Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 12/15/03

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE ex rel. THOMAS J.
ORLOFF, as District Attorney, etc., et al., )
S099131
Plaintiffs
and
Appellants,
Ct.App.
1/4
v.
A09528
PACIFIC BELL et al.,
Alameda
County
Defendants and Respondents. )
Super. Ct. No. 816635-9

Public Utilities Code section 1759 provides that only this court and the
Court of Appeal possess jurisdiction to review decisions of the California Public
Utilities Commission (PUC) or “to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with” the PUC in
the performance of its duties. Thus, an action filed in superior court against a
public utility subject to the jurisdiction of the PUC can be precluded by section
1759, where the action would “interfere with” the authority of the PUC. Here,
several district attorneys filed a civil action in superior court, alleging that a public
utility violated the law by engaging in false advertising and unfair business
practices. An administrative enforcement proceeding involving some of the same
allegations of misconduct by this utility was pending in the PUC at the time the
civil action was filed, and the superior court and the Court of Appeal concluded
that because the present action might result in conflicting rulings with the parallel
PUC proceeding , the action would interfere with the authority of the PUC and
thus was barred by section 1759.

---

We conclude that the lower courts erred in determining that the present
action is barred by Public Utilities Code section 1759. As we shall explain, past
decisions of this court recognize that the PUC does not have exclusive jurisdiction
over all actions against a public utility, and that the mere possibility of, or
potential for, conflict with the PUC is, in general, insufficient in itself to establish
that a civil action against a public utility is precluded by section 1759. Although
the lower courts relied upon the circumstance that in this instance an
administrative proceeding presenting a similar or identical issue was concurrently
pending before the PUC, a number of statutory provisions expressly authorize
public law enforcement officials (in addition to the PUC) to initiate civil
enforcement actions against public utilities in instances of alleged misconduct by
such utilities. In expressly establishing overlapping enforcement authority against
public utilities by both the PUC and public prosecutors, the Legislature has
demonstrated that it contemplates that public prosecutors and the PUC will
coordinate their enforcement efforts — and that the superior court in such a civil
action can tailor its proceedings and rulings — to avoid any actual conflict.
Nothing in the present action brought by public prosecutors inevitably would lead
to conflicting rulings that would interfere with or undermine the regulatory
authority of the PUC, and indeed the PUC itself has filed an amicus curiae brief in
this matter, eschewing any suggestion that the initiation and prosecution of this
civil action would interfere with the performance of its duties and instead
maintaining that civil actions brought by public prosecutors are an important
complement to the PUC’s consumer protection efforts. Under these
circumstances, we conclude that the superior court erred in dismissing this action
under section 1759, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal upholding
the dismissal.
2

---

I
A
Acting on behalf of and in the name of the People, on September 2, 1999,
the District Attorneys for the Counties of Alameda, San Mateo, and Monterey
collectively filed this action against defendants, seeking injunctive relief, civil
penalties, and restitution pursuant to the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. &
Prof. Code, §§ 17200, 17500). Named as defendants in the action were Pacific
Bell, Pacific Telesis Group, SBC Communications (SBC, then the parent
corporation of Pacific Bell), and Business Response Inc. (BRI, an independent
telemarketing firm).1
The first cause of action in the complaint alleged that Pacific Bell violated
Business and Professions Code section 17500 by making false and misleading
representations to consumers when marketing three types of telecommunications
services — (1) caller identification blocking, (2) custom calling services, and
(3) inside wire repair insurance.
The second cause of action alleged that the foregoing marketing practices
also constituted unfair competition in violation of Business and Professions Code
section 17200. In addition, the complaint alleged that Pacific Bell violated section
17200 by: (1) failing to provide consumers with sufficient information to choose
telecommunications products and services, as required by Public Utilities Code
section 2896; (2) depriving consumers of the right, conferred by Public Utilities
Code section 2893, to withhold the display of their telephone numbers and

1
Except when necessary to distinguish among the various defendants, they
are referred to herein as Pacific Bell.
3

---

identities upon other telephone equipment; and (3) infringing the right of privacy
guaranteed by article I, section 1, of the California Constitution.
The complaint specifically alleged that Pacific Bell did not disclose
sufficient information to consumers in the course of marketing the options for
blocking caller identification. The caller identification system can permit the
display of a customer’s telephone number and other personal information,
including the name of the customer, upon a specially equipped telephone of the
recipient of the call. If a customer chooses the unblocked option for caller
identification, this personal information automatically is displayed for the recipient
of the call. In the event more customers select the unblocked option, the caller
identification system is more profitable for Pacific Bell, because more consumers
subscribe to the service when it provides identification information concerning a
greater percentage of telephone users. The option for blocking caller
identification, on the other hand, protects the privacy of a customer by
automatically preventing the display of the caller’s name and telephone number.
And, because less information is available through this service when fewer
customers choose the unblocked option, the service is less profitable for Pacific
Bell when customers choose to block their caller identification information.
Pacific Bell hired defendant BRI to commence a telemarketing campaign to
induce customers to select the unblocked option. Pacific Bell allegedly instructed
BRI to characterize a change to the unblocked option as “selective blocking” and
as a free upgrade in service, rather than as a downgrade, as BRI originally had
proposed. The unblocked option could be characterized as selective blocking
because a caller is able to block his or her personal identifying information for any
single telephone call by pressing three keys on the telephone touchpad before
making that particular call. Unless this three-digit code for blocking is dialed
again before making each subsequent call, however, the personal information
4

---

identifying the caller once again is displayed, because the default setting for the
unblocked option is to display this information.2
As a result of this advertising campaign, more than 100,000 customers
switched to the unblocked option. Approximately one-quarter of these customers,
however, subsequently requested to return to complete blocking of their caller
identification. These customers reported either that they had not authorized the
change to selective blocking, or that they had authorized the change based upon
untrue or misleading information. The People alleged that customers had not been
informed fully regarding the two options for caller identification blocking, and that
Pacific Bell thus had not met the disclosure standards required by Public Utilities
Code section 2896.
The complaint further alleged that Pacific Bell had engaged in misleading
and deceptive marketing of its optional custom calling service packages. These
packages, which combine more than one optional service, were marketed under
names such as “Basics Saver Pack” and “Essential Saver Pack.” Because Pacific
Bell also used the term “basic” to describe its minimum level of residential phone
service, the complaint alleged that the practice of marketing the optional and more
expensive custom calling service packages by using the same term was misleading
and failed to disclose adequately that the costs for optional custom calling services
were in addition to the cost of the lower level of basic services. Moreover, Pacific
Bell allegedly did not disclose that individual services included in a custom calling

