Filed 7/29/04
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S111028
v.
Ct.App. 2/1 No. B145982
JALEH WILKINSON,
County of Los Angeles
Super. Ct. No. SA 035468
Defendant and Appellant.
)
In re
JALEH WILKINSON
Ct.App. 2/1 No. B154520
On
Habeas
Corpus
Defendant Jaleh Wilkinson was convicted at trial of the offenses of battery
on a custodial officer, driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, and failing
to stop at the scene of an accident. The Court of Appeal reversed defendant’s
convictions on two unrelated grounds, concluding that (1) the statutory scheme
pertaining to battery on a custodial officer violates equal protection principles
because the statutes allow battery on a custodial officer without injury to be
punished more severely than battery on a custodial officer with injury, and (2) the
trial court erred in denying defendant a hearing, pursuant to the Kelly/Frye
doctrine (People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24; Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir.
1923) 293 F. 1013), regarding the admissibility of polygraph evidence to support
defendant’s claim that her commission of the charged offenses resulted from her
unknowing and involuntary ingestion of drugs. We granted review to consider the
Court of Appeal’s resolution of both issues.
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that (1) the statutory
provisions pertaining to battery on a custodial officer do not violate the equal
protection clause of the state or federal Constitution, and (2) in light of the
categorical prohibition on the admission of polygraph evidence in Penal Code
section 351.1, the trial court did not err in declining to hold a Kelly/Frye hearing
regarding the evidence proffered by defendant. Accordingly, we shall reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeal.
I
Defendant was charged by information with the offenses of battery on a
custodial officer (Pen. Code, § 243.1), a felony, and with driving a vehicle under
the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) and failing to stop at the
scene of an accident (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)), both misdemeanors. At trial,
the prosecution presented evidence that, in the early morning hours of
February 27, 1999, a motorist observed defendant driving erratically on a street in
the City of Santa Monica. Defendant’s vehicle crossed over the center divider,
struck a parked car, and continued down the street, swerving between lanes.
Defendant eventually stopped her car at a curb and placed her head on the front
passenger seat. After the motorist telephoned the police, officers responded and
tapped on the window of defendant’s parked car, whereupon defendant looked at
one of the officers and drove off. The police gave chase for three blocks before
defendant stopped. Defendant, who smelled strongly of alcohol and exhibited
slurred speech, indicated she had consumed some drinks but not many. She could
not complete a field sobriety test and did not respond when told she was required
to submit to a blood or breath test for alcohol.
2
Officers transported defendant to the police station. She was belligerent
during booking and resisted a patsearch. At one point, defendant grabbed a
custodial officer’s arm with both hands, causing a visible welt. When taken to a
holding cell, defendant charged at an officer and yelled, kicked, and banged at the
door. After the police reminded defendant that she would have to submit to a
blood or breath test, defendant covered her ears, stated “I can’t hear you,” and
began running around inside the cell. An officer testified defendant appeared to be
under the influence of alcohol but not of drugs.
Defendant testified in her own defense as follows. On the night in
question, defendant, a bank vice-president, went to a bar, where she met a man
who offered to buy her a drink. She accepted and eventually consumed two
glasses of wine. The man invited defendant to dinner, and they agreed to meet at a
Santa Monica restaurant. At the restaurant, defendant consumed three alcoholic
beverages over the course of three hours while she waited for the man, but he
never arrived. She left her drink several times to use the restroom and to smoke a
cigarette outside. She eventually left the restaurant, driving away without feeling
any signs of intoxication. The next thing she remembered was waking up in jail,
with no recollection of her encounter with the officers. After her release from
custody, defendant filed a police complaint alleging she had been drugged.
A toxicologist, testifying on behalf of the defense, expressed the opinion
that on the night in question defendant was under the influence of alcohol and
gamma hydroxy butyrate (hereafter GHB), commonly known as a “date rape”
drug, basing his opinion on a review of the police report and a videotape of
defendant’s conduct in the holding cell. GHB depresses the nervous system,
exaggerates the effects of alcohol, and may cause drowsiness and memory loss.
Depending upon a person’s personality, the drug may make a person more
emotional and combative. The toxicologist also suggested that if defendant was
3
not under the influence of GHB, she must have been visibly drunk when she left
the restaurant in order for her to exhibit the effects of intoxication so long after her
last drink. A City of Concord police officer, testifying for the defense as a drug
recognition expert, stated that defendant’s symptoms appeared much more severe
than what would be expected of someone who had consumed five alcoholic drinks
over the course of several hours.
Prior to trial, defendant sought admission of evidence establishing that she
had submitted to a polygraph examination and that, in the opinion of the polygraph
examiner, she had “passed” the exam, responding truthfully (in the negative) to
queries regarding whether she knowingly consumed more than five drinks on the
night in question, knowingly ingested GHB or any other drug, or knowingly
attacked an officer in a detention cell. Defendant requested a Kelly/Frye hearing,
making an offer of proof that the polygraph examination technique employed by
the examiner had been generally accepted in the scientific community and that the
examiner employed proper procedures in administering the test. The trial court
declined to hold an evidentiary hearing, citing Penal Code section 351.1.
The jury convicted defendant as charged, and the trial court placed
defendant on formal probation for three years. The Court of Appeal reversed
defendant’s convictions, determining by a two-to-one vote that the statutory
scheme pertaining to battery on a custodial officer violates equal protection
principles, and unanimously concluding that the trial court erred by failing to hold
a Kelly/Frye hearing regarding the admissibility of defendant’s proffered
polygraph evidence. We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review as to
both issues.1
1
Defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the Court of
Appeal considered concurrently with her appeal. She claimed in that petition that
(footnote continued on following page)
4
II
A
Defendant was convicted of violating Penal Code section 243.1,2 which
states in full: “When a battery is committed against the person of a custodial
officer as defined in Section 831 of the Penal Code, and the person committing the
offense knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a custodial officer
engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and the custodial officer is
engaged in the performance of his or her duties, the offense shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison.” Section 831, subdivision (a), in turn, defines a
“custodial officer” as “a public officer, not a peace officer, employed by a law
enforcement agency of a city or county who has the authority and responsibility
for maintaining custody of prisoners and performs tasks related to the operation of
a local detention facility used for the detention of persons usually pending
arraignment or upon court order either for their own safekeeping or for the specific
purpose of serving a sentence therein.” Because section 243.1 provides for a
punishment of imprisonment in state prison, but does not otherwise specify the
(footnote continued from preceding page)
her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by counseling her to reject a plea
agreement that would have allowed her to plead guilty to two misdemeanor counts
and serve no jail time, by rejecting a plea offer without consulting defendant, and
by misinforming her regarding the admissibility of evidence. Defendant declared
she faced deportation to Iran as a result of her felony conviction. The Court of
Appeal issued an order to show cause in the habeas corpus matter, returnable
before the trial court. Because no issue has been presented here regarding
defendant’s habeas corpus claims, we do not address them.
2
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
Because section 243.1 was amended without substantive change after the
commission of the present offenses, we consider the current version of that statute.
5
term of imprisonment, under section 18 the offense is punishable “by
imprisonment in any of the state prisons for 16 months, or two or three years . . . .”
At the time section 243.1 was enacted in 1976, section 243 prescribed the
punishment (1) for simple battery (which section 243 made punishable as a
misdemeanor), (2) for battery against a person who the defendant knew or should
have known was a “peace officer or fireman engaged in the performance of his
duties” (which section 243 made punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor,
commonly known as a “wobbler”), and (3) for battery resulting in the infliction of
“serious bodily injury” (which section 243 also made punishable as a wobbler,
prescribing a punishment of two, three, or four years’ imprisonment for a felony
violation).3 (Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, § 150.5, pp. 5104-5105.)
In 1981, the Legislature divided section 243 into subdivisions, with
subdivision (a) covering simple battery (punishable as a misdemeanor with a
maximum jail sentence of six months), subdivision (b) covering battery on a
person who the defendant knows or should know is a peace officer, firefighter, etc.
3
Section 243 then stated in relevant part: “A battery is punishable by fine of
not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail
not exceeding six months, or by both. When it is committed against the person of
a peace officer or fireman, and the person committing the offense knows or
reasonably should know that such victim is a peace officer or fireman engaged in
the performance of his duties, and such peace officer or fireman is engaged in the
performance of his duties, the offense shall be punished by imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding one year or by imprisonment in the state prison. When it
is committed against a person and serious bodily injury is inflicted on such person,
the offense shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not
more than one year or imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four
years.” (Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, §150.5, p. 5104.) Section 243 later was amended
to provide expressly that a felony violation involving a peace officer or fireman
could be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months or two or
three years. (Stats. 1980, ch. 1340, §2.2, p. 4719.)
6
(punishable as a misdemeanor with a maximum jail sentence of one year),
subdivision (c) covering battery on a peace officer, firefighter, etc., that results in
the infliction of injury (a wobbler with a possible state prison term of 16 months,
two years, or three years), and subdivision (d) covering battery that results in
serious bodily injury (a wobbler with a possible prison term of two, three, or four
years). (Stats. 1981, ch. 678, § 2, pp. 2476-2477.) The following year, in 1982,
the Legislature added a reference to custodial officers to subdivisions (b) and (c)
of section 243, defining custodial officers by reference to section 831. (Stats.
