Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S120474
People v. American Contractors


Filed 7/22/04

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S120474
v.
Ct.App. 4/2 E031426
AMERICAN CONTRACTORS
INDEMNITY CO.,
Orange
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. 99NF2727

When a person for whom a bail bond has been posted fails without
sufficient excuse to appear as required, the trial court must declare a forfeiture of
the bond. (Pen. Code,1 § 1305, subd. (a).) The surety that posted the bond then
has a statutory “appearance” period in which either to produce the accused in court
and have the forfeiture set aside, or to demonstrate other circumstances requiring
the court to vacate the forfeiture. If the forfeiture is not set aside by the end of the
appearance period, the court is required to enter summary judgment against the
surety. (§ 1306, subd. (a).) The issue in this case is whether a summary judgment
entered on the last day of the appearance period, or one day prematurely, is void or
merely voidable. We also consider whether the surety may collaterally attack the
premature judgment 11 months after its entry.

1
All further undesignated statutory references are to this code.
1



We conclude the premature summary judgment entered here was voidable,
and not void. Thus, while it was subject to correction by appeal or a timely
motion to vacate the judgment, there is no basis under the circumstances of this
case to set it aside by collateral attack once it was final. In particular, here we
need not rely on estoppel principles, but simply on the rule that collateral attack on
a voidable but final judgment is not available absent unusual circumstances, not
present here, that precluded earlier challenge of the judgment. We therefore
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
I. BACKGROUND REGARDING BAIL BOND STATUTES
While bail bond proceedings occur in connection with criminal
prosecutions, they are independent from and collateral to the prosecutions and are
civil in nature. (People v. Wilcox (1960) 53 Cal.2d 651, 654.) “The object of bail
and its forfeiture is to insure the attendance of the accused and his obedience to the
orders and judgment of the court.” (Id. at pp. 656-657; see Stack v. Boyle (1951)
342 U.S. 1, 5 [“Like the ancient practice of securing the oaths of responsible
persons to stand as sureties for the accused, the modern practice of requiring a bail
bond or the deposit of a sum of money subject to forfeiture serves as additional
assurance of the presence of an accused”].) “In matters of this kind there should
be no element of revenue to the state nor punishment of the surety.” (Wilcox, at
p. 657.) Nevertheless, the “bail bond is a contract between the surety and the
government whereby the surety acts as a guarantor of the defendant’s appearance
in court under the risk of forfeiture of the bond.” (People v. Ranger Ins. Co.
(1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 13, 22.) Thus, when there is a breach of this contract, the
bond should be enforced. (See People v. North Beach Bonding Co. (1974) 36
Cal.App.3d 663, 675.)
When a person for whom a bail bond has been posted fails without
sufficient excuse to appear as required, the trial court must declare a forfeiture of
2

the bond. (§ 1305, subd. (a).)2 The 185 days after the date the clerk of the court
mails a notice of forfeiture (180 days plus five days for mailing) to the appropriate
parties is known as the appearance period. (§ 1305, subd. (b).) During this time,
the surety on the bond is entitled to move to have the forfeiture vacated and the
bond exonerated on certain grounds, such as an appearance in court by the
accused. (§ 1305, subd. (c)(1).) The trial court may also toll the appearance
period under certain circumstances, or extend the period by no more than 180 days
from the date the trial court orders the extension, provided that the surety files its
motion before the original 185-day appearance period expires and demonstrates
good cause for the extension. (§§ 1305, subds. (e), (i), 1305.4.)
After the appearance period expires, the trial court has 90 days to enter
summary judgment on the bond.3 (§ 1306, subds. (a), (c).)4 If summary judgment

