Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S131484
Muzzy Ranch v. Solano Co. Airport etc.


Filed 6/21/07

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

MUZZY RANCH CO.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
S131484
v.
Ct.App.
1/5
A104955
SOLANO COUNTY AIRPORT LAND
USE COMMISSION,
Solano
County
Defendant and Respondent.
Super. Ct. No. FCS020127

In this case, we consider whether an airport land use commission conducted
sufficient environmental review pursuant to the California Environmental Quality
Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) when it adopted a land use
compatibility plan that embraces existing restrictions on residential housing
development for a large area near an Air Force base. We conclude the
commission’s adoption of the plan fell within an exemption from CEQA for
projects that have no potential to cause a significant effect on the environment.
(See Guidelines for Implementation of Cal. Environmental Quality Act, Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 14, § 15061, subd. (b)(3).) Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeal, which remanded for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Solano County Airport Land Use Commission (Commission) was
established, pursuant to the State Aeronautics Act (Pub. Util. Code, § 21001 et
1



seq.), for the purposes of ensuring the orderly expansion of airports and
promulgating appropriate land use measures in Solano County (id., § 21670, subd.
(a)(2)).
The Commission first adopted a land use plan for the Travis Air Force Base
area in 1990, amending it in 1994. In 1999, the Commission determined that
preparation of a new plan was appropriate owing to “changes in current and
reasonably foreseeable aircraft operations at Travis Air Force Base, as well as
development in the surrounding areas.” In 2002, the Commission adopted by
resolution the Travis Air Force Base Land Use Compatibility Plan (TALUP) that
is the subject of this litigation. The Commission’s resolution stated that “based on
advice provided by its legal counsel, the Commission finds that the [TALUP] is
not a ‘project’ subject to [CEQA] because it would not cause a direct physical
change or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment.”
The TALUP “sets forth land use compatibility policies applicable to future
development in the vicinity” of Travis Air Force Base. The policies are designed
“to ensure that future land uses in the surrounding area will be compatible with the
realistically foreseeable, ultimate potential aircraft activity at the base” and are
“intended to be reflected in the general plans and other policy instruments adopted
by the entities having jurisdiction over land uses near” the base.
The TALUP also sets forth criteria for determining the compatibility with
Travis Air Force Base’s activities and mission of possible future development in
several geographic zones. This litigation has centered on the TALUP’s regulation
of “Compatibility Zone C,” which the TALUP defines to encompass “locations
exposed to potential noise [from the base] in excess of approximately 60 dB
2

CNEL1 together with additional areas occasionally affected by concentrated
numbers of low-altitude . . . aircraft overflights,” excluding developed residential
areas within existing city limits. Although the TALUP does not provide precise
acreage or square mile measurements, maps included in the plan make clear that
Compatibility Zone C covers a large land area within Solano County, an area
Muzzy Ranch Co. represents to be greater than 600 square miles extending more
than 35 miles through Solano County.
The TALUP purports to restrict residential development within
Compatibility Zone C to levels currently permitted under existing general plans
and zoning regulations. Specifically, the TALUP states that “[n]o amendment of a
general plan land use policy or land use map designation and no change of zoning
shall be permitted if such amendment or change would allow more dwelling units
in the affected area than are allowed under current zoning.”
Five days after adopting the TALUP, the Commission filed with the Clerk
of Solano County a “Notice of Exemption,” citing Public Resources Code section
15061, subdivision (b)(3), and declaring that the Commission’s action created
“[n]o possibility of significant effect on the environment.”
Muzzy Ranch Co. (Muzzy Ranch) is a limited partnership holding
ownership interests in more than 1,000 acres within the area affected by the
TALUP. Following the Commission’s adoption of the TALUP, Muzzy Ranch
filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief,
contending that the adoption of the TALUP violated CEQA. The trial court

