Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 8/28/06



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA



THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

S124090

v.

Ct.App. 3 C043590

CATHY DAWN GARCIA,

Butte

County

Defendant and Appellant.

Super. Ct. No. CM015310





Nearly 25 years ago, we held in People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, that a

welfare recipient who has been exonerated of fraud charges by the Department of

Social Services in an administrative hearing cannot be criminally prosecuted for

welfare fraud, because the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the prosecution from

relitigating issues that were determined in the administrative hearing. The

Attorney General urges us to reconsider our decision in Sims based, in part, on

statutory changes enacted more than 20 years ago. For the reasons that follow, we

conclude that these statutory and other changes do not warrant reconsideration of

this court’s decision in Sims.

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant is the mother of four children. She applied for welfare

assistance, representing that her household unit consisted of herself and all of her

children. A dispute arose over whether defendant’s two oldest children, both

boys, actually were residing in defendant’s household, or instead were living with

their father.

In August 2000, the Butte County Department of Social Welfare (the

County) sent defendant several notices of action advising her that she had received

$5,839 in welfare benefits between October 1998 and June 2000 to which she was

not entitled: $3,669 in cash aid and $2,170 in food stamps. The initial notices

explained that “the overpayment was caused by the County,” or alternately that the

“County Welfare Department made a mistake,” and also noted that “the wrong

household size was used” to calculate the cash aid and food stamps to which

defendant was entitled.

Defendant requested an administrative hearing on the County’s proposal to

recoup the overpayment from her future benefit grants. At this hearing, the

County rescinded the notices of action; the matter was dismissed without prejudice

on January 30, 2001. Later, the County issued new notices, alleging that the

overpayment of cash aid and overissuance of food stamps were caused by

defendant’s failure to report that the two boys were living with their father, which

constituted a material change in her household.

In May 2001, an administrative law judge held a hearing to determine

“[w]hether the boys were members of the assistance unit and household during the

periods in question,” and “[w]hether the overissuance and overpayment were the

result of administrative errors or [defendant’s] failure to report the boys’ absence

from her home.” Evidence admitted at the hearing included a county case

worker’s determination that defendant remained eligible for benefits for her sons

after she reported in September 1998 that they lived with their father “half of the

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time.” Evidence, however, also was presented to the contrary: that defendant’s

sons lived with their father during the week, that he had assumed primary

responsibility for the care of the two boys since before 1997, and that their longest

stay with defendant was for four weeks in the summer of 1999.

In the written decision that followed the administrative hearing, the

administrative law judge noted that there were three potential causes of the alleged

overpayment: (1) “inadvertent household error,” (2) “administrative error,” and

(3) “intentional program violations.” The administrative law judge concluded that

the overpayment in this case was “the result of administrative errors of omission

committed by the county welfare department,” because the county did not conduct

required periodic redetermination reviews and investigations. Therefore the

administrative law judge ordered that “[t]he claim is granted in that all the

overpayments and overissuances are determined to have been caused by

administrative errors. In all other respects, the claim is denied.” Defendant was

ordered to repay the excess benefits.

In March 2001, while the administrative proceedings were pending,

defendant was charged by felony complaint with fraudulently receiving welfare

benefits of over $400 in violation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 10980,

subdivision (c)(2)1 and committing perjury by false application for aid (Pen. Code,

§ 118) when she “affirmatively omitted that [her sons] had moved out of the

defendant’s home.”

After the administrative decision was issued, defendant moved to dismiss

the criminal action, arguing that collateral estoppel barred the district attorney

from proceeding on criminal charges because the administrative law decision had

determined that she had received the excess welfare benefits because of


1

All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.

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administrative errors by the County. The trial court denied her motion and,

following a bench trial, defendant was convicted on both counts.

Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in a

published decision, holding that the trial court erred in failing to follow Sims, in

which this court held that collateral estoppel bars the state from prosecuting for

welfare fraud a person who was exonerated of that charge in administrative

proceedings. (People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.) We granted the

People’s petition for review.

II. DISCUSSION

The People argue that this court should reconsider our decision in People v.

Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d 468 (Sims), in light of intervening changes in the law. In

1982, we addressed in Sims circumstances similar to those in the present case and

held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the People from prosecuting

for welfare fraud a welfare recipient who had been exonerated at an administrative

hearing conducted by the county. (Id. at p. 489.)

In

Sims, the Social Services Department of Sonoma County sought to

recoup from June Sims alleged overpayments of aid and food stamps. Sims

requested an administrative hearing to challenge the decision. Meanwhile, the

district attorney charged Sims with felony welfare fraud under section 11483. The

county refused to participate in the administrative hearing, asserting that the

pending criminal charges divested the county of jurisdiction. After Sims

presented evidence in her behalf, the hearing officer determined that the county

had not met its burden of proof and ordered the county to rescind its notice of

action against Sims and refund any restitution payments she had made. The county

did not seek a rehearing or judicial review. Sims then moved to dismiss the

criminal information, contending that the decision at the administrative hearing

collaterally estopped the criminal prosecution. The trial court granted Sims’s

motion, and the People appealed. (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 473-474.)

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We began our discussion in Sims by noting that the United States Supreme

Court had concluded that “[c]ollateral estoppel may be applied to decisions made

by administrative agencies ‘[when] an administrative agency is acting in a judicial

capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties

have had an adequate opportunity to litigate . . . .’ ” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at

p. 479, quoting United States v. Utah Constr. Co. (1966) 384 U.S. 394, 422, italics

omitted; see also Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006)

37 Cal.4th 921, 944 (Pacific Lumber).) We noted that the standard formulated in

Utah Construction supports the primary public policy goal underlying the doctrine

of collateral estoppel: “ ‘limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one

fair trial on an issue from again drawing it into controversy.’ ” (Sims, supra, at

p. 479, quoting Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 811.)

We concluded in Sims that an administrative hearing conducted by the

California Department of Social Services (DSS) was “a judicial-like adversary

proceeding,” emphasizing that: 1) the hearing was impartial; 2) all testimony was

submitted under oath; 3) both parties could call and cross-examine witnesses and

introduce documentary evidence; 4) the parties could request that witnesses be

subpoenaed; 5) regulations required that a verbatim record of the hearing be made;

and 6) a written decision would issue after the hearing. (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at

pp. 479-480.) Sims also stressed that the administrative decision was adjudicatory

in nature, as it involved applying “ ‘a rule . . . to a specific set of existing facts,’

rather than ‘the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases.’ ” (Id. at p.

480, quoting Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974)

11 Cal.3d 28, 34-35, fn. 2.) Finally, we noted that the availability of a rehearing

before the agency and the right to petition for review in superior court supported

our conclusion that the administrative hearing was judicial in nature. (Sims, supra,

32 Cal. 3d at p. 480.)

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We then considered whether the traditional requirements of collateral

estoppel had been satisfied. There are five threshold requirements: 1) the issue to

be precluded must be identical to that decided in the prior proceeding; 2) the issue

must have been actually litigated at that time; 3) the issue must have been

necessarily decided; 4) the decision in the prior proceeding must be final and on

the merits; and 5) the party against whom preclusion is sought must be in privity

with the party to the former proceeding. (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 484; accord,

Pacific Lumber, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 943; see also Lucido v. Superior Court

(1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341 (Lucido); Rest.2d Judgments, § 27.)

In examining whether the welfare fraud issue was actually litigated at the

administrative hearing, we noted in Sims that respondent’s request for an

administrative hearing had “properly raised” the welfare fraud issue, that the

controversy was submitted for a determination on the merits, and that there was a

finding that made “clear that respondent’s guilt or innocence of welfare fraud was

actually litigated at the . . . fair hearing.” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 484.)

We also held in Sims that the welfare fraud issue actually litigated in the

administrative hearing was “identical to that involved in the criminal

proceedings.” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 485.) After noting that the same

amount of overpayments, the same relevant time periods, and the same allegation

that Sims had failed to report a change in her household size were at issue in the

administrative hearing as in the criminal prosecution, we addressed the fact that

different burdens of proof apply at administrative hearings and in criminal

prosecutions. Because an administrative hearing is civil in nature, and the county

must prove its case by a preponderance of evidence, the burden at the hearing is

not as great as the state’s burden at a criminal proceeding of proving a defendant’s

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we concluded that “if the County fails to prove

its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence at the fair hearing, it follows a

fortiori that it has not satisfied the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.” (Ibid.)

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We then held that the administrative law judge’s decision is “final for

purposes of applying collateral estoppel” when the deadline for the welfare

department to seek rehearing passes, or upon the finality of any appeals of the

administrative hearing decision. (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 485-486.)

Finally, we concluded in Sims that the county and the district attorney were

in privity, as is required for collateral estoppel to apply. Although there is “ ‘no

universally applicable definition of privity,’ ” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 486,

quoting Lynch v. Glass (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 943, 947), we explained that

whether privity exists depends upon whether the “ ‘relationship between the party

to be estopped and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation . . . is “sufficiently

close” so as to justify application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.’ ” (Id. at

pp. 486-487, quoting Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865,

875.)

In discussing whether privity existed, we examined the relationship

between “the district attorney’s office, which represents the party to be estopped,

and the County, the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation . . . .” (Sims, supra,

32 Cal.3d at p. 487.) Both entities, we noted, are county agencies that are

designated by statute to represent the interests of the State of California; just as the

district attorney’s office represents the state in criminal matters (Pen. Code, §

684), the county welfare department acts for the state in administrative

proceedings related to welfare benefits. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 10800.) Entities

that are “ ‘agents of the same government’ ” are generally found to be in privity,

because they are both acting to vindicate the rights of the same governmental

entity. (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 487.)

The

Sims decision additionally recognized the “close association between

the County and the district attorney’s office” in cases involving alleged benefit

overpayments and welfare fraud. (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 487.) We

explained that the district attorney and the county “operate jointly in investigating

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and controlling welfare fraud,” and that a special unit had been created “to

investigate suspected welfare fraud and to function as a liaison between the

County and law enforcement agencies.” (Ibid.) We also noted that the county

must provide documentary evidence to the district attorney upon request, and that

county officials must be available to appear at criminal hearings and trials. The

Sims decision also mentioned that “[i]n addition, an attempt by the County to

obtain restitution of overpayments made to a welfare recipient suspected of fraud

is sufficient to satisfy the mandate of section 11483 that the district attorney seek

restitution before commencing criminal proceedings.” (Id. at p. 488.) In view of

the integrated relationship between the county and the district attorney in

controlling welfare fraud, this court found in Sims that the county and the district

attorney were in privity for purposes of applying collateral estoppel.

Having concluded that the traditional requirements of collateral estoppel

were satisfied, we then examined whether precluding the district attorney from

prosecuting the welfare recipient would further the traditional public policies

served by the collateral estoppel doctrine. We noted in Sims that the application of

collateral estoppel to bar criminal prosecutions of welfare fraud would further

several public policy goals. First, we observed that “[g]iving conclusive effect to

the [administrative] decision exonerating respondent of welfare fraud would

promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation.” (Sims, supra, 32

Cal.3d at p. 488; see also Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 849.) Additionally,

we expressed concern that, unless the later prosecutions were estopped, the

possibility of inconsistent judgments could undermine the integrity of the judicial

system as well as the integrity of the administrative hearing process; if a welfare

recipient is found in an administrative hearing to have lawfully received welfare

benefits, and then is successfully prosecuted in criminal court for welfare fraud,

both decisions become suspect. (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 488.)

