Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 7/10/08

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S147510
v.
Ct.App. 2/6 B168269
SAUL GARCIA CUEVAS,
Los Angeles County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. LA040073

Negotiated plea agreements may include a sentence “lid,” which constrains
the maximum sentence a trial court may impose but is less than the maximum
exposure the defendant would otherwise face absent the agreed-upon lid. In
People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 763 (Shelton), we held that when a plea
agreement specifies a sentence lid, “a challenge to the trial court’s authority to
impose the lid sentence is a challenge to the validity of the plea requiring a
certificate of probable cause.” Absent such certificate, a defendant may not later
complain that the imposed sentence lid violated Penal Code1 section 654’s
proscription against multiple punishment, which in substance is a challenge to the
plea’s validity. (Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 769.)

1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
noted.
1

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In this case, the defendant and the prosecution negotiated a plea by which
certain charges would be dismissed or reduced, and the defendant agreed that the
maximum possible sentence for the remaining charges would be 37 years eight
months. After the trial court sentenced him to a term within that maximum, the
defendant attempted to raise a section 654 challenge to the sentence in the Court of
Appeal. Arguably, the negotiated sentence here was not technically a sentence lid.
In Shelton, we described a sentence lid as ordinarily less than the maximum
possible sentence the trial court may lawfully impose for the offenses admitted by
the defendant’s guilty or no contest plea. (Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 767,
768.) “If the maximum sentence authorized by law were at or below the specified
sentence lid, the lid provision would be superfluous and of no benefit to the
defendant.” (Id. at p. 768.)
Instead, the stated sentence here was what the parties agreed was the
maximum for the charges to which the defendant pleaded no contest. It was,
however, significantly less than the sentence he faced under the original charges,
which included two life sentences. The issue here is whether Shelton governs this
case despite this factual difference. We conclude that Shelton and related cases
apply here, and compel the conclusion that a certificate of probable cause is
required.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which reached a contrary
conclusion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant Saul Garcia Cuevas was charged with 27 counts of robbery, one
count of grand theft, one count of attempted robbery, and two counts of
kidnapping for robbery. (§§ 211, 487, subd. (c), 664, 209, subd. (b)(1).) The
information also alleged that he used a firearm in the commission of each of these
31 offenses. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).)
2

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Between December 2001 and March 2002, defendant, armed with a BB
gun, entered approximately 18 businesses and demanded money and/or personal
property from the employees. As relevant here, on eight occasions, defendant
took or attempted to take both personal property from the employees and money
from the store’s safe or cash register. He was charged with two counts of robbery
(or in one instance, robbery and attempted robbery) for each of these incidents,
one count for taking money from the employee out of the cash register and the
other for taking personal property from the same employee.
In exchange for defendant’s plea of no contest, the prosecution agreed to
reduce the two aggravated kidnapping counts (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)) to simple
kidnapping (§ 207), and to drop the 31 charged allegations under section
12022.53, subdivision (b), and instead add one section 12022, subdivision (b)(1)
allegation. Based on the terms of the plea agreement (as discussed in greater
detail below), defendant agreed to a maximum possible sentence of 37 years eight
months. After the prosecution advised him of the consequences of his plea,
defendant pled no contest to 27 counts of second degree robbery, two counts of
simple kidnapping, one count of attempted robbery, and one count of grand theft.
He admitted one allegation that he used a weapon during commission of these
offenses (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to 35 years eight months, calculated as
follows: the upper term of eight years on one kidnapping count; 27 consecutive
one-year terms for each robbery count; and a consecutive term of eight months for
grand theft. The court imposed concurrent terms for the attempted robbery count
and second kidnapping count, and struck any remaining allegations under section
1385. Defendant filed a notice of appeal and requested a certificate of probable
cause, seeking reversal of his convictions on grounds that his defense attorney was
3

