IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
MANTA MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, )
Cross-complainant and Respondent,
S144492
v.
Ct.App. 4/2 E036942
CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO,
San Bernardino County
Cross-defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. SCV18157
Under federal law, “[l]ocal governing bodies . . . can be sued directly under
[Title 42, United State Code] § 1983 for monetary . . . relief where . . . the action
that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body’s officers.” (Monell v. N. Y. City Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S.
658, 690, fn. omitted (Monell).)
Here, Manta Management Corporation (Manta) seeks monetary damages
against the City of San Bernardino (the city) for lost profits caused by a
preliminary injunction and a stay pending appeal that the city sought and that a
superior court and a Court of Appeal, respectively, issued. Ultimately, those
courts held that the city’s ordinance that was the legal basis for the preliminary
injunction was unconstitutional. We must decide whether the city is liable under
title 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983) for lost profits to Manta
while the injunction and stay were in effect. We conclude, consistent with
1
analogous federal and state court decisions, that the courts’ intervening exercise of
independent judgment in issuing the preliminary injunction and stay, though the
former was dissolved and the latter was lifted after the ordinance was declared
unconstitutional, breaks the chain of causation for purposes of section 1983
liability in the absence of evidence that the city materially misled or pressured the
judges who were expected to exercise independent judgment. In this case, where
the parties dispute whether material misrepresentations were made to the judges
who issued the preliminary injunction and the stay, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeal and remand the case for further proceedings on that factual
issue.1
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts and procedural discussion are taken largely from the Court of
Appeal opinion, supplemented by the entire record in San Bernardino County
Superior Court case No. SCV18157.2
The City of San Bernardino Municipal Code regulates adult businesses,
including adult cabarets. (San Bernardino Mun. Code, § 19.06.030, subd. 2.A.)
As relevant here, a zoning ordinance (the ordinance) in effect at the time in
question prohibited adult businesses in regional commercial or “CR-3” zones
while permitting those businesses to be located in CH (heavy commercial) or IL
(light industrial) zones. In 1994, Manta opened a comedy nightclub (the Club) in
1 Manta argues that the city was required to post an injunction bond and that the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed on the ground that the city refused
to post a bond. The bond issues discussed by the parties are irrelevant to our
disposition of the case. We therefore choose not to address them. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.516(b)(3).)
2 We have taken judicial notice of the entire record in case No. SCV18157,
including the appellate records in case Nos. E019635 and E015790.
2
the city’s CR-3 zone, in which nightclubs were a permitted use. Six months after
the Club opened, Manta converted it to an adult cabaret called The Flesh Club and
began to present “topless entertainment” in place of comedy. Once Manta
converted its comedy club to an adult entertainment business, the Club was not in
compliance with the city’s ordinance in effect at the time, which limited adult
businesses to CH and IL zones. On the day that it began operating as an adult
cabaret, Manta sued the city in federal court, alleging, inter alia, that the city’s
location limitations were unconstitutionally restrictive.
In January 1995, the city filed an action in state court seeking to enjoin the
operation of Manta’s cabaret on the ground that it was a public nuisance that
violated the city’s zoning laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 731.)3 In response to the
city’s ex parte application for a temporary restraining order and order to show
cause regarding a preliminary injunction, Manta argued that the initial ordinance
violated its free speech rights under article I, section 2 of the California
Constitution, “as applied,” because it was “unduly restrictive.”4 The superior
court issued a temporary restraining order and scheduled a hearing on the motion
for a preliminary injunction.
During the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction, Manta again
contended that the ordinance violated its free speech rights under the California
3 In its federal court action, Manta sought a judicial declaration that it had the right
to present topless entertainment at its cabaret and a permanent injunction
preventing the city from enforcing the ordinance. After the city filed its own
action in state court, the city asked the federal court to refrain from deciding its
case pending the state court’s consideration of the city’s request for an injunction.
The federal lawsuit ultimately was dismissed on abstention grounds and has no
bearing on the issues before this court.
4 While Manta’s federal action was pending, Manta expressly chose not to raise
any federal issues in state court because it did not want “to be compelled to litigate
federal constitutional issues in state court.”
3
Constitution. The city argued the ordinance was constitutional and asked the trial
court “to enforce [it] by means of injunctive relief.” The trial court expressed its
view that the ordinance’s “zone restrictions” were consistent with the city’s
general plan policy “to control the location of adult businesses based on proximity
requirements.” It granted the city’s motion for a preliminary injunction and
ordered Manta to cease adult cabaret performances at the Club. In so doing, the
trial court stated that the city “has established that its likelihood of prevailing on
the merits is strong.” The court noted that allowing the Club to continue as an
adult business “could cause as much harm to the surrounding businesses as to any
subjective harm to the adult entertainment business as projected by [Manta].” The
court expressly chose to abate the challenged activity on a showing that Manta
violated the local zoning ordinance rather than allow the activity to continue
during the “judicial process which can take up to ten years” to litigate the
constitutionality of the underlying ordinance. It added that the Club could resume
operation as a comedy club because the injunction only restricted operation as an
adult business.