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The possibility of having to defend the receipt of welfare benefits in two

forums also works a hardship on the welfare recipient; if collateral estoppel does

not apply, the welfare recipient cannot rely upon success at the administrative

hearing because “he or she may still be required to return the benefits” after a

criminal prosecution. (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.) Finally, we explained

that precluding the district attorney from relitigating the issue of welfare fraud

would protect welfare recipients from being harassed by repeated litigation. After

receiving a judgment at the administrative hearing that the county did not

satisfactorily prove that the welfare recipient wrongly received welfare benefits,

we commented that it would be “manifestly unfair” to subject her to a second

proceeding in criminal court “in which she must defend herself against the very

same charges of misconduct.” (Ibid.)

As additional support for the conclusion that the application of collateral

estoppel would further the public policy considerations served by the doctrine as a

whole, we observed that “[i]n addition to the public policy considerations . . . the

uniqueness of the statutory scheme governing prosecutions for [welfare] fraud and

the circumstances of the individuals receiving welfare benefits make application of

collateral estoppel particularly appropriate . . . .” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at

p. 489.)

Principles of stare decisis present a formidable obstacle to the People’s

request that we reconsider our decision in Sims, which has been the law for nearly

25 years: “It is, of course, a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior

applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if considered

anew, might be decided differently by the current justices. This policy, known as

the doctrine of stare decisis, ‘is based on the assumption that certainty,

predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system;

i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into

relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.’ ” (Moradi-

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Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296, quoting 9

Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 758, p. 726.) Although we

recognize that “reexamination of precedent may become necessary when

subsequent developments indicate an earlier decision was unsound, or has become

ripe for reconsideration,” (Moradi-Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 297) the

arguments posed by the People do not convince us that a reexamination of our

decision in Sims is warranted.

The People first argue that our decisions subsequent to Sims place in doubt

our characterization of the district attorney as essentially a “county agency,” and

therefore have undercut our holding in Sims that the district attorney and the

county are in privity. This argument is based upon a false premise. Our decision

in Sims did not characterize the district attorney as a county agency but, to the

contrary, emphasized that the district attorney acts as an agent of the state in

prosecuting welfare fraud: “The district attorney’s office represents the State of

California in the name of the ‘People’ at criminal prosecutions.” (Sims, supra, 32

Cal.3d at 487.) It was precisely the district attorney’s action as a surrogate for the

state, combined with the county’s work as an “ ‘agent’ of the state” (ibid.), that

weighed in support of our conclusion that the district attorney and the county were

in privity. We have not, as the People contend, “re-examined” the role of the

district attorney’s office; this court relied in Sims upon the district attorney’s role

as a representative of the state, and continues to recognize that criminal

prosecutions are brought on behalf of the People of the State of California,

whether by a county district attorney or by the Attorney General. (See Pitts v.

County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 345 [holding that “the district attorney

represents the state, not the county, . . .when prosecuting crimes”]; People v.

Eubanks (1997) 14 Cal.4th 580, 588-589.)

The People further argue that amendments to section 11483 made over 20

years ago place in doubt our conclusion in Sims that welfare fraud is governed by

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a “unique statutory scheme which established a preference for the noncriminal

resolution of cases” and have “made more evident the Legislature’s intent that the

district attorney prosecute welfare fraud as a criminal violation.” We disagree. As

explained below, our observation in Sims that the statutes governing welfare fraud

evidenced a unique preference for noncriminal resolution was not a lynchpin of

that decision; the statutory scheme merely offered additional, but nonessential,

support for our holding. Further, even if we assume that the now decades-old

changes to section 11483, upon which the People rely, removed the legislative

preference for restitution, such changes do not establish a preference for criminal

prosecution, but rather leave the government free either to seek restitution first or

prosecute first.

Section 11483 prescribes criminal penalties for persons who have

fraudulently obtained welfare benefits in amounts greater than $2,000.2 At the

time of Sims, the statute incorporated by reference to sections 12250 and 12850

the requirement that “restitution shall be sought . . . prior to the bringing of a

criminal action.” The purpose of this requirement was, in the words of the Court

of Appeal, “ ‘that the person accused of fraud should be given an opportunity to

make restitution, and if restitution is made, then the prosecutor should be required

to reconsider the case in light of the fact that restitution has been made to

determine whether prosecution is in fact warranted.’ ” (People v. Preston (1996)

43 Cal.App.4th 450, 454, quoting People v. Jordan (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 529,

535.) In People v. McGee (1977) 19 Cal.3d 948, this court held that the state’s


2

Section 11483 provides in pertinent part: “[W]henever any person has, by

means of false statement or representation or by impersonation or other fraudulent
device, obtained aid for a child not in fact entitled thereto, the person obtaining
such aid shall be subject to prosecution . . . .” In cases involving an amount less
than $2,000, section 11483 requires that “all actions necessary to secure restitution
shall be brought.”

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failure to comply with the statutory restitution requirement was grounds for

dismissal of the criminal prosecution. (Id. at p. 966.)3

In 1984, as part of a reform of the statutes punishing welfare fraud, the

Legislature amended section 11483 by replacing the reference to sections 12250

and 12850 with a reference to section 10980. Section 10980, which prescribes the

penalties for various welfare fraud related offenses, does not require prosecutors to

demand restitution of overpayments of more than $2,000 before criminal

proceedings for welfare fraud may commence. (See People v. Preston, supra, 43

Cal.App.4th at p. 456; 2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000)

Crimes Against Government Authority, § 152, p. 1243.) The Court of Appeal, in

People v. Preston, held that the 1984 amendments “remove[d] any current

statutory underpinning to the argument that the statute requires a prior demand for

restitution.” (Preston, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 460.) In doing so, the Preston

court disagreed with an earlier Court of Appeal opinion, People v. Camillo (1988)

198 Cal.App.3d 981, 994, that assumed that the 1984 amendments had not

abrogated the requirement that the state seek restitution before pursuing criminal

penalties.4 (Preston, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 459.)

The People argue that the Legislature’s enactment of the 1984 changes to

the Welfare and Institutions Code undermined our decision in Sims. Prior to those


3

Prior to Sims, the Legislature repealed sections 12250 and 12850, but

section 11483 still referred to those repealed sections. This court held in McGee
that the reference in section 11483 to those statutes therefore remained effective,
and continued to direct that the state must pursue administrative remedies before
criminal prosecution. (People v. McGee, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 958, fn. 3.)

4

Both the People and defendant presuppose that the Preston court correctly

concluded that the Legislature abrogated the requirement that the state first seek
restitution, and neither party argues that the state is required to seek restitution
prior to commencing criminal proceedings. Accordingly, we assume for purposes
of argument, but do not decide, that the 1984 changes to section 11483 eliminated
the requirement that the state must pursue restitution before criminal prosecution.

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statutory changes, the state could punish “welfare fraud” under at least seven

different statutes that spanned the Welfare and Institutions Code and the Penal

Code. (Preston, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 456.) Consequently, “the same

fraudulent act frequently violated several statutes, and was chargeable under more

than one of these statutes.” (Ibid.) The statutory changes were enacted to resolve

the confusion and unnecessary filing of complaints that had resulted from the prior

statutory framework. (Sen. Com. on Health & Human Services, Analysis of Sen.

Bill No. 2171 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 17, 1984.) “The purpose

of section 10980 was to create administrative efficiencies in investigating and

prosecuting fraud cases by creating a specific welfare fraud statute under which a

single fraudulent act involving more than one welfare program could be

prosecuted. . . . [¶]. . . [¶] The remaining, and current, text of section 11483 does

not contain any criminal proscriptions, but merely requires that restitution be

sought in cases of failure to report not more than $2,000 in income or resources

. . . .” (Preston, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 456.)

As noted above, the People contend that these statutory changes indicate

that the Legislature no longer prefers that cases involving possible welfare fraud

be resolved without resort to criminal prosecution, and that such a shift in

legislative purpose implicitly overrules this court’s decision in Sims. We reject

this contention for two reasons. Even if the restitution-first requirement indicates

a preference for noncriminal resolutions, it does not necessarily follow that the

repeal of the requirement evinces a preference for criminal resolutions. Rather,

the current statutory scheme instead places the criminal and noncriminal options in

equipoise, leaving the County free to obtain restitution before, during, or after

instituting criminal proceedings.5


5

We express no opinion on whether the DSS’s current regulatory scheme

indicates a preference for criminal resolution of welfare fraud cases. The parties

(Footnote continued on next page.)

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Additionally, though the existence of a restitution-first requirement was

considered by this court in Sims, it was only one factor in a multifactor analysis,

and was alluded to only in addition to numerous other public policy reasons

supporting our conclusion that privity existed between the district attorney and the

county. Rather, as we have noted, the court in Sims primarily relied upon the

sharing of information between the county and law enforcement agencies and “the

fact that both entities are county agencies representing the state” in holding that

collateral estoppel principles should apply. (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 488.)

The People do not contend that the 1984 changes to the Welfare and Institutions

Code altered the sharing of information between the County and the district

attorney, nor do they point to any authority that would cause us to reconsider our

characterization of the close relationship between the County and the district

attorney.

The People argue our subsequent decision in Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d 335,

demonstrates that the restitution-first requirement was essential to the outcome in

Sims. But a careful reading of Lucido leads to the opposite conclusion. The

restitution-first requirement was one basis for our decision in Sims, but far from

the only grounds for our decision.

In

Lucido, we held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar the

People from relitigating in a criminal proceeding an issue on which the defendant

had prevailed in a prior probation revocation hearing. (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at

p. 339.) The defendant in Lucido, after being convicted of indecent exposure, was

sentenced to probation. While on probation, he was charged with a new count of



(Footnote continued from previous page.)

have not raised or briefed the court on this issue, nor have they addressed whether
the pertinent regulations were in place at the time Sims was decided by this court.

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indecent exposure. The People sought to have Lucido’s probation revoked based

upon the indecent exposure, as well as upon the independent ground that Lucido

had tested positive for marijuana use. Following a hearing, the court revoked

Lucido’s probation based only upon the marijuana use, and not upon the indecent

exposure charge, stating that the prosecution had not produced clear and

convincing evidence of the indecent exposure. (Id. at pp. 339-341.)

We held that the state was not collaterally estopped from prosecuting

Lucido for indecent exposure, even though the state had failed to prove a violation

of probation based on the same conduct. (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d 335, 351.) In

so holding, we followed the estoppel framework set forth and applied in Sims,

including an analysis of whether the threshold requirements and traditional policy

reasons for applying collateral estoppel were satisfied. (Id. at pp. 341-343.)

Our decision in Lucido discussed Sims on two occasions. First, we

determined that Sims had not nullified an earlier decision, Chamblin v. Municipal

Court (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 115, in which the Court of Appeal held that findings

from a probation revocation hearing did not bar prosecution for Vehicle Code

violations, stating: “In Sims we noted that the ‘particular and special

circumstances’ presented by the ‘unique statutory scheme’ for resolution of

welfare fraud strongly supported a holding that collateral estoppel should apply.”

(Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 345, quoting Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 489-

490.) As noted above, the hearing in Sims was statutorily required to be held prior

to any criminal action on the fraud. (Sims, supra, at p. 475, citing § 11483.) This

requirement suggested that the Legislature intended to afford some protection

from criminal prosecution for welfare recipients, and “supported our conclusion

that collateral estoppel preempted a criminal trial if fraud was not proved at the

hearing.” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 345.)

We noted that Chamblin had reached the same conclusion, but the lower

court in Lucido had declined to follow the decision in Chamblin, concluding that it

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had “been ‘nullified sub silentio’ by Sims.” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 344.)

