Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 6/15/06

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S128884
v.
Ct. App. 5 F041563
ROBERT NICHOLAS CORPUZ,
Kern
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. SC084193A

We granted review to construe the stalking statute, which makes it a felony to
engage in certain defined conduct when “there is a temporary restraining order,
injunction, or any other court order in effect prohibiting” that “behavior . . . against the
same party.” (Pen. Code § 646.9, subd. (b), italics added; hereafter section 646.9(b).)1
We must decide whether the italicized language includes a so-called stay away order
imposed as a condition of probation. We conclude, based upon the statute’s language and
history, that it does.
I
Defendant had a two-year-old child with his former girlfriend, Evelia Chavez. In
2001 defendant was arrested after pushing and shoving Chavez. Based upon that
incident, defendant was convicted of “spousal battery” (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)), a
misdemeanor, and was placed on probation for a three-year term, which included the

1
All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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following requirement: “Defendant ordered to stay away from Evie Chavez during
probationary period.”
Defendant and Chavez thereafter resumed their relationship but stopped dating in
March 2002 when Chavez became involved with a previous boyfriend. Subsequently, on
three separate occasions, defendant went to the department store where Chavez was
employed and attempted to speak with her. On one occasion, he pulled her arm and shirt
upon learning that she was involved with another man.
At approximately 11:30 p.m. on April 25, 2002, defendant contacted Chavez on
her cell phone, and grew upset after he came to believe that she and the baby were with
Chavez’s boyfriend. Defendant threatened Chavez, telling her: “I’m going to kick your
ass and watch you and your boyfriend. When I see you guys together I’m going to shoot
you guys.” Immediately thereafter, defendant left numerous threatening telephone
messages for Chavez. Later that same night Chavez drove from her girlfriend’s home to
her own home. After Chavez parked her car about midnight, defendant emerged from
some bushes and repeatedly punched and kicked the driver’s side window and door while
attempting to open the locked car. Chavez backed out of her driveway and called 911 on
her cell phone as defendant ran after her.
Defendant was arrested, prosecuted, and eventually convicted by a jury of, among
other things, felony stalking (§ 646.9(b)), for which he was sentenced to the middle term
of three years in prison.
Defendant argued on appeal that his conviction under section 646.9(b) must be
reversed because the probationary “stay away” order upon which the conviction was
based does not fall within the meaning of “any other court order” as used in that statutory
subdivision. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant, concluding that although a
stay-away condition of probation is indeed a court order, a felony stalking conviction
cannot be based upon a violation of a condition of probation. The appellate court
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accordingly reduced defendant’s stalking conviction under section 646.9(b) to a
misdemeanor under section 646.9, subdivision (a), and remanded for resentencing.
We granted the People’s petition for review. We reverse the judgment rendered
by the Court of Appeal.
II
Section 646.9, subdivision (a), describes a “wobbler” offense — that is, a crime
punishable as either a misdemeanor (by incarceration in county jail) or a felony (by
incarceration in state prison). The statute provides: “Any person who willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follows or willfully and maliciously harasses another person
and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for
his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family is guilty of the crime of
stalking, punishable by imprisonment in the county jail . . . or . . . in the state prison.”
Section 649.9(b), which we must construe in this case, describes a straight felony
offense. It provides: “Any person who violates subdivision (a) when there is a
temporary restraining order, injunction, or any other court order in effect prohibiting the
behavior described in subdivision (a) against the same party, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years.” (Italics added.) In other
words, the conduct described in subdivision (a) of the statute becomes a felony when, at
the time the act is committed, any of the conditions described in section 646.9(b) exist.
The plain language of the relevant condition — “or any other court order” —
includes a stay-away order issued as a condition of probation. Any ambiguity or doubt in
this respect is dispelled by the history of the provision, which discloses the Legislature’s
intent to include, in the quoted phrase, orders issued as a condition of probation.
As originally enacted in 1990, a violation of section 646.9, subdivision (a) — the
basic stalking provision — was designated a misdemeanor. (Stats. 1990, ch. 1527, § 1,
pp. 7143-7144.) Under subdivision (b) of the statute as enacted, a violation of
subdivision (a) “when there is a temporary restraining order or an injunction, or both, in
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effect, prohibiting the behavior described in subdivision (a) against the same party” was
expressly punishable as a wobbler. (Id., at p. 7144.)
Subsequent to its adoption, the statute was amended on numerous occasions in
order to strengthen its provisions and increase the punishment provided. The first of
these amendments — Senate Bill No. 1342 — was introduced by Senator Royce (sponsor
of the original measure as well) in late January 1992. That bill proposed to modify the
statute in three general ways, including by providing a new subdivision (c) that
additionally would designate as a wobbler a violation of the statute by “[a]ny person who
violates subdivision (a) when that person is on probation or parole on the condition that
they are prohibited from the behavior described in subdivision (a) against the same party
. . . .” (Sen. Bill No. 1342 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.), as introduced Jan. 29, 1992, § 1, some
italics deleted.) The Legislative Counsel’s Digest prepared for the bill treated this
proposed amendment as linked with the “temporary restraining order or an injunction”
provision, section 646.9(b).2
Thereafter, Senate Bill No. 1342 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) itself was amended on
April 21, 1992, to provide that the newly proposed subdivision (c), described above, be
eliminated, and to modify subdivision (b) to read — as it does today — as applicable
“when there is a temporary restraining order, injunction, or any other court order in
effect prohibiting the behavior described in subdivision (a) against the same party . . . .”

