Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 4/17/08

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

JON MAYS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
S149455
v.
Ct.App. 2/5 B188527
CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,
Los Angeles County
Defendants and Respondents. )
Super. Ct. No. BS 090169

This case concerns the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act.
(Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.)1 Section 3304, subdivision (d) (section 3304(d)),
provides a limitations period specifying that “no punitive action” may be imposed
upon any public safety officer for alleged misconduct unless the public agency
investigating the allegations “complete[s] its investigation and notif[ies] the public
safety officer of its proposed disciplinary action” within one year of discovering
the alleged misconduct. We granted review to address the question of whether the
notice required by section 3304(d) is satisfied by informing an accused officer,
within the statutory one-year period, that the agency proposes that certain
misconduct charges “be adjudicated by a Board of Rights.”

1
Our opinion refers to this statute by its commonly-used name, the Peace
Officers Bill of Rights Act or POBRA. All further statutory references are to the
Government Code unless otherwise indicated.

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In the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), a “Board of Rights” is an
administrative tribunal charged under the Los Angeles City Charter (L.A. Charter)
with the adjudication of charges of police officer misconduct. (L.A. Charter,
§ 1070(a).) At the conclusion of a Board of Rights hearing, the board is required
to make a finding of “guilty” or “not guilty” on each charge and to prescribe, for
any positive finding of misconduct, a penalty from a specified range of
disciplinary options including reprimand, suspension, demotion, and dismissal.
(Id., § 1070(n).) The Los Angeles Chief of Police (Chief of Police) has the
discretion to accept or reduce, but not to increase, any punishment recommended
by the Board of Rights. (Id., § 1070(p).)
The Court of Appeal held that a notice informing plaintiff that the LAPD
was proposing to the Chief of Police that several counts of misconduct “be
adjudicated by a Board of Rights” failed to comply with section 3304(d) because
the notice did not specifically identify any contemplated punishment or discipline.
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon language from Sanchez v. City of
Los Angeles (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1069 (Sanchez). The Court of Appeal also
concluded that a second notice subsequently provided to plaintiff, although
sufficiently specific, was served upon him too late — slightly more than one year
after discovery of the alleged misconduct. Accordingly, the appellate court
directed the trial court to issue a writ of mandate setting aside the discipline (a
written reprimand) that ultimately was imposed upon plaintiff for the misconduct
at issue.
We conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in interpreting section 3304(d)
to require notice of specific proposed punishment. To the contrary, the notice
contemplated by the language and context of section 3304(d) is simply notice that
the public agency, having completed its investigation into the alleged misconduct
within the statutory period, has decided that it may take disciplinary action against
2

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the officer for specified misconduct. Although the agency is not precluded from
proposing specific discipline at that time, it is not required by section 3304(d) to
do so. A notice informing an officer of a proposed Board of Rights adjudication
not only informs him or her that disciplinary action may be taken as the result of
the investigation into the alleged misconduct — the notice required by the
statute — but also identifies the procedural mechanism by which the officer’s
punishment, if any, will be determined. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is
therefore reversed.
I.
We provide only a very brief summary of the facts of this case sufficient to
enable us to address the question upon which review was granted. On July 23,
2002, plaintiff, Sergeant Jon Mays, received a written form entitled “Notice of
Proposed Disciplinary Action” from his employer, the LAPD. The notice and
related materials advised plaintiff that he faced disciplinary charges for, among
other things, failing to (1) adequately secure confidential department materials or
(2) promptly report their loss.2 This form listed four “penalties” that could be
proposed to the Chief of Police for misconduct involving sworn tenured
employees: (1) suspension for a specified period of days; (2) demotion to a
specified rank; (3) suspension for a specified period of days plus demotion to a
specified rank; or (4) “[t]hat the matter be adjudicated by a Board of Rights.”3

