IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
Plaintiff and Respondent,
TRACY F. ALFORD,
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. 146177
Penal Code section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1)1 requires the imposition of a
$20 court security fee “on every conviction for a criminal offense . . . .” The
questions here are whether the fee is subject to section 3’s general prohibition
against retroactive application of a newly enacted law, and whether imposition of
the fee for a crime committed before the effective date of the statute violates state
and federal prohibitions against ex post facto laws. We hold that section 3 is not
implicated and that the fee does not violate the prohibition against ex post facto
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 10, 2003, Tracy F. Alford (defendant) robbed a grocery store in
Oakland. He was charged with second degree robbery and personal use of a
firearm. Defendant was also alleged to have eight prior serious felony
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On January 18, 2005, defendant was convicted of robbery, but not gun use.
In a bifurcated jury trial, the prior convictions were found true.
Defendant was sentenced to prison for 40 years to life. The court also
imposed the court security fee under section 1465.8, which took effect shortly
after the defendant committed the robbery, but before he was convicted. The
Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, including imposition of the court security
fee. Here we consider only the fee’s imposition.
The court security fee is set out in section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1)
(section 1465.8(a)(1)), which provides in pertinent part: “To ensure and maintain
adequate funding for court security, a fee of twenty dollars ($20) shall be imposed
on every conviction for a criminal offense, including a traffic offense, except
parking offenses as defined in subdivision (i) of Section 1463, involving a
violation of a section of the Vehicle Code or any local ordinance adopted pursuant
to the Vehicle Code.” Section 1465.8 was enacted as part of Assembly Bill No.
1759 (Assembly Bill 1759.) (Stats. 2003, ch. 159, § 25.) It became operative on
August 17, 2003, approximately two months after defendant robbed the grocery
store. (Stats. 2003, ch. 159, §§ 25, 27.)2 As explained in greater detail below, the
“ ‘The effective date [of a statute] is . . . the date upon which the statute
came into being as an existing law.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he operative date is the date
upon which the directives of the statute may be actually implemented.’ [Citation.]
Although the effective and operative dates of a statute are often the same, the
Legislature may ‘postpone the operation of certain statutes until a later time.’
[Citation.]” (Preston v. State Bd. of Equalization (2001) 25 Cal.4th 197, 223.)
Assembly Bill 1759 became effective on August 2, 2003. According to
Assembly Bill 1759, section 1465.8 was to become operative on the 15th day after
the effective date of the bill, or on July 1, 2003, whichever was later, contingent
on specified appropriations in the Budget Act of 2003. The Budget Act of 2003,
which was effective on August 2, 2003, included these appropriations. Thus,
section 1465.8 became operative on August 17, 2003. (See Stats. 2003, ch. 159, §
Assembly Bill 1759 was one of a number of trailer bills related to the 2003-2004
Penal Code Section 3
Defendant urges that imposition of the fee is barred because his criminal
conduct occurred before the law’s effective date. Defendant relies on Penal Code
section 3, which provides: “No part of [the Penal Code] is retroactive, unless
expressly so declared.” (Italics added.) We have previously construed the statute
to mean, “[a] new statute is generally presumed to operate prospectively absent an
express declaration of retroactivity or a clear and compelling implication that the
Legislature intended otherwise. [Citation.]” (People v. Hayes (1989) 49 Cal.3d
As its own language makes clear, section 3 is not intended to be a
“straitjacket.” “Where the Legislature has not set forth in so many words what it
intended, the rule of construction should not be followed blindly in complete
disregard of factors that may give a clue to the legislative intent. It is to be applied
only after, considering all pertinent factors, it is determined that it is impossible to
ascertain the legislative intent.” (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 746.) Even
without an express declaration, a statute may apply retroactively if there is “ ‘a
clear and compelling implication’ ” that the Legislature intended such a result.
(People v. Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150, 157 (Grant) quoting People v. Hayes,
supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1274).)
Section 1465.8’s legislative history supports the conclusion the Legislature
intended to impose the court security fee to all convictions after its operative date.
