Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 6/2/08

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S149898
v.
Ct.App. 3 C045935
SILVESTRE GARCIA GONZALEZ et al., )

El Dorado County
Defendants and Appellants.
Super. Ct. No. P00CRF0406

As relevant here, a jury found defendant Luis Lopez Arriaga guilty of the
attempted premeditated murder of William Hunt.1 The jury also found that, in the
commission of that offense, defendant used a firearm in a manner described in
Penal Code section 12022.5, as well as in a manner described in each of the three
firearm enhancements set forth in Penal Code section 12022.53.2
We granted the People’s petition for review in order to resolve a conflict
regarding the question of whether, after a trial court imposes punishment for the

1
We granted the People’s petition for review as to the sentence of defendant
Arriaga, Silvestre Garcia Gonzalez’s codefendant at trial. We separately denied
Arriaga’s petition for review on March 14, 2007. Gonzalez did not petition for
review. We refer to Arriaga as defendant throughout this opinion.

2
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted. We
generally refer to subdivisions of sections 12022.5 and 12022.53 in abbreviated
form, e.g., section 12022.53(d), or simply by subdivision when the statutory
reference is obvious.
1

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section 12022.53 firearm enhancement with the longest term of imprisonment, the
remaining section 12022.53 firearm enhancements and any section 12022.5
firearm enhancements that were found true for the same crime must be stayed or
stricken. For the reasons set forth below, we construe section 12022.53 to require
that, after a trial court imposes punishment for the section 12022.53 firearm
enhancement with the longest term of imprisonment, the remaining section
12022.53 firearm enhancements and any section 12022.5 firearm enhancements
that were found true for the same crime must be imposed and then stayed. For a
different reason, however, we do not have cause to reverse the Court of Appeal’s
judgment insofar as it directed otherwise.3
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Gonzalez hired defendant to guard his marijuana gardens. For that purpose,
Gonzalez gave defendant a shotgun and told him to shoot anyone who came near
the gardens. In October 2000, defendant twice fired a shotgun at William Hunt,
who was hunting with his children near Gonzalez’s marijuana plants. Hunt was
hit in the wrist and in his midsection.
In conjunction with its guilty verdict as to the count that charged the
attempted premeditated murder of Hunt (§§ 187, 664), the jury found true the
firearm enhancements of subdivisions (b), (c), and (d) of section 12022.53 and the
firearm enhancement in section 12022.5, former subdivision (a)(1) (as amended

3
After oral argument in this case, we were informed that defendant Arriaga
died on March 14, 2008. Although defendant’s death will abate his appeal (see
e.g., In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 879; People v. Anzalone (1999) 19
Cal.4th 1074, 1076; People v. Dail (1943) 22 Cal.2d 642, 659), we exercise our
inherent authority to retain this case for an opinion in order to resolve the
recurring conflict in the Courts of Appeal regarding whether prohibited firearm
enhancements should be stayed or stricken under section 12022.53. (In re Sheena
K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 879.)
2

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by Stats. 1999, Ch. 129, §5).4 Defendant received an indeterminate life sentence
with the possibility of parole for the substantive crime. The trial court imposed an
unstayed additional and consecutive term of 25 years to life for the 12022.53(d)
firearm enhancement. It then sentenced defendant on the remaining firearm
enhancements, but stayed execution of those sentences pending “successful
completion” of the sentence previously imposed “[b]y virtue and operation of law
under Penal Code section 654.”5 On appeal, defendant claimed all of the
remaining prohibited firearm enhancements must be stricken. A majority of the
Court of Appeal agreed with defendant and held that the remaining firearm
enhancement findings “must be stricken,” rather than imposed and then stayed.
Their opinion directed the trial court to strike those findings and vacate the related
sentences.6 The majority disagreed, in part, with People v. Bracamonte (2003)
106 Cal.App.4th 704 (Bracamonte), which had, on similar facts, concluded that
the prohibited section 12022.53 firearm enhancements must be imposed and then
stayed, but that the prohibited section 12022.5 firearm enhancement must be

4
Defendant was sentenced under section 12022.5, former subdivision (a)(1).
The same punishment now appears in section 12022.5(a). Section 12022.53 also
was amended after the commission of the crimes at issue here. Because these
changes do not affect our analysis, we refer to the current version of both statutes.

