IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
In re the MARRIAGE of MARY ANN and )
DARRIN FELLOWS.
)
MARY ANN MOYSE,
Respondent,
S127874
v.
) Ct.App.
3
C044636
DARRIN FELLOWS,
Shasta
County
Appellant.
) Super.Ct.No.
146580
We consider whether Family Code section 4502, subdivision (c),1 applies
retroactively and bars a parent from relying on laches to defend an action to
enforce a child support order. We hold that it does and affirm the Court of
Appeal.
I. Facts And Procedural Background
In June 1985, a New York court ordered Darrin Fellows to pay $50.00 a
week in child support to Mary Ann Moyse. Over 17 years later, Moyse registered
the child support order in California. She alleged that Fellows had never made
1
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise
indicated.
support payments and owed her $26,000 plus interest. Fellows sought to vacate
the registration asserting, among other things, a laches defense.
The trial court denied Fellows’s motion to vacate, confirmed the
registration, and ordered arrearage payments of $20,800. The court noted that
Moyse “testified that no child support payments were made” while Fellows
“testified [that] all child support payments were made.” Both parties “called
corroborating witnesses supporting their respective testimony.” The court found
that Fellows failed to establish, “by a preponderance of the evidence, that the child
support was paid.”
The trial court applied section 4502, subdivision (c) (section 4502(c)),
retroactively and disallowed the laches defense. The section, added in 2002,
provides: “In an action to enforce a judgment for child, family, or spousal
support, the defendant may raise, and the court may consider, the defense of laches
only with respect to any portion of the judgment owed to the state.” Although the
court determined that Fellows had “met his burden of proof as to the defense of
laches,” it concluded that the defense was statutorily unavailable.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, declining to follow In re Marriage of
Garcia (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 140 (Garcia), which held to the contrary. Instead,
relying on Rice v. Clark (2002) 28 Cal.4th 89 (Rice), the court concluded that
section 4 of the Family Code demonstrates a general legislative intent that future
Family Code amendments “are to be retroactively applied.” The court also noted
that the Legislature’s intent to right a “perceived injustice . . . dictates the
retroactive application of section 4502(c).” Finally, the court concluded that
subdivisions (f) and (g) of section 4 did not compel a contrary result and that
retroactive application did not violate due process.
We granted review to resolve the conflict between Garcia, supra, 111
Cal.App.4th 140, and the Court of Appeal opinion here.
II. Discussion
A. Retroactive Application Of Section 4502(c)
If, in light of the lapse of time and other relevant circumstances, a court
concludes that a party’s failure to assert a right has caused prejudice to an adverse
party, the court may apply the equitable defense of laches to bar further assertion
of the right. (Nealis v. Carlson (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 65, 69.) The parties agree
that section 4502(c), by its terms, bars the laches defense in a private action to
enforce a child support order. They disagree over its application here. We review
the retroactive application of the statute de novo. (In re Marriage of McClellan
(2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 247, 254.)2
1. Section 4502(c) Changed Existing Law
As a general rule, statutes do not operate retroactively3 “unless the
Legislature plainly intended them to do so.” (Western Security Bank v. Superior
Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243 (Western Security).) Nonetheless, “a statute that
merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing law does not operate retrospectively
even if applied to transactions predating its enactment.” (Ibid.) Such a statute
“may be applied to transactions predating its enactment without being considered
retroactive” because it “is merely a statement of what the law has always been.”
(Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 599, 603.)
In determining whether a statute clarified or changed the law, we give “due
consideration” to the Legislature’s intent in enacting that statute. (Western
Security, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 244.) The Legislature’s declaration of an existing
2
The parties do not dispute that section 4502(c) was retroactively applied
here.
3
We note that the cases use the terms “retroactively” and “retrospectively”
interchangeably.
statute’s meaning, while not dispositive, is a factor entitled to consideration.
(McClung v. Employment Development Dept. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 473
(McClung).) We look to “the surrounding circumstances” as well as the
Legislature’s intent when determining whether a statute changed or merely
clarified the law. (Western Security, at p. 243.)
Here, the Legislature intended to change the law. Explaining the need for
the statute, both the Senate Rules Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee
observed that “the equitable defense of laches remains applicable in an action to
enforce a support order.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis
of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 2, 2002, p. 2; Sen.
Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) May 7,
2002, p. 2.) 4 According to the Senate Rules Committee, the enactment of section
4502(c) would “change that” by “substantially restricting the laches defense in
support enforcement cases.” (Assem. Floor Analysis, 3d reading analysis of Sen.
Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 2, 2002, p. 3, italics
added.) Thus, section 4502(c) would “[s]et[] forth new statutory restrictions on
the use of the common law defense of laches in support enforcement actions.”
(Assem. Judiciary Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.)
June 25, 2002, p. 2, italics added.) In doing so, it would close “a loophole that
allow[ed] child support obligors to evade responsibility for their debts.” (Sen.
Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) May 7,
2002, p. 3.) “By amending the statute to close the loophole, the Legislature sought
4
(See also Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-
2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 19, 2002, p. 6 [“laches . . . remains a viable
equitable defense in a subsequent enforcement action to collect past-due child or
spousal support”].)
to change the law.” (City of West Hollywood v. 1112 Investment Co. (2003) 105
Cal.App.4th 1134, 1145.)
A review of the law before the enactment of section 4502(c) confirms that
the statute did effect a change. “Prior to 1992, judgments for child and spousal
support expired within a stated period of years.” (In re Marriage of Fogarty &
Rasbeary (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1359 (Fogarty).) California courts had
recognized a laches defense in spousal support cases but held that the defense did
not apply to claims for arrearages brought within the statutory enforcement period.
(See, e.g., DiMarco v. DiMarco (1963) 60 Cal.2d 387, 394; Leiden v. Hudson
(1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 72, 74-75.) In 1992 and 1993, however, the Legislature
made all support orders enforceable “until paid in full.” (Civ. Code, former §
4384.5, now Fam. Code, § 4502, subd. (a).)5 In doing so, the Legislature cast
some doubt on the viability of the laches defense in support actions.
However, the court In re Marriage of Plescia (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 252,
262 (Plescia), held that the legislative changes in 1992 and 1993 did not eliminate
the laches defense in actions for spousal support arrearages. Three years later, the
Fogarty court followed Plescia and recognized laches in actions for child support
5
In 1992, the Legislature repealed and reenacted Civil Code former section
4384.5, to provide: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a judgment for
child or spousal support, including a judgment for reimbursement or other
arrearages, is exempt from any requirement that judgments be renewed. A
judgment for child or spousal support, including all lawful interest and penalties
computed thereon, is enforceable until paid in full.” (Stats. 1992, ch. 718, § 3, pp.
3319-3320.)
The Legislature later moved this provision to Family Code section 4502,
subdivision (a), which provided: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a
judgment for child, family, or spousal support, including a judgment for
reimbursement or other arrearages, is exempt from any requirement that
judgments be renewed. . . .” (As added by Stats. 1993, ch. 219, § 143, p. 1650.)
arrearages. (Fogarty, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1364.) These precedents were
consistently followed until the enactment of section 4502(c). 6 The Legislature
may certainly amend a statute to overrule a judicial decision. But, in doing so it
changes the law. (See McClung, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 473-474.)
In re Marriage of Cordero (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 653, does not alter our
conclusion. The Cordero court disagreed with the reasoning of Plescia, supra, 59
Cal.App.4th 252, and opined that support orders less than 10 years old would not
be subject to a laches defense. (Cordero, at pp. 664-665.) The court
acknowledged, however, that its observation was dictum. (Id. at p. 666, fn. 17.)
Thus, there is nothing to suggest that the Legislature enacted section 4502(c) in
response to any controversy created by Cordero on this point. Indeed, the
legislative history behind section 4502(c) is replete with references to Plescia,
Fogarty, Hamer, Dancy, and Copeman, but makes no mention of Cordero.7
Accordingly, we conclude that the Legislature enacted section 4502(c) to change
existing law, not to clarify a controversy over its interpretation.
2. The Legislature Intended That Section 4502(c) Apply Retroactively
Before section 4502(c) became effective on January 1, 2003, a viable laches
defense would have barred Moyse’s claim. The statute applies to this case
6 See
In re Marriage of Copeman (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 324, 332; In re
Marriage of Dancy (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1148; In re Marriage of Hamer
(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 712, 723.
7
See, e.g., Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen.
Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 2, 2002, pp. 2-3; Assem.
Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.)
as amended July 2, 2002, p. 1; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill
No. 1658 as amended June 19, 2002, pp. 3, 5-8; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis
of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) May 7, 2002, p. 2.
only if the Legislature intended to give it retroactive effect. We conclude that it
did.
While nothing in the language or legislative history of section 4502(c)
speaks directly to retroactive application, section 4 of the Family Code provides
guidance. The Family Code was enacted in 1992, and made operative on January
1, 1994, to create a unified statutory scheme. (Stats. 1992, ch. 162, p. 463 et seq.)