2
These charges arose out of allegations that plaintiff (1) lost internal affairs
documents when the documents were taken from his automobile during a burglary
that occurred when the vehicle was parked in the driveway of his residence and
(2) failed promptly to report the loss. Defendants concede that this alleged
misconduct, which is the subject of the reprimand at issue, was discovered by the
LAPD on July 26, 2001.
3
Pursuant to the LAPD manual, adjudication by a Board of Rights is itself
characterized as a “penalty” that a commanding officer may recommend when a
(Footnote continued on next page.)
3

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Only the last option was checked on the form provided to plaintiff.4 Accordingly,
the notice informed plaintiff that the LAPD was proposing to the Chief of Police

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

disciplinary complaint against a sworn employee is sustained. (See 3 LAPD 2007
1st Quarter Manual, §§ 820.30, 825.10 (LAPD Manual).) Generally, LAPD
officers cannot be “suspended, demoted in rank, suspended and demoted in rank,
removed, or otherwise separated from the service of the department . . . except for
good and sufficient cause shown upon a finding of guilty of the specific charge or
charges . . . after a full, fair, and impartial hearing” before a Board of Rights.
(L.A. Charter, § 1070(a).) Exceptions to this rule allow the Chief of Police to
(1) temporarily relieve an officer from duty pending a hearing before and decision
by a Board of Rights, (2) suspend an officer for 22 working days (or less) with
loss of pay and with or without reprimand, (3) demote an officer with or without
suspension or reprimand, or both, or (4) demote the member in rank, with or
without temporary relief from duty or cancellation of such relief from duty. (Id.,
§ 1070(b).) Even in circumstances falling within the exceptions, however, the
actions of the Chief of Police are subject to predisciplinary procedures otherwise
required by law and to the officer’s right to file an application for a hearing before
a Board of Rights which, if invoked, automatically stays any suspension and/or
demotion. (Id., § 1070(b).) If the Chief of Police decides that a suspension of
more than 22 working days or termination is appropriate, the case automatically
proceeds to a Board of Rights hearing.

A Board of Rights hearing is considered a de novo hearing. (L.A. Charter,
§ 1070(f).) Comprised of two officers with the rank of captain or above and one
civilian, a Board of Rights has the authority to examine witnesses under oath and
compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents. (Id.,
§ 1070(h), (j).) In a Board of Rights proceeding, the LAPD has the burden of
proving each charge by a preponderance of the evidence, and the accused officer
has the right to appear in person (and by counsel or a representative, at the
officer’s expense) and defend against the charges, and may produce witnesses and
cross-examine witnesses. (Id., § 1070(l), (m).)
4
The notice further informed plaintiff of his right to representation prior to
engaging in discussion of the matter, of the opportunity to respond either orally or
in writing by a certain date, and that his response would be reviewed and
forwarded to the Chief of Police for evaluation prior to adjudication of the matter.
4

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that the disciplinary charges alleged against plaintiff go forward and be
adjudicated by a Board of Rights.
Section 1070(n) of the L.A. Charter sets forth the possible punishment that
may be prescribed by a Board of Rights upon a positive finding of officer
misconduct. These options range from reprimand to removal. (See L.A. Charter,
§ 1070(n); Board of Rights Manual (12th ed. 2005) § 272.30.) But, following a
series of procedural complications that are not relevant to the issue before us, two
of the charges of alleged misconduct contained in the July 23, 2002 notice — that
is (1) the failure to secure confidential materials adequately and (2) the failure to
report their loss promptly — ultimately were not submitted to a Board of Rights
hearing, but instead were sustained by the Chief of Police in the official letter of
reprimand at issue in this case.5

5
These complications include the following. On August 12, 2002, several
weeks after providing him with the initial July 23 notice, the LAPD served
plaintiff with a second document entitled “Complaint and Relief from Duty,
Suspension or Demotion.” That document referred to both of the instances of
alleged misconduct set forth in the July 23 notice (including the failure to secure
confidential materials adequately or promptly report their loss), and also to an
additional charge relating to false statements allegedly made by plaintiff during an
official investigation. It further informed plaintiff that, on the basis of this alleged
misconduct, he was being demoted in rank effective August 17, 2002, and was not
being relieved of duty “pending a hearing before and decision by [a Board of
Rights]” on the charges.

