Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 7/26/07

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

KENDRA O’CONNELL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
S135160
v.
Ct.App.
3
CV044400
CITY OF STOCKTON et al.,
San Joaquin County
Defendants and Respondents. )
Super. Ct. No. CV019275

Our state Constitution allows cities and counties to enact and enforce local
ordinances so long as they are “not in conflict” with the state’s “general laws.”
(Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.) Any conflicting ordinance is preempted by state law
and thus void.
At issue here is a city ordinance allowing forfeiture to the city of any
vehicle used to commit certain acts made criminal by state law. The Court of
Appeal held that state law preempts the city ordinance. We agree.
I.
Plaintiff Kendra O’Connell filed this taxpayer action (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 526a) against the City of Stockton and its city attorney (City) challenging the
constitutionality of a City ordinance labeled “Seizure and Forfeiture of Nuisance
Vehicles.” Plaintiff sought to enjoin the City’s enforcement of the ordinance. The
trial court sustained the City’s demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint, allowing plaintiff

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leave to amend her complaint. When plaintiff did not do so, the trial court
dismissed the lawsuit.
On plaintiff’s appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed. It held that the
forfeiture ordinance violated procedural due process because it failed to provide
for a reasonably prompt postseizure probable cause hearing on the City’s right to
hold a vehicle pending its forfeiture. The Court of Appeal also held that the
forfeiture ordinance was preempted by specific state law provisions governing
vehicle forfeiture. This conclusion conflicted with Horton v. City of Oakland
(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 580, in which a different Court of Appeal held that a
vehicle forfeiture ordinance enacted by the City of Oakland, and similar to the one
at issue here, was not preempted by state law. We granted review to resolve the
conflict.1
II.
Part XXV of Chapter 5 of the Stockton Municipal Code is entitled “Seizure
and Forfeiture of Nuisance Vehicles.” The term “forfeiture,” as used here, means
that the government assumes title to property used to further some illegal purpose.
(See United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321; Bennis v. Michigan (1996)