2
Section 1305 provides in relevant part: “(a) A court shall in open court
declare forfeited the undertaking of bail or the money or property deposited as bail
if, without sufficient excuse, a defendant fails to appear for [particular procedural
events]: [¶] . . . [¶] (c)(1) If the defendant appears either voluntarily or in custody
after surrender or arrest in court within 180 days of the date of forfeiture or within
180 days of the date of mailing of the notice if the notice is required under
subdivision (b), the court shall, on its own motion at the time the defendant first
appears in court on the case in which the forfeiture was entered, direct the order of
forfeiture to be vacated and the bond exonerated. If the court fails to so act on its
own motion, then the surety’s or depositor’s obligations under the bond shall be
immediately vacated and the bond exonerated. . . .”
3
We have no occasion to consider in this case whether the filing of a motion
for extension of the appearance period (or a motion to vacate forfeiture) extends
the commencement of the 90-day period for entering summary judgment. (See
§§ 1305, subd. (i), 1305.4, 1306, subd. (a); cf. People v. Granite State Ins. Co.
(2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 758, 763, 770 [timely motion to vacate forfeiture decided
after expiration of appearance period results in 90-day summary judgment period
commencing after motion denied].)
4
Section 1306 provides in relevant part: “(a) When any bond is forfeited
and the period of time specified in Section 1305 has elapsed without the forfeiture
having been set aside, the court which has declared the forfeiture, regardless of the

(footnote continued on next page)
3



is not entered within the statutory 90-day period, the bond is exonerated. (§ 1306,
subd. (c).)
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The relevant facts are undisputed and taken largely from the Court of Appeal
opinion. On September 19, 1999, defendant American Contractors Indemnity
Company (ACIC) issued a $50,000 bail bond to secure the release of Juan P.
Garcia (Garcia or accused), a criminal defendant. On August 7, 2000, Garcia
failed to appear for trial, and the bail bond was ordered forfeited. On August 14,
2000, the clerk of the court mailed notice of forfeiture to ACIC and its bail agent.
February 15, 2001, was the 185th day after the notice of forfeiture was
mailed. On the same date, the trial court entered summary judgment against ACIC
on the bail bond. The summary judgment was therefore premature because it was
entered on the last day of the appearance period. ACIC did not appeal the
judgment, which became final 60 days from the mailing of the notice of entry of
judgment in February 2001.5 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2(a)(1).)

(footnote continued from previous page)

amount of the bail, shall enter a summary judgment against each bondsman named
in the bond in the amount for which the bondsman is bound. The judgment shall
be the amount of the bond plus costs, and notwithstanding any other law, no
penalty assessments shall be levied or added to the judgment. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) If,
because of the failure of any court to promptly perform the duties enjoined upon it
pursuant to this section, summary judgment is not entered within 90 days after the
date upon which it may first be entered, the right to do so expires and the bail is
exonerated.”
5
While it is unclear from the record, ACIC does not dispute that notice of
entry of judgment was given. Moreover, section 1308, subdivision (b) provides,
“The clerk of the court in which the judgment is rendered shall serve notice of the
entry of judgment upon the judgment debtor within five days after the date of the
entry of the summary judgment.” We presume, particularly in the absence of any

(footnote continued on next page)
4



On February 14, 2001, the day before summary judgment was entered, ACIC
filed a motion to extend the appearance period. On March 5, 2001, the trial court
ordered the appearance period extended to October 5, 2001.6 On March 6, 2001,
the People filed a demand for payment of the summary judgment, and on
December 13 and 18, 2001, respectively, the People served and filed an amended
demand for payment.
On January 7, 2002, 94 days after October 5, 2001, ACIC filed a motion to
set aside the summary judgment, discharge the forfeiture, and exonerate the bail.
It argued that the summary judgment was void because it was entered prematurely.
Assuming that the summary judgment had never been entered, the last day
the trial court could have entered summary judgment was January 3, 2002, 90 days
after the expiration of the appearance period, and 4 days before ACIC filed its
motion. Garcia was not produced in court at any time relevant to these
proceedings.
The trial court denied the motion to set aside the judgment, discharge the
forfeiture, and exonerate the bail. It stated that the extension of the appearance
time granted in March 2001 “was in essence without basis and void” because the
time to request such an extension had already expired. The court further stated the