We explained that Chamblin had not been nullified, because the decisions in

Chamblin and Sims “do not necessarily conflict,” noting that “the ‘unique

statutory scheme’ for resolution of welfare fraud strongly supported a holding that

collateral estoppel should apply.” (Id. at p. 345.) The statutory requirement

present in Sims that the administrative hearing be held prior to any criminal

prosecution “suggested that the Legislature intended to afford some protection

from criminal prosecution for welfare recipients, by virtue of their ‘minimal

standard of living.’ ” (Ibid.) We observed that “[t]his interest was not present in

Chamblin, and is not present here.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)

Having distinguished the decisions in Chamblin and Sims and explained

why our decision in Sims had not weakened the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision

in Chamblin, we held in Lucido that our earlier holding in Sims did not require us

to apply collateral estoppel in the context of probation revocation hearings because

we have applied collateral estoppel to preclude criminal trials “only when

compelling public policy considerations outweighed the need for determinations

of guilt and innocence to be made in the usual criminal trial setting.” (Lucido,

supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 349.) Deciding that Sims did not compel this court to apply

collateral estoppel to the probation revocation setting, we observed that “[i]n Sims

. . . we applied collateral estoppel partly on the ground that the ‘unique statutory

scheme’ at issue was intended to essentially resolve issues of criminal guilt and

innocence in regard to welfare fraud.” (Ibid., italics omitted.)

Missing from either discussion of Sims was any statement or implication

that we would have decided Sims differently had the former statutory scheme for

resolution of welfare fraud been different. We simply relied upon the unique

statutory scheme considered in Sims as a ready means of distinguishing the

decision in Chamblin, and observed that the restitution-first requirement and the

goal it furthered “supported” our holding in Sims. (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p.

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345.) Indeed, the discussion in Lucido noted that the Sims court “applied

collateral estoppel partly on the ground” that the restitution-first requirement

evinced a legislative intent “to essentially resolve issues of criminal guilt” in an

administrative setting. (Id. at p. 349, italics added.) The other multiple bases for

our decision in Sims remain untouched by our decision in Lucido.

The change in the statutory scheme governing welfare fraud to permit,

rather than require, administrative proceedings seeking restitution of welfare

benefits prior to criminal prosecution does not alter our conclusion that our

decision in Lucido is consistent with our decision in Sims. For example, the

circumstances in Lucido did not raise the concern expressed in Sims that forcing

welfare recipients to respond to criminal charges after an administrative law judge

found that no overpayment was made or that no fraud occurred would impose a

hardship on them and leave them exposed to being “harassed by repeated

litigation.” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.) Rather, as we explained in Lucido,

“[t]he essence of vexatiousness, however, is not mere repetition. Rather, it is

harassment through baseless or unjustified litigation. [Citation.] Petitioner does

not assert that the criminal proceedings in this case are intended to harass. The

public has a legitimate expectation that a person once found guilty of a crime may

both be held to the terms of his probation and (if deemed appropriate by the

prosecution) tried anew for any offenses alleged to have been committed during

the probationary period. For this reason, it is neither vexatious nor unfair for a

probationer to be subjected to both a revocation hearing and a criminal trial.”

(Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 351.)

Further, we noted in Lucido that the existence of evidentiary rules

rendering the probationer’s testimony at the revocation hearing inadmissible at a

subsequent criminal trial “significantly protect[s] probationers from prejudice

caused by the juxtaposition of revocation hearings and criminal trials,” and

therefore weighed against the application of collateral estoppel. (Lucido, supra,

17

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51 Cal.3d at p. 351.) This was not so in Sims. As the People conceded at

argument, no similar evidentiary rules prohibit a welfare recipient’s testimony at

an administrative hearing from being introduced at a later criminal trial for welfare

fraud.

Finally, different public policy concerns affected the decisions in Sims and

Lucido.6 In Lucido, we noted that the probation revocation hearing “arises as a

continuing consequence of the probationer’s original conviction” (Lucido, supra,

51 Cal.3d at p. 348), that any sanction imposed at the hearing stems from the fact

that the probationer has been judged guilty of a prior crime, and that the subject of

the revocation hearing is whether the defendant can safely remain at liberty. (Id.

at pp. 347-348.) Sims did not arise from an earlier determination of culpability,

and involved a welfare recipient—not a convicted criminal.


6

The concurring and dissenting opinion relies heavily upon the decision in

Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, in which this court held that
“a private arbitration award, even if judicially confirmed, may not have nonmutual
collateral estoppel effect under California law unless there was an agreement to
that effect in the particular case.” (Id. at p. 824.) In failing to even cite
Vandenberg, the People evidently do not view that decision as providing a tenable
basis for reconsidering Sims. Nor do we.


Among other things, Vandenberg involved an insurance coverage dispute

between two insurance companies that was presided over by a private arbitrator
who was “not strictly bound by evidence, law, or judicial oversight.”
(Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 833.) Unlike a private arbitration, in
which parties effectively “bypass the judicial system” in favor of private dispute
resolution (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 10), the public
administrative hearing at issue here and in Sims is “a judicial-like adversary
proceeding” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 479-480) that is conducted by a state
entity, the DSS, whose administrative law judges must follow California law
and render decisions subject to judicial review. (See § 10962.) And in contrast to
typical private arbitrations, DSS administrative hearings involve the government
as a party and seek to resolve a matter of public concern, i.e., the alleged
overissuance of public funds. We are not persuaded that the decision in
Vandenberg warrants reconsideration of our decision in Sims.

18

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We noted in Lucido that “[p]robation revocation hearings and criminal

trials serve different public interests.” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 347.)

“Probation is a form of leniency which is predicated on the notion that a

defendant, by proving his ability to comply with the requirements of the law and

certain special conditions imposed upon him, may avoid the more severe sanctions

justified by his criminal behavior. Once given the opportunity for lenient

treatment the choice is his as to whether he merits being continued on probation.”

(People v. Zuniga (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 739, 743.) We stated in Lucido: “A

probation revocation hearing assesses whether conditions relating to punishment

for a prior crime have been violated so that probation should be modified or

revoked . . . .” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 347-348.) In essence, the issue at

a probation revocation hearing is whether the defendant’s conduct demonstrates

that the leniency extended by the grant of probation remains justified. By contrast,

we noted in Lucido, “a criminal prosecution seeks conviction for wholly new

offenses.” (Id. at p. 348.)

Sims differs from Lucido in this respect, because the purposes of

administrative proceedings seeking restitution of welfare benefits do not differ

greatly from the purposes of criminal prosecution for welfare fraud in obtaining

those same benefits. As we noted in Sims, “[t]he County had an adequate

opportunity at the fair hearing to prove that respondent had fraudulently obtained

welfare benefits. However, [Sims] successfully demonstrated her innocence.”

(Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.)

Our conclusion that Sims remains vital after the 1984 changes to the

welfare fraud scheme is supported by the legislative history of those changes,

which reveals that the Legislature did not contemplate abrogating Sims, either as a

direct or indirect effect of the 1984 statutory changes that resulted in, among other

things, removing the restitution-first requirement. “[W]hen, as here, the

Legislature undertakes to amend a statute which has been the subject of judicial

19

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construction” “it is presumed that the Legislature was fully cognizant of such

construction . . . .” (Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula

Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 659; see also White v. Ultramar, Inc.

(1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 572; People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 263, fn.

6.) Because the Legislature amended the welfare fraud statutes after this court’s

decision in Sims became final, we assume that the Legislature was aware of this

court’s construction of the welfare fraud statutes in that case. Had the Legislature

wanted to invalidate Sims, it could have provided that no administrative decision

would prevent a prosecution for welfare fraud.

The Legislature has demonstrated the ability, when it so intends, to specify

that administrative proceedings will not bar judicial proceedings. For example,

the Legislature specifically provided that administrative proceedings before the

Department of Motor Vehicles could not have “a preclusive effect on related

criminal proceedings.” (Gikas v. Zolin, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 851.) The

Legislature did not incorporate such a provision denying preclusive effect to

administrative hearings in cases of suspected welfare fraud; indeed, the

Legislature rejected a bill that contained such language, in favor of legislation that

did not directly implicate Sims. 7


7

Senate Bill No. 962 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.), which was introduced at

roughly the same time as Senate Bill No. 2171 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.), proposed
to introduce the following language into the Welfare and Institutions Code:
“Nothing in this chapter, including any administrative decision, shall be construed
so as to prevent the prosecution of an applicant or recipient for a criminal violation
of Section 396 of the Penal Code, or the crime of perjury, as defined in Section
188 of the Penal Code.” (Sen. Bill No. 962 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 3, 1983.)


This provision of Senate Bill No. 962 was intended to “repeal the Sims

decision by providing that no administrative decision would prevent the
prosecution of an applicant or recipient for criminal violation of the welfare fraud
provision.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 962 (1983-1984
Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 21, 1984, p. 12.) The Legislature, however, did not
enact Senate Bill No. 962. Rather, the Legislature modified the welfare fraud

(Footnote continued on next page.)

20

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Finally, the People raise for the first time in their opening brief in this court,

the argument that the enactment of Proposition 115 in 1990 compels this court to

reconsider our decision in Sims. Among other things, Proposition 115 added to

the California Constitution a provision that provides the People of California with

the right to “a speedy and public trial.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 29.) The People

argue that “the creation of an express constitutional right in the People to a public

trial compels rejection of the pre-1990 rule that the county’s failure in an

administrative hearing operates to deprive the People of the right to try the issue of

fraud and perjury in a criminal proceeding.” In support of the argument that

administrative hearings do not satisfy the People’s right to a public trial, the

People note that administrative regulations state that “attendance at the hearing is

ordinarily limited to the claimant, authorized representative . . . county

representative, legal counsel, authorized interpreter, and witnesses relevant to the

issue.” (DSS Manual of Policies & Procedures, May 12, 1995, ch. 22-000, § 22-

049.1.)

The People thus assert that attendance at administrative hearings related to

welfare benefit overpayment ordinarily is limited, but because they raise the issue

for the first time before this court, they provide no showing that attendance at the

hearing in this particular case was so limited as to render the hearing nonpublic, or

that the procedures employed at the hearing in this case render it nonjudicial. Nor

do the People cite any persuasive authority supporting their contention that



(Footnote continued from previous page.)

statutes by enacting into law Senate Bill No. 2171, which did not contain a
provision preventing the application of collateral estoppel principles to an
administrative decision. However, as this court has previously noted, unpassed
bills “have little value” in ascertaining legislative intent. (See, e.g., People
v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 921.)

21

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Proposition 115’s general provision regarding the People’s right to a speedy and

public trial was intended to overrule Sims or to more generally prevent the

application of collateral estoppel principles. Indeed, the Sims regime does not

foreclose the People from seeking a criminal trial prior to the administrative

hearing; the hearing can only estop the issue of welfare fraud if the People do not

pursue the criminal option as speedily as the County pursues the matter

administratively.

The People also contend that, even if Sims remains vital after the statutory

changes described above, collateral estoppel should not act to bar the prosecution

of defendant in this particular case, because the Court of Appeal erred in finding

that the issues actually litigated in the administrative hearing were identical to the

issues in the criminal prosecution.8

As noted above, the first of the traditional requirements of collateral

estoppel is that the issue to be precluded must be identical to that decided in the

prior proceeding. (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 484.) The Court of Appeal in the

present case determined what issues had been litigated in the administrative

hearing by considering what issues had been “ ‘properly raised, by the pleadings

or otherwise,’ ” and whether those issues had been “ ‘submitted for determination,

and . . . determined.’ ” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal relied upon the fact that “[t]he


8

The concurring and dissenting opinion complains that our holding that our

decision in Sims survives statutory changes and intervening judicial decisions is
dictum. We disagree. We granted review in this case to examine the People’s
contention that Sims is no longer good law in light of the 1984 statutory changes
and our 1990 decision in Lucido. The concurring and dissenting opinion contends
that the court should dispose of this case by finding that the threshold
requirements for collateral estoppel have not been met here. (Conc. & dis. opn. of
Chin, J., post, at p. 6.) However, the concurring and dissenting opinion fails to
recognize that we must first decide whether Sims remains effective after the
statutory and other changes before turning to whether the requirements outlined in
Sims apply to the facts of this particular case.