The fee was projected to generate $34 million in revenue and the Budget
Act of 2003 reduced, by that same amount, support for the trial courts from the
General Fund. (Assem. Com. on Budget, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill 1759
(2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) July 27, 2003, p. 7; Legis. Analyst, Rep. to Joint Legis.
Budget Com., analysis of 2003-2004 Budget Bill, Assem. Bill 1759 (2003-2004
Reg. Sess.) p. 5.) We are persuaded that the Legislature necessarily anticipated
the full realization of the $34 million to be generated by the court security fee
during the budget year. This intent is clearly manifest in its action to reduce
General Fund financing for the year by that concomitant amount. Imposing the
court security fee only on defendants who committed a crime after section 1465.8
became operative would not have produced the needed revenue in the budget year.
The income would only be realized at some future time as the cases wended their
way through the system. The enactment of section 1465.8 as part of an urgency
measure to implement the Budget Act of 2003 reveals the Legislature’s intent to
implement the directives of section 1465.8 immediately after it became operative.
(Stats. 2003, ch. 159, § 29 [“In order to provide for changes to implement the
Budget Act of 2003, it is necessary that this act take effect immediately”].)
Defendant argues that because section 1465.8 did not become operative on
the same date it became effective, the Legislature could not have intended it to
take effect immediately. We disagree. “[T]he postponement of the operative date
of the legislation . . . does not mean that the Legislature intended to limit its
application to transactions occurring after that date. [Citation.] . . . . The
Legislature may do so for reasons other than an intent to give the statute
prospective effect. For example, the Legislature may delay the operation of a
statute to allow ‘persons and agencies affected by it to become aware of its
existence and to comply with its terms.’ [Citation.] In addition, the Legislature
may wish ‘to give lead time to the governmental authorities to establish machinery
for the operation of or implementation of the new law.’ [Citation.] A later
operative date may also ‘provide time for emergency clean-up amendments and
the passage of interrelated legislation.’ [Citation.] Finally, a later operative date
may simply be ‘a date of convenience . . . for bookkeeping, retirement or other
reasons.’ [Citation.]” (Preston v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
pp. 223-224.) This case is an example of how and why the Legislature uses
delayed operation provisions. Section 1465.8 became operative only if certain
other provisions of the Budget Act of 2003 were enacted. (Stats. 2003, ch. 159, §
27.) The $20 court security fee was just one of a number of surcharges
implemented by the Legislature when it enacted Assembly Bill 1759. (People v.
Wallace (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 867, 875-876.) Thus, it is understandable that
the Legislature prudently delayed the operative date of section 1465.8 to ensure
that the Budget Act of 2003 was enacted. The delayed operation also ensured that
the courts were prepared to establish collection procedures for the fees. (Preston
v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 223-224.)
The legislative history of section 1465.8 makes clear that the Legislature
intended the fee to operate as quickly as feasible, consistent with the overall goals
of the Budget Act of 2003. Thus, we conclude that section 3 is not implicated in
The ex post facto prohibitions
Article I, section 10, clause 1 of the federal Constitution and article I,
section 9 of the state Constitution prohibit the passage of ex post facto laws.
(Grant, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p.158.) California’s ex post facto law is analyzed in
the same manner as the federal prohibition. (Ibid.) “[T]he ex post facto clauses of
the state and federal Constitutions are ‘aimed at laws that “retroactively alter the
definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.” ’ ” (Grant, at p.
158 quoting California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales (1995) 514 U.S. 499,
504.) Here, the court security fee does not alter the definition of a crime; the
question is whether it increases punishment. In making this determination we
consider “whether the Legislature intended the provision to constitute punishment
and, if not, whether the provision is so punitive in nature or effect that it must be
found to constitute punishment despite the Legislature’s contrary intent.” (People
v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 795.)
“If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the
inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil
and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is ‘ “so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention” to deem it
“civil.” ’ [Citations.] Because we ‘ordinarily defer to the legislature’s stated
intent,’ [citation], ‘ “only the clearest proof ” ’ will suffice to override legislative
intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal
penalty, ’ [citations].” (Smith v. Doe (2003) 538 U.S. 84, 92; see also People v.