1
“60 dB CNEL” means 60 decibel community noise equivalent level, which
represents the average daytime noise level during a 24-hour day, adjusted to
account for the lower tolerance of people to noise during evening and nighttime
relative to their daytime tolerance.
3



denied the petition and entered judgment for the Commission. The Court of
Appeal reversed, remanding with directions that the trial court issue a writ of
mandate ordering the Commission to set aside its adoption of the TALUP. We
granted the Commission’s petition for review.
DISCUSSION
In order to “[e]nsure that the long-term protection of the environment,
consistent with the provision of a decent home and suitable living environment for
every Californian, shall be the guiding criterion in public decisions” (Pub.
Resources Code, § 21001, subd. (d)), CEQA and its implementing administrative
regulations (the CEQA Guidelines)2 establish a three-tier process to ensure that
public agencies inform their decisions with environmental considerations. (No
Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 13 Cal.3d 68, 74.) The first tier is
jurisdictional, requiring that an agency conduct a preliminary review to determine
whether an activity is subject to CEQA. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15060; see Pub.
Resources Code, § 21065.) An activity that is not a “project” as defined in the
Public Resources Code (see § 21065) and the CEQA Guidelines (see § 15378) is
not subject to CEQA. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15060, subd. (c)(3).)
The second tier concerns exemptions from CEQA review. The Legislature
has provided that certain projects, such as ministerial projects and repairs to public
service facilities of an emergency nature, are exempt. (Pub. Resources Code,

2
The term “CEQA Guidelines” refers to the regulations for the
implementation of CEQA authorized by the Legislature (Pub. Resources Code,
§ 21083), codified in title 14, section 15000 et seq. of the California Code of
Regulations, and “prescribed by the Secretary of Resources to be followed by all
state and local agencies in California in the implementation of [CEQA].” (CEQA
Guidelines, § 15000.) In interpreting CEQA, we accord the CEQA Guidelines
great weight except where they are clearly unauthorized or erroneous. (Citizens of
Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors
(1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 564, fn. 3.)
4



§ 21080, subd. (b)(1), (2); CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15061, subd. (b)(1), 15260.) In
addition, pursuant to the Legislature’s command (see Pub. Resources Code,
§ 21084, subd. (a)), the CEQA Guidelines list categorical exemptions or “classes
of projects” that the Resources Agency has determined to be exempt per se
because they do not have a significant effect on the environment. (CEQA
Guidelines, §§ 15061, subd. (b)(2), 15300 et seq.)
A project that qualifies for neither a statutory nor a categorical exemption
may nonetheless be found exempt under what is sometimes called the “common
sense” exemption, which applies “[w]here it can be seen with certainty that there
is no possibility that the activity in question may have a significant effect on the
environment” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15061, subd. (b)(3)). (See generally Davidon
Homes v. City of San Jose (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 106, 113-118.)
If a public agency properly finds that a project is exempt from CEQA, no
further environmental review is necessary. (No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,
supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 74.) The agency need only prepare and file a notice of
exemption (see CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15061, subd. (d), 15062, subd. (a)), citing
the relevant statute or section of the CEQA Guidelines and including a brief
statement of reasons to support the finding of exemption (id., § 15062, subd.
(a)(4)). If a project does not fall within an exemption, the agency must “conduct
an initial study to determine if the project may have a significant effect on the
environment.” (Id., § 15063, subd. (a).) If there exists “no substantial evidence
that the project or any of its aspects may cause a significant effect on the
environment” (id., § 15063, subd. (b)(2)), the agency must prepare a “negative
declaration” that briefly describes the reasons supporting its determination (see id.,
§ 15070 et seq.).
CEQA’s third tier applies if the agency determines substantial evidence
exists that an aspect of the project may cause a significant effect on the
5

environment. In that event, the agency must ensure that a full environmental
impact report is prepared on the proposed project. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15063,
subd. (b)(1); see also Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21100, 21151; CEQA Guidelines,
§ 15080 et seq.)
Muzzy Ranch’s objections to the Commission’s proceedings in this case
focus on the first and second tiers of the CEQA process. With respect to the first
(jurisdictional) tier, Muzzy Ranch contends that in its resolution adopting the
TALUP, the Commission erred in concluding that adopting the TALUP was not
subject to CEQA. With respect to the second (exemptions) tier, Muzzy Ranch
contends the Commission violated CEQA by failing to examine the potential
environmental impacts of its adopting the TALUP before filing its Notice of
Exemption claiming the common sense exemption. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15061,
subd. (b)(3).)
Our inquiry into whether the Commission has complied with CEQA
extends only to “whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (Pub.
Resources Code, § 21168.5.) In a CEQA case, as in other mandamus cases, our
review of the administrative record for error is the same as the trial court’s; we
review the agency’s action, not the trial court’s decision. (County of Amador v. El
Dorado County Water Agency (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 931, 946; Friends of the Old
Trees v. Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1393.)
Throughout, we must bear in mind that “[t]he foremost principle under CEQA is
that the Legislature intended the act ‘to be interpreted in such manner as to afford
the fullest possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of
the statutory language.’ ” (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of
University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 390.)
6