22

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administrative decision identified the issues subject to determination as (1)

whether defendant’s two sons were members of her household when she received

aid on their behalf, and (2) whether she received relief to which she was not

entitled because she ‘fail[ed] to report the boys’ absence from her home.’ ”

At issue in a prosecution for welfare fraud is whether a person has obtained

aid for a child not entitled to assistance “by means of false statement or

representation or by impersonation or other fraudulent device.” (§ 11483, italics

added.) However, the Court of Appeal did not adequately consider whether the

administrative law decision actually determined whether defendant made any such

misrepresentations or omissions and whether those misrepresentations or

omissions caused, at least in part, the overpayments.

The administrative decision concluded that “all the overpayments and

overissuances are determined to have been caused by administrative errors.” But

this does not foreclose the possibility that defendant misrepresented whether her

two sons were members of her household when she received aid on their behalf

and failed to report the boys’ absence from her home. The administrative decision

that the overpayments were caused by administrative errors leaves open the

possibility that defendant made misstatements that were a contributing cause to the

overpayments. It is possible that the administrative decision did not determine

whether defendant made any misrepresentations, or whether such

misrepresentations were a cause, but not the sole cause, of the overpayments.

Only if the administrative law judge did indeed find that defendant had made no

misrepresentations or omissions in her applications for aid would the state be

barred from prosecuting her for welfare fraud; if defendant made no false

representations, an element of that crime has not been satisfied. (People v.

Carlson (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 112, 116.)

We decline to determine whether in the present case the People are

collaterally estopped from prosecuting defendant for welfare fraud and, instead,

23

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remand the case to permit the Court of Appeal to resolve that issue in the first

instance. In so doing, the Court of Appeal should consider the circumstance that

the record on appeal does not include the notices of action issued by the County

on January 16, 2001, in the administrative proceedings. Although we can deduce

from the administrative decision that the notices alleged that defendant, rather than

the County, was at fault for the overpayments, the absence of these notices from

the record makes it difficult to determine what issues were raised “ ‘by the

pleadings or otherwise’ ” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 484) in the administrative

hearing. On remand, the Court of Appeal should consider the effect, if any, of the

absences of these documents from the record on appeal.

It is also unclear whether the People are collaterally estopped from

prosecuting defendant for perjury. The Court of Appeal decision does not discuss

the perjury charge. The elements of perjury are: “ ‘a willful statement, under oath,

of any material matter which the witness knows to be false.’ ” (Cabe v. Superior

Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 732, 735; see also Chein v. Shumsky (2004) 373 F.3d

978, 983.) Again, if the administrative decision actually decided that defendant

had made no misstatements, collateral estoppel would bar prosecution of

defendant for perjury. However, if defendant willfully made misstatements, but

the administrative law judge determined that such misstatements were not the

dominant cause of the overpayments, collateral estoppel would not necessarily

dispose of the perjury charge, as it is possible that defendant’s false representation

could have been material to the administrative proceeding. (See People v. Kobrin

(1995) 11 Cal.4th 416, 426-427.)

Accordingly, we remand this matter to the Court of Appeal for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a determination of whether the

issues litigated at the administrative hearing and the criminal prosecution for

welfare fraud and perjury were identical.

24

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III. DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed;

and the matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion, including reconsideration of whether the issues

litigated at the administrative hearing and the criminal prosecution for welfare

fraud and perjury were identical.

MORENO, J.


WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD,

J.

BAXTER,

J.

WERDEGAR,

J.

25

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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J.




I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeal’s judgment must be

reversed because the record fails to demonstrate that in resolving the

administrative proceedings before the California Department of Social Services,

the administrative law judge (ALJ) necessarily determined that defendant Cathy

Dawn Garcia did not make misrepresentations or omissions that contributed to her

receipt of overpayments. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 22-23.) However, as explained

below, I disagree with the majority’s decision to remand the case to the Court of

Appeal for further consideration of this question. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 24-25.)

Because defendant bears the burden of proving her collateral estoppel claim and

the record she has provided is insufficient to meet that burden, I would hold that

her collateral estoppel claims fails; she simply has not established what the

majority correctly identifies as the “threshold requirements” of collateral estoppel.

(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.)

I also do not join the majority’s discussion of whether applying collateral

estoppel under the circumstances here would be consistent with public policy.

The majority is reversing the Court of Appeal’s judgment because of doubts that

collateral estoppel’s threshold requirements are met in this case. It is therefore

both premature and unnecessary to decide whether, assuming the threshold

requirements have been met, public policy considerations support collateral

estoppel’s application. Moreover, substantively, I disagree with the majority’s

1

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analysis. In light of statutory developments since People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d

468 (Sims), and our post-Sims decisions in Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51

Cal.3d 335 (Lucido), and Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815

(Vandenberg), were it necessary to decide the question, I would hold that public

policy considerations do not support applying collateral estoppel in this case.

I. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE THRESHOLD

REQUIREMENTS OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL.




As we recently explained, collateral estoppel “applies ‘only if several

threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded from

relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this

issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must

have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in

the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against

whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the

former proceeding. [Citations.]’ ” (Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources

Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921, 943.)

“The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing

these [threshold] requirements. [Citation.]” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 341.)

Because “the law does not favor estoppels” (People v. Frank (1865) 28 Cal. 507,

517 (Frank)), this burden is a heavy one. As we have explained, “[c]ertainty is an

essential element of every estoppel . . . .” (City of Oakland v. Oakland Water-

Front Co. (1897) 118 Cal. 160, 221.) Thus, where a party asserts “a certain

question in issue has been litigated and determined between the same parties in a

previous action, it is not enough that the proposed evidence tends to show that the

precise question may have been involved in such litigation.” (Emerson v. Yosemite

Gold Min. & Mill. Co. (1906) 149 Cal. 50, 57.) In other words, “ ‘[e]very estoppel

must be certain to every intent, and not to be taken by argument or inference.’

2

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[Citation.] ‘If upon the face of a record anything is left to conjecture as to what

was necessarily involved and decided, there is no estoppel in it when pleaded, and

nothing conclusive in it when offered in evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Beronio v.

Ventura County Lumber Co. (1900) 129 Cal. 232, 236.)

These rules take on special significance where the decision asserted as an

estoppel may have been based on several alternative grounds. “ ‘[I]f it appear[s]

that several distinct matters may have been litigated’ ” in the prior action, “ ‘upon

one or more of which the judgment may have passed,’ ” unless the record clearly

indicates “ ‘which of them was thus litigated, and upon which the judgment was

rendered,’ ” collateral estoppel does not apply. (Horton v. Goodenough (1920)

184 Cal. 451, 461.) Thus, collateral estoppel does not apply if “it is impossible to

determine from the evidence offered in support of the estoppel” which of several

potentially dispositive issues the prior decision was “founded upon.” (Frank,

supra, 28 Cal. at p. 516.)

Under these principles, defendant’s collateral estoppel claim fails. As the

majority correctly explains, the ALJ’s determination here that the overpayments

“were caused by administrative errors leaves open the possibility that defendant

made misstatements that were a contributing cause to the overpayments.” (Maj.

opn., ante, at p. 23.) Indeed, this is precisely what the trial court concluded in

rejecting defendant’s collateral estoppel claim. Based on the ALJ’s decision, the

trial court concluded that the ALJ’s “causation finding” simply represents a

“qualitative comparison between the things the county did and the things the

defendant did” and “does not carry with it an implicit finding that there was no

error in reporting.” Supporting this conclusion are the ALJ’s findings that “[t]he

county welfare department was not fully apprised of the actual circumstances

surrounding which parent had primary responsibility for the care and control of”

defendant’s children and that “the likelihood of overpayments” would merely have

been “diminished”—not eliminated—had the county welfare department properly

3

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“reviewed the [children’s] living arrangement in September 1998.” In light of

these findings, the trial court correctly concluded the ALJ made no finding that

misstatements by defendant did not contribute to the overpayments.

The majority also correctly explains that the absence in the record of the

notices of action “makes it difficult to determine” precisely what issues were

before and decided by the ALJ. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.) Notably, at oral

argument, defendant’s counsel conceded that “it’s a difficult record to read”

because “all” of the information and documents “weren’t entered into evidence at

the criminal trial.” Indeed, in her brief, defendant explains that the only evidence

she produced below in support of her collateral estoppel claim was a copy of the

ALJ’s decision. Under the governing law as set forth above, because defendant

bears the burden of proving the elements of collateral estoppel, the absence from

the record of the notices is her responsibility and the failure of the incomplete

record to clarify the scope of the ALJ’s decision requires rejection of her collateral

estoppel claim. (Cf. Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 258 [rejecting res

judicata claim where “sparse record presented . . . fail[ed] to show either the

precise nature of the factual issues litigated, or the depth of the court’s inquiry”].)

I disagree with the majority’s view that we should remand the case to the

Court of Appeal to “consider the effect, if any, of the absences of [the notices of

action] from the record . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.) As demonstrated above,

by placing the burden on the party alleging collateral estoppel to prove with

certainty that a particular issue was decided in the prior proceeding, and by

rejecting the doctrine’s application where the record fails to demonstrate which of

several potentially dispositive issues the prior decision was based on, our

decisions clearly specify “the effect” of the record’s incompleteness (ibid.):

defendant’s collateral estoppel claim should be rejected. Because the majority

correctly concludes that, on the record before us, the ALJ’s determination leaves

open the possibility that “defendant made misstatements that were a contributing

4

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cause to the overpayments” (id. at p. 23), under the governing cases, there is

nothing left for the Court of Appeal to consider. Notably, although the majority

directs the Court of Appeal on remand to “consider the effect, if any, of the

absences of [the notices of action] from the record” (id. at p. 24), the majority

gives the Court of Appeal no guidance as to what it is supposed to do with this

information. Rather than remand for further consideration of this issue, we should

simply affirm the trial court’s rejection of defendant’s collateral estoppel claim

and its denial of her dismissal motion.1

II. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DO NOT SUPPORT APPLYING

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN THIS CASE.

As explained above, collateral estoppel does not apply if the party asserting

it fails to establish several “threshold” requirements. (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at

p. 341.) We also refer to these threshold requirements as “prerequisites.” (Sims,

supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 488.)

However, “even where the minimal prerequisites” are established,

“ ‘ “policy considerations may limit [collateral estoppel’s] use where the . . .

underpinnings of the doctrine are outweighed by other factors.” ’ [Citations.]”

(Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 829.) In other words, California’s collateral

estoppel doctrine “has a public policy exception” (People v. Santamaria (1994) 8

Cal.4th 903, 917, fn. 6) that precludes the doctrine’s application, even where the

threshold requirements are met, if the “policy reasons for applying collateral

estoppel” are not “satisfied by the facts of [the] case.” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at

p. 477.)


1

I would, however, remand to the Court of Appeal for consideration of other

issues that defendant raised and the Court of Appeal did not address in light of its
conclusion that collateral estoppel applies.