It drew together a number of statutes scattered throughout various parts of the
California codes, and enacted some new provisions. Section 4 provides that, in the
Family Code, the term “new law” describes either the enactment of the Family
Code itself, or future modifications of the code. (§ 4, subd. (a)(1)(A) & (B).)8
The term “old law” refers to the law in effect before the Family Code was adopted.
(§ 4, subd. (a)(2).)
Section 4, subdivision (c) provides: “Subject to the limitations provided in
this section, the new law applies on the operative date to all matters governed by
the new law, regardless of whether an event occurred or circumstance existed
before, on, or after the operative date, including, but not limited to,
commencement of a proceeding, making of an order, or taking of an action.”
Thus, by its terms, section 4, subdivision (c), establishes that amendments to the
Family Code apply retroactively unless otherwise provided by law.
The Law Revision Commission comment to section 4 confirms this
interpretation. The Commission explains that section 4 “applies both to the act
that enacted the Family Code and to any later act that changes the code, whether
8
Section 4, subdivision (a)(1)(A) defines “New Law” as “[t]he act that
enacted this code.” Subdivision (a)(1)(B) defines “New Law” as an “act that
makes a change in this code, whether effectuated by amendment, addition, or
repeal of a provision of this code.”
the change is effectuated by amendment, addition, or repeal of a provision of the
code.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29C West’s Ann. Fam. Code (2004 ed.)
foll. § 4, p. 7, italics added.) The comment then notes: “The general rule
prescribed in subdivision (c) is that a new law applies immediately on its operative
date to all matters, including pending proceedings,” (ibid.) and that section 4
governs the “substantive provisions” of the Family Code. (Cal. Law Revision
Com. com., at p. 8.) Thus, as a general rule, future changes to the Family Code
apply retroactively.
We reached a similar conclusion in Rice, supra, 28 Cal.4th at page 100,
where we held that the 1995 amendments to Probate Code section 21350 applied
retroactively to “instruments executed before the amendments’ effective date.”
Specifically, we found that section 3 of the Probate Code “mandates application of
the law as amended in 1995, even though the trust and will were executed prior to
that amendment’s effectiveness.” (Rice, at p. 99.) Section 4 of the Family Code is
“comparable” to section 3 of the Probate Code (Cal. Law Revision Com. com.,
29C West’s Ann. Family Code, supra, foll. § 4, p. 7) and contains virtually
identical language.9 Thus, Rice is highly persuasive and consistent with our
conclusion that section 4502(c) applies retroactively absent some exception to the
rule of retroactivity found in section 4 of the Family Code.10 In re Marriage of
9
As relevant here, Probate Code section 3, subdivision (c), states: “Subject
to the limitations provided in this section, a new law applies on the operative date
to all matters governed by the new law, regardless of whether an event occurred or
circumstance existed before, on, or after the operative date, including, but not
limited to, creation of a fiduciary relationship, death of a person, commencement
of a proceeding, making of an order, or taking of an action.”
10
We note that section 4 is a general rule, subject to numerous exceptions.
(See, e.g., § 4, subds. (d)-(h).) The Legislature may enact statutes that direct
prospective application. (§ 4, subd. (b).)
Wood (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1059 is disapproved to the extent it conflicts with
our opinion today, because the Wood court did not adequately consider the
language and history of section 4.
3. Section 4, Subdivisions (f) and (g) Do Not Bar Retroactive
Application Here
Notwithstanding the general rule of retroactivity established by section 4,
subdivision (c), Fellows contends the exceptions found subsequently in
subdivisions (f) and (g), bar such application here. The argument fails.
a. Section 4, Subdivision (f)
Subdivision (f) of section 4 provides that: “No person is liable for an action
taken before the operative date that was proper at the time the action was taken,
even though the action would be improper if taken on or after the operative date,
and the person has no duty, as a result of the enactment of the new law, to take any
step to alter the course of action or its consequences.” Fellows creatively argues
retroactive application would impose new duties on him: (1) to indefinitely
preserve written proof of his compliance with the New York support order, and (2)
to strictly comply with and refuse to orally modify the order. His contention lacks
merit.
Section 4502(c) placed no new duties on Fellows. Both before and after its
enactment, Fellows had a duty to pay his child support, and could establish
compliance through testimony alone. The elimination of a laches defense did not
create some novel proof requirement. Even before the enactment, prudence would
have counseled preservation of written payment records. Indeed, success on a
laches claim is always uncertain because it is an equitable remedy that depends on
“the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” (Austin v. Hallmark Oil Co.