5
Although the trial court correctly stayed all of the prohibited firearm
enhancements, it incorrectly issued those stays under section 654, which applies
only to offenses punishable in different ways, not to prohibited enhancements
committed in the commission of an unstayed offense. As discussed below, we
reach the conclusion that the trial court properly stayed the punishment for the
prohibited section 12022.53 and section 12022.5 firearm enhancements based on
our analysis of the statutory language in section 12022.53.

6
The dissenting justice suggested the trial court “should have left the
[remaining] enhancement findings in place, but not imposed any punishment
based on them.”
3

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stricken. (Bracamonte at pp. 711-712.) In this court, defendant contends the
remaining firearm enhancements must be stricken or reversed, while the People
contend they should be imposed and then stayed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Background
“By definition, a sentence enhancement is ‘an additional term of
imprisonment added to the base term.’ ” (Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30
Cal.4th 894, 898, quoting Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 4.405(c), now rule
4.405(3).) The statutes at issue here, sections 12022.5 and 12022.53, provide
various sentence enhancements for the use of a firearm in the commission or
attempted commission of a crime.
Section 12022.5(a) provides for a sentence enhancement of three, four, or
10 years for personal use of a firearm in the attempted commission of any felony.
Section 12022.53 sets forth the following escalating additional and
consecutive penalties, beyond that imposed for the substantive crime, for use of a
firearm in the commission of specified felonies, including attempted premeditated
murder: a 10-year prison term for personal use of a firearm, even if the weapon is
not operable or loaded (id., subd. (b)); a 20-year term if the defendant “personally
and intentionally discharges a firearm” (id., subd. (c)); and a 25-years-to-life term
if the intentional discharge of the firearm causes “great bodily injury” or “death, to
any person other than an accomplice” (id., subd. (d)). For these enhancements to
apply, the requisite facts must be alleged in the information or indictment, and
defendant must admit those facts or the trier of fact must find them to be true.
(§ 12022.53(j); People v. Najera (1972) 8 Cal.3d 504, 509-510 & fn. 4.)
Section 12022.53(f) provides, in part, that “[o]nly one additional term of
imprisonment under this section shall be imposed per person for each crime. If
4

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more than one enhancement per person is found true under this section, the court
shall impose upon that person the enhancement that provides the longest term of
imprisonment. An enhancement involving a firearm specified in
Section . . . 12022.5 . . . shall not be imposed on a person in addition to an
enhancement imposed pursuant to this section.” (Italics added.)
Section 12022.53(h) provides, “Notwithstanding Section 1385 or any other
provision of law, the court shall not strike an allegation under this section or a
finding bringing a person within the provisions of this section.”
Section 12022.5(c) was amended in 2002 to include language identical to
the language in section 12022.53(h). The legislation enacting that amendment
stated that the amendment was declarative of existing law. (See Stats. 2002, ch.
126, § 13.)
Although most prohibitions are statutory, including those at issue here, the
procedure for dealing with prohibited terms or enhancements often has no express
statutory basis. In those situations, the procedures have been formulated by the
courts and the California Judicial Council. (See, e.g., People v. Lai (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 1227, 1244-1245; People v. Niles (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 756.)
In order to understand our statutory construction of sections 12022.53 and
12022.5, as well as the interplay between the statutes in question and the
procedures the Judicial Council adopted in order to address prohibited
enhancements, it is important to understand that the word “impose” applies to
enhancements that are “imposed and then executed” as well as ones that are
“imposed and then stayed. However, as a practical matter, the word ‘impose’ is
often employed as shorthand to refer to the first situation, while the word ‘stay’
often refers to the latter.” (Bracamonte, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 711, italics
added.)
5