1
In granting review in this case, we asked the parties to brief these three
issues: “(1) Does California state law preempt provisions of the City of Stockton
Municipal Code pertaining to ‘Seizure and Forfeiture of Nuisance Vehicles’? (2)
Do the Stockton municipal code provisions allowing the commencement of
vehicle forfeiture proceedings ‘as soon as practicable but in any case within one
year’ satisfy the state and federal constitutional requirements of procedural due
process? (3) Do the municipal code provisions allocating proceeds of vehicle
forfeitures to the offices of the San Joaquin County District Attorney and the
Stockton City Attorney violate state or federal constitutional guarantees of
substantive or procedural due process?” Because we conclude here that state law
preempts the provisions of the Stockton Municipal Code pertaining to seizure and
forfeiture of nuisance vehicles, thus invalidating those provisions and rendering
them unenforceable, we need not address the remaining two issues.
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516 U.S. 442; Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. (1974) 416 U.S. 663,
682.)
The ordinance at issue provides for the forfeiture of “[a]ny vehicle used to
solicit an act of prostitution, or to acquire or attempt to acquire any controlled
substance,” with “[a]ll right, title, and interest” thereafter vesting in the City.
(Stockton Mun. Code, §§ 5-1000 & 5-1002, italics added.) A vehicle so used may
be seized by a peace officer (1) with a court order; (2) incident to an arrest or a
search conducted with a search warrant; or (3) with probable cause to believe the
vehicle was used in the specified crimes. (Id., § 5-1003.) Within one year of
police seizure of a vehicle, either the Stockton City Attorney or the San Joaquin
County District Attorney “shall file a petition for forfeiture with the Superior
Court of San Joaquin County.” (Id., § 5-1006, subds. (a) & (b).) The prosecuting
agency must then give notice of the intended forfeiture proceedings to interested
parties, advising them of their rights to file claims with the San Joaquin County
Superior Court challenging the forfeiture. (Id., § 5-1006, subd. (c).)
A trial of the vehicle forfeiture can be before either a court or a jury. The
City has “the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence” that the
vehicle was used for one of the prohibited purposes set out in the ordinance.
(Stockton Mun. Code, § 5-1006, subd. (f).) Forfeited vehicles are to be sold; the
proceeds are used first to pay any “bona fide or innocent purchaser, conditional
sales vendor, mortgagee or lien holder” of the vehicle, when such payment is
ordered by the prosecuting agency. (Id., § 5-1008, subd. (a).) After paying the
costs of publishing the notice of the forfeiture action and of storing, repairing and
selling the vehicle (id., § 5-1008, subd. (b)), remaining funds are distributed in
proportionate shares to the involved prosecuting and law enforcement agencies.
(Id., § 5-1008, subd. (c).)
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We now turn to the principles governing state law preemption of local
ordinances.
III.
We have in the past articulated the following principles on state law
preemption of local ordinances. “Under article XI, section 7 of the California
Constitution, ‘[a] county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local,
police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general
[state] laws.’ [¶] ‘If otherwise valid local legislation conflicts with state law, it is
preempted by such law and is void.’ [Citations.] [¶] ‘A conflict exists if the local
legislation “ ‘duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general
law, either expressly or by legislative implication. [Citations.] ’ ” ’ ” (Sherwin-
Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897 (Sherwin-Williams),
italics added; see also American Financial Services Assn. v. City of Oakland
(2005) 34 Cal.4th 1239, 1251 (American Financial).) We explain the italicized
terms below.
A local ordinance duplicates state law when it is “coextensive” with state
law. (Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 897-898, citing In re Portnoy
(1942) 21 Cal.2d 237, 240 [as “finding ‘duplication’ where local legislation
purported to impose the same criminal prohibition that general law imposed”].)
A local ordinance contradicts state law when it is inimical to or cannot be
reconciled with state law. (Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898, citing Ex
Parte Daniels (1920) 183 Cal. 636, 641-648 [as finding “ ‘contradiction’ ” in a
local ordinance that set the maximum speed limit for vehicles below that set by
state law].)
A local ordinance enters a field fully occupied by state law in either of two
situations -- when the Legislature “expressly manifest[s]” its intent to occupy the
legal area or when the Legislature “impliedly” occupies the field. (Sherwin-
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Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898; see also 8 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law
(10th ed. 2005) Constitutional Law, § 986, p. 551 [“[W]here the Legislature has
manifested an intention, expressly or by implication, wholly to occupy the field
. . . municipal power [to regulate in that area] is lost.”].)
When the Legislature has not expressly stated its intent to occupy an area of
law, we look to whether it has impliedly done so. This occurs in three situations:
when “ ‘(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general
law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern;
(2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such
terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further
or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter has been partially covered by
general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local
ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to
the’ locality.” (Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898.)
With respect to the implied occupation of an area of law by the
Legislature’s full and complete coverage of it, this court recently had this to say:
“ ‘Where the Legislature has adopted statutes governing a particular subject
matter, its intent with regard to occupying the field to the exclusion of all local
regulation is not to be measured alone by the language used but by the whole
purpose and scope of the legislative scheme.’ ” (American Financial, supra, 34
Cal.4th at p. 1252, quoting Tolman v. Underhill (1952) 39 Cal.2d 708, 712.) We
went on to say: “ ‘State regulation of a subject may be so complete and detailed as
to indicate an intent to preclude local regulation.’ ” (American Financial, supra,
at p. 1252.) We thereafter observed: “ ‘Whenever the Legislature has seen fit to
adopt a general scheme for the regulation of a particular subject, the entire control
over whatever phases of the subject are covered by state legislation ceases as far as
local legislation is concerned.’ ” (Id. at p. 1253, quoting In re Lane (1962) 58
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Cal.2d 99, 102.) When a local ordinance is identical to a state statute, it is clear
that “ ‘the field sought to be covered by the ordinance has already been
occupied’ ” by state law. (American Financial, supra, at p. 1253.)
“[W]hen local government regulates in an area over which it traditionally
has exercised control, such as the location of particular land uses, California courts
will presume, absent a clear indication of preemptive intent from the Legislature,
that such regulation is not preempted by state statute.” (Big Creek Lumber Co. v.
County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1149.)
With these principles in mind, we consider below whether state law
preempts the City’s vehicle forfeiture ordinance.
IV.
As we noted earlier, the City’s ordinance permits the forfeiture of any
vehicle used to “to solicit an act of prostitution, or to acquire or attempt to acquire
any controlled substance.” (Stockton Mun. Code, § 5-1000, italics added.) We
turn first to the latter aspect. The Court of Appeal concluded that this part of the
ordinance was preempted by certain provisions of the California Uniform
Controlled Substances Act (UCSA) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11000 et seq.)
authorizing forfeiture of vehicles used in specified serious drug crimes. We too
look to the UCSA as the source of state law preemption of this part of the City’s
forfeiture ordinance. But unlike the Court of Appeal, we do not rely solely on the
UCSA’s vehicle forfeiture provisions; instead, we consider the UCSA as a whole,
a comprehensive scheme defining and setting the penalties for crimes involving
controlled substances. This requires an analysis of various UCSA provisions
pertinent here. It makes for tedious reading, but it is central to a resolution of the
preemption issue presented.
As defined in the UCSA, controlled substances include every “drug,
substance, or immediate precursor” listed in one of five schedules set out in Health
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and Safety Code sections 11054 through 11058. The schedules include all
commonly known controlled substances, such as marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and
methamphetamine, as well as many others less familiar. The UCSA not only
regulates the lawful use and distribution of controlled substances (see Health &
Saf. Code, §§ 11100, 11210-11211), but it also defines as criminal offenses the
unlawful possession and distribution of specified controlled substances (see Health
& Saf. Code, § 11350-11361).
In addition, the UCSA sets forth the penalties for criminal violations of its
provisions. For example, unlawful possession of “not more than 28.5 grams of
marijuana” is a misdemeanor offense carrying a maximum fine of $100 and no jail
time. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (b).) For more serious possessory drug
crimes and those involving manufacture, sale, or possession for sale, the UCSA
prescribes felony penalties. (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, subd. (a)
[providing that certain specified possessory drug crimes “shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison”], 11351.5 [punishment for the sale of cocaine
base is “imprisonment . . . for . . . three, four, or five years”], 11352, subd. (a)
[providing state prison terms of three, four, or five years for transporting,
importing into California, selling, furnishing, administering, or giving away
certain controlled substances.].)
In Health and Safety Code section 11470, the Legislature specifies the
following as subject to forfeiture: Controlled substances “manufactured,
distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this division” (id., subd. (a)); the
raw materials, products and equipment used, or intended to be used, to
manufacture, compound, process, deliver, import or export controlled substances
in violation of the UCSA (id., subd. (b)); items used as containers for the property
described in subdivisions (a) and (b) (id., subd. (c)); “[a]ll books, records, and
research products and materials, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data
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which are used, or intended for use, in violation of this division” (id., subd. (d));
moneys, negotiable instruments, securities and other valuable items furnished or
intended to be furnished in illicit exchanges of specified controlled substances as
well as all proceeds traceable to such exchanges (id., subd. (f)); and the real
property of persons convicted of specified drug crimes involving such property,
except for real property “used as a family residence or for other lawful purposes,
or which is owned by two or more persons, one of whom had no knowledge of its
unlawful use” (id., subd. (g)).
Subdivision (e) of Health and Safety Code section 11470 governs
forfeitures involving boats, airplanes, and vehicles. It makes the following subject
to forfeiture: “The interest of any registered owner of a boat, airplane, or any
vehicle [other than certain vehicles used for agricultural purposes] which has been
used as an instrument to facilitate the manufacture of, or possession for sale or
sale of” specified amounts of certain controlled substances including 14.25 grams
or more of heroin or cocaine base, or a substance containing 14.25 grams or more
of heroin or cocaine base, or 28.5 grams or more of all Schedule I controlled
substances except marijuana, peyote, or psilocybin, or 10 pounds or more of
marijuana, peyote, or psilocybin, or methamphetamine in any amount. (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11470, subd. (e), italics added.) Health and Safety Code section
11488.4, subdivision (i)(1), states that forfeiture of airplanes, boats, and vehicles
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the property to be forfeited was
used for one of the specified drug offenses. Thus, as relevant here, under the
UCSA a vehicle can be forfeited to a government entity only upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the vehicle was “used as an instrument to facilitate the
manufacture of, or possession for sale or sale” of specified amounts of certain
controlled substances. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11470, subd. (e).)
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In Health and Safety Code section 11469, the Legislature has established
“guidelines” that local law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies should follow
in enforcing the state law provisions regarding the seizure and forfeiture of
property used to commit drug crimes in California. It points out, among other
things, that “[l]aw enforcement is the principal objective of forfeiture,” and that
“[p]otential revenue [to be derived from property forfeiture] must not be allowed
to jeopardize the effective investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses.”
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11469, subd. (a).) And it reminds prosecutors that they
should “[w]henever appropriate . . . seek criminal sanctions as to the underlying
criminal acts which give rise to the forfeiture action.” (Id., subd. (c).)
Recognizing that forfeiture can sometimes lead to harsh results, the
Legislature included this cautionary language in subdivision (j) of Health and
Safety Code section 11469: “Although civil forfeiture is intended to be remedial
by removing the tools and profits from those engaged in the illicit drug trade, it
can have harsh effects on property owners in some circumstances. Therefore, law
enforcement shall seek to protect the interests of innocent property owners,
guarantee adequate notice and due process to property owners, and ensure that
forfeiture serves the remedial purpose of the law.”
We summarize: State law, through the UCSA (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11000 et seq.), defines controlled substances, regulates their use, and sets
penalties for their unlawful possession and distribution. Among the available
penalties is vehicle forfeiture but, as pointed out earlier, only upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of the vehicle’s use to facilitate certain serious drug crimes
(manufacture, sale, or possession for sale of methamphetamine, or of heroin or
cocaine base, marijuana, peyote, or psilocybin and other Schedule I controlled
substances in specified amounts). By way of contrast, the City’s ordinance allows
the harsh penalty of vehicle forfeiture upon proof merely by a preponderance of
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evidence of a vehicle’s use simply “to attempt to acquire” any amount of any
controlled substance (for instance, less than 28.5 grams of marijuana, a low-grade
misdemeanor warranting only a $100 fine and no jail time and not subject to
vehicle forfeiture under the UCSA).
The comprehensive nature of the UCSA in defining drug crimes and
specifying penalties (including forfeiture) is so thorough and detailed as to
manifest the Legislature’s intent to preclude local regulation. The UCSA
accordingly occupies the field of penalizing crimes involving controlled
substances, thus impliedly preempting the City’s forfeiture ordinance to the extent
it calls for the forfeiture of vehicles used “to acquire or attempt to acquire”
(Stockton Mun. Code, § 5-1000) controlled substances regulated under the UCSA.
(See American Financial, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1252; Tolman v. Underhill,
supra, 39 Cal.2d at p. 712.)
Relevant to this conclusion is our decision in In re Lane, supra, 58 Cal.2d
99. That case involved a statewide statutory scheme that, we held, fully occupied
an area of regulation, thereby preempting a municipal ordinance covering the same
legal area. The statewide statutory scheme consisted of comprehensive criminal
proscriptions against specified sexual conduct, and the local law was a Los
Angeles City ordinance criminalizing sexual intercourse between persons not
married to each other. Although the state statutory scheme included laws
prohibiting prostitution, pimping and pandering, bigamy, acts against public
decency, rape, and various sex crimes against children, it did not include any
offense for “simple fornication or adultery.” (In re Lane, supra, 58 Cal.2d at
p. 104.) This court reasoned that the exclusion of fornication or adultery from the
comprehensive state law scheme showed the Legislature’s intent that “such
conduct sh[ould] not be criminal.” (Ibid.)
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Here too the Legislature’s comprehensive enactment of penalties for crimes
involving controlled substances, but exclusion from that scheme of any provision
for vehicle forfeiture for simple possessory drug offenses, manifests a clear intent
to reserve that severe penalty for very serious drug crimes involving the
manufacture, sale, or possession for sale of specified amounts of certain controlled
substances.
We now consider the Court of Appeal’s decision in Horton v. City of
Oakland, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 580, which involved an ordinance similar to the
one at issue here, but which reached a conclusion contrary to that of the Court of
Appeal in this case. Horton held that the UCSA’s forfeiture provisions did not
preempt Oakland’s ordinance allowing forfeiture of vehicles used to acquire or
attempt to acquire controlled substances. It reasoned that the ordinance covered
an area of law “untouched by statewide legislation” because the UCSA’s forfeiture
provisions, which apply only to persons possessing for sale or selling illicit drugs,
were “silent with regard to vehicles used by drug buyers.” (Horton v. City of
Oakland, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 586, italics added.) In focusing solely on the
UCSA’s forfeiture provisions, Horton failed to consider the UCSA’s
comprehensive scheme of drug crime penalties, which include forfeiture of
various items of property, including vehicles, when used in specified serious drug
offenses. Thus, Horton never addressed whether the UCSA as a whole constitutes
a comprehensive scheme that fully occupies the field of penalizing crimes
involving controlled substances. Because of our conclusion in this case that the
UCSA’s comprehensive regulation of drug offenses as a whole impliedly preempts
the City’s ordinance allowing forfeiture of vehicles used in acquiring controlled
substances, we need not resolve whether the UCSA’s forfeiture provisions alone
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establish implied state preemption, the question entertained by the Courts of
Appeal in this case and in Horton.2
We now turn to the other aspect of the City’s forfeiture ordinance, allowing
for the forfeiture of any vehicle used to solicit prostitution. The Court of Appeal
below held that the Legislature had expressly preempted that field through the
interplay of two Vehicle Code provisions: Vehicle Code section 21 (precluding
local regulation in areas covered by the Vehicle Code absent express legislative
authorization) and Vehicle Code section 22659.5, subdivision (a) (setting up a
five-year pilot program for local entities to declare vehicles used in specified
prostitution-related offenses public nuisances). The Court of Appeal was correct,
as we explain below.
Vehicle Code section 21 states: “Except as otherwise expressly provided,
the provisions of this code are applicable and uniform throughout the State and in
all counties and municipalities therein, and no local authority shall enact or
enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this code unless expressly
authorized herein.” (Italics added.) Thus, under section 21, local regulation of
any “matter[]” covered by this state’s Vehicle Code is prohibited unless the
Legislature has expressly allowed local regulation in that field. (See Rumford v.
City of Berkeley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 545, 550; Save the Sunset Strip Coalition v. City
of West Hollywood (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1177-1178.)