Castellanos, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 794-795.)
The legislative history demonstrates that the court security fee was enacted
as part of an emergency budgetary measure for the nonpunitive purpose of funding
court security. (People v. Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at pp. 874-878.) 3
“The stated reason for enacting the $20 court security fee appears in section
1465.8, subdivision (a)(1), ‘To ensure and maintain adequate funding for court
security . . . .’ The maintenance of ‘adequate funding for court security’ purposes
is unambiguously a nonpunitive objective. Assembly Bill No. 1759 was one of 24
trailer bills which were part of a ‘mechanism to implement critical provisions’ of
the fiscal year 2003-2004 state budget. (Assem. 3d reading analysis of Assem.
Bill No. 1759, as introduced Mar. 11, 2003, p. 1.) The only expressed rationale
for making Assembly Bill No. 1759 an urgency statute was a budgetary reason, ‘In
order to provide for changes to implement the Budget Act of 2003, it is necessary
that this act take effect immediately.’ (Stats. 2003, ch. 159, § 29.) Moreover, the
$20 court security fee was imposed not merely upon persons convicted of [a]
crime. Government Code section 69926.5, subdivision (a), which was adopted
pursuant to section 19 of Assembly Bill No. 1759, required a $20 court security
Wallace also provides an extensive list of the statutory changes contained
in Assembly Bill 1759 that support the conclusion that the court security fee
enacted as part of a budget measure. In addition to imposing the $20 court
security fee, these changes included, inter alia: “increases in fees under specified
circumstances in small claims actions (Code Civ. Proc., § 116.230; Stats. 2003, ch.
159, §§ 1-2); imposing new costs for issuance of documents relative to the
enforcement of small claims judgments (Code Civ. Proc., § 116.820; Stats, 2003,
ch. 159, § 3) . . . increased filing fees in civil actions (Gov. Code, § 26826.4; Stats.
2003, ch. 159, § 8); increased fees in probate actions (Gov. Code, § 26827; Stats.
2003, ch. 159, §§ 9-10.” (People v. Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 872.)
surcharge also be imposed on the first paper filed on behalf of a plaintiff or a
defendant in any limited and unlimited civil action or special proceeding and in
probate matters. (Stats. 2003, ch. 159, § 19; Gov. Code, §§ 26820.4, 26826,
26827, 72055, 72056.) Moreover, section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(2) requires that
the $20 surcharge be imposed when a traffic violation charge is dismissed because
the alleged violator attends traffic school. Further, section 1465.8, subdivision (c)
requires that the $20 court security fee be collected when bail is posted—a
scenario which includes arrestees who will never be charged in an information,
indictment, or complaint with a crime. Additionally, section 1465.8 could only go
into effect if specified levels of trial court funding were enacted by the Legislature.
(Stats. 2003, ch. 159, § 27.) Although it conceivably could happen, it is difficult
to divine a punitive purpose for a fee that would go into effect only if specified
trial court funding levels ($2,186,864,000 ‘or more’ for item 0450-101-0932 and
$1,001,001,000 ‘or more’ for item 0450-111-0001 in the 2003 Budget Act) were
enacted. (Ibid.) ” (Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at pp. 875-876.)
The Legislature generally does not adopt punitive statutes that are
dependent on “trial court funding levels in budget line items.” (People v. Wallace,
supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 876.) The Legislature also referred to the $20
amount due upon conviction by a nonpunitive term, labeling it as a “fee” and not a
“fine.” (Ibid.) Considering these factors in conjunction with the express
legislative purpose of “maintain[ing] adequate funding for court security” (§
1465.8(a)(1)), the Wallace court concluded the fee was imposed for a nonpunitive
purpose. (Wallace, at p. 876.) Because the legislative intent is clear, the analysis
Defendant notes that Government Code section 69926.5, which is cited in
People v. Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th 867, was repealed by its own terms,
operative January 1, 2006. (See Stats. 2005, ch. 75, § 115.) Defendant urges the
$20 court security fee now only applies to criminal actions and thus reflects the
Legislature’s intent that the fee is punitive in nature. This argument fails.