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B. Statutory Analysis
“Under settled canons of statutory construction, in construing a statute we
ascertain the Legislature’s intent in order to effectuate the law’s purpose. (Dyna-
Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-
1387.) We must look to the statute’s words and give them their usual and ordinary
meaning. (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601.) The statute’s
plain meaning controls the court’s interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.”
(Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, 260.) If the words in the
statute do not, by themselves, provide a reliable indicator of legislative intent,
“[s]tatutory ambiguities often may be resolved by examining the context in which
the language appears and adopting the construction which best serves to
harmonize the statute internally and with related statutes. (Woods v. Young (1991)
53 Cal.3d 315, 323.)” (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871.) “ ‘Literal
construction should not prevail if it is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in
the
statute . . . ; and if a statute is amenable to two alternative interpretations, the one
that leads to the more reasonable result will be followed [citation].’ [Citations.]”
(People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 67-68.) If the statute is ambiguous, we
may consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including legislative history, the statute’s
purpose, and public policy. (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 738.)
In reaching its conclusion that the prohibited firearm enhancements must be
stricken rather than imposed and stayed, the Court of Appeal reasoned that
“[s]ection 12022.53, subdivision (f), expressly states that only the greatest
enhancement may be imposed, making no exception to this prohibition for
enhancements thereafter stayed.” In other words, the Court of Appeal interpreted
the word “imposed” in that portion of subdivision (f) as encompassing both
6

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meanings of “impose,” namely, impose and then execute, as well as impose and
then stay.
However, when the words of section 12022.53 are construed in context,
any possible ambiguity regarding the meaning of the term “imposed” in
subdivision (f) is resolved. This is because the construction which best serves to
harmonize the statute internally is the construction that interprets the words
“impose” and “imposed,” as used throughout subdivision (f), as shorthand to mean
impose and then execute, as opposed to impose and then stay.
Subdivision (f) directs that “[o]nly one additional term of imprisonment . . .
shall be imposed per person for each crime.” In light of the subdivision’s further
direction that “the court shall impose upon that person the enhancement that
provides the longest term of imprisonment,” it would be unreasonable for the
Legislature to direct the court to impose the longest enhancement in the sense of
“impose and stay.” This point is likewise made in section 12022.53(j). There, the
Legislature directs that the court “impose punishment” for “an enhancement . . .
admitted or found to be true [under this section] . . . unless another enhancement
provides for a greater penalty or a longer term of imprisonment.” In both
instances, the word “impose” ensures that the statute’s punishment and legislative
intent will be carried out only if it is interpreted as shorthand for “impose and then
execute.”
Subdivisions (g) and (h) of section 12022.53 ensure execution of the
maximum enhancement; combined, they direct the trial court not to grant
probation or suspend “the execution or imposition of sentence”(id., subd. (g)) or
“strike an allegation under this section or a finding bringing a person within the
provisions of [section 12022.53]” (id., subd. (h)).
Section 12022.53(i) directs that the “credits awarded . . . shall not exceed
15 percent of the total term of imprisonment imposed on a defendant upon whom
7

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a sentence is imposed pursuant to this section.” The Legislature’s limitation of
credits on the term served for an enhancement in section 12022.53 also makes
sense only if “impose” is interpreted as impose and then execute.
As explained, several examples of the word “impose” throughout section
12022.53 must be interpreted as shorthand for “impose and then execute” to make
sense. The principle that a word’s meaning may be determined by reference to the
rest of the statute allows us to extend this interpretation to the use of “impose”
throughout section 12022.53(f). (People v. Rogers (1971) 5 Cal.3d 129, 142.) If
subdivision (f) is so interpreted, it directs that only one enhancement may be
imposed and then executed per person for each crime, and allows a trial court to
impose and then stay all other prohibited enhancements.
In any event, a contrary interpretation of subdivision (f) of section
12022.53 would violate the rule of statutory construction mandating that words
and provisions in a statute that relate to the same subject matter “ ‘must be
harmonized to the extent possible. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Shabazz, supra, 38
Cal.4th at p. 67.) Similarly, we reject an interpretation of section 12022.53(f) that
would have the trial court strike, rather than stay, the prohibited firearm
enhancements because the rules of statutory construction mandate that we interpret
the statute in a manner that does not create unnecessary disharmony between
subdivision (f) and subdivision (h) of section 12022.53. In any event, a contrary
interpretation “would disserve the public safety policy that . . . underlies the
legislative intent reflected in the statute” (Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th
1121, 1137), by making it more difficult, if not impossible, to impose and execute
the term of imprisonment for an initially prohibited firearm enhancement in the
event the section 12022.53 enhancement with the longest term of imprisonment is
invalidated on appeal.
8