Only the charge relating to alleged false statements proceeded to a Board of
Rights, however. The remaining charges (including the charges relating to the
failure to secure confidential materials adequately or promptly report their loss)
were sustained in the reprimand that is the subject of the present appeal. The
Chief of Police signed the reprimand on February 4, 2003, but apparently it was
not formally served on plaintiff while the false-statement charge was awaiting a
Board of Rights hearing. On May 12, 2003, the Board of Rights found plaintiff
“not guilty” of that charge. Shortly thereafter, on May 22, 2003, the LAPD served
plaintiff with the challenged reprimand.
5

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Plaintiff challenged the reprimand by initiating an administrative appeal
and filing a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court. In the writ
proceeding, plaintiff asserted, among other claims, that the notice he received on
July 23, 2002, did not satisfy section 3304(d), because no specific penalty was
mentioned. The trial court denied the petition, finding that plaintiff was
adequately notified within one year of the “proposed disciplinary action,” as
required by section 3304(d) when he received the July 23, 2002 notice.
The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding in relevant part that the notice
received by plaintiff on July 23, 2002, although given within one year of
discovery of the alleged misconduct, was insufficient to satisfy section 3304(d),
because it informed him only of the action proposed to the Chief of Police that the
misconduct be adjudicated by a Board of Rights, and “did not specify any
‘proposed disciplinary action’ as explicitly required by section [3304(d)].” We
granted review to address the Court of Appeal’s holding that section 3304(d)
requires that an accused officer be notified of a specific proposed discipline.
II.
This case calls upon us to interpret a provision of the Peace Officers Bill of
Rights Act. Initially enacted in 1976 (Stats. 1976, ch. 465, § 1, p. 1202), POBRA
“sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace
officers [citation] by the public entities which employ them. It is a catalogue of
the minimum rights [citation] the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable
employer-employee relations [citation].” (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128,
135; see also White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 681 [noting
that POBRA “is concerned primarily with affording individual police officers
certain procedural rights during the course of proceedings which might lead to the
imposition of penalties against them”].) The various procedural protections
provided by POBRA “balance the public interest in maintaining the efficiency and
6

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integrity of the police force with the police officer’s interest in receiving fair
treatment.” (Jackson v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 899, 909
(Jackson), citing Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena (1990) 51
Cal.3d 564, 569.)
Section 3304 provides a number of procedural rights for public safety
officers who may be accused of misconduct in the course of their employment.
Subdivision (d), providing for a limitations period, states in pertinent part:
“Except [as otherwise provided,] no punitive action, nor denial of promotion on
grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken for any act, omission or other
allegation of misconduct if the investigation of the allegation is not completed
within one year of the public agency’s discovery . . . of an act, omission, or other
misconduct. This one-year limitation period shall apply only if the act, omission,
or other misconduct occurred on or after January 1, 1998. In the event that the
public agency determines that discipline may be taken, it shall complete its
investigation and notify the public safety officer of its proposed disciplinary action
within that year, except [as specifically provided].” (§ 3304(d).)6
At issue in this appeal is the meaning of the language in section 3304(d)
requiring a public agency to “notify the public safety officer of its proposed
disciplinary action.” Defendants contend that the quoted language requires only
that notice of the misconduct charges be provided. Plaintiff and the Court of
Appeal, however, view section 3304(d) as mandating notice of the specific
punishment or discipline that is contemplated for the charged misconduct. As we

6
In addition to satisfying the requirements of section 3304(d), a public entity
must accord constitutional procedural due process before depriving an officer of
any significant property interest in his or her employment. (See Skelly v. State
Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 215; Burrell v. City of Los Angeles (1989)
209 Cal.App.3d 568, 577.)
7