1982, ch. 1353, § 2, pp. 5048-5050; see current § 243, subd. (f)(6).) Thus, as
amended in 1982, section 243, subdivision (b), provided that battery on a person
who the defendant knows or reasonably should know is a custodial officer is
punishable as a misdemeanor with a maximum imprisonment of one year in
county jail, and section 243, subdivision (c), provided that when such a battery
results in injury to the custodial officer, the offense is punishable as a wobbler
with possible imprisonment in state prison for 16 months, two years, or three
years. Although the Legislature subsequently designated former section 243,
subdivision (c), as current section 243, subdivision (c)(1) (with section 243,
subdivision (c)(2), now covering battery on a peace officer or security guard with
injury), the scheme of section 243 with respect to battery on a custodial officer has
not been substantively changed since 1982.4
4
Section 243, like section 243.1, was amended without substantive change
subsequent to the commission of the present offenses. In its current form, section
243, subdivision (b) provides in full: “When a battery is committed against the
person of a peace officer, custodial officer, firefighter, emergency medical
technician, lifeguard, process server, traffic officer, code enforcement officer, or
animal control officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, whether on
or off duty, including when the peace officer is in a police uniform and is
concurrently performing the duties required of him or her as a peace officer while
(footnote continued on following page)
7
(footnote continued from preceding page)
also employed in a private capacity as a part-time or casual private security guard
or patrolman, or a nonsworn employee of a probation department engaged in the
performance of his or her duties, whether on or off duty, or a physician or nurse
engaged in rendering emergency medical care outside a hospital, clinic, or other
health care facility, and the person committing the offense knows or reasonably
should know that the victim is a peace officer, custodial officer, firefighter,
emergency medical technician, lifeguard, process server, traffic officer, code
enforcement officer, or animal control officer engaged in the performance of his or
her duties, nonsworn employee of a probation department, or a physician or nurse
engaged in rendering emergency medical care, the battery is punishable by a fine
not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail
not exceeding one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.”
Section 243, subdivision (c)(1) currently provides: “When a battery is
committed against a custodial officer, firefighter, emergency medical technician,
lifeguard, process server, traffic officer, or animal control officer engaged in the
performance of his or her duties, whether on or off duty, or a nonsworn employee
of a probation department engaged in the performance of his or her duties, whether
on or off duty, or a physician or nurse engaged in rendering emergency medical
care outside a hospital, clinic, or other health care facility, and the person
committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a
nonsworn employee of a probation department, custodial officer, firefighter,
emergency medical technician, lifeguard, process server, traffic officer, or animal
control officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, or a physician or
nurse engaged in rendering emergency medical care, and an injury is inflicted on
that victim, the battery is punishable by a fine of not more than two thousand
dollars ($2,000), by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by
both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16
months, or two or three years.” “Injury” is defined as “any physical injury which
requires professional medical treatment.” (§ 243, subd. (f)(5).)
Section 243, subdivision (d) currently provides: “When a battery is
committed against any person and serious bodily injury is inflicted on the person,
the battery is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year
or imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years.” “Serious bodily
injury,” for purposes of this provision, is defined as “a serious impairment of
physical condition, including, but not limited to, the following: loss of
consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss or impairment of
function of any bodily member or organ; a wound requiring extensive suturing;
and serious disfigurement.” (§ 243, subd. (f)(4).)
8
B
On appeal, defendant contended in relevant part that the current statutory
scheme pertaining to battery on a custodial officer is “irrational” and violates the
federal and state guarantees of equal protection because one who commits the
“lesser” offense of battery on a custodial officer without injury can receive felony
punishment under section 243.1 while a person committing the “greater” offense
of battery on a custodial officer with injury can be convicted of a wobbler offense
under section 243, subdivision (c)(1) and can receive a misdemeanor sentence.
A majority of the Court of Appeal below agreed with defendant, reasoning:
“If the battery on custodial officer statutes included only two options, a straight
felony under section 243.1 or a straight misdemeanor under section 243,
subdivision (b), both of which have identical elements, prosecutorial discretion to
choose different punishment between offenders engaging in similar conduct would
not violate equal protection . . . . [¶] What is troubling about our scheme,
however, is its inclusion of a third charging option, the wobbler under section 243,
subdivision (c)(1), which contains the additional requirement of infliction of an
injury. . . . This third option raises the specter of complete irrationality in the
scheme, because the more serious offense of battering a custodial officer with
injury could be punished less seriously (an alternative felony/misdemeanor) than
battering a custodial officer without injury (a straight felony under section 243.1).”
Because the “greater” offense can be punished less severely, the majority found
the scheme “is not even rationally related to a scheme which would give
prosecutors the entire range of punishments” and “encourages arbitrary, irrational
charging” because prosecutors have an incentive to prove the “lesser” offense in
order to obtain the greater punishment.
The dissent found no equal protection violation, questioning whether there
is substantial evidence that the custodial officer here suffered an “injury” so as to
9
allow a wobbler charge under section 243, subdivision (c)(1). The dissent also
questioned whether a battery without injury necessarily was a less serious offense
than battery with injury such that greater punishment for the former offense could
not be imposed without violating equal protection principles.
C
We begin our discussion with an overview of relevant case authority.
Although the precise issue before us has not previously been addressed, at least
two cases have discussed the legislative history surrounding the statutory scheme
pertaining to battery on a custodial officer. In In re Rochelle B. (1996) 49
Cal.App.4th 1212, the juvenile court sustained a wardship petition, finding true the
allegation that the minor committed battery on a custodial officer under section
243.1. The minor challenged the finding on appeal, contending that a juvenile
probation counselor was not a “custodial officer” within the meaning of sections
831 and 243.1. The Court of Appeal described in detail the legislative history of
section 243.1, as well as the inclusion of “custodial officers” within section 243.
The court observed: “A report of the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice
suggested the bill ‘should be amended to delete Section 243.1 of the Penal Code
which is a special section referring only to custodial officers,’ apparently to avoid
the resulting duplication in provisions setting out aggravated penalties for batteries
against ‘custodial officers.’ [Citation.] This suggestion was evidently ignored,
with the result that two separate statutes now provide somewhat different
punishments for batteries against custodial officers.” (In re Rochelle B., supra, 49
Cal.App.4th at p. 1217, fn. omitted.)
In People v. Chenze (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 521, 525 (Chenze), the
defendant contended that he was improperly charged and convicted under section
243.1 because that provision had been “impliedly repealed” when the Legislature
amended section 243 to include references to custodial officers. The defendant
10
urged that the two statutes were in “irreconcilable conflict” since “[t]he older
statute, section 243.1, provides that any battery against a custodial officer is a
felony,” whereas “the more recent statute [i.e., section 243, subdivision (c)(1)]
permits felony treatment only if injury is inflicted.” (Chenze, supra, 97
Cal.App.4th at p. 526.)
The Court of Appeal in Chenze disagreed that the two statutes were in
irreconcilable conflict and thus rejected the claim of implied repeal. The court
cited an enrolled bill report prepared by the California Youth and Adult
Correctional Agency, which explained the need for an amendment to section 243
to include references to custodial officers notwithstanding the existence of section
243.1: “ ‘According to the bill’s sponsors, simple battery charges against
custodial officers are rarely pursued by local prosecutors because the present law
only provides for felony charges with imprisonment in a state prison. Thus, these
violators are rarely, if ever, punished. [¶] By providing for the option of county
jail and/or fine for such violations, proponents hope that simple battery charges
will be prosecuted more vigorously. Felony battery charges can still be pursued
for the more serious cases.’ [Citation.]” (Chenze, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p.
527.) In light of this legislative history, the court in Chenze rejected the
defendant’s claim of irreconcilable conflict, reasoning: “In view of the fact that
the Legislature amended section 243 to include custodial officers when it was
aware of section 243.1, it is apparent the Legislature intended to give prosecutors a
full panoply of prosecutorial options for a battery on a custodial officer. Under
section 243, the offense may be punished as a misdemeanor (§ 243, subd. (b)), or a
misdemeanor or felony if injury is inflicted (§ 243, subd. (c)(1)). But the
Legislature also apparently envisioned that there might be circumstances under
which no or only slight injury was inflicted, but felony charges would nonetheless
still be appropriate. Accordingly, it did not repeal section 243.1, and has very
11
recently amended it.” (Ibid.) Although the defendant in Chenze pointed out that
under section 243.1 all batteries on custodial officers are punished as felonies
while under section 243, subdivision (c)(1), only batteries involving injury may be
so punished, the Court of Appeal observed that “‘[i]t is axiomatic the Legislature
may criminalize the same conduct in different ways . . . ’” and the “prosecutor has
discretion to proceed under either of two statutes that proscribe the same conduct,
but which prescribe different penalties. (United States v. Batchelder (1979) 442
U.S. 114, 123-125 [99 S.Ct. 2198, 2203-2205, 60 L.Ed.2d 755] [(Batchelder)]”
(Chenze, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 528.)
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Batchelder, supra, 442 U.S.
114, cited in Chenze, concluded that the defendant properly could be sentenced
under one federal firearms statute, although an almost identical statute prescribed a
lesser punishment. In Batchelder, the court took note of legislative history
indicating that Congress “intended to enact two independent gun control statutes,
each fully enforceable on its own terms . . . .” (Batchelder, supra, 442 U.S. at p.
119.) The court in Batchelder then stated that “[t]his Court has long recognized
that when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may
prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of
defendants” (id. at pp. 123-124). The high court concluded that the statutory
scheme at issue fell under this rule: “[T]here is no appreciable difference between
the discretion a prosecutor exercises when deciding whether to charge under one
of two statutes with different elements and the discretion he exercises when
choosing one of two statutes with identical elements. In the former situation, once
he determines that the proof will support conviction under either statute, his
decision is indistinguishable from the one he faces in the latter context. The
prosecutor may be influenced by the penalties available upon conviction, but this
12
fact, standing alone, does not give rise to a violation of the Equal Protection or
Due Process Clause.” (Id. at p. 125.)
We recently applied Batchelder in Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27
Cal.4th 537 (Manduley), in rejecting an equal protection challenge to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d)) as amended by Proposition 21. In
relevant part, section 707, subdivision (d) was amended to expand the
circumstances under which the prosecution may file criminal charges directly in
adult court without first filing a wardship petition in the juvenile court and having
that court conduct a fitness hearing to determine whether the matter should remain
in juvenile court. The minors alleged that the amended provision violated equal
protection principles because “minors of the same age and charged with the same
crime under the circumstances enumerated in section 707 [subdivision (d)] are
subject either to the juvenile court law or to the criminal justice system, based
solely upon a prosecutorial decision that is unguided by any statutory standards.”