2
The dissent, relying on the Court of Appeal decision in Horton, asserts
there is no conflict between the City’s ordinance and the UCSA because the
former covers drug buyers while the latter is silent on that topic. Not so. As
comprehensive statewide legislation that broadly addresses the problems arising
from illicit drugs, the UCSA, through its generally applicable laws against
possession or attempted possession of all controlled substances, imposes criminal
penalties on those who, in the words of the City’s forfeiture ordinance, “acquire or
attempt to acquire any controlled substance.”
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The matter that is covered by the Vehicle Code and that is pertinent here is
the authority of local government entities to declare a vehicle used in soliciting
prostitution to be a public nuisance. That topic is addressed in the Vehicle Code
by subdivision (a) of section 22659.5. That provision allows a city or a county to
“adopt an ordinance establishing a five-year pilot program that implements
procedures for declaring any motor vehicle a public nuisance” when used in the
commission of specified criminal conduct, including acts covered in Penal Code
section 647, subdivision (b), which prohibits engaging in acts of prostitution as
well as soliciting or agreeing to engage in such acts. (Veh. Code, § 22659.5, subd.
(a), italics added.)
Subdivision (b) of Vehicle Code section 22659.5 permits local ordinances
adopted under the statutory scheme to “include procedures to enjoin and abate the
declared [vehicular] nuisance by ordering the defendant not to use the vehicle
again,” and it allows for the forcible removal of vehicles. Under subdivision (c) of
section 22659.5, any action taken to abate a public nuisance is limited to those
“specified in subdivision (b),” that is, an injunction against or abatement of a
declared nuisance or the removal of a nuisance vehicle. Section 22659.5 contains
no language, however, that would allow a local entity such as the City here to
seize and forfeit a vehicle that, through its use in soliciting prostitution, has
created a public nuisance.
We summarize: Vehicle Code section 21 precludes local regulation of
“matters covered” by the Vehicle Code, absent express legislative authorization.
The use of vehicles in soliciting prostitution is a matter that the Vehicle Code
covers in section 22659.5, which establishes a five-year pilot program under
which cities and counties may treat as a public nuisance any vehicle used in
soliciting prostitution, but that pilot program does not allow for forfeiture of the
vehicle. There being no express legislative authorization for any other form of
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local regulation of the matter covered by Vehicle Code section 22659.5, Vehicle
Code section 21 precludes an ordinance like the City’s, which seeks to regulate
vehicle use in soliciting prostitution by requiring forfeiture of the vehicle. Under
Vehicle Code section 21, therefore, the City’s ordinance is expressly preempted by
state law.
In addressing a similar ordinance adopted by the City of Oakland, the Court
of Appeal in Horton v. City of Oakland, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 580, reached a
contrary conclusion. First, asking whether Vehicle Code section 22659. 5 had
impliedly preempted the Oakland ordinance allowing forfeiture of any vehicle
used to solicit prostitution, Horton concluded it had not, because Oakland had not
adopted the five-year pilot program authorized by that statute. (Horton, supra, 82
Cal.App.4th at p. 589.) Horton then considered whether there was express
preemption under Vehicle Code section 21. As we have seen, absent express
legislative authorization of local regulation in a legal area, Vehicle Code section
21 prohibits such regulation pertaining to any “matters” covered by the Vehicle
Code. And section 22659.5 of the Vehicle Code specifically covers abatement of
public nuisance vehicles used to solicit prostitution, the same subject of the
Oakland ordinance at issue in Horton. But Horton reasoned that because Vehicle
Code section 22659.5 allowed local entities to abate as a public nuisance any
vehicle used to solicit prostitution only if the local entity participated in “an
optional and limited pilot program” authorized by section 22659.5, that state
statute, according to Horton, did not cover the same subject as the Oakland
ordinance, which was not based on the pilot program. (Horton, supra, 82
Cal.App.4th at p. 591.) We disagree.
Vehicle Code section 22659.5, and the vehicle forfeiture ordinances in this
case and in Horton v. City of Oakland, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 580, both address
the same subject: abatement of a public nuisance created by vehicles used in
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soliciting prostitution. As the Court of Appeal here noted, the purpose of the state
Legislature’s enactment of section 22659.5 was to ascertain through a five-year
pilot program “ ‘whether declaring motor vehicles a public nuisance when used in
the commission of acts of prostitution would have a substantial effect upon the
reduction of prostitution in neighborhoods, thereby serving the local business
owners and citizens of our urban communities.’ ” (Quoting Stats. 1993, ch. 485,
§ 1, pp. 2595-2596.) Because the Vehicle Code addresses the same subject --
nuisance abatement of vehicles used to solicit prostitution -- as the City’s
ordinance at issue, and the state Legislature has in no other statute provided for
local regulation in this area, the City’s ordinance is preempted by state law.3
We also reject the City’s characterization of Vehicle Code section 22659.5
as a “special statute” that cannot support a claim of preemption, because such
claims must be “founded upon a ‘conflict with general laws’ ” (Baldwin v. County
of Tehama (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 166, 177, italics added). Vehicle Code section
22659.5 allows, but does not require, a city or a county to adopt an ordinance
declaring vehicles used in specified sex offenses to be a public nuisance in accord
with the terms of the statute. But this statute is, contrary to the City’s contention,
a general rather than a special law because it applies generally throughout the
state; it is not limited to certain listed cities and counties. Thus, Vehicle Code
section 22659 cannot be characterized as special legislation. (See Cal. Const., art.
IV, § 16 [authorizing the enactment of statutes applicable to particular cities or
counties]; White v. State of California (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 298, 305
[Legislature must have rational basis for singling out a city or county to be
“ ‘affected by [a special] statute’ ”]; Baldwin, supra, at p. 177 [uncodified