In November 1995, while Manta’s appeal from the order granting the
preliminary hearing was pending, Manta filed a cross-complaint in the trial court.
That complaint included, in addition to state causes of action that were eventually
dismissed, a cause of action in which Manta sought monetary relief pursuant to
section 1983 based on its allegation that the ordinance and actions of the city
violated Manta’s federal civil rights.
One year later, after a nonjury trial, the trial court dissolved the preliminary
injunction after ruling the city’s ordinance an unconstitutional infringement on
Manta’s First Amendment right to free speech as applied to Manta’s cabaret
because it “neither serve[d] a substantial governmental interest nor allow[ed] for
reasonable alternative avenues of communication.” The city appealed and moved
4
for a stay pending appeal. In response, the Court of Appeal issued a writ of
supersedeas (the stay) that prevented Manta from “operating as an adult business”
pending resolution of the appeal. It dismissed as moot Manta’s appeal from the
order granting the preliminary injunction.
Approximately two years later, on January 26, 1999, the Court of Appeal
lifted its stay after we denied review of its opinion affirming the trial court’s order
dissolving the preliminary injunction.5
In 2000, the parties agreed to a non-jury trial on the issue of the city’s
liability under section 1983 and a separate trial on damages. In the liability phase,
the trial court ruled that the acts of “precipitating” the preliminary injunction and
stay were an effort to enforce an unconstitutional zoning ordinance. It held that
those acts violated Manta’s federally protected rights and constituted a basis for
section 1983 liability. On the other hand, the court did not find that the city’s
ordinance itself was a basis for section 1983 liability. A jury awarded Manta $1.4
million in damages for profits lost while subject to the injunction and the stay.
The city appealed and argued that it could not be liable for damages under
section 1983 because it had sought redress through the courts The Court of
Appeal affirmed the judgment obtained under section 1983. It held that the city’s
act of obtaining an injunction to enforce an unconstitutional ordinance is an act in
violation of the First Amendment within the meaning of section 1983, and that,
accordingly, “a city is liable for damages under section 1983 if it chooses to
enforce an unconstitutional ordinance by means of a preliminary injunction.” The
Court of Appeal concluded that “the city’s good faith reliance on the trial court’s
5 People v. Manta Management Corp. (Jan. 26, 1999, E019635) (nonpub. opn.)
review denied April 21, 1999, S062091 (Manta).
5
issuance of the preliminary injunction does not provide it with immunity.” We
granted review.
II. DISCUSSION
As relevant here, section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under
color of any . . . ordinance . . . of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .”
As noted above, “[l]ocal governing bodies . . . can be sued directly under
§ 1983 for monetary . . . relief where . . . the action that is alleged to be
unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation,
or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” (Monell,
supra, 426 U.S. at p. 590, fn. omitted.) Section 1983 was enacted to provide
compensation “to those deprived of their federal rights by state actors,” a category
that includes cities and other local governments. (Felder v. Casey (1988) 487 U.S.
131, 141; see also Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 690.) In particular, cities are
liable for damages resulting from their actions that cause an infringement of free
speech as protected under the First Amendment to the federal Constitution. (See,
e.g., Gerritsen v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1993) 994 F.2d 570, 575-578, cert.
den. (1993) 510 U.S. 915 [city’s enforcement of an unconstitutional ordinance
restricting handbill distribution supported a § 1983 action for monetary damages].)
“ ‘Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights,” but merely
provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” ’
[Citations.]” (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 292,
297.) Although section 1983 is silent as to what remedies are available to those
suing for a violation of their civil rights, the United States Supreme Court has held
6
that monetary damages are available under that section for actions that have
violated federal “ ‘constitutional rights and . . . have caused compensable
injury . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Carey v. Piphus (1978) 435 U.S. 247, 255, italics
omitted.) Thus, a city may be sued for monetary relief under section 1983 if it
unconstitutionally implements an ordinance adopted by its officers. “Because
section 1983 does not comprehensively dictate the procedures and remedies
applicable to actions brought under it, a state court ordinarily applies state law in
adjudicating those actions. The supremacy clause of the federal Constitution,
however, prohibits a state court from applying state law that is inconsistent with
federal law. [Citations.]” (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, 21
Cal.4th at p. 298.)