(Manduley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 567.)
In Manduley we rejected this claim, reasoning in part: “[A]ll minors who
meet the criteria enumerated in [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 707
[, subdivision] (d) equally are subject to the prosecutor’s discretion whether to file
charges in criminal court. Any unequal treatment of such minors who commit the
same crime under similar circumstances results solely from the decisions of
individual prosecutors whether to file against particular minors a petition in
juvenile court or instead an accusatory pleading in criminal court. Although, as
petitioners assert, a prosecutor’s decision in this regard can result in important
consequences to the accused minor, so does a decision by a prosecutor to initiate
criminal charges against any individual, including an adult.” (Manduley, supra,
27 Cal.4th at p. 568.) We explained in Manduley that “petitioners cannot establish
a violation of their right to the equal protection of the laws by showing that other
13
minors in circumstances similar to those of petitioners can be prosecuted under the
juvenile court law” (id. at p. 570), likening a prosecutor’s discretion to file adult
criminal charges (instead of a juvenile court petition) to a prosecutor’s discretion
to bring charges under statutes proscribing similar conduct but with differing
penalties (see id. at pp. 569-570). Accordingly, our decision in Manduley
concluded that the “prosecutor’s discretion to select those statutorily eligible cases
in which to seek a criminal disposition against a minor — based upon permissible
factors such as the circumstances of the crime, the background of the minor, or a
desire to show leniency, for example — does not violate the equal protection
clause.” (Id. at p. 571.)
D
The Attorney General contends the statutory scheme before us does not
violate equal protection principles because all persons who commit battery on a
custodial officer are subject to the same statutory scheme and are not treated
differently. He asserts that any possible disparate treatment results from charging
decisions of prosecutors that, under Batchelder and Manduley, do not violate equal
protection principles. The Attorney General further argues that in resolving the
equal protection issue, we should conduct so-called rational basis review and find
that there exists a rational basis for the statutory scheme at issue.
Defendant argues, in contrast, that so-called strict scrutiny should apply to
the equal protection question at issue, because the present classification involves
the “fundamental interest” of the “right to liberty.” Further, defendant contends
that even assuming that rational basis review applies, the Court of Appeal majority
properly concluded that the statutory scheme before the court was irrational
because it allows one who commits the “greater” offense (battery on a custodial
officer with injury) to be punished less severely than one who commits the
“lesser” offense (battery on a custodial officer without injury).
14
It is a fundamental principle that, “[t]o succeed on [a] claim under the equal
protection clause, [a defendant] first must show that the state has adopted a
classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal
manner.” (Manduley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 568; In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d
522, 530.) “In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . we apply different levels of scrutiny to
different types of classifications. At a minimum, a statutory classification must be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. [Citations.]
Classifications based on race or national origin . . . and classifications affecting
fundamental rights . . . are given the most exacting scrutiny. Between these
extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate
scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based
on sex or illegitimacy. [Citations.]” (Clark v. Jeter (1988) 486 U.S. 456, 461; see
also Manduley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 571 [“equal protection provisions in the
California Constitution ‘have been generally thought . . . to be substantially
equivalent of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.’ ” (Fn. Omitted.)].)
Defendant relies upon People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236 and its
progeny for her claim that the strict scrutiny standard applies in the situation
before us. The court in Olivas considered an equal protection challenge to a
statute that granted a trial court discretion to commit a defendant who was
convicted in an adult criminal prosecution, and was between 16 and 21 years of
age, to the California Youth Authority for a term longer than he or she would have
received had the defendant been sentenced as an adult. Concluding that “personal
liberty” constitutes a fundamental right that triggers application of the strict
scrutiny standard, Olivas stated: “No reason has been suggested, nor can we
conceive of any, why the concern for personal liberty implicit in both the
15
California and federal Constitutions is any less compelling in defendant’s case.
We believe that those charters are no less vigilant in protecting against continuing
deprivations of liberty than are their due process clauses in protecting against the
initial deprivation of that liberty. We conclude that personal liberty is a
fundamental interest, second only to life itself, as an interest protected under both
the California and United States Constitutions.” (Id. at pp. 250-251; see also
People v. Jacobs (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 797, 800-801 [following Olivas and
applying strict scrutiny to an equal protection challenge to a prior-prison-term
enhancement statute]; People v. Gonzalez (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 274, 277 [citing
Olivas for the proposition that “[c]lassifications which deal with restraints upon
personal liberty are subject to the strict scrutiny test applicable to equal protection
of fundamental interests.”].)
The language in Olivas could be interpreted to require application of the
strict scrutiny standard whenever one challenges upon equal protection grounds a
penal statute or statutes that authorize different sentences for comparable crimes,
because such statutes always implicate the right to “personal liberty” of the
affected individuals. Nevertheless, Olivas properly has not been read so broadly.
As the court observed in People v. Davis (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 250: “It appears
. . . that the Olivas court did not want to increase substantially the degree of
judicial supervision of the Legislature’s criminal justice policies. Such a highly
intrusive judicial reexamination of legislative classifications is not merited by a
close reading of Olivas. There is language in the Olivas opinion that emphasizes
the narrowness of the holding. For instance, the court noted that [the statute in
question] was constitutionally infirm because persons committed under the statute
had been ‘prosecuted as adults, adjudged by the same standards which apply to
any competent adult, and convicted as adults in adult courts.’ (17 Cal.3d at
pp. 242-243.) This language requires only that the boundaries between the adult
16
and juvenile criminal justice systems be rigorously maintained. We do not read
Olivas as requiring the courts to subject all criminal classifications to strict
scrutiny requiring the showing of a compelling state interest therefor.” (Davis,
supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 258.) Other courts similarly have concluded that a
broad reading of Olivas, as advocated by defendant here, would “intrude[] too
heavily on the police power and the Legislature’s prerogative to set criminal
justice policy.” (People v. Bell (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1049; see People v.
Owens (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 798, 802 [“California courts have never accepted
the general proposition that ‘all criminal laws, because they may result in a
defendant’s incarceration, are perforce subject to strict judicial scrutiny,’ ” quoting
People v. Silva (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1167]; People v. Mitchell (1994) 30
Cal.App.4th 783, 796 [“Determining gradations of culpability . . . does not
implicate the strict scrutiny test for equal protection purposes.”].)
We find the rational basis test applicable here. Defendant contends that the
statutory scheme regarding battery on a custodial officer violates equal protection
principles because it allows the “lesser” offense of battery without injury to be
punished more severely than the “greater” offense of battery with injury. A
defendant, however, “does not have a fundamental interest in a specific term of
imprisonment or in the designation a particular crime receives.” (People v. Flores
(1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 74, 88; see People v. Alvarez (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1110,
1116 [finding the rational basis test applicable to equal protection challenge
involving “an alleged sentencing disparity”].) Defendant makes no claim that the
classification here at issue involves a suspect class, nor does her claim implicate
any interest akin to that at issue in Olivas, in which an individual faced a longer
period of confinement if treated as a juvenile rather than as an adult. Application
of the strict scrutiny standard in this context would be incompatible with the broad
17
discretion the Legislature traditionally has been understood to exercise in defining
crimes and specifying punishment.
Turning to the merits of defendant’s claim, we find it unpersuasive.
Batchelder instructs us that neither the existence of two identical criminal statutes
prescribing different levels of punishments, nor the exercise of a prosecutor’s
discretion in charging under one such statute and not the other, violates equal
protection principles. (Batchelder, supra, 442 U.S. at pp. 124-125.) Thus,
defendant may not complain that she was charged with a felony violation under
section 243.1 even though section 243, subdivision (b) is an identical statute
prescribing a lesser punishment. As we observed in Manduley, numerous factors
properly may enter into a prosecutor’s decision to charge under one statute and not
another, such as a defendant’s background and the severity of the crime, and so
long as there is no showing that a defendant “has been singled out deliberately for
prosecution on the basis of some invidious criterion,” that is, “ ‘one that is
arbitrary and thus unjustified because it bears no rational relationship to legitimate
law enforcement interests[,]’ ” defendant cannot make out an equal protection
violation. (Manduley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 568-569.) Defendant “does not
allege that [her] prosecution was motivated by improper considerations.”
(Batchelder, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 125, fn. 9.)
Defendant, citing section 243, subdivision (c)(1), claims that the statutory
scheme is irrational, based on her assertion that under the current scheme the
“lesser” offense of battery on a custodial officer without injury may be punished
more severely than the “greater” offense of battery on a custodial officer with
injury. Defendant’s assertion is based upon the questionable premise that battery
on a custodial officer without injury always is a less serious offense than battery
with injury, so as to warrant inevitably a lesser punishment. The dissent below
questioned whether a hypothetical defendant “who, in the course of grabbing the
18
arm of a correctional officer, inflicts a puncture wound with her fingernail that
requires medical attention” would be more culpable “than a defendant who
repeatedly hits and kicks the correctional officer, intending to cause serious injury
but does not do so through no lack of effort.” As recounted by the court in
Chenze, the Legislature amended section 243 to include references to custodial
officers while simultaneously not repealing section 243.1. The legislative history
of the amendment suggests the amendment was intended to allow misdemeanor
prosecutions of batteries committed on custodial officers, and the Legislature did
not repeal section 243.1 to allow felony prosecutions for more serious cases, even
if no injury was inflicted. (See Chenze, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 527.) The
Legislature’s actions tend to demonstrate it contemplated that the ostensible
“lesser” offense of battery without injury sometimes may constitute a more serious
offense and merit greater punishment than the “greater” offense of battery
accompanied by injury.