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In this regard, our interpretation of the language of subdivision (f)
harmonizes section 12022.53 with the rationale underlying both section 654 and
the Judicial Council’s general rule that sets forth the procedure courts should
follow when pronouncing sentence on any prohibited enhancement. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 4.447.) At the time of defendant’s offense in 2000, former rule 447
(now rule 4.447), provided, in pertinent part, that “[n]o finding of an enhancement
shall be stricken or dismissed because imposition of the term is either prohibited
by law or exceeds limitations on . . . the imposition of multiple enhancements.
The sentencing judge shall impose sentence for the aggregate term of
imprisonment computed without reference to those prohibitions and limitations,
and shall thereupon stay execution of so much of the term as is prohibited or
exceeds the applicable limit. The stay shall become permanent upon the
defendant’s service of the portion of the sentence not stayed.” (Former rule 447,
as amended eff. Jan. 1, 1991.)7 The Advisory Committee comment to former rule
447 explained its rationale as follows: “Present practice of staying execution is
followed to avoid violating a statutory prohibition or exceeding the statutory

7 The current rule is virtually the same except for having been renumbered. As of
January 1, 2007, California Rules of Court, rule 4.447 provides that “No finding
of an enhancement may be stricken or dismissed because imposition of the term
either is prohibited by law or exceeds limitations on the imposition of multiple
enhancements. The sentencing judge must impose sentence for the aggregate term
of imprisonment computed without reference to those prohibitions and limitations,
and must thereupon stay execution of so much of the term as is prohibited or
exceeds the applicable limit. The stay will become permanent upon the
defendant’s service of the portion of the sentence not stayed.” The Advisory
Committee comment was amended to add the following introductory statement:
“Statutory restrictions may prohibit or limit the imposition of an enhancement in
certain situations. (See, for example, sections 186.22(b)(1), 667(a)(2), 667.61(f),
1170.1(f) and (g), 12022.53(e)(2) and (f), and Vehicle Code section 23558.)”
(Advisory Com. com., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.447, italics added.)
9

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maximum, while preserving the possibility of imposition of the stayed portion
should a reversal on appeal reduce the unstayed portion of the sentence. See
People v. Niles (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 756. [¶] Only the portion of a
sentence or component thereof that exceeds a maximum is prohibited, and this rule
provides a procedure for that situation.” (Advisory Com. com., rule 447,
Deering’s Ann. Codes, Rules (1999 ed.) foll. p. 220.) The Niles case the Advisory
Committee cited discussed the analogous rationale underlying section 654 and
concluded that staying the punishment for a conviction pursuant to that section is
the only possible “reconciliation of the various policies involved. Any other
method either incurs the risk of letting a defendant escape altogether, or else
imposes an unnecessary burden on an appellate court and on the trial court on the
inevitable remand for correction of sentence.” (Niles, supra, 227 Cal.App.2d at p.
756.)
The legislative history of section 12022.53 confirms our construction of the
legislative scheme. For example, in People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, we
discussed the legislative intent behind section 12022.53: “An uncodified section
of the enacting legislation stated: ‘The Legislature finds and declares that
substantially longer prison sentences must be imposed on felons who use firearms
in the commission of their crimes, in order to protect our citizens and to deter
violent crime.’ (Stats. 1997, ch. 503, § 1.) Several legislative reports explained
that ‘[t]he purpose of [the statute] is to deter crimes in which a firearm is used and
to incapacitate those who use firearms in crimes.’ [Citations.] Another report
explained: ‘According to the author [of the statute], “For far too long, criminals
have been using guns to prey on their victims. [Section 12022.53] will keep these
parasites where they belong . . . in jail! The problem is not guns, the problem is
gun violence . . . criminals misusing guns to terrorize, injure and kill their
victims . . . . With the Three Strikes law, the voters sent a clear message to
10