(footnote continued from previous page)

indication by ACIC otherwise, that the clerk performed this duty. (Evid. Code,
§ 664 [“It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed”].) The
judgment was therefore final 60 days after the mailing of such notice, or long
before ACIC’s January 2002 motion to set aside the summary judgment. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 2(a)(1).)
6
It is not clear on what basis this extension was granted, given summary
judgment had previously been entered on February 15, 2001. Nor is any argument
made regarding the validity of the trial court’s extension of the appearance period
for more than the statutorily allowed 180 days.
5



summary judgment was not premature. Even if it was premature, the court found
the surety had failed to timely raise the issue, and hence it lacked jurisdiction to
grant the motion. Finally, even if there was jurisdiction, the court concluded the
motion should be denied on the grounds of unclean hands and waiver.
The Court of Appeal affirmed. Expressly disagreeing with People v. Ranger
Ins. Co. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1229 (Ranger) and People v. International Fidelity
Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 470 (International Fidelity), it concluded the
prematurely entered summary judgment was merely voidable, not void, and that
ACIC’s challenge to the judgment was barred by the doctrines of estoppel and
disfavor of collateral attack.
We granted ACIC’s petition for review.
III. DISCUSSION
The parties agree that under section 1306, subdivision (c), summary
judgment in this case was premature because it was entered on the last day of the
appearance period. The issue is whether this error rendered the judgment voidable
or void, and whether, if it is merely voidable, it was subject to collateral attack
long after the judgment was final.
The term “jurisdiction,” “used continuously in a variety of situations, has so
many different meanings that no single statement can be entirely satisfactory as a
definition.” (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 287
(Abelleira).) Essentially, jurisdictional errors are of two types. “Lack of
jurisdiction in its most fundamental or strict sense means an entire absence of
power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject
matter or the parties.” (Id. at p. 288.) When a court lacks jurisdiction in a
fundamental sense, an ensuing judgment is void, and “thus vulnerable to direct or
collateral attack at any time.” (Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7
Cal.3d 94, 119 (Barquis).)
6

However, “in its ordinary usage the phrase ‘lack of jurisdiction’ is not limited
to these fundamental situations.” (Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 288.) It may
also “be applied to a case where, though the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties in the fundamental sense, it has no ‘jurisdiction’ (or power)
to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act
without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites.” (Ibid.) “[W]hen a
statute authorizes [a] prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to the
authority thus conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 290.) When a
court has fundamental jurisdiction, but acts in excess of its jurisdiction, its act or
judgment is merely voidable. (In re Marriage of Goddard (2004) 33 Cal.4th 49,
55; Conservatorship of O’Connor (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1088.) That is, its
act or judgment is valid until it is set aside, and a party may be precluded from
setting it aside by “principles of estoppel, disfavor of collateral attack or res
judicata.” (Conservatorship of O’Connor, at p. 1088.) Errors which are merely in
excess of jurisdiction should be challenged directly, for example by motion to
vacate the judgment, or on appeal, and are generally not subject to collateral attack
once the judgment is final unless “unusual circumstances were present which
prevented an earlier and more appropriate attack.” (Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
McConnell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 715, 727; id. at p. 725 [general rule is that a “final
judgment or order is res judicata” and not subject to collateral attack “even though
contrary to statute where the court has jurisdiction in the fundamental sense, i.e.,
of the subject matter and the parties”]; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996)
Jurisdiction, § 323, p. 899.)
In determining whether a prematurely entered summary judgment is void or
voidable, we look first to the language of the statute. Here, sections 1305 and
1306 expressly provide that in circumstances not present in this case, if a court or
court clerk fails to perform in a specific manner, the surety is released of all
7

obligations or the bond is exonerated. Thus, if a clerk fails to give timely notice of
the forfeiture, the surety is “released of all obligations under the bond.” (§ 1305,
subd. (b)(1); People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 799, 806-807.) Similarly, if summary judgment is entered after
expiration of the 90-day period, section 1306 expressly provides that the bond is
exonerated. (§ 1306, subd. (c) [“If, because of the failure of any court to promptly
perform the duties enjoined upon it pursuant to this section, summary judgment is
not entered within 90 days after the date upon which it may first be entered, the
right to do so expires and the bail is exonerated”]; People v. Topa Ins. Co. (1995)
32 Cal.App.4th 296, 303 [summary judgment void and bail exonerated as a matter
of law since judgment entered several months after expiration of 90-day period].)
By contrast, as the People observe, there “is no similar statutory provision
declaring the surety released from its obligations if the judgment is entered
prematurely.” Here, the bond had been forfeited, and the matter was under the
court’s jurisdiction for the 185-day period the surety has to move to set aside the
forfeiture. That the court may have failed to follow the procedural requirements to
enter judgment properly did not affect the court’s statutory control and jurisdiction
over the bond. Indeed, ACIC concedes the court had subject matter jurisdiction at
the time it prematurely entered summary judgment.
Barquis, supra, 7 Cal.3d 94, is illustrative. In Barquis, the plaintiffs alleged
the defendant collection agency violated former Code of Civil Procedure section
396a by “filing actions in improper counties, pursuant to statutorily inadequate
complaints, for the purpose of impairing its adversaries’ ability to defend these
actions, and with the intent, and effect, of obtaining an increased number of
default judgments.” (Barquis, at pp. 97-98.) Due to a statutory exception, the
general rule that failure to move for a change of venue constitutes a waiver of any
venue defects was inapplicable. (Id. at p. 115.) We nevertheless concluded that
8