Another premise underlying defendant’s claim of irrationality that the
current statutory scheme allows battery on a custodial officer, without injury, to be
punished “more severely” than battery with injury appears somewhat
questionable. As noted, a person who commits battery on a custodial officer,
without injury, faces the same maximum imprisonment under section 243.1 as one
who commits battery on a custodial officer with injury under section 243,
subdivision (c)(1), namely state imprisonment for 16 months, two years, or three
years.5 Similarly, a person who does not inflict injury may be prosecuted under
section 243, subdivision (b) and receive a misdemeanor sentence, the same
5
A person prosecuted under section 243, subdivision (c)(1) faces an
additional fine of up to $2,000 which that person would not face under section
243.1.
19
sentence that a person who does inflict injury may receive under section 243,
subdivision (c)(1). The only difference between sections 243.1 and 243,
subdivision (b) on the one hand, and section 243, subdivision (c)(1) on the other,
is that, because section 243, subdivision (c)(1) is a wobbler, a trial court has
discretion at sentencing either to impose misdemeanor punishment or grant
probation and later, upon the defendant’s successful completion of probation,
declare the offense to be a misdemeanor. (§17, subd. (b)(1), (3).) A magistrate
also has discretion at the preliminary hearing to determine that a wobbler offense
is a misdemeanor. (§17, subd. (b)(5).)6
The circumstance that the Legislature did not grant to the trial court the
same discretion in prosecutions under section 243.1 to reduce the charge to a
misdemeanor as it did for prosecutions under section 243, subdivision (c) does not
render the statutory scheme unconstitutional. A rational basis for these statutes
exists; the Legislature reasonably could have concluded that reduction of the
section 243.1 offense is not appropriate in cases of a battery on a custodial officer
that is deemed serious enough by the prosecutor to warrant felony prosecution
under the latter statute. As the Legislature properly may eliminate a trial court’s
discretion to dismiss an action or strike an allegation in furtherance of justice (see
6
Section 17, subdivision (b) states in relevant part: “When a crime is
punishable, in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment in the state prison or by
fine or imprisonment in the county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all purposes under
the following circumstances: [¶] (1) After a judgment imposing a punishment
other than imprisonment in the state prison. [¶] . . . [¶] (3) When the court grants
probation to a defendant without imposition of sentence and at the time of granting
probation, or on application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter, the
court declares the offense to be a misdemeanor. [¶] . . . [¶] (5) When, at or before
the preliminary examination . . . the magistrate determines that the offense is a
misdemeanor, in which event the case shall proceed as if the defendant had been
arraigned on a misdemeanor complaint.”
20
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 518; People v. Thomas
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 206, 209-214), so too may it by defining an offense as a
straight felony deny a trial court discretion to reduce an offense to a
misdemeanor. “It is the prerogative, indeed the duty, of the Legislature to
recognize degrees of culpability when drafting a Penal Code.” (Michael M. v.
Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 608, 613 [rejecting an equal protection challenge
against the statutory rape law].) As stated in People v. Flores, supra, 178
Cal.App.3d 74: “The decision of how long a particular term of punishment should
be is left properly to the Legislature. The Legislature is responsible for
determining which class of crimes deserves certain punishments and which crimes
should be distinguished from others. As long as the Legislature acts rationally,
such determinations should not be disturbed.” (Id. at p. 88 [finding the Legislature
did not violate equal protection principles by not dividing the crime of attempted
murder into degrees].) Because a rational basis exists for the statutory scheme
pertaining to battery on a custodial officer, these statutes are not vulnerable to
challenge under the equal protection clause. (See People v. Romo (1975) 14
Cal.3d 189, 196-197 [rejecting equal protection challenge based upon the claim
that assault could be punished more severely than the greater offense of assault
with intent to commit murder].)7
7
In arguing that the existing statutory scheme is irrational and violates equal
protection principles, the concurring and dissenting opinion states that prosecutors
would have no incentive to charge a defendant with a wobbler under section 243,
subdivision (c), because that provision requires proof of the additional element of
injury and prescribes a “lesser” penalty than that provided for a violation of the
straight felony of section 243.1. This point misjudges the significance of the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Batchelder, supra, 442 U.S. 114, 123-
125, that the existence of two statutes, covering the same criminal conduct but
carrying different penalties, does not violate either equal protection or due process
principles, even though a prosecutor may be influenced by the different penalties
(footnote continued on following page)
21
(footnote continued from preceding page)
available upon conviction in determining under which statute to charge a
defendant. Defendant in the present case cannot point to any harm that she
suffered by virtue of the circumstance that section 243, subdivision (c), applies
only to battery on a custodial officer with injury, inasmuch as she properly could
have been charged under section 243.1 (even if section 243, subdivision (c),
applied to battery on a custodial officer without injury) and persons who commit
battery on a custodial officer with injury may be charged and punished under
section 243.1. Further, the concurring and dissenting opinion’s argument ignores
the observation in Chenze, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th 521, 527, that the Legislature
added the references to custodial officers in section 243 precisely to allow for
prosecutions involving lesser punishments.
The concurring and dissenting opinion’s observation that the prosecutor in
this case twice offered to dismiss the section 243.1 charge pursuant to a plea
agreement does not call into question our conclusion that the Legislature properly
can eliminate a trial court’s discretion to reduce a charge in cases deemed by the
prosecutor to warrant felony treatment. Such offers may reflect the prosecutor’s
judgment regarding the benefits of avoiding the administrative burden and expense
of a trial rather than reflecting an assessment by the prosecutor regarding the
seriousness of the offense. In any event, the circumstance that a prosecutor may
engage in plea negotiation regarding a section 243.1 offense does not establish that
no rational basis exists for the Legislature to provide an alternative that does not
afford a trial court discretion to reduce a charge when such plea negotiation fails.
Further, because any battery on a custodial officer, whether with or without injury,
may be prosecuted under section 243.1, the concurring and dissenting opinion’s
argument that no rational basis exists for eliminating the trial court’s discretion
to reduce the charge when a defendant is prosecuted for a straight felony under
section 243.1 misses the mark.
In addition, contrary to the suggestion in the concurring and dissenting
opinion, the present case does not involve any issue regarding necessarily included
offenses, because there is no claim that section 243.1 is a necessarily included
offense of section 243, subdivision (c), so that a jury must be instructed on section
243.1 when a defendant is charged under section 243, subdivision (c). Defendant
was charged and the jury was instructed only under section 243.1. If a jury were
to be instructed on a lesser necessarily included offense in a case in which the
defendant is charged under the wobbler provision of section 243, subdivision (c),
it appears that the lesser necessarily included offense that the jury would be
instructed upon would be the misdemeanor offense prescribed by section 243,
subdivision (b), rather than the felony offense prescribed by section 243.1.
22
III
A
With regard to the second issue before us, the Attorney General contends
the Court of Appeal erred by remanding for a Kelly/Frye hearing, because
Evidence Code section 351.1 establishes a categorical prohibition on the
admission of polygraph evidence in criminal cases absent a stipulation.
Subdivision (a) of section 351.1, which was enacted in 1983, provides:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph
examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to
take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted
into evidence in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction
motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense,
whether heard in juvenile or adult court, unless all parties stipulate to the
admission of such results.”
As noted, prior to trial defendant filed a written motion seeking an
evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence tending to establish
that she had “passed” a polygraph examination. Defendant indicated that at such
hearing she would present testimony by “one or more experts” proving that
polygraph examinations now were generally accepted in the scientific community
within the meaning of the Kelly/Frye test. As an offer of proof, defendant
explained that the polygraph expert who examined her utilized the “control
question” method;8 that defense experts would testify this method is accepted in
8
“The control question technique involves basically two types of questions;
control or comparison questions and relevant questions that specifically concern
the investigation at hand. The control questions are designed to arouse the
concern of the innocent subject and it is expected that the subject will react more
strongly to them than to the relevant questions. The control questions deal with
(footnote continued on following page)
23
the scientific community, as established by scientific studies; and that proper
procedures were employed in administering the test under this method. Defendant
also asserted that other jurisdictions have found polygraph evidence to be accepted
in the scientific community. Defendant attached as an exhibit to her motion an
issue of the journal Polygraph a publication of the American Polygraph
Association (APA) discussing the United States Supreme Court case of United
States v. Scheffer (1998) 523 U.S. 303 (still pending at the time this issue of the
journal was published) and including the parties’ briefs in Scheffer as well as an
amicus curiae brief filed in that case by the APA. Defendant acknowledged that
Evidence Code section 351.1 bars the admission of polygraph evidence in criminal
proceedings unless all parties stipulate to its admission, but argued that this
statutory provision improperly interfered with her federal constitutional right to
present a defense. The trial court, declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing,
held that under section 351.1 “the evidence is inadmissible, period, Kelly or
otherwise.”
(footnote continued from preceding page)
acts that are similar to the issue of the investigation. However, they are more
general, cover long periods of time in the life history of the subject, and are
deliberately vague. During the pretest review of the control questions, the
examiner carefully introduces the control questions to the subject so that in
answering these questions on the test the subject is likely to be deceptive or
uncertain as to the truthfulness of his answers. In this way, the innocent subject
will react more strongly to the control questions than to the relevant questions. On
the other hand, guilty subjects who answer the relevant questions deceptively will
be more concerned about being detected in that deception than with the control
questions. Thus, it is the comparative reactivity rather than the absolute reactivity
to a particular question that forms the basis for determining truth or deception.”
(United States v. Galbreth (D.N.M. 1995) 908 F.Supp. 877, 884.)
24
On appeal, defendant contended that, notwithstanding the apparent
categorical prohibition of Evidence Code section 351.1, she was entitled to a
Kelly/Frye hearing to determine the admissibility of her proposed polygraph
evidence under the reasoning of this court’s decisions in People v. Jackson (1996)
13 Cal.4th 1164 (Jackson), and People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075 (Fudge)
(discussed below). The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that she had
“made a sufficient offer of proof to entitle her to a [Kelly/Frye] hearing” under the
reasoning of Jackson and Fudge, observing that “we do not see what more such an
offer would need to meet the threshold required to convene such a hearing.” The
court, concluding that the denial of a Kelly/Frye hearing prejudiced defendant,
remanded the case to the trial court with directions to conduct such a hearing and
to set aside defendant’s convictions in the event the trial court “concludes the
polygraph evidence is admissible.”