2
Complete blocking of caller identification information also could have been
characterized as selective blocking, because a caller is able to permit the display of
his or her personal information for a particular telephone call by dialing a different
three-digit code before making that call. The default setting for the complete
blocking option, however, is not to display any personal information regarding the
caller.
5

---

service package could be purchased separately, without purchasing an entire
package. Finally, the complaint alleged that although Pacific Bell required its
marketers to recommend custom calling services to individual customers based
upon the specific needs of the customer, Pacific Bell invariably recommended the
most expensive package of optional services for all customers.
With regard to insurance for inside telephone wire repair, the complaint
alleged that Pacific Bell did not disclose to tenants that landlords possess the duty
to maintain inside telephone wiring. In addition, the People alleged, Pacific Bell
specified the hourly rate that Pacific Bell would charge for wire repair in the
absence of insurance, but did not inform customers that the customers could hire
installers not affiliated with Pacific Bell and not bound by the rate schedule of
Pacific Bell. Furthermore, customers allegedly were not informed of less
expensive wire insurance plans.
The complaint sought a permanent injunction to prohibit the alleged
misconduct, as well as civil penalties, restitution, and costs of suit.
Soon after filing the complaint, the People filed a motion seeking a
preliminary injunction to prohibit Pacific Bell from continuing to engage in the
alleged false advertising and unlawful business practices. The superior court
denied the motion on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
action, and the court did not address the merits of the motion. Subsequently, the
superior court sustained the demurrer of Pacific Bell without leave to amend —
once again determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over all claims
asserted against Pacific Bell.
The superior court entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of Pacific Bell.
The People appealed from that judgment and from the order denying the motion
for a preliminary injunction. Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the superior
6

---

court stayed all proceedings against the three remaining defendants pending the
outcome of the appeal.
B
The determination of the superior court that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction was based upon the circumstance that a related administrative
proceeding was then pending before the PUC. That proceeding arose from several
complaints filed by private consumer advocates between April and June of 1998.
The PUC Office of Ratepayers Advocates subsequently joined the PUC
proceeding, and on June 30, 1998, an administrative law judge (ALJ) consolidated
the various complaints. These administrative complaints included challenges to
the legality of the practices alleged in the present action, as described in the
preceding subsection, including allegations that such practices amounted to
violations of the UCL. The administrative complaints also challenged additional
practices, not questioned in the present action, allegedly committed by Pacific Bell
in connection with its marketing of telecommunications services.
After an evidentiary hearing, the administrative proceeding in the PUC was
submitted on March 26, 1999, and several days later the PUC extended
indefinitely the deadline for issuing a ruling in the matter. When the People filed
the present civil action on September 9, 1999, no tentative or final ruling had been
issued by the PUC, and the PUC had not issued any order requiring defendants to
cease and desist any activities challenged in the proceeding. According to the
People, defendants continued their allegedly unlawful practices during the
pendency of the proceeding in the PUC.
On December 22, 1999, the ALJ filed a tentative decision for the
consideration of the PUC. The tentative decision determined that Pacific Bell had
violated Public Utilities Code section 2896 by not disclosing sufficient
information to consumers when it marketed options for blocking caller
7

---

identification. In addition, the ALJ concluded that Pacific Bell had engaged in
misleading and deceptive marketing of its optional custom calling service
packages. Furthermore, the ALJ found that Pacific Bell did not present customers
with sufficient information regarding insurance for inside wire repair. The
tentative decision recommended imposing a $25 million fine and establishing a
customer education fund of $25 million.
Pacific Bell appealed the tentative decision rendered by the ALJ to the PUC
commissioner assigned to the case. This commissioner issued a proposed decision
in November 2000, recommending that Pacific Bell be fined $2,373,000 for
violations in the marketing of call blocking and for its failure to inform customers
of less expensive optional services. The decision also would have required Pacific
Bell to pay restitution, and determined that any further action against Pacific Bell
for violations of the UCL was not necessary.3
When the Court of Appeal issued its decision in the present appeal in June
2001, the PUC had not yet issued a final decision in the administrative proceeding.
The appellate court concluded that Public Utilities Code section 1759, subdivision
(a), which provides that only this court and the Court of Appeal possess
jurisdiction to review a decision of the PUC or to interfere with the PUC in the
performance of its duties, divested the superior court of subject matter jurisdiction
over the civil action filed by the district attorneys. The decision of the Court of
Appeal reasoned that the present action raises claims identical to those asserted in
the administrative proceeding in the PUC and thus might result in factual and legal
conflicts with regard to ongoing PUC proceedings. The Court of Appeal held that

3
The Court of Appeal took judicial notice of the various decisions proposed
by the ALJ and by the commissioner.
8

---

the circumstance that the present civil action was instituted by plaintiffs acting on
behalf of the public was insufficient to overcome the preemption of such actions
pursuant to section 1759. The appellate court therefore affirmed the judgment of
dismissal entered by the superior court.
While the petition for review from the Court of Appeal’s decision in this
case was pending before this court, the PUC issued its final decision in the
administrative proceeding in September 2001.4 The decision determined that
Pacific Bell had failed to provide customers with adequate information when it
marketed the three types of services challenged in the present action, and that the
utility therefore had deprived customers of meaningful choices with regard to such
services. The final decision imposed a fine of $25,550,000 (later reduced by the
PUC on rehearing to $15,225,000)5 but, unlike the tentative decision of the ALJ,
did not order the creation of a customer education fund and, unlike the revised
proposed decision of the commissioner, did not order restitution. Instead, the PUC
required Pacific Bell to notify its customers of their options regarding the various
services at issue and to provide an opportunity for them to cancel any unwanted
services.
The decision of the PUC expressly was limited to whether Pacific Bell
violated provisions of the Public Utilities Code and to remedies available under
that code. After stating that (1) the UCL claims in the present civil action were
“based on factual allegations essentially identical to those . . . alleged in this