3
To the extent it is contrary to our conclusions here, we disapprove Horton
v. City of Oakland, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 580.
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enactments granting limited powers over groundwaters to “specifically identified
special districts” described as “special acts”].)
We now turn to the City’s arguments made in overall support of its vehicle
forfeiture ordinance. According to the City, the ordinance does not conflict with
any state law, and therefore a necessary precondition to state preemption is
lacking. We disagree. As discussed earlier, the ordinance conflicts with state law
because anyone using a vehicle “to solicit an act of prostitution, or to acquire or
attempt to acquire any controlled substance” -- conduct exclusively within the
purview of state law – is subject to penalties in excess of those prescribed by the
Legislature.
The City also argues that because it operates under a charter rather than
under the general laws governing California cities and therefore meets the
requirement of Government Code section 34101 for a “chartered city,” our state
Constitution allows it to adopt and enforce ordinances in conflict with state law so
long as the subject matter constitutes a “municipal affair[]” rather than a
“statewide concern.” (See Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5; Johnson v. Bradley (1992) 4
Cal.4th 389, 399.) The City asserts that its vehicle forfeiture ordinance deals with
a municipal affair, namely, abating the nuisance caused by vehicular traffic
associated with the “illicit commercial activity” of obtaining drugs or soliciting
prostitution within the City’s boundaries. We are not persuaded, as explained
below.
The illicit commercial activities — prostitution and trafficking in controlled
substances — that are the focus of the City’s vehicle forfeiture ordinance are
matters of statewide concern that our Legislature has comprehensively addressed
through various provisions of this state’s Penal and Vehicle Codes, leaving no
room for further regulation at the local level. One of the lesser harms associated
with these crimes is the traffic congestion that may result when vehicles are used
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to solicit acts of prostitution or to buy or sell drugs illegally on city streets.
Although traffic congestion is a local problem that cities ordinarily are authorized
to address, they may not do so by means of an ordinance that, by allowing
forfeiture of a vehicle used to commit a specific state law violation, impinges on
an area fully occupied or exclusively covered by state law.4
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
KENNARD, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C. J.
WERDEGAR, J.
MORENO, J.