5

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For several reasons, I do not join the majority’s discussion of the public

policy exception’s application in this case. Initially, the discussion is both

premature and unnecessary. As I have explained, defendant has failed to establish

the threshold requirements of her collateral estoppel claim. In reversing the Court

of Appeal’s judgment, the majority agrees that the threshold requirements of the

doctrine may not be met in this case. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 22-24.) Unless and

until it is determined that defendant has established the threshold requirements, it

is unnecessary to discuss whether the public policy exception to the collateral

estoppel doctrine applies on the facts of this case. The majority improperly inverts

the analysis, by first discussing whether the public policy exception applies, and

then, as if by afterthought, discussing whether the threshold requirements have

even been established. This analytical inversion cannot hide the fact that the

majority’s conclusion regarding the threshold question—that the defendant may

have failed to establish the prerequisites of her collateral estoppel claim—and its

reversal of the Court of Appeal’s judgment on this basis make it unnecessary to

address the applicability of the public policy exception. Thus, the majority’s

discussion is dictum.2 (See People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 358

[discussion of issue that might arise on remand “was essentially dictum” where

court “determined that the judgment would be reversed on other grounds”]; People

v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 914 [where conviction was reversed because of


2

Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, Sims did not first “outline[]”

collateral estoppel’s threshold requirements. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 22, fn. 8.)
Those requirements were already well-established when we decided Sims, as
clearly evidenced by the fact that Sims merely quoted one of our earlier decisions
in setting forth the requirements. (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 484, quoting
People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686, 691.) The majority is simply incorrect in
asserting that we “must” determine whether Sims’s discussion of collateral
estoppel’s policy exception “remains effective” before we determine whether
collateral estoppel’s threshold requirements have even been met. (Maj. opn., ante,
at p. 22, fn. 8.)

6

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erroneous exclusion of evidence, discussion of other issues that might arise on

retrial “was not necessary to . . . case’s resolution”]; Stockton Theatres, Inc. v.

Palermo (1956) 47 Cal.2d 469, 474 [“discussion or determination of a point not

necessary to the disposition of a question that is decisive of the appeal is generally

regarded as obiter dictum”].)

More fundamentally, I disagree with the majority’s analysis of the issue.

At the outset, it is important to note that the majority does not make an

independent analysis of whether the relevant public policy considerations support

application of collateral estoppel on the facts of this case. Nor does the majority

decide whether Sims was correctly decided. Instead, purporting to apply

“[p]rinciples of stare decisis” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 9), the majority simply

considers whether “statutory and other changes” since Sims “warrant

reconsideration of” that decision. (Id. at p. 1.) Rather than focus almost

exclusively on Sims, as does the majority, I also look to our subsequent decisions

in Lucido and Vandenberg. Viewing those decisions in light of relevant statutory

changes, I conclude that public policy considerations do not support application of

collateral estoppel on the facts of this case.

Like the majority, I begin with Sims. There, we held that “collateral

estoppel bar[red] the state from [criminally] prosecuting” a welfare recipient “for

welfare fraud since she was exonerated in [an administrative fair] hearing of that

charge.” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.) In analyzing that question, we first

considered whether “the technical prerequisites for applying collateral estoppel . . .

were satisfied.” (Id. at p. 488.) After concluding that they were, we then

considered whether “public policy considerations” supported the doctrine’s

application (id. at p. 489) on “the facts of [that] case.” (Id. at p. 477.) We stated

that applying the doctrine “would promote judicial economy by minimizing

repetitive litigation” and would prevent “the possibility of inconsistent judgments

which may undermine the integrity of the judicial system” and of “the

7

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[administrative] fair hearing process.” (Id. at p. 488.) We next explained that not

applying the doctrine would work “a hardship” on a welfare recipient “who

presents a successful case at the fair hearing,” by requiring the recipient, “[i]n

planning a budget for limited resources, . . . to take into consideration that he or

she may still be required to return the benefits” that were “found” in the

administrative hearing to have been “legally obtained.” (Id. at pp. 488-489.)

Next, we stated that applying the doctrine “would protect [the defendant] from

being harassed by repeated litigation.” (Id. at p. 489.) It “would be manifestly

unfair,” we declared, “[t]o subject [the defendant] to a second proceeding in which

she must defend herself against the very same charges of misconduct.” (Ibid.)

Finally, we stressed that “the uniqueness of the statutory scheme governing

prosecutions for [welfare] fraud . . . ma[d]e application of collateral estoppel

particularly appropriate in [that] case.” (Ibid.) Specifically, we cited the fact that

the statutes required the state to “seek restitution by request or civil action before

initiating criminal proceedings in cases involving certain categories of [welfare]

fraud.” (Ibid.) By enacting this “restitution-first requirement” (maj. opn., ante, at

p. 13), we explained, “the Legislature establishe[d] a policy in favor of resolving

[welfare] fraud cases outside the criminal justice system.” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d

at p. 489.) Only by “ignor[ing]” this legislatively established policy, we reasoned,

could we hold that collateral estoppel did not apply. (Ibid.) Based on this

analysis, we concluded that collateral estoppel applied “[i]n the particular and

special circumstances of [that] case.” (Ibid.)

Eight years later, in Lucido, we again considered whether “collateral

estoppel principles” may be invoked “to preclude criminal trials. [Citation.]”

(Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 349.) There, based on a judicial finding in a

probation revocation hearing that the state failed to prove an alleged criminal

offense, the defendant argued that the state was collaterally estopped from

criminally prosecuting him for that offense. (Id. at pp. 340-341.) After explaining

8

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that the defendant “arguably ha[d] fulfilled the threshold requirements” of

collateral estoppel (id. at p. 341), we considered whether “the public policies

underlying [the doctrine]—preservation of the integrity of the judicial system,

promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by

vexatious litigation”—warranted its application. (Id. at p. 343.) Regarding the

first, we acknowledged that “[p]ublic confidence in the integrity of the judicial

system is threatened whenever two tribunals render inconsistent

verdicts. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 347.) However, we then explained that

“[c]onsistency . . . is not the sole measure of the integrity of judicial decisions”

(ibid.), and that in this context, preserving the integrity of the judicial system

requires “preserving the criminal trial process as the proper forum for

determinations of criminal guilt or innocence.” (Id. at p. 350, fn. 11.) In light of

this concern, we explained, we have applied collateral estoppel principles to

preclude criminal trials “only when compelling public policy considerations

outweighed the need for determinations of guilt and innocence to be made in the

usual criminal trial setting.” (Id. at p. 349.) Regarding the second policy

consideration—judicial economy—we stated that “the efficiencies of applying

collateral estoppel . . . pale before the importance of preserving the criminal trial

process as the exclusive forum for determining guilt or innocence as to new

crimes.” (Id. at p. 351.) Regarding the third policy consideration—vexatious

litigation—after noting that “[t]he essence of vexatiousness . . . is harassment

through baseless or unjustified litigation,” “not mere repetition,” we stated: “[The

defendant] does not assert that the criminal proceedings in this case are intended to

harass. The public has a legitimate expectation that a person once found guilty of

a crime may both be held to the terms of his probation and (if deemed appropriate

by the prosecution) tried anew for any offenses alleged to have been committed

during the probationary period. For this reason, it is neither vexatious nor unfair

for a probationer to be subjected to both a revocation hearing and a criminal trial.

9

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The People’s failure to prevail at the revocation hearing does not alone transform

the otherwise permissible subsequent trial into harassment.” (Ibid.) We thus held

that the finding at the defendant’s probation revocation hearing did not collaterally

estop the defendant’s prosecution. (Ibid.)

As the majority notes (maj. opn., ante, at p. 16), in Lucido, we expressly

explained why Sims did not require a different result. We cited Sims as a case in

which “compelling public policy considerations outweighed the need for

determinations of guilt and innocence to be made in the usual criminal trial

setting.” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 349.) The determinative policy

consideration we identified was “ the ‘unique statutory scheme’ at issue” in Sims,

which expressed—through the restitution-first requirement—a “legislative

determination” to “deemphasize[] the role of criminal trials in the overall scheme

for resolution of welfare fraud cases.” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 349-350.)

We then explained: “[B]ecause [of this] legislative determination,” the

“concern . . . about the overall integrity of the criminal trial process as the intended

forum for determinations of guilt and innocence was less at issue in Sims. . . . In

the present case, by contrast, the Legislature has not indicated a preference that

questions of guilt or innocence on criminal charges be litigated in revocation

hearings rather than at trial. For this reason, we decline in this context to follow

Sims’s conclusion that preservation of the integrity of either the judicial system as

a whole or the hearing process itself warrants application of collateral estoppel.

Similarly, we decline to attribute as much weight in this case as we did in Sims to

a need to prevent inconsistent judicial determinations.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)

In

Vandenberg, this court held that a private arbitration award, even when

judicially confirmed, “may not have nonmutual collateral estoppel effect under

California law unless there was an agreement to that effect in the particular case.”

(Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 824.) Regarding the relevant public policy

considerations, the court reasoned that applying collateral estoppel in this context

10

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was not necessary either to preserve the integrity of the judicial system or to

promote judicial economy. (Id. at p. 833.) As to the former, the court explained

that “because a private arbitrator’s award is outside the judicial system, denying

the award collateral estoppel effect has no adverse impact on judicial integrity.”

(Ibid.) As to the latter, the court reasoned that “because private arbitration does

not involve the use of a judge and a courtroom, later relitigation does not

undermine judicial economy by requiring duplication of judicial resources to

decide the same issue.” (Ibid.)

Applying

Sims, Lucido, and Vandenberg in light of the current statutory

and administrative scheme, I conclude that public policy considerations do not

support applying collateral estoppel on the facts of this case. Under Vandenberg,

“because [an ALJ’s decision at a fair hearing] is outside the judicial system,

denying the award collateral estoppel effect has no adverse impact on judicial

integrity.” (Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 833.) Moreover, according to

Lucido, the paramount policy concern in terms of the judicial system’s integrity is

“preserving the criminal trial process as the proper forum for determinations of

criminal guilt or innocence.” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 350, fn. 11.) Lucido

establishes that this concern controls unless “outweighed” by “compelling public

policy considerations.” (Id. at p. 349.)

I find no such compelling policy considerations here. Concerns about

judicial economy do not suffice. Under Vandenberg, “because [an administrative

fair hearing] does not involve the use of a judge and a courtroom, later relitigation

does not undermine judicial economy by requiring duplication of judicial

resources to decide the same issue.” (Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 833.) In

any event, under Lucido, any concerns about judicial economy “pale before the

importance of preserving the criminal trial process as the exclusive forum for

determining guilt or innocence as to new crimes.” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p.

351.) Nor do concerns about vexatious litigation suffice; as in Lucido, defendant

11

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here “does not assert that the criminal proceedings in this case [were] intended to

harass.” (Ibid.) Moreover, to quote Lucido in this context, “[t]he public has a

legitimate expectation” that a welfare recipient “may both be held to the terms” of

the welfare program in an administrative fair hearing held at the recipient’s request

“and (if deemed appropriate by the prosecution) tried . . . for any [criminal]

offenses alleged to have been committed” in connection with the program. (Ibid.)

“For this reason, it is neither vexatious nor unfair” for a welfare recipient who has

requested an administrative fair hearing also “to be subjected to . . . a criminal

trial.” (Ibid.) Finally, the overriding public policy consideration that, according to

Lucido, allowed us to apply collateral estoppel in Sims—the Legislature’s

decision, expressed through the restitution-first requirement, to “deemphasize[] the

role of criminal trials in the overall scheme for resolution of welfare fraud cases”

(Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 350)—no longer exists; as the parties agree and the

majority “assume[s] for purposes of argument” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 12, fn. 4), in

1984, the Legislature enacted changes to the relevant statutes that eliminated the

restitution-first requirement. (People v. Preston (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 450, 455-

461.)

Indeed, the statutory and administrative scheme that now governs indicates

a preference for resolution of welfare fraud cases through the criminal trial

process. The Welfare and Institutions Code provides that “whenever” a person

fraudulently obtains aid, that person “shall be subject to prosecution.” (Welf. &

Inst. Code , § 11483. 3) The regulations of the California Department of Social

Services (DSS) provide that if an investigation uncovers sufficient evidence that a

welfare recipient “intentionally . . . [¶] Made a false or misleading statement, or

misrepresented, concealed, or withheld facts” (DSS Manual of Policies &


3

All further unlabeled statutory references are to Welfare and Institutions

Code.