4
At the request of the People and amicus curiae Consumer Attorneys of
California, we take judicial notice of the PUC’s final decision. (Evid. Code,
§ 452, subd. (c).)
5
The PUC reduced the amount of the fine based on its conclusion that the
time period for which penalties properly could be imposed was shorter than
originally determined.
9

---

[administrative] proceeding”; (2) the remedies for violations of the UCL are
“cumulative to each other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other
laws of this state” (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17205, 17534.5); and (3) the superior
court had dismissed the present action on the ground that the PUC possessed
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, the decision of the
PUC stated: “Our disposition of the instant complaint rests on Public Utility Code
issues, and we do not adjudicate the Unfair Competition Law claims. (See
Business and Professions Code[,] § 17204.)” (Italics added.)
We granted the People’s petition for review to determine whether the Court
of Appeal properly concluded that the district attorneys’ civil action was barred by
Public Utilities Code section 1759.6 , 7
II
A
Public Utilities Code section 1759, subdivision (a) (hereafter section
1759(a)), states: “No court of this state, except the Supreme Court and the court

6
While this matter was pending before this court, the PUC decision
summarized above came before the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal
rejected a challenge to the PUC’s determination that it had no authority to
adjudicate the UCL claims that had been raised in the PUC proceeding, agreeing
with the PUC’s conclusion that a claim under the UCL may be brought only in
court and not in an administrative proceeding. (Greenlining Institute v. Public
Utilities Com. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1328-1333.) That issue is not
presented in this case and has not been briefed or argued in this court, and
accordingly we express no view on the question.
7
Appearing as amici curiae on behalf of the People are the California Public
Utilities Commission, the Attorney General of California, and the Consumer
Attorneys of California. Briefs supporting defendants have been filed by amicus
curiae Civil Justice Association of California and, collectively, by amici curiae
Verizon California Inc., Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas &
Electric Company, and Southern California Gas Company.
10

---

of appeal, to the extent specified in this article, shall have jurisdiction to review,
reverse, correct, or annul any order or decision of the commission or to suspend or
delay the execution or operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the
commission in the performance of its official duties, as provided by law and the
rules of court.”
The issue here is whether the present civil action against Pacific Bell, filed
in the superior court, would require the superior court: (1) to review, reverse,
correct, or annul any decision of the PUC; or (2) to enjoin, restrain, or interfere
with the PUC in the performance of its official duties, within the meaning of
section 1759(a). If so, section 1759(a) would preclude the superior court from
exercising jurisdiction over the action, as concluded by the superior court and the
Court of Appeal.
In analyzing this issue, we note at the outset that it is well established that
section 1759(a) is not intended to, and does not, immunize or insulate a public
utility from any and all civil actions brought in superior court. (See, e.g., Truck
Owners etc., Inc. v. Superior Court (1924) 194 Cal. 146, 154-159 [construing
predecessor to section 1759]; Yolo Water etc. v. Superior Court (1919) 43
Cal.App. 332, 339-342 [same].) Indeed, a number of statutes in the Public
Utilities Code expressly authorize the filing of civil actions in superior court
against public utilities. (See Pub. Util. Code, §§ 2101, 2102, 2106; see also id. ,
§ 243 [Public Utilities Act “shall not release or waive any right of action . . . which
may . . . accrue under any law of this State.”] )
The most general of these provisions is Public Utilities Code section 2106.
That statute provides that any public utility that violates the laws of this state, or
that violates an order or decision of the PUC, shall be liable to persons and entities
damaged by such conduct. The statute also provides for exemplary damages, and
explicitly states that an action to recover damages caused by a public utility “may
11

---

be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction by any corporation or person.”
(Ibid.) Moreover, recovery pursuant to section 2106 does not in any manner affect
the state’s recovery of penalties or the PUC’s power to punish for contempt.
(Ibid.)8
Two relatively recent decisions of this court have examined the relationship
between sections 1759(a) and 2106. In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior
Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893 (Covalt),9 private individuals had filed a civil action
in superior court against a public utility, seeking damages and injunctive relief on
the ground that powerlines owned and operated by the utility emitted dangerous
levels of electromagnetic radiation, causing plaintiffs to fear for their health and to
require medical monitoring. Our decision set forth a three-part inquiry for
determining whether the action would interfere with the PUC in the performance
of its duties and thus was precluded by section 1759(a): (1) whether the PUC
possessed the authority to formulate a policy regarding any public health risk

8
Section 2106 states in full:
“Any public utility which does, causes to be done, or permits any act,
matter, or thing prohibited or declared unlawful, or which omits to do any act,
matter, or thing required to be done, either by the Constitution, any law of this
State, or any order or decision of the commission, shall be liable to the persons or
corporations affected thereby for all loss, damages, or injury caused thereby or
resulting therefrom. If the court finds that the act or omission was wilful, it may,
in addition to the actual damages, award exemplary damages. An action to
recover for such loss, damage, or injury may be brought in any court of competent
jurisdiction by any corporation or person.

“No recovery as provided in this section shall in any manner affect a
recovery by the State of the penalties provided in this part or the exercise by the
commission of its power to punish for contempt.”
9
Covalt was a real party in interest in that matter, and we have utilized this
designation in the past in referring to the decision. (See, e.g., Hartwell Corp. v.
Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 256, 264.) For consistency, we continue the use
of that designation here.
12

---

related to electric and magnetic fields arising from the powerlines of regulated
utilities, or a policy regarding what actions, if any, the utilities should have taken
to minimize any such risk; (2) whether the PUC had exercised that authority to
adopt such policies; and (3) whether the superior court action filed by private
persons against the utility would hinder or interfere with those policies.
With regard to the third part of the test set forth in Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th
893 — regarding whether the civil action would hinder or interfere with a policy
of the PUC — our decision followed the rule previously set forth in Waters v.
Pacific Telephone Co. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 1, 4: “[A]n action for damages against a
public utility pursuant to section 2106 is barred by section 1759 not only when an
award of damages would directly contravene a specific order or decision of the
commission, i.e., when it would ‘reverse, correct, or annul’ that order or decision,
but also when an award of damages would simply have the effect of undermining a
general supervisory or regulatory policy of the commission, i.e., when it would
‘hinder’ or ‘frustrate’ or ‘interfere with’ or ‘obstruct’ that policy.” (Covalt,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 918, italics added.)
Applying the foregoing three-part test to the civil action filed in Covalt,
supra, 13 Cal.4th 893, our decision determined that (1) the PUC possessed the
authority to regulate matters related to electromagnetic fields arising from the
powerlines of public utilities, as well as matters regarding the actions utilities must
undertake to minimize any associated risks; (2) the PUC had exercised its
authority to adopt such policies  policies reflecting the commission’s finding
that it lacked sufficient information to decide whether such fields were dangerous
or whether utilities must undertake particular mitigation measures; and (3) a civil
action seeking a determination that electromagnetic fields arising from utility
powerlines caused damage to the plaintiffs, or that the utility should be enjoined
from locating its powerlines in particular areas, would be inconsistent with the
13