The court security fee is not so punitive in nature or effect that it constitutes
punishment. The United States Supreme Court has articulated certain
nonexclusive factors governing this determination. “The factors most relevant to
our analysis are whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: has
been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes an
affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has
a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this
purpose.” (Smith v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 97; see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez (1963) 372 U.S. 144, 168-169.) Only the “clearest proof” will suffice to
override the Legislature’s intent and transform a civil remedy into a criminal
punishment. (People v. Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 876.) We conclude
the fee is not so punitive as to override the Legislature’s express intent.
Fines arising from convictions are generally considered punishment.
(People v. Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 877.) However, several
countervailing considerations undermine a punitive characterization. The purpose
Government Code section 69926.5 was amended (and repealed by its own
terms) as part of Assembly Bill 145 which became operative on January 1, 2006.
However, the Legislature simply replaced this statute with a “uniform civil fee
structure.” (Stats. 2005, ch. 75, § 1, subds. (d), (e).)
The uniform civil fee structure was created to, “establish a uniform
schedule of filing fees and other civil fees for the superior courts. Among other
things, [Assembly Bill 145] would generally increase the filing fees for civil
actions and proceedings, including, but not limited to, those fees related to small
claims court, motions, appeals, judgments, the filing of the first paper in a civil
action or proceeding in the superior court, in a limited civil case, and in complex
cases, and in family law and probate matters, and fees for various certifications,
recordings, filings, and the authentication of documents.” (Leg. Counsel’s Dig.,
Assem. Bill 145 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.).) The Legislature acted to “streamline
and simplify civil fees, provide for uniformity in different counties, address the
funding shortfall occurring under the current fee structure, and significantly
improve financial stability, accountability, and predictability in the courts.” (Stats.
2005, ch. 75, § 1, subd. (d).) Thus, the legislative changes were made to increase
efficiency in how civil fees were imposed, and there is no indication that there was
a change in the Legislature’s intent with respect to section 1465.8.
of the court security fee was not to punish but to ensure adequate funding for court
security. (Ibid.) The fee is not imposed only in a criminal context. “[T]he same
fee is imposed in limited and unlimited civil and probate cases as well.” (Ibid.)
Finally, whether or not the fee provision became effective was completely
dependent on the funding of other budget line items. (Ibid.)
Whether the court security fee imposes an affirmative disability or restraint
depends on how the challenged statute affects those subject to it. “If the disability
or restraint is minor and indirect, its effects are unlikely to be punitive.” (Smith v.
Doe, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 100.) A $20 fee is relatively small, and less onerous
than other consequences that have been held to be nonpunitive.
For example, in holding that Alaska’s sex offender registration act was not
punitive, the high court stated, “The Act imposes no physical restraint, and so does
not resemble the punishment of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic
affirmative disability or restraint. [Citation.] The Act’s obligations are less harsh
than the sanctions of occupational debarment, which we have held to be
nonpunitive. [Citations.]” (Smith v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 100.) We have
likewise held California’s sex offender registration requirement and the compelled
submission of convicted felons to AIDS testing,5 to be nonpunitive for ex post
facto purposes. (People v. Castellanos, supra, 21 Cal.4th 785, 799 [sex offender
registration]; People v. McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, 90 [submission to AIDS
testing].) The impact of the $20 fee is minimal in comparison to these registration
and testing requirements.6 Other examples of far more onerous postcrime
disabilities that have survived ex post facto challenges include allowing the
See Penal Code section 1202.1.
Defendant cites People v. Schoeb (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 861, 865-866
where the court held that section 1465.8 requires imposition of the $20 fee for
each count for which a defendant is convicted. He argues that the $20 fee is thus
punitive because the amount collected could become substantial. That defendant
may choose to commit a number of crimes does not change the fact that the $20
fee in connection with each is small.
relaxation of procedures used to find juvenile probation violations, (John L. v.
Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 158, 171-186), the denial of rehabilitation and
pardon applications to sex offenders, (People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868, 883-
893), and the postprison commitment of an individual as a sexually violent
predator, (Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1170-1179.) In
People v. Rivera (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 705, 707-711 the court concluded a “jail
booking fee” of $135 and “jail classification fee” of $33 were not properly
classified as punishment. Thus we conclude that the fee at issue here does not
impose an affirmative disability or restraint for the purposes of our ex post facto
We look next to whether the court security fee promotes the traditional
aims of punishment: retribution or deterrence. (See People v. Castellanos, supra,
21 Cal.4th at p. 804 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) The stated purpose of the
court security fee is “[t]o ensure and maintain adequate funding for court
security. . . .” (§ 1465.8(a)(1).) As originally enacted, the fee was “part of an
extensive statutory scheme applicable to both criminal and specified civil cases
designed to fund and coordinate court security . . . .” (People v. Wallace, supra,
120 Cal.App.4th at p. 878.) It promotes court safety, not punishment and
retribution. (Ibid.) In addition, the amount of the fee is not dependent on the
seriousness of the offense. Thus, it does not meet the objectives of punishment
and is distinguishable from a fine. Indeed, the same fee is imposed in unlimited
civil and probate cases. Finally, federal and state ex post facto protections serve to
ensure a “fair warning” of the consequences of violating penal statutes. (Weaver
v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 28; Hubbart v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th
at p. 1171.) It is inconceivable that defendant would have decided not to commit
his crime had he known in advance that this $20 fee would be imposed in addition
to his 40-year-to-life sentence. The fee is also rationally related to its nonpunitive
purpose security goal. (People v. Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 878.)
The $20 fee is not excessive and imposes no physical restraint. It “furthers
the purpose of section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) which, as part of Assembly Bill
No. 1759, [ensures] appropriate funding levels for court operations and providing
a more rational process for planning court security.” (People v. Wallace, supra,
120 Cal.App.4th at p. 878.)
In light of these factors and the Legislature’s express intent, imposition of
the fine serves a nonpunitive purpose. (Smith v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 92.)
Accordingly, it does not violate either federal or state prohibitions against ex post
facto statutes. (Accord People v. Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 878.)
We affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment.
GEORGE, C. J.
DISSENTING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J.
The $20 at issue in this case, which defendant was ordered to pay as a court
security fee pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1), is by any
measure a trivial amount for the California Supreme Court to consider. But it is
sometimes from such minutiae that legal problems arise. We require our
government to turn square corners, even when a paltry few dollars are at stake.
So it is here. Because the retroactive application of the security fee law violates
defendant’s statutory right to be free of the retroactive application of the laws,
Section 3 provides both the beginning and the end of the analysis. Since
1872, that section has provided that “[n]o part of [the Penal Code] is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared.” This statutory language is clear and unequivocal
and applies to all provisions of the Penal Code whether or not they impose a
punitive or nonpunitive sanction. Because section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) does
not expressly declare that it is retroactive, our work should be at an end.
As the majority explains, however, we must dig a little deeper. In In re
Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 746, we found the single sentence in section 3
“simply embodies the general rule of construction, coming to us from the common
law, that when there is nothing to indicate a contrary intent in a statute it will be
presumed that the Legislature intended the statute to operate prospectively and not
retroactively. That rule of construction, however, is not a straitjacket. Where the
Legislature has not set forth in so many words what it intended, the rule of
construction should not be followed blindly in complete disregard of factors that
All statutory references are to this code.
may give a clue to the legislative intent. It is to be applied only after, considering
all pertinent factors, it is determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative
Later, in People v. Hayes (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1260, 1274, we held that
section 3 means that “[a] new statute is generally presumed to operate
prospectively absent an express declaration of retroactivity or a clear and
compelling implication that the Legislature intended otherwise.” (Italics added; cf.
Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1208-1209 [“California
continues to adhere to the time-honored principle, . . . that in the absence of an
express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it
is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature or the voters must have
intended a retroactive application” (italics added)].)