The proper analysis of a section 1983 claim against a municipality requires
the examination of two interrelated issues, namely, “(1) whether plaintiff’s harm
was caused by a [federal] constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is
responsible for that violation.” (Collins v. Harker Heights (1992) 503 U.S. 115,
120.) “[T]he fact that a § 1983 claimant has demonstrated a violation of [his or]
her federally protected rights under color of state law does not necessarily mean
that a named defendant will be found liable under § 1983. The liability of a
§ 1983 defendant depends upon (1) the rules governing culpability and
responsibility, including principles of causation and the rule against respondeat
superior liability; (2) whether individual or governmental liability is at issue; and
(3) the available immunities from liability.” (Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation:
Claims and Defenses (Aspen Pub. 4th ed. 2003) § 6.01, p. 6-3.) Of the three
major issues concerning culpability and responsibility, one is relevant here,
namely, “[t]he issue of causation: how closely related a defendant’s action or
inaction must be to the alleged injury . . . .” (Ibid.) On the issue of causation,
“[f]ederal courts turn to the causation factors developed in the common law of
7
torts to supply the necessary causation factor in the civil rights field.” (Stevenson
v. Koskey (9th Cir. 1989) 877 F.2d 1435, 1438.)
In the case before us, we assume, without deciding, that the city’s
ordinance as written violated Manta’s First Amendment right to free speech
because the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision to dissolve the
preliminary injunction on First Amendment grounds and we denied review of that
decision in Manta, supra, E019635. However, the ordinance caused Manta no
harm because Manta did not abide by it. Manta suffered no monetary damages
until the trial court enjoined its operating an adult cabaret where its comedy club
had been located. The issue before us is whether the city’s act of seeking an
injunction to enforce the ordinance dealing with the location of adult businesses
and its subsequent act of filing a petition for writ of supersedeas to obtain a stay
pending appeal “caused” the harm suffered by Manta to the extent that the city is
liable for damages Manta incurred during the 53 months the injunction and the
stay were in place.
In support of its judgment affirming Manta’s damage award against the
city, the Court of Appeal focused on whether the city was immune from liability
because it had relied in good faith “on a preliminary injunction duly issued by a
trial court.” It relied upon the holding in Owen v. City of Independence (1980)
445 U.S. 622, that “municipalities have no immunity from damages liability
flowing from their constitutional violations” (id. at p. 657), as the basis for its
conclusion that the city’s act of obtaining an injunction to enforce an
unconstitutional ordinance is an act in violation of the First Amendment within the
meaning of section 1983, and that “the city’s good faith reliance on the trial
court’s issuance of the preliminary injunction does not provide it with immunity.”
However, the critical question is not whether the city is immune from
liability, but whether the city’s seeking a preliminary injunction and a stay were
8
acts in violation of the First Amendment that caused injury to Manta for which the
city could conceivably be liable under section 1983. The question of immunity
would only become relevant if the defendant caused the harm. Indeed, the city
does not assert immunity in this case. Instead, it questions “whether there is any
initial liability under federal law” for its actions in obtaining a preliminary
injunction and stay. In response, Manta argues that the city caused the
constitutional violation because the courts would not have issued the overbroad
injunction and the stay unless the city had requested them; Manta claims the city is
liable for its damages because the courts were enforcing the unconstitutional
ordinance “at the City’s request.”
Cities have been found liable for damages based on official action to
enforce an ordinance later determined to be unconstitutional in a variety of
contexts. (See, e.g., RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle (9th Cir. 2002) 307 F.3d
1045, 1050-1063 [plaintiff could maintain § 1983 action for damages resulting
from prosecution of civil abatement action based on an unconstitutional
ordinance]; Grossman v. City of Portland (9th Cir. 1994) 33 F.3d 1200, 1203-
1210 [city liable for arrest pursuant to an unconstitutional ordinance]; Gerritsen v.
City of Los Angeles, supra, 994 F.2d at pp. 575-578, 580 [city’s enforcement of
unconstitutional ordinance restricting handbill distribution supported § 1983
action for monetary damages]; Murray v. City of Sioux Falls (8th Cir. 1989) 867
F.2d 472, 474, fn. 2. [acknowledged that a city may be liable for damages
resulting from an arrest or criminal prosecution pursuant to an ordinance later
found unconstitutional]; AAK, Inc. v. City of Woonsocket (D.R.I. 1993) 830
F.Supp. 99, 100-101, 105 [imposition of higher licensing fee on an adult cabaret
than on similar entertainment businesses supported claim for monetary damages];
Pesticide Public Policy v. Village of Wauconda, Ill. (N.D.Ill. 1985) 622 F.Supp.
423, 433-434 [enforcement of invalid ordinance regulating pesticide use supported
9
claim for damages]; Negin v. City of Mentor, Ohio (N.D.Ohio 1985) 601 F.Supp.
1502, 1505 [city liable for damages resulting from unconstitutional application of
zoning ordinance].) Significantly, however, none of the cases cited above
involved a situation in which a court sanctioned the city’s enforcement of its
ordinance before the ordinance was found to be unconstitutional.
More closely analogous to our case is Townes v. City of New York (2d Cir.