---

findings of the PUC. Those findings included determinations that the available
evidence did not support a reasonable belief or conclusion that electromagnetic
fields from powerlines posed a substantial risk of harm, and that utilities need not
take action to reduce field levels unless and until the evidence supported such a
conclusion. Therefore, our decision concluded, the civil action would require an
adjudication of issues previously considered by the PUC, and the resolution of
those issues by the PUC was reflected in its official policies. For these reasons,
we held that the action would interfere with and hinder the ongoing regulatory
efforts undertaken by the PUC in connection with this subject matter, and section
1759 thus precluded the civil action.
Our other recent decision, filed in 2002, also determined whether a civil
action filed pursuant to Public Utilities Code section 2106 was precluded by
section 1759, and there we reached a conclusion different, at least in part, from
that in Covalt. In Hartwell Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.4th 256
(Hartwell), residents of an area filed civil actions alleging that various water
companies had provided them unsafe drinking water, causing deaths, personal
injuries, and property damage. Our decision in Hartwell determined that not all
claims alleged in the civil action were barred by section 1759, and we applied the
three-part test established in Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th 893, as follows.
First, our decision concluded that the PUC possessed authority to adopt
policies regarding water quality and to undertake appropriate action to ensure
water safety. (Hartwell, supra, 27 Cal.4th 256, 269-272.)
Second, we concluded that, although another state agency had assumed
responsibility for setting standards and enforcing laws related to water quality, the
PUC had continued to exercise its authority to adopt policies regarding the rates
charged by public water utilities and the compliance by these utilities with water
quality standards. (Hartwell, supra, 27 Cal.4th 256, 272-274.)
14

---

Third, our decision in Hartwell found some claims alleged in the civil
action to be barred because their adjudication would interfere with the regulatory
authority of the PUC, but that other claims would not result in such interference
and therefore were not precluded by section 1759. The decision concluded, for
example, that because the PUC relied upon certain water quality standards as a
benchmark in approving water rates charged by public utilities, challenges in the
civil action to the adequacy of those standards, and claims for damages allegedly
caused by unhealthy water permitted by the standards, would interfere with broad
and continuing regulatory programs of the PUC such as ratemaking for public
utilities. In addition, the PUC had provided a safe harbor for utilities meeting
these water quality standards, and our decision observed that a determination by
the superior court that the existing standards were inadequate would undermine
this policy of the PUC by holding the utilities liable for damages caused by their
failure to undertake action that the PUC repeatedly had determined was not
required. (Hartwell, supra, 27 Cal.4th 256, 276.) Similarly, claims in the civil
action seeking injunctive relief for current violations of water quality standards
were precluded by section 1759, because an injunction predicated upon a finding
of such violations would conflict with the decision of the PUC that the defendant
utilities presently were in compliance with the standards, and that no further
inquiries or evidentiary hearings regarding compliance were required. (Hartwell,
supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 278.)
In contrast, the decision in Hartwell concluded that claims in the civil
action for damages allegedly caused by water that did not satisfy applicable water
standards were not preempted by section 1759 — even though the PUC had issued
a decision including a finding that, for the previous 25 years, water provided by
the defendant utilities substantially did comply with the water standards. In
concluding that this prior PUC pronouncement regarding past compliance with
15

---

water quality standards did not prelude these particular civil claims, our decision
relied upon the following circumstances: (1) the investigation by the PUC that led
to the decision was characterized by the commission as a process designed to
gather information, rather than as a rulemaking proceeding; (2) even though
information gathered in the investigation and reported in the decision might have
resulted in a rulemaking or enforcement proceeding against the utilities, the
finding by the PUC that the utilities had complied with water quality standards did
not constitute “part of a broad and continuing program to regulate . . . water
quality” and thus the program “was not part of an identifiable ‘broad and
continuing supervisory or regulatory program of the commission’ [citation] related
to such routine PUC proceedings as ratemaking [citation] or approval of water
quality treatment facilities”; and (3) the civil action sought damages for injuries
caused by water that had failed to meet water standards in prior years, whereas any
finding by the PUC regarding past compliance would be relevant only to a future
remedial program designed to halt current and ongoing violations, rather than to
redress injuries for past violations, because the PUC could not provide such relief
for past violations.10 (Hartwell, supra, 27 Cal.4th 256, 276-277.)
In sum, we determined in Hartwell that the claims for damages in the civil
action might result in a jury award based upon a finding that public water utilities
violated water quality standards, and that although such a finding would be
contrary to a pronouncement in a single prior PUC decision, such a finding or

10
“[T]he PUC can redress violations of the law or its orders by suit (§ 2101),
by mandamus or injunction (§§ 2102-2103), by actions to recover penalties
(§§ 2104, 2107), and by contempt proceedings (§ 2113), but these remedies are
essentially prospective in nature.” (Hartwell, supra, 27 Cal.4th 256, 277.)
16

---

damage award would not hinder or frustrate the declared supervisory and
regulatory policies of the PUC. (Hartwell, supra, 27 Cal.4th 256, 277-278.)11
B
Unlike the civil actions in Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th 893, and Hartwell,
supra, 27 Cal.4th 256, which were instituted against public utilities by private
parties, the superior court action in this case was instituted by district attorneys on
behalf of the People, and the People maintain that this distinction has a significant
bearing on the applicability of section 1759(a). As explained below, we agree that
this factor is significant in determining whether a civil action impermissibly will
interfere with the PUC in the performance of its official duties within the meaning
of section 1759(a).
As noted in Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th 892, 916, Public Utilities Code
section 2106 provides for the sole private remedy — a traditional action for
damages brought by the injured party in superior court — among the various
remedies prescribed in chapter 11 of the Public Utilities Act (Pub. Util. Code,
§ 2100 et seq.) that are designed to redress violations of the law and of PUC
decisions by public utilities. The other remedies set forth in this chapter “are
public remedies prosecuted in the name of the people of the state by commission
counsel or by the Attorney General or the appropriate district attorney. (§ 2101.)”
(Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th 893, 916, italics added.)