A. First Tier
Whether an activity constitutes a project subject to CEQA is a categorical
question respecting whether the activity is of a general kind with which CEQA is
concerned, without regard to whether the activity will actually have environmental
impact. Thus, for CEQA’s purposes, “ ‘[p]roject’ means an activity which may
cause either a direct physical change in the environment, or a reasonably
foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment, and which is any of the
following: [¶] (a) An activity directly undertaken by any public agency.
[¶] (b) An activity undertaken by a person which is supported, in whole or in part,
through contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of assistance from one or
more public agencies. [¶] (c) An activity that involves the issuance to a person of
a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more
public agencies.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21065.) Whether an activity is a
project is an issue of law that can be decided on undisputed data in the record on
appeal. (Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Education (1982)
32 Cal.3d 779, 794-795, questioned on another point in Board of Supervisors v.
Local Agency Formation Com. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 903, 918.)
Here, we are concerned only with Public Resources Code section 21065,
subdivision (a). That the Commission is a public agency and in adopting the
TALUP it engaged in an activity within the meaning of CEQA is undisputed. The
question is whether the Commission’s adoption of the TALUP is the sort of
activity that may cause a direct physical change or a reasonably foreseeable
indirect physical change in the environment (Pub. Resources Code, § 21065) so as
to constitute a project.
The Commission maintains it is not. The Commission contends that, as a
matter of law, it had no duty to consider any displaced development the TALUP
might generate by freezing residential densities in Compatibility Zone C, because
7

such displacement is inherently too speculative to be considered a reasonably
foreseeable effect of an airport land use compatibility plan. The Commission
further argues that because the TALUP merely advises the jurisdictions it affects,
it cannot be the legal cause of environmental changes that result if the jurisdictions
follow its advice. We disagree on both counts.
1. Displaced development
The population of California is ever increasing. Our Legislature has
declared that “[t]he availability of housing is of vital statewide importance, and the
early attainment of decent housing and a suitable living environment for every
California family is a priority of the highest order.” (Gov. Code, § 65580, subd.
(a).) In order to “assure that cities and counties recognize their responsibilities in
contributing to the attainment of the state housing goal” (id., § 65581, subd. (a)),
the Legislature requires that local jurisdictions in their land use planning “identify
adequate sites for housing . . . and . . . make adequate provision for the existing
and projected needs of all economic segments of the community” (id., § 65583),
including “the locality’s share of the regional housing need” (id., § 65583, subd.
(a)(1)). Thus, no California locality is immune from the legal and practical
necessity to expand housing due to increasing population pressures.
Depending on the circumstances, a government agency may reasonably
anticipate that its placing a ban on development in one area of a jurisdiction may
have the consequence, notwithstanding existing zoning or land use planning, of
displacing development to other areas of the jurisdiction. Zoning, as California
courts recognize, “is subject to change[,] and amendment of a general plan is not a
rare occurrence.” (Stanislaus Audubon Society, Inc. v. County of Stanislaus
(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 144, 157.) “[T]he planning and zoning amendment process
has become in many communities one of ‘piecemeal adjustment’ by local planners
8

and local legislators in response to development pressures.” (Devita v. County of
Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 790.)
That further governmental decisions need to be made before a land use
measure’s actual environmental impacts can be determined with precision does not
necessarily prevent the measure from qualifying as a project. For example, in
Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Education, supra, 32
Cal.3d at pages 794-798, we considered whether the State Board of Education
violated CEQA in approving a county committee’s plan to form a new school
district by dividing an existing one. We concluded that the Board of Education
should have undertaken at least an initial environmental study of the secession
plan’s likely environmental impacts before approving it. (Id. at p. 798.) In so
doing, we expressly rejected the board’s argument that its approval was not a
CEQA project “merely because further decisions must be made before schools are
actually constructed, bus routes changed, and pupils reassigned.” (Id. at p. 795.)
That the board’s approval of the plan was an essential step leading to potential
environmental impacts, including construction of a new high school, was
sufficient. (Id. at p. 797.) Nor was the board’s approval exempt from CEQA
merely because it had to be ratified by the voters. (Id. at p. 796.)
As earlier noted, the definition of project for CEQA purposes is not limited
to agency activities that demonstrably will impact the environment. “. . . CEQA
does not speak of projects which will have a significant effect, but those which
may have such effect.” (No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 13 Cal.3d at
p. 83, fn. 16.) Thus, contrary to the Commission’s suggestion, nothing inherent in
the notion of displaced development places such development, when it can
reasonably be anticipated, categorically outside the concern of CEQA.
9