1999) 176 F.3d 138 (Townes). There, the plaintiff’s section 1983 complaint
alleged that he was subjected to an unconstitutional stop and search by the
defendant police officers while he was a passenger in a taxicab. The plaintiff
moved to suppress the evidence found during that search in state criminal
proceedings, but the motion was denied. He was convicted based on that
evidence, but the conviction was overturned by a state appellate court on the
ground that the evidence should have been suppressed because it was obtained in
violation of the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. The plaintiff did not seek
damages “for [the] specific invasions of his privacy, but rather for injuries
derivative of these invasions — his arrest, conviction, and incarceration.” (Id. at
p. 141.) While agreeing that the stop and search had violated the plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment rights (id. at p. 144), the Second Circuit held that the alleged injuries
were not “fairly traceable to the actual violations of his civil rights.” (Id. at p.
141.) It held that the “state trial court’s exercise of independent judgment in
deciding not to suppress the evidence, though later ruled to be erroneous, broke
the chain of causation for purposes of § 1983 liability for the plaintiff’s conviction
and incarceration.” (Id. at p. 147.) The court relied on the “well settled” principle
“that the chain of causation between a police officer’s unlawful arrest and
subsequent conviction and incarceration is broken by the intervening exercise of
independent judgment . . . in the absence of evidence that the police officer misled
or pressured the official who could be expected to exercise independent
10
judgment.” (Ibid., citations omitted.) After noting that there was no claim of such
evidence, the court held that plaintiff Townes could not recover damages for his
conviction and incarceration from the police officers who handled the stop and
search. (Ibid.)
Recently, the Second Circuit revisited the traditional tort concept of
independent intervening cause when considering whether the petitioner could
establish a claim against an officer for the erroneous admission at trial of
testimony regarding an unduly suggestive identification. (Wray v. City of New
York (2d Cir. 2007) 490 F.3d 189.) Using language similar to that in its Townes
decision, the court ruled that “extending liability to [the officer] is unprecedented
and unwarranted. In the absence of evidence that [the officer] misled or pressured
the prosecution or trial judge, we cannot conclude that his conduct caused the
violation of Wray’s constitutional rights; rather, the violation was caused by the
ill-considered acts and decisions of the prosecutor and trial judge.” (Id. at p. 193.)
Another federal case in which the defendant’s conduct was followed by a
court’s exercise of independent judgment is Egervary v. Young (3d Cir. 2004) 366
F.3d 238 (Egervary). In that case, government officials, as well as attorneys,
urged a federal district court to make a particular decision. The judge made that
decision, which ultimately turned out to be erroneous. In deciding whether the
government officials were liable for section 1983 damages suffered by the
plaintiffs as a result of the judge’s decision, the Third Circuit applied common law
tort causation principles in concluding that “an intervening act of a third party,
which actively operates to produce harm after the first person’s wrongful act has
been committed, is a superseding cause which prevents the first person from being
liable for the harm which his antecedent wrongful act was a substantial factor in
bringing about.” (Egervary, supra, 366 F.3d at p. 246, citing Rest.2d Torts § 440-
441; see also McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP (3d Cir. 2007) 494 F.3d 418, 436.)
11
With regard to the specific factual situation before it, the court held that, “where,
as here, the judicial officer is provided with the appropriate facts to adjudicate the
proceeding but fails to properly apply the governing law and procedures, such
error must be held to be a superseding cause, breaking the chain of causation for
purposes of § 1983 . . . liability.” (Egervary, supra, 366 F.3d at pp. 250-251,
italics added.) Citing Townes, the circuit court similarly exempted from its
general holding instances in which the judicial officer reached an erroneous
decision as a result of being misled as to the relevant facts. (Id. at p. 250.) The
court added that its conclusion was “not inconsistent with” the holding in Lanier v.
Sallas (5th Cir. 1985) 777 F.2d 321, 324-325, that “a judge’s decision to commit
plaintiff to a mental health facility did not sever the chain of causation where that
decision was based in part on a misrepresentation made by defendants.”
(Egervary, supra, 366 F.3d at p. 249.)
The Fifth Circuit reached a similar result in Murray v. Earle (5th Cir. 2005)
405 F.3d 278. There, a plaintiff juvenile sought damages under section 1983 from
defendant detectives. The juvenile alleged that a confession coerced from her by
the detectives was improperly admitted into evidence in his delinquency
proceeding, in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and that the violation of her civil rights caused “her later-reversed
conviction (and lengthy incarceration) for injury to a child.” (Murray v. Earle, at
p. 282.) The court acknowledged the “fundamental tension” between two
“primary tenets of tort law: (1) An individual is liable for reasonably foreseeable
consequences of his actions, and (2) an intervening decision of an informed,
neutral decision-maker ‘breaks’ the chain of causation.” (Id. at p. 292.) It then
held that the trial judge’s ruling, albeit an incorrect one, to admit the confession
“constituted a superseding cause of [the plaintiff’s] injury, relieving the defendants
of liability under § 1983.” (Id. at p. 293.) The court reasoned that, “as in the
12
analogous context of Fourth Amendment violations, an official who provides
accurate information to a neutral intermediary, such as a trial judge, cannot
‘cause’ a subsequent Fifth Amendment violation arising out of the neutral
intermediary’s decision.” (Ibid., italics added; see also Shields v. Twiss (5th Cir.
