Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S141148
Metro. Water v. Campus Crusade


Filed 7/23/07

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S141148
v.
Ct.App. 4/2 E034248
CAMPUS CRUSADE FOR CHRIST, INC., )
et al.,
San Bernardino County
Defendants and Appellants.
Super. Ct. No. SCV 35498

The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD), a public
agency founded in 1928, supplies water to six Southern California counties. In
1997, MWD brought an eminent domain action to condemn a portion of land in
San Bernardino County owned by Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc., and Del Rosa
Mutual Water Company (collectively Campus Crusade) to construct a segment of
a 43-mile water pipeline to channel water from the inland areas to the coastal
plains of Southern California. Prior to trial on the issue of just compensation,
MWD persuaded the trial court to exclude valuation evidence offered by Campus
Crusade’s experts to the extent such valuation was based on the property’s
potential use as a planned residential development and resort area, which differed
from its current use and which was not permitted under the zoning in effect at the
time of the taking. The trial court also granted MWD’s request to exclude
evidence of severance damages to the fair market value of the remainder of
Campus Crusade’s property (i.e., the property not taken) to the extent the damages
1



were based on fear that the pipeline (which crosses the San Andreas Fault on
Campus Crusade’s property) could rupture in an earthquake and to the extent the
damages were based on certain other aspects of the pipeline and its construction
process. Finally, the trial court excluded evidence of temporary severance
damages to the extent the damages were based on the adverse impact of the seven-
year construction period on Campus Crusade’s ability to finance and market the
property.
Based on these rulings, Campus Crusade waived its right to a jury trial.
The trial court fixed just compensation at $479,278.45, none of which was
attributable to severance damages. Campus Crusade appealed, and the Court of
Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding (1) that Judge John P.
Wade, who had replaced Judge Cynthia Ludvigsen following her reassignment,
had overstepped his authority in reconsidering and overruling her prior evidentiary
rulings; (2) that a property owner does not bear the burden of proof on the amount
of compensation or on any preliminary facts that may affect the jury’s
determination of just compensation; (3) that the trial court had erred in preventing
Campus Crusade from offering evidence that the property’s highest and best use
was as a future planned residential and resort development, notwithstanding
evidence of a reasonable probability the property could be rezoned in the near
future, and had erred as well in taking that issue away from the trier of fact; and
(4) that the trial court had erred in excluding evidence of severance damages
arising from fear of a pipeline rupture and in excluding evidence of temporary
severance damages arising from the adverse effects of construction on Campus
Crusade’s ability to market and finance the property.
We granted review to clarify the respective roles of the trial court and the
jury at a compensation trial in an eminent domain action and the nature of the
damages that a property owner may recover. For the reasons outlined below, we
2

affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand
for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND1
Campus Crusade, a charitable religious corporation, owns 1,824 acres of
land situated partly within the northern edge of the City of San Bernardino and
partly in unincorporated county territory within the city’s sphere of influence and
slated for annexation. Although most of the property is undeveloped, it is the site
of the historic Arrowhead Springs Hotel, the International School of Theology,
several office buildings, a conference center, a sports field, and a village. The
property is also the primary source for Arrowhead Mountain Spring Water.
In early 1996, Campus Crusade retained a land developer to assist with its
plans to create a planned residential development on the property and to restore
the existing resort and other buildings. The city seemed to be enthusiastic and
supportive of Campus Crusade’s plans for future development. But Campus
Crusade’s plans were disrupted when MWD decided to construct a portion of the
Inland Feeder project, a 43-mile water pipeline from Devil Canyon to Diamond
Valley Lake, across the property. Now built, the pipeline is 12 feet in diameter,
constructed of welded steel, and buried hundreds of feet underground along most
of its route. However, the pipeline enters covered trenches along the Campus
Crusade property that are only 10 to 12 feet deep and, in some places, the pipeline
is as close as four feet to the surface. The pipeline is designed to be close to the
surface in these areas in order to facilitate repair in case of a rupture and to

1
Because no party petitioned for rehearing to challenge the Court of
Appeal’s recital of the factual and procedural history, we take our statement of
facts largely from that opinion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2).)
3



function as a “safety valve” in the event of an earthquake. The pipeline crosses
the San Andreas Fault at this location.
MWD’s board of directors adopted their resolution of necessity on
December 10, 1996. The resolution provided that MWD was to acquire the land at
issue “for the purpose of constructing, reconstructing, maintaining, operating,
enlarging, removing, and replacing a line or lines of pipe at any time, and from
time to time, for water transportation, with every appendage or structure necessary
or convenient to be installed at any time in connection therewith.” On December
23, 1996, MWD deposited funds into the State Treasury, thereby setting the date
of valuation. The following month, MWD filed its complaint in eminent domain
and an ex parte application for possession. The first amended complaint sought
10.4 acres in fee, 18.7 acres of permanent easements, 27.4 acres of temporary
construction easements for a period of seven years, and two permanent tunnel
easements, one below ground and the other above ground.
Campus Crusade submitted statements of valuation from three appraisers:
E. R. Metcalfe, James Smothers, and Robert Swing. The appraisers estimated the
value of the property interests being taken at between $1,500,000 and $1,600,000,
and the temporary and permanent damage to the remainder at between
$12,600,000 and $14,000,000. The pipeline cut across Campus Crusade’s
property at a location that was most valuable and most amenable to development.
One of the permanent easements ran up against some of the existing buildings, and
the resolution provided that Campus Crusade was not to interfere unreasonably
with MWD’s rights over the permanent easements. Further, the resolution
restricted Campus Crusade’s ability to modify the topography, construct buildings,
or plant trees in the areas covered by the easements.
The taking also interfered with Campus Crusade’s secondary access rights
to the property by way of 40th Street, San Bernardino, over a neighboring parcel.
4

In addition, Campus Crusade contended that the pipeline, which crossed a branch
of the San Andreas Fault at the site where the pipeline was raised to within several
feet of the earth’s surface, posed a risk of rupture. A breach in the pipeline could
cause a sudden outflow of millions of gallons of water onto Campus Crusade’s
property at a rate of 1,000 cubic feet per second. MWD analyzed this risk as a
significant environmental impact in its environmental impact report.
Finally, the temporary construction easements encompassed a row of
mature trees that served as a natural entryway for the historic hotel. MWD’s use
of these easements required the cutting of all the mature vegetation in the area.
MWD disclaimed any obligation to restore the vegetation to its prior condition.
MWD submitted a revised statement of valuation of $392,000 as just
compensation for all the property taken, with no amount allocated for severance or
temporary severance damages. On October 7, 1999, MWD filed a final offer of
compensation for $1,500,000 plus costs and interest, but subsequently increased
its offer to $3,500,000. Campus Crusade revised its demand to $12,500,000 for
the property taken and severance damages.
Prior to trial, MWD filed several motions in limine to exclude evidence.
Judge Cynthia Ludvigsen denied most of the motions and allowed Campus
Crusade to present evidence to support its claim of severance damages, including
damages caused by fear of a pipeline rupture. Judge Ludvigsen also allowed
Campus Crusade to present evidence of construction-related damages if those
damages were excessive and beyond the ordinary annoyances associated with a
public works project.
After Judge Ludvigsen was reassigned and replaced by Judge John P.
Wade, MWD filed additional motions in limine: requests to exclude evidence of
temporary and permanent severance damages, including evidence of damages
caused by the seven-year period that would be needed to complete construction of
5

the pipeline; a request to exclude valuation evidence to the extent it was based on
uses not permitted by current zoning; a request to exclude evidence concerning
impairment of Campus Crusade’s access to the property via 40th Street; and a
request to exclude evidence concerning the fear of a pipeline rupture. Judge Wade
granted each of these motions, effectively precluding Campus Crusade from
presenting evidence of severance damages, on the grounds that such damages were
not recoverable as a matter of law, were too speculative, or assumed circumstances
that did not exist on the date of valuation.
Based on Judge Wade’s rulings, Campus Crusade reduced its demand for
compensation to $5,380,000. Because Judge Wade’s rulings effectively limited its
recovery to compensation for the actual taking only, Campus Crusade also waived
its right to a jury. On June 12, 2003, Judge Wade awarded Campus Crusade
$478,278.45, which did not include any amount for severance damages.
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the matter for a new trial. The
appellate court held that Campus Crusade had presented sufficient evidence of
severance damages to warrant consideration of such damages by the trier of fact,
that Campus Crusade had presented sufficient evidence of a likelihood that the
property would be rezoned for residential and hotel development to permit the trier
of fact to consider such potential uses in determining the property’s fair market
value, and that the trier of fact should have been permitted to consider the effect of
the seven-year-long construction on Campus Crusade’s ability to plan, finance,
and market the property.
We granted MWD’s petition for review.
DISCUSSION
This case arises under article I, section 19 of the California Constitution,
which requires the owner whose property is taken or damaged for a public use be
paid “just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived.”
6

The Legislature has defined the measure of just compensation as “the fair
market value of the property taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1263.310.)2 “The fair
market value of the property taken is the highest price on the date of valuation that
would be agreed to by a seller, being willing to sell but under no particular or
urgent necessity for so doing, nor obliged to sell, and a buyer, being ready,
willing, and able to buy but under no particular necessity for so doing, each
dealing with the other with full knowledge of all the uses and purposes for which
the property is reasonably adaptable and available.” (§ 1263.320, subd. (a).) “As
section 1263.320 indicates, the fair market value of property taken has not been
limited to the value of the property as used at the time of the taking, but has long
taken into account the ‘highest and most profitable use to which the property
might be put in the reasonably near future, to the extent that the probability of such
a prospective use affects the market value.’ ” (City of San Diego v. Neumann
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 738, 744.) This prospective use “is to be considered, not
necessarily as the measure of value, but to the full extent that the prospect of
demand for such use affects the market value while the property is privately held.”
(Olson v. United States (1934) 292 U.S. 246, 255.)
When the property taken is part of a larger parcel, the owner is
compensated not merely for the injury to the part taken but also for the injury, if
any, to the remainder. (§ 1263.410, subd. (a).) Compensation for injury to the
remainder is the amount of the damage to the remainder caused by the taking,
reduced by the amount of the benefit to the remainder caused by the taking.
(§ 1263.410, subd. (b).) Such compensation is commonly called “severance
damages.” (City of San Diego v. Neumann, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 741.)

2
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless
otherwise noted.
7



The procedures governing eminent domain actions differ in some respects
from those governing other actions. For example, “all issues except the sole issue
relating to compensation[] are to be tried by the court.” (People v. Ricciardi
(1943) 23 Cal.2d 390, 402.) The defendant (i.e., the property owner) shall present
evidence on the issue of compensation first and shall commence and conclude the
argument. (§ 1260.210, subd. (a).) And, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
statute, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has the burden of proof on the issue
of compensation.” (§ 1260.210, subd. (b).) In this respect, California law differs
from that of most other states. (See 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d ed. 2006)
§ 18.02[3], pp. 18-12.1 to 18-20, fn. 8.)
A. The Reasonable Probability of Rezoning
The Court of Appeal found that that the trial court improperly excluded—
and thus prevented Campus Crusade’s appraisal experts from relying on—
evidence that the highest and best use of the property was comprehensive
development for residential, commercial, industrial, and recreational uses. In the
view of the Court of Appeal (and echoed by Campus Crusade here), the trier of
fact should have been allowed to consider these prospective uses in assessing the
value of the property taken and the damage to the remainder; instead, the trial
court usurped the jury’s role by deciding for itself, prior to trial, whether there was
a reasonable probability the property could be rezoned to permit these other uses.
MWD, by contrast, argues that the question whether there was a reasonable
probability of the property being rezoned is properly entrusted to the court, not the
jury, and that the court’s pretrial determination that rezoning was not reasonably
probable here is supported by substantial evidence.
There is no dispute that the existing zoning did not authorize the
development envisioned by Campus Crusade. The portion of the property lying
within the City of San Bernardino was zoned residential low, which imposed a
8

maximum density of 3.1 dwelling units per gross acre and does not allow
commercial uses. The remaining property was zoned rural living, which imposed
a minimum three-acre lot size; single residential, which permitted a slightly higher
density; and resource conservation, which imposed a minimum 40-acre lot size.
The existing buildings on the property, including the hotel, predated the current
zoning and were operating as legal nonconforming uses.
Prior to trial, MWD filed a motion in limine “for an order prohibiting the
presentation of any evidence treating Campus Crusade’s property as zoned for
anything other than the uses permitted by the Resource Conservation zone unless,
and until, Campus Crusade has borne its burden of proof and convinced the Court,
outside of the jury’s presence, that there is substantial evidence of a reasonable
probability of rezoning on the date of value.” After conducting a pretrial
evidentiary hearing, Judge Wade granted the motion. He agreed with MWD that
the question whether a reasonable probability of rezoning existed in the near future
was for the court to decide, and he determined, based on the evidence presented by
both sides at the pretrial hearing, that “it is not reasonably probable that the subject
property would be rezoned in the reasonably near future.” As a result, Judge Wade
prohibited Campus Crusade’s appraisers “from valuing the remainder as anything
other than Resource Conservation.” Unfortunately, the trial court thereby usurped
the role of the jury in valuing the property.
“Where due to zoning restrictions the condemned property is not presently
available for use to which it is otherwise geographically and economically
adaptable, the condemnee is entitled to show a reasonable probability of a zoning
change in the near future and thus to establish such use as the highest and best use
of the property.” (City of Los Angeles v. Decker (1977) 18 Cal.3d 860, 867.) The
jury’s role in this assessment is settled. “ ‘[T]he determination as to whether or
not there is a reasonable probability of a [use] change is ordinarily a question of
9

fact for the jury.’ ” (Redevelopment Agency v. Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. (1982)
135 Cal.App.3d 73, 84, quoting People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Arthofer (1966)
245 Cal.App.2d 454, 467; see Community Redevelopment Agency v. Henderson
(1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 336, 345 [“the court . . . correctly left to the jury the
determination whether there was a reasonable probability of a zone change”]; see
also City of Los Angeles v. Decker, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 872 [“the purported need
for airport parking and the suitability of defendant's property for that purpose were
critical to the issue of valuation”]; People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v.
Donovan (1962) 57 Cal.2d 346, 354 [criticizing defendant’s proffered jury
instruction concerning the probability of rezoning where the evidence was
conflicting because of “the possible implication that the court had concluded as a
matter of law that there was a reasonable probability of a zoning change”]; accord,
4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra, § 12C.03[3], p. 12C-82 [“The existence of a
reasonable probability of an imminent change in zoning is a question of fact”]; id.,
§ 12C.03[3], p. 12C-88 [“it is for the jury to consider the weight to be given the
testimony based on such probability, whether there is such probability, and its
effect on the fair market value”].)
Before such evidence may be presented to the jury, however, the trial court
must first determine whether there is sufficient evidence that would permit a jury
to conclude there is a reasonable probability of rezoning in the near future.
Evidence of a reasonable probability of a zoning change in the near future “ ‘must
at least be in accordance with the usual minimum evidentiary requirements, and
that which is purely speculative, wholly guess work and conjectural, is
inadmissible.’ ” (City of Los Angeles v. Decker, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 868.) The
evidence, if credited, must also be sufficient to establish that rezoning is
reasonably probable. (People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Arthofer, supra, 245
Cal.App.2d at p. 466 [upholding the exclusion of testimony from an expert whose
10

opinion “was based on a ‘reasonable possibility’ instead of a ‘reasonable
probability’ of zone change”].) If the trial court determines that no fact finder
could find a reasonable probability of rezoning on the record presented, it may
exclude all evidence and opinions of value based on a use other than that
authorized by the existing zoning. (Id. at p. 467; accord, City of San Diego v.
Neumann, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 744 [evidence of a probability of rezoning is
relevant only “ ‘to the extent that the probability of such a prospective use affects
the market value’ ”].) If, on the other hand, the trial court determines that there is
sufficient evidence of a reasonable probability of rezoning to warrant submitting
the issue to the jury, it is for the jury, in considering the weight to be given
valuation testimony based upon a reasonable probability of rezoning, to determine
whether there was a reasonable probability of rezoning and, if so, its effect on the
market value of the property. Thus, before a jury may even reach the question
whether a use which was unauthorized by the existing zoning otherwise meets the
criteria of a highest and best use, the jury must first find that there was a
reasonable probability of rezoning to permit that use. Once that has been
established, neither party bears the burden to persuade the fact finder of the effect
of this probability on the valuation of the property. (§ 1260.210, subd. (b); accord,
2 Judicial Council of Cal. Civ. Jury Instns. (2007) CACI No. 3503; cf. Evid. Code,
§ 403, subd. (c)(1), (2).)
Relying on language in certain Court of Appeal decisions, MWD contends
that the property owner bears the burden of proving that a reasonable probability
of rezoning exists. MWD relies in particular on County of San Diego v. Rancho
Vista Del Mar, Inc. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1058 (Rancho Vista Del Mar),
which asserted that “[t]he property owner has the burden of showing a reasonable
probability of a change in the restrictions on the property,” as well as on City of
San Diego v. Rancho Pensaquitos Partnership (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1013,
11

1028, and City of San Diego v. Barratt American, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th
917, 934, which simply quote this passage from Rancho Vista Del Mar. But these
statements must be interpreted against the backdrop of section 1260.210, which
provides: “(a) The defendant shall present his evidence on the issue of
compensation first and shall commence and conclude the argument. [¶] (b)
Except as otherwise provided by statute, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has
the burden of proof on the issue of compensation.”
What does section 1260.210, subdivision (b) mean when it says that neither
party “has the burden of proof on the issue of compensation”? “We begin with a
discussion of key terms: burden of proof and burden of producing evidence.
Attorneys, judges, and commentators often have confused these terms and the
concepts they represent. As the United States Supreme Court observed, ‘For many
years the term “burden of proof” was ambiguous because the term was used to
describe two distinct concepts. Burden of proof was frequently used to refer to
what we now call the burden of persuasion—the notion that if the evidence is
evenly balanced, the party that bears the burden of persuasion must lose. But it
was also used to refer to what we call the burden of production—a party’s
obligation to come forward with evidence to support its claim.’ ” (Sargent
Fletcher, Inc. v. Able Corp. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1658, 1666-1667, italics
omitted.) With those definitions in mind, we can now construe section 1260.210.
Subdivision (a) articulates a burden of production, which is merely the burden of
going forward with (or producing) some evidence of a material fact.
(Redevelopment Agency v. Metropolitan Theatres Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d
808, 811, fn 3; see generally Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th
826, 862.) Here, the property owner has the burden to produce evidence to
support a finding that rezoning is reasonably probable. Once that burden has been
satisfied, however, subdivision (b) makes it clear that neither party bears a
12

particular burden of persuasion with respect to convincing the trier of fact that the
reasonable probability exists or what effect such probability would have on the
valuation of the property.
We thus understand the “burden” described in Rancho Vista Del Mar,
supra, 16 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1058, and its progeny to be the burden of production,
not the burden of persuasion. This accords with the Law Revision Commission
Comment to section 1260.210, which explains that “[a]bsent the production of
evidence by one party, the trier of fact will determine compensation solely from
the other party’s evidence, but neither party should be made to appear to bear
some greater burden of persuasion than the other.”3 (Cal. Law Revision Com.
com., 19 West’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (1982 ed.) foll. § 1260.210, p. 746.)
Accordingly, when presented with a proffer that there is a highest and best
use that is not permitted by the property’s current zoning, the trial court should
examine whether the proffer supplies sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find
that there was a reasonable probability of rezoning to permit that use in the near
future. The jury should then be instructed that it may consider the change in use,
provided that it first finds a reasonable probability the property could be rezoned
in the near future. In this case, however, the trial court collapsed these two steps
into one by deciding, prior to trial, whether it was convinced there was a
reasonable probability of rezoning. Because the trial court examined the evidence
of rezoning under an unduly rigorous standard, we direct the Court of Appeal to

3
MWD relies as well on our statement in City of Los Angeles v. Decker,
supra, 18 Cal.3d at page 868 that “ ‘[t]he burden of proof as to reasonable
probability of zone change is on the landowner.’ ” But, as MWD concedes, the
trial in Decker preceded the effective date of section 1260.210, and Decker did not
purport to decide the new law’s effect other than to alert the trial court to its
existence as “guidance” on retrial. (City of Los Angeles v. Decker, supra, 18
Cal.3d at p. 872.)
13



remand the matter to the trial court to reexamine the record under the correct
standard in the first instance. (E.g., Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co. (1999) 20
Cal.4th 785, 802-803; Lindenstadt v. Staff Builders, Inc. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th
882, 889.)
B. Severance Damages
The Court of Appeal also found that the trial court usurped the jury’s role
by purporting to determine whether Campus Crusade had proven an entitlement to
severance damages and then excluding evidence of such severance damages from
the trial. The Court of Appeal held that it was for the trier of fact to determine
whether the fear of a pipeline rupture during an earthquake and whether the impact
of the delay in construction on Campus Crusade’s ability to market and finance the
property negatively affected the value of the property not taken—or, in other
words, whether these factors established severance damages. MWD, on the other
hand, contends that the trial court should decide first whether severance damages
exist; if so, only then does the jury determine the amount of those damages. We
agree with the Court of Appeal, but only in part.
Severance damages, as noted above, consist generally of the diminution in
the fair market value of the remainder property caused by the project. “ ‘Where
the property taken constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the owner is entitled to
recover, inter alia, the difference in the fair market value of his property in its
“before” condition and the fair market value of the remaining portion thereof after
the construction of the improvement on the portion taken. Items such as view,
access to beach property, freedom from noise, etc. are unquestionably matters
which a willing buyer in the open market would consider in determining the price
he would pay for any given piece of real property.’ [Citation.] Severance
damages are not limited to special and direct damages, but can be based on any
factor, resulting from the project, that causes a decline in the fair market value of
14

the property.” (Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v.
Continental Development Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 694, 712, italics added
(Continental Development).)
The property owner in an eminent domain action “is entitled to a jury trial
on the issue of just compensation.” (Citizens Utilities Co. v. Superior Court
(1963) 59 Cal.2d 805, 816.) Because a condemnation suit is a special proceeding,
however, “all issues except the sole issue relating to compensation[] are to be tried
by the court,” including, “except those relating to compensation, the issues of
fact.” (People v. Ricciardi, supra, 23 Cal.2d at p. 402.) “ ‘It is only the
“compensation,” the “award,” which our constitution declares shall be found and
fixed by a jury. All other questions of fact, or of mixed fact and law, are to be
tried, as in many other jurisdictions they are tried, without reference to a jury.’ ”
(Ibid.)
In support of its theory that entitlement to severance damages is for the
court and only the amount thereof is for the jury, MWD points to certain issues
related to severance damages that we have deemed issues for the trial court. For
example, we have held that what constitutes the larger parcel (for purposes of
determining severance damages) “is essentially a question of law for the
determination of the court” (Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber Etc. Co. (1915) 171
Cal. 392, 397); whether separate parcels may be aggregated and considered as one
larger parcel is “an issue of law to be decided by the trial court” (City of San
Diego v. Neumann, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 757); and whether a taking has
substantially impaired access to the remaining property is “a matter of law” for the
court (Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 659, 664). Similarly, it is
for the trial court to decide whether a party had acquired an avigation easement
over a neighboring property that was condemned (Pacific Gas & E. Co. v.
Peterson (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 434, 438) and, more generally, to determine
15

whether a party had a cognizable legal interest in the condemned property.
(County of San Diego v. Miller (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 424, 433.)
Both sides here thus agree that the court, not the jury, must make certain
determinations that are a predicate to the award of severance damages. But MWD
is on weaker ground when it attempts to derive from the above cases a general rule
that “as a matter of constitutional and decisional law, all issues having to do with
the existence of, or entitlement to, severance damages are entrusted to the trial
judge,” such that “[o]nly after the trial judge has determined that severance
damages exist does the jury consider the amount of those severance damages.”
MWD’s proposed rule assumes that questions relating to the measurement of
severance damages can be readily distinguished from questions relating to the
entitlement to them in the first place but, as we have previously cautioned, the two
concepts are not necessarily “so easily separable.” (City of San Diego v.
Neumann, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 757.) Even if these two concepts can be separated
for purposes of allocating decisionmaking between the court and the jury, MWD’s
proposed rule does not find much support in the law. Severance damages
“normally are measured by comparing the fair market value of the remainder
before and after the taking.” (City of San Diego v. Neumann, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p.
745.) The fair market value of a property is a fact to be determined by the jury.
(Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber Etc. Co., supra, 171 Cal. at p. 400; San Diego
Land Etc. v. Neale (1891) 88 Cal. 50, 57.) “The jury is entitled to and should
consider those factors which a buyer would take into consideration in arriving at a
fair market value, were [the buyer] contemplating a purchase of the property.”
(People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Donovan, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 352.)
The factors Campus Crusade identified below—e.g., fear that the pipeline
will rupture in an earthquake, negative visual and aesthetic impacts on the
landscaping, and limitations on potential development caused by grading
16

restrictions and placement of the pipeline—at least arguably have the potential of
affecting the market value of the remaining property.4 As long as the effect of
these factors on market value is not conjectural, speculative, or remote, it is for the
jury to decide the extent to which they may affect the value of the property. (City
of Pasadena v. Stimson (1891) 91 Cal. 238, 259 [trial court erred in precluding
jury from deciding whether the temporary escape of sewer gas during reasonable
repairs to the sewer reduced the market value of abutting property]; San Diego
Gas & Electric Co. v. Lux Land Co. (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 472, 482 [whether
appraisers should have considered the effects of unsightly towers, damage to
existing views, the shape of the remaining land, and interference with radio
reception “were questions of fact for the jury to determine”]; People v. O’Connor
(1939) 31 Cal.App.2d 157, 159 [the effects of widening the highway, such as
decreasing the distance from the house to the highway, adverse impact on
landscaping, and increased traffic noise and hazards, were proper subjects of
expert testimony “and the jury could determine what weight to give the opinions
in proportion to the weight the reasons had with them”]; see generally Continental
Development, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 718 [“in determining a landowner’s
entitlement to severance damages, the fact finder . . . shall consider competent
evidence relevant to any conditions caused by the project that affect the remainder
property’s fair market value, insofar as such evidence is neither conjectural nor
speculative” (italics added)].)
By contrast, the issues we have reserved for the trial court in condemnation
actions have been issues of law—or mixed issues of law and fact where the legal

4
We need not decide whether Campus Crusade satisfied its burden of
production with respect to these factors inasmuch as that issue was not included in
our grant of review.
17



issues predominate, even if there are also underlying disputes of fact—antecedent
to the valuation of the property and the question of severance damages. (See
Emeryville Redevelopment Agency v. Harcros Pigments, Inc. (2002) 101
Cal.App.4th 1083, 1117.) In such circumstances, reserving the issue for the court
is consistent with the state constitutional right to a jury trial on the issue of just
compensation and facilitates the conduct of the trial. (Cf. Merced Irrigation Dist.
v. Woolstenhulme (1971) 4 Cal.3d 478, 498, fn. 12.) Once the court performs its
role—e.g., once the court finds that the taking has substantially impaired the
property owner’s right of access—it is for the jury to determine the effect of the
impairment, if any, on the property’s market value. (People ex rel. Dept. of Pub.
Wks. v. Presley (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 309, 313.) Similarly, where the property
owner produces evidence tending to show that some other aspect of the taking—
such as the risk of a pipeline rupture—“naturally tends to and actually does
decrease the market value” of the remaining property, it is for the jury to weigh its
effect on the value of the property, as long as the effect is not speculative,
conjectural, or remote. (Gas & Electric Co. v. Miller & Lux Inc. (1931) 118
Cal.App. 140, 144.)
MWD then contends that, even if such factors are for the jury to consider,
the property owner still bears the burden to prove the existence of severance
damages. But this misconceives the nature of severance damages, which is simply
a shorthand term describing the diminution in the market value of the remaining
property as a result of a taking and, hence, of describing the compensation for the
property owner’s loss. (Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Lewis (Ark.
1968) 422 S.W.2d 866, 868.) It is plain that the property owner bears the burden
of producing evidence tending to show the diminution in market value under
section 1260.210, subdivision (a) (Redevelopment Agency v. Metropolitan
Theatres Corp., supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 811, fn. 3)—otherwise neither the
18

testifying experts nor the jury would have any basis for justifying severance
damages—but the jury then decides what effect (if any) the evidence, taken “as a
whole,” may have on the value of the property. (Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Hufford (1957) 49 Cal.2d 545, 561; San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Daley (1988)
205 Cal.App.3d 1334, 1351; see generally People v. Thompson (1954) 43 Cal.2d
13, 25 [“It became a question of fact then, which the court properly left to the jury,
whether severance damage occurred and, if so, in what amount”].) Under section
1260.210, subdivision (b), the fact finder must ascertain the value of the property
before and after the taking and fix the amount of compensation without assigning
a burden of persuasion to either party. “As the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws state in their Comment to Unif. Eminent Domain Code § 904, 13 U.L.A. 93-
94 (1980), ‘[i]t seems difficult to assign an intelligible meaning to the concept of
“burden of proof” in the eminent domain context, since the pleadings are not
required to allege or deny the amount of compensation claimed, and the ultimate
standard of decision is the constitutional rule of “just compensation.” ’
Necessarily, as they go on to say, ‘the ultimate determination necessarily reflects
the weight and degree of credibility accorded to [conflicting] estimates.’ ”
(Winooski Hydroelectric Co. v. Five Acres of Land (2d Cir. 1985) 769 F.2d 79,
84.)
The foregoing is sufficient to dispose of most of the issues presented in the
petition for review concerning severance damages. Having now determined the
respective roles of the judge and jury in connection with severance damages and
the nonexistence of a burden of persuasion with respect to such damages, we have
no cause to determine whether the trial court overstepped its bounds in excluding
evidence of certain severance damages prior to trial or whether the trial court erred
in finding that certain other severance damages had not been established at trial,
inasmuch as MWD (with one exception) has not challenged here any part of the
19

Court of Appeal’s opinion relating to severance damages, nor did Campus Crusade
challenge in its answer any such ruling by the trial court.
The lone exception concerns Campus Crusade’s attempt to recover
temporary severance damages for the allegedly adverse impact of the project on its
ability to use, develop, and market its property during the seven-year period of
construction. The trial court granted MWD’s motion in limine to exclude
evidence of such damages, observing that “[t]he time period of construction may
result in severance damages as to rental losses, for example, but not as to
marketability.” The Court of Appeal disagreed and held that Campus Crusade
should have been allowed to present evidence to show how the project as proposed
interfered with its plans for developing the property, “especially in regards to
obtaining financing and marketing the property.”
In support of its claim of temporary severance damages, Campus Crusade
relies on Placer County Water Agency v. Hofman (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 890, but
the case provides scant support. In Hofman, the owner alleged that the agency’s
temporary easement for the construction of a pipeline across the owner’s property
“substantially prevented use of the property for cattle and sheep ranching” and
sought damages in the form of the cost to rent comparable ranching facilities.
(Hofman, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 894.) In other words, the taking interfered
with the owner’s actual intended use of the property. Here, by contrast, Campus
Crusade has not identified any intended use of the property during the relevant
period, nor has it identified any specific loss attributable to the delay in
construction. (City of Los Angeles v. Ricards (1973) 10 Cal.3d 385, 388; Orange
County Flood Control Dist. v. Sunny Crest Dairy, Inc. (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 742,
762.) Although the Court of Appeal was correct in saying that a property owner
generally should be able “to present evidence to show whether and to what extent
the delay disrupted its use of the remaining property,” Campus Crusade has failed
20

to support its allegation of damages in this court with any specificity—or, indeed,
with any citation to the record.
If Campus Crusade had sold the property during the construction period and
if the ongoing construction had temporarily lowered the sales price of the property,
it would appear that Campus Crusade would be entitled to recover that loss from
MWD. (See City of Los Angeles v. Ricards, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 388.) But the
mere fact of a delay associated with construction of the pipeline did not, without
more, entitle Campus Crusade to temporary severance damages relating to the
financing or marketing of the property in this eminent domain action. (People ex
rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Home Trust Investment Co. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 1022,
1026-1027 [owner failed to show how it had been damaged by decade-long delay
in constructing a freeway].)
This is not to say, however, that Campus Crusade is barred from recovering
damages for actual injury it may have suffered during the construction of the
pipeline. On remand, Campus Crusade may have the opportunity before the trial
court to create an appropriate record to support its claim of severance damages. In
addition, “[w]hen the condemnation action is tried before the improvement is
constructed, and substantial although temporary interference with the property
owner’s rights of possession or access occurs during construction, the property
owner may maintain a subsequent action for such damage occurring during
construction.” (People v. Ayon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 217, 229.)
21

DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed in part and reversed in
part and the matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
BAXTER, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.


22

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Metropolitan Water District v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc.
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion


Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 135 Cal.App.4th 568
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S141148
Date Filed: July 23, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: San Bernardino
Judge: John P. Wade
__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Redwine & Sherill, Justin M. McCarthy, Scott R. Heil; Berger & Norton, Michael M. Berger, Gideon
Kanner, John T. Fogarty; Matteoni, Saxe & O’Laughlin, Matteoni, O’Laughlin & Hechtman, Norman E.
Matteoni, Peggy M. O’Laughlin and Gerry Houlihan for Defendants and Appellants.

Jenny, Jenny & Jenny and Scott E. Jenny as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

Sullivan, Workman & Dee, Roger M. Sullivan and Gary A. Kovacic as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Defendants and Appellants.

Palmieri, Tyler, Wiener, Wilhelm & Waldron and Patrick A. Hennessey as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Defendants and Appellants.

Law Offices of Peter D. Lepiscopo, Peter D. Lepiscopo and James M. Griffiths for Pacific Justice Institute
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

James S. Burling for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Jeffrey Kightlinger, Henry S. Barbosa Lauren R. Brainard, Karen Tachiki, Sydney B. Bennion, Joseph A.
Vanderhorst; Cox, Castle & Nicholson, Kenneth B. Bley and Edward C. Dygert for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

Janet Morningstar for Municipal Water District of Orange County as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff
and Respondent.

Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Schneider and Katherine E. Stone for League of California Cities,
California State Association of Counties and Association of California Water Agencies as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

Ferguson, Case, Orr, Paterson & Cunningham, Douglas E. Kulper and Sandra M. Robertson for Calleguas
Municipal Water District as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.



Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Norman E. Matteoni
Matteoni, O’Laughlin & Hechtman
848 The Alameda
San Jose, CA 95126
(408) 293-4300

Kenneth B. Bley
Cox, Castle & Nicholson
2049 Century Park East, Suite 2800
Los Angeles, CA 90067
(31) 284-2231


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Mon, 07/23/2007S141148

Parties
1Metropolitan Water District Of Southern California (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by Kenneth B. Bley
Cox, Castle & Nicholson
2049 Century Park East, 28th Floor
Los Angeles, CA

2Metropolitan Water District Of Southern California (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by Jeffrey Kightlinger
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
P.O. Box 54153
Los Angeles, CA

3Campus Crusade For Christ, Inc. (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Scott Richard Heil
Redwine & Sherrill
1950 Market Street
Riverside, CA

4Campus Crusade For Christ, Inc. (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Norman E. Matteoni
Matteoni O'Laughlin & Hechtman
848 The Alameda
San Jose, CA

5Campus Crusade For Christ, Inc. (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Margaret Mary O'Laughlin
Matteoni O'Laughlin & Hechtman
848 The Alameda
San Jose, CA

6Del Rosa Mutual Water Company (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Scott Richard Heil
Redwine & Sherrill
1950 Market Street
Riverside, CA

7Del Rosa Mutual Water Company (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Norman E. Matteoni
Matteoni O'Laughlin & Hechtman
848 The Alameda
San Jose, CA

8Del Rosa Mutual Water Company (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Margaret Mary O'Laughlin
Matteoni O'Laughlin & Hechtman
848 The Alameda
San Jose, CA

9Jenny, Scott E. (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Scott E. Jenny
Attorney at Law
736 Ferry Street
Martinez, CA

10Sullivan, Workman & Dee, Llp (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Roger M. Sullivan
Sullivan, Workman & Dee
800 S. Figueroa Street, 12th Floor
Los Angeles, CA

11Sullivan, Workman & Dee, Llp (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Gary Kovacic
Sullivan Workman & Dee
800 S. Figueroa Street, 12th Floor
Los Angeles, CA

12Pacific Legal Foundation (Amicus curiae)
Represented by James S. Burling
Pacific Legal Foundation
3900 Lennane Drive, Suite 200
Sacramento, CA

13Municipal Water District Of Orange County (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Janet Morningstar
Janet Morningstar, a Law Corporation
1048 Irvine Avenue, Suite 407
Newport Beach, CA

14Pacific Justice Institute (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Peter Dominick Lepiscopo
Attorney at Law
2635 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 108
San Diego, CA

15League Of California Cities (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Katherine E. Stone
Attorney at Law
5425 Everglades Street
Ventura, CA

16California State Association Of Counties (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Katherine E. Stone
Attorney at Law
5425 Everglaeds Street
Ventura, CA

17Association Of California Water Agencies (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Katherine E. Stone
Attorney at Law
5425 Everglades Street
Ventura, CA

18Palmieri, Tyler, Wiener, Wilhelm & Waldron Llp (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Patrick Anthony Hennessey
Palmieri Tyler et al., LLP
2603 Main Street, East Tower, Suite 1300
Irvine, CA

19Calleguas Municipal Water District (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Sandra M. Robertson
Ferguson Case Orr et al.
1050 S. Kimball Road
Ventura, CA


Disposition
Jul 23 2007Opinion: Affirmed in part/reversed in part

Dockets
Feb 15 2006Petition for review filed
  Respondent The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California Attorneys Kenneth B. Bley, Retained and Jeffrey Kightlinger, Metropolitan Water District
Mar 1 20062nd record request
 
Mar 3 2006Received Court of Appeal record
  two boxes
Mar 6 2006Answer to petition for review filed
  Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc. and Del Rosa Mutual Water Company, appellant Peggy M. O'Laughlin, counsel
Mar 9 2006Received:
  letter from Respondent Metropolitan Water District of Southern California AttorneyKenneth B. Bley, Retained
Mar 13 2006Received:
  letter from Lemieux & O'Neill.
Mar 16 2006Reply to answer to petition filed
  Respondent Metropolitan Water District of Southern California Attorneys Kenneth B. Bley, etal, Retained
Apr 12 2006Time extended to grant or deny review
  to and including May 16, 2006
Apr 19 2006Petition for review granted (civil case)
  Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ.
May 3 2006Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  Metropolitan Water District, respondent Kenneth B. Bley, counsel
May 4 2006Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  Campus Crusade for Christ, appellant Scott Richard Heil, counsel
May 19 2006Opening brief on the merits filed
  Respondent The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California Attorney Kenneth B. Bley
Jun 16 2006Answer brief on the merits filed
  Campus Crusade for Christ, INc., and Del Rosa Mutual Water Company, appellant Norman E. Matteoni, counsel Peggy M. O'Laughlin, counsel
Jul 5 2006Application to file over-length brief filed
  reply brief/merits Respondent The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California Attorney Kenneth B. Bley, retained
Jul 5 2006Received:
  oversize reply brief/merits
Jul 10 2006Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  The Metropolitan Water District of Southen California, appellant by Kenneth B. Bley, counsel
Jul 28 2006Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  for Scott E. Jenny , in support of respondent by Scott E. Jenny
Aug 1 2006Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  for Scott E. Jenny, in support of respondent. Answer due within twenty days.
Aug 1 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
  Scott E. Jeny in support of respondent
Aug 3 2006Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  Sullivan, Workman & Dee, LLP, in support of appellant by Roger M. Sullivan and Gary A. Kovacic, counsel
Aug 3 2006Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  Municipal Water District of Orange County, in support of respondent Attorney Janet Morningstar
Aug 4 2006Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  Amicus Curiae Palmieri, Tyler, Wiener, Wilhelm & Waldron, LLP [in support of appellants] Attorney Patrick A. Hennessey
Aug 4 2006Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  for Pacific Legal Foundation, in support of appellants by James S. Burling, counsel
Aug 7 2006Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  of Pacific Justice Insitute's, in support of appellants by Peter D. Lepiscopo, counsel
Aug 8 2006Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  of League of California Cities, California State Association of Counties and Association of California Water Agencies, in support of respondent by Katherine E. Stone
Aug 8 2006Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  Calleguas Municipal Water District [in support of respondent] Attorney Sandra M. Robertson
Aug 10 2006Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Palmieri, tyler, Wiener, Wilhelm & Waldron LLP, in support of appellants. Answer due within twenty days.
Aug 10 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
  Palmieri, Tyler, Wiener, Wilhelm & Waldron LLP, in support of appellants.
Aug 10 2006Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Municipal Water District of Orange County, in support of respondent. Answer due within twenty days.
Aug 10 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
  Municipal Water District of Orange County, in support of respondent.
Aug 10 2006Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  League of California Cities, California State Association of Counties and Association of California Water Agencies, in suppport of respondent. Answer due within twenty days.
Aug 10 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
  League of California Cities, California State Association of Counties and Association of California Water Agencies, in support of respondent. Answer due within twenty days.
Aug 10 2006Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Pacific Legal Foundation, in support of appellant Answer due within twenty days.
Aug 10 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
  Pacific Legal Foundation in support of appellant.
Aug 10 2006Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Sullivan, Workman & Dee, LLP, in support of appellant. Answer due within twenty days.
Aug 10 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
  Sullivan, Workman & Dee, LLP, in support of appellant.
Aug 10 2006Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Pacific Justice Institute
Aug 10 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
  Pacific Justice Institute in support of appellant, answer due within twenty days.
Aug 11 2006Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Calleguas Municipal Water District
Aug 11 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
  Callegus Municipal Water District, in support of respondent. answer due within twenty days.
Aug 21 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  to AC brief of Scott E. Jenny Respondent The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California Attorneys Kenneth B. Bley, etal
Aug 30 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  Respondent The MWD to brief of Roger M. Sullivan and Gray A. Kovacic
Aug 30 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  Respondent The MWD to brief of Pacific Legal Foundation
Aug 30 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  Respondent The MWD to brief of Pacific Justice Institute and Palmieri, Tyler, Wiener, Wilhelm & Waldron LLP on behalf of Campus Crusade for Christ.
Aug 31 2006Received:
  Application to file a consolidated anser to multiple amicus curiae briefs. Appellant, Campus Crusade, et al. , along with brief.
Sep 6 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  one consolidated brief of Appellant Campus Crusade, et. al., to Amicus Curiae briefs of League of Calif. Cities, Calif. State Assoc. of Counties, Assoc. of. Calif. Water Agencies. Callegus Muni. Water District, and Municipal Water Dist. of Orange County. Filed with permission.
May 2 2007Case ordered on calendar
  to be argued on Tuesday, May 29, at 1:00 p.m., in San Francisco
May 14 2007Received:
  application for permission to have an exhibit sent to the court by Keneth B. Bley, counsel for respondent
May 17 2007Request for Extended Media coverage Filed
  by James Gualtieri of the California Channel.
May 17 2007Request for extended media coverage denied
  The request for extended media coverage, filed by The California Channel, on May 17, 2007, is hereby denied.
May 17 2007Filed:
  Exhibits 116, a memorandum from James M. Roddy, Executive Officer, to the Local Agency formation Commission of San Bernardino County, from counsel Kenneth B. Bley
May 29 2007Cause argued and submitted
 
Jul 20 2007Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
 
Jul 23 2007Opinion filed: Affirmed in part, reversed in part
  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, matter is remanded to Court of Appeal Opinion by: Baxter, J -----joined by: George, C.J., Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, Corrigan, JJ.
Aug 7 2007Rehearing petition filed
  Respondent The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California Attorney Kenneth B. Bley, etal
Aug 10 2007Time extended to consider modification or rehearing
  The time for granting or denying rehearing in the above-entitled case is hereby extneded to and including October 21, 2007, or the date upon which rehearing is either granted or denied, whichever occurs first.
Aug 15 2007Answer to rehearing petition filed
  Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc. and Del Rosa Mutual Water Company, defendants/appellants Norman E. Matteoni and Peggy M. O'Laughlin, Matteoni, O'Laughlin & Hechtman.
Sep 12 2007Rehearing denied
  The request for modification of the opinion is denied.
Nov 5 2007Remittitur issued (civil case)
 
Nov 19 2007Received:
  receipt for remittitur from court of appeal

Briefs
May 19 2006Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Jun 16 2006Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Jul 10 2006Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
Aug 1 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Aug 10 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Aug 10 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Aug 10 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Aug 10 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Aug 10 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Aug 10 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Aug 11 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Aug 21 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
Aug 30 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
Aug 30 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
Aug 30 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
Sep 6 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
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