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ineffective in developing a defense to the charges and in providing advice about
the consequences of his plea. The trial court denied the certificate.
After examining the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436,
the Court of Appeal requested supplemental briefing on the effect of both Blakely
v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely), and section 654 on defendant’s
sentence. While agreeing with the Attorney General that defendant’s “failure to
obtain a certificate of probable cause precludes this court from addressing the
validity of his plea to these counts” (see People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68,
76 (Panizzon)), the Court of Appeal concluded that defendant was not
procedurally barred from challenging the duplicative robbery and attempted
robbery counts under section 654. It did not reach defendant’s Blakely claim. We
granted and held this case for Shelton, which had not yet been decided, and later
transferred the case back for reconsideration after our decision in Shelton had
become final.
On reconsideration, the Court of Appeal identified the issue as “whether the
rule articulated in Shelton applies when the plea agreement does not specify a lid,
but the court, in taking the plea, advises the defendant of the maximum sentence
available for the charges and proceeds to impose a sentence within that theoretical
maximum.” In such a case, the Court of Appeal held, the defendant and the
prosecution have not agreed to any specified maximum sentence, and any
challenge to the sentence does not affect the validity of the plea, which would
otherwise require a certificate of probable cause under Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th
759.
Addressing the merits of defendant’s claims, the Court of Appeal held that
he was improperly sentenced for 15 counts of robbery and one count of attempted
robbery, because on these counts defendant “was sentenced twice for robbing a
single store employee victim of personal property and the store’s money during
4

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the course of a single robbery. Section 654 precludes multiple punishment for a
single act or indivisible course of conduct.” The Court of Appeal remanded the
case for resentencing directing the trial court to stay the sentences on the eight
duplicative counts. Pursuant to People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1238, the Court
of Appeal rejected defendant’s claims that the imposition of the upper term and
consecutive sentences violated Blakely.
We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review.2
DISCUSSION
A defendant may not appeal “from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere,” unless he has obtained a certificate of probable cause.
(§ 1237.5, subd. (b); see People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 790 (Buttram)
[§ 1237.5’s purpose is “to weed out frivolous and vexatious appeals from pleas of
guilty or no contest, before clerical and judicial resources are wasted”].) Exempt
from this certificate requirement are postplea claims, including sentencing issues,
that do not challenge the validity of the plea. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.304(b)(4)(B); Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 766; Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at
p. 776; Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 74-75.) For example, “when the claim

2
We denied without prejudice defendant’s petition seeking relief under
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, which had not yet been decided,
Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. 296, and United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220.
In any event, the Cunningham issue is distinguishable from the section 654 issue
presented in this case. (See People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36.) As we
recently made clear, a defendant’s claim that the imposition of an upper term
violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as established in Cunningham,
supra, 549 U.S. 270, implicates his sentence only and does not challenge the
validity of the plea agreement. (People v. French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 41, 45
[“In contrast to a case in which the maximum term under the plea agreement
would be unlawful under section 654, the Sixth Amendment would not render an
upper term unlawful for defendant’s crimes under all circumstances”].)
5

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on appeal is merely that the trial court abused the discretion the parties intended it
to exercise, there is, in substance, no attack on a sentence that was ‘part of [the]
plea bargain.’ [Citation.] Instead, the appellate challenge is one contemplated,
and reserved, by the agreement itself.” (Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 786.)
In Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th 759, we addressed the related issue whether a
defendant may challenge the trial court’s authority to impose a sentence lid on the
ground that the sentence violated the multiple punishment prohibition of section
654.3 In exchange for the dismissal of other charges and a sentence lid of three
years eight months, defendant Shelton pled no contest to one count of stalking in
violation of a protective order and one count of making a criminal threat. The trial
court explained the plea agreement’s sentencing provision as follows: “ ‘And the
lid is three years eight months. Which means that the agreement is that I cannot
sentence you to more than three years and eight months and you can argue for
something less than three years and eight months.’ ” (Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at
p. 764.) Rejecting Shelton’s claim that section 654 required it to stay any sentence
for the criminal threat conviction, the trial court sentenced him to consecutive
terms totaling the lid of three years eight months. The Court of Appeal majority
held that by entering into a plea agreement with a sentence lid, Shelton did not
waive the right to challenge the sentence based on section 654 because the
agreement expressly permitted him to “argue for” a sentence less than the
maximum term. (Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 764-765.) We reversed the
Court of Appeal’s judgment. (Id. at p. 771.)