2. Nonbinding advice
The Commission repeatedly characterizes the TALUP as containing merely
“recommendations,” “requests” or “advice” to the affected jurisdictions. In so
doing, the Commission errs. The TALUP speaks in mandatory terms. The
TALUP, by its terms, “[d]efines the responsibilities of affected jurisdictions to
modify their general plans and other policies for consistency with [Commission]
policies and to submit certain land use development actions to the [Commission]
for review.” It provides that the County of Solano and its affected cities “shall
utilize [the TALUP] as the basis for: (a) [m]odifying their respective general
plans, zoning ordinances, and other local land use policies to assure that future
land use development will be compatible with aircraft operations [and]
(b) [m]aking planning decisions regarding specific development proposals
involving the lands impacted by aircraft activity.”
Pursuant to the statutory scheme authorizing it, the TALUP carries
significant, binding regulatory consequences for local government in Solano
County. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, § 65302.3; Pub. Util. Code, § 21676.)
Government Code section 65302.3, subdivision (a) specifies that at all times a
county’s or city’s general plan, as well as any applicable specific plans, “shall be
consistent” with an airport land use commission’s plan and that every affected
county and city must amend its general and specific plans as necessary to keep
them consistent with an applicable commission plan (id., subd. (b)).3 Any local

3
In its entirety, Government Code section 65302.3 provides: “(a) The
general plan, and any applicable specific plan prepared pursuant to Article 8
(commencing with Section 65450), shall be consistent with the plan adopted or
amended pursuant to Section 21675 of the Public Utilities Code. [¶] (b) The
general plan, and any applicable specific plan, shall be amended, as necessary,
within 180 days of any amendment to the plan required under Section 21675 of the

(footnote continued on next page)
10



agency seeking to amend its general plan in a way that affects an area governed by
an airport land use compatibility plan must first refer its proposed action to the
responsible commission for a determination whether the proposed action is
consistent with the airport land use plan. If the commission determines the
amendment is not consistent, the agency may not enact it unless a two-thirds
supermajority of the agency’s governing body votes to override the commission’s
disapproval and the agency makes specific findings that its proposed action is
consistent with the purposes of the State Aeronautics Act. (Pub. Util. Code,
§ 21676, subd. (b).) Thus, even in the event a local authority invokes the override
provision, the State Aeronautics Act scheme still controls.
As Muzzy Ranch observes, under these statutes an airport land use
compatibility plan can operate like a multijurisdictional general plan to trump the
land use planning authority that affected jurisdictions might otherwise exercise
through general and specific plans or zoning. The adoption of an airport land use
compatibility plan and the amendment of a general plan are analogous to the
extent each “embod[ies] fundamental land use decisions that guide the future
growth and development of cities and counties” (City of Livermore v. Local
Agency Formation Com. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 531, 539, citing, inter alia,
Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 263, 277-278, fn. 16).
That the enactment or amendment of a general plan is subject to environmental
review under CEQA is well established. (DeVita v. County of Napa, supra,
9 Cal.4th at pp. 793-795; Black Property Owners Assn. v. City of Berkeley (1994)

(footnote continued from previous page)
Public Utilities Code. [¶] (c) If the legislative body does not concur with any
provision of the plan required under Section 21675 of the Public Utilities Code, it
may satisfy the provisions of this section by adopting findings pursuant to Section
21676 of the Public Utilities Code.”
11



22 Cal.App.4th 974, 985; City of Santa Ana v. City of Garden Grove (1979) 100
Cal.App.3d 521, 532.) “Although [they are] not explicitly mentioned in the
CEQA statutes, general plans ‘embody fundamental land use decisions that guide
the future growth and development of cities and counties,’ and amendments of
these plans ‘have a potential for resulting in ultimate physical changes in the
environment.’ [Citation.] General plan adoption and amendment are therefore
properly defined in the CEQA guidelines [citation] as projects subject to
environmental review.” (DeVita v. County of Napa, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 793-
794 [enactment or amendment of general plan]; see also City of Livermore v.
Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 538 [revision of
sphere of influence guidelines]; City of Santa Ana v. City of Garden Grove, supra,
100 Cal.App.3d at pp. 532-533 [enactment of general plan]; Edna Valley Assn. v.
San Luis Obispo County etc. Coordinating Council (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 444,
449 [adoption of regional transportation plan]; see generally CEQA Guidelines,
§ 15378, subd. (a)(1).)4
In sum, the Commission erred in concluding that adopting the TALUP was
not a project, i.e., was a type of governmental activity not subject to CEQA.
B. Second Tier
Five days after adopting the TALUP, the Commission filed a Notice of
Exemption claiming the “common sense” exemption of the CEQA Guidelines.
(CEQA Guidelines, § 15061, subd. (b)(3).) As noted earlier, the common sense