11
Our decision in Hartwell, supra, 27 Cal.4th 256, 279-283, also held that
civil claims against entities not regulated by the PUC were not precluded by
section 1759, even though such claims might result in findings that conflict with
analogous findings in PUC decisions regarding regulated public utilities. The
decision stated: “[S]ection 1759 must be read to bar superior court jurisdiction
that interferes with the PUC’s performance of its regulatory duties, duties which
by constitutional mandate apply only to regulated utilities.” (Hartwell, supra, 27
Cal.4th 256, 280-281.)
17

---

The People contend that because the present action constitutes a public
action initiated by several district attorneys to remedy alleged violations of
sections 17200 and 17500 of the Business and Professions Code, section 1759
does not preclude the action, notwithstanding any concurrent proceedings in the
PUC regarding the same subject matter. The People rely upon several statutes in
support of this contention.
Public Utilities Code section 2101 requires the PUC to ensure that the
provisions of the California Constitution and statutes affecting public utilities are
enforced, and that any violations of these provisions are prosecuted promptly.
This statute further states: “Upon the request of the commission, the Attorney
General or the district attorney of the proper county or city and county shall aid in
any investigation, hearing, or trial had under the provisions of this part, and shall
institute and prosecute actions or proceedings for the enforcement of the
provisions of the Constitution and statutes of this State affecting public utilities
and for the punishment of all violations thereof.” (Italics added.) In addition,
Public Utilities Code section 2105 states that all penalties provided by the Public
Utilities Act shall be cumulative, and that an action to recover one penalty shall
not constitute a bar to, or affect the recovery of, any other penalty or forfeiture.
Although it is unclear from the record whether the PUC requested that the
district attorneys involved in the present action aid in the PUC’s investigation of
defendant utilities or in its administrative proceeding against those utilities, Public
Utilities Code sections 2101 and 2105 do appear to authorize district attorneys,
even without such a request by the PUC, to prosecute actions in the name of the
People against public utilities for violations of the law. (See California Oregon
Power Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 858, 870 [the superior court
had jurisdiction over an action initiated by the State of California to abate a
18

---

nuisance caused by a public utility, because the PUC did not possess exclusive
jurisdiction and had not undertaken any action regarding the matter].)
The People further rely upon Government Code section 26509, subdivision
(a), which states in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, . . .
the district attorney shall be given access to, and may make copies of, any
complaint against a person subject to regulation by a consumer-oriented state
agency and any investigation of the person made by the agency, where that person
is being investigated by the district attorney regarding possible consumer fraud.”
(Italics added.) This statute expressly identifies the PUC as one of the consumer-
oriented state agencies to which subdivision (a) refers. (Gov. Code, § 26509,
subd. (d)(32).) Only where the release of such materials would jeopardize an
investigation or other duties of the agency is the agency authorized to withhold
this information from the district attorney, and even then the agency only can
delay the release of the materials. (Id., subd. (c).) Government Code section
26509 does not expressly authorize district attorneys to initiate actions against
public utilities, but it implicitly does so by conferring a right to examine agency
materials as part of the district attorney’s investigation of consumer fraud. There
would be little reason to require that the district attorney be provided access to
agency materials to facilitate his or her investigation of consumer fraud, if the
district attorney could not seek to remedy, in a judicial action, any consumer fraud
discovered as a result of that investigation. Moreover, subdivision (b) of
Government Code section 26509 states that if the district attorney does not take
action with respect to the complaint or investigation, the material must remain
confidential. This subdivision also implicitly suggests authorization for the
district attorney to file an action for consumer fraud.
Finally, the People assert that claims under the UCL, including those
asserted in the present action, constitute allegations of possible consumer fraud
19

---

within the meaning of Government Code section 26509, subdivision (a), and that
the UCL expressly authorizes district attorneys to prosecute such claims
“exclusively in a court of competent jurisdiction.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204.)
These claims, the People contend, therefore are not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the PUC.
The People apparently do not assert that the claims authorized by these
statutes never could be precluded by section 1759, and appear to concede that the
three-part inquiry set forth in Covalt remains applicable to these claims.
According to the People, however, the circumstance that the present action
constitutes a public enforcement action initiated pursuant to the authority
conferred by the foregoing statutes must be considered when determining,
pursuant to the third part of that inquiry, whether the action would undermine a
general regulatory policy of the PUC.
We agree with the position of the People that the foregoing statutes
significantly influence the inquiry whether a general regulatory policy of the PUC
would be interfered with or undermined by the filing and maintenance of the civil
action. The constitutional and statutory authority of the PUC to regulate public
utilities is indeed broad (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 914-915), but where a
civil action brought by public prosecutors in the name of the People against a
public utility does not usurp any exclusive power of the PUC and is authorized
expressly by statute, we properly may discern a legislative intent that the superior
court and the PUC possess concurrent subject matter jurisdiction, and that public
prosecutors and PUC officials share the authority and responsibility to prosecute
violations of these laws. Furthermore, statutes such as Government Code section
26509, subdivision (d)(32), which permits the PUC to defer disclosure of
investigative materials to public prosecutors in the event such disclosure would
jeopardize the PUC’s own investigation or other duties, clearly indicate that in
20