2004) 389 F.3d 142, 150 [placing facts supporting an arrest before an independent
intermediary breaks the chain of causation unless plaintiff affirmatively shows the
intermediary’s deliberations were tainted by actions of the defendant].)
In
Jones v. Cannon (11th Cir. 1999) 174 F.3d 1271, 1287, the court
similarly held that “the grand jury indictment broke the chain of causation for the
detention from the alleged false arrest . . . . [Citation.] The intervening acts of
the prosecutor in presenting the murder case to the grand jury and of the grand
jury returning the indictment broke the chain of causation for any detention of
Jones that followed the grand jury indictment.”
A sister state court considered questions similar to those before us. After
distinguishing its case from those in which factual misrepresentations or
misconduct misled the court issuing the injunction, the Michigan court concluded
that “[t]he direct ‘cause’ of the [First Amendment] violation here was the court’s
issuance of the overbroad injunction, not plaintiff’s pursuit thereof.” (Mayor of
Lansing v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (Mich.App. 1997) 564 N.W.2d 177, 180
(Mayor of Lansing).)
We note that, in our state, in a context other than § 1983 litigation, the
Court of Appeal found the exercise of independent judgment by a court constitutes
an independent superseding cause. (Brewer v. Teano (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th
1024.) In that case, according to the plaintiff’s complaint and reasonable
inferences from its allegations, Teano negligently and recklessly drove his car so
that it repeatedly collided with a car driven by Brewer. Fearful that he would be
assaulted by Teano if he stopped, Brewer left the scene. A bystander saw him
13
leave the accident scene and contacted the police. Brewer was arrested for hit-
and-run. Brewer stood trial for felony hit and run and was acquitted. He then
sued the estate of Teano, who had died, seeking compensation for damage to his
car, for physical injury and emotional distress, and for expenses incurred as a
result of the arrest and prosecution. (Id. at p. 1027.) Relying on the Restatement
Second of Torts,6 the appellate court concluded that “the decision of the
prosecutor to file felony charges against plaintiff, and of the magistrate to hold
him to answer those charges, were superseding acts for which Teano’s estate is not
liable.” (Brewer, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1027.) After noting the multiple
separate steps that led to the prosecution of a criminal trial, the court concluded
that “it cannot be said that the intervening force consisting of the prosecution of
formal criminal charges against plaintiff was ‘foreseeable’ from Teano’s conduct,
however characterized. The harm from that proceeding was different in kind from
that which may be expected to result from the kind of conduct alleged in this case.
([Restatement Second of Torts] § 442, com. (a).) It is an extraordinary rather than
a normal result of Teano’s act. (Id., com. (b).) The decision of prosecutors to file
against plaintiff, and of the magistrate or grand jury to hold him to answer on
felony charges, operated independently from anything that Teano did; they cannot
be described as a normal result of his negligent driving. (Id., com. (c).)” (Id. at p.
1037.)
We find the reasoning in the above federal and state cases that have
analyzed similar factual situations in terms of independent superseding causation
6 The Restatement Second of Torts, section 440, defines a superseding cause as
“an act of a third person or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor
from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a
substantial factor in bringing about.”
14
to be persuasive. We also agree with those cases that find an exception to the
principle of superseding causation when the party seeking an injunction or stay
pending appeal either misled or pressured the court, which was expected to
exercise independent judgment. Accordingly, we hold that, where a court is
provided with appropriate facts to adjudicate a motion for preliminary injunction
or a motion for a stay pending appeal, the courts’ intervening exercise of
independent judgment breaks the chain of causation for purposes of section 1983
liability.7 We also hold that this general rule of superseding causation does not
apply when the judicial officer reached an erroneous decision as a result of being
pressured or materially misled as to the relevant facts.
The city contends the only exception to the rule that exercise of
independent judgment by the court breaks the chain of causation “is if material
facts are either intentionally misstated or intentionally withheld,” and it claims that
Mayor of Lansing recognized an exception to the rule if the party seeking an
injunction “intentionally misled the court.” To the contrary, Mayor of Lansing,
consistent with other cases on the issue of superseding intervening cause, held that
the court’s exercise of independent judgment broke the chain of causation because
the section 1983 defendants did not engage in any wrongdoing and because they
“did not make misrepresentations that would have undermined the trial court’s
ability to perform its adjudicative function or to exercise its discretion.” (Mayor of
Lansing, supra, 564 N.W. 2d at p. 183.) Newman v. County of Orange (9th Cir.
2006) 457 F.3d 991, also cited by the city, similarly recognizes that a plaintiff can
produce evidence of material omissions or conflicting evidence to rebut a
presumption that a court or prosecutor exercised independent judgment. (Id. at p.