(1943) 21 Cal.2d 718, 734.) Assertion of a laches defense seeks an equitable act
of grace to relieve the burden of an existing obligation. Elimination of the defense
does not create a new duty.
b. Section 4, Subdivision (g)
Subdivision (g) of section 4 is also inapplicable here. It provides that “[i]f
the new law does not apply to a matter that occurred before the operative date, the
old law continues to govern the matter notwithstanding its repeal or amendment by
the new law.” (Ibid.) According to Fellows, subdivision (g) limits the
retroactivity rule to procedural changes. He contends section 4502(c) is a
substantive change and must, therefore, apply prospectively. Nothing in the text
or history of section 4 suggests an intent to distinguish between procedural and
substantive changes in applying the rule of retroactivity. There is no reasoned
basis for adopting such a distinction especially when “California has rejected this
type of classification” in determining whether a statute has retroactive effect.
(Western Security, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 244, fn. 4.)
Instead, read together, subdivisions (c) and (g) of section 4 establish that
the “old law” will govern only if the “new law” falls within the other statutory
exceptions to the rule of retroactivity or does not apply to a “matter” previously
governed by the “old law.” Section 4502(c) does not fall within either statutory
exception and applies in this action to “enforce a judgment for child . . . support.”
Finally, in In re Marriage of Garcia (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 693, 698-699,
the court declined to apply the 1993 amendments to the Family Code retroactively
and held that the pre-1993 scheme governing support orders still controlled. In re
Marriage of Garcia, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th 693, did not, however, consider
section 4, and is disapproved to the extent it conflicts with this opinion.
B. Due Process
Even in the face of specific legislative intent, retrospective application is
impermissible if it “impairs a vested . . . right without due process of law.” (In re
Marriage of Fabian (1986) 41 Cal.3d 440, 447, codified in section 4, subdivision
(h).)11 Fellows was not denied due process.
In evaluating a due process claim, we consider two groups of factors:
(1) “ ‘[T]he significance of the state interest served by the law [and] the
importance of the retroactive application of the law to the effectuation of that
interest’ ”; and (2) “ ‘[T]he extent of reliance upon the former law, the legitimacy
of that reliance, the extent of actions taken on the basis of that reliance, and the
extent to which the retroactive application of the new law would disrupt those
actions.’ ” (In re Marriage of Heikes (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1211, 1219, quoting In re
Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 592.) These considerations support
retroactive application.
1. State Interests
Stating the need for section 4502(c), the sponsor noted “that over 2 million
children in California are owed over $19 million in unpaid support, and that ‘many
of these children fail to thrive because there are not adequate resources to meet
their basic needs.’ ” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658
(2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as introduced May 7, 2002, p. 3.) According to the
sponsor, “ ‘[t]hese non-payors are escaping justice by hiding from the child
support system for long enough to allow a defense of laches to shield them from
ever having to pay the child support they have been court-ordered to pay.’ ” (Id.,
11
Subdivision (h) of section 4 states: “If a party shows, and the court
determines, that application of a particular provision of the new law or of the old
law in the manner required by this section or by the new law would substantially
interfere with the effective conduct of the proceedings or the rights of the parties
or other interested persons in connection with an event that occurred or
circumstance that existed before the operative date, the court may, notwithstanding
this section or the new law, apply either the new law or the old law to the extent
reasonably necessary to mitigate the substantial interference.”
at pp. 2-3.) Eliminating the defense of laches would close “a loophole that allows
child support obligors to evade responsibility for their debts,” (id., at p. 3.) and
“strengthen the public policy favoring enforcement of an obligor’s responsibility
to pay support.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658
(2001-2002) as amended June 19, 2002, p. 9.)
Fellows concedes that the state’s interests in protecting California’s
children and enforcing support obligations are compelling. Yet he contends that
retroactive application does not serve those interests. The argument fails.
Unquestionably, the availability of laches impaired the ability of a parent to collect
child support. Eliminating the defense necessarily advances the state’s interest in
securing payment of all child support obligations. Moreover, to the extent obligor
parents benefit from their efforts to evade support obligations through the use of
the defense, section 4502(c) cures this “ rank injustice of the former law.” (In re
Marriage of Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 594.) Notwithstanding his claims to
the contrary, “[t]here is nothing unfair about requiring a parent to fulfill his moral
and legal responsibilities.” (In re Marriage of Cutler (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 460,
476.) Retroactive application is “necessary to subserve a sufficiently important
state interest” (In re Marriage of Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 593), and our
“inquiry need proceed no further.” (In re Marriage of Buol (1985) 39 Cal.3d 751,
761.)
2. Reliance
The second group of factors is likewise unavailing. Fellows contends he
reasonably relied on the availability of laches in failing to preserve written proof
or to obtain judicial acknowledgment of payment. Fellows’s defense did not fail
for lack of proof. In fact, the trial court determined that Fellows would have
prevailed if laches were available. However, his purported reliance was not
reasonable, as discussed previously. The retroactive application of section 4502(c)
did not “substantially interfere” with his conduct in violation of due process. (§ 4,
subd. (h).)12
Accordingly, we also disapprove In re Marriage of Garcia, supra, 111
Cal.App.4th 140,13 and hold that section 4502(c) applies retroactively to bar
Fellows from asserting laches.
III. Disposition
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.14
CORRIGAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
12
Fellows also contends that section 4502(c) is overbroad because it
impermissibly restricts his right to due process. Assuming that a due process
claim permits an overbreadth analysis (see Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9
Cal.4th 1069, 1108), retroactive application of section 4502(c) did not violate his
right.
13
The Garcia court did not consider the language and history of section 4 in
holding that section 4502(c) did not apply retroactively. (Garcia, supra, 111
Cal.App.4th 140.)
14
Because we conclude that section 4502(c) applies retroactively and bars
Fellows from raising laches as a defense, we do not address Moyse’s contention
that the 1993 amendments to the Family Code eliminated the defense.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion In re Marriage of Fellows
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 121 Cal.App.4th 607
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No.
S127874Date Filed: July 20, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
SuperiorCounty: Shasta
Judge: Jack Halpin*
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Enochian & Kenny and Mark D. Norcross for Appellant.__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Edgar J. Lana and Robert J. McNair for Respondent.*Retired judge of the Shasta Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6
of the California Constitution.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Mark D. NorcrossEnochian & Kenny
2701 Park Marina Drive
Redding, CA 96001
(530) 225-8990
Robert J. McNair
18 Orinda Way, P.O. Box 2180
Orinda, CA 94563
(925) 253-1010
| Date: | Docket Number: |
| Thu, 07/20/2006 | S127874 |
| 1 | Fellows, Darrin (Appellant) Represented by Mark D. Norcross Enochian, Kenny & Snowden P.O. Box 994608 2701 Park Marina Drive Redding, CA |
| 2 | Moyse, Mary Ann (Respondent) |
| 3 | Mary Ann And Darrin Fellows (Overview party) |
| Disposition | |
| Jul 20 2006 | Opinion: Affirmed |
| Dockets | |
| Sep 20 2004 | Petition for review filed by counsel for appellant (Darrin Fellows). |
| Sep 20 2004 | Record requested |
| Sep 22 2004 | Received Court of Appeal record one doghouse |
| Oct 22 2004 | Received: untimely answer to petition for review by respondent (Mary Ann Fellows). |
| Oct 26 2004 | Application for relief from default filed |
| Oct 26 2004 | Answer to petition for review filed with permission |
| Nov 12 2004 | Time extended to grant or deny review To December 17, 2004. |
| Dec 1 2004 | Letter sent to: parties re: review granted. |
| Dec 1 2004 | Petition for review granted (civil case) Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown, and Moreno, JJ. |
| Dec 9 2004 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed By counsel for appellant. |
| Jan 3 2005 | Opening brief on the merits filed By counsel for appellant {Darrin Fellows}. |
| Jan 4 2005 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed By counsel for Respondent. |
| Jan 31 2005 | Answer brief on the merits filed By counsel for Respondent {Mary Ann Fellows}. |
| Feb 19 2005 | Time for filing final brief expired; case fully briefed |
| Mar 2 2005 | Received: Faxed letter from Enochian & Kenny dated today. Appellant (Darrin Fellows) does not intend to file a reply brief. |
| Apr 4 2006 | Case ordered on calendar Tuesday, May 2, 2006, at 1:30 p.m., in San Francisco |
| May 2 2006 | Cause argued and submitted |
| Jul 20 2006 | Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full Opinion by: Corrigan, J. -----Joined by: George, C.J. Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, J.J. |
| Aug 23 2006 | Remittitur issued (civil case) |
| Aug 28 2006 | Received: Receipt for Remittitur received from the CA3D. |
| Briefs | |
| Jan 3 2005 | Opening brief on the merits filed |
| Jan 31 2005 | Answer brief on the merits filed |