4
Section 15378, subdivision (a)(1) of the CEQA Guidelines explains in
pertinent part that “project” includes “any activity undertaken by a public agency
that reasonably might affect the environment, including but not limited to . . .
enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances, and the adoption and amendment
of local General Plans or elements thereof.”
12



exemption applies “[w]here it can be seen with certainty that there is no possibility
that the activity in question may have a significant effect on the environment . . . .”
(Ibid.)5 The exemption can be relied on only if a factual evaluation of the
agency’s proposed activity reveals that it applies. (Davidon Homes v. City of San
Jose, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 114 [public agency “abuses its discretion if there
is no basis in the record for its determination that the project was exempt from
CEQA”].)
The Commission’s original intention with respect to its Notice of
Exemption is unclear. The notice assumes that the Commission’s “Adoption of
Travis Air Force Base Land Use Compatibility Plan, March 2002” is a CEQA
project, but, as indicated, claims that action is exempt from CEQA. This approach
is consistent with the Resources Agency’s direction that, “[o]nce a lead agency has
determined that an activity is a project subject to CEQA, a lead agency shall
determine whether the project is exempt from CEQA.” (CEQA Guidelines,
§ 15061, subd. (a).) But, as seen, the Commission has also argued that its
adoption of the TALUP was, as a matter of law, not a project subject to CEQA.
In any event, in connection with its argument its adoption of the TALUP is
exempt from CEQA, the Commission acknowledges that whether a particular
activity qualifies for the common sense exemption presents an issue of fact, that
the agency invoking the exemption has the burden of demonstrating it applies, and
that its finding in that regard is subject to review under the substantial evidence

5
In its entirety, CEQA Guidelines section 15061, subdivision (b)(3)
provides: “(b) A project is exempt from CEQA if: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) The activity is
covered by the general rule that CEQA applies only to projects which have the
potential for causing a significant effect on the environment. Where it can be seen
with certainty that there is no possibility that the activity in question may have a
significant effect on the environment, the activity is not subject to CEQA.”
13



standard. (Davidon Homes v. City of San Jose, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 114;
see also CalBeach Advocates v. City of Solano Beach (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 529,
535-536 [statutory exemption]; Apartment Assn. of Greater Los Angeles v. City of
Los Angeles (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1162, 1173-1174 [categorical exemption].)
“An agency’s obligation to produce substantial evidence supporting its exemption
decision is all the more important where the record shows, as it does here, that
opponents of the project have raised arguments regarding possible significant
environmental impacts.” (Davidon Homes, at p. 117.)
When filing its Notice of Exemption, however, the Commission did not cite
any evidence. Instead, the Commission’s notice merely invokes section 15061,
subdivision (b)(3) of the CEQA Guidelines and states the legal conclusion that
“Adoption of an Airport Land Use Plan is not a ‘project’ as defined by [Public
Resources Code section] 21065.”
Insofar as it failed to consider the record in determining that adopting the
TALUP fell within the common sense exemption, the Commission erred. “[T]he
agency’s exemption determination must be supported by evidence in the record
demonstrating that the agency considered possible environmental impacts in
reaching its decision.” (Davidon Homes v. City of San Jose, supra, 54
Cal.App.4th at p. 117.) “The question whether alleged physical changes are
reasonably foreseeable requires an examination of the evidence presented in the
administrative record.” (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 273, 291.) An agency obviously cannot declare “with certainty that
there is no possibility that the activity in question may have a significant effect on
the environment” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15061, subd. (b)(3)) if it has not
considered the facts of the matter. Since legitimate questions were raised about
the possible environmental impacts of the Commission’s adopting the TALUP, the
14