2
The Legislative Counsel’s Digest divided the various amendments proposed by
Senate Bill No. 1342 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) into three categories, and addressed the
final category as follows: “(3) Under existing law, any person who violates a temporary
restraining order or an injunction, or both, that prohibits the behavior described in
(1) [section 646.9, subdivision (a)] against the same party is punishable as a misdemeanor
or a felony, as specified. [¶] This bill would provide, with respect to a person granted
probation or release on parole upon the condition that they are prohibited from the
behavior described in (1) [section 646.9, subdivision (a)] against the same party, that a
violation of that condition is punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony, as specified . . . .”
4

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(Sen. Bill No. 1342 (1992 Reg. Sess.), as amended Apr. 21, 1992, § 1, some italics
deleted.) Once again, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest prepared for the bill treated both
of these proposed changes as linked.3
This coordinated treatment of proposed subdivision (c) and its reference to
probation conditions, and the eventual withdrawal of that proposed subdivision together
with the simultaneous addition to subdivision (b) of the inclusive language at issue in this
case, convinces us that the Legislature intended, by the April 21, 1992, amendment of
Senate Bill No. 1342 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) and the eventual adoption of that amended
bill, to incorporate probation conditions (including stay-away orders such as the one at
issue in the present case) within section 646.9(b)’s phrase “or any other court order.”
Defendant contests this interpretation of the foregoing legislative history. Relying
upon three documents, he asserts that they “demonstrate[] affirmatively that the
[L]egislature did not intend that additional punishment be imposed for stalking in
violation of conditions of probation . . . .” We disagree.
The first document, apparently dated April 2, 1992, is from the Sacramento
Legislative Office of the Los Angeles District Attorney and is titled “Explanation of
Proposed Amendments to SB 1342 (Royce).” According to defendant, this document

3
The relevant part of the Legislative Counsel’s Digest was as follows: “(3) Under
existing law, any person who violates a temporary restraining order or an injunction, or
both, that prohibits the behavior described in (1) [section 646.9, subdivision (a)] against
the same party is punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony, as specified. [¶] This bill
would provide, with respect to a person granted probation or released on parole upon the
condition that they are prohibited from the behavior described in (1) [section 646.9,
subdivision (a)] against the same party, that a violation of that condition is punishable as
a misdemeanor or a felony, as specified. . . . [¶] This bill would additionally provide that
any person who violates any other court order in effect prohibiting the behavior
described in [section 646.9, subdivision (a)] against the same party is guilty of a
misdemeanor or a felony, as specified.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1342
(1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 21, 1992.)
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was located in the Senate Committee on Judiciary’s bill file for Senate Bill No. 1342
(1991-1992 Reg. Sess.). The second document, dated April 7, 1992, stamped “working
copy,” and prepared for a hearing on April 7, 1992, appears to be a product of the Senate
Committee on Judiciary, analyzing Senate Bill No. 1342 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) as
introduced and stating that the bill “reflects author’s amendments to be offered in
committee.” The third document, dated April 21, 1992, and also stamped “working
copy,” is, according to defendant, the “Third Reading floor analysis of SB 1342 from the
Legislative Bill file of the Assembly Committee on Public Safety . . . .”
Of these documents, only the latter two were generated by the Legislature itself.
As defendant acknowledges, neither of those documents refers to ― let alone discusses
or analyzes ― the deletion of proposed subdivision (c) and/or the simultaneous addition
of the phrase “or any other court order” to section 646.9(b). Accordingly, neither
illuminates the Legislature’s intent in taking this action.4 The first document, prepared by
the Los Angeles District Attorney’s legislative office, does mention proposed subdivision
(c), but not subdivision (b). As defendant emphasizes, that document asserts in part:
“Subdivision (c) is not necessary and is in fact redundant if a higher penalty is imposed
for a second or subsequent conviction.”
The District Attorney’s cryptic comment apparently referred to subdivision (c) of
the original statute (redesignated as subdivision (d) in the January 29 version of Senate
Bill No. 1342 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.), presently once again designated as subdivision
(c)), which always has provided for increased punishment for a second or subsequent
conviction involving the same victim. From this, defendant — echoing a similar