B
Prior to the enactment of Evidence Code section 351.1, the admission of
polygraph evidence in California was governed by the test of Frye v. United
States, supra, 293 F. 1013. Under that test, one who seeks the admission of
evidence based upon a new scientific technique must make “a preliminary
showing of general acceptance of the new technique in the relevant scientific
community.” (Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30; see id. at p. 32 [“reaffirm[ing] our
allegiance” to the Frye “ ‘general acceptance’ ” test for new scientific techniques];
see also People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 593-604 [retaining the Kelly/Frye
test as the applicable California standard and declining to adopt the new federal
standard set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509
U.S. 579].) Relying upon Frye and its progeny, a long line of California decisions
has held or recognized that the results of a polygraph examination are inadmissible
at trial absent a stipulation by the parties. (See People v. Carter (1957) 48 Cal.2d
25
737, 752 [“Lie detector tests do not as yet have enough reliability to justify the
admission of expert testimony based on their results”]; People v. Adams (1975) 53
Cal.App.3d 109, 111-119 [concluding results of polygraph test inadmissible at
trial under doctrine of stare decisis and also because insufficiently reliable];
People v. York (1959) 174 Cal.App.3d 305, 311-312 [refusing to reexamine
holdings of prior cases finding polygraph examination results inadmissible];
People v. Porter (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 461, 470 [the trial court did not err in not
ordering a lie detector test because the results were inadmissible at trial]; People v.
Porter (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 506, 510-511 [same case]; People v. Wochnick
(1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 124, 127-128 [following Frye and finding that the “systolic
blood pressure deception test” has “not yet gained such standing and scientific
recognition as to justify the admission of expert testimony . . . .”]; see also People
v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 763 [noting “the results of [a polygraph] test
are not admissible evidence in a court of law”]; People v. Jones (1959) 52 Cal.2d
636, 653 [“The courts have consistently held that whether the test is a polygraph
test, or a sodium amytal or sodium pentothal test, the results are not such as to be
admissible for or against the defendant because of a lack of scientific certainty
about the results.”]; People v. Schiers (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 102, 108; People v.
Adams (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 27, 33 [noting “the established rule that the results
of lie detector tests are not admissible in evidence”]; People v. Parrella (1958)
158 Cal.App.2d 140, 147 [“There can be no doubt that evidence about the results
of the lie detector test was inadmissible.”]; People v. Aragon (1957) 154
Cal.App.2d 646, 658 [stating of polygraph examinations that “we know of no
appellate decision sustaining its use in the trial of a criminal case in the absence of
a stipulation”].)
The legal landscape in California changed with the Court of Appeal’s
opinion in Witherspoon v. Superior Court (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 24
26
(Witherspoon). The majority in Witherspoon criticized the judicial rule that
consistently excludes polygraph evidence as “an almost ‘knee jerk’ response”
“based more on considerations of policy rather than any demonstrated lack of
reliability or acceptance of the test” considerations that the majority felt “are
more properly matters for legislative rather than judicial determination.” (Id. at
pp. 29, 31.) The majority, not finding any provision in the Evidence Code
expressly barring the admission of polygraph evidence, concluded the defendant
was entitled to a hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence, suggesting
that the polygraph evidence should be admitted so long as the evidence was
relevant (Evid. Code, § 210), its probative value was not substantially outweighed
by the probability of undue prejudice (id., § 352), and the defendant could satisfy
the requirements for the admission of expert testimony (id., § 801 [expert opinion
testimony]; see also id., § 720 [qualification of expert witness]; id., § 405
[determination of preliminary fact]). (Witherspoon, supra, at pp. 30-35.)
“It was in reaction to Witherspoon that the Legislature enacted Evidence
Code section 351.1.” (People v. Kegler (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 72, 85 (Kegler); In
re Kathleen W. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 68, 72.) The Assembly Committee on
Criminal Law and Public Safety’s analysis of the bill that became section 351.1
expressly stated the bill was “ ‘intended to overrule [Witherspoon] and to create an
exception to the truth-in-evidence section of Proposition 8 that bars exclusion of
any relevant evidence.’ (Assembly Com. on Crim. Law and Pub. Safety, staff
comments on Sen. Bill. No. 266 as amended Mar. 16, 1983 (1983-1984 Reg.
Sess.), for hg. on June 8, 1983, p. 2.)” (Kegler, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 84.)
Legislative history materials expressed concerns that (1) the Witherspoon
procedure would “ ‘substantially increase trial time by requiring courts to litigate
collateral issues regarding the reliability of the particular test and qualifications of
the specific polygraph examiner in every case,’ ” (2) polygraph testing procedures
27
lack standardization and cannot be tested for accuracy, and (3) jurors would
“ ‘assign too much credence to the results of a polygraph examination.’ ” (Kegler,
supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 89.)
As past decisions make clear, the Kelly/Frye test constitutes a judicially
created rule relating to the admissibility of certain types of evidence and, as
such, a rule that is subject to legislative revision. (See, e.g., People v. Leahy,
supra, 8 Cal.4th 587, 604 [taking note of legislative failure to abrogate or modify
the general Kelly/Frye standard]; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
supra, 509 U.S. 579, 585-589 [Frye test superseded in federal courts by the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence].) By enacting Evidence Code section
351.1, the Legislature abrogated the Kelly/Frye rule with respect to the admission
of polygraph evidence in criminal cases. As noted, the Legislature enacted section
351.1 to overrule the then recently decided appellate court decision in
Witherspoon, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d 24, which had criticized the routine
application of the Frye test to exclude polygraph evidence and had suggested that
such evidence could be admitted if the proponent made a showing of admissibility
under certain provisions of the Evidence Code. Thus, in adopting Evidence Code
section 351.1, the Legislature effectively codified the rule set forth in the pre-
Witherspoon California cases involving polygraph evidence, namely that such
evidence is categorically inadmissible in the absence of the stipulation of all
parties.
This understanding of Evidence Code section 351.1 is consistent with
numerous cases that subsequently have interpreted the statute to exclude
polygraph evidence categorically in criminal cases, absent the stipulation of the
parties. (See In re Aontae D. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 167, 173; Kegler, supra, 197
Cal.App.3d at p. 84; In re Kathleen W., supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 72.)
Defendant concedes that this is the import of section 351.1, but she argues she
28
nonetheless was entitled to a Kelly/Frye hearing under this court’s precedents, in
particular the decisions in Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1164, and Fudge, supra, 7
Cal.4th 1075. Insofar as section 351.1’s categorical exclusion is applied to
deprive her of the opportunity to demonstrate the current reliability of proffered
polygraph evidence under the Kelly/Frye standard, defendant claims the statute
infringes upon her right to present a defense at trial, in violation of the federal
Constitution.9
C
We first address defendant’s claim that she was entitled to a Kelly/Frye
hearing notwithstanding Evidence Code section 351.1. We begin with a review of
the relevant portions of the decisions in Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1164, and
Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1075, upon which defendant relies. In Jackson, the
defendant, at the guilt phase of a capital trial, sought to present evidence that he
had “passed” a polygraph test and had stated truthfully in the polygraph session
that he had not killed the victim. (Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1212.) The
defendant in Jackson contended he was entitled to a Kelly/Frye hearing
notwithstanding section 351.1, arguing that the statute’s exclusion of such
9
Although defendant’s brief in this court contains a fleeting reference to “her
rights to federal and state due process” in the heading of the brief’s argument
relating to the exclusion of polygraph evidence, her brief fails to cite any authority
or present any argument relating to state constitutional due process principles.
“[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the
points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as
waived, and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]” (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure
(4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 594, p. 627; see also People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th
764, 793; Cal. Rules of Court rules 14, subd. (a)(1)(B), 29.1, subd. (b)(1).)
Because defendant’s “unelaborated citation[]” to the state due process clause
“add[s] nothing to [her] argument” (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 118),
we “‘pass it without consideration’” (Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793).
29
“reliable exculpatory evidence” denied him his right to due process of law under
the federal Constitution. (Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1212.) We rejected this
claim, reasoning: “Even if defendant’s argument were true in the abstract, he has
failed to make the proper offer of proof under Kelly/Frye that the polygraph is now
viewed in the scientific community as a reliable technique. ‘ “. . . Having failed to
make the proper offer of proof, defendant is in no position to assign error in the
trial court’s ruling.” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1122.)
In Fudge, the defendant attempted to present evidence at the penalty phase
of a capital trial that he had “passed” a polygraph examination, arguing that
Evidence Code section 351.1 unconstitutionally deprived him of his right to
present “relevant mitigating evidence.” (Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1121,
1122.) Fudge rejected this claim: “Defendant, however, failed to present an offer
of proof that polygraph evidence was generally accepted in the scientific
community. We have previously held that such an offer of proof is necessary to
preserve the issue for appeal. (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 193.) ‘
“Absent an offer of proof that the polygraph is now accepted in the scientific
community as a reliable technique, the evidence was presumptively unreliable and
inadmissible.” ’ ” (Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1122, quoting People v. Harris
(1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1094-1095.) Other cases similarly have rejected federal
constitutional challenges to section 351.1 because of the defendant’s failure to
make an offer of proof regarding the reliability of polygraph evidence. (See
People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 870-871; People v. Koontz (2002) 27
Cal.4th 1041, 1090; People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 264; People v. Price
(1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 419; see also People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 413-
414 (Maury) [exclusion of polygraph evidence did not impair ability to present a
defense].)