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criminals. With the 10-20-life provisions of [Section 12022.53], we are sending
another clear message: If you use a gun to commit a crime, you’re going to jail,
and you're staying there.”’ [Citations.] Imposing multiple subdivision (d)
enhancements under the circumstances here clearly serves these legislative goals.”
(People v. Oates, supra, at pp. 1057-1058, italics omitted.)
In this context, it becomes apparent that section 12022.53 was enacted to
ensure that defendants who use a gun remain in prison for the longest time
possible and that the Legislature intended the trial court to stay, rather than strike,
prohibited enhancements under section 12022.53. As noted above, staying rather
than striking the prohibited firearm enhancements serves the legislative goals of
section 12022.53 by making the prohibited enhancements readily available should
the section 12022.53 enhancement with the longest term be found invalid on
appeal and by making “the trial court’s intention clear — it is staying part of the
sentence only because it thinks it must. If, on the other hand, the trial court were
to strike or dismiss the prohibited portion of the sentence, it might be
misunderstood as exercising its discretionary power under Penal Code section
1385.” (People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 355, 365.) When the word
“impose” in section 12022.53(f) is properly understood as shorthand to mean
impose and then execute, section 12022.53 allows for the same resolution of the
prohibited enhancements under sections 12022.53 and 12022.5, namely, that they
must be imposed and then stayed.8
Here, the trial court imposed punishment for the section 12022.53 firearm
enhancement with the longest term of imprisonment allowed under the statute.
Albeit under an incorrect section 654 analysis, the trial court also imposed and

8 We disapprove of People v. Bracamonte, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th 704, to the
extent it held otherwise.
11

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then stayed punishment for the remaining prohibited determinate terms for the
enhancements set forth in section 12022.5, and in subdivisions (b) and (c) of
section 12022.53. The trial court’s act of imposing and staying the punishments
for all of the prohibited firearm enhancements was proper under the statutory
analysis set forth above. The Court of Appeal therefore erred when it ordered the
trial court to strike the prohibited enhancements and to vacate the related
sentences.
We do not rely on rule 4.447 of the California Rules of Court as a basis for
our statutory analysis of section 12022.53. We therefore need not address
defendant’s claim that rule 4.447 violates the separation of powers doctrine. The
fact that defendant’s contentions concern enhancements that “do not constitute
separate crimes or offenses” (In re Tameka C. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 190, 198-199)
undermines his claim that the stayed enhancements constitute impermissible
punishment under the federal double jeopardy clause. (People v. Sloan (2007) 42
Cal.4th 110, 120-121; People v. Izaguirre (2007) 42 Cal.4th 126, 134.) In
addition, because our analysis of section 12022.53 does not create a new judicial
rule, we need not address the constitutional ex post facto issue defendant raised.
(See People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 534 [court should not entertain
constitutional claims unless necessary to resolve a case].)
III. CONCLUSION
We conclude section 12022.53 requires that, after a trial court imposes
punishment for the section 12022.53 firearm enhancement with the longest term of
imprisonment, the remaining section 12022.53 firearm enhancements and any
section 12022.5 firearm enhancements that were found true for the same crime
must be imposed and then stayed.
12

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IV. DISPOSITION
The court received a certified copy of the death certificate of defendant
Luis Lopez Arriaga during the pendency of this appeal. Therefore, all proceedings
in this case regarding defendant Arriaga must be permanently abated. (In re
Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 879, 893.) The case is remanded to the Court
of Appeal, with directions to enter an order in case No. C045935 permanently
abating all proceedings with respect to defendant Arriaga and requiring the
Superior Court of the County of El Dorado to enter an order to that effect in case
No. P00CRF0406.9
CHIN,
J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.