7 To the extent that Gill v. Epstein (1965) 62 Cal.2d 611, 617-618, held to the
contrary, it is disapproved.
15
993-994.) In fact, the majority of cases that discuss the exception to the break in
the chain of causation do not focus on whether the party seeking the injunction
intentionally misled the official who could be expected to exercise independent
judgment. They hold, instead, that the chain of causation is broken by the
intervening exercise of independent judgment in the absence of evidence that the
party seeking the injunction misled or pressured the official, or did not provide
him or her with the appropriate facts to adjudicate the proceeding. (See Townes,
supra, 176 F.3d at p. 147; Egervary, supra, 366 F.3d at pp. 250-251.) After
reviewing analogous federal and state cases that discuss the principle of
superseding causation and its exception, we conclude Manta does not need to
prove that the city’s failure to provide the court with accurate information was
intentional. Instead, Manta needs to show only that the misrepresentations were
material, in that they would have undermined the courts’ ability to exercise
independent judgment on the issues presented.
On the record before us, we cannot determine whether the principle of
superseding causation or its exception applies in this case. The parties agree that
declarations submitted by the city in support of its request for a preliminary
injunction contained misinformation regarding the number of sites and acres
within the city on which adult entertainment businesses could operate under the
city’s ordinance in effect at the time Manta converted its comedy club to an adult
cabaret, and Manta asserts that, in support of the issuance of a writ of supersedeas,
the city misrepresented to the appellate court that Manta would suffer no
irreparable harm because it had a damage remedy. The parties dispute whether
some of the factual misstatements were actually misleading and whether any
misrepresentations that were made were material in that they “would have
undermined the trial court’s ability to perform its adjudicative function or to
exercise its discretion.” (Mayor of Lansing, supra, 564 N.W. 2d at p. 183.)
16
As noted above, here, unlike the circumstances in Townes, supra, 176 F.3d
at page 147, there is a claim that the city made material misrepresentations
regarding the factual basis upon which the preliminary injunction and the writ of
supersedeas depended. We remand the matter to allow the trial court to resolve
any relevant factual issues and to apply the principles of superseding intervening
causation in the first instance. (See, e.g., Zengen, Inc. v. Comerica Bank (2007)
41 Cal.4th 329, 259; People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 510.)
III. DISPOSITION
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeal, and remand the cause to that court with directions to remand it in turn to
the superior court with directions to conduct proceedings consistent with the views
expressed herein.
CHIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
17
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion Manta Management Corporation v. City of San Bernardino
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 139 Cal.App.4th 447
Rehearing Granted
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Opinion No.
S144492Date Filed: April 24, 2008
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Court:
SuperiorCounty: San Bernardino
Judge: Donald R. Alvarez
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Attorneys for Appellant:
Arias, Lockwood & Gray, Arias & Lockwood, Arias Aaen, Joseph Arias, Christopher D. Lockwood andLaura Tall Liu for Cross-defendant and Appellant.
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Attorneys for Respondent:
Roger Jon Diamond for Cross-complainant and Respondent.Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Christopher D. LockwoodArias & Lockwood
225 W. Hospitality Lane, Suite 314
San Bernardino, CA 92408
(909) 890-0125
Roger Jon Diamond
2115 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90405
(310) 399-3259
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in a civil action. This case includes the following issue: Can a municipality be held liable for damages under the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. section 1983) for obtaining a preliminary injunction to enforce an ordinance that is later found to be invalid as an unconstitutional impingement on the First Amendment right to freedom of speech?