30
As the foregoing decisions demonstrate, defendant is correct in observing
that, even after the enactment of Evidence Code section 351.1, we have required,
as a prerequisite to preserving the claim for appeal, that a challenge to the
constitutionality of this statute include an offer of proof that the proffered
polygraph evidence is generally accepted under the Kelly/Frye standard. The
constitutional challenges to section 351.1 raised in the foregoing cases generally
have involved claims that the exclusion of polygraph evidence deprived a
defendant of his or her right to present “reliable exculpatory evidence” at the guilt
phase of a capital trial (see Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1212-1213), “relevant
mitigating evidence” at the penalty phase (see Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1122-
1123; see also People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1090), or impeachment
evidence (see People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 870-871; People v.
Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 264; People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 419).
Because the constitutional challenges to section 351.1’s exclusion of polygraph
evidence rest on the premise that the statute would abridge a defendant’s federal
and state constitutional rights to due process and to present a defense only if the
proffered evidence were shown to be reliable, we have required those who would
challenge section 351.1 on these grounds to make an adequate offer of proof
regarding the reliability of polygraph evidence. And because the defendants in
those prior cases failed to make the requisite offer of proof regarding the reliability
of the proffered polygraph evidence, we did not have the occasion to decide the
substantive merits of the constitutional claims regarding the exclusion of
polygraph evidence under section 351.1.
The Court of Appeal correctly concluded in the present case that defendant
had preserved her constitutional challenge to section 351.1 by making her offer of
proof regarding the reliability of polygraph evidence under Kelly/Frye. The court,
however, went further and remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a
31
Kelly/Frye hearing, directing the trial court to set aside the judgment if that court
found the polygraph evidence to be “admissible” under the Kelly/Frye standard,
that is, if defendant demonstrated at the hearing that the polygraph technique
employed was generally accepted in the scientific community.
Although our past cases have determined that an offer of proof regarding
the reliability of polygraph evidence is a prerequisite for raising a constitutional
challenge against Evidence Code section 351.1’s categorical exclusion, we never
have held that such proof is sufficient by itself to make out such a claim, that is,
we never have suggested that evidence that satisfies the Kelly/Frye test must, as a
constitutional matter, be admitted in evidence notwithstanding the statutory
provision barring such admission. Indeed, in our recent decision in People v.
Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th, 833, we cautioned: “Before a criminal defendant can
establish a federal due process right to use the results of a polygraph examination,
it is necessary (although perhaps not sufficient) to offer proof that the technique
has become generally accepted in the scientific community.” (Id. at p. 871, italics
added.) Thus, the Court of Appeal erred by remanding the case for a Kelly/Frye
hearing without specifically addressing the question whether section 351.1’s
categorical exclusion of polygraph evidence would be unconstitutional in the event
defendant is able to satisfy the Kelly/Frye test. Because defendant has preserved
her federal constitutional challenge to section 351.1, we now address that issue.
D
The Attorney General contends that under the reasoning of United States v.
Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. 303, the categorical exclusion of polygraph evidence
mandated by Evidence Code section 351.1 does not violate the federal
Constitution. In that case, the United States Supreme Court rejected a
32
constitutional challenge to Military Rules of Evidence, rule 707, subdivision (a),
which bans polygraph evidence in military trials.10 The defendant, an airman who
faced a military court-martial for alleged drug use, sought the admission of
evidence that he had “passed” a polygraph examination, in order to bolster his
testimony that he innocently had ingested the drugs. In a portion of the opinion
authored by Justice Thomas and joined by seven other justices,11 the high court
noted that “there is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable,”
observing that this lack of consensus is “reflected in the disagreement among state
and federal courts concerning both the admissibility and the reliability of
polygraph evidence.” (United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 309-311
(lead opn. of Thomas, J.).) In light of this circumstance, the court concluded that
the per se exclusion of polygraph evidence “is a rational and proportional means
of advancing the legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence” and that
“[i]ndividual jurisdictions therefore may reasonably reach differing conclusions as
to whether polygraph evidence should be admitted. We cannot say, then, that
presented with such widespread uncertainty, the President acted arbitrarily or
disproportionately in promulgating a per se rule excluding all polygraph
evidence.” (Id. at p. 312.)
10
Military Rules of Evidence, rule 707, subdivision (a) provides:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph
examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to
take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted
into evidence.”
11
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined this portion of Justice Thomas’s opinion in Scheffer.
(See United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 309-311 (lead opn. of
Thomas, J.); id. at p. 318 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).)
33
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion joined by three other justices,12
commented that the “continuing, good-faith disagreement among experts and
courts on the subject of polygraph reliability counsels against our invalidating a
per se exclusion of polygraph results,” and “[g]iven the ongoing debate about
polygraphs, I agree the rule of exclusion is not so arbitrary or disproportionate that
it is unconstitutional.” (United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 318 (conc.
opn. of Kennedy, J.).) Justice Kennedy, however, expressed doubt “that the rule
of per se exclusion is wise, and some later case might present a more compelling
case for introduction of the testimony than this one does.” (Ibid.)
We recently applied Scheffer in Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th 342, in which the
defendant sought the admission of evidence that he had “ ‘passed’ ” a polygraph
examination, in order to bolster his claim that someone else had killed the victim.
(Id. at p. 413.) We concluded that in light of Scheffer, “[e]xcluding such evidence
does not violate defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense.” (Ibid.)
Noting that “[i]mplicit in the Legislature’s passage of Evidence Code section
351.1 is the conclusion that ‘[L]ie detector tests themselves are not considered
reliable enough to have probative value’ [Citation.],” and quoting Scheffer, we
concluded that a “per se rule excluding polygraph evidence is a ‘rational and
proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest in barring unreliable
evidence.’ (Scheffer, supra, at p. 312.)” (Ibid.)
We reach the same conclusion here. Scheffer noted that “the scientific
community remains extremely polarized about the reliability of polygraph
techniques.” (United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 309 (lead opn. of
Thomas, J.).) With respect to the reliability of the “control question technique”
12
Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion.
34
employed in the present case, Scheffer observed that studies ran the gamut from
showing an 87 percent accuracy rate to a rate “ ‘little better than could be obtained
by the toss of a coin, that is, 50 percent.’ ” (Id. at p. 310.) This disagreement in
the scientific community in turn has been reflected “in the disagreement among
state and federal courts concerning both the admissibility and the reliability of
polygraph evidence.” (Id. at pp. 310-311.)
Defendant cannot persuasively contend that between the time of the
Scheffer decision and defendant’s trial, a span of two and one-half years, the deep
division in the scientific and legal communities regarding the reliability of
polygraph evidence, as recognized by Scheffer, had given way to a general
acceptance that would render the categorical exclusion of polygraph evidence “so
arbitrary or disproportionate that it is unconstitutional.” (United States v. Scheffer,
supra, 523 U.S. at p. 318 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) Indeed, defense counsel
conceded at oral argument that the disagreement within the scientific community
regarding the reliability of polygraph evidence had not been significantly altered
in that time period. Further, defendant’s offer of proof in the trial court regarding
the reliability of polygraph evidence consisted of a publication of the APA that
outlined the studies and briefing presented in the Scheffer case — materials which
the United States Supreme Court expressly considered and cited in Scheffer in
concluding there existed no scientific consensus on the reliability of polygraph
evidence in general and the control question technique in particular. Likewise, the
legal authorities cited by defendant in the trial court as indicative of a “major
reevaluation of the admissibility of polygraph evidence by the federal courts” all
predate the Scheffer decision and, in any event, did not consider the
constitutionality of a categorical exclusion of polygraph evidence. (See United
States v. Cordoba (9th Cir. 1997) 104 F.3d 225, 227-229 [holding that the Ninth
Circuit’s per se ban on polygraph evidence, based upon Frye, was overturned by
35
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 509 U.S. 579, which
concluded the Federal Rules of Evidence superceded the Frye “general
acceptance” test in federal courts]; United States v. Piccinonna (11th Cir. 1989)
885 F.2d 1529, 1532-1537 [concluding there was no per se ban on polygraph
evidence in the Eleventh Circuit]; United States v. Galbreth, supra, 908 F.Supp.
877, 890-896 [holding polygraph evidence admissible under the Daubert
standard]; United States v. Crumby (D.Ariz. 1995) 895 F.Supp. 1354, 1358-1365
[same].) In light of the continuing division of opinion regarding the reliability of
polygraph evidence, as recognized by Scheffer, the California Legislature has not
acted “arbitrarily or disproportionately in promulgating [and retaining] a per se
rule excluding all polygraph evidence.” (Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 312 (lead
opn. of Thomas, J.); see In re Aontae D., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 177
[exclusion of polygraph evidence under Evidence Code section 351.1 does not
deny due process]; Kegler, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 89 [same].)
Defendant contends the polygraph evidence she proffered was “critical to
her defense” and thus exclusion of this evidence deprived her of the constitutional
right to present a defense, citing Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 U.S. 44 and
Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284. In Rock, the United States Supreme
Court concluded that a per se rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony
infringed upon the defendant’s constitutional right to testify, where the rule
prevented the defendant from testifying regarding the circumstances underlying
the charged killing, including whether it was accidental. (Rock v. Arkansas, supra,
483 U.S. at pp. 56-62.) The court in Chambers held that the defendant’s
constitutional right to present a defense was impaired by Mississippi’s “voucher”
rule, which prevented the defendant from impeaching a defense witness whom he
alleged had committed the charged killing, coupled with application of the hearsay
rule to exclude testimony that the witness had confessed to three persons.
36
(Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. at pp. 294-303; see also Green v.
Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95, 96-97 [due process denied by exclusion of hearsay
evidence that a codefendant had confessed to committing the crime alone].)