12

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Procedures, Feb. 8, 2005, §§ 20-300.1.11, 20-351i(1)(a) (hereafter MPP)), then a

county must ask the prosecuting authority to issue a criminal complaint. (Id.,

§§ 20-007.35, 20-300.21, 20-352.13.) While the prosecution is evaluating the

case and “subsequent to any action taken against the accused individual by the

prosecutor or court of the appropriate jurisdiction,” a county may not hold an

administrative hearing to determine whether the recipient engaged in such

conduct. (Id., §§ 20-300.24, 20-352.3.) Thus, whereas Sims found that

application of collateral estoppel was “warranted . . . due to the unique statutory

scheme which established a [legislative] preference for the noncriminal resolution

of cases involving an accusation of welfare fraud” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p.

490), the statutory and administrative scheme now in place indicates a preference

for criminal resolution of such cases. For this reason, Sims does not govern here;

instead, we should follow Lucido and hold that collateral estoppel does not apply

in light of the public’s paramount interest in “preserving the criminal trial process

as the proper forum for determinations of criminal guilt or innocence.” (Lucido,

supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 350, fn. 11.)

The majority makes several errors in concluding that there is no existing

“preference for criminal resolutions” of welfare fraud cases. (Maj. opn., ante, at p.

13.) Initially, the majority fails to consider the language of section 11483 that I

have discussed above, which the People rely on in their brief. Moreover, the

majority expressly declines to consider whether the “current regulatory scheme”

speaks to this question, because the parties have not briefed the issue. (Maj. opn.,

ante, at p. 14, fn. 5.) However, because Sims relied on the regulatory scheme in

reaching its conclusion (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 480-481, 487-488), the

majority, in relying exclusively on Sims, necessarily is also relying on that

scheme. In my view, we should not, as the majority implicitly does, rely only on

part of the regulatory scheme; we should consider all of it. If the majority believes

it cannot do so on the existing record, then it should either request further briefing

13

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or decline to decide whether the public policy exception applies; it should not

purport to decide that issue based on an incomplete analysis that ignores an

important consideration. Indeed, in addition to its conclusion that the threshold

requirements of the collateral estoppel may not be met here, the majority’s view

that the record is insufficient to determine the impact of the regulatory scheme

further demonstrates that it is premature to decide whether the public policy

exception applies.4

Even were the statutes and regulations silent on the point, as explained

above, Lucido is not. In this regard, although the majority purports to be

concerned with “[p]rinciples of stare decisis” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 9), it fails even

to consider—much less give any weight to—the paramount public policy

consideration we identified and based our decision on in Lucido: “preserving the

criminal trial process as the proper forum for determinations of criminal guilt or

innocence.” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 350, fn. 11.) The majority does not

explain why this consideration does not apply here; instead, the majority simply

ignores it. The majority also fails to consider our conclusion in Lucido that

concerns about judicial economy—which Sims cited in support of its conclusion

(Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 488)—“pale before the importance of preserving the


4

I also disagree with the majority’s view that we cannot determine the

relevance of the regulatory scheme without briefing on “whether the pertinent
regulations were in place at the time Sims was decided by the court.” (Maj. opn.,
ante, at p. 14, fn. 5.) An administrative agency has no discretion to promulgate
regulations that are inconsistent with governing statutes, and any such regulation
is invalid. (Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1019,
1029; Esberg v. Union Oil Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 262, 269.) Because the
preference for noncriminal resolution of welfare cases we relied on in Sims was
established by statute, it would have overridden any contrary preference expressed
in the administrative regulations at that time (which no doubt explains why Sims
did not consider this question). Thus, contrary to the majority’s view, it is
irrelevant whether “the pertinent regulations were in place at the time Sims was
decided . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14, fn. 5.)

14

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criminal trial process as the exclusive forum for determining guilt or innocence as

to new crimes.” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 351.) Nor does the majority

consider Vandenberg’s analysis and application of two relevant policy

considerations: the judicial system’s integrity and judicial economy. In

purporting to follow Sims as a matter of stare decisis, the majority proceeds as if

Lucido and Vandenberg, which are also entitled to respect as precedents of this

court, have nothing to say about how to apply the relevant policy factors. Most

notably, the majority makes no effort to resolve the tension between Lucido,

which emphasized the public’s interest in preserving the criminal trial process as

the proper forum for determining criminal guilt or innocence, and Sims, which did

not even mention this consideration.

The majority incorrectly disregards Lucido in another important respect.

According to the majority, the People may avoid the collateral estoppel problem

that exists under the majority’s conclusion simply by pursuing a criminal case “as

speedily as the County pursues the matter administratively.” (Maj. opn., ante, at

p. 22.) In Lucido, we expressly rejected a similar analysis. There, after noting that

“the People could avoid being collaterally estopped” by the decision in a probation

revocation hearing “by prosecuting first” and “seeking revocation afterward,” we

stated: “As in our previous cases, . . . we refuse to mandate such a

chronology. [Citation.]” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 348, fn. 10.) Thus, in

essentially mandating that a criminal prosecution be finished before completion of

an administrative fair hearing, the majority again disregards Lucido.

In any event, the majority’s discussion of this consideration rests on a false

premise: that a county is in control of the speed with which administrative

proceedings progress. It is the welfare recipient, not the county, who initiates the

fair hearing process by filing a request. (§§ 10950, 10951.) Moreover, the

governing regulations require that the hearing be decided within 90 days of the

date the request is filed (60 days if the claim involves only food stamps), unless

15

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the recipient waives this requirement. (MPP, § 22-060.1.) Thus, the majority errs

in suggesting that the speed of the administrative fair hearing process is within a

county’s control. The welfare recipient’s control over the timing of the fair

hearing process and the short regulatory time limit for deciding a fair hearing

refute the majority’s view that the People can easily avoid collateral estoppel’s

application in a criminal case simply by ensuring that prosecution is completed

and a verdict rendered before an administrative fair hearing is concluded.

The majority disregards Lucido in at least one other important respect. The

majority asserts that Sims merely made “observation[s]” about the restitution-first

requirement that provided “nonessential[] support for our holding.” (Maj. opn.,

ante, at p. 11.) As I have explained, in Lucido, we took a decidedly different view

of Sims’s discussion. (Ante, pp. 9-10.) Supporting our analysis in Lucido is our

statement in Sims that refusing to apply collateral estoppel there would have

required us “to ignore” the legislatively established “safeguard[]” established by

the restitution-first requirement. (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.) Indeed,

despite its assertion, the majority elsewhere concedes that the restitution-first

requirement was “one basis for our decision in Sims” and was “one factor” we

considered there in applying the “multifactor analysis” that governs application of

the collateral estoppel doctrine. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.) Thus, contrary to the

majority’s view, the issue here is not whether the restitution-first requirement was

“the only ground[]” for our decision in Sims. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.) Rather,

the issue is how to apply the governing multifactor test absent the restitution-first

factor that was “one basis for our decision in Sims” (ibid.) and in light of our

discussion and application of that test in Lucido and Vandenberg. Contrary to the

majority’s assertion, given Lucido, Vandenberg, and the relevant statutory

changes, stare decisis poses no obstacle to reaching a conclusion here different

from the one we reached in Sims. As the majority expressly recognizes,

“ ‘reexamination of precedent may become necessary when subsequent

16

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developments indicate an earlier decision . . . has become ripe for

reconsideration . . . .’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10, quoting Moradi-Shalal v.

Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 297.)

The majority’s attempts to distinguish Lucido are unsuccessful. According

to the majority, the facts in Lucido “did not raise the concern expressed in Sims”

that allowing criminal proceedings after an ALJ’s findings of no fraud and no

overpayment would “leave” welfare recipients “exposed to being ‘harassed by

repeated litigation.’ [Citation.]” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.) However, although

Lucido did not involve a welfare recipient, we did consider in that case the fact

that applying collateral estoppel to a decision in a probation revocation hearing

“would eliminate repetitive litigation” and “prevent [the defendant] from being

subjected to consecutive proceedings raising the same factual allegations.”

(Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 351.) As noted above, regarding this issue, we

stated: “The essence of vexatiousness . . . is not mere repetition. Rather, it is

harassment through baseless or unjustified litigation. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Thus,

whereas Sims found that it would have been “manifestly unfair” to permit the

defendant’s criminal prosecution after she “successfully demonstrated her

innocence” at a “fair hearing” in which the government “had an adequate

opportunity . . . to prove” its case (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489), we held in

Lucido that “mere repetition” is not enough to implicate the public policy concern

about vexatious litigation. (Lucido, supra, at p. 351.) Given that Sims apparently

equated repetition with harassment, and did not, in considering the integrity of the

judicial system and judicial economy, even mention the importance of preserving

the criminal trial process as the proper forum for determining criminal guilt or

innocence, the majority is simply incorrect in asserting that the “bases for our

17

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decision in Sims” other than the restitution-first requirement “remain untouched by

our decision in Lucido.”5 (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.)

Also unpersuasive is the majority’s view that the facts in Lucido “did not

raise the concern expressed in Sims” that allowing criminal proceedings after an

ALJ’s findings of no fraud and no overpayment would “impose a hardship on”

welfare recipients. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.) As noted above, the “hardship” we

identified in Sims was that involved in requiring a welfare recipient, after

establishing at a fair hearing that benefits were “legally obtained,” to “plan[] a

budget for limited resources” based on the possibility “he or she may still be

required to return the benefits . . . .” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 488-489.) In

my view, forcing convicted criminals who have successfully avoided probation

revocation by establishing that they did not commit a new offense to plan their

lives based on the possibility they might still be convicted of and incarcerated for

that offense presents an equal or greater hardship; nonetheless, that is what Lucido

requires.

In any event, the facts of this case do not present the hardship at issue in

Sims. Whereas the hearing officer in Sims found that the defendant had not

received overpayments and was entitled to keep the money in question (Sims,

supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 474), the ALJ here ruled that defendant did receive

overpayments and had to return the extra money. Thus, in declining to apply

collateral estoppel and permitting defendant’s prosecution to go forward, the trial

court did not threaten defendant with having to return money the ALJ ruled she


5

In view of this analysis, I disagree with the majority’s view that our

discussion in Lucido contains no “implication that we would have decided Sims
differently had the former statutory scheme for resolution of welfare fraud been
different.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16.) The majority’s observation that Lucido
contains no express “statement” to this effect (ibid.) is both curious and
unremarkable. It would have been entirely inappropriate to make such a
statement, as that question was not before us in Lucido.

18

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could keep. As noted above, in Sims, we identified the relevant inquiry as whether

“policy” considerations supported collateral estoppel’s application on “the facts of

[that] case” (id. at p. 477), and we carefully limited our holding to “the particular

and special circumstances of [that] case.” (Id. at p. 489.) Given these statements

and the factual differences between Sims and the case now before us, the majority

errs in concluding that “[p]rinciples of stare decisis” prevent us from reaching a

different conclusion here. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9.)

The majority also errs in asserting that this case “differs from Lucido” in

that “ ‘probation revocation hearings and criminal trials serve different public

interests’ ” whereas “the purposes” of administrative fair hearings and welfare

fraud prosecutions “do not differ greatly.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.) The

majority incorrectly indicates that the purpose of the administrative fair hearing

here was “ ‘to prove that [defendant] had fraudulently obtained welfare benefits.’ ”

(Ibid., italics added.) As the majority elsewhere explains, the issue at the fair

hearing here was not whether defendant obtained the overpayments fraudulently,

but whether they “ ‘were the result of administrative errors or [defendant’s] failure

to report [her children’s] absence from her home.’ ” (Id. at p. 2.) In answering

this question, it was unnecessary for the ALJ also to determine whether defendant

had a fraudulent intent. (See People v. Camillo (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 981, 989,

fn. 3; People v. Faubus (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 1, 5-6.) The governing statutes

confirm that the DSS was not required to prove defendant acted with fraudulent

intent in order to obtain reimbursement. (§ 11004.)