| Date: | Citation: | Docket Number: | Category: | Status: |
| Thu, 04/24/2008 | 43 Cal. 4th 400, 181 P.3d 159, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 353 | S144492 | Review - Civil Appeal | closed; remittitur issued |
| 1 | City Of San Bernardino (Cross-defendant and Appellant) Represented by Christopher D. Lockwood Arias & Lockwood 225 W. Hospitality Lane, Suite 314 San Bernardino, CA |
| 2 | Manta Management Corporation (Cross-complainant and Respondent) Represented by Roger Jon Diamond Attorney at Law 2115 Main Street Santa Monica, CA |
| Opinion Authors | |
| Opinion | Justice Ming W. Chin |
| Disposition | |
| Apr 24 2008 | Opinion: Reversed |
| Dockets | |
| Jun 20 2006 | Petition for review filed appellant City of San Bernardino attorney, Christopher D. Lockwood, retained. |
| Jun 21 2006 | Record requested |
| Jun 23 2006 | Received Court of Appeal record one full box |
| Jul 10 2006 | Answer to petition for review filed Manta Management Corporation, respondent Roger Jon Diamond, counsel |
| Aug 11 2006 | Time extended to grant or deny review to and including September 18, 2006 |
| Aug 30 2006 | Petition for review granted (civil case) Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ. |
| Sep 27 2006 | Opening brief on the merits filed City of San Bernardino, Appellant by Christopher D. Lockwood of Arias & Lockwood |
| Oct 24 2006 | Answer brief on the merits filed respondent Manta Management, Inc. attorney Roger Jon Diamond |
| Nov 15 2006 | Received: Untimely Reply Brief on the Merits City of San Bernardino, Appellant by Christopher Loockwood, counsel |
| Nov 16 2006 | Application for relief from default filed |
| Nov 22 2006 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) Filed with permission |
| Dec 12 2007 | Supplemental briefing ordered The parties are requested to brief the question whether the actions of the superior court and Court of Appeal in issuing a preliminary injunction and a stay, respectively, broke the chain of causation, thus making the City of San Bernardino not liable for lost profits. (See, e.g., Townes v. City of New York (2d Cir. 1999) 176 F.2d 138, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 964; Egervary v. Young (3rd Cir. 2004) 366 F.3d 238; Murray v. Earle (5th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3d 278; Mayor of Lansing v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (Mich.App. 1997) 564 N.W.2d 177, 180-183, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 904 (1998); Rest.2d Torts, ?? 440-441.) The parties are directed to file supplemental letter briefs limited to this question on or before January 11, 2008. The parties may file simultaneous letter reply briefs within 10 days after the filing of the supplemental letter briefs. |
| Jan 3 2008 | Case ordered on calendar to be argued on Wednesday, February 6, 2008, at 9:00 a.m., in Sacramento |
| Jan 10 2008 | Supplemental brief filed (Opening Letter Brief) City of San Bernardino, appellant by Christopher D.Lockwood, counsel |
| Jan 11 2008 | Supplemental brief filed Respondent Manta Management Corp. Attorney Roger Jon Diamond |
| Jan 22 2008 | Supplemental brief filed Letter Reply Brief of the City of San Bernardino, appellant by Christopher D. Lockwood, counsel |
| Jan 22 2008 | Supplemental brief filed Letter Reply Brief of Manta Management Corporation, respondent by Roger Jon Diamond, counsel |
| Jan 23 2008 | Request for judicial notice granted This court takes judicial notice of the records in the following two appellate cases: People et al. v. Manta Management Corporation, E019635 and People v. Manta Management, E015790. (See Evid. Code section 452, subd. (d)(1).) |
| Jan 29 2008 | Received additional record |
| Feb 6 2008 | Cause argued and submitted |
| Apr 23 2008 | Notice of forthcoming opinion posted |
| Apr 24 2008 | Opinion filed: Judgment reversed Court of Appeal judgment reversed and remanded with directions. Opinion by Chin, J. -- George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Moreno, Corrigan, JJ. |
| Apr 28 2008 | Rehearing petition filed Manta Management, Inc., respondent by Roger Jon Diamond, counsel. |
| Apr 30 2008 | Time extended to consider modification or rehearing The time for granting or denying rehearing in the above-entitled case is hereby extended to and including July 23, 2008, or the date upon which rehearing is either granted or denied, whichever occurs first. |
| May 1 2008 | Received: Errata to Petition for Rehearing of Respondent Manta Management, Inc. by Roger Jon Diamond, counsel (Faxed copy) |
| Jun 18 2008 | Rehearing denied The opinion is modified on the court's own motion. The petition for rehearing is denied. George, C.J., was absent and did not participate. Werdegar and Corrigan, JJ., were absent and did not participate. |
| Jun 18 2008 | Opinion modified - no change in judgment |
| Jun 19 2008 | Remittitur issued (civil case) |
| Jun 27 2008 | Returned record case No. E036942 to Fourth District/Division 2 (Riverside) |
| Jun 30 2008 | Returned record 3 doghouses. |
| Jul 2 2008 | Received: Acknowledgement of receipt for remittitur from Fourth District, Division Two, signed for by Michelle Parlapiano, Deputy. |
| Nov 10 2008 | Certiorari denied by U.S. Supreme Court |
| Briefs | |
| Sep 27 2006 | Opening brief on the merits filed |
| Oct 24 2006 | Answer brief on the merits filed |
| Nov 22 2006 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) |
| Brief Downloads | |
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| May 24, 2011 Annotated by alexis orenstein | Facts: In 1994, Manta Management Corporation (Manta) opened a comedy club in a zone of the City of San Bernardino (city) that permitted such activities. Six months later, Manta converted the club into an adult cabaret with topless entertainment, which meant that it was no longer in compliance with the city’s zoning ordinance. Manta sued the city in federal court arguing that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutionally restrictive. The city filed an action in state court seeking to enjoin the operation of the cabaret as a public nuisance. The federal lawsuit was ultimately dismissed but Manta filed a cross-complaint against the city in state court. Initially the state court granted the city a preliminary injunction but it dissolved the injunction after it concluded in a non-jury trial that the ordinance was an unconstitutional restriction on Manta’s First Amendment right to free speech. The city appealed and the Court of Appeal granted a stay that prevented Manta from operating as a cabaret pending the appeal. The Court of Appeal lifted the stay after the California Supreme Court denied review of its order affirming the dissolution of the injunction. The parties