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shall explain, we believe the Court of Appeal’s interpretation is not consistent with
the language or purpose of the statute.
In construing statutes, “our fundamental task is ‘to ascertain the intent of
the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ [Citations.] We
begin by examining the statutory language because it generally is the most reliable
indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.] We give the language its usual and
ordinary meaning, and ‘[i]f there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers
meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.’ [Citation.]
If, however, the statutory language is ambiguous, ‘we may resort to extrinsic
sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative
history.’ [Citation.] Ultimately we choose the construction that comports most
closely with the apparent intent of the lawmakers, with a view to promoting rather
than defeating the general purpose of the statute. [Citations.]” (Allen v. Sully-
Miller Contracting Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 222, 227.)
Viewing the terms of section 3304(d) as a whole, it appears clear that the
fundamental purpose of this provision is to place a one-year limitation on
investigations of officer misconduct. The one-year period runs from the time the
misconduct is discovered. Once the public agency decides that discipline may be
warranted (“that discipline may be taken” (ibid.)), it must so inform the public
safety officer (must “notify the public safety officer of its proposed disciplinary
action” (ibid.)). In this context, it seems most reasonable to interpret the language
“proposed disciplinary action” as referring to the agency’s determination that
“discipline may be taken.” (Ibid.) Not only completion of the investigation, but
also the requisite notification to the officer, must be accomplished within a year of
discovery of the misconduct. This interpretation is consistent with the apparent
purpose of the subdivision, which is to ensure that an officer will not be faced with
the uncertainty of a lingering investigation, but will know within one year of the
8

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agency’s discovery of the officer’s act or omission that it may be necessary for the
officer to respond in the event he or she wishes to defend against possible
discipline.
A contrary conclusion — that section 3304(d) requires notification of the
specific discipline contemplated by the public agency — prematurely would
impose a requirement that is unreasonable in view of the timing of the notice.
Section 3304(d) refers to an agency decision that “discipline may be taken.”
(Italics added.) The use of the conditional word “may” demonstrates the
preliminary nature of the proceedings at the time the notice is required under
subdivision (d). It would be anomalous to require the public agency to reach a
conclusion regarding potential discipline prior to any predisciplinary proceedings
or response on the part of the officer. (See Sulier v. State Personnel Bd. (2004)
125 Cal.App.4th 21, 29 (Sulier) [“the notice contemplated by section 3304(d) is
given at a time when the disciplinary authority has not necessarily committed itself
to disciplining the employee”].) Such a requirement also could have the practical
effect of always leading the public agency to propose the maximum punishment in
order to ensure it retained the full range of options in the subsequent disciplinary
proceedings.
Another subdivision of section 3304 — subdivision (f) — strongly supports
the foregoing interpretation of section 3304(d). Subdivision (f) provides: “If,
after investigation and any predisciplinary response or procedure, the public
agency decides to impose discipline, the public agency shall notify the public
safety officer in writing of its decision to impose discipline, including the date that
the discipline will be imposed, within 30 days of its decision, except if the public
safety officer is unavailable for discipline.” (Ibid.) Thus, it appears that,
ordinarily, a predisciplinary response and/or hearing will occur subsequent to the
investigation but prior to the agency’s conclusion regarding the specific discipline
9

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to be imposed. Once the agency follows its relevant procedural mechanism and
decides the level of specific discipline it intends to impose, it then has 30 days to
so notify the officer. (See Sulier, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 29-30 [a formal
notice of adverse action containing a statement of the nature of such action is
required when the public agency decides to impose discipline and serves a formal
notice pursuant to § 3304, subd. (f)].) When the two subdivisions are read
together, it is evident that section 3304(d) limits the duration of the investigation
and provides, through its notice requirement that discipline may be imposed, a
starting point for predisciplinary responses or procedures, whereas subdivision (f)
is directed at providing the officer with written notice of the discipline that the
agency — after considering the officer’s predisciplinary response — has decided
to impose.
Another subdivision of section 3304 also merits consideration.
Subdivision (b) provides: “No punitive action, nor denial of promotion on
grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken by any public agency against any
public safety officer who has successfully completed the probationary period . . .
without providing the public safety officer with an opportunity for administrative
appeal.” (Ibid.) Section 3304 itself, however, does not provide a mechanism for
administrative appeal; rather, public agencies employ a number of locally created
mechanisms, including those established by collective bargaining agreements, for
that purpose. There is no indication in the statute that the local mechanism cannot
provide for a determination of the precise discipline at a hearing occurring
subsequent to the notification envisioned by section 3304(d).
We reiterate that section 3304(d) functions as a limitations period. (See
Moore v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 373, 381; Breslin v. City
and County of San Francisco (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1075; Parra v. City
and County of San Francisco (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 977, 988, fn. 7; Jackson,
10