Indeed, under DSS regulations, the ALJ apparently lacked jurisdiction to

determine whether defendant acted with fraudulent intent. The regulations

provide that “intentionally” making “a false or misleading statement, or

misrepresent[ing], conceal[ing], or withh[o]ld[ing] facts” constitutes an

“Intentional Program Violation” (IPV). (MPP, §§ 20-300.1.11, 20-351i(1)(a).)

IPV’s may be dealt with administratively only at an “administrative

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disqualification hearing” (id., §§ 63-801.11, 63-801.231), which may be initiated

only by the DSS or a county through service of notice on the welfare recipient.

(Id., §§ 22-201.412, 22-202.51; 22-315.5.) The fair hearing at issue here, which

was initiated by defendant’s request in response to the notices of action (maj. opn.,

ante, at p. 2), was not an administrative disqualification hearing. (See MPP,

§§ 22-200.2 [“Administrative disqualification hearings are distinct from” fair

hearings], 22-301.2 [same].) Indeed, because a criminal action was filed in this

case, an administrative disqualification hearing to determine whether defendant

committed an IPV could not have been held. (Id., §§ 20-300.24, 20-352.3.) And,

because an IPV had not been established at an administrative disqualification

hearing (or by a court), to the extent DSS claimed that defendant was at fault, the

regulations required the claim to be “established and handled as an inadvertent

household error claim.” (Id., § 63-801.23.231.) Thus, it was not within the ALJ’s

authority here to determine at defendant’s fair hearing whether she acted with

fraudulent intent.

In this regard, this case materially differs from Sims. There, the DSS

alleged that the defendant had “fraudulently obtained” benefits by failing to report

material information. (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 473.) Under the statutory

scheme that governed the defendant’s fair hearing in Sims, whether the

overpayments resulted from a “willful failure to report facts” or “any willfully

fraudulent device,” and whether the defendant had “willfully withheld

information” were expressly relevant to the DSS’s ability to recoup overpayments.

(Former § 11004, subds. (d) & (e), added by Stats. 1979, ch. 804, § 2, p. 2768 and

repealed by Stats. 1982, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 3, § 2, p. 6890.) The defendant denied

that she had failed to disclose material information and she denied that she had

received benefits to which she was not entitled. Thus, the ALJ in Sims had to

determine whether the defendant had acted fraudulently, and it expressly found

that the DSS failed to prove she “fraudulently obtained welfare benefits.” (Sims,

20

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supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 474.) It therefore ruled that the defendant was entitled to

keep all benefits she had received and ordered the DSS to “refund any restitution

payments [she] had made.” (Ibid.) Here, as already explained, the function of the

fair hearing was to determine whose conduct caused the overpayments defendant

received, and under the governing statute, whether defendant acted fraudulently

was irrelevant to determining that question.

The purposes of administrative fair hearings and criminal prosecutions for

welfare fraud appear to differ in another important respect: the nature of the

causation inquiry. In the trial court, defendant’s counsel asserted that the ALJ

here had only “two choices” regarding causation: “either county error or client”

conduct. These two choices excluded the possibility of finding that both county

error and defendant’s conduct were contributing factors. Counsel’s argument is

fully consistent with the ALJ’s statement of the issue before him: “Whether the

overissuance and overpayment were the result of administrative errors or

[defendant’s] failure to report [her children’s] absence from her home.” It is also

consistent with the governing administrative regulations, which required the ALJ

at the fair hearing to find that the overpayments were caused either by

administrative error or by inadvertent household error. (MPP, §§ 63-801.211, 63-

801.221.) Thus, the purpose of the fair hearing was to determine which of two

mutually exclusive possible causes was the cause of the overpayments. For this

reason, as the majority explains, the ALJ’s decision that the overpayments were

caused by administrative errors “leaves open the possibility that defendant made

misstatements that were a contributing cause to the overpayments.” (Maj. opn.,

ante, at p. 22.) As the majority also explains, the causation inquiry in defendant’s

criminal prosecution for welfare fraud was different; it did not focus on

determining the exclusive cause of the overpayments. In this regard, the purposes

of administrative fair hearings and criminal prosecutions for welfare fraud are

surely different.

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In other respects, administrative fair hearings and criminal welfare fraud

prosecutions “serve different public interests” in the same sense that, as we found

in Lucido, “[p]robation revocation hearings and criminal trials serve different

public interests . . . .” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 347.) A criminal

prosecution is initiated by the People to vindicate the public’s “vital interest in

enforcement of [its] criminal laws.” (U.S. v. Jorn (1971) 400 U.S. 470, 479.)

That interest includes “deter[ring] the individual from committing acts that injure

society” and “express[ing] society’s condemnation of such acts by punishing

them.” (People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 316, italics added; see also Best

v. State Bar of Cal. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 633, 637 [“purpose” of a “criminal

proceeding” is “punishment” if “accused . . . is found guilty”].) As previously

noted, an administrative fair hearing is initiated by a welfare recipient to vindicate

the recipient’s own private interest in challenging an “action of the county

[welfare] department relating to his or her application for or receipt of public

social services . . . .” (§ 10950.) It provides a “ ‘welfare recipient with a speedy

[citations] and informal [citations] means to challenge an administrative action

[that] may reduce or terminate’ ” benefits. (Lentz v. McMahon (1989) 49 Cal.3d

393, 402.) No punishment results from an administrative fair hearing. Thus, like

the probation revocation hearing at issue in Lucido, an administrative fair hearing,

“despite its obvious importance to” a welfare recipient, “neither threatens” the

recipient “with the stigma of a new conviction nor with punishment . . . .”

(Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 348.) Moreover, like “the hearing judge in a

revocation proceeding,” an ALJ’s “fundamental role and responsibility” at an

administrative fair hearing “is not to determine whether” the subject of the hearing

“is guilty or innocent of a crime” (ibid.); the ALJ’s responsibility is to determine

whether the DSS has properly found that the welfare recipient must reimburse the

agency for benefits that should not have been paid. To paraphrase Lucido,

“because the limited nature of this inquiry may not involve or invoke presentation

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of all evidence bearing on the underlying factual allegations, the [DSS’s] failure to

satisfy the lower burden of proof at the [administrative fair] hearing does not

necessarily amount to an acquittal or demonstrate an inability to meet the higher

criminal standard of proof. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) For these reasons, the majority

errs in asserting that “the purposes” of administrative fair hearings and welfare

fraud prosecutions “do not differ greatly.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)

Accordingly, as we concluded in Lucido with respect to a probation revocation

hearing, I conclude that “[p]reemption of trial of a [criminal] charge by [a fair

hearing] decision designed to perform a wholly independent social and legal task

would undermine the function of the criminal trial process as the intended forum

for ultimate determinations as to guilt or innocence of newly alleged crimes.”

(Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 349; cf. People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236,

256 [declining to apply collateral estoppel because of the public’s “substantial

interest in . . . ‘prevent[ing]’ [criminal] offenders ‘from escaping the penalties

imposed by [recidivism] statutes through technical defects in . . . proof’ ”].)

The majority also errs in asserting that Lucido can meaningfully be

distinguished by the absence in this case of “evidentiary rules [that] prohibit a

welfare recipient’s testimony at an administrative hearing from being introduced at

a later criminal trial for welfare fraud.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.) In Lucido, we

explained that such rules “guarantee[] the probationer the ability to present a full

case at the [revocation] hearing without running the risk of prejudicing his defense

at a subsequent [criminal] trial.” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 351.) In the

context of administrative welfare fraud hearings, such evidentiary rules are not

critical to a welfare recipient’s ability fully to present his or her case. By statute,

administrative fair hearings are “informal,” must be conducted “in order to

encourage free and open discussion by the participants,” and are not constrained

by the “rules of procedure or evidence applicable in judicial proceedings.”

(§ 10955.) DSS regulations provide that “evidence shall be admitted [at an

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administrative fair hearing] if it is the sort of evidence on which responsible

persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs.” (MPP, § 22-

050.2.) Thus, welfare recipients can fully present their cases at administrative fair

hearings through means other than their own sworn testimony. Moreover, a

welfare recipient who wants to testify but who is concerned that his or her

testimony may be used at a subsequent criminal trial can readily solve this

potential dilemma by requesting that the fair hearing be continued until

completion of the criminal prosecution. (See id., §§ 22-053 [postponements and

continuances], 22-060.1 [allowing claimant to waive requirement that fair hearing

be decided within 60 or 90 days of date hearing request is filed].)

In any event, the majority’s focus on this issue is a red herring because the

dilemma exists even under the majority’s view that collateral estoppel may, as a

matter of public policy, apply in this context. Welfare recipients who lose at

administrative fair hearings cannot assert collateral estoppel and thus may have

their hearing testimony used at any subsequent criminal trial. Of course, at the

time they must decide whether to testify at the administrative hearing, welfare

recipients cannot know whether they will win or lose. Thus, at the time the

decision whether to testify must be made, even under the majority’s view that

collateral estoppel applies if they win, welfare recipients face the risk they will

lose and that their testimony will therefore be admissible against them at a

subsequent criminal trial. Therefore, in this context, even under the majority’s

view, welfare recipients trying to decide whether to testify at administrative

hearings must still consider the possibility that their testimony may later be used

against them in criminal proceedings. Because the concern the majority discusses

exists whether or not collateral estoppel potentially applies, the majority errs in

24

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relying on this consideration as a basis for reaching a policy conclusion here

different from the one we reached in Lucido.6

Indeed, contrary to the majority’s analysis, under Vandenberg, the most

meaningful distinction between this case and Lucido establishes that it would be

even more appropriate—not less—to apply collateral estoppel’s public policy

exception in this case than it was in Lucido. The probation revocation hearing in

Lucido was a judicial proceeding decided by a judge of a “justice court.” (Lucido,

supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 339.) The fair hearing in this case was an administrative

proceeding decided by a nonjudicial officer. As previously explained, under

Vandenberg, that administrative fair hearings are “outside the judicial system” and

do “not involve the use of a judge and a courtroom” supports the conclusion that,

as a matter of public policy, we should not apply collateral estoppel in this case.

(Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 833.)

The majority’s stated reason for disregarding Vandenberg is inadequate.

According to the majority, Vandenberg involved “a private arbitration” that

“effectively ‘bypass[ed] the judicial system,’ ” whereas this case involves “a

matter of public concern” dealt with in “ ‘a judicial-like adversary proceeding’

[citation] that [was] conducted by a state entity, the DSS, whose administrative

law judges must follow California law and render decisions subject to judicial

review. [Citation.]” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18, fn. 6.) In making this assertion, the

majority once again ignores prior precedent of this court, which characterizes

“private arbitration proceedings” as “ ‘quasi-judicial’ proceedings . . . that are

functionally equivalent to court proceedings. [Citation.]” (Moore v. Conliffe


6

Because defendant did not testify at her administrative fair hearing, any

concern about unfairness in actually using a welfare recipient’s fair hearing
testimony at a subsequent criminal trial is irrelevant to determining whether policy
considerations support applying collateral estoppel “[i]n the particular and special
circumstances of this case.” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.)

25

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(1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 645.) The majority also ignores the fact that in Vandenberg,

the arbitration “took place before a retired federal judge,” the parties conducted

“[f]ormal discovery,” “the transcribed proceedings included representation by

counsel, and extensive evidence, briefing, and argument,” the arbitrator issued “a

lengthy and detailed decision,” and the arbitration award was judicially

“confirmed by a superior court judgment” (Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p.

826), which gave it “the same force and effect as . . . a judgment in a civil action

of the same jurisdictional classification” and made it enforceable “like any other

judgment of the court in which it [was] entered . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1287.4.)