“when a trial court erroneously fails to dismiss or transfer the action and the
defendant does not raise a timely objection to such error, . . . a final judgment
rendered on an inadequate complaint is not void for lack of jurisdiction and thus
cannot be set aside at any time in the future.” (Id. at p. 116.)
We observed that while former Code of Civil Procedure section 396a was
“intended to protect litigants against the evil of distantly obtained default
judgments, the section contemplates that the trial judge’s independent scrutiny of
the plaintiff’s complaint in the original action will afford such protection. . . . [I]f
the trial judge fails to discover a deficient complaint and erroneously permits the
entry of a default judgment, a defendant retains the right to challenge such
judgment either on appeal or by motion to set aside the default judgment. . . .
[S]uch error does not deprive the trial court of ‘jurisdiction’ in the fundamental
sense, and therefore . . . plaintiffs may not collaterally attack such judgments long
after they have become final.” (Barquis, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 99.) We further
observed no constitutional infirmity rendered the judgments void, given the
plaintiffs had received “notice of the full amount sought in the collection agency’s
action.” (Id. at p. 120, fn. 25.)
Similarly, the court’s failure to comply with section 1306 by prematurely
entering summary judgment “does not effect a fundamental loss of jurisdiction,
i.e., ‘an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of
authority over the subject matter or the parties.’ ” (People v. Superior Court
(Marks) (1991) 1 Cal.4th 56, 66.) As the People observe, “Here, the trial court
retained fundamental jurisdiction at the time it entered summary judgment. Under
the Penal Code, a court has jurisdiction over a bail bond from the point that it is
issued until the point it is either satisfied, exonerated, or time expires to enter
summary judgment after forfeiture.” Moreover, as in Barquis, we encounter no
“constitutional infirmities.” ACIC does not contend it did not receive notice of the
9

entry of summary judgment or the amount of that judgment. (Barquis, supra, 7
Cal.3d at p. 120, fn. 25.) The trial court’s erroneous entry of summary judgment
on the 185th instead of the 186th day did not deprive the court of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the bail bond forfeiture or personal jurisdiction over the
surety, and thus the premature entry of summary judgment was voidable, not void.
The contrary Court of Appeal conclusions in Ranger, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th
1229, and International Fidelity, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 470, do not compel a
different result. In International Fidelity, the court first concluded the surety’s
motion for an order extending the appearance period was timely filed. It then
concluded without any analysis that the “summary judgment was prematurely
entered during [the] extension period, and was therefore void.” (International
Fidelity, at p. 475.) In Ranger, the court concluded an order extending the
appearance period was valid, and “[i]t necessarily follows that the summary
judgment order . . . ‘was prematurely entered during that extension period, and
was therefore void.’ ” (Ranger, at p. 1235, quoting International Fidelity, at p.
475.) Neither case contains any discussion of the distinction between void and
voidable judgments.7
Moreover, no exceptional circumstances in this case precluded an earlier or
more appropriate attack on the premature judgment, and hence it is not subject to
collateral attack nearly a year after its entry.8 (Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
McConnell, supra, 44 Cal.2d at pp. 725, 727; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra,

7 People v. Ranger Ins. Co., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th 1229, and People
v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 470, are disapproved to
the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion.
8
ACIC makes no argument that Code of Civil Procedure section 473 applies
under these circumstances, or that its January 7, 2002, motion was timely under
this section.
10