The interpretive gloss these cases place on the otherwise clear language of
section 3 seems unnecessary and possibly incorrect, but the Legislature can rectify
the situation should it so choose. Assuming (as I do) that those cases correctly
interpret section 3, I nevertheless conclude section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1)
cannot be applied retroactively to defendant because no clear and convincing
extrinsic evidence demonstrates the Legislature intended to apply the $20 security
fee to those, like defendant, who committed their crimes before the law became
Although the majority purports to find such evidence in the facts that the
Legislature intended the fee to close a budget shortfall, that the money raised
would replace money removed from judicial branch coffers, and that the law was
passed as an urgency measure, this extrinsic evidence shows merely that the
Legislature may have intended to apply section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1)
retroactively. I cannot, however, conclude it proves the Legislature intended a
retroactive application by clear and convincing evidence. There is, for example,
no clear statement in the legislative history that the Legislature intended the law to
apply retroactively or that it considered for one moment the temporal difference
between the date of the crime and the date of the eventual conviction. Moreover,
that the Legislature desired to raise money quickly does not mean it desired to do
so in the fastest way possible, contravening normal assumptions that new statutes
apply prospectively only. The parties identify no legislative analysis of the
amount of money that would have been lost if the law was applied prospectively
only, or whether the amount lost by a prospective application would be of such an
amount that it would seriously undermine the Legislature’s intended goal of
funding court security. In short, while one can certainly speculate that the
Legislature, had it considered the point, may have desired retroactive application
of the security fee law, the evidence fails to satisfy the high standard that there
exist clear and convincing evidence the Legislature intended a retroactive effect.
In sum, because section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) does not expressly
declare that it is retroactive (as required by section 3), and because no clear and
convincing evidence demonstrates the Legislature intended that the law apply
retroactively, section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) cannot be applied to defendant.
Because this statutory analysis disposes of the case, it is unnecessary to address
the constitutional ex post facto issue. (See People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th
518, 534 [a court should not entertain constitutional claims unless necessary to
dispose of a case]; People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 767 (conc. & dis. opn.
of Werdegar, J.) [same].)
Because the majority holds otherwise, I dissent.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion People v. Alford
Review Granted XXX 137 Cal.App.4th 612
Date Filed: December 3, 2007
Judge: Leopoldo E. Dorado
Attorneys for Appellant:John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Attorneys for Respondent:Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Mary Jo Graves,
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit, Morris
Lenk, Laurence K. Sullivan and Catherine A. Rivlin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):John F. Schuck
Law Offices of John F. Schuck
4083 Transport Street, Suite B
Palo Alto, CA 94303
Catherine A. Rivlin
Deputy Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment of conviction of a criminal offense. The court limited review in Alford to the following issue: Can the trial court security fee mandated by Penal Code section 1465.8 be imposed on a defendant who committed his or her crime before the effective date of the statute without violating the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws?
|Date:||Citation:||Docket Number:||Category:||Status:||Cross Referenced Cases:|
|Mon, 12/03/2007||42 Cal.4th 749 original opinion||S142508||Review - Criminal Appeal||closed; remittitur issued|| |
PEOPLE v. CARMICHAEL (S141415)
|1||Alford, Tracy F. (Defendant and Appellant)|
California State Prison at Folsom
P.O. Box 29
Represa, CA 95671
Represented by John F. Schuck
Law Office of John F. Schuck
4083 Transport Street, Suite B
Palo Alto, CA
|2||The People (Plaintiff and Respondent)|
Represented by Catherine A. Rivlin
Office of the Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA
|Dec 3 2007||Opinion: Affirmed|
|Apr 10 2006||Received premature petition for review|
Tracy F. Alford, appellant John F. Schuck, counsel
|Apr 11 2006||Case start: Petition for review filed|
|Apr 11 2006||Record requested|
|Apr 13 2006||Received Court of Appeal record|
file jacet/ briefs/ transcripts/ two accordian folders
|May 10 2006||Petition for review granted; issues limited (criminal case)|
Petition for review GRANTED. The issues to be briefed and argued are limited to the following: Can the trial court security fee mandated by Penal Code section 1465.8 be imposed retroactively - i.e., on a defendant who committed his or her crime before the effective date of the statute - without violating the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws? George, C.J., was absent and did not participate. Votes: Kennard, ACJ, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ.