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supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 909.) Limitations statutes ordinarily establish the
period in which an action must be initiated (see, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., §§ 335-
340.6; Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18
Cal.4th 739, 755-756; see also Jackson, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 909
[applying ordinary principles governing limitations statutes to § 3304(d)]), but the
outcome of the claim or charges generally remains to be adjudicated pursuant to
separate statutes governing the specified subsequent procedure. It would be
inconsistent with the general function of limitations statutes to treat the limitations
provision contained in section 3304(d) as requiring the public agency to reach a
firm conclusion with respect to the discipline or punishment actually intended to
be imposed at a point ordinarily viewed as the commencement of an action.
Nor is there any indication in section 3304(d)’s legislative history that the
Legislature intended to require that public agencies propose a specific punishment
at the stage when an investigation has been completed but disciplinary
proceedings have yet to commence. Indeed, that history reveals no discussion or
debate concerning the meaning of section 3304(d)’s phrase “notify the public
safety officer of its proposed disciplinary action.” Rather, the history confirms
that section 3304(d) was intended to function primarily as a limitation upon
investigations of misconduct. The express purpose of the bill that encompasses
what is now section 3304(d) was “to enact specific time limits and exceptions for
investigating alleged acts or omissions which may lead to punitive actions, as
specified.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of
Assem. Bill No. 1436 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 17, 1997, p. 3,
italics added.) Relevant committee reports express concern about the length of
disciplinary investigations and focus upon the need to conclude those
investigations in a timely fashion. (See, e.g., Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on
Assem. Bill No. 1436 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) June 10, 1997, p. 4 [“ ‘it is unfair to
11

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our peace officer[s] not to investigate and bring charges or dismiss the action
within a reasonable time,’ ” and “ ‘[o]ne year is the agreed-upon time by both
labor and management’ ”].) There is no documented discussion of the specific
content of the notice to be provided to the officer once the investigation is
completed and discipline is being contemplated. Accordingly, in enacting section
3304(d), it is clear that the Legislature was focused upon preventing a perceived
lack of fairness caused by a drawn-out investigatory process — and not with
requiring that officers receive notice of specific intended discipline at that early
stage of the process.
Had the Legislature intended section 3304(d) to require public agencies to
propose precise disciplinary consequences or punishment for alleged misconduct,
we believe that it would have made this intention clear in the language of the
provision, or at least that such an intent would appear in the legislative reports
concerning the provision. And yet we find no such indication in either source. In
light of the circumstance that section 3304(d) is concerned primarily with setting a
one-year deadline for the completion of the public agency’s investigation of
allegations of officer misconduct, it is more reasonable to conclude that the notice
it contemplates is intended only to inform the officer that the agency has found the
allegations to be sufficiently serious that they may subject the officer to discipline.
In the present case, plaintiff received notice of the misconduct charges and
that the LAPD was proposing to the Chief of Police an adjudication of the charges
by a Board of Rights. Notice of charges and of a proposed Board of Rights
adjudication informs the officer that the public agency is pursuing disciplinary
action. Under the L.A. Charter, a Board of Rights must indicate a penalty from a
specified range of disciplinary options (dismissal, demotion, suspension, or
written reprimand) for any officer it finds “guilty” of misconduct; the
recommended penalty then is imposed or reduced by the Chief of Police. (L.A.
12