4
Because the determination to preclude or to allow local regulation in a field
addressed by state law resides exclusively with the state Legislature, that body
can, of course, expressly authorize local entities to enact ordinances such as the
one in this case that we conclude is preempted under existing law.
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DISSENTING OPINION BY CORRIGAN, J.

I respectfully dissent from the opinion of my colleagues.
The ordinance at issue is a practical and responsible attempt by the City of
Stockton (Stockton) to address problems it, and many other cities face on a daily
basis. The ordinance speaks to a narrow, pressing and quite real local concern.
Street commerce in drugs and sex forces innocent people to share their
neighborhoods with pimps, prostitutes, and drug dealers who use their streets as a
bazaar for illegal transactions.
Article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution provides, “[a] county or
city may make and enforce within it limits all local, police, sanitary, and other
ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.” Article XI, section
5 of the California Constitution, commonly referred to as the “home rule”
doctrine, “reserves to charter cities the right to adopt and enforce ordinances that
conflict with general state laws, provided the subject of the regulation is a
‘municipal affair’ rather than one of ‘statewide concern.’ [Citation.]” (Horton v.
City of Oakland (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 580, 584-585 (Horton).) “[W]hen local
government regulates in an area over which it traditionally has exercised
control, . . . California courts will presume, absent a clear indication of preemptive
intent from the Legislature, that such regulation is not preempted by state statute.”
(Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1149.)
1

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In deciding whether a local ordinance enacted by a charter city, like
Stockton, is valid, we apply the following analysis: “ ‘First, a court must
determine whether there is a genuine conflict between a state statute and a
municipal ordinance. [Citations.] Only after concluding there is an actual conflict
should a court proceed with the second question; i.e., does the local legislation
impact a municipal or statewide concern?’ [Citation.] Courts should avoid
making unnecessary choices between competing claims of municipal and state
governments ‘by carefully insuring that the purported conflict is in fact a genuine
one, unresolvable short of choosing between one enactment and the other.’
[Citation.] In other words, the preemption question begins with an inquiry into the
existence of a conflict. If there is no conflict, the home rule doctrine is not
brought into play.” (Horton, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 585.)
The majority relies on the California Uniform Controlled Substances Act
(UCSA) (Health & Saf. Code, §11000 et seq.) in reaching its conclusion that
Stockton’s ordinance is preempted because of a conflict. It views the UCSA as so
comprehensive in nature “as to manifest the Legislature’s intent to preclude local
regulation.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.) The majority’s reasoning, if accepted,
requires preemption on an all-encompassing basis.
Unlike the majority, I cannot conclude that the overall structure of the
UCSA “manifests a clear intent” to limit the penalty of vehicle forfeiture to “very
serious drug crimes involving the manufacture, sale, or possession for sale of”
drugs. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.) The Legislature has authorized a state prison
sentence of up to three years for the simple possession of even a small amount of
certain drugs. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350; Pen. Code, § 18.) It is difficult to
conclude that the Legislature intended to deprive a person of freedom for simple
possession, but intended to protect an automobile from forfeiture in only very
serious cases of drug manufacture and sale.
2