3
“It is well settled . . . that the court acts ‘in excess of its jurisdiction’ and
imposes an ‘unauthorized’ sentence when it erroneously stays or fails to stay
execution of a sentence under section 654.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331,
354, fn. 17.)
6

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Distinguishing Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th 773, we held that
notwithstanding the provision recognizing Shelton’s right to argue for a lesser
term, the “inclusion of a sentence lid implies a mutual understanding and
agreement that the trial court has authority to impose the specified maximum
sentence and preserves only the defendant’s right to urge that the trial court should
or must exercise its discretion in favor of a shorter term.” (Shelton, supra, 37
Cal.4th at p. 763; see id. at p. 768.) In Shelton’s case, “Because the plea
agreement was based on a mutual understanding (as determined according to
principles of contract interpretation) that the court had authority to impose the lid
sentence, defendant’s contention that the lid sentence violated the multiple
punishment prohibition of Penal Code section 654 was in substance a challenge to
the plea’s validity and thus required a certificate of probable cause, which
defendant failed to secure.” (Id. at p. 769.)
In this case, the Court of Appeal determined that because the parties had
not agreed on a sentence lid, Shelton did not apply to foreclose defendant’s
challenge to his sentence. It found instead that the trial court merely advised
defendant of the maximum sentence that could be imposed based on the charges to
which he pled. This, the Court of Appeal held, was not enough to trigger Shelton:
“A defendant who merely acknowledges the theoretical maximum sentence based
on an open plea stands in different shoes than a defendant who has entered an
agreement that calls for a lid on the sentence. . . . A defendant who enters an open
plea and is advised of his maximum exposure has received no promise with
respect to his sentence — he is simply being provided with the information
necessary to enter a voluntary and intelligent plea.”4 Advancing the Court of

4
Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s and the parties’ characterization,
defendant’s plea was not truly “open.” (See People v. Cole (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th

(footnote continued on next page)
7

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Appeal’s reasoning, defendant here contends that absent a negotiated sentence lid
(and thus, he asserts, absent the parties’ mutual understanding and agreement that
the trial court had authority to impose the ultimate sentence), defendant’s intent to
waive a section 654 challenge cannot be implied. He argues, in other words, that
“there is no lid from which to imply that a section 654 challenge was waived.”
Contrary to defendant’s contention, the presence or absence of a sentence
lid does not dictate the result here. For purposes of the certificate of probable
cause requirement, the critical question is whether defendant’s section 654
challenge to his sentence is in substance a challenge to the validity of his plea.
(Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 766-767; see Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p.
782; Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 76.) In other words, the question is whether
defendant “seeks only to raise [an] issue[] reserved by the plea agreement, and as
to which he did not expressly waive the right to appeal.” (Buttram, supra, 30
Cal.4th at p. 787; see Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 769; Panizzon, supra, 13
Cal.4th at p. 78, fn. 8.) We conclude that defendant’s plea agreement did not
reserve such a postplea challenge because the maximum possible sentence
defendant faced was “part and parcel of the plea agreement he negotiated with the
People.” (Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 78.)

(footnote continued from previous page)

850, 857-858 [despite prosecutor’s and written waiver’s reference to defendant’s
“open” plea, plea was actually “negotiated disposition”].) An open plea is one
under which the defendant is not offered any promises. (People v. Williams
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 156.) In other words, the defendant “plead[s]
unconditionally, admitting all charges and exposing himself to the maximum
possible sentence if the court later chose to impose it.” (Liang v. Superior Court
(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1055-1056.) Under the plea agreement, defendant
here received a significant reduction in sentence in exchange for his plea. (See
post, at p. 11.)
8