9 The abatement orders in this case with regard to defendant Arriaga in no way
affect the judgment with regard to defendant Silvestre Garcia Gonzalez.
13

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Gonzalez
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 146 Cal.App.4th 327
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S149898
Date Filed: June 2, 2008
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: El Dorado
Judge: Eddie T. Keller

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Hilda Scheib, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Silvestre Garcia
Gonzalez.

Carlo Andreani, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Luis Lopez
Arriaga.


__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette,
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves and Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorneys General,
Stephen G. Herndon, David Andrew Eldridge, Julie A. Hokans and Michael Dolida, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Bonnie M. Dumanis, District Attorney (San Diego) and Charles E. Nickel, Deputy District Attorney, for
California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Carlo Andreani
528 Market Street, Suite 811
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 398-9870

Michael Dolida
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street, Suite 125
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
(916) 445-8538

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Petition for review after the Court of Appeal modified and affirmed judgments of conviction of criminal offenses. This case presents the following issue: When separate firearm enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.5 and subdivisions (b), (c), and/or (d) of section 12022.53 are found true and the longest enhancement is imposed, should the lesser enhancements be stricken, stayed or simply not imposed at all?

Opinion Information

Date:	Citation:	Docket Number:	Category:	Status:	Cross Referenced Cases:
Mon, 06/02/2008	43 Cal. 4th 1118, 184 P.3d 702, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 569	S149898	Review - Criminal Appeal	closed; remittitur issued	PEOPLE v. ARRIAGA (S113887) PEOPLE v. YBARRA (S152984) PEOPLE v. WARNER (S157246) PEOPLE v. SUN (S159495) PEOPLE v. MCFEARSON (S160601)