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Certainly the Legislature has not said that was its intent and no legislative
history1 has been cited to support that conclusion. Unlike the majority, I do not
discern a conflict between the UCSA and Stockton’s ordinance.
In fact, “the [UCSA] is silent with regard to vehicles used by drug buyers.”
(Horton, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 586, fn. omitted.) Stockton has included
these vehicles in its nuisance abatement program in an attempt to alleviate the
concerns of its residents. Thus, rather than creating a conflict, Stockton’s
ordinance covers an area undisturbed by the UCSA.
Also, Stockton’s ordinance does not conflict with provisions of the Vehicle
Code. The majority relies on Vehicle Code section 21, which states, “Except as
otherwise expressly provided, the provisions of this code are applicable and
uniform throughout the State and in all counties and municipalities therein, and no
local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this
code unless expressly authorized herein.” The majority next refers to Vehicle

1
In Horton, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at page 588, the court rejected an
argument that it should “retroactively infer . . . preemptive intent from recent
legislative activity” based on the Legislature’s passage of Assembly Bill No. 662
(1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) That bill amended Health and Saf. Code section 11469 et
seq. “to include forfeitures under the criminal profiteering statute. The bill also
declared the Legislature’s intent that forfeiture law be exclusive of any local
ordinance or regulation, declaring the subject a matter of statewide concern.”
(Horton, at p. 588.) The Governor vetoed Assembly Bill No. 662 explaining, “
‘[i]t is not appropriate for the State to take away the tools from Oakland,
Sacramento, and other cities considering the adoption of similar ordinances
without a more careful analysis of the amount of discretion which should be left to
cities to craft their own remedies in response to local conditions.’ ” (Horton, at p.
588.) The court concluded, “Thus the bill’s statement that ‘[t]he provisions of this
section are a clarification and declaration of existing law’ is far from definitive. A
‘clear indication’ is one which needs no further elucidation. The Legislature’s
perceived need to ‘clarify’ demonstrates that the statute as drafted fails to provide
the clear indication required to preempt by implication.” (Ibid.)
3

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Code section 22659.5, which authorizes a city to “adopt an ordinance establishing
a five-year pilot program that implements procedures for declaring any motor
vehicle a public nuisance” used in soliciting prostitution. (See maj. opn., ante, at
p. 12, italics omitted.) The majority concludes that because Vehicle Code section
22659.5 covers nuisance abatement of vehicles used in soliciting prostitution and
“does not allow for forfeiture of the vehicle,” Stockton’s ordinance is preempted
under the provisions of Vehicle Code section 21. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.)
I disagree. The provisions of Vehicle Code section 22659.5 merely
authorize “an optional and limited pilot program.” (Horton, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th
at p. 591.) Vehicle Code section 22659.5 “does not preclude local governments
from enacting other provisions if they decide not to adopt the proffered pilot
program.” (Horton, at p. 589.) Like the Oakland ordinance in Horton, Stockton’s
ordinance “was not enacted pursuant to section 22659.5, [therefore] it is not
constrained by the procedural requirements of that statute.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
Thus, Stockton’s ordinance does not conflict with state law. The ordinance does
not interfere with the operation of state law as it is not “inimical” to its provisions
in the relevant sense, and it “does not prohibit what the statute commands or
command what it prohibits.” (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993)
4 Cal.4th 893, 902.)
This court has counseled that we should carefully ensure “that the
purported conflict is in fact a genuine one, unresolvable short of choosing between
one enactment and the other.” (California Fed. Savings and Loan Assn. v. City of
Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 17.) Contrary to the majority, I would hold that
there is no conflict between state law and Stockton’s ordinance.
In addition, assuming there is a conflict with state law, because Stockton is
a charter city, it argues that its ordinance addresses a municipal affair: nuisance
abatement. Stockton urges that the ordinance’s forfeiture provisions are necessary
4

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to reduce the urban blight and traffic caused by prostitution and drug dealing. The
majority summarily rejects this argument holding that although traffic congestion
is a harm associated with these crimes, illicit commercial activities such as
prostitution and drug trafficking are matters of statewide concern. (Maj. opn.,
ante, at p. 16.)
The majority quotes our opinion in Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of
Santa Cruz, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1139, for the rule that when a local government
regulates an area which it traditionally exercised control, courts will presume that
the regulation is not preempted by state statute, absent the Legislature’s clear
intention to preempt. (Id. at p. 1149; see maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.) The majority
fails to follow this rule. It cannot be said that when the Legislature enacted the
UCSA and Vehicle Code, it intended to invalidate local nuisance ordinances
targeting the urban blight created by drug trafficking and prostitution.
The majority also relies on American Financial Services Assn. v. City of
Oakland (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1239 (American Financial), where we concluded that a
statutory scheme that regulated predatory lending practices preempted an Oakland
ordinance that purported to regulate predatory lending practices in the Oakland
home mortgage market. In that case, we found it significant that “the Legislature
was not suddenly entering an area previously governed by municipalities,” but
instead was addressing a subject matter that historically has been regulated “at the
state, not the municipal, level.” (Id. at p. 1255.)
Here, by contrast, Stockton passed an ordinance aimed at nuisance
abatement, a traditionally local police power.2 (People v. Johnson (1954) 129

2
The majority relies on In re Lane (1962) 58 Cal.2d 99, in support of its
conclusion that the UCSA thoroughly “occupies the field of penalizing crimes
involving controlled substances.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.) Lane is

