than May 25.
May 3 2005Case ordered on calendar
  6/2/05, 1:30pm, LA
May 16 2005Filed letter from:
  appellant, dated 5-13-2005, re oral argument focus issues and advising of 30 minutes for oral argument.
May 17 2005Filed:
  focus letter>>respondent People
May 23 2005Filed:
  appellant's proof of service of focus issues letter on CAP and appellant.
Jun 2 2005Cause argued and submitted
 
Jun 13 2005Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Jun 22 2005Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Aug 29 2005Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
  Majority Opinion by Chin, J. -----joined by George, C.J., Baxter, Werdegar & Moreno, JJ. C&D Opinion by Kennard, J.
Sep 12 2005Rehearing petition filed
  by appellant. (18 pp. - 4152 words)
Sep 15 2005Time extended to consider modification or rehearing
  to 11/23/2005 or the date upon which rehearing is either granted ro denied, whichever occurs first.
Sep 23 2005Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Sep 28 2005Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Oct 19 2005Rehearing denied
  Kennard, J., was absent and did not participate.
Oct 19 2005Remittitur issued (AA)
 
Oct 27 2005Exhibit(s) returned
  People's 1, 3-25, 28-33, 38-40, 43, 48-59, 61-64, 70-73, 74, 74A 75, 80 and 88; Defendant's B, C, D, E, F, I and J.
Oct 31 2005Received:
  acknowledgment of receipt of remittitur.
Nov 3 2005Order filed (150 day statement)
 
Nov 7 2005Received:
  acknowledgment of receipt of exhibits.
Dec 21 2005Related habeas corpus petition filed (post-judgment)
  No. S139789
Jan 5 2006Application to stay AA-related proceeding filed
  appellant's request for stay of Penal Code section 1193 proceedings. (note: hearing set in superior court on 1-9-2006.)
Jan 5 2006Order filed
  The "Request for Stay of Penal Code Section 1193 Proceedings," filed on January 5, 2006, is granted. Execution of the judgment of death entered against condemned inmate Maurice Lydell Harris by the Los Angeles Superior Court (No. YA020916) and affirmed by this court on August 29, 2005 (37 Cal.4th 310), is hereby stayed pending final determination of any timely filed petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. If a petition for writ of certiorari is not submitted within the time prescribed, this stay will terminate when the time for submitting such petition has expired.
Jan 6 2006Order filed
  The order filed on January 5, 2006, granting the "Request for Stay of Penal Code Section 1193 Proceedings" is amended to read, in its entirety: The 'Request for Stay of Penal Code Section 1193 Proceedings,' filed on January 5, 2006, is granted. All proceedings to set the date for the execution of the judgment of death entered against condemned inmate Maurice Lydell Harris by the Los Angeles Superior Court (No. YA020916) and affirmed by this court on August 29, 2005 (37 Cal.4th 310), are hereby stayed pending final determination of any timely filed petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. If a petition for writ of certiorari is not submitted within the time prescribed, this stay will terminate when the time for submitting such petition has expired."
Jan 20 2006Received:
  copy of appellant's cert petition filed in U.S.S.C. (34 pp. - excluding attached appendix)
Jan 27 2006Order appointing Habeas Corpus Resource Center filed
  Upon request of condemned prisoner Maurice Lydell Harris for appointment of counsel, the Habeas Corpus Resource Center is hereby appointed to represent Maurice Lydell Harris for habeas corpus/executive clemency proceedings related to the above automatic appeal now final in this court. Any "petition for writ of habeas corpus will be presumed to be filed without substantial delay if it is filed . . . within 36 months" of this date (Supreme Ct. Policies Regarding Cases Arising From Judgments of Death, policy 3, timeliness std. 1-1.1), and it will be presumed that any successive petition filed within that period is justified or excused (see In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 774-782), in light of this court's delay in appointing habeas corpus/executive clemency counsel on behalf of condemned prisoner Maurice Lydell Harris.
Jan 31 2006Filed:
  applicaton for appointment of counsel (IFP form).
Feb 6 2006Received:
  letter from U.S.S.C. dated 1/31/2006, advising Cert Petn was filed on 1/12/2006, No. 05-8914.
Feb 8 2006Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
Mar 30 2006Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from HCRC.
Apr 3 2006Certiorari denied by U.S. Supreme Court
  Motion of Friends of Maurice Harris for leave to file brief as amici curiae is granted. Petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
Apr 5 2006Motion for access to sealed record filed
  Appellant's application for an order allowing HCRC to inspect and copy transcripts sealed for the benefit of appellant.
Apr 11 2006Filed:
  supplemental proof of service of application for order allowing HCRC to inspect and copy transcripts, filed on 4-5-2006.
May 10 2006Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Niemy
May 26 2006Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from HCRC.
Jul 5 2006Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from atty Niemy.
Jul 12 2006Motion for access to sealed record granted
  Appellant's "Application for an Order Allowing Undersigned Counsel to Inspect and Copy Transcripts Sealed for the Benefit of Appellant," filed on April 5, 2006, is granted. Counsel must supply the personnel and equipment necessary to undertake this examination and copying of the records, which must occur on the premises of the court.
Jul 13 2006Order filed
  The order filed on July 12, 2006 is hereby amended to read in its entirety; "Appellant's 'Application for an Order Allowing Undersigned Counsel to Inspect and Copy Transcripts Sealed for the Benefit of Appellant,' filed on April 5, 2006, is granted. "The clerk is directed to provide the Habeas Corpus Resource Center with a copy of the sealed clerk's transcript, vol. VI, pages 1429 to 1594."
Jul 28 2006Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from HCRC.
Sep 26 2006Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from HCRC.
Nov 30 2006Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from HCRC.
Jan 26 2007Counsel's status report received (confidential)
  from HCRC.
Mar 17 2008Application filed
  Application for an order allowing Habeas Corpus Resource Center counsel to inspect and copy clerk's transcripts sealed for the benefit of appellant.
Apr 16 2008Motion for access to sealed record granted
  Appellant's "Application for an Order Allowing Undersigned Counsel to Inspect and Copy Transcripts Sealed for the Benefit of Appellant," filed on March 17, 2008, in which appellant requests access to and permission to copy the Sealed Second Supplemental Clerk's Transcript, pages 16 through 224, of his record on appeal, is granted. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.328 (c)(6).) Counsel must supply the personnel and equipment necessary to undertake this review and copying of the records, which must occur on the premises of the court. Use of such materials is limited to any petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the lawfulness of confinement pursuant to the underlying judgment of death. To the extent the parties quote or describe such materials in court papers, those papers must themselves be filed or lodged under seal. The materials referred to above are to remain under seal. George, C.J., was absent and did not participate.

Briefs
Apr 22 2003Appellant's opening brief filed
 
Jan 30 2004Respondent's brief filed
 
Nov 17 2004Appellant's reply brief filed
 
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