Disposition
Jun 2 2008	Opinion filed

Dockets
Jan 31 2007	Petition for review filed   Luis Arriaga, defendant and appellant Carlo Andreani, c/a appointed counsel c/a rec req
Feb 7 2007	2nd petition for review filed   the People, plaintiff and respondent Michael Dolida, Dep. A.G.
Feb 7 2007	Received Court of Appeal record   one doghouse
Feb 9 2007	Record requested
Feb 15 2007	Received:   Replacement for petition for review filed by respondent on 2/7/07
Feb 21 2007	2nd record request   for additional two volumes
Feb 22 2007	Received additional record   two doghouses ( volume 2 & 3)
Feb 22 2007	Request for depublication (petition for review pending)   Office of the District Attorney County of San Diego, non party by Charles E. Nickel
Mar 14 2007	Petition for review granted (criminal case)   Appellant's petition for review is DENIED. Votes: George, C. J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno and Corrigan, JJ.
Mar 19 2007	Received:   letter from Carlo Andreani, Esq.
Apr 11 2007	Request for extension of time filed   to file respondent's opening brief on the merits, to May 14, Michael Dolida, Dep. A.G.
Apr 19 2007	Extension of time granted   On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including May 14, 2007.
Apr 27 2007	Counsel appointment order filed   Upon request of appellant Luis Lopez Arriaga for appointment of counsel, Carlo Andreani is hereby appointed to represent appellant on the appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits must be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days form the date respondent's opening brief on the merits is filed.
May 11 2007	Counsel appointment order filed   Upon request of appellant Silvestre Garcia Gonzalez for appointment of counsel, Hilda Scheib is hereby appointed to represent appellant on the appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits must be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date respondent's opening brief on the merits is filed.
May 17 2007	Request for extension of time filed   to May 28, 2007 to file respondents opening brief on the merits by Michael Dolida, Deputy Attorney General
May 22 2007	Extension of time granted   to May 28, 2007 to file respondents opening brief on the merits.
May 25 2007	Opening brief on the merits filed   The People, plaintiff and respondent by Michael Dolida, Deputy Attorney General
Jun 25 2007	Request for extension of time filed   appellant (Luis Lopez Arriaga) requesting 30 day extension until July 25 2007 to file appellants answer brief on the merits. by Carlo Andreani, counsel
Jun 26 2007	Extension of time granted   to July 25, 2007 to file appellant (Luis Lopez Arriaga) answer brief on the merits.
Jul 20 2007	Request for extension of time filed   Appellant (Luis Arriaga) requesting additional 30 day extension until August 24, 2007 to file appellants answer brief on the merits. by Carlo Andreani, counsel
Jul 26 2007	Extension of time granted   to August 24, 2007 to file appellant's (Luis Arriaga) answer brief on the merits.
Aug 24 2007	Filed:   letter from Hilda Scheib - attorney for Silvestre Garcia Gonzalez appellants counsel that she is not filing any reply briefs on this case.
Aug 24 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed   Luis Lopea Arriaga, appellant by Carlo Andreani, counsel
Sep 13 2007	Request for extension of time filed   to October 3, 2007 to file respondents reply brief on the merits. by Michael Dolida, Deputy Attorney General
Sep 25 2007	Extension of time granted   On applicaiton of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including October 3, 2007.
Sep 25 2007	Extension of time granted   On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including October 3, 2007.
Oct 3 2007	Request for extension of time filed   Respodents requesting additional seven (7) days till October 10, 2007 to file reply brief on the merits. by Michael Dolida, Deputy Attorney General
Oct 10 2007	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   The People, Respondent by Michael Dolinda, counsel
Oct 19 2007	Extension of time granted   On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extneded to and including October 10, 2007. No further extensions will be contemplated.
Nov 9 2007	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   Califoronia District Attorneys Associaiton in support of respondent. by Charles E. Nickel, Deputy District Attorney
Nov 26 2007	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   California District Attorneys Association by Charles E. Nickel, Deputy District Attorney
Nov 26 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed   The application of California Distirct Attorneys Association for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondent is hereby granted. An ansewr thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Dec 14 2007	Request for extension of time filed   Appellant - Luis Lopez Arriage requesting twenty day extenstion till January 7, 2008 to file answer to amicus curiae brief. by Carlo Andreani, counsel
Dec 18 2007	Extension of time granted   On application of appellant (Luis Lopez Arriaga) and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer to amicus curiae brief is extended to and including January 7, 2008.
Dec 18 2007	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   The People, Respondent by Michael Dolida, Deputy Attorney General
Jan 4 2008	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   Luis Lopez Arriaga, appellant by Carlo Andreani, counsel
Jan 10 2008	Received:   Amended proof of service by Carlo Andreani, counsel
Feb 6 2008	Case ordered on calendar   to be argued Thursday, March 6, 2008, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
Mar 6 2008	Cause argued and submitted
Apr 8 2008	Motion to abate filed (non-AA)   Motion to abate proceedings Luis Arriaga Valencia certificate of vital record 03/14/08. by Carlo Andreani, counsel
Apr 23 2008	Opposition filed   The People, respondent by Michael Dolida, Deputy Attorney General
May 6 2008	Filed:   Appellant's reply to respondent's opposition to abatement motion. by Carlo Andreani, counsel with permission.
May 30 2008	Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
Jun 2 2008	Opinion filed   The court received a certified copy of the death certificate of defendant Luis Lopez Arriaga during the pendency of this appeal. Therefore, all proceedings in this case regarding defendant Arriaga must be permanently abated. (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 879, 893.) The case is remanded to the Court of Appeal, with directions to enter an order in case No. C045935 permanently abating all proceedings with respect to defendant Arriaga and requiring the Superior Court of the County of El Dorado to enter an order to that effect in this case No. P00CRF0406. Opinion by: Chin, J. -----joined by: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ.
Jun 19 2008	Application filed   for Authorization of Legislative Intent Material's Expense. filed by Carlo Andreani, counsel for appellant Arriaga.
Jul 7 2008	Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Jul 14 2008	Received:   Remitittur from Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District.
Jul 30 2008	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Andreani

Briefs
May 25 2007	Opening brief on the merits filed
Aug 24 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed
Oct 10 2007	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Nov 26 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed
Dec 18 2007	Response to amicus curiae brief filed
Jan 4 2008	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

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