---

situations encompassed by this statute and by analogous provisions, the PUC and
public prosecutors are expected to coordinate their efforts to accomplish the most
efficient and effective means of remedying any misconduct of the public utility.
To summarize, where the PUC does not possess exclusive regulatory
authority over a matter, district attorneys are authorized to initiate actions against
public utilities that have violated the law. Where the matter concerns consumer
fraud, and disclosure of investigative materials by the PUC would not jeopardize
its own investigation or authority, district attorneys are authorized to prosecute
civil actions against public utilities for violations of these consumer fraud laws. If
disclosure would impede the investigation being conducted by the PUC, the
district attorneys are required to await disclosure pending further action by the
PUC. In any event, where one of the foregoing statutes authorizes a superior court
action by a public prosecutor regarding an issue that also is within the jurisdiction
of the PUC, there is a diminished likelihood that an action in superior court
initiated by the district attorney would undermine the ongoing regulatory authority
of the PUC over the particular issue involved, because as a general matter the
Legislature intended in these situations for the enforcement authority of the PUC
to be shared with public prosecutors.
Nevertheless, as the People appear to concede, even where these statutes
authorize actions against public utilities in the name of the public, such an action
in superior court potentially might result in direct interference with a broad and
continuing regulatory program of the PUC and thus be precluded by section 1759.
For example, where any relief awarded by the superior court would render
completely ineffective or moot the relief, orders, or policies previously rendered
by the PUC with regard to precisely the same subject matter, it would be
reasonable to conclude that such an action in superior court would frustrate the
ongoing regulatory powers of the PUC and would be precluded by section 1759.
21

---

Certainly, it appears that the present action, initiated in superior court by district
attorneys, was authorized by Public Utilities Code sections 2101 and 2105,
Government Code section 26509, subdivision (a), and Business and Professions
Code section 17204. Nevertheless, because a similar proceeding addressing much
of the same alleged misconduct by the same parties was pending in the PUC at the
time the action was filed, the statutory authorization for the civil action does not
necessarily establish that the action is permissible pursuant to section 1759 
although the explicit statutory authorization for such an action by a public
prosecutor is very relevant to the pertinent inquiry, as explained above.
C
The parties do not identify any decisions that have considered whether an
action initiated by a public prosecutor against a public utility for alleged violations
of the UCL is precluded by section 1759. (Cf. Wise v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
(1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 287 [private attorney general action for violation of UCL
was not precluded by section 1759 where concurrent investigatory PUC
proceeding was pending, but the trial court was directed to stay the civil action
under the primary jurisdiction doctrine pending further PUC proceedings];
Cellular Plus v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1224 [action alleging price
fixing in violation of the Cartwright Act was not barred by section 1759 even
though PUC regulated applicable rates].) The decision of the Court of Appeal
determined that the present action, including the motion for preliminary injunctive
relief, was barred because it posed a potential conflict with the PUC administrative
proceeding. The People contend no such conflict warranting preclusion of the
present action could have existed, because no final decision had been issued by the
PUC when the trial court and the Court of Appeal filed their decisions, and these
courts should not have speculated regarding the action the PUC might take at
some future time. To illustrate the point, the People note that the subsequent final
22

---

decision of the PUC in this case expressly declined to resolve the UCL claims that
had been asserted in the PUC, thus eliminating any possibility of conflicting
rulings regarding those claims, even though the same claims had been asserted in
each proceeding and thus a potential for conflict existed.
Indeed, as the People contend, the Court of Appeal did not identify any
existing policy or ongoing regulatory effort by the PUC that would be frustrated
by the present action. There existed only a potential for conflicting findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
On the other hand, unlike the PUC proceeding considered in Hartwell,
which was intended only to gather information concerning subjects regulated by
the commission, the present PUC proceeding constituted an enforcement
proceeding to determine whether Pacific Bell had violated the law and, if so, what
penalties and remedies should be imposed. No party to the present dispute
contests that the PUC, pursuant to the first two parts of the test in Covalt, supra,
13 Cal.4th 892, possesses the authority to engage in such an enforcement
proceeding, or that it had exercised that authority by conducting the administrative
proceeding. The pertinent inquiry is whether the potential for inconsistent
findings of fact and conclusions of law in the present civil action and in the
administrative proceeding would impede or interfere with the PUC in the
performance of its duties, pursuant to the third part of the test set forth in the
Covalt decision. We conclude that it would not, and that section 1759 does not
preclude the present action.
Like the Court of Appeal, Pacific Bell asserts that the present action is
barred because it raises some of the same claims that were made in the PUC
proceeding. But the circumstance that a civil action, brought by a public
prosecutor, involves a claim similar to one presented in a pending PUC proceeding
does not in itself establish that the prosecution of the civil action will interfere
23

---

with the PUC’s performance of its duties. Pacific Bell does not contend that the
proceeding pending in the PUC was part of any ongoing supervisory or regulatory
program or rulemaking procedure that would be obstructed or frustrated by the
civil action. Indeed, the PUC itself, in an amicus curiae brief filed in this court in
support of the People, agrees that nothing in the present action undermines or
hinders any ongoing policy, program, or other aspect of its authority, and
emphasizes that the Attorney General and the district attorneys expressly are
authorized to bring UCL claims in court, but that the PUC is not. (Bus. & Prof.
Code, §§ 17204, 17535.) As is established by the various statutory provisions
discussed above, as well as by others cited in the PUC’s brief (see, e.g., Pub. Util.
Code, §§ 7607, 7720, 7721), the PUC, the Attorney General, and the district
attorneys possess overlapping responsibility for investigating and prosecuting
enforcement actions against public utilities. The PUC’s brief further indicates that
“the relief sought in the court action would complement,” rather than interfere
with, the PUC’s efforts. Furthermore, as discussed previously, because the present
action concerns allegations of consumer fraud against a public utility, and district
attorneys are authorized to initiate actions to remedy such misconduct,
Government Code section 26509 makes clear that the PUC and the district
attorneys are expected to coordinate their actions. Where a potential for
conflicting factual findings or legal conclusions exists, coordination of efforts
between the PUC and the district attorneys can avoid any actual conflict. For
example, district attorneys might seek a stay of a civil action to await the outcome
of parallel PUC proceedings. In addition, the superior court might fashion
preliminary injunctive relief in a manner so that it is subject to modification in the
event the PUC issues a different order concerning the same misconduct.
Similarly, a superior court considering the imposition of penalties in the civil
action can take into account any fines imposed by the PUC.
24