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In Panizzon, our seminal decision clarifying the scope of section 1237.5,
we held that a certificate of probable cause was required where the defendant
claimed on appeal that his negotiated sentence constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. (Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 78.) Although defendant Panizzon
did not purport to challenge the validity of his no contest plea, we concluded that
the sentence to which he agreed was “an integral part of the plea agreement,” and
that “by contesting the constitutionality of the very sentence he negotiated as part
of the plea bargain, defendant is, in substance, attacking the validity of the plea.”
(Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 78; see Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 776.)
Like Panizzon, defendant here is challenging the very sentence he
negotiated as part of the plea bargain, and, in substance, is attacking the validity of
his plea. The record here clearly reflects that defendant agreed to a maximum
possible sentence of 37 years eight months, and belies the assertion that he was
merely advised of the maximum sentence.
For instance, when first discussing the terms of the plea agreement on the
record, the parties specified the maximum sentence defendant faced:
“The Court: All right. And it was indicated off the record what the
theoretical max is on this case, and I believe it was indicated to be thirty-six years
and eight months.
“[Prosecutor]: Actually with the one-year enhancements it would be thirty-
seven years and eight months, and I understand this is going to be an open plea
wherein the defense would present at a sentencing hearing factors in mitigation
and the court would, after hearing both sides, sentence the defendant to what the
court felt was the appropriate sentence.
“[Defense counsel]: That’s our understanding.
“The Court: But no more than the max obviously.
“[Defense counsel]: Hopefully.” (Emphasis added.)
9

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In another exchange, defendant was advised of and waived certain
constitutional rights based on his plea, and confirmed he was freely and
voluntarily pleading because he felt it was in his best interest to do so. In advising
him of the consequences of his plea, the prosecution reiterated the maximum
sentence defendant faced under terms of the plea agreement:
“All right. Now, there are certain consequences that you need to be aware
of before you enter your plea in this case. The maximum time as you’ve heard, as
it’s charged in the information and had we gone to trial, would have been two life
sentences plus thirty-six years or more, thirty-seven years. You are — our
understanding with you is that that is not going to be your maximum, your
maximum is going to be a determinant sentence of thirty-seven years, and you’re
pleading open to the information under those circumstances and the judge is going
to listen to a sentencing — in a sentencing hearing to what your attorney has to
present and then he will make the final decision as to exactly how much time
you’re going to receive. Do you understand that?
“[The defendant:] Yes, ma’am.” (Emphasis added.)
In addition, defense counsel informed the court that he had “indicated to
[defendant] that the terms of this disposition are that the plea is open, that he faces
a maximum of thirty-seven years, eight months.” The trial court shared that
understanding; before sentencing defendant, it informed the parties: “I’m working
off 37, 8 because that was indicated at the time of the plea. . . . [I]n fairness to
everybody we should go with what the deal was, and the max then was 37 years, 8
months, according to page 9 of [the] transcript.”
“ ‘When a guilty [or nolo contendere] plea is entered in exchange for
specified benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum
punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the terms of the
agreement.’ ” (Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 80; see People v. Hester (2000)
10

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22 Cal.4th 290, 295 [“defendants who have received the benefit of their bargain
should not be allowed to trifle with the courts by attempting to better the bargain
through the appellate process”].) “Defendant’s attack on the legality of his
maximum sentence is an effort to unilaterally improve, and thus alter, the terms of
that which was agreed and thus should not be permitted without a certificate of
probable cause.” (People v. Young (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 827, 833 [following
Panizzon and affirmed in Shelton].)
In this case, defendant received a significant reduction in sentence, or in the
prosecution’s words, two “very large breaks,” in exchange for his plea. Under the
plea agreement, the prosecution agreed to reduce the two kidnapping for robbery
counts (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)) — each carrying a life sentence — to simple
kidnapping (§ 207), and to dismiss the 31 firearm allegations (§ 12022.53, subd.
(b)), and instead add a single weapon use allegation (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The
prosecution informed defendant that had they gone to trial on all the charged
offenses, he would have faced two life sentences plus 37 years. By negotiating the
reduction and dismissal of these charges, defendant necessarily understood and
agreed that he faced a significantly reduced sentence of 37 years eight months.
This maximum sentence was “part and parcel” of the plea bargain the parties
negotiated. (Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 78; see Young, supra, 77
Cal.App.4th at p. 832 [“by attacking the maximum term, defendant seeks to void a
term of the agreement to which both parties agreed to abide”].) Thus, by
challenging the negotiated maximum sentence imposed as part of the plea bargain,
defendant is challenging the validity of his plea itself. (Panizzon, supra, 13
Cal.4th at p. 79; Young, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 832.)5

5
We reject defendant’s separation of powers claim, which is based on his
erroneous assertion that the court “actively” imposed a term on the parties’ plea

(footnote continued on next page)
11

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Contrary to defendant’s argument, Shelton does not dictate a different
result. In Shelton, our interpretation of the negotiated plea agreement, though
focused on the sentence lid, emphasized giving effect to the parties’ mutual
intention. (Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 767.) In that case, the plea agreement’s
provision permitting Shelton to “argue for” a lesser term created an ambiguity as
to whether he was allowed to raise an appellate claim on any ground. (Id. at pp.
767-768; see id. at p. 771 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) Therefore, in order to
resolve the ambiguity, we were required to analyze “ ‘objective manifestations of
the parties’ intent,’ ” including the surrounding circumstances under which the
parties negotiated the agreement. (Id. at p. 767.) We concluded that under the
“totality of the circumstances,” Shelton “did not reserve a right to argue that the
trial court lacked authority to impose the specified maximum sentence.” (Id. at p.
769.)
In contrast to Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th 759, there was no such ambiguous
provision here. Defendant received what he negotiated and agreed to under the
plea agreement, and he must abide by the terms of the agreement. (Panizzon,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 80.) In asserting that section 654 requires the trial court to
stay any duplicative counts, defendant is not challenging the court’s exercise of
sentencing discretion, but attacking its authority to impose consecutive terms for
these counts. This amounts to a challenge to the plea’s validity, requiring a
certificate of probable cause, which defendant failed to secure. (Shelton, supra, 37

(footnote continued from previous page)

agreement. Moreover, contrary to defendant’s suggestion, People v. Walker
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, lends no support because in defendant’s case, there was no
breach of the plea bargain. (See Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1029-1030
[remedy for breach of plea bargain is to reduce fine to statutory minimum].)
12

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Cal.4th at p. 770; Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 79.) Therefore, his appeal
based on section 654 is barred.6
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment and
remand the matter for proceedings consistent with our opinion.
CHIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.

6
Given this conclusion, we need not, and do not, reach the issue whether
defendant’s challenge under section 654 is barred by rule 4.412(b) of the
California Rules of Court. (See Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 771.)
13

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Cuevas
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 142 Cal.App.4th 1141
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S147510
Date Filed: July 10, 2008
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: John S. Fisher

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Roberta Simon, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette,
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Pamela C. Hamanka, Assistant Attorney General, Margaret E. Maxwell,
Lawrence M. Daniels, Kristofer Jorstad, Lance E. Winters and Susan S. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Roberta Simon
Post Office Box 10728
Oakland, CA 94610
(510) 763-7226

Susan S. Kim
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 620-6449

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Petition for review after the Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing and otherwise affirmed a judgment of conviction of criminal offenses. This case presents the following issues: (1) Was defendant required to obtain a certificate of probable cause in order to claim on appeal that the sentence imposed violated Penal Code section 654, when he entered his no contest plea with an understanding of the maximum sentence he faced although the plea agreement did not specify a maximum sentence? (2) Does rule 4.412(b) of the California Rules of Court bar defendant from challenging his sentence under Penal Code section 654 in such circumstances?

Opinion Information

Date:	Citation:	Docket Number:	Category:	Status:	Cross Referenced Cases:
Thu, 07/10/2008	44 Cal. 4th 374, 187 P.3d 30, 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303	S147510	Review - Criminal Appeal	closed; remittitur issued	PEOPLE v. CUEVAS (S132016)