By contrast, in this case, the administrative proceeding never involved a court in

any capacity. Because the ALJ’s decision here was entirely “outside the judicial

system” and the fair hearing did “not involve the use of a judge and a courtroom”

(Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 833), Vandenberg’s discussion of these

considerations in connection with arbitration fully applies, whether or not, as the

majority asserts, the fair hearing was “ ‘judicial-like’ ” and involved “a matter of

public concern.”7 (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18, fn. 6.)

Finally, for several reasons, the majority’s assertion that the Legislature, in

amending the welfare fraud statutes in 1984, “did not contemplate abrogating

Sims” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 19) is unpersuasive. First, it is largely beside the

point. As we have explained, the result in Sims was a judicial policy decision that

was “informed by the ‘unique statutory scheme’ at issue there. [Citations.]”

(Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 851.) Thus, the primary question here is not

whether the Legislature intended to abrogate Sims, but whether we should make a

different policy decision in this case because, among other things, the “ ‘unique


7

Of course, the analysis might be different had defendant petitioned under

section 10962 for judicial review of the ALJ’s decision and were we dealing with
a superior court judgment rendered after that review.

26

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statutory scheme’ ” that “informed” our policy decision in Sims (ibid.) has been

materially changed.

Second, the majority’s analysis is inconsistent with our prior decisions.

The majority asserts that we must presume the Legislature was aware of Sims and

would have specified that administrative decisions do not preclude criminal

prosecutions for welfare fraud had it wanted to invalidate Sims. (Maj. opn., ante,

at p. 20.) We rejected a very similar argument in Estate of Kachigian (1942) 20

Cal.2d 787. At issue there was our construction of the probate homestead statutes,

which we had based on the homestead statutes that apply before death. (Id. at pp.

788-790.) The question we faced was whether a legislative amendment to the

latter affected the former. (Ibid.) Offering an analysis very similar to the

majority’s, the respondent in Kachigian, who contended that the amendment did

not effect a change, argued: “[I]t must be presumed that the Legislature was

familiar with the former decisions and that in failing to change the probate statutes

it must have intended to leave the probate law unchanged.” (Id. at p. 790.) We

rejected the argument, stating: “[I]f we presume that the Legislature was familiar

with the former decisions, it would seem improper for us to presume that it was

unaware of their basic reasoning and hold that it did not realize the probate rule

must change if the basis therefor were changed.” (Ibid.) Similarly, here, “if we

presume that the Legislature was familiar with [Sims], it would seem improper for

us to presume that [the Legislature] was unaware of [Sims’s] basic reasoning and

hold that [the Legislature] did not realize the [Sims] rule must change if [a] basis

therefor were changed.” (Ibid.) Thus, I disagree with the majority’s view that the

Legislature, in repealing the statutory requirement that informed our decision in

Sims, “did not contemplate abrogating Sims.”8 (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)


8

The majority correctly observes at the end of a long footnote that “unpassed

bills ‘have little value’ in ascertaining legislative intent. [Citation.]” (Maj. opn.,

(Footnote continued on next page.)

27

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As the preceding analysis demonstrates, ultimately, in concluding that Sims

does not “warrant reconsideration” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1), the majority is

focusing on the wrong question. As noted above, in Sims, we considered whether

“policy” considerations supported collateral estoppel’s application on “the facts of

[that] case” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 477), and we expressly limited our

holding to “the particular and special circumstances of [that] case.” (Id. at p. 489.)

As also explained above, the facts and circumstances of the case now before us are

different: the restitution-first requirement that was a “basis for our decision in

Sims” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 14) no longer exists, the ALJ ruled that defendant

must repay the overpayments she received, and the question of whether defendant

intentionally made misrepresentations or omissions was not at issue in the

administrative proceeding. Thus, the question we must answer here is not, as the

majority posits, whether to reconsider Sims, but is whether to extend that decision

to the different facts and circumstances of this case. More precisely, under

Lucido, a precedent of this court that the majority simply ignores in relevant part,

the question we must answer is whether “compelling public policy considerations

outweigh[] the need for determinations of guilt and innocence to be made in the

usual criminal trial setting.” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 349.) Because I find



(Footnote continued from previous page.)

ante, at p. 20, fn. 7.) Indeed, as we have explained, “because the Legislature’s
failure to enact a proposed statutory amendment may indicate many things other
than approval of a statute’s judicial construction, including the pressure of other
business, political considerations, or a tendency to trust the courts to correct its
own errors,” “ ‘[w]e can rarely determine from the failure of the Legislature to
pass a particular bill what the intent of the Legislature is with respect to existing
law.’ [Citation, fn. omitted.]” (People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 921.)
In light of these well-established principles, it is unclear why the majority, in its
textual discussion, appears to emphasize the Legislature’s failure to pass a bill that
would have expressly abrogated Sims. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.)

28

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no such consideration and the majority fails to identify one, and because the

majority offers no meaningful basis for distinguishing Lucido and concluding that

although collateral estoppel does not apply after probation revocation hearings, it

may apply after administrative fair hearings, were it necessary to decide the

question here, I would hold that public policy considerations do not support

applying collateral estoppel in “the particular and special circumstances of this

case.” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.)

CHIN, J.

I CONCUR:

CORRIGAN, J.

29

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Garcia
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 117 Cal.App.4th 88
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S124090
Date Filed: August 28, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior
County: Butte
Judge: William P. Lamb*

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Elizabeth M. Campbell, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Sally P. Brajevich, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Legal Services of Northern California, Gary F. Smith; Western Center on Law and Poverty, Richard A.
Rothschild, Dora Lopez and Robert D. Newman for Legal Aid Association of California as Amicus Curiae
on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.


__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Janet E. Neeley, Stephen G.
Herndon, Maggy Krell, David Andrew Eldridge, Paul E. O’Connor, Janis Shank McLean and Donald E.
deNicola, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

David Labahn; Greg Gibeson, Assistant Deputy District Attorney (Alameda); and Stan Kubochi, Deputy
District Attorney (Sacramento) for California District Attorney’s Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf
of Plaintiff and Respondent.





*Retired judge of the former Justice Court for the Big River Judicial District, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

---

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Elizabeth M. Campbell
2407 J Street, Suite 301
Sacramento, CA 95816
(916) 441-3792

Gary F. Smith
Legal Services of Northern California
517 12th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 551-2111

Donald E. deNicola
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
(916) 324-5290

---

Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Mon, 08/28/2006	S124090

Disposition
Aug 28 2006	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Apr 16 2004	Record requested
Apr 19 2004	Received premature petition for review   counsel for aplt.
Apr 19 2004	Received Court of Appeal record   one doghouse
Apr 27 2004	Case start: Petition for review filed   counsel for resp. (People)
Jun 16 2004	Petition for review granted (criminal case)   Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown, Moreno, JJ.
Jun 24 2004	Received additional record   one doghouse
Jul 9 2004	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for respondent requests extension of time to August 16, 2004, to file the opening brief on the merits.
Jul 12 2004	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the opening brief is extended to and including August 16, 2004.
Jul 16 2004	Counsel appointment order filed   Central California Appellate Program is hereby appointed to represent appellant on his appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits shall be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date of this order.
Jul 22 2004	Filed:   substitution of counsel : Deputy Attorney General Paul E. O'Connor for Respondent .
Jul 22 2004	Received:   letter from Attorney Sally P. Brajevich stating she no longer represents Cathy Garcia as CEN has been appointed.
Jul 28 2004	Order filed   The order filed July 16, 2004 is hereby amended to read: " Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, Central California Appellate Program is hereby appointed to represent appellant on his appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits shall be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date respondent's opening brief on the merits is filed.
Aug 3 2004	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for resp. (People) requests extension of time to September 15, 2004 to file the opening brief on the merits.
Aug 6 2004	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the opening brief is extended to and including September 15, 2004.
Aug 18 2004	Received:   from counsel for resp. (People) (copy of Notice to Correct Omission in Record) filed in Supr. Court of Calif. County of Butte.
Aug 30 2004	Received:   Records (Clerk's Transcript on Appeal, Vol. One) from Butte Co. Supr. Court.
Sep 2 2004	Request for extension of time filed   counsel (AG) for respondent requests extension of time to October 15, 2004, to file the opening brief on the merits.
Sep 9 2004	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the opening brief is extended to and including October 15,2004
Sep 15 2004	Received Court of Appeal record   1 doghouse (RT =2)
Oct 13 2004	Request for extension of time filed   counsel (AG) for resp. requests extension of time to November 15, 2004 to file the answer brief on the merits.
Oct 14 2004	Received:   from respondent Amended Declaration of Service on extension request.
Oct 18 2004	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including Novmeber 15, 2004. No further extensions of time are contemplated.
Nov 15 2004	Opening brief on the merits filed   by counsel for resp. (People)
Dec 13 2004	Request for extension of time filed   counsel requests extension of time to January 18, 2005, to file the answer brief on the merits.
Dec 21 2004	Extension of time granted   Appellant's time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including January 18, 2005.
Dec 30 2004	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for appellant requests extension of time to February 17, 2005 to file the answer brief on the merits.
Jan 7 2005	Extension of time granted   Appellant's time to serve and file the answer brief is extended to and including February 17, 2005.
Feb 17 2005	Request for extension of time filed   Counsel for aplt. requests extension of time to March 18, 2005, to file the answer brief on the merits. (3rd request for extension)
Feb 24 2005	Extension of time granted   Appellant's time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including March 18, 2005, No further extensions are contemplated
Mar 18 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed   in Sacramento by counsel for appellant (Cathy Dawn Garcia).
Mar 29 2005	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for resp. requests extension of time to May 9, 2005, to file the reply brief on the merits.
Apr 4 2005	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the reply brief is extended to and including May 9, 2005.
Apr 29 2005	Request for extension of time filed   counsel fro resp. requests extension of time to June 8, 2005, to file the reply brief on the merits.
May 3 2005	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the reply brief is extended to and including June 8, 2005. No further extensions of time are contemplated.
Jun 7 2005	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   by counsel for resp. (People)
Jun 7 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   California District Attorney's Association (non-party) in support of respondent.
Jun 22 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   California District Attorney's Association
Jun 22 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   California District Attorney's Association in support of respondent. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Jul 7 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   Legal Aid Association of California [in support of appellant]
Jul 11 2005	Request for extension of time filed   by counsel for appellant Garcia: request extension of time to 8-1-05 to file the reply to amicus curiae brief of the California District Attorneys Association
Jul 14 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   Legal Aid Association of California in support of appellant.
Jul 14 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   Legal Aid Association of California in support of appellant. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Jul 22 2005	Extension of time granted   To August 1, 2005 to file appellant's response to AC brief filed by The California District Attorney's Association.
Aug 2 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   Calif. Dist. Attorneys Assoc. (40.1(b))
Aug 31 2005	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Campbell - Central California Appellate Program
May 2 2006	Case ordered on calendar   June 2, 2006, at 1:30 p.m., in San Francisco
May 17 2006	Order filed   The request of counsel for appellant in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of appellant at oral argument is hereby granted. The request of appellant to allocate to amicus curiae Legal Aid Association of California 15 minutes of appellant's 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
Jun 2 2006	Cause argued and submitted
Aug 28 2006	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   and remanded. OPINION BY: Moreno, J. ----- joined by: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, JJ. CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY: Chin, J. ----- joined by : Corrigan, J.
Sep 28 2006	Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Sep 28 2006	Note:   records returned to CA/3
Oct 4 2006	Received:   Receipt for remittitur.
Aug 8 2007	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Campbell - Central California Appellate Program

Briefs
Nov 15 2004	Opening brief on the merits filed
Mar 18 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed
Jun 7 2005	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Jun 22 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Jul 14 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Aug 2 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

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