(footnote continued on next page)
5

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Cal.App.2d 1, 6 [“[a] city has the power to pass general police regulations to
prevent nuisances”]; see also The City of Oakland v. Williams (1940) 15 Cal.2d
542, 549 [cities “possess the necessary police power, both under constitutional
grant and under their respective charters, to abate nuisances”].) In acknowledging
what constitutes a “nuisance,” the Civil Code defines the term broadly as
including “[a]nything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the
illegal sale of controlled substances,” or anything that is “indecent or offensive . . .
so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property,” or anything
that “unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any
. . . public park, square, street, or highway . . . .” (Civ. Code, § 3479, italics added;
see also Civ. Code, § 3480 [“[a] public nuisance is one which affects at the same
time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon
individuals may be unequal”].) Therefore, the traditionally local nature of
nuisance regulation distinguishes this case from the situation presented in
American Financial, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1239.
The majority does not address the compelling problem of urban blight for
the poor and elderly, which is immediate, significant, and certainly a local

(footnote continued from previous page)

distinguishable. It involved a statewide statutory scheme providing
comprehensive criminal proscriptions against specified sexual conduct. Lane held
void, a local ordinance that appears quaint nearly 50 years later, which purported
to criminalize sexual intercourse between unmarried persons.

This case involves a completely different situation. Here, Stockton’s
ordinance attempts to address the problems caused by drug dealing and
prostitution, activities the city understandably views as public nuisances. (Civ.
Code, §§ 3479, 3480, 3491.)

6

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concern. The aged homeowner who must shut herself inside while drug
transactions are conducted in her front yard, and the parents who must walk their
children to school while commercial sex acts are performed in cars parked at the
curb pay a heavy and very local price. Not all Californians confront these
problems, but those who do have a pressing and localized need for protection.
It should not be the case that local governments require the permission of
the state to protect their own citizens from nuisances that profoundly affect their
quality of life and the quiet enjoyment of their own property.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.3
CORRIGAN, J.
WE CONCUR:

BAXTER, J.

CHIN, J.

3
I believe the distinctions drawn in Horton, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 580, are
sound and should be adopted. Horton specifically left open the due process
question raised by ordinances that impose a reduced burden of proof and the
authorization of a one-year time frame before requiring notice and providing an
opportunity for challenging the forfeiture. These procedural provisions are worthy
of careful scrutiny.

7

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion O’Connell v. City of Stockton
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 128 Cal.App.4th 831
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S135160
Date Filed: July 26, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: San Joaquin
Judge: Elizabeth Humphreys

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Mark T. Clausen for Plaintiff and Appellant.

O’Melveny & Myers, Meredith N. Landy, Dale M. Edmondson, Joshua D. Baker and Michel Amaral for
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern
California, American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego & Imperial Counties and California Attorneys for
Criminal Justice as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson, Joseph M. Quinn; Richard E. Nosky, Jr., City Attorney, and Lori
S. Whittaker, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents.

Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney (Los Angeles) and Claudia McGee Henry, Assistant City Attorney,
for The League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

---

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Mark T. Clausen
18 E. Fulton Road
Santa Rosa, CA 94117
(415) 221-1817

Joseph M. Quinn
Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson
575 Market Street, Suite 2600
San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 421-3711