Commission had the burden to cite substantial evidence supporting its invocation
of CEQA’s common sense exemption. (Davidon Homes, at p. 117.)
The Commission, citing a Court of Appeal opinion superseded by ours in
Sierra Club v. California Coastal Com. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 839, contends it had no
obligation to consider any environmental impacts its adopting the TALUP would
cause outside the plan’s boundaries. Sierra Club is inapposite. There, we
considered whether the California Coastal Commission, in light of statutory
provisions restricting its permitting authority to areas within the coastal zone, was
required when exercising that authority to consider the intracoastal zone impacts
of a project outside the coastal zone. (Id. at p. 843.)
In this case, by contrast, no statute (in CEQA or elsewhere) imposes any
per se geographical limit on otherwise appropriate CEQA evaluation of a project’s
environmental impacts. To the contrary, CEQA broadly defines the relevant
geographical environment as “the area which will be affected by a proposed
project.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21060.5.)6 Consequently, “the project area
does not define the relevant environment for purposes of CEQA when a project’s
environmental effects will be felt outside the project area.” (County Sanitation
Dist. No. 2 of Los Angeles County v. County of Kern (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th
1544, 1582-1583.) Indeed, “the purpose of CEQA would be undermined if the
appropriate governmental agencies went forward without an awareness of the
effects a project will have on areas outside of the boundaries of the project area.”
(Napa Citizens for Honest Government v. Napa County Bd. of Supervisors (2001)

6
In its entirety, Public Resources Code section 21060.5 provides:
“ ‘Environment’ means the physical conditions which exist within the area which
will be affected by a proposed project, including land, air, water, minerals, flora,
fauna, noise, objects of historic or aesthetic significance.”
15



91 Cal.App.4th 342, 369 (Napa Citizens).) Thus, the Commission is mistaken in
its suggestion that agencies have no obligation under CEQA to consider
geographically distant environmental impacts of their activities.
Notwithstanding its errors in this regard, however, the record before us
demonstrates that the Commission reached the correct result. Determining
whether a project qualifies for the common sense exemption need not necessarily
be preceded by detailed or extensive factfinding. Substantial evidence appropriate
to the CEQA stage in issue is all that is required. Under CEQA, a public agency is
not always “required to make a detailed analysis of the impacts of a project on
[future] housing and growth.” (Napa Citizens, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 369
[discussing contents of environmental impact report].) “Nothing in the [CEQA]
Guidelines, or in the cases, requires more than a general analysis of projected
growth. The detail required in any particular case necessarily depends on a
multitude of factors, including, but not limited to, the nature of the project, the
directness or indirectness of the contemplated impact and the ability to forecast the
actual effects the project will have on the physical environment.” (Ibid.)
“In addition, it is relevant, although by no means determinative, that future
effects will themselves require analysis under CEQA.” (Napa Citizens, supra, 91
Cal.App.4th at p. 369.) And “[t]hat the effects will be felt outside of the project
area . . . is one of the factors that determines the amount of detail required in any
discussion. Less detail, for example, would be required where those effects are
more indirect than effects felt within the project area, or where it would be
difficult to predict them with any accuracy.” (Ibid.; see also Goleta Union School
Dist. v. Regents of University of California (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1032;
CEQA Guidelines, § 15146, subd. (b).)
Most significantly, the CEQA Guidelines provide for streamlined review of
projects that are consistent with existing general plans and zoning. (See CEQA
16

Guidelines, § 15183.)7 When approving a project that is consistent with a
community plan, general plan, or zoning ordinance for which an environmental
impact report already has been certified, a public agency need examine only those
environmental effects that are peculiar to the project and were not analyzed or
were insufficiently analyzed in the prior environmental impact report. (Pub.
Resources Code, § 21083.3, subd. (b).)
Considered in light of these principles, the Commission’s adoption of the
TALUP falls within the common sense exemption. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15061,
subd. (b)(3).) One objective of the TALUP is to “minimize new residential
development within areas significantly impacted by noise from Travis Air Force
Base,” most importantly within Compatibility Zone C, the area immediately
surrounding Travis Air Force Base. The record reflects that the TALUP’s
provision implementing that objective simply incorporates existing county general
plan and zoning provisions concerning the maximum number of permitted
dwelling units. The record further reflects that most of the land in the vicinity of
the base is in the land use jurisdiction of Solano County and that the county’s