These decisions do not assist defendant. Scheffer distinguished Rock and
Chambers, finding that “unlike the evidentiary rules at issue in those cases, [the
rule excluding polygraph evidence] does not implicate any significant interest of
the accused.” (United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 316-317 (lead opn.
of Thomas, J.).) The use of polygraph evidence proposed at defendant’s trial was
indistinguishable from that proposed in Scheffer. Defendant sought the admission
of polygraph evidence to bolster her testimony that she was not under the
influence of alcohol prior to leaving the restaurant and driving home, and to
corroborate evidence suggesting that her subsequently inebriated state (which led
to her erratic driving and assault of a custodial officer) could have been caused by
someone placing a drug in the drinks she consumed at the restaurant. Similarly,
the airman in Scheffer sought to introduce polygraph evidence to bolster his claim
of “ ‘innocent ingestion’ ” of drugs. (Id., at p. 306.) Scheffer held that the
exclusion of such evidence did not abridge the defendant’s right to present a
defense, because the defendant was not prevented from presenting “the relevant
details of the charged offense from the perspective of the accused” or from
“introducing any factual evidence.” (Id. at p. 317.) Defendant in the present case
testified to her version of the events and presented the testimony of a toxicologist
and a police officer in support of her claim of having been drugged. As in
Scheffer, defendant “was barred merely from introducing expert opinion testimony
to bolster [her] own credibility.” (Ibid.; Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 414
[concluding the “defense was not significantly impaired by exclusion of the
polygraph examination results”].)
37
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. Because no issue has
been presented to us concerning defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus
(see fn. 1, ante), we express no opinion on that matter.
GEORGE,
C.J.
WE CONCUR:
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.
38
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J.
I join the majority in holding polygraph evidence inadmissible. I disagree,
however, with its conclusion upholding the constitutionality of the statutory
provisions concerning battery on a custodial officer.
Two statutory provisions concerning battery on a custodial officer are at
issue here: Penal Code section 243.1 makes battery on a custodial officer a felony,
1
whether or not the battery caused injury to the custodial officer. (For
convenience, I sometimes refer to the offense defined by section 243.1 as battery
on a custodial officer without injury, because injury is not an element of the
offense.) Subdivision (c) of section 243 (hereafter section 243(c)), by comparison,
makes a battery on a custodial officer that results in injury to the custodial officer
an offense punishable either as a felony or as a misdemeanor. (For convenience, I
sometimes refer to this offense as battery on a custodial officer with injury.)
Although battery on a custodial officer with injury is on its face more egregious
that battery on a custodial officer without injury, it carries a lesser minimum
penalty (it may be punished as a misdemeanor) and the same maximum penalty.
In this respect, the statutory scheme lacks any rational basis, in my view, and
thereby violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
1
Statutory citations are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise noted.
1
I
“ ‘The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection
clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or
more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.’ ” (Cooley v. Superior
Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253, quoting In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530;
accord, People v. Wutzke (2002) 28 Cal.4th 923, 943.) In this case, persons who
commit the same illegal act – a battery on a custodial officer causing injury – are
in that respect similarly situated, but they are treated differently depending on
whether they are charged under section 243.1, which does not require proof of
injury, or under section 243(c), which does. The Attorney General’s assertion that
persons who commit identical acts with the identical mental states but are charged
under different statutes are not similarly situated is incorrect when the equal
protection issue is the constitutionality of the distinction between the two statutes.
(People v. Nguyen (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 705, 714-715.)
As the majority observes (maj. opn., ante, at p. 17), under the federal and
state equal protection clauses the constitutionality of the statutory scheme at issue
turns on whether there is a rational basis for the distinction it draws between
persons prosecuted under section 243.1 (battery on a custodial officer without
2
injury) and section 243(c) (battery on a custodial officer with injury). (See Kasler
v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 514 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) The
equal protection clause “does not forbid classifications,” but it does forbid
2
If two groups are not similarly situated, then any “equal protection claim
cannot succeed, and does not require further analysis.” (People v. Nguyen, supra,
54 Cal.App.4th at p. 714.) Thus, by applying a rational basis test, the majority
here implicitly acknowledges that the two groups—persons charged under section
243.1 and those charged under section 243(c)—are similarly situated.
2
“government decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all
relevant respects alike.” (Nordlinger v. Hahn (1992) 505 U.S. 1, 10; see Kasler v.
Lockyer, supra, at p. 515 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)
II
The relevant statutory provisions are these:
Section 243.1 declares that battery “committed against the person of a
custodial officer” is a felony when the person committing the battery “knows or
reasonably should know that the victim is a custodial officer engaged in the
performance of his or her duties.”
Section 243, subdivision (b), makes the same conduct a misdemeanor. It
prescribes misdemeanor punishment for a battery “committed against the person
of a . . . custodial officer . . . engaged in the performance of his or her duties . . .
and the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that the
victim is a . . . custodial officer . . . .”
Section 243(c) describes more egregious conduct. It requires a battery
“committed against a custodial officer . . . engaged in the performance of his or
her duties” when “the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should
know that the victim is a . . . custodial officer . . . and an injury is inflicted on that
victim.” (Italics added.) Violation of section 243(c) is punishable as either a
felony or a misdemeanor, in the discretion of the trial court. (Such crimes are
colloquially referred to as “wobblers.”)
Finally, section 243, subdivision (d), not directly relevant here, describes an
even more serious crime: battery on a custodial officer resulting in serious bodily
injury. Violation of this provision too can be punished as either a felony or a
misdemeanor.
Traditionally, California’s sentencing laws have punished crimes that cause
injury more harshly than similar crimes that do not. The statutory scheme at issue
3
here, however, goes against this pattern. As the Court of Appeal majority
observed, “[t]he current scheme encourages arbitrary, irrational charging.” In the
case of a battery on a custodial officer that causes injury, there would be no
incentive for the prosecutor to charge the defendant under section 243(c) (battery
on a custodial officer with injury). By ignoring the injury and charging the
defendant under section 243.1 (battery on a custodial officer without injury), the
prosecutor is spared the burden of proving the injury and the trial court is
precluded from treating the offense as a misdemeanor, an option that would be
available to the court if the defendant had been charged with, and convicted of a
3
violation of section 243(c) (battery on a custodial officer with injury).
Other consequences of the statutory scheme are even more perplexing, as
illustrated by the problems involved in instructing a jury in the trial of a defendant
charged with a violation section 243(c) (battery on a custodial officer with injury).
A trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser included offense when the evidence
raises a question whether all of the elements of the charged crime are present, and
the evidence would support a conviction of the lesser offense. (People v. Bradford
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055.) “[A] lesser offense is necessarily included in a
greater offense if either the statutory elements of the greater offense, or the facts
actually alleged in the accusatory pleading, include all the elements of the lesser
offense, such that the greater cannot be committed without also committing the
lesser.” (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 117.) Because a defendant cannot
3
Although the prosecutor has no incentive to charge a defendant with battery
on a custodial officer with injury (§ 243(c)), there would still be an incentive to
charge a defendant with battery causing serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d))
because that offense, although a wobbler, has a higher maximum penalty than of
offense defined by section 243.1 (battery on a custodial officer without injury).
4
commit battery on a custodial officer with injury (§ 243(c)) or battery on a
custodial officer causing serious bodily injury (§ 243, sub. (d)) without
committing all elements of battery in violation of section 243.1 (battery on a
custodial officer without injury), the latter is an offense necessarily included in the
crimes of battery on a custodial officer with injury or with serious bodily injury.
Consequently, when a defendant is charged with a battery on a custodial officer
with injury or serious bodily injury, and there is a question whether the injury
occurred, the trial court must instruct on the necessarily included offense of
battery in violation of section 243.1 (battery on a custodial officer without injury).
If the jury then found the defendant guilty as charged of a battery on a custodial
officer causing injury (§ 243(c)), the court would have discretion to impose a
misdemeanor sentence. But if the jury, because it entertained a reasonable doubt
that the battery had caused an injury to the custodial officer, found the defendant
guilty only of the necessarily included offense of battery on a custodial officer
(§ 243.1), the trial court would be required to sentence the defendant as a felon.
I can perceive no rational basis for this rather startling statutory scheme.
The majority does, however.
The majority first questions whether the offense defined in section 243.1
(battery on a custodial officer without injury) is actually less serious than the
offense defined in section 243(c) (battery on a custodial officer with injury). It
observes that if we compare two different batteries, it is possible that a particular
battery without injury could be more heinous than another battery that did cause
an injury. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 18-19.) By the same reasoning, however, a
particular petty theft could, depending on the circumstances, be more serious than
a particular grand theft, and a particular grand theft could be more serious than a
particular robbery, and so forth. Under this reasoning, the legal classification of
crimes as inherently “greater” or “lesser” becomes meaningless and a rational
5
ordering of crimes and punishment in the penal law becomes impossible. In
deciding which of two crimes is the greater, the only meaningful comparison is
between the elements of each crime, as I discussed on pages 3-4, ante, not the
particular circumstances of their commission.
The majority also questions defendant’s claim that the statutory scheme
allows a battery on a custodial officer without injury to be punished more severely
than one with injury. The majority points out that the maximum punishment under
both section 243.1 (battery on a custodial officer without injury) and section
243(c) (battery on a custodial officer with injury) is the same—three years. (See
maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.) But the majority cites neither authority nor reason for
the proposition that when comparing statutes for the purpose of equal protection
analysis a court should examine only the maximum punishment and ignore
everything else. Here the minimum punishment specified under section 243.1
(battery on a custodial officer without injury) is 16 months in state prison (§ 18)
while the minimum punishment under section 243(c) (battery on a custodial officer
with injury) is “a fine of not more than two thousand dollars ($2000) [or]
imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year.” When, as here, the
defendant’s crime could reasonably be treated as a misdemeanor, it is the
minimum punishment that is more important.
The majority holds that section 243.1 (battery on a custodial officer without
injury) does not violate the principle of equal protection of the laws because the
Legislature could have rationally concluded that reduction of this offense to a
misdemeanor is not appropriate whenever the prosecutor deems the offense
serious enough for felony prosecution. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.) This reasoning
misses the point. Equal protection analysis requires comparing two statutes—here
section 243.1 (battery on a custodial officer without injury) and section 243(c)
6
(battery on a custodial officer with injury). The majority offers no rational basis
4
for the distinction between them.