|May 16 2006||Counsel appointment order filed|
upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel John F. Schuck is hereby appointed to represent appellant on the appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits must be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date of this order.
|Jun 5 2006||Request for extension of time filed|
to July 20 2006 to file appellant's opening brief on the merits.
|Jun 8 2006||Extension of time granted|
to July 20, 2006 to file appellant's brief on the merits.
|Jul 13 2006||Motion filed (non-AA)|
to clarify issue on review or, in the alternative, to expand issue on review.
|Jul 17 2006||Request for extension of time filed|
for appellant to file the brief on the merits, to 8-21-06.
|Jul 24 2006||Extension of time granted|
to August 21, 2006 to file appellants opening brief on the merits.
|Aug 2 2006||Change of contact information filed for:|
updated petitioner's address
|Aug 17 2006||Request for extension of time filed|
to September 20, 2006 to file appellant's opening brief on the merits.
|Aug 21 2006||Extension of time granted|
to September 20, 2006 to file appellant's opening brief on the merits.
|Aug 23 2006||Additional issues ordered|
The parties are directed to brief the following additional issue: Is the $20.00 court security fee provided for by Penal Code section 1465.8 subject to Penal Code section 3's prohibition on retroactive application of newly enacted law? The parties are directed to file simultaneous letter briefs on this question on or before September 22, 2006. Simultaneous reply briefs may be filed on or before October 6, 2006. Corrigan, J., was absent and did not participate.
|Sep 20 2006||Opening brief on the merits filed|
Tracy F. Alford, appellant John F. Schuck, counsel
|Sep 22 2006||Received:|
supplemental letter brief from Catherine A. Rivlin, Supervising Deputy Attorney General
|Sep 22 2006||Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)|
The People of the State of California, by Attorney General for respondent
|Oct 4 2006||Received:|
letter dated October 2, 2006 from appellants counsel John F. Schuck
|Oct 19 2006||Request for extension of time filed|
to Novewmber 20, 2006 to file respondents brief on the merits.
|Oct 24 2006||Extension of time granted|
to November 20, 2006 to file respondents brief on the merits.
|Nov 17 2006||Request for extension of time filed|
to November 30l, 2006 to file respondents breif on the merits by Catherine A. Rivlin, Supervising Deputy Attorney General
|Nov 27 2006||Extension of time granted|
to November 30, 2006 to file respondents brief on the merits.
|Nov 30 2006||Answer brief on the merits filed|
The People of the State of California, respondent by Catherine A. Rivlin, Supervising Deputy Attorney General
|Dec 13 2006||Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)|
Tracy F. Alford, appellant by John F. Schuck, counsel crc.40.1(b)
|Aug 8 2007||Case ordered on calendar|
to be argued on Thursday, September 6, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
|Aug 15 2007||Notice of substitution of counsel|
Deputy Catherine A. Rivlin attorney of record for respondent, The People.
|Aug 29 2007||Request for judicial notice granted|
Respondent's motion for judicial notice, filed in this court on September 22, 2006, is granted as to (1) Legislative history documents for Assembly Bill No. 1759; (2) Legislative Analyst's Office, Analysis of the 2003-2004 Budget Bill [this is an additional legislative history document not available online]; and (3) Enrolled Bill Memorandum to Governor [this is an additional legislative history document not available online]. In all other respects, the motion is denied.
|Sep 6 2007||Cause argued and submitted|
|Nov 30 2007||Notice of forthcoming opinion posted|
|Dec 3 2007||Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full|
Opinion by: Corrigan, J. -----joined by George, C.J., Kennard, J., Baxter, J., Chin,J. Dissent by: Werdegar,J. -----joined by, Moreno, J.
|Jan 3 2008||Remittitur issued (criminal case)|
|Jan 8 2008||Received:|
receipt for remititur
|Jan 23 2008||Compensation awarded counsel|
|Sep 20 2006||Opening brief on the merits filed|
|Nov 30 2006||Answer brief on the merits filed|
|Dec 13 2006||Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)|