Disposition
Jul 10 2008	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Oct 20 2006	Petition for review filed   Respondent People Deputy Attorney General Susan S. Kim
Oct 23 2006	Petition for review to exhaust state remedies filed   Appellant Saul Garcia Cuevas in pro per
Oct 26 2006	Received Court of Appeal record   B190920-file jacket - also - B168269-one doghouse
Dec 18 2006	Time extended to grant or deny review   to and including January 22, 2007, or the date upon which review is either granted or denied.
Jan 3 2007	Petition for review granted (criminal case)   Appellant's petition for review denied without prejudice to any relief to which defendant might be entitled after the United States Supreme Court determines in Cunningham v. California, No. 05-6551, the effect of Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 and United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220, on California law. Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ. Corrigan, J., was absent and did not participate.
Jan 23 2007	Counsel appointment order filed   Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, Roberta Simon is hereby appointed to represent appellant on the appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits must be served and filed on or before thirty (30 days from the date respondent's opening brief on the merits is filed.
Jan 26 2007	Request for extension of time filed   opening brief/merits to 3-5-07 Respondent People Deputy Attorney General Susan S. Kim
Feb 1 2007	Extension of time granted   On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including March 5, 2007.
Feb 27 2007	Request for extension of time filed   opening brief/merits to 4-4-07 Respondent People Deputy Attorney General Susan S. Kim
Mar 5 2007	Extension of time granted   On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including April 4, 2007.
Apr 4 2007	Application to file over-length brief filed   to file oversized respondent's opening brief Respondent The People - submitted with declaration
Apr 11 2007	Opening brief on the merits filed   counsel for respondent **** w/permission ****
May 7 2007	Request for extension of time filed   By appellant, Saul G. Cuevas, requesting a 30-day extension to and including June 11, 2007 to file appellant's answer brief on the merits.
May 11 2007	Extension of time granted   On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merit is extended to and including June 11, 2007.
Jun 7 2007	Request for extension of time filed   Counsel for aplt. requests extension of time to July 11, 2007 to file the answer brief on the merits.
Jun 11 2007	Extension of time granted   On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including July 11, 2007,
Jul 6 2007	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for aplt. requests extension of time to August 10, 2007, to file the answer brief on the merits.
Jul 12 2007	Extension of time granted   On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including August 10, 2007. No further extensions of time are contemplated.
Aug 8 2007	Request for extension of time filed   Counsel for respondent requests extension of time to 9-10-07 to file the answer brief on the merits.
Aug 10 2007	Extension of time granted   On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including August 30, 2007. No further extensions of time will be granted.
Aug 29 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed   counsel for aplt.
Sep 14 2007	Request for extension of time filed   to file reply brief to Oct., 23, 207 respondent The People Deputy A.G. Margaret E. Maxwell
Sep 17 2007	Request for extension of time filed   Counsel for respondent requests exrtension of time to 10-23-2007, to file the reply brief.
Sep 20 2007	Extension of time granted   On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the reply brief is extended to and including October 23, 2007.
Oct 10 2007	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Simon
Oct 18 2007	Request for extension of time filed   to file respondent's reply brief/merits to 11-22-07.
Oct 25 2007	Extension of time granted   On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it ordered that the time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including November 22, 2007. No further extensions are contemplated.
Nov 19 2007	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   Respondent, The People.
Apr 9 2008	Case ordered on calendar   to be argued on Wednesday, May 7, 2008, at 1:30 p.m. in San Francisco
May 7 2008	Cause argued and submitted
Jul 9 2008	Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
Jul 10 2008	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   Based on the foregoing, we reverse the Court of Appeal's judgment and remand the matter for proceedings consistent with our opinion. OPINION BY: Chin, J. --- joined by: George, C. J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ.
Jul 22 2008	Rehearing petition filed   Saul Garcia Cuevas, appellant by Roberta Simon, Counsel
Jul 29 2008	Time extended to consider modification or rehearing   The time for granting or denying rehearing in the above-entitled case is hereby extended to and including October 8, 2008, or the date upon which rehearing is either granted or denied, whichever occurs first.
Aug 13 2008	Rehearing denied
Aug 13 2008	Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Aug 21 2008	Received:   receipt for remittitur from CA 2/6
Oct 16 2008	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Simon
Oct 20 2008	Note:   records returned to CA 2/6 (2 vols.)
Mar 26 2009	Received:   2 doghouses from CA 2/6
Jun 30 2009	Returned record   2 doghouses (attention: Jim Terry)
Jul 8 2009	Received:   two doghouses

Briefs
Apr 11 2007	Opening brief on the merits filed
Aug 29 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed
Nov 19 2007	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website