I perceive no rational basis for giving trial courts the power to punish as a
misdemeanor a charge of battery on a custodial officer with injury, but to deny
that power as to battery on a custodial officer without injury under section 243.1.
Could the Legislature rationally believe that some batteries without injury are so
serious that the prosecutor must be given unfettered, unreviewable power to ensure
that they are prosecuted as felonies, but that this is not the case for batteries
causing injury? Conversely, could the Legislature rationally believe that the
courts could be trusted to determine when batteries causing injury should be
treated as felonies rather than misdemeanors, but could not be trusted to make the
same determination as to batteries that did not cause injury? The answer is
inescapable: the statutory distinction has no rational basis, thus denying defendant
the equal protection of the laws.
The allegations of defendant’s petition for habeas corpus filed in
4
The majority mistakenly relies on United States v. Batchelder (1979) 442
U.S. 114, a case involving a federal statutory scheme that defined two crimes with
essentially the same elements but different penalties. The United States Supreme
Court concluded that the federal scheme did not deny equal protection to a
defendant convicted of the crime carrying the greater penalty. (Id. at pp. 124-
125.) The court was not faced with a statutory scheme like the one at issue here,
which defines two closely related crimes and permits lesser punishment for the
crime that differs only in requiring one additional aggravating element. The high
court in Batchelder thus had no occasion to decide whether a statutory scheme
with those irrational features violated the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws. I note, moreover, that the Colorado Supreme Court found
the reasoning in Batchelder unpersuasive and declined to follow it in construing
the equal protection clause of its own state constitution. (People v. Estrada (Colo.
1979) 601 P.2d 619, 621.)
7
5
conjunction with defendant’s appeal, if true, belie the majority’s assumption that
prosecutors will charge the felony offense of battery on a custodial officer without
injury under section 243.1 only when they deem the offense serious enough to
warrant felony punishment. Here, after charging defendant with a felony battery
under section 243.1, the prosecutor offered to dismiss the felony charge if
defendant would plead guilty to a misdemeanor battery, which would be further
reduced to an infraction if she successfully completed probation. Defense counsel
refused the offer. The prosecutor then offered to dismiss the battery charge if
defendant would plead guilty to the misdemeanor of driving under the influence of
alcohol or drugs (Veh. Code, § 23152). Defense counsel rejected this offer as
well. The case was then prosecuted as a felony. The trial court expressed dismay
that the case had not been settled, and, after the jury found defendant guilty as
charged, the court placed defendant on probation instead of sending her to prison
for the felony conviction.
If true, these facts show that the prosecutor did not consider defendant’s
conduct so egregious as to require felony punishment. A prosecutor taking that
view would not have been so eager to induce defendant to plead guilty to crimes
punishable only as misdemeanors. But because defendant was charged under
section 243.1, a mandatory felony, the trial court was prevented from exercising
the discretion the Legislature gave it to treat the more serious crime of battery on a
5
The truth of these allegations may be determined at an evidentiary hearing
ordered by the Court of Appeal on the habeas corpus petition defendant filed in
conjunction with her appeal. At issue there is whether defense counsel failed to
consult with defendant before rejecting the prosecution’s offers to dismiss the
felony charge if defendant would plead guilty to either of two misdemeanors,
battery or driving under the influence.
8
custodial officer with injury (§ 243(c)) as a misdemeanor. This kind of injustice is
the predictable result of the current irrational statutory scheme.
I would affirm the Court of Appeal.
KENNARD,
J.
9
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Wilkinson
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 102 Cal.App.4th 72
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S111028
Date Filed: July 29, 2004
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Steven C. Suzukawa
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Anthony J. Dain, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Eric R. Larson for Defendant and
Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C.
Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. De Nicola, Jaime L. Fuster and Thomas C. Hsieh,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Tony Rackauckas, District Attorney (Orange), Brian N. Gurwitz, Deputy District Attorney; Jan Scully,
District Attorney (Sacramento), Albert C. Locher, Assistant Chief Deputy District Attorney; Steve Cooley,
District Attorney (Los Angeles), George M. Palmer, Head Deputy District Attorney; and David R. LaBahn
for California District Attorney’s Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Anthony J. Dain
1010 Second Avenue, Suite 2300
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 238-5575
Eric R. Larson
1010 Second Avenue, Suite 2300
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 238-5575
Thomas C. Hsieh
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 576-1335
2
Opinion Information
| Date: | Docket Number: |
| Thu, 07/29/2004 | S111028 |
Parties
| 1 | The People (Plaintiff and Respondent) Represented by Thomas C. Hsieh Office of the Attorney General 300 S. Spring St., Suite 500 Los Angeles, CA |
| 2 | Wilkinson, Jaleh (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by Anthony J. Dain Attorney At Law 330 J Street #609 San Diego, CA |
| 3 | Wilkinson, Jaleh (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by California Appellate Project - La 520 South Grand Avenue, Suite 400 520 South Grand Avenue, Suite 400 Los Angeles, CA |
| 4 | Wilkinson, Jaleh (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by Eric Robert Larson Attorney at Law 330 J Street #609 San Diego, CA |
| 5 | California District Attorneys Association (Amicus curiae) Represented by Brian Neal Gurwitz DA Orange County P.O. Box 808 Santa Ana, CA |
| 6 | California District Attorneys Association (Amicus curiae) Represented by Albert C. Locher Ofc District Attorney Box 749 Sacramento, CA |
| Disposition | |
| Jul 29 2004 | Opinion: Reversed |
| Dockets | |
| Oct 28 2002 | Petition for review filed counsel for respondent The People |
| Oct 29 2002 | Record requested |
| Oct 30 2002 | Received Court of Appeal record one doghouse. |
| Dec 11 2002 | Petition for Review Granted (criminal case) Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown and Moreno, JJ. |
| Dec 11 2002 | Record requested remainer of C/A record for B145982 and B154520 |
| Dec 19 2002 | Received Court of Appeal record 1 doghouse [B145982] & 1 envelope [B154520] |
| Dec 31 2002 | Counsel appointment order filed Anthony Dain is hereby appointed to represent aplt. Aplt's brief on the merits shall be served & filed on or before 30 days from the date resp's opening brief on the merits is filed. |
| Jan 3 2003 | Request for extension of time filed respondent A.G. to file brief on the merits/opening. To Feb 9, 2003. |
| Jan 14 2003 | Extension of time granted to 2-10-03 for resp to file the opening brief on the merits. |
| Feb 10 2003 | Opening brief on the merits filed counsel for resp The People |
| Mar 10 2003 | Request for extension of time filed by aplt to file the answer brief on the metits, to 4-11. |
| Mar 13 2003 | Extension of time granted to 4-11-03 for aplt to file the answer brief on the merits. |
| Apr 7 2003 | Request for extension of time filed for aplt to file the answer brief on the merits, to 5/12.) |
| Apr 14 2003 | Extension of time granted Appellant's time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including May 12, 2003. |
| May 9 2003 | Request for extension of time filed for aplt to file the brief on the merits, to May 16. |
| May 14 2003 | Extension of time granted to 5-16-03 for aplt to file the answer brief on the merits |
| May 19 2003 | Answer brief on the merits filed by counsel for appellant ( J. Wilkinson) (40k) |
| Jun 6 2003 | Request for extension of time filed reply brief/merits to 6-16-03 |
| Jun 13 2003 | Extension of time granted to 6-16-03 for resp to file the reply brief on the merits. |
| Jun 16 2003 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) by respondent People |
| Jul 15 2003 | Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief by Calif. District Attorney's Association in support of resp |
| Jul 23 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted by Calif. District Attorneys Association in support of resp. Answers may be filed w/in 20 days. |
| Jul 23 2003 | Amicus Curiae Brief filed by: Calif. Dist. Attorneys Assn. in support of resp. |
| Jul 30 2003 | Received: errata to A/C brief of Cal. DA's Assn. |
| Jul 30 2003 | Compensation awarded counsel Atty Dain |
| Aug 12 2003 | Request for extension of time filed by aplt to file a response to the A/C brief (of Cal. DA's Assn.) to 9-2-03. |
| Aug 20 2003 | Extension of time granted to 9-2-03 for aplt to file a response to the A/C brief of Calif. District Attorneys Association. |
| Sep 2 2003 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed by aplt to the a/c of Cal. DA's Assn. |
| Dec 18 2003 | Received document entitled: fax from aplt questioning accuracy of case information contained in docket on court website |
| Jan 13 2004 | Change of Address filed for: counsel for aplt (attys Dain and Larson) |
| Apr 6 2004 | Case ordered on calendar 5-5-04, 9am, S.F. |
| Apr 12 2004 | Filed: Request that two attorneys present oral argument on behalf of aplt. |
| Apr 21 2004 | Order filed Permission granted for two counsel to present oral argument on behalf of appellant. |
| Apr 21 2004 | Order filed The request of Anthony Dain to allocate to Eric Larson 15 min of aplt's oral argument time is granted. |
| May 5 2004 | Cause argued and submitted |
| Jul 29 2004 | Opinion filed: Judgment reversed re appeal. (the Court expresses no opinion re the habeas corpus petition) Majority opinion by George, C.J. ------------------joined by Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown, Moreno, JJ. Concurring & Dissenting opinion by Kennard, J. |
| Aug 31 2004 | Remittitur issued (criminal case) |
| Sep 10 2004 | Received: from CA 2/1 receipt for remittitur. |
| Jan 19 2005 | Compensation awarded counsel Atty Dain |
| Briefs | |
| Feb 10 2003 | Opening brief on the merits filed |
| May 19 2003 | Answer brief on the merits filed |
| Jun 16 2003 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) |
| Jul 23 2003 | Amicus Curiae Brief filed by: |
| Sep 2 2003 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed |