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Charter, § 1070(n), (p).) Indeed, notice of proposed adjudication by a Board of
Rights not only fulfills the statutory requirement of section 3304(d) by notifying
the officer that “discipline may be taken” for the alleged misconduct, but also
informs him or her of the intended procedural mechanism under which it is
proposed that any potential punishment be determined.
In construing section 3304(d) to require substantially more detail
concerning contemplated discipline than is required by statute, the Court of
Appeal focused upon language in Sanchez, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th 1069, stating
that section 3304(d) requires the public agency “to notify the officer of the specific
disciplinary action that is being proposed, not merely to advise the officer that
some disciplinary action is being contemplated.” (Sanchez, supra, at p. 1081.) In
Sanchez, the department recommended a 20-day suspension within section
3304(d)’s one-year period following the police department’s discovery of the
operative facts giving rise to the disciplinary action. With respect to
“ ‘Demotion/Downgrade Considerations,’ ” the report at that time stated
“ ‘None.’ ” (Id. at p. 1072.) Subsequent to the expiration of the one-year period,
however, the department decided to pursue a downgrade in addition to a
suspension.
The appellate court in Sanchez held that the notice of proposed disciplinary
action, which specifically proposed a 20-day suspension and rejected a
downgrade, was insufficient to notify the officer that he faced a possible
downgrade — and thus further held that the resulting punitive action was untimely
under section 3304(d). (Sanchez, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1080-1083.)
Although the court appeared to believe that section 3304(d) required notice of “the
specific disciplinary action that is being proposed” (Sanchez, supra, at p. 1081),
the import of the case is that the agency actively misled the officer by later
pursuing a downgrade that had been affirmatively eschewed in the section 3304(d)
13

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notice. Nonetheless, to the extent Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 140
Cal.App.4th 1069, purports to interpret section 3304(d) to require notice of
specific discipline rather than notice that disciplinary action may be taken, it is
disapproved.
III.
We conclude that the notice contemplated by section 3304(d) is notice that
the public agency, having completed its investigation into the alleged misconduct
within the statutory period, has decided that it may take disciplinary action against
the officer for specified misconduct. A notice proposing that alleged misconduct be
adjudicated by a Board of Rights constitutes sufficient notice of proposed
disciplinary action under section 3304(d).
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is remanded
to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
GEORGE, C. J.
WE CONCUR:

KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
14

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Mays v. City of Los Angeles
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 145 Cal.App.4h 932
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S149455
Date Filed: April 17, 2008
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Dzintra I. Janavs

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Diane Marchant for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Silver, Hadden, Silver, Wexler & Levine, Stephen H. Silver, Enrique A. Hernandez, Susan Silver and
Elizabeth Silver Tourgeman for Los Angeles Protective League and California Association of Highway
Patrolmen as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Clishman & Sortor, William H. Sortor and Lawrence J. Friedman for Peace Officers Research Association
of California Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.


__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, Claudia McGee Henry, Assistant City Attorney, and Gerald
Masahiro Sato, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Diane Marchant
1308 West 8th Street, Suite 206
Los Angeles, CA 90017
(213) 531-2327

Stephen H. Silver
Silver, Hadden, Silver, Wexler & Levine
1428 Second Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2161
(310) 393-1486

Gerald Masahiro Sato
Deputy City Attorney
900 City Hall East
200 N. Main Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012-4129
(213) 978-7734

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Petition for review after the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in an action for writ of administrative mandate. This case presents the following issue: Does the Public Safety Officers' Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, section 3300 et seq.) require that an officer facing discipline be provided with notice of both the alleged offense of which he or she is accused and the potential punishment within one year of discovery of the alleged misconduct?