---

Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Thu, 07/26/2007	S135160

Disposition
Jul 26 2007	Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Jun 30 2005	Record requested
Jun 30 2005	Petition for review filed   by counsel for defts. and resps. (City of Stockton, et al.,)
Jul 1 2005	Received Court of Appeal record   one doghouse
Jul 7 2005	Answer to petition for review filed   by counsel for aplt. (K. O'Connell)
Jul 13 2005	Filed:   by counsel for aplt. Errata to Answer to Petition for Review
Aug 22 2005	Time extended to grant or deny review   to and including September 28, 2005, or the date upon which review is either granted or denied.
Sep 7 2005	Petition for review granted (civil case)   Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Morneo, JJ.
Sep 7 2005	Change of contact information filed for:   counsel for aplt (O'Connell)
Sep 9 2005	Received:   from counsel for resp. (O'Connell) request for partial publication
Sep 9 2005	Note:   Records sent to Cal-Co-ord. office: 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, Mtns., Opps. to Mtns., Ltr. briefs., misc. docs and records.
Sep 22 2005	Order filed   In this matter in which this court granted review on September 6, 2005, the parties are directed to brief the following three issues: (1) Does California state law preempt provisions of the City of Stockton Municipal Code pertaining to "Seizure and Forfeiture of Nuisance Vehicles"? (2) Do the Stockton municipal code provisions allowing the commencement of vehicle forfeiture proceedings "as soon as practicable but in any case within one year" satisfy the state and federal constitutional requirements of procedural due process? (3) Do the municipal code provisions allocating proceeds of vehicle forfeitures to the offices of the San Joaquin County District Attorney and the Stockton City Attorney violate state or federal constitutional guarantees of substantive or procedural due process?
Sep 23 2005	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   by counsel for aplt.
Oct 3 2005	Received additional record   file jacket/doghouse (vol 2)
Oct 4 2005	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for resps. requests extension of time to 11-21-2005, to file the opnieng brief on the merits.
Oct 12 2005	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including November 21, 2005.
Nov 15 2005	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for respondents requests extension of time to December 19, 2005, to file the opening brief on the merits.
Nov 17 2005	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including December 19, 2005.
Dec 19 2005	Opening brief on the merits filed   by counsel for resps. (City of Stockton and Jayne William)
Jan 19 2006	Request for extension of time filed   Counsel for aplt. requests extension of time to 2-20-06 to file the answer brief on the merits.
Jan 19 2006	Motion filed (non-AA)   counsel for appellant. Motion to substitute Stockton City Attorney Richard E. Nosky, Jr. in place of Defendant and former Interim City Atty. Jayne Williams.
Jan 19 2006	Filed:   Counsel for aplt. Request for Recusal of or, in the alternative, Motion to Disqualify Justice Corrigan from consideration of the issue of Preemption.
Jan 24 2006	Extension of time granted   Appellant's time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including February 20, 2006.
Feb 6 2006	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for respondent requests extension of time to February 14, 2006, to file a response to appellant's Request for Recusal/Motion to Disqualify Justice Corrigan.
Feb 8 2006	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the response to recusal/motion to disqualify is extended to and including February 14, 2006.
Feb 9 2006	Application to file over-length brief filed   counsel for aplt. (Kendra O'Connell)
Feb 9 2006	Received:   from counsel for aplt. over-sized answer brief.
Feb 10 2006	Answer brief on the merits filed   w/permission by counsel for Kendra O'Connell
Feb 10 2006	Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)   counsel for respondent (O'Connell)
Feb 10 2006	Received:   from counsel for (O'Connell) Courtesy Copy of case cited in Answer brief.
Feb 10 2006	Received:   from counsel for respondent Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice
Feb 14 2006	Opposition filed   by counsel for respondent to Plaintiff's and Appellant's Request for Recusal/Motion to Disqualify Justice Corrigan
Feb 15 2006	Filed:   by counsel for aplt. (O'Connell) Errata letter to answer brief on the merits.
Feb 15 2006	Filed:   counsel for plf. (O'Connell) Withdrawal of Motion to Disqualify, plaintiff's Request for Recusal remains.
Feb 21 2006	Filed:   by counsel for resp. Second Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice
Mar 2 2006	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for respondent City of Stockton requests extension of time to 4-3-06 to file the reply brief on the merits.
Mar 6 2006	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including April 3, 2006.
Apr 3 2006	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for respondents requests extension of time to 4-6-2006, to file the reply brief on the merits.
Apr 6 2006	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   counsel for City of Stockton and Jayne Williams
Apr 6 2006	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is hereby extended to and including April 6, 2006.
May 5 2006	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   League of California Cities supports respondent The City of Stockton
May 5 2006	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, Amercian Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego & Imperial Counties and California Attorneys for Criminal Justice in support of appellant.
May 9 2006	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, et al., in support of appellant.
May 9 2006	Amicus curiae brief filed   American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, et al., in support of appellant. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
May 30 2006	Request for extension of time filed   Counsel for resps. requests extension of time to June 19, 2006, to file the response to amicus curiae brief.
Jun 1 2006	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the response to amicus curiae brief is extended to and including June 19, 2006.
Jun 1 2006	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   League of California Cities in support of defendant
Jun 1 2006	Amicus curiae brief filed   League of California Cities in support of defendant. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Jun 13 2006	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   counsel for aplt. (O'Connell) to a/c brief of League of Calif. Cities.
Jun 16 2006	Motion filed (non-AA)   counsel for resp. City of Stockton and Jayne Williams, Motion to Strike and Memo. of Points and Auths. in support of Mtn. to Strike
Jun 16 2006	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   counsel for resps. (City of Stockton and Jayne Williams ) to a/c brief of Amer. Civil Liberties Union of No. Calif.
Jun 29 2006	Opposition filed   counsel for resp. (O'Connell) to Mtn. to Strike statements of facts re: a/c brief of ACLU of No. Calif.
Jun 30 2006	Opposition filed   counsels for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of No. Calif., et al. to Motion to Srike by respondent City of Stockton.
Aug 8 2006	Change of contact information filed for:   counsel for aplt. (O'Connell)
Apr 3 2007	Case ordered on calendar   to be argued Tuesday, May 1, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
Apr 10 2007	Change of contact information filed for:   Joseph M. Quinn, counsel for aplts., City of Stockton and Jayne Williams.
Apr 12 2007	Supplemental brief filed   counsel for aplt. (O'Connell)
Apr 20 2007	Supplemental brief filed   counsel for resps. City of Stockton and Jayne Williams
Apr 25 2007	Received:   from counsel for plf. (O'Connell) Request to Posthumously include Alison Rowley as Associate Counsel for purposes of the Decison on the Merits.
Apr 27 2007	Order filed   Respondent's motion to strike the amicus brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, filed June 16, 2006, is denied.
May 1 2007	Cause argued and submitted
May 22 2007	Request for judicial notice granted   Appellant's Request for Judicial Notice filed February 10, 2006, is granted as to Items 1, 15, and 43 and is otherwise denied. Appellant's Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice filed February 10, 2006, is denied.
Jul 25 2007	Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
Jul 26 2007	Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full   Majority Opinion by Kennard, J., ----- Joined by George, C. J., Werdegar and Moreno, JJ. Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, J. -----Joined by Baxter and Chin, JJ.
Aug 10 2007	Rehearing petition filed   City of Stockton et al., Respondents by Joseph M. Quinn, counsel
Aug 14 2007	Received:   from counsel for resp. City of Stockton and Jayne Williams, Amended Proof of Service.
Aug 15 2007	Time extended to consider modification or rehearing   to and including October 24, 2007, or the date upon which rehearing is either granted or denied, whichever occurs first.
Aug 15 2007	Answer to rehearing petition filed   counsel for Kendra O'Connell
Aug 29 2007	Received:   counsel for Kendra O'Connell Request for Judicial Notice, Support of Answer to Pet. for Rehearing/Response to Atty. General's letter brief in support of Pet. for Rehearing.
Aug 30 2007	Received:   counsel for Kendra O'Connell Suppelmental Request for Judicial Notice
Oct 10 2007	Rehearing denied   Baxter, Chin and Corrigan, JJ., are of the opinion the petition should be granted.
Oct 10 2007	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Oct 19 2007	Received:   receipt for remittitur.

Briefs
Dec 19 2005	Opening brief on the merits filed
Feb 10 2006	Answer brief on the merits filed
Apr 6 2006	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
May 9 2006	Amicus curiae brief filed
Jun 1 2006	Amicus curiae brief filed
Jun 13 2006	Response to amicus curiae brief filed
Jun 16 2006	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

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