---

The only instance in which the present action inevitably would result in a
conflict with the PUC enforcement proceeding, with the result that the authority of
the PUC conceivably might be hindered, is where permanent injunctive relief
ordered by the superior court would conflict with a “safe harbor” subsequently
established by the PUC or with some type of permanent cease and desist order of
the PUC regarding the same conduct. Because injunctive relief is subject to
modification by the court upon a showing of changed circumstances, however, this
potential conflict would not undermine the authority of the PUC as long as the
superior court deferred to any contrary ruling by the PUC with regard to a subject
over which the PUC possesses exclusive jurisdiction. Other claims seeking
penalties or restitution for past misconduct, as asserted in the present case,
including UCL claims premised upon the same violations of the Public Utilities
Code adjudicated before the PUC, would not interfere with any ongoing regulatory
effort of the PUC, even where, despite coordination between the PUC and the
district attorneys and despite efforts by the superior court, the claims might result
in factual findings or legal conclusions different from those reached by the PUC.
In sum, the Court of Appeal erred in relying solely upon the circumstance
that the allegations of the complaint in the present action were the same as the
allegations in the PUC proceeding, rather than considering the extent to which the
remedies in the two proceedings were likely to be inconsistent and thus were
likely to undermine any ongoing authority or regulatory program of the PUC.
Enforcement of the vast array of consumer protection laws to which public utilities
are subject is a task that would be difficult to accomplish by a single regulatory
agency, and the applicable statutes clearly contemplate that other public law
enforcement officials, in addition to the PUC, must be involved in the effort to
enforce such laws. No actions by the district attorneys in the present case would
interfere with the authority of the PUC; on the contrary, the proceedings they have
25

---

instituted assist the enforcement efforts of the PUC by ensuring that public
utilities  to the same degree as other types of businesses  are subject to
liability in actions initiated by public officials.12
Contrary to the contention of Pacific Bell, the case of People v. Superior
Court (Dyke Water Co.) (1965) 62 Cal.2d 515 is clearly distinguishable from the
present case and does not compel the conclusion reached by the lower courts in the
case before us. In Dyke Water Co., after the PUC had rendered a decision against
a public utility requiring the utility to formulate and implement a plan for making
refunds to its customers, the utility filed a declaratory judgment action in superior
court, seeking to have that court, rather than the PUC, resolve issues regarding the
implementation of the PUC order. In that setting, this court held: “The controlling
facts are that the whole matter of how refunds are to be made is still pending and
undecided before the commission and Dyke is obligated by a final order of the
commission to present a plan for making refunds. Under these circumstances
section 1759 precludes the superior court from adjudicating at Dyke’s behest the
very issues that will necessarily be presented to the commission in the continuing
exercise of its jurisdiction in the refund proceedings.” (62 Cal.2d at p. 518.) For
the reasons explained above, the civil enforcement action brought by public

12
We have no occasion in the present case to consider the circumstances in
which a civil action under the UCL may be brought against a public utility by a
private party acting as a private attorney general when a parallel enforcement
proceeding is pending in the PUC. We note, however, that when a UCL action is
brought by one or more private parties, there may be more of a risk of a lack of
coordination with PUC officials, and thus greater danger that the civil action might
undermine an ongoing regulatory program or policy of the PUC. In such
circumstances, a court, faced with the question whether the civil action is barred
by section 1759(a), may deem it appropriate to solicit the views of the PUC
regarding whether the action is likely to interfere with the PUC’s performance of
its duties.
26

---

prosecutors in the present case bears little resemblance to the civil action instituted
by the utility in Dyke Water Co, which sought a declaration relating to the
implementation of a refund program that had been ordered by, and was still
pending before, the PUC.
The case of Schell v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d
1039, also relied upon by Pacific Bell, is similarly inapposite. In Schell, the owner
of a recreational vehicle park filed a civil action, contending that the defendant
public utility improperly discriminated against him by charging him a commercial
rate for electricity and refusing to supply him with electricity under the PUC rate
schedule applicable to mobilehome parks and their residents. The trial court
sustained the defendant’s demurrer to the complaint and dismissed the action, and
on appeal the Court of Appeal affirmed, noting that the question of the proper rate
structure for recreational vehicle parks was before the PUC. The appellate court
further concluded that “[t]he decision as to whether or not master-metered
residential recreational vehicle parks should be charged at the same rate as master-
metered mobilehome parks, or at another domestic or commercial rate, is clearly
within the exclusive purview of the PUC as part of its continuing jurisdiction over
rate making and rate regulation in provision of baseline service to residential
customers of the electric and gas corporations.” (204 Cal.App.3d at p. 1046.)
Unlike Schell, the case before us presents a question — whether Pacific Bell
engaged in false advertising in undertaking the alleged marketing activities here at
issue — that does not involve ratemaking or any other matter assigned to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the PUC.
27

---

III
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.
GEORGE, C.J.
WE CONCUR:

KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.
28

---

See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People ex rel. Orloff v. Pacific Bell

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted

XXX 89 Cal.App.4th 844
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S099131
Date Filed: December 15, 2003

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior
County: Alameda
Judge: Henry E. Needham, Jr.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Thomas J. Orloff, District Attorney, Harry B. Johnson and Julie A. Dunger, Deputy District Attorneys, for
Plaintiff and Appellant Alameda County District Attorney.

James P. Fox, District Attorney, and John E. Wilson, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant
San Mateo County District Attorney.

Dean D. Flippo, District Attorney, Lydia Villarreal and Denine J. Guy, Deputy District Attorneys, for
Plaintiff and Appellant Monterey County District Attorney.

Gary M. Cohen, Mary F. McKenzie, Barbara J. Ferguson, Karen Paull and Charlyn Hook for California
Public Utilities Commission as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Herschel T. Elkins,
Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Botwin and Margaret Reiter, Deputy Attorneys General, for the
State of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Lawrence G. Brown and David La Bahn for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

The Sturdevant Law Firm, James C. Sturdevant, Mark T. Johnson; Steyer Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez
& Smith, Allan Steyer, Carlos A. Alvarez and Jennifer Chon for Consumer Attorneys of California as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bart Kimball, Bobby C. Lawyer, Carol M. Anderson; Pillsbury Winthrop and Kevin M. Fong for
Defendants and Respondents.

---

Page 2 - counsel continued - S099131

Attorneys for Respondent:

Fred J. Hiestand for The Civil Justice Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants
and Respondents.