Jurisdiction, § 323, p. 899.) A surety has the same opportunity as any other
litigant to alert a court to judicial mistakes. Here, ACIC could have moved to set
aside the judgment or appealed its erroneous entry. It did not do so.
ACIC asserts that summary judgment in a bail bond proceeding is a consent
judgment from which there is no appeal. (People v. Hodges (1928) 205 Cal. 476,
477-478 [rejecting claim that judgment was irregularly entered and dismissing
appeal]; People v. National Auto. & Cas. Co. (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 150, 152,
fn. 2 [summary judgment is a consent judgment and not appealable; “therefore,
[we] regard the matter as a premature notice of appeal from the order denying
appellant’s motion to strike and vacate the judgment, a special order after final
judgment, and, therefore, appealable”].) However, numerous courts have
reasonably held such judgments are appealable where “the judgment was not
entered in accordance with the consent given in the undertaking.” (County of Los
Angeles v. Surety Ins. Co. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1221, 1224; see, e.g., County of
Los Angeles v. American Bankers Ins. Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 792, 795
[summary judgment “ ‘not entered in compliance with the consent given’ ” is
appealable]; County of Los Angeles v. Surety Ins. Co. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 58,
60 [“While the summary judgment is regarded as a ‘consent’ judgment, it is now
established that the judgment, a final determination of the rights of the parties, is
appealable”].)
ACIC argues that had it appealed the summary judgment, “it would have
removed the trial court’s jurisdiction to consider the motion for relief from
forfeiture which was pending, since the taking of an appeal deprives the trial court
of jurisdiction to consider any ‘matters embraced therein and affected thereby.’
Code of Civ. Proc. § 916 . . . . The surety’s statutory right to seek relief from
forfeiture within the 180-day period or any extension thereof is cut off by the
premature entry of summary judgment, particularly if an appeal is taken from such
11

judgment.” ACIC also observes that “if judgment were prematurely entered and
an appeal therefrom taken, the trial court would no longer have jurisdiction to . . .
exonerate bail if the defendant were apprehended and returned to court.”
These concerns are overstated. Presumably, if the voidable summary
judgment is set aside on appeal, it is as if it was never entered. If, on the other
hand, the judgment is affirmed, it is no longer relevant, for example, whether the
defendant is subsequently produced.
ACIC argues that “premature entry of summary judgment disrupts the
orderly implementation of [the] jurisdictional time limitations and throws into
confusion the operation of the 180-day period.” It is difficult to see how such
confusion would arise. The surety is on notice of the entry of judgment, and can
move to have the judgment set aside or appeal it. Here, for example, it is likely
that the trial court would have set aside the February 15, 2001, judgment had its
premature entry been brought promptly to the court’s attention, and granted, as it
did in this case, ACIC’s previously filed motion to extend the appearance period.
ACIC relies on Tabor v. Superior Court (1946) 28 Cal.2d 505, 508, which
held that a “premature notice of intention to move for a new trial was ‘a nullity
and ineffectual for any purpose’ and that in the absence of the filing of a timely
notice, [the] court was without power to entertain the motion.” (See id. at p. 509
[“All proceedings for a new trial having been abortive in this case, [the] court
lacked jurisdiction to grant the motion, and its order purporting to grant a new trial
was ‘void and of no force or effect . . . as completely as if never entered’ ”].) As
we observed over 30 years ago in Barquis, however, Tabor is distinguishable from
cases involving collateral attacks on a voidable judgment or order because the
order in Tabor was attacked by extraordinary writ while the trial court proceeding
was ongoing, not after it was final as in this case. (Barquis, supra, 7 Cal.3d at
p. 120, fn. 25.)
12

ACIC asserts estoppel is inappropriate in this case because “Once the trial
court entered judgment prematurely, appellant had no duty to speak regarding the
court’s improvident action. Indeed, since the premature judgment was a defensive
matter which unless corrected by the People or the trial court would release
appellant from liability, appellant’s counsel had a duty to remain silent on behalf
[of] its client and to allow the defense to mature, the same as a defendant in a civil
action has a right, and his counsel a duty, to remain silent and allow a statute of
limitations defense to mature.”
Whatever the merits of such a waiting game if the judgment is void, it fails if
the judgment is, as we have concluded, voidable. In particular, here we need not
rely on estoppel principles, but simply on the rule that collateral attack on a
voidable but final judgment is not available absent unusual circumstances, not
present in this case, that precluded earlier challenge of the judgment. Rather, a
voidable judgment must be challenged while the trial court or Court of Appeal can
still correct the mistake. ACIC concedes in its above argument it knew the
judgment was premature, and deliberately waited nearly a year until after the time
to enter a timely judgment had passed, before bringing the issue to the trial court’s
attention. Thus, there is no basis for us to conclude ACIC had no means to
challenge the judgment earlier.
13

DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
BROWN, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE,
C.J.
KENNARD,
J.
BAXTER,
J.
WERDEGAR,
J.
CHIN,
J.
MORENO,
J.
14



See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. American Contractors
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion


Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 112 Cal.App.4th 613
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S120474
Date Filed: July 22, 2004
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Orange
Judge: Richard W. Stanford, Jr.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Nunez & Bernstein and E. Alan Nunez for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, and Wendy J. Phillips, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

Jennifer B. Henning and Doraine F. Meyer for California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae
on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.


15



Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

E. Alan Nunez
Nunez & Bernstein
4836 N First St., Ste. 106
Fresno, CA 93726
(559) 227-2373

Wendy J. Phillips
Deputy County Counsel
10 Civic Center Plaza, 4th Floor
Santa Ana, CA 92702-1379
(714) 834-6298

Doraine F. Meyer
648 Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration
500 West Temple Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
(213) 974-8118

16


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Thu, 07/22/2004S120474

Parties
1American Contractors Indemnity Company (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by E. Alan Nunez
Attorney at Law
4836 North First Street, Suite #106
Fresno, CA

2The People (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by Wendy Jane Phillips
Ofc Orange County Counsel
P.O. Box 1379
Santa Ana, CA

3California State Association Of Counties (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Jennifer Bacon Henning
California State Association of Counties
1100 K Street, Suite 101
Sacramento, CA

4California State Association Of Counties (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Doraine F. Meyer
648 Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration
500 West Temple Street
Los Angeles, CA


Disposition
Jul 22 2004Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Nov 13 2003Petition for review filed
  by counsel for appellant (American Contractors Indemnity Co.).
Nov 14 2003Record requested
 
Nov 19 2003Received Court of Appeal record
  one doghouse
Dec 23 2003Petition for Review Granted (civil case)
  Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown, and Moreno, JJ.
Dec 23 2003Letter sent to:
  Counsel regarding Certification of Interested Entities or Persons.
Jan 5 2004Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  by counsel for appellant (American Contractors Indemnity Company.
Jan 21 2004Opening brief on the merits filed
  In Fresno by counsel for appellant {American Contractors Indemnity Company}.
Feb 20 2004Answer brief on the merits filed
  respondent, The People.
Feb 27 2004Request for extension of time filed
  appellant American Cotnractors Indemnity Company asking to April 12 to file reply brief
Mar 5 2004Extension of time granted
  To March 31, 2004 to file appellant's Reply Brief on the Merits.
Mar 22 2004Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  California State Association of Counties in support of respondent.
Mar 24 2004Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  California State Association of Counties in support ot Respondent.
Mar 24 2004Amicus curiae brief filed
  California State Association of Counties in support of Respondent. Answer is due within twenty days.
Mar 26 2004Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  In Fresno by counsel for appellant ( American Contractors Indemnity Company}.
Apr 28 2004Case ordered on calendar
  5-26-04, S.F. @ 1:30 p.m.
May 10 2004Filed:
  request of resp to allocate oral argument time to A/C Calif. State Assn of Counties
May 19 2004Order filed
  Permission granted for two counsel to present oral argument for resp.
May 19 2004Order filed
  permission granted for resp to allocate 10 min. of oral argument time to A/C Calif. State Association of Counties.
May 26 2004Cause argued and submitted
 
Jul 22 2004Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
  Majority Opinion by Brown, J. ----- Joined by George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin and Moreno, JJ.
Aug 26 2004Remittitur issued (civil case)
 
Sep 8 2004Received:
  receipt for remittitur.

Briefs
Jan 21 2004Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Feb 20 2004Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Mar 24 2004Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Mar 26 2004Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website