then agreed to separate trials to determine: 1) whether the city was liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for having an unconstitutional municipal policy, and 2) the amount of damages. In a non-jury trial on the liability issue, the court held that the acts of “precipitating” the injunction and the stay were an effort to enforce an unconstitutional zoning ordinance. It further held that these acts violated Manta’s federally protected rights and constituted a basis for §1983 liability, although it did not conclude that the ordinance itself was a basis for liability under §1983. In the trial for damages, the jury awarded Manta $1.4 million for lost profits. The city appealed but the Court of Appeal held that the city’s good faith reliance upon the trial court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction did not provide it with immunity under §1983 and affirmed the trial court’s finding of liability. Procedural History: The city filed an action in state court in 1995 seeking to enjoin Manta from operating as an adult cabaret. The court granted a temporary restraining order followed by a preliminary injunction, which Manta appealed. While its appeal was pending, Manta filed a cross-complaint against the city. In 1996, the trial court ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional and issued an order dissolving the preliminary injunction, which mooted Manta’s appeal from the order granting the injunction. The Court of Appeal granted the city a stay pending its appeal. In 1999, the Court of Appeal lifted its stay after the California Supreme Court denied review of its order affirming the trial court’s dissolution of the injunction. In 2000, separate trials were conducted on the issue of the city’s liability under §1983 and a jury trial on damages. The trial court held that the city was liable under §1983 and the jury awarded damages. The city appealed and the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment obtained under §1983. The city petitioned for review by the California Supreme Court. Issue: Can a municipality be held liable for damages under the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §1983) for obtaining a preliminary injunction to enforce an ordinance that is later found to be invalid as an unconstitutional impingement on the First Amendment right to freedom of speech? Holding: No it cannot under the circumstances of this case; the decision of the Court of Appeal is reversed. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeal with directions to remand it to the trial court to determine the outstanding factual issues in accordance with the principles of superseding intervening causation expressed in the opinion. Where a court is provided with appropriate facts to adjudicate a motion for preliminary injunction or a motion for a stay pending appeal, the courts’ intervening exercise of Analysis: Under §1983, a city may be held liable for an unconstitutional policy that has been “officially adopted and promulgated” by its agents (Monell v. N. Y. City Dept. of Social Services 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Section 1983 is not a basis for substantive rights; it is a means to vindicate rights conferred elsewhere. A court must determine whether a plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and if so, whether the city is responsible for that violation. (Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992)). In this case, the Court assumed without deciding that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional (noting that it had denied review on this issue). According to the Court, the crucial question was whether the city’s act of seeking an injunction to enforce the zoning ordinance and its subsequent act of filing a petition for a writ of supersedeas to obtain a stay pending appeal “caused” the harm suffered by Manta for the 53 months during which the injunction and stay were in place. It was not, as the Court of Appeal thought, whether the city is immune from liability; the city did not even assert immunity. According to Manta, the city caused the harm because the trial court would not have issued the overbroad injunction but for the city’s request. Although cities have been found liable for damages based on official action to enforce ordinances later deemed unconstitutional, the Court distinguished those cases from the instant case because none involved a situation in which a court sanctioned the ordinance before it was found to be unconstitutional. It likened this case to Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1999). In Townes, the trial court’s exercise of its independent judgment in (wrongly) deciding to suppress evidence from an illegal search broke the chain of causation between the plaintiff’s unlawful arrest and his subsequent conviction and incarceration. Thus, the plaintiff was prevented from obtaining damages from the police officers that conducted the search even though his conviction was ultimately overturned. In addition, the Court reasoned that the traditional tort law concept of independent intervening cause would prevent recovery in this case and cited cases from several federal circuit courts of appeal as well as a sister state court. For example, in Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238, the Third Circuit concluded that “an intervening act of a third party, which actively operates to produce harm after the first person’s wrongful act has However, the Court also agreed with cases that found an exception to the principle of superseding causation when the party seeking an injunction or stay pending appeal either misled or pressured the court, which was expected to exercise independent judgment. In this regard, the city contended that Manta must demonstrate that the city intentionally misstated or withheld material facts to fit within the exception. The Court disagreed and concluded that Manta does not need to prove that the city’s failure to provide the court with accurate information was intentional; it only needs to show that the misrepresentations were material, in that they would have undermined the courts’ ability to exercise independent judgment on the issues presented. The Court disapproved of Gill v. Epstein, 62 Cal.2d 611 (1965) to the extent that it held to the contrary. Manta argued that the city mislead the court that granted the injunction; the city disagreed. The Court was unable to reach a conclusion based on the record before it. Dissent: None. Tags: 42 U.S.C. §1983 Authority Cited: 42 U.S.C. 1983: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/42/usc_sec_42_00001983----000-.html Annotation by Alexis Orenstein. |
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