4
Subsequent legislative history documents do refer to the April 21, 1992,
amendment expanding section 646.9(b) (to include the phrase “or any other court order”),
but they do not contain any analysis or description of that change. (See, e.g., Assem.
Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1342 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) for
hearing on June 30, 1992.)
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argument advanced by the Court of Appeal in its opinion below — appears to suggest,
first, that the eventual deletion of the version of subdivision (c) containing the probation-
condition language was undertaken at least partially in response to the Los Angeles
District Attorney’s suggestion that the provision was unnecessary insofar as penalty was
concerned, and second, that the simultaneous expansion of section 646.9(b) to include the
language “or any other court order” was wholly unrelated to this change in that version of
subdivision (c). Even assuming the first point, the second proposition does not follow.
In any event, the latter proposition finds no support in any document that we have seen,
and as demonstrated above, the relevant history strongly suggests otherwise: that the two
changes indeed were linked and coordinated, and that the April 21 amendments reflected,
at least in part, an intent to expand section 646.9(b) to include probation orders such as
the one here at issue. We find no basis upon which to conclude that the Legislature
actually may have intended, by the April 21 amendment, to accomplish something other
than what is implied by the history we have surveyed.
Finally, defendant discerns support for his view in a further change made to Senate
Bill No. 1342 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) on July 6, 1992. On that date, the bill sponsor
proposed a new subdivision (presently § 646.9, subd. (k)) allowing a court to issue an
order restraining a defendant from contact with a victim for a period of up to 10 years.
Defendant suggests the challenged language (“or any other court order”) that was added
to section 646.9(b) on April 21, 1992, must have been included at that time so as to
accommodate the sponsor’s future amendment — made two and a half months later —
permitting a court to issue long-term restraining orders that would last up to 10 years.
And yet, defendant implicitly argues, the same April 21 amendment did not contemplate
inclusion of violations of stay away orders issued in connection with a grant of probation.
In light of the history recounted above, we find defendant’s reading to be implausible. It
is much more likely that the April 21 amendment — which, as noted earlier,
simultaneously eliminated formerly proposed subdivision (c) and its reference to
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probation conditions prohibiting stalking behavior and added the phrase, “or any other
court order” to subdivision (b) — was coordinated and designed to fold probation orders
such as the one here at issue into the amended inclusive language of subdivision (b).
III
The judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal is reversed.
GEORGE,
C.
J.
WE CONCUR:

KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
HOLLENHORST, J.*

* Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Corpuz
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 122 Cal.App.4th 804
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S128884
Date Filed: June 15, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Kern
Judge: Robert T. Baca*

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Oliver J. Northup, Jr., under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, J. Robert Jibson, Janet E. Neeley and Judy Kaida,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

*Retired judge of the Kern Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Oliver J. Northup, Jr.
4006 Cowell Boulevard
Davis, CA 95616
(530) 758-0458

Judy Kaida
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
(916) 327-0306

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Thu, 06/15/2006	S128884

Disposition
Jun 15 2006	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Oct 29 2004	Petition for review filed   Respondent ( People).
Nov 1 2004	Record requested
Nov 3 2004	Received Court of Appeal record   one doghouse
Nov 18 2004	Answer to petition for review filed   By counsel for appellant {Robert Nicholas Corpuz}.
Dec 15 2004	Petition for review granted (criminal case)   Baxter, J., is recused and did not participate. Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Werdegar, and Moreno, JJ.
Jan 6 2005	Counsel appointment order filed   Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, Oliver J. Northup is hereby appointed to represent appellant on his appeal now pending in this court. Appelllant's brief on the merits must be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date respondent's opening brief on the merits is filed.
Jan 7 2005	Opening brief on the merits filed   In Sacramento by counsel for Respondent {The People}.
Jan 7 2005	Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)   In Sacramento by counsel for Respondent.
Feb 9 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed   By counsel for appellant {Robert Nicholas Corpuz} / CRC 40.1(b).
Feb 9 2005	Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)   Appellant{Robert Nicholas Corpuz}.
Feb 23 2005	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   In Sacramento by counsel for respondent {The People}.
Apr 28 2005	Change of contact information filed for:   Counsel for appellant.
Apr 4 2006	Case ordered on calendar   Wednesday, May 3, 2006, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
Apr 21 2006	Request for judicial notice granted   Respondent's motion for judicial notice, filed January 7, 2005, is granted as to Exhibits A and B, and denied as to Exhibit C. Appellant's motion for judicial notice, filed February 9, 2005, is granted.
May 3 2006	Cause argued and submitted
Jun 7 2006	Note:   People's Exhibit No. 3 returned to CA 5.
Jun 15 2006	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   Opinion by: George, C.J. -----Joined by: Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, Corrigan, J.J. Hollenhorst, J. Associate Justine, Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Jul 20 2006	Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Jul 27 2006	Received:   Receipt for Remittitur - CA5D
Aug 17 2006	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Morris

Briefs
Jan 7 2005	Opening brief on the merits filed
Feb 9 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed
Feb 23 2005	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)

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