7
CEQA Guidelines section 15183 was promulgated on the authority of
Public Resources Code section 21083.3, which provides, inter alia, that “[i]f a
parcel has been zoned to accommodate a particular density of development or has
been designated in a community plan to accommodate a particular density of
development and an environmental impact report was certified for that zoning or
planning action, the application of this division to the approval of any subdivision
map or other project that is consistent with the zoning or community plan shall be
limited to effects upon the environment which are peculiar to the parcel or to the
project and which were not addressed as significant effects in the prior
environmental impact report, or which substantial new information shows will be
more significant than described in the prior environmental impact report.” (Pub.
Resources Code, § 21083.3, subd. (a).)
17



existing plans for this area call for nearly all of it to remain in agricultural or open
space uses.
Since, as the TALUP points out, “the presently planned land uses are, on
the whole, compatible with Travis [Air Force Base] operations” and since the
TALUP simply incorporates existing general plan and zoning law restrictions on
residential housing density, any potential displacement the TALUP might
otherwise have effected already has been caused by the existing land use policies
and zoning regulations to which the TALUP is keyed. The only possible new
effect of the TALUP is to make it more difficult for local agencies to change their
policies in the future to permit increased development within Compatibility Zone
C. (See Gov. Code, § 65032.3, subd. (a).) But there is no reason to assume the
agencies will seek to take that step, even in the face of population pressures. The
pertinent agencies already have restricted residential development in
Compatibility Zone C, to the same extent the TALUP does, because Compatibility
Zone C’s location within the noise pattern of an active military base makes it less
suitable for new housing than other areas.8
In sum, although the Commission erred in failing to reference the factual
record in its Notice of Exemption, it was correct in determining that CEQA’s
common sense exemption applied to its adoption of the TALUP. Accordingly, no
further environmental review is required.

8
Of course, further environmental review may be required should the
Commission in the future alter the TALUP to be inconsistent with the Solano
County general plan.
18



CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.
WERDEGAR, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.

19



See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Muzzy Ranch Company v. Solano County Airport Land Use Commission
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion


Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 125 Cal.App.4th 810
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S131484
Date Filed: June 21, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Solano
Judge: Donald R. Fretz

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Howard Rice Nemerovski Canady Falk & Rabkin, Richard C. Jacobs and Jonathan W. Hughes for Plaintiff
and Appellant.

Bingham McCutchen, Stephen L. Kostka and Marie A. Cooper for California Building Industry
Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Dennis Bunting, County Counsel, and James W. Laughlin, Deputy County Counsel , for Defendant and
Respondent.



Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Richard C. Jacobs
Howard Rice Nemerovski Canady Falk & Rabkin
Three Embarcadero Center, 7th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111-4024
(415) 434-1600

James W. Laughlin
Deputy County Counsel
675 Texas Street, Suite 6600
Fairfield, CA 94533
(707) 784-6140


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Thu, 06/21/2007S131484

Parties
1Solano County Airport Land Use Commission (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by James W. Laughlin
Office of the County Counsel
675 Texas Street, Suite 6600
Fairfield, CA

2Muzzy Ranch Company (Petitioner and Appellant)
Represented by Richard C. Jacobs
Howard Rice Nemerovski Canady Falk & Rabkin
3 Embarcadero Center, 7th Floor
San Francisco, CA

3Muzzy Ranch Company (Petitioner and Appellant)
Represented by Jonathan W. Hughes
Howard Rice Nemerovski Canady Falk & Rabkin
3 Embarcadero Center, 7th Floor
San Francisco, CA

4California Building Industry Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Stephen L. Kostka
Bingham McCutchen, LLP
P.O. Box V
Walnut Creek, CA

5California Building Industry Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Marie A. Cooper
Bingham McCutchen, LLP
P.O. Box V
Walnut Creek, CA


Disposition
Jun 21 2007Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Feb 15 2005Petition for review filed
  By counsel for respondent {Solano County Airport Land Use Commission} / CRC 40.1(b).
Feb 15 2005Record requested
 