Opinion Information

Date:	Citation:	Docket Number:	Category:	Status:	Cross Referenced Cases:
Thu, 04/17/2008	43 Cal. 4th 313, 180 P.3d 935, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 891	S149455	Review - Civil Appeal	closed; remittitur issued	QUIHUIS v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES (S161544)

Disposition
Apr 17 2008	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Jan 11 2007	Received:   City of Los Angeles and William Bratton, Defendants and Respondents Gerald M. Sato, Deputy City Attorney ** Request for Depublication ** scheduled to be filed January 17
Jan 17 2007	Request for depublication filed (initial case event)
Jan 18 2007	Opposition filed   Jon Mays, appellant Diane Marchant, counsel
Jan 24 2007	Petition for review filed   Respondents City of Los Angeles and William J. Bratton Deputy City Attorney Gerald M. Sato
Jan 29 2007	Received Court of Appeal record
Feb 8 2007	Answer to petition for review filed   Appellant Jon Mays Attorney Diane Marchant
Feb 16 2007	Reply to answer to petition filed   City Of Los Angeles & William J. Bratton, respondents Gerald M. Sato, Deputy City Attorney
Mar 14 2007	Petition for review granted (civil case)   Votes: George, Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno and Corrigan, JJ.
Mar 14 2007	Letter sent to:   Counsel regarding Certification of Interested Entities or Persons.
Mar 22 2007	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   Attorney Diane Marchant for Appellant, Mays.
Mar 29 2007	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   Attorney Gerald Sato for respondent City of L.A.
Apr 10 2007	Opening brief on the merits filed   Respondents City of Los Angeles/Williams Bratton
Apr 30 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed   Appellant, Jon Mays
May 17 2007	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   Respondents City of Los Angeles and William Bratton Deputy City Attorney Gerald Masahiro Sato
Jun 11 2007	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   Los Angeles Police Protective League, Calif Assn of Highway Patrolmen and Silver, Hadden, Silver, Wexler & Levine [in support of appellant] Attorney Stephen H. Silver
Jun 15 2007	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   Peace Officers Research Association of California Legal Defense Fund in support of Appellant by William Sortor, counsel
Jun 20 2007	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   The application of Los Angeles Police Protective League, California Association of Highway Patrolmen and the Law Firm of Silver, Hadden, Silver Wexler & Levine for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellant is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Jun 20 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed   Los Angeles Police Protective League, California Association of Highway Patrolmen and the Law Firm of Silver, Hadden, Silver Wexler & Levine in support of appellant by Stephen Silver, counsel
Jun 20 2007	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   The application of Peace Officers Research Association of California Legal Defense Fund for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellant is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Jun 20 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed   Peace Officers Research Association of California Legal Defense Fund in support of appellant. by William H. Sortor, counsel
Jun 27 2007	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   to AC Peace Officers Research Assn of California Legal Defense Fund by Respondents City of Los Angeles & William Bratton Deputy City Attorney Gerald Masahiro Sato
Jun 27 2007	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   to AC Los Angeles Police Protective League, etal by Respondents City of Los Angeles & William Bratton Deputy City Attorney Gerald Masahiro Sato
Feb 6 2008	Case ordered on calendar   to be argued Wednesday, March 5, 2008, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
Feb 11 2008	Filed letter from:   Diane Marchant, counsel for appellant Jon Mays, requesting to share 15 minutes of time with amici curiae Los Angeles Police Protective League et al.
Feb 13 2008	Order filed   The request of counsel for appellant in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of appellant at oral argument is hereby granted. The request of appellant to allocate to amici curiae Los Angeles Police Protective League et al. 15 minutes of appellant's 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
Feb 25 2008	Received:   Additional authorities for oral argument Jon Mays, appellant Diane Merchant, counsel
Mar 5 2008	Cause argued and submitted
Apr 16 2008	Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
Apr 17 2008	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   and the matter remanded to the Court of Appeal Majority opinion by George, C.J. ---------------joined by: Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, Corrigan, JJ.
May 23 2008	Returned record   1 doghouse shipped to Tommie Wright on Thursday, 6/5/08 via UPS Ground.
May 23 2008	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Jun 5 2008	Note:   case record being sent to L.A. Supreme Ct. office
Jun 9 2008	Received:   one small box containing record [1 4" dh] delivered to Jed Belcher CA-2/5.

Briefs
Apr 10 2007	Opening brief on the merits filed
Apr 30 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed
May 17 2007	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Jun 20 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed
Jun 20 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed
Jun 27 2007	Response to amicus curiae brief filed
Jun 27 2007	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

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