Munger, Tolles & Olson, Henry Weissmann and A. Tali Zer-Ilan for Verizon California, Inc., Southern
California Edison Company, San Diego Gas & Electric Company and Southern California Gas Company as
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

---

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Harry B. Johnson
Deputy District Attorney
7677 Oakport Street, Suite 650
Oakland, CA 94621
(510) 569-9281

Kevin M. Fong
Pillsbury Winthrop
50 Fremont Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 983-1000

---

Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Mon, 12/15/2003	S099131

Disposition
Dec 15 2003	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Jul 16 2001	Petition for review filed   by the People ex rel. district attorneys of Alameda, San Mateo & Monterey counties.
Jul 23 2001	Record requested
Jul 26 2001	Received Court of Appeal record   file jacket/loose briefs/two accordian files
Aug 2 2001	Request for Depublication (petition/rev. pending)   by counsel for Daniel J. Mulligan (non-party)
Aug 6 2001	Request for Depublication (petition/rev. pending)   non-party amicus Consumer Attorneys of Calif.
Aug 14 2001	Filed:   resp. Pacific Bell's objections to depub requests.
Sep 7 2001	Request for Depublication (petition/rev. pending)   filed by (non-party) Legal Advocacy Committee of the League of California Cities
Sep 10 2001	Time extended to grant or deny review   to and including October 12, 2001
Sep 26 2001	VPetition for Review Granted (civil case)   Votes: George, CJ, Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown, JJ.
Oct 24 2001	Opening brief on the merits filed   by counsel (DA) for appellant
Oct 24 2001	Request for Judicial Notice filed   by counsel (DA) for appellant. (first request)
Oct 25 2001	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   counsel (DA) for appelllant.
Nov 6 2001	Association of attorneys filed for:   Respondents (Pacific Bell)
Nov 6 2001	Change of Address filed for:   counsel for Pacific Bell ( Bobby C. Lawyer)
Nov 8 2001	Application for Extension of Time filed   Respondent (Pacific Bell) requests extension of time to December 26, 2001 to file the brief on the merits.
Nov 13 2001	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   counsel for Respondent (Pacific Bell)
Nov 14 2001	Extension of Time application Granted   Respondents Pacific Bell et al ., time to serve and file the brief on the merits is extended to and including December 26, 2001.
Dec 26 2001	Answer brief on the merits filed   Respondents (Pacific Bell et al.)
Jan 15 2002	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   by aplt
Feb 8 2002	Request for extension of time filed   for Calif. P.U.C. to file an A/C brief. to 2-28-02.
Feb 8 2002	Request for extension of time filed   for Calif. A.G. to file an A/C brief. to 2-28-02.
Feb 11 2002	Request for extension of time filed   to file amicus brief of Verizon California Inc.& So. Calif. Edison Company
Feb 13 2002	Request for extension of time filed   for Civil Justice Association of Calif. to file an A/C brief. to 3-7-02
Feb 14 2002	Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief   Consumer Attorneys of California
Feb 14 2002	Received:   Request for Judicial Notice from California Consumer Attorney of Calif.
Feb 14 2002	Extension of time granted   California Public Utilities Commission time to serve and file request for permission to file amicus curiae brief is extended to and including February 28, 2002.
Feb 14 2002	Extension of time granted   California Attorney General time to serve and file amicus curiae brief is extended to and including February 28, 2002.
Feb 14 2002	Extension of time granted   Verizon California , et al., time to serve and file amicus curiae brief is extended to and including February 28, 2002.
Feb 14 2002	Extension of time granted   Civil Justice Association of California time to serve and file amicus curiae brief is extended to and including March 7, 2002.
Feb 21 2002	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   Consumer Attorneys of California
Feb 21 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:   Consumer Attorneys of California in support of appellant. (non-party)
Feb 21 2002	Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)   by Consumer Attorneys of California in connection with Amicus Brief
Feb 28 2002	Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief   Calif. Public Utilities Commission in support of petitioners ( People, ex rel Thomas J. Orloff, et al.)
Feb 28 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:   California Attorney General in support of appellant
Feb 28 2002	Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)   by California Attorney General
Feb 28 2002	Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief   of Verizon California Inc., Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas & Electric Company, and Southern California Gas Company [brief supports resp., PacBell]
Mar 5 2002	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   Calif.Public Utilities Comm.
Mar 5 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:   California Public Utilities Comission in support of petitioners
Mar 7 2002	Request for extension of time filed   by counsel for respondent (Pacific Bell) requesting extension to April 1, 2002 to serve and file answer to amicus curiae briefs.
Mar 7 2002	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   Verizon California Inc., et al. (non-party)
Mar 7 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:   Verizon California Inc., et al
Mar 8 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:   Civil Justice Association of California in support of respondent. (non-party) (40k)
Mar 11 2002	Received:   Request from Calif. District Attys. Assoc. to join as amicus curiae in brief filed by the Calif. Attorney General's Office.
Mar 12 2002	Extension of time granted   Respondent (Pacific Bell) time to serve and file answer to amicus briefs is extended to and including April 1, 2002.
Mar 15 2002	Request for extension of time filed   counsel (Dist. Atty) for petitioner (People) requests extension to April 1, 2002. to serve and file consolidated answer to amicus briefs.
Mar 18 2002	Order filed   the request of the California District Attorneys Assoc. to join as amicus curiae in the amicus brief filed by the California Attorney's General's Office is hereby granted.
Mar 19 2002	Extension of time granted   Petitioner's time to serve and file the consolidated answer to amicus briefs is extended to and including April 1, 2002.
Mar 29 2002	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   by counsel (Dist. Atty) for petitioner to amicus briefs (consolidated answer).
Apr 2 2002	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   consolidated answer by Resp Pacific Bell
Jan 24 2003	Filed:   letter from (Dist. Atty) counsel for petitioner re: Notice of Recent Decision of CA
Apr 24 2003	Filed:   letter from (Dist. Atty) counsel for petitioner re: Notice of Recent Decision of CA.
May 7 2003	Filed:   by counsel for respondent (Pacific Bell) response to letter from petitioner re: Notice of Recent Decision of CA.
Aug 28 2003	Case ordered on calendar   10-08-03, 9am, L.A.
Oct 8 2003	Cause argued and submitted
Dec 15 2003	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   OPINION BY: George, C. J. -- joined by: Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown, Moreno, JJ.
Jan 15 2004	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Jan 16 2004	Received:   receipt for remittitur from CA 1/4

Briefs
Oct 24 2001	Opening brief on the merits filed
Dec 26 2001	Answer brief on the merits filed
Jan 15 2002	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Feb 21 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Feb 28 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Mar 5 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Mar 7 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Mar 8 2002	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Mar 29 2002	Response to amicus curiae brief filed
Apr 2 2002	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website