Feb 24 2005Received Court of Appeal record
  file jacket/briefs/transcripts/accordian file
Mar 3 2005Answer to petition for review filed
  by counsel for appellant (Muzzy Ranch Company).
Mar 14 2005Reply to answer to petition filed
  By counsel for Respondent {Solano County Airport Land Use Commission}.
Apr 13 2005Petition for review granted (civil case)
  Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ.
Apr 13 2005Letter sent to:
  Counsel re: Certification of Interested Entities or Persons.
Apr 27 2005Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  By counsel for appellant.
May 3 2005Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  By counsel for respondent.
May 18 2005Opening brief on the merits filed
  Respondent ( Solano County) with permission.
May 24 2005Received:
  Respondent's errata to Opening Brief on the Merits (Table of Authorities).
Jun 1 2005Request for extension of time filed
  by counsel for appellant Muzzy Ranch Company, requesting a 30-day extension to and including July 18, 2005 to file appellant's answer brief on the merits.
Jun 7 2005Extension of time granted
  To July 18, 2005 to file appellant's answer brief on the merits.
Jul 13 2005Answer brief on the merits filed
  Appellant (Muzzy Ranch Company) by counsel.
Aug 3 2005Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  Respondent (Solano County Airport Land Use Commission) by counsel. 40.1(b)
Sep 2 2005Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  of California Building Industry Association in support of Appellant.
Sep 9 2005Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  California Building Industry Association in support of Appellant.
Sep 9 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
  by California Building Industry Association in support of Appellant. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Sep 28 2005Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  Appellant (Muzzy Ranch Company) by counsel.
Sep 30 2005Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  Respondent (Solano County Airport Land Use Commission) by counsel. 40.1(b)
Sep 30 2005Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  Respondent (Solano County Airport Land Use Commission) by counsel. 40.1(b)
Oct 17 2005Opposition filed
  by Appellant ( Muzzy Ranch) to Respondent Solano Co. Airport's request for judicial notice
Jul 26 2006Received Court of Appeal record
  One box (Administrative Record).
Jan 10 2007Request for judicial notice granted
  The request for judicial notice filed March 12, 2004, by Muzzy Ranch Company is granted. The request for judicial notice filed September 30, 2005, by Solano County Airport Land Use Commission is denied. (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 573, fn. 4.)
Mar 6 2007Case ordered on calendar
  to be argued Wednesday, April 4, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., in Los Angeles
Mar 23 2007Supplemental brief filed
  Airport Land Use Commission, James Laughin, Deputy County Counsel
Apr 4 2007Cause argued and submitted
 
Jun 20 2007Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
 
Jun 21 2007Opinion filed: Judgment reversed
  The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. -----Opinion by Werdegar J. -----joined by: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Chin, Moreno, Corrigan, J.J.
Jul 6 2007Rehearing petition filed
  Muzzy Ranch Company, appellant Richard Jacobs, Counsel
Jul 9 2007Request for modification of opinion filed
  Susan Brandt-Hawley
Jul 11 2007Time extended to consider modification or rehearing
  The time for granting or denying rehearing in the above-entitled case is hereby extended to and including September 19, 2007, or the date upon which rehearing is either granted or denied, whichever occurs first.
Jul 17 2007Received:
  Request for modification without change in judgment. Planning and Conservation League Foundation (PCLF) et al., J. William Yeates, Counsel
Jul 25 2007Received:
  Supplemental letter. Muzzy Ranch Co, appellant Richard C. Jacobs, Counsel
Jul 27 2007Received:
  San Diego and Riverside Counties, petitioner Chevalier,Allen, & Lichman, LLP, Barbara E. Lichman, Counsel
Sep 12 2007Rehearing denied
  The request for modification of the opinion is granted.
Sep 12 2007Opinion modified - no change in judgment
 
Sep 14 2007Remittitur issued (civil case)
 
Sep 17 2007Received:
  Receipt for remittitur.
Sep 19 2007Returned record
  5 doghouses returned to the CA1
Oct 5 2007Motion filed (non-AA)
  Motion for Recall of the Remittitur and Issuance of a New Remittitur, and Alternative Motion for Clarification of the Remittitur. Muzzy Ranch Co., appellant Richard C. Jacobs, Counsel
Oct 23 2007Opposition filed
  "Opposition to Motion for Recall or Clarification of the Remittitur" filed by the Airport Land Use Commission, by James Laughlin, Counsel
Oct 24 2007Filed:
  with permission. Reply to Opposition of Motion for Recall of the Remittitur and Issuance of a New Remittitur, and Alternative Motion for Clarification of the Remittitur. Muzzy Ranch Co., appellant Richard C. Jacobs, Counsel
Nov 16 2007Received:
  record from Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, five doghouses
Nov 28 2007Application to stay issuance of remittitur denied
  The motion for recall of the remittitur and issuance of a new remittitur, and alternative motion for clarification of the remittitur, filed October 5, 2007, is denied without prejudice to the Court of Appeal's recalling its remittitur and conducting any appropriate "further proceedings in the Court of Appeal" (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.272(b)(2)(A)).
Dec 5 2007Returned record
  to Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five (Five doghouses)

Briefs
May 18 2005Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Jul 13 2005Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Aug 3 2005Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
Sep 9 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Sep 28 2005Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